Sanhedrin

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מתני׳ דיני ממונות בשלשה גזילות וחבלות בשלשה נזק וחצי נזק תשלומי כפל ותשלומי ארבעה וחמשה בשלשה

MISHNA: Cases concerning monetary law are adjudicated by three judges. Cases concerning robbery and personal injury are adjudicated by three judges. Cases concerning damage that one is responsible for because he or his property caused the damage are adjudicated by three judges as well. Likewise, cases concerning payment for half the damage, which is paid in the event that an ox whose owner has not been warned that it gored more than two times gores another animal (see Exodus 21:35); cases concerning payment of double the principal by a thief who was caught stealing (see Exodus 22:3); and cases concerning payment of four or five times the principal by a thief who slaughtered or sold a stolen ox or a lamb (see Exodus 21:37) are all adjudicated by three judges.

האונס והמפתה והמוציא שם רע בשלשה דברי ר"מ

Cases concerning one who rapes or one who seduces a virgin girl, and must therefore pay the girl’s father fifty silver shekels (see Deuteronomy 22:29, Exodus 22:15); and cases concerning a defamer who falsely asserts that his wife was not a virgin when she married him, and brings false witnesses who testify that she committed adultery while betrothed to him and who must therefore pay the girl’s father one hundred silver shekels as well as receive lashes (see Deuteronomy 22:13–19): All of these are adjudicated by three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וחכמים אומרים מוציא שם רע בעשרים ושלשה מפני שיש בו דיני נפשות

And the Rabbis say: Cases concerning a defamer are adjudicated by a court of twenty-three judges, which is the type of court authorized to judge cases of capital law, because this case includes the possibility of becoming a case of capital law. The husband brings witnesses that his wife committed adultery. If she is found guilty, she is liable to receive the death penalty. This punishment applies to the witnesses if they are exposed as conspiring witnesses.

מכות בשלשה משום רבי ישמעאל אמרו בעשרים ושלשה

Cases concerning the violation of prohibitions that render one liable to receive lashes are adjudicated by three judges. The Sages stated in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Cases concerning lashes are adjudicated by twenty-three judges.

עיבור החדש בשלשה עיבור השנה בשלשה דברי ר"מ רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר בשלשה מתחילין ובחמשה נושאין ונותנין וגומרין בשבעה ואם גמרו בג' מעוברת:

The intercalation of the month is performed by a panel of three judges. The intercalation of the year, meaning the decision to add an extra month to the year when necessary, is also decided by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The deliberations begin with three judges, and they debate the matter with five judges, and they conclude the matter with seven judges, due to the significance of the decision. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes that if they concluded the matter with only three judges, the intercalation is valid and it is a leap year.

סמיכת זקנים ועריפת עגלה בשלשה דברי ר' שמעון ר' יהודה אומר בחמשה החליצה והמיאונין בשלשה

Both the laying of hands by the Sages and the breaking of the heifer’s neck in a case where a person was found murdered and it is not known who killed him (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9) are performed in front of a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: These rituals are performed in front of five judges. Both ḥalitza, the ritual through which the yavam, a surviving brother of a married man who died without sons, frees the yevama, the widow, of her levirate bond in a case where the yavam does not wish to marry the yevama (see Deuteronomy 25:5–10), and the refusal of a girl before reaching majority to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brother married her off, are performed before a court of three judges.

נטע רבעי ומעשר שני שאין דמיו ידועין בשלשה ההקדשות בשלשה הערכין המטלטלים בשלשה ר' יהודה אומר אחד מהן כהן

The halakha concerning fruit of a fourth-year sapling and second-tithe produce is that they are to be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. If this is impractical, the produce can be redeemed and the redemption money brought to Jerusalem, where it is used to purchase food and drink. Valuation of fruit of a fourth-year sapling or second-tithe produce in cases where their value is not known is performed by three judges. The valuation of consecrated property for purposes of redemption is performed by three judges, and the valuations that are movable property (see Leviticus 27:1–8) are performed by three judges. Rabbi Yehuda says: One of the three judges must be a priest.

והקרקעות תשעה וכהן ואדם כיוצא בהן

And the valuation of consecrated land is performed by nine judges and, in addition, one priest. And the valuation of a person for the purpose of a vow is performed in a similar manner to that of land.

דיני נפשות בעשרים ושלשה הרובע והנרבע בעשרים ושלשה שנאמר (ויקרא כ, טז) והרגת את האשה ואת הבהמה ואומר ואת הבהמה תהרוגו

§ Cases of capital law are judged by twenty-three judges. An animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality are judged by twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “And if a woman approaches any animal to lie with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal” (Leviticus 20:16), and it states: “And if a man lies with an animal, he shall be put to death and you shall kill the animal” (Leviticus 20:15). In cases of bestiality, the verse juxtaposes the execution of the animal to the execution of the person, and therefore the case of the animal is adjudicated in the same way as cases of capital law.

שור הנסקל בעשרים ושלשה שנאמר (שמות כא, כט) השור יסקל וגם בעליו יומת כמיתת בעלים כך מיתת השור הזאב והארי הדוב והנמר והברדלס והנחש מיתתן בעשרים ושלשה רבי אליעזר אומר כל הקודם להורגן זכה רבי עקיבא אומר מיתתן בעשרים ושלשה:

Similarly, an ox that is to be stoned because it killed a person is judged by twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “But if the ox was wont to gore in time past, and warning has been given to its owner, but he did not guard it and it kills a man or a woman the ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). From this verse it is derived that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox. The same halakha applies in the case of a wolf or a lion, a bear or a leopard, or a cheetah, or a snake that killed a person: Their death is decreed by twenty-three judges. Rabbi Eliezer says these dangerous animals do not need to be brought to court; rather, anyone who kills them first merits the performance of a mitzva. Rabbi Akiva says: Their death is decreed by twenty-three judges.

אין דנין לא את השבט ולא את נביא השקר ולא את כהן גדול אלא על פי בית דין של שבעים ואחד ואין מוציאין למלחמת הרשות אלא על פי בית דין של שבעים ואחד אין מוסיפין על העיר ועל העזרות אלא על פי בית דין של שבעים ואחד אין עושין סנהדריות לשבטים אלא על פי בית דין של שבעים ואחד

§ The court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned, or a false prophet (see Deuteronomy 18:20–22), or a High Priest who transgressed a prohibition that carries a possible death sentence, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin. And the king may bring the nation out to an optional war, i.e., a war that was not mandated by the Torah and is not a war of defense, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. They may extend the city of Jerusalem or the courtyards of the Temple only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. And they may appoint a lesser Sanhedrin of twenty-three judges for the tribes only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges.

אין עושין עיר הנדחת אלא על פי בית דין של שבעים ואחד אין עושין עיר הנדחת בספר ולא שלש אבל עושין אחת או שתים

A city may be designated as an idolatrous city, i.e., a city whose residents all practice idolatry, and therefore according to Torah law all the residents must be killed and the city must be destroyed (see Deuteronomy 13:13–19), only in accordance with the ruling of a court of seventy-one judges. Additionally, the court may not designate a city as an idolatrous city if it is on the frontier, close to the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and three adjoining cities may not be designated as idolatrous cities. But the court may designate one city, or two adjoining cities, as idolatrous cities.

סנהדרין גדולה היתה של שבעים ואחד וקטנה של עשרים ושלשה מנין לגדולה שהיא של שבעים ואחד שנאמר (במדבר יא, טז) אספה לי שבעים איש מזקני ישראל ומשה על גביהן ר' יהודה אומר שבעים

§ With regard to the number of judges in the different courts the mishna presents a halakhic midrash: The Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges, and a lesser Sanhedrin was composed of twenty-three. From where is it derived that the Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges? As it is stated: “Gather Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel, whom you know to be the Elders of the people and officers over them, and bring them into the Tent of Meeting, and they shall stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16), and together with Moses at the head of this body, there are a total of seventy-one. Rabbi Yehuda says: Moses was indeed at the head of the body, but he is not counted as part of the group. Consequently, a future Great Sanhedrin modeled after these Elders is to be composed of seventy judges.

ומנין לקטנה שהיא של עשרים ושלשה שנאמר (במדבר לה, כד) ושפטו העדה והצילו העדה עדה שופטת ועדה מצלת הרי כאן עשרים

And from where is it derived that a lesser Sanhedrin is composed of twenty-three judges? As it is stated: “And the congregation shall judge between the assailant and the avenger…and the congregation shall save the manslayer from the hands of the avenger” (Numbers 35:24–25). Therefore, there must be a congregation, which consists of at least ten judges, that judges the accused and attempts to convict him, and there must be a congregation, also consisting of at least ten judges, which attempts to save the accused by finding him innocent. Together, there are twenty judges here.

ומנין לעדה שהיא עשרה שנאמר (במדבר יד, כז) עד מתי לעדה הרעה הזאת יצאו יהושע וכלב

Before proceeding to derive the requirement for the final three judges, the mishna clarifies: And from where is it derived that a congregation consists of at least ten men? As it is stated concerning the spies: “How long shall I bear with this evil congregation that keep complaining about me?” (Numbers 14:27) There were twelve spies; excluding Joshua and Caleb, who did not complain, there would be ten men who are called: A congregation. Accordingly, the verses describing a congregation that attempts to convict the accused and a congregation that attempts to acquit him together add up to twenty judges.

ומנין להביא עוד שלשה ממשמע שנאמר (שמות כג, ב) לא תהיה אחרי רבים לרעות שומע אני שאהיה עמהם לטובה אם כן למה נאמר אחרי רבים להטות לא כהטייתך לטובה הטייתך לרעה הטייתך לטובה על פי אחד הטייתך לרעה על פי שנים

And from where is it derived to bring three more judges to the court? From the implication of that which is stated: “You shall not follow a multitude to convict” (Exodus 23:2), I would derive that I may not convict a person on the basis of a majority but I should follow the majority to exonerate. If so, why is it stated in the same verse: “To incline after a multitude,” from which it can be understood that the majority is followed in all cases? In order to resolve the apparent contradiction it must be explained: Your inclination after the majority to exonerate is not like your inclination after the majority to convict. Your inclination after the majority to exonerate can result in a verdict by a majority of one judge. But your inclination after the majority to convict a transgressor must be by a more decisive majority of at least two. Therefore, the court must have at least twenty-two judges.

ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהם עוד אחד הרי כאן עשרים ושלשה

And since there is a principle that a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, as such a court may be unable to reach a decision, therefore they add another one to them, and there are twenty-three judges here.

וכמה יהא בעיר ותהא ראויה לסנהדרין מאה ועשרים רבי נחמיה אומר מאתים ושלשים כנגד שרי עשרות:

And how many men must be in the city for it to be eligible for a lesser Sanhedrin? One hundred and twenty. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Two hundred and thirty, corresponding to the ministers of tens, as outlined by Moses and Yitro in the wilderness (Exodus, chapter 18). That is to say, each member of the Sanhedrin can be viewed as a judge with responsibility for ten residents. If there are not enough men in the city to enable this calculation, it would not be honorable to appoint a Sanhedrin, as their members will each preside over less than the minimum of ten residents.

גמ׳ אטו גזילות וחבלות לאו דיני ממונות נינהו אמר רבי אבהו מה הן קתני מה הן דיני ממונות גזילות וחבלות אבל הודאות והלואות לא

GEMARA: The mishna states that cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges, and that cases of robbery and personal injury must also be adjudicated by three judges. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that cases of robbery and personal injury are not cases of monetary law? Obviously they are; why did the mishna delineate them separately? Rabbi Abbahu says: The mishna teaches this clause employing the style: What are these, meaning that the expression: Cases of monetary law, is a description of a category, followed by the specification. Accordingly, the mishna should be read as follows: What are these cases of monetary law that are adjudicated by three judges? Cases of robbery and personal injury. But cases of admissions, where one party admits that he owes another money, and cases of loans that were not repaid are not included in this halakha.

וצריכא דאי תנא דיני ממונות הוה אמינא דאפי' הודאות והלואות תנא גזילות וחבלות ואי תנא גזילות וחבלות ולא קתני דיני ממונות הוה אמינא הוא הדין דאפילו הודאות והלואות והאי דקתני גזילות וחבלות משום דעיקר ג' דכתיבי בגזילות וחבלות כתיבי

And this specification is necessary, as had the tanna taught only that cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges, I would say that this applies even to cases of admissions and loans. Therefore, to avoid this misunderstanding, he taught: Cases of robbery and personal injury, in order to clarify that only they are included in the halakha. And had he taught only cases of robbery and personal injury and had not taught cases of monetary law, I would say that the same is true even with regard to admissions and loans, that they are adjudicated in the same manner. And I would understand this fact, that the mishna teaches specifically cases of robbery and personal injury, by saying that these are mere examples and that the mishna mentions them because in the primary cases in which the requirement for three judges is written in the Torah, it is written with regard to cases of robbery and personal injury.

גזילות דכתיב (שמות כב, ז) ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים חבלות מה לי חבל בגופו מה לי חבל בממונו תנא מה הן דיני ממונות גזילות וחבלות אבל הודאות והלואות לא

The Gemara explains this assertion. With regard to cases of robbery, as it is written with regard to a bailee who accepted a deposit from another and then claims that it was stolen: “The owner of the house shall come near the court [ha’elohim], to see whether he has not put his hand upon his neighbor’s property” (Exodus 22:7). And with regard to cases of personal injury, they are adjudicated in the same manner as cases of robbery, because what difference is there to me if another injured one’s body and what difference is there to me if another injured one’s property? Therefore, in order to clarify that the halakha applies only to cases of robbery and injury, the tanna taught: What are these cases of monetary law? Cases of robbery and personal injury. But this halakha does not apply with regard to cases of admissions and loans.

ולמאי אילימא דלא בעינן שלשה והאמר רבי אבהו שנים שדנו דיני ממונות לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין

The Gemara asks: And with regard to which halakha are cases of admissions and loans unlike cases of robbery and injury? If we say that we do not need a court of three judges to adjudicate such cases, but doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment, as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid?

אלא דלא בעינן מומחין

The Gemara answers: This is not the difference between the categories; rather, the difference is that for cases of admissions and loans we do not require expert, ordained judges who have studied extensively and received permission to judge; any three laymen can serve as a court for these types of cases. The mishna singled out cases of robbery and personal injury in order to indicate that for those cases expert judges are necessary.

מאי קסבר אי קסבר עירוב פרשיות כתוב כאן ליבעי נמי מומחין ואי קסבר אין עירוב פרשיות כתוב כאן שלשה למה לי

The Gemara clarifies: What does the tanna hold? If he holds that a merging of Torah portions is written here, then he should also require expert judges for cases of admissions and loans. The passage from which the halakha requiring three judges is derived (Exodus 22:6–8) discusses several different halakhot. According to the understanding that these portions should be considered as merged, they are interpreted to indicate equivalence between those halakhot. And if he holds that there is no merging of Torah portions written here, meaning that the halakhot are to be derived only from verses that discuss them directly, then why do I need three judges for admissions and loans? The requirement for three judges is derived from the repetition of the word elohim three times in the context of cases of robbery and personal injury.

לעולם קסבר עירוב פרשיות כתוב כאן ובדין הוא דליבעי נמי מומחין והאי דלא בעינן מומחין משום דרבי חנינא דאמר רבי חנינא דבר תורה אחד דיני ממונות ואחד דיני נפשות בדרישה ובחקירה

The Gemara answers: Actually, the tanna holds that a merging of Torah portions is written here, and by right he should have required expert judges to judge cases of admissions and loans as well. And this fact, i.e., that we do not require expert judges for these cases, is due to the reasoning of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina says: By Torah law, both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law require inquiry and interrogation of witnesses in order to conclusively determine the time, place, and circumstance of the incident, with the purpose of finding any possible contradiction in the witnesses’ testimony.

שנאמר (ויקרא כד, כב) משפט אחד יהיה לכם ומה טעם אמרו דיני ממונות לא בעינן דרישה וחקירה כדי שלא תנעול דלת בפני לווין

The source for this is as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), from which it is derived that all judges must judge in the same manner. And since with regard to cases of capital law it is stated: “And you shall inquire and investigate, and ask diligently” (Deuteronomy 13:15), the same should apply to cases of monetary law. And what is the reason that the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not require inquiry and interrogation of witnesses? The Gemara answers: The Sages established this exemption so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses would be required in order to have the court rule that the lender can collect payment of a loan, lenders would be deterred by the difficulty of proving the matter and might cease to lend money to the poor. For the same reason, the Sages also waived the need for expert judges in these cases.

אלא מעתה טעו לא ישלמו כל שכן אתה נועל דלת בפני לווין

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if these laymen err they should not be liable to pay compensation to the party unfairly wronged by their judgment, just as expert judges are not liable. The Gemara responds: If this is the halakha, you are all the more so locking the door in the face of potential borrowers; wealthy people will not want to lend money, as they will fear that a court of laymen will judge the case incorrectly.

אי הכי תרתי קתני דיני ממונות בשלשה הדיוטות גזילות וחבלות בשלשה מומחין

With regard to Rabbi Abbahu’s method of explaining the mishna, the Gemara asks: If that is so, then instead of explaining the mishna employing the style: What are these, Rabbi Abbahu could more easily say that two matters are taught in the mishna, and explain it as follows: Cases of monetary law, meaning cases of admissions and loans, are adjudicated by three judges who could be non-ordained laymen [hedyotot], and cases of robbery and personal injury are adjudicated by three ordained, expert judges.

ועוד שלשה שלשה למה לי

And furthermore, according to Rabbi Abbahu’s explanation that the term: Cases of robbery and personal injury, simply clarifies the meaning of the term: Cases of monetary law, why do I need the repetitive statement that cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges and cases of robbery and injury are adjudicated by three judges? The repetition seems to indicate that these are two separate matters.

אלא אמר רבא תרתי קתני משום דרבי חנינא רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר מדאורייתא חד נמי כשר שנאמר (ויקרא יט, טו) בצדק תשפוט עמיתך אלא משום יושבי קרנות

Rather, Rava said: Two matters are in fact taught in the mishna, because of the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina that the Sages instituted leniencies with regard to cases of monetary law so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: By Torah law, the adjudication of one judge is also valid in cases of admissions and loans, as it is stated: “In righteousness shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15), in the singular. But by rabbinic law, three judges are required, due to the concern that a single judge may be one of those who sit idly on street corners, i.e., unlearned people who are not involved in business and are unlikely to judge the case correctly.

אטו בתלתא מי לא הוו יושבי קרנות אי אפשר דלית בהו חד דגמיר אלא מעתה טעו לא ישלמו כ"ש דנפישי יושבי קרנות

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with three judges they will not be among those who sit idly on street corners? How is this concern addressed by increasing the number of judges? The Gemara answers: When there are three judges it is impossible, i.e., highly unlikely, that there is not among them one who is learned. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then if they err they should not be liable to pay compensation, since rabbinic law authorizes laymen to judge cases of this nature. The Gemara answers: If the judges will be exempt from paying compensation in the event that they err in their judgment, this lack of accountability will lead all the more so to having many of those who sit idly on street corners assume the role of judges.

מאי איכא בין רבא לרב אחא בריה דרב איקא איכא בינייהו דאמר שמואל שנים שדנו דיניהן דין אלא שנקראו בית דין חצוף לרבא לית ליה דשמואל לרב אחא בריה דרב איקא אית ליה דשמואל:

The Gemara asks: What are the implications of the difference between the opinion of Rava, who says that cases of monetary law may be adjudicated by three laymen due to the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, and the opinion of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, who holds that according to the Torah one judge is sufficient? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to that which Shmuel says: If two people adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rava is of the opinion that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as he holds that three judges are required by Torah law. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, is of the opinion that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as he holds that fundamentally, even one judge may judge a case of monetary law.

נזק וחצי נזק וכו': נזק היינו חבלות משום דקא בעי למיתנא חצי נזק תני נמי נזק שלם

§ The mishna teaches that cases involving payment for damage and payment for half the damage are adjudicated by three judges. The Gemara challenges: Damage is the same as injury, since the term: Injury, includes various damages one causes another directly or by his property. The Gemara explains: Since he needed to teach the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of the full cost of the damage.

חצי נזק נמי היינו חבלות תנא ממונא וקתני קנסא

The Gemara challenges: Payment of half the damage is also the same as personal injury, so it did not need to be stated separately. The Gemara explains: There is a difference. The tanna taught the halakha with regard to a case of monetary matters, and he also taught the halakha with regard to a case of a fine, such as payment of half the damage in a case where an innocuous ox gored another animal. Consequently, payment of half the cost of the damage needed to be stated separately from payment for injury, and once he needed to teach the halakha with regard to payment for half the cost of the damage, he first mentioned general payments for damages.

הניחא למאן דאמר פלגא ניזקא קנסא אלא למאן דאמר פלגא ניזקא ממונא מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that the payment for half the cost of the damage is considered a fine, meaning that according to the standard halakhot of damages the owner of the goring ox should be exempt, and the Torah instituted a payment of half the cost of the damage as a penalty for not being exceedingly careful. But according to the one who says that the payment for half the cost of the damage is an actual monetary payment, meaning that according to the standard halakhot of damages the owner of the goring ox should be fully liable but the Torah exempted him from part of his liability due to the unusual nature of the damage, what can be said? Therefore, this explanation must be rejected.

אלא איידי דקא בעי למיתנא תשלומי כפל ותשלומי ארבעה וחמשה דממון

Rather, since the tanna needed to teach the halakha with regard to cases involving payment of double the principal and payment of four or five times the principal, which are cases of money

שאינו משתלם בראש הוא תנא נמי חצי נזק דממון שאינו משתלם בראש הוא ואיידי דקא בעי למיתנא חצי נזק תנא נמי נזק:

that is not paid according to its value, meaning that the payment is not equal to the cost of the damage but is actually more than that amount, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, which is also money that is not paid according to its value, as he pays less than the full cost of the damage. And since he needs to teach the halakha with regard to payment of half the cost of the damage, he also taught the halakha with regard to payment of the full cost of the damage.

שלשה מנלן דתנו רבנן (שמות כב, ז) ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים הרי כאן אחד (שמות כב, ח) עד האלהים יבא דבר שניהם הרי כאן שנים (שמות כב, ח) אשר ירשיעון אלהים הרי כאן שלשה דברי רבי יאשיה

§ The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the fundamental requirement for three judges? The Gemara answers: This is as the Sages taught: The verse states: “The owner of the house shall come near the court, to see whether he has not put his hand upon his neighbor’s property” (Exodus 22:7), so there is one judge here. The following verse states: “The cause of both parties shall come before the court,” so there are two judges here. And that verse concludes: “He whom the court shall condemn shall pay double to his neighbor,” so there are three judges here, corresponding to the three mentions of the term “the court.” This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

ר' יונתן אומר ראשון תחילה נאמר ואין דורשין תחילות אלא עד האלהים יבא דבר שניהם הרי כאן אחד אשר ירשיעון אלהים הרי כאן שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחד הרי כאן שלשה

Rabbi Yonatan says: The first instance of the term “the court” is stated first as part of the primary text of the passage, and it is necessary for conveying the straightforward meaning of the verse. And one does not derive tallies for halakhic matters by counting the first mention of a term. Rabbi Yonatan holds that when a tally is derived from the number of instances a certain word appears in the Torah, the first instance is not included in the tally, as it is necessary to teach the mitzva itself; the tally may be counted only from subsequent mentions. Rather, this is how it is derived: “The cause of both parties shall come before the court,” there is one judge here, and the continuation of the verse: “He whom the court shall condemn” teaches that there are two judges here. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they must add an additional one to them, so there are three judges here.

נימא בדורשין תחילות קמיפלגי דמר סבר דורשין תחילות ומר סבר אין דורשין תחילות לא דכולי עלמא אין דורשין תחילות אמר לך ר' יאשיה אם כן נימא קרא ונקרב בעל הבית אל השופט מאי אל האלהים ש"מ למניינא

Let us say that Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan disagree with regard to whether one derives tallies for halakhic matters from the first mention of a term in the Torah. As one Sage, Rabbi Yoshiya, holds that one derives tallies from the first mention of the term in the Torah, and one Sage, Rabbi Yonatan, holds that one does not derive tallies from the first mention of the term. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually everyone holds that one does not derive tallies from the first mention of the term, but in this case there is a separate source for the derivation, as Rabbi Yoshiya could have said to you: If it is true that no halakha is derived from the first mention, let the verse say: The owner of the house shall come near to the judge [hashofet]. What, then, is the significance of the unique expression: “To the court [haelohim]”? Conclude from it that the term elohim was chosen to count toward the tally.

ורבי יונתן לישנא דעלמא נקט כדאמרי אינשי מאן דאית ליה דינא ליקרב לגבי דיינא

The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Yonatan respond to this analysis? The Gemara answers: He would say that the verse employed the common language of the world, as people say: One who has a case, a claim against another, should approach the regular judge, the one who generally judges cases and can be referred to by the term elohim. Consequently, no unique halakha can be derived from this first usage.

ור' יאשיה לית ליה ב"ד נוטה והתניא רבי אליעזר בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר מה תלמוד לומר (שמות כג, ב) לנטות אחרי רבים להטות התורה אמרה עשה לך ב"ד נוטה

But doesn’t Rabbi Yoshiya accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges? And isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: What is the meaning when the verse states: “To incline after a multitude to pervert justice” (Exodus 23:2)? The meaning is that the Torah is saying to you: Make for yourself a court that is composed of an odd number of judges, that will perforce incline in one direction, so that there will always be a majority that can be followed.

סבר לה כרבי יהודה דאמר שבעים דתנן סנהדרי גדולה היתה של שבעים ואחד ר' יהודה אומר שבעים

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya does not accept this halakha but instead holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A Great Sanhedrin is composed of seventy judges. As we learned in the mishna: The Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges, and Rabbi Yehuda says: It is composed of seventy judges. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges.

אימר דשמעת ליה לרבי יהודה בסנהדרי גדולה דכתיבי קראי בשאר בי דינא מי שמעת ליה

The Gemara asks: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda said this halakha with regard to the Great Sanhedrin, about which specific verses are written, and he derives from these verses that the Great Sanhedrin must be composed of exactly seventy judges. Have you heard him say with regard to the rest of the courts, those whose composition is not explicitly addressed in the Torah, that these courts can also be composed of an even number of judges?

וכי תימא לא שנא והתנן סמיכת זקנים ועריפת עגלה בשלשה דברי ר' שמעון ר' יהודה אומר בחמשה

And if you would say: There is no difference; Rabbi Yehuda does not differentiate between the Great Sanhedrin and lower courts, but didn’t we learn in the mishna: The laying of hands by the Sages and the breaking of the heifer’s neck are performed in front of a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: These rituals are performed in front of five judges.

ואמרינן מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה (ויקרא ד, טו) וסמכו שנים זקני שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחד הרי כאן ה'

And we say with regard to this halakha: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse states: “And the Elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock” (Leviticus 4:15). The term: “Shall lay their hands,” which is in the plural, indicates that there are two, and the word “Elders,” which is also plural, indicates another two, meaning a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, we add another one to them, and there are five judges here. Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda does accept the halakha that a court may not be composed of an even number of judges.

דרבי יאשיה עדיפא מדר' יהודה דאילו ר' יהודה בסנהדרי גדולה הוא דלית ליה הא בשאר בי דינא אית ליה ור' יאשיה בשאר בי דינא נמי לית ליה ואלא האי לנטות מאי עביד ליה מוקים לה בדיני נפשות

The Gemara answers: It can be explained that Rabbi Yoshiya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda but goes further than he does. This is because Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle that a court must be composed of an odd number of judges in connection with a Great Sanhedrin, but with regard to other courts he does accept it. And Rabbi Yoshiya also does not accept it with regard to other courts. The Gemara asks: And what does he do with this verse: “To incline after a multitude to pervert justice”? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya interprets it in relation to cases of capital law. In such cases he agrees that the court must be composed of an odd number of judges, in order that it will be possible to exonerate the accused on the basis of a majority of one judge.

אבל בדיני ממונות לא אלא הא דתנן שנים אומרים זכאי ואחד אומר חייב זכאי שנים אומרים חייב ואחד אומר זכאי חייב נימא דלא כרבי יאשיה

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yoshiya not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges with regard to cases of monetary law? But there is that which we learned in a mishna (29a): If two judges say the defendant is exempt from payment and one says he is liable, he is exempt; if two say he is liable and one says he is exempt, he is liable. Let us say that this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as Rabbi Yoshiya does not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges concerning cases of monetary law, and therefore perhaps he holds that the verdict must be agreed upon unanimously by all the judges.

אפילו תימא רבי יאשיה מייתי לה בקל וחומר מדיני נפשות ומה דיני נפשות דחמירי אמר רחמנא זיל בתר רובא דיני ממונות לא כל שכן:

The Gemara rejects this possibility: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya. Although he does not accept the requirement for an odd number of judges in cases of monetary law, he does allow for a decision on the basis of a majority. He derives this principle based on an a fortiori inference from cases of capital law: If concerning cases of capital law, which are strict, the Merciful One states in the Torah: Follow the majority, and does not require a unanimous ruling, concerning cases of monetary law, which are more lenient, is it not all the more so clear that a majority ruling is sufficient?

תנו רבנן דיני ממונות בשלשה רבי אומר בחמשה כדי שיגמר הדין בשלשה אטו בתלתא מי לא גמר דינא בתרי הכי קאמר מפני שגמר דין בשלשה אלמא קסבר תלתא כי כתיבי בגמר דינא כתיבי

§ The Sages taught: Cases concerning monetary law are adjudicated by three judges. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: They are adjudicated by five judges, so that a verdict can be issued with three judges. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with a court of three judges a verdict cannot be issued by two judges? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by five judges, due to the fact that a verdict must be issued by three. In other words, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the judges who form the majority that decides the verdict must themselves be eligible to constitute a court. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when the requirement for three judges is written in the Torah, it is written with regard to the number of judges necessary to issue the verdict.

מגדף בה רבי אבהו אלא מעתה תהא סנהדרי גדולה צריכה מאה וארבעים ואחד כדי שיגמר הדין בשבעים ואחד ותהא סנהדרי קטנה צריכה ארבעים וחמשה כדי שיגמר הדין בשלשה ועשרים

Rabbi Abbahu would ridicule [megaddef ] this suggestion. If that is so, then the Great Sanhedrin would need to consist of 141 judges, so that the verdict can be issued by seventy-one, and a lesser Sanhedrin would need to consist of forty-five judges, so that the verdict can be issued by twenty-three. But these assertions contradict the halakha as derived from the verses.

אלא (במדבר יא, טז) אספה לי שבעים איש אמר רחמנא משעת אסיפה שבעים (במדבר לה, כד) ושפטו העדה והצילו העדה נמי משעת שפיטת העדה הכי נמי (שמות כב, ז) ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים משעת קריבה שלשה

Rather, the Merciful One states: “Gather Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel” (Numbers 11:16), and this means that from the time of gathering, there must be seventy. Likewise, the verse states: “And the congregation shall judge…and the congregation shall save” (Numbers 35:24–25), from which it is derived that cases of capital law are adjudicated by twenty-three judges, and this also means that from the time that the congregation judges there must be twenty-three. Similarly, with regard to a case of monetary law, the verse states: “The owner of the house shall come near to the court” (Exodus 22:7), and this means from the time of coming near to judge the cases there must be three judges. Consequently, there is no requirement that the verdict be decided by a majority who could themselves form a court.

אלא היינו טעמא דרבי (שמות כב, ח) אשר ירשיעון אלהים תרי נאמר אלהים למטה ונאמר אלהים למעלה מה למטה שנים אף למעלה שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהם עוד אחד הרי כאן חמשה

Therefore, the previous explanation must be rejected. Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: It is stated in the next verse: “He whom the court shall condemn” (Exodus 22:8) in the plural, which means there must be two judges. Consequently, it is stated: “The court,” in the verse below and it is stated: “The court,” in the verse above. Just as below it is referring to two judges, as the word: “Shall condemn,” is written in the plural, so too above it is referring to two judges, making a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add another one to them, so there are five judges here.

ורבנן ירשיען כתיב

And how would the Rabbis respond to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s proof? They would say that although the term: “Shall condemn” is pronounced as a plural verb, it is written in a way that could also be read in the singular. Consequently, one cannot derive a requirement for more than one judge from there.

א"ר יצחק בר (יוסי) אמר ר' יוחנן רבי ורבי יהודה בן רועץ ובית שמאי ור"ש ור' עקיבא כולהו סבירא להו יש אם למקרא

§ The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Sages is explained as an example of the more general question of whether the written consonantal text or the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative. As Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosei says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz, Beit Shammai, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Akiva, they all hold that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, and that the halakha is therefore decided based on the meaning of the word as pronounced, and not on possible alternative readings of the written text.

רבי הא דאמרן

The Gemara explains the basis for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s assertion with regard to each of the tanna’im that he mentioned: With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the proof is that which we have just said, with regard to the interpretation of the verse: “He whom the court shall condemn” (Exodus 22:8) deriving a requirement for five judges in cases of monetary law based on the vocalized plural pronunciation of the term: “Shall condemn.”

ור' יהודה בן רועץ דתניא שאלו תלמידים את ר' יהודה בן רועץ אקרא אני (ויקרא יב, ה) שבעים יכול תהא יולדת נקבה טמאה שבעים

And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz, it is as it is taught in a baraita: His students asked Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz: The verse states: “But if she gives birth to a female, then she shall be unclean for two weeks, as in her menstrual impurity; and she shall then continue in the blood of purification for sixty-six days” (Leviticus 12:5). Based on the written consonantal text, I can read the amount of time she is impure as: “Seventy [shivim] days,” and not as: “Two weeks [shevuayim].” One might have thought, therefore, that a woman who gives birth to a female should be impure for seventy days.

אמר להן טימא וטיהר בזכר וטימא וטיהר בנקבה מה כשטיהר בזכר בנקבה כפלים אף כשטימא בזכר בנקבה כפלים

Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz said to them: It can be proven that this is not the halakha, as the Torah deemed her impure and deemed her pure when she gave birth to a male, and deemed her impure and deemed her pure when she gave birth to a female. Just as when it deemed her pure for thirty-three days after the initial period of impurity when she gave birth to a male, when she gives birth to a female she is pure for sixty-six days, which is double the amount of time; so too, when it deemed her impure for seven days when she gave birth to a male, when she gives birth to a female she is also impure for double the amount of time. Consequently, the verse must be read according to the vocalized reading: “Two weeks,” and not according to the consonantal text, which could be read: “Seventy.”

לאחר שיצאו יצא ומחזיר אחריהם אמר להן אי אתם זקוקים לכך שבועיים קרינן ויש אם למקרא

After they left, Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz went out and followed them. He then said to them: You do not need this proof that I gave based on the comparison of the periods of impurity with the periods of purity. Rather, we read the verse as: “Two weeks,” and the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative.

ב"ש דתנן ב"ש אומרים כל הניתנין על מזבח החיצון שנתנן במתנה אחת כיפר (שנאמר (דברים יב, כז) ודם זבחיך ישפך) ובחטאת שתי מתנות ובית הלל אומרים אף בחטאת שנתנן במתנה אחת כיפר

With regard to Beit Shammai, the proof that they also hold that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative is as we learned in a mishna (Zevaḥim 36b): Beit Shammai say: With regard to all offerings whose blood must be presented on the external altar, once the blood has been presented with one presentation the offering has effected atonement, even if more presentations are ideally required, as it is stated: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured out against the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). This verse teaches that even with regard to a burnt-offering, which requires multiple presentations of the blood, a single presentation is sufficient to render the offering valid after the fact. But with regard to a sin-offering, it is valid only if there were at least two presentations. And Beit Hillel say: Even with regard to a sin-offering that one presented with one presentation, it has effected atonement after the fact.

ואמר רב הונא מ"ט דב"ש (ויקרא ד, ז) קרנות קרנות קרנות הרי כאן שש ארבע למצוה ושתים לעכב

And Rav Huna says: What is the reasoning for the opinion of Beit Shammai? The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger, and put it on the horns of the altar” (Leviticus 4:25); and “The priest shall take of the blood thereof with his finger, and put it on the horns of the altar” (Leviticus 4:30); and again: “The priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger, and put it on the horns of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). As the minimum amount justifying the use of plural, i.e., “horns,” is two, one may conclude that there are six references to the horns of the altar here. Four of them are mentioned for the mitzva, meaning that he should present the blood on all four horns of the altar ab initio, and the other two were mentioned to invalidate the offering if he did not present it on at least two horns.

ובית הלל אומרים קרנות קרנת קרנת הרי כאן ארבע ג' למצוה ואחת לעכב

And Beit Hillel say: The matter should be understood according to the written consonantal text. The word “horns” is written once plene, with a vav, which means that it must be read in the plural; and the other two times the words “horns” and “horns” are written deficient, without a vav, in a way that can be vocalized in the singular. Therefore, there are four references to horns here. Three of these presentations are written to indicate that they are performed only as a mitzva, i.e., they are performed ab initio, but the offering is valid even absent their presentation. And the remaining one, i.e., the fourth presentation, is written to indicate that its absence invalidates the offering, i.e., the offering is not valid if the blood was not presented against at least one horn of the altar. Evidently, Beit Shammai hold the vocalization is authoritative, whereas Beit Hillel hold the consonantal text is authoritative.

ואימא כולהו למצוה כפרה בכדי לא אשכחן

The Gemara asks: But according to this explanation of Beit Hillel, why not say that all of them are written for the mitzva and none to invalidate, meaning the blood must be presented on all four horns ab initio, but the offering atones after the fact even if it has not been presented at all? The Gemara rejects this possibility: We have not found anywhere in the Torah an example of an offering in which atonement can be achieved with no presentation of the blood of the offering at all.

ר"ש דתניא שתים כהלכתן ושלישית אפילו טפח ר"ש אומר שלש כהלכתן ורביעית אפילו טפח במאי קמיפלגי רבנן סברי יש אם למסורת ור"ש סבר יש אם למקרא

With regard to Rabbi Shimon, it is as it is taught in a baraita that records a dispute among the Sages with regard to the number of walls required in a sukka: There must be two walls in their standard sense, completely closing each of those two sides, and a third wall, which, based on a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, may measure even as little as one handbreadth. Rabbi Shimon says that there must be three walls in their standard sense, and a fourth one that can measure even one handbreadth. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis hold that the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and Rabbi Shimon holds that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative.

רבנן סברי יש אם למסורת בסכת בסכת בסוכות הרי כאן ארבע דל חד קרא לגופיה פשו להו תלת אתאי הלכתא גרעתא לשלישית ואוקימתא אטפח

The Gemara explains: The Rabbis hold that the tradition of the manner in which the verses in are written is authoritative. The Torah states: “You shall reside in sukkot” (Leviticus 23:42) spelled deficient, without the letter vav, in a way that can be read in the singular. And later in that verse it also states: “All that are homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot” spelled the same way. And in the next verse it states: “So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in sukkot,” this time spelled plene, with a vav, which means it must be plural. Therefore, there are four walls here. Remove one verse, which is needed to teach the mitzva to sit in a sukka itself, and three walls remain. The halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, which says that one of the walls may be incomplete, comes and reduces the third and establishes it as a minimum of one handbreadth.

ור"ש סבר בסוכות בסוכות בסוכות הרי כאן שש דל חד קרא לגופיה פשו להו ארבע אתאי הלכתא גרעתא לרביעית ואוקמיה אטפח

And Rabbi Shimon holds that the vocalization is authoritative. Since the verses state: “You shall reside in sukkot,” and: “All that are homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot,” and: “So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in sukkot,” all of which are pronounced as plural nouns, there are six walls here. Remove one verse to teach the mitzva of sukka itself, and four walls remain. The halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai then comes and reduces the fourth wall, and establishes it at a minimum of one handbreadth. Consequently, it is clear that Rabbi Shimon also holds that the vocalization is authoritative.

ר"ע דתניא ר"ע אומר מניין לרביעית דם שיצאה משני מתים שמטמא באהל שנאמר (ויקרא כא, יא) על כל נפשות מת לא יבא שתי נפשות ושיעור א' ורבנן נפשת כתיב

With regard to Rabbi Akiva, it is as it is taught in a baraita: It is known that a quarter-log of blood that came from a corpse imparts ritual impurity in a tent. And Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived that a quarter-log of blood that came out of two separate corpses also imparts ritual impurity in a tent? As it is stated with regard to a priest: “He shall not come upon any dead bodies” (Leviticus 21:11). The word “bodies” is pronounced as a plural word, and since the Torah teaches elsewhere that: “The blood is the life” (Deuteronomy 12:23), this indicates that impurity can be imparted by one measure of blood that came from two bodies. And the Rabbis say: The word “bodies” is written deficient, without a vav, so that it can also be read as a singular word, indicating that a quarter-log of blood imparts impurity in a tent only if it came from a single corpse.

מתקיף לה רב אחא בר יעקב מי איכא דלית לי' יש אם למקרא והתניא (שמות כג, יט) בחלב אמו יכול בחלב

Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov objects to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s assertion that all of the above disputes are based on the question of whether the traditional consonantal text or the vocalized text of the Torah is authoritative: Is there a Sage who does not accept the principle that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: “You shall not cook a young goat in its mother’s milk [baḥalev]” (Exodus 23:19). One might have thought the verse should be read as prohibiting the cooking of the young goat in the fat [beḥelev] of the mother, and there is no prohibition against cooking the meat with milk.

אמרת יש אם למקרא

You therefore say in response: The vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, and the verse prohibits cooking the young goat in its mother’s milk.

אלא דכ"ע יש אם למקרא ורבי ורבנן בהא קמיפלגי רבי סבר (שמות כב, ח) ירשיעון אלהים אחריני ורבנן סברי ירשיעון דהאיך והאי

Rather, everyone agrees that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative. But in actuality, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the phrase “the court shall condemn” is referring to other judges, in addition to the three that were derived from the earlier verse, leading to a total of five, whereas the Rabbis hold that the term “shall condemn” means these judges, i.e., those who have already been mentioned, and therefore there are only three.

ור"י בן רועץ לא פליגי רבנן עליה

And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda ben Roetz, who applied the principle: The vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, to the question of the duration of the ritual impurity of a woman who gave birth to a female, it can be explained that the Rabbis do not disagree with him, as everyone agrees that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative.

ב"ה דתניא (ויקרא ד, כ) וכפר (ויקרא ד, כו) וכפר (ויקרא ד, לא) וכפר מפני הדין

With regard to Beit Hillel, who hold that a single presentation of blood is sufficient to atone even when bringing a sin-offering, this is not because they hold the traditional consonantal text is authoritative. Rather, their opinion is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin-offering brought by a ruler: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:26), and with regard to a sin-offering of a goat brought by an ordinary person: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:31), and with regard to a sin-offering of a lamb brought by an ordinary person: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:35), repeating this term three times. This repetition is due to the following logical inference:

והלא דין הוא נאמר דמים למטה ונאמר דמים למעלה מה דמים האמורים למטה שנתנן במתנה אחת כיפר אף דמים האמורים למעלה שנתנן במתנה אחת כיפר

Could this halakha not be derived through an a fortiori inference? There is stated a term of blood below, in the verse written with regard to a bird brought as a sin-offering (see Leviticus 5:9), and there is stated a term of blood above, in the verse written with regard to an animal brought as a sin-offering (see Leviticus 4:25, 31, 35). Just as with regard to the blood that is stated below, when it is presented with one presentation it has effected atonement, so too with regard to the blood that is stated above, when it is presented with one presentation it has effected atonement.

או כלך לדרך זו נאמר דמים בחוץ ונאמר דמים בפנים מה דמים האמורים בפנים חיסר אחת ממתנות לא עשה ולא כלום אף דמים האמורים בחוץ חיסר אחת ממתנות לא עשה כלום

Or perhaps go this way, offering a different explanation: There is stated a term of blood in the verse written with regard to the external altar, i.e., in the verse written with regard to a sin-offering of an ordinary person that is brought on the external altar in the courtyard (see Leviticus 4:25), and there is stated a term of blood in the verse written with regard to the inner altar, i.e., with regard to a sin-offering of the community or the High Priest, the blood of which is sprinkled on the incense altar inside the Sanctuary (see Leviticus 4:7, 18). Just as with regard to the blood that was stated concerning the inner altar, i.e., if one of the presentations is lacking it has not accomplished anything and the offering is not valid, so too, with regard to the blood that was stated concerning the external altar, if one of the presentations is lacking it has accomplished nothing.

נראה למי דומה דנין חוץ מחוץ ואין דנין חוץ מפנים

The Gemara analyzes the two possibilities: Let us see to which of the two comparisons this is more similar. It can be claimed: We derive a halakha stated with regard to the external altar from a halakha stated with regard to the external altar, but we do not derive a halakha stated with regard to the external altar from a halakha stated with regard to the inner altar.

או כלך לדרך זו דנין חטאת וד' קרנות מחטאת וארבע קרנות ואל יוכיח זה שאין חטאת וד' קרנות

Or go this way: We derive a halakha stated with regard to a sin-offering whose blood is to be sprinkled on the four corners of the altar from the halakha stated with regard to a sin-offering whose blood is to be sprinkled on the four corners of the altar, and this sin-offering consisting of a bird, which is not a sin-offering of the type whose blood is to be sprinkled on the four corners of the altar, cannot prove that the halakha is similar with regard to a sin-offering whose blood is to be sprinkled on the four corners of the altar.

תלמוד לומר וכפר וכפר וכפר מפני הדין כיפר אע"פ שלא נתן אלא שלשה כיפר אף על פי שלא נתן אלא שתים כיפר אע"פ שלא נתן אלא אחת

Since there are two legitimate inferences, the halakha cannot be decided through a logical inference. Therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall make atonement,” “And the priest shall make atonement,” “And the priest shall make atonement,” three times, due to the logical inference. The verses are interpreted as follows: “The priest shall make atonement,” even though he presented only three presentations, and then a second verse repeats: “The priest shall make atonement,” even though he presented only two presentations, and then a third verse repeats: “The priest shall make atonement,” even though he presented only one presentation. This interpretation is the source of Beit Hillel’s opinion.

ור"ש ורבנן בהא פליגי ר"ש סבר סככא לא בעי קרא ורבנן סברי סככא בעי קרא

And concerning Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, who disagreed with regard to the number of walls required in a sukka, it is with regard to this that they disagree: Rabbi Shimon holds that the basic requirement of placing roofing [sekhakha] on the sukka does not need a verse to teach that it is required, as it is implied by the word sukka. Consequently, the word sukkot appears two times in the text beyond the initial mitzva, teaching a requirement for four walls, and there is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai that reduces the minimum size of one of the walls to a handbreadth. And the Rabbis hold that the requirement of placing roofing does need a verse. Therefore, one of the four derivations is used to teach that requirement, and only three walls remain, one of which is reduced to a handbreadth.

ור"ע ורבנן בהא פליגי ר"ע סבר (ויקרא כא, יא) נפשות תרתי משמע ורבנן סברי נפשות דעלמא משמע

And with regard to Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, who disagreed about the issue of a quarter-log of blood that emanated from two corpses, it is with regard to this that they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that “bodies” in plural indicates two. Consequently, a quarter-log of blood that emanated from two corpses also renders one impure. And the Rabbis hold that “bodies” in plural indicates a general halakha, and no derivation can be made with regard to blood that emanated from two corpses. Both opinions, however, agree that the vocalized text of the Torah is authoritative.

ודכולי עלמא יש אם למקרא והתניא (שמות יג, טז) לטטפת (דברים ו, ח) לטטפת (דברים יא, יח) לטוטפות הרי כאן ארבע דברי ר' ישמעאל

The Gemara asks: And does everyone actually hold that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to the number of compartments in the phylacteries of the head, the verse states: “It shall be for a sign upon your hand, and for totafot between your eyes” (Exodus 13:16), with the word totafot spelled deficient, without a second vav, in a way that can be read as singular; and again: “They shall be for totafot between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), spelled as a singular word; and again: “They shall be for totafot between your eyes” (11:18), this time spelled plene, with a second vav, in a manner that must be plural? There are four mentions of totafot here, as the third one is written in the plural and therefore counts as two. Consequently, it is derived that the phylacteries of the head must have four compartments. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

ר"ע אומר אינו צריך טט בכתפי שתים פת באפריקי שתים

Rabbi Akiva says: There is no need for this proof, as the requirement of four compartments can be derived from the word totafot itself: The word tat in the language of the Katfei means two, and the word pat in the language of Afriki also means two, and therefore totafot can be understood as a compound word meaning: Four. The baraita therefore indicates that Rabbi Yishmael holds that not the vocalization but rather the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative.

אלא לעולם פליגי והני מילי כי פליגי היכא דשני קרא ממסורת אבל האי חלב וחלב דכי הדדי נינהו יש אם למקרא

Rather, the explanation that everyone holds that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative must be rejected, and it must be explained that the Sages actually do disagree whether it is the vocalization of the Torah or the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written that is authoritative. And in order to explain the unresolved problem with regard to the baraita about the prohibition of cooking a young goat in its mother’s milk, the explanation is that this statement, that they disagree as to whether the vocalization or the tradition is authoritative, applies where the vocalization of the word differs from the tradition of the manner in which the word is written. But in this case the words milk [ḥalev] and fat [ḥelev] are written in an identical manner, as there is no difference in the writing at all, only in the way they are vocalized. Therefore, all agree that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative.

והרי (שמות כג, יז) יראה יראה דכי הדדי נינהו ופליגי דתניא יוחנן בן דהבאי אומר משום רבי יהודה בן תימא הסומא בא' מעיניו פטור מן הראיה שנא' יראה יראה כדרך שבא לראות כך בא ליראות מה לראות בשתי עיניו אף ליראות בשתי עיניו

The Gemara asks: But the words: “Shall see” and “shall appear” are written in an identical matter, and nevertheless the Sages disagree about which reading is authoritative. As it is taught in a baraita: Yoḥanan ben Dahavai says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima: One who is blind in one of his eyes is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, i.e., the obligation to appear in the Temple and to sacrifice an offering on the three pilgrimage Festivals, as it is stated: “Three times in the year all your males shall appear [yera’eh] before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17). According to the way in which the verse is written, without vocalization, it can be read as yireh, meaning: Shall see, instead of yera’eh, meaning: Shall appear. This teaches that in the same manner that one comes to see, so he comes to appear, i.e., to be seen: Just as the usual way to see is with both of one’s eyes, so too, the obligation to appear applies only to one who comes with the sight of both his eyes.

אלא אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר קרא (שמות כג, יט) לא תבשל גדי דרך בישול אסרה תורה

It is therefore apparent that even when there is no difference in the way the words are written, some say that the tradition, not the vocalization, is authoritative. Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: The reason all agree that there is a prohibition to cook a young goat in its mother’s milk and not in its mother’s fat is that the verse states: “You shall not cook a young goat” (Exodus 23:19). The verse teaches that the action the Torah prohibited is in the manner of cooking, which is generally done in a liquid such as milk and not in a solid substance such as fat.

תנו רבנן דיני ממונות בשלשה

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges.

ואם היה מומחה לרבים דן אפילו יחידי אמר רב נחמן כגון אנא דן דיני ממונות ביחידי וכן אמר ר' חייא כגון אנא דן דיני ממונות ביחידי

But if one was a judge accepted as an expert for the public, then he may judge cases even as the lone judge. Rav Naḥman said: One such as I may judge cases of monetary law as the lone judge. And similarly, Rabbi Ḥiyya said: One such as I may judge cases of monetary law as the lone judge.

איבעיא להו כגון אנא דגמירנא וסבירנא ונקיטנא רשותא אבל לא נקיט רשותא דיניה לא דינא או דילמא אע"ג דלא נקיט רשותא דיניה דינא

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of: Such as I, in the statements of these Rabbis? Did they intend to say: Such as I, in that I have studied and have the skills to extrapolate and derive new rulings on the basis of earlier decisions, and have also received permission to judge as the lone judge? But accordingly, if one has not received permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is not a valid judgment? Or perhaps this is not the correct reading of the statements, and the halakha is that even though he did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is nevertheless a valid judgment?

ת"ש דמר זוטרא בריה דר"נ דן דינא וטעה אתא לקמיה דרב יוסף א"ל אם קיבלוך עלייהו לא תשלם ואי לא זיל שלים ש"מ כי לא נקיט רשותא דיניה דינא ש"מ

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following case: Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, once adjudicated a certain case and erred in his ruling. Upon recognizing his error, he came before Rav Yosef to ask what he should do. Rav Yosef said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves as the lone judge, and both had agreed that they would accept your ruling, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who lost the case due to your erroneous ruling. But if they did not accept you on themselves, but were rather compelled to be judged before you, you must go and pay restitution. And learn from it that even in a case where one did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his ruling is a valid judgment. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

אמר רב האי מאן דבעי למידן דינא ואי טעה מיבעי למיפטרא לישקול רשותא מבי ריש גלותא וכן אמר שמואל לשקול רשותא מבי ריש גלותא

§ Rav says: One who wants to adjudicate a case and wants to be exempt from payment of restitution if he errs in his judgment must receive permission from the Exilarch to judge cases. And similarly, Shmuel says: In such a case he must receive permission from the Exilarch. Once he receives permission, even an erroneous decision carries halakhic force and therefore it is as if he did not err.

פשיטא מהכא להכא ומהתם להתם (מהני) ומהכא להתם (נמי) מהני דהכא שבט והתם מחוקק

Since the Gemara mentioned the importance of a judge receiving authorization from the Exilarch, it now discusses the scope of this authority. It is obvious that from here to here, meaning relying on permission granted by the Exilarch in Babylonia in order to adjudicate cases within Babylonia, and from there to there, relying on permission granted by the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael in order to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, the authorization is effective. And it is also obvious that from here to there, relying on permission granted by the Exilarch to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, it is also effective, as the authority of the Exilarch is greater than that of the Nasi. This is so since the Exilarch here in Babylonia may be termed a scepter, i.e., a ruler with actual power of governance, and the Nasi there in Eretz Yisrael is only a staff, i.e., a legislator with limited power.

כדתניא (בראשית מט, י) לא יסור שבט מיהודה אלו ראשי גליות שבבבל שרודין את ישראל בשבט ומחוקק מבין רגליו אלו בני בניו של הלל שמלמדין תורה ברבים

This is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “The scepter shall not depart from Judah nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet until Shiloh comes” (Genesis 49:10). The term “Shiloh” is understood as a reference to the Messiah, and therefore the verse is interpreted as delineating the authority of Jewish rulers during the exile, before the Messiah comes. “The scepter shall not depart from Judah”; these are the Exilarchs in Babylonia, who are empowered by the government and consequently subjugate the Jewish people as with a scepter. “Nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet”; These are the grandchildren of Hillel the Elder who hold the position of Nasi and teach Torah in public, but do not have authority to actually enforce their judgments.

מהתם להכא מאי ת"ש דרבה בר חנה דן דינא וטעה אתא לקמיה דרבי חייא א"ל אי קיבלוך עלייהו לא תשלם ואי לא זיל שלים והא רבה בר חנה רשותא הוה נקיט ש"מ מהתם להכא לא מהני ש"מ

If one has permission from there, from the Nasi, and wants to adjudicate cases here in Babylonia, what is the halakha? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident that occurred: Rabba bar Ḥana adjudicated a case in Babylonia and erred. He came before Rabbi Ḥiyya to ask what he should do. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who unjustly lost the case, but if not, go and pay. But Rabba bar Ḥana received permission from the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael; therefore, learn from this incident that permission from there to adjudicate cases here is not effective. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

ולא מהני והא רבה בר רב הונא כי הוה מינצי בהדי דבי ריש גלותא אמר לאו מינייכו נקיטנא רשותא נקיטנא רשותא מאבא מרי ואבא מרי מרב ורב מר' חייא ור' חייא מרבי במילתא דעלמא הוא דאוקים להו

The Gemara asks: And is this permission not effective? But when Rabba bar Rav Huna was involved in a dispute with the members of the house of the Exilarch he said: It is not from you that I received permission to judge cases. I received permission from my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, and my father, my master, received permission from Rav, and Rav from Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, it seems that permission received in Eretz Yisrael is in fact effective in Babylonia. The Gemara rejects this proof: He was merely standing up to them with words alone, but there was no halakhic validity to his statement.

וכי מאחר דלא מהני רבה בר חנה רשותא דנקט למה לי לעיירות העומדים על הגבולין

The Gemara asks: But since permission to judge received in Eretz Yisrael is not effective in Babylonia, why did Rabba bar Ḥana need to receive permission when he left for Babylonia? What was the value of that permission? The Gemara answers: The permission is effective for the cities that stand on the borders of Babylonia, which are not entirely in the jurisdiction of Babylonia, so permission from Eretz Yisrael is effective there.

מאי רשותא כי הוה נחית רבה בר חנה לבבל אמר ליה רבי חייא לרבי בן אחי יורד לבבל יורה יורה ידין ידין יתיר בכורות יתיר

§ What is the specific nature of this permission? The Gemara relates: When Rabba bar Ḥana descended to Babylonia, his uncle Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: My brother’s son is descending to Babylonia. May he teach people and issue rulings with regard to what is prohibited and what is permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may teach. Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked: May he also adjudicate cases of monetary law, and be absolved from payment if he errs? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may adjudicate. Rabbi Ḥiyya continued: May he declare a firstborn animal permitted? The male firstborn of a kosher animal may not be eaten, as it is supposed to be offered in the Temple. But if it acquires a permanent blemish it is unfit for an offering, and it may be eaten. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may declare such an animal permitted.

כי הוה נחית רב לבבל אמר ליה רבי חייא לר' בן אחותי יורד לבבל יורה יורה ידין ידין יתיר בכורות אל יתיר

Similarly, when Rav, who was also Rabbi Ḥiyya’s nephew, descended to Babylonia, Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: My sister’s son is descending to Babylonia. May he teach people and issue rulings with regard to what is prohibited and what is permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may teach. Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked: May he also adjudicate cases of monetary law, and be absolved from payment if he errs? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded: He may adjudicate. Rabbi Ḥiyya continued: May he declare a firstborn animal permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may not declare such an animal permitted.

מ"ש למר דקא קרי בן אחי ומ"ש למר דקא קרי בן אחותי וכי תימא הכי הוה מעשה והאמר מר איבו וחנה ושילא ומרתא ורבי חייא כולהו בני אבא בר אחא כרסלא מכפרי הוו רב בר אחוה דהוה בר אחתיה רבה בר חנה בר אחוה דלאו בר אחתיה

This incident raises several questions, which the Gemara asks in sequence. What is different concerning this Sage, Rabba bar Ḥana, that Rabbi Ḥiyya called him: My brother’s son, and what is different concerning that Sage, Rav, that Rabbi Ḥiyya called him: My sister’s son? And if you would say that this was the situation: Rabba bar Ḥana was his brother’s son and Rav was his sister’s son, but doesn’t the Master say: Aivu, Rav’s father, and Ḥana, the father of Rabba bar Ḥana, and Sheila, and Marta, and Rabbi Ḥiyya, were all sons of Abba bar Aḥa Karsala from Kafrei? Consequently, Rav would also be Rabbi Ḥiyya’s brother’s son. The Gemara answers: Rav was his brother’s son who was also his sister’s son, as Rabbi Ḥiyya’s half-brother married Rabbi Ḥiyya’s half-sister; while Rabba bar Ḥana was his brother’s son who was not his sister’s son. Therefore, he referred to Rav in a manner that emphasized the additional relationship.

ואי בעית אימא

And if you wish, say instead that he called him: My sister’s son, for a different reason:

על שם חכמתו דכתיב (משלי ז, ד) אמור לחכמה אחותי את

It was due to his extraordinary wisdom, as it is written: “Say to wisdom: You are my sister” (Proverbs 7:4). Therefore, calling him: My sister’s son, was an indication of his great wisdom.

יתיר בכורות אל יתיר מאי טעמא אילימא משום דלא חכים הא קא אמרינן דחכים טובא אלא משום דלא בקיע במומי

The Gemara had related that Rabbi Ḥiyya asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: May Rav declare a firstborn animal permitted, and that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had responded: He may not declare such an animal permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he denied him this permission? If we say that it was because Rav was not sufficiently wise and learned, but that is difficult, as we already said that he was exceedingly wise. Rather, it must be that it was because, although he was quite knowledgeable about the halakha, he was not an expert with regard to blemishes, meaning that he lacked the practical expertise to apply the halakha to actual cases.

והאמר רב שמונה עשר חדשים גדלתי אצל רועה בהמה לידע איזה מום קבוע ואיזה מום עובר אלא לחלק לו כבוד לרבה בר חנה

The Gemara rejects this answer. But didn’t Rav say: I apprenticed with a shepherd for eighteen months in order to be able to know which blemish is a permanent blemish, and which is a temporary blemish? Evidently, he had a high level of practical expertise in this matter. The Gemara explains: Rather, it was in order to bestow honor upon Rabba bar Ḥana. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wanted to ensure that Rabba bar Ḥana would be treated with respect, so he made sure that there was an area of halakha with regard to which the people would not be able to consult with Rav and would need to consult with Rabba bar Ḥana instead.

ואיבעית אימא משום הא גופיה דרב בקיע במומי טפי ושרי מומי דלא ידעי אינשי ואמרי כי האי גוונא שרא רב ואתו למשרי מום עובר

And if you wish, say instead: It is due to this fact itself: Since Rav was a great expert with regard to blemishes, he would permit blemishes that average people do not know about. And as a result, they would erroneously say with regard to a different blemish: In a case like this Rav declared the animal permitted, and in this way they would come to erroneously permit an animal with a temporary blemish, believing it to be identical to the blemish that Rav had declared permitted. Due to this concern, Rav was denied the authority to declare firstborn animals permitted on the basis of a blemish.

יורה יורה אי גמיר רשותא למה לי למישקל משום מעשה שהיה

With regard to the permission granted to Rabba bar Ḥana and Rav, the Gemara had related that Rabbi Ḥiyya asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: May he teach people and issue rulings concerning what is prohibited and what is permitted? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded: He may teach. The Gemara asks: If he had studied and mastered the relevant halakhot, why do I need him to receive permission? The need for formal authority is understandable when it comes to serving on a court to judge cases of monetary law, but any knowledgeable person should be qualified to answer questions about ritual law. The Gemara explains: The need for such permission is due to an incident that took place.

דתניא פעם אחת הלך רבי למקום אחד וראה בני אדם שמגבלין עיסותיהם בטומאה אמר להם מפני מה אתם מגבלין עיסותיכם בטומאה אמרו לו תלמיד אחד בא לכאן והורה לנו מי בצעים אין מכשירין והוא מי ביצים דרש להו ואינהו סבור מי בצעים קאמר

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once went to a certain place, and he saw people there kneading dough while they were in a state of ritual impurity, and they believed that nevertheless, the dough remained ritually pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: For what reason are you kneading your dough in a state of ritual impurity? They said to him: A certain Torah scholar came here and taught us that water from swamps [mei betza’im] does not render food susceptible to contract ritual impurity. Therefore, they would take water from swamps and knead dough with it, in the mistaken belief that such dough would not be susceptible to ritual impurity. But in reality, what he taught them was that water of eggs [mei beitzim], i.e., the albumin of eggs, does not render food susceptible to impurity, as it is not considered water. But they thought he said: Water from swamps.

וטעו נמי בהא מי קרמיון ומי פיגה פסולין מפני שהן מי (בצעים) ואינהו סבור מדלגבי חטאת פסילי אכשורי נמי לא מכשרי ולא היא התם לענין חטאת בעינן מים חיים הכא אכשורי כל דהו מכשרי

And the residents of that same place erred also with regard to this: It was taught in a mishna (Para 8:10): The waters of the Keramiyyon River and the waters of the Piga River are not fit for mixing with ashes of the red heifer to use as water of purification, since they are water from swamps. And they erroneously thought: Since this water is not fit for use as water of purification, this means it is not considered water, and therefore it also does not render food susceptible to contracting impurity. But it is not so, as there, with regard to water of purification, we need: “Running water” (see Numbers 19:17), and water from swamps is not running water. But here, with regard to rendering food susceptible to impurity, any water renders food susceptible.

תנא באותה שעה גזרו תלמיד אל יורה אלא אם כן נוטל רשות מרבו

It was taught: At that time, when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi discovered the consequences resulting from a Torah scholar who was not precise with his terminology, the Sages decreed: A Torah scholar may not teach halakha unless he receives permission from his teacher to do so. The teacher should not grant him this permission if he does not know how to express himself in a clear manner.

תנחום בריה דרבי אמי איקלע לחתר דרש להו מותר ללתות חיטין בפסח אמרו לו לאו ר' מני דמן צור איכא הכא ותניא תלמיד אל יורה הלכה במקום רבו אלא אם כן היה רחוק ממנו שלש פרסאות כנגד מחנה ישראל אמר להו לאו אדעתאי

Concerning a similar matter, the Gemara relates: Tanḥum, son of Rabbi Ami, arrived at a place called Ḥatar, and he taught them: It is permitted to wash wheat in a small amount of water in order to make it easier to peel during the grinding process on Passover, and there is no concern that perhaps it will become leavened. They said to him: Isn’t Rabbi Mani from Tyre here i.e., near our location? And it is taught in a baraita: A Torah scholar may not teach halakha in the vicinity of his teacher, unless he is distant from the teacher by at least three parasangs [parsaot], corresponding to the size of the camp of Israel. In the encampment in the wilderness no one else judged cases, as all the Jewish people brought their cases to Moses (see Exodus 33:7). Tanḥum, son of Rabbi Ami, said to them: It did not enter my mind that Rabbi Mani was in the vicinity.

רבי חייא חזייה לההוא גברא דהוה קאי בבית הקברות אמר ליה לאו בן איש פלוני כהן אתה אמר ליה אין אבוה דההוא גברא גבה עינים הוה נתן עיניו בגרושה וחיללו

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya saw a certain man standing in a cemetery. He said to him: Are you not the son of so-and-so the priest? As it is prohibited for priests to come into contact with the dead (see Leviticus 21:1–4), Rabbi Ḥiyya was surprised to see a priest standing in a cemetery. The man said to him: Yes, but that man’s, meaning his own, father was a man with raised eyes who would desire things that he saw, even if they were forbidden. He set his eyes upon a divorcée and married her despite the Torah prohibition against such a union (see Leviticus 21:7), and thereby disqualified the offspring of that union from the sanctity of priesthood. As the son of a priest and a divorcée, the man had the status of a ḥalal and was therefore not obligated to abide by the restrictions specific to priests.

פשיטא לפלגא הא קאמר דמהני על תנאי מאי תא שמע דאמר ליה רבי יוחנן לרב שמן הרי אתה ברשותינו עד שתבא אצלנו

Continuing the discussion about receiving permission to teach halakha, the Gemara discusses the extent of this authority. It is obvious that one’s teacher can grant partial permission, meaning permission to rule on certain types of cases but not others, as it has been said above that doing so is effective. But what is the halakha with regard to granting such permission conditionally? Is it possible to grant permission limited to a certain period of time, or limited to a certain location? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the solution to this matter from what Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rav Shemen: You have our permission to instruct and to adjudicate until you return to us. This statement proves that it is possible to grant permission limited to a specific period of time.

גופא אמר שמואל ב' שדנו דיניהם דין אלא שנקרא ב"ד חצוף יתיב רב נחמן וקאמר להא שמעתא איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן אפילו שנים מזכין או שנים מחייבין ואחד אומר איני יודע יוסיפו הדיינין ואי איתא להוו כשנים שדנו

§ Earlier, the Gemara discussed the possibility of a court consisting of only two judges adjudicating a case. Concerning the matter itself, Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rav Naḥman sat and said this halakha. Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a mishna (29a): In a case where three judges are adjudicating a case, even if two judges deem the defendant exempt from payment or two judges deem him liable to pay, and one says: I do not know, the judges must add another judge, since the one who abstained has removed himself from the court, and there are not enough judges. And if it is so as Shmuel says, they should be viewed as two judges who adjudicated the case, and there would be no need to add another judge, as a judgment passed by two judges is valid.

שאני התם דמעיקרא אדעתא דתלתא יתיבי הכא לאו אדעתא דתלתא יתיבי

Rav Naḥman answered him: It is different there, as they convened from the outset with the knowledge that they are three and intended to judge the case with three judges. Therefore, if one abstains, they must add another to complete the quorum. But here they did not convene with the knowledge that they are three, but rather intended to adjudicate the case as a court of two judges.

איתיביה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר הדין בשלשה ופשרה בשנים ויפה כח פשרה מכח הדין ששנים שדנו בעלי דינין יכולין לחזור בהן ושנים שעשו פשרה אין בעלי דינין יכולין לחזור בהן

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges, and mediation leading to compromise can be performed by two mediators. And the power of compromise is greater than the power of adjudication, as if two judges adjudicated a case, the litigants are able to withdraw from the case and demand a court with a complete quorum. But if two mediated a compromise, the litigants may not withdraw.

וכי תימא פליגי רבנן עליה דרשב"ג והאמר רבי אבהו שנים שדנו לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין גברא אגברא קא רמית

And if you would say the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the minimum number of judges necessary to adjudicate, but doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment, as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid? The Gemara rejects this question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Although Rabbi Abbahu asserts that all agree that two judges cannot issue a binding judgment, Shmuel differs. According to Shmuel, the Rabbis hold that the judgment of two judges is considered binding.

גופא א"ר אבהו שנים שדנו דיני ממונות לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין איתיביה רבי אבא לרבי אבהו דן את הדין וזיכה את החייב וחייב את הזכאי טימא את הטהור טיהר את הטמא מה שעשה עשוי ומשלם מביתו

§ Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Abbahu says: With regard to a court of two judges that adjudicated cases of monetary law of any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, everyone agrees that their judgment is not a valid judgment. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a single judge adjudicated a case of monetary law and erroneously exonerated the litigant who should have been deemed liable, or deemed liable the litigant who should have been deemed exempt, or if one issued a halakhic ruling whereby he deemed ritually impure that which is actually pure, or deemed pure that which is impure, what he did is done, i.e., his ruling is binding. And the judge nevertheless pays from his house, i.e., from his own pocket, for the loss he has caused. Evidently, the ruling of even a single judge constitutes a valid judgment.

הכא במאי עסקינן דקיבלוהו עלייהו אי הכי אמאי משלם מביתו דאמרו ליה דיינת לן דין תורה

The Gemara responds: Here we are dealing with a case in which the litigants accepted the singular judge upon themselves, and it is for that reason that his ruling is binding. Otherwise, it would not be binding, as a halakhic court must contain a minimum of three judges. The Gemara asks: If so, that the litigants agreed to accept whatever ruling the judge issued, why must the judge pay from his own house? The Gemara answers: The judge is liable because the case is where they said to him: Adjudicate the case for us according to Torah law. Since he did not issue a halakhically proper judgment, he is liable.

א"ל רב ספרא לרבי אבא דטעה במאי אילימא דטעה בדבר משנה והאמר רב ששת א"ר (אמי) טעה בדבר משנה חוזר אלא דטעה בשיקול הדעת

Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: This ruling applies when he erred in what respect? If we say that he erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and he mistakenly ruled against an explicitly stated halakha, that is difficult. But doesn’t Rav Sheshet say that Rabbi Ami says: If the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked and the case retried? Rather, the case is where he erred in his deliberation.

היכי דמי בשיקול הדעת אמר רב פפא כגון תרי תנאי ותרי אמוראי דפליגי אהדדי ולא איתמר הלכתא לא כמר ולא כמר וסוגיין דעלמא אליבא דחד מינייהו ואזל איהו ועבד כאידך היינו שיקול הדעת

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an error in deliberation? Rav Pappa said: The circumstances of an error in deliberation are where, for example, there are two tanna’im or two amora’im who disagree with one another, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with the opinion of one Sage or with the opinion of the other Sage; and the standard practice is in accordance with the opinion of one of them, and he went and executed the judgment in accordance with the other opinion; this is an error in deliberation.

לימא כתנאי ביצוע בשלשה דברי ר"מ וחכ"א פשרה ביחיד סברוה לכ"ע מקשינן פשרה לדין

§ The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as detailed in the following baraita: Mediation can be performed by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromise can be performed by even a single judge. The Sages assumed that everyone agrees that we compare compromise to judgment, and require the same amount of judges for each process.

מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר דין בשלשה ומר סבר דין בשנים לא דכ"ע דין בשלשה והכא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מקשינן פשרה לדין ומר סבר לא מקשינן פשרה לדין

What, is it not that they disagree in this matter, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed by a minimum of three judges, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed even by two judges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: No, it is that everyone holds that judgment must be performed by a minimum of three judges, and here, they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that we compare compromise to judgment, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we do not compare compromise to judgment.

לימא תלתא תנאי בפשרה דמר סבר בשלשה ומר סבר בשנים ומר סבר ביחיד אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ואיתימא רבי יימר בר שלמיא מאן דאמר תרי אפילו חד נמי והאי דקאמר תרי כי היכי דליהוו עליה סהדי

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there are three opinions of tanna’im with regard to mediation leading to compromise, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that mediation must be performed by a panel of three judges; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it can be performed by two judges; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it can be performed by a single judge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who says mediation must be performed by two judges would say that it may even be performed by one. And the reason that he says two is merely that there would be two witnesses to the proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise.

אמר רב אשי ש"מ פשרה אינה צריכה קנין דאי סלקא דעתך צריכה קנין למ"ד צריכה תלתא ל"ל תסגי בתרי וליקני מיניה והלכתא פשרה צריכה קנין

Rav Ashi says: Learn from that discussion that compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition, which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. As if it enters your mind that compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms, according to the one who says it requires an act of acquisition, why do I need a formal court of three judges? Let it suffice with two judges, and let one litigant perform an act of acquisition with the other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: But nevertheless, the halakha is that a compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms.

תנו רבנן כשם שהדין בשלשה כך ביצוע בשלשה

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:2–8): Just as judgment is performed by three judges, so too, mediation is performed by three judges.

נגמר הדין אי אתה רשאי לבצוע:

Once the verdict of the judgment has been issued, it is not permitted for you to mediate a dispute.

סרמ"ש בנק"ש סימן: ר"א בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אסור לבצוע וכל הבוצע ה"ז חוטא וכל המברך את הבוצע הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר (תהלים י, ג) בוצע ברך נאץ ה'

The Gemara presents a mnemonic device alluding to the names of tanna’im in the coming discussion: Samekh, reish, mem, shin; beit, nun, kuf, shin. The Tosefta cites several statements of tanna’im related to compromise and the term botze’a. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze’a] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3).

אלא יקוב הדין את ההר שנאמר (דברים א, יז) כי המשפט לאלהים הוא וכן משה היה אומר יקוב הדין את ההר אבל אהרן אוהב שלום ורודף שלום ומשים שלום בין אדם לחבירו שנאמר (מלאכי ב, ו) תורת אמת היתה בפיהו ועולה לא נמצא בשפתיו בשלום ובמישור הלך אתי ורבים השיב מעון

Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: “For the judgment is God’s” (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: “The law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity” (Malachi 2:6).

ר' אליעזר אומר הרי שגזל סאה של חטים וטחנה ואפאה והפריש ממנה חלה כיצד מברך אין זה מברך אלא מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ובוצע ברך נאץ ה'

The Tosefta cites several other interpretations of the above-mentioned verse from Psalms. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se’a of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated ḥalla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of ḥalla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze’a] the bread despises the Lord.

רבי מאיר אומר לא נאמר בוצע אלא כנגד יהודה שנאמר (בראשית לז, כו) ויאמר יהודה אל אחיו מה בצע כי נהרוג את אחינו וכל המברך את יהודה הרי זה מנאץ ועל זה נאמר ובוצע ברך נאץ ה'

Rabbi Meir says: The term botze’a employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: “And Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites” (Genesis 37:26–27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: “And whoever blesses the profiteer [botze’a] despises the Lord.”

רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר מצוה לבצוע שנאמר (זכריה ח, טז) אמת ומשפט שלום שפטו בשעריכם והלא במקום שיש משפט אין שלום ובמקום שיש שלום אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו שלום הוי אומר זה ביצוע

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: It is a mitzva to mediate a dispute, as it is stated: “Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates” (Zechariah 8:16). Is it not that in the place where there is strict judgment there is no true peace, and in a place where there is true peace, there is no strict judgment? Rather, which is the judgment that has peace within it? You must say: This is mediation, as both sides are satisfied with the result.

וכן בדוד הוא אומר (שמואל ב ח, טו) ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה והלא כל מקום שיש משפט אין צדקה וצדקה אין משפט אלא איזהו משפט שיש בו צדקה הוי אומר זה ביצוע

And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). And is it not that wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which is the justice that has within it charity? You must say: This is mediation.

אתאן לת"ק דן את הדין זיכה את הזכאי וחייב את החייב וראה שנתחייב עני ממון ושלם לו מתוך ביתו זה משפט וצדקה

The Gemara cites an alternative interpretation of David’s method of judgment, in which we come to the opinion of the first tanna, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that it is prohibited to mediate a dispute: If a judge adjudicated a case of monetary law, and he correctly exonerated the party who was exempt from payment and deemed liable the party who was liable to pay, if he then saw that due to his ruling a poor person became liable to pay an amount of money that is beyond his means and therefore the judge himself paid for him from his own house, this is justice and also charity.

משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממון וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו (וכן בדוד הוא אומר ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו משפט לזה שהחזיר לו את ממונו וצדקה לזה ששילם לו מתוך ביתו)

The Gemara continues: It is justice for this one and charity for that one: It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him; and it is charity for that poor person, because the judge paid for him from his own house. And similarly, with regard to David, it says: “And David executed justice and charity to all his people” (II Samuel 8:15). He executed justice for this one, because he restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because he paid for him from his own house.

קשיא ליה לרבי האי לכל עמו לעניים מיבעי ליה אלא (רבי אומר) אע"פ שלא שילם מתוך ביתו זהו משפט וצדקה משפט לזה וצדקה לזה משפט לזה שהחזיר לו ממונו וצדקה לזה שהוציא גזילה מתחת ידו

This interpretation of the verse is difficult for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If the word “charity” is meant to demonstrate that David supported the poor defendants, this term: “To all his people,” is incorrect. If the interpretation is correct, it should have stated: Charity to the poor people. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Although he did not pay from his own house, it is still justice and charity. It is justice for this one and charity for that one. It is justice for this one, because the judge restored his money to him, and charity for that one, because the judge removed the stolen item from his possession. By adjudicating the case correctly and compelling the liable party to pay his debt, the judge thereby ensures that the liable party does not illegitimately maintain property to which he is not entitled.

רבי שמעון בן מנסיא אומר שנים שבאו לפניך לדין עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו שנאמר (משלי יז, יד) פוטר מים ראשית מדון ולפני התגלע הריב נטוש קודם שנתגלע הריב אתה יכול לנטשו משנתגלע הריב אי אתה יכול יכול לנטשו

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If two litigants come before you for a judgment, before you hear their respective statements and claims; or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, meaning that it is not yet clear to the judge which party is in the right, you are permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate. But after you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you are not permitted to say to them: Go out and mediate, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water; therefore leave off contention before the quarrel breaks out” (Proverbs 17:14). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya interprets the verse to mean: Before the resolution of the contention is revealed, you can cast it off. Once the resolution of the contention is revealed, you cannot cast it off.

(וריש לקיש) אמר שנים שבאו לדין אחד רך ואחד קשה עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להם אין אני נזקק לכם שמא נתחייב חזק ונמצא חזק רודפו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה יכול לומר להן איני נזקק לכם שנא' (דברים א, יז) לא תגורו מפני איש

And Reish Lakish says: If two litigants come for a judgment, and one is flexible and agreeable and one is rigid and contentious, before you hear their respective statements, or after you hear their statements but you do not yet know where the judgment is leaning, it is permitted for you to say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you. The judge may refuse the case out of fear that perhaps the strong and contentious one will be found liable, and it will turn out that the strong one will pursue the judge with intent to harm him. But once you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, you may not say to them: I will not submit to your request to judge you, as it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man” (Deuteronomy 1:17).

ר' יהושע בן קרחה אומר מניין לתלמיד שיושב לפני רבו וראה זכות לעני וחובה לעשיר מניין שלא ישתוק שנאמר לא תגורו מפני איש רבי חנין אומר לא תכניס דבריך מפני איש ויהו עדים יודעים את מי הן מעידין ולפני מי הן מעידין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנא' (דברים יט, יז) ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני ה'

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that a student who is sitting before his teacher and he sees a point of merit for a poor person or liability for a wealthy person, from where is it derived that he should not be silent? As it is stated: “You shall not be afraid before any man”; he should fear neither his teacher nor the wealthy litigant. Rabbi Ḥanin says: The verse intimates: Do not suppress your statement before any man. And the witnesses should know about whom they are testifying, and before Whom they are testifying, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “Then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 19:17).

ויהו הדיינין יודעין את מי הן דנין ולפני מי הן דנין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנא' (תהלים פב, א) אלהים נצב בעדת אל וכן ביהושפט הוא אומר (דברי הימים ב יט, ו) ויאמר אל השופטים ראו מה אתם עושים כי לא לאדם תשפטו כי (אם) לה' שמא יאמר הדיין מה לי בצער הזה ת"ל עמכם בדבר משפט אין לו לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות

And the judges should know whom they are judging, and before Whom they are judging, and Who will ultimately exact payment from them, as it is stated: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1). And similarly, with regard to Jehoshaphat it says: “And he said to the judges: Consider what you do; for you judge not for man, but for the Lord” (II Chronicles 19:6). And lest the judge say: What value is there for me with this suffering? Why should I engage in such a burdensome and difficult task? The verse states: “He is with you in giving judgment,” from which it is derived that in rendering his decision, a judge has only that which his eyes see. He is enjoined to render the best judgment possible based on the information he has available, and he is not accountable for anything else.

היכי דמי גמר דין אמר רב יהודה אמר רב איש פלוני אתה חייב איש פלוני אתה זכאי אמר רב הלכה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה איני והא רב הונא תלמידיה דרב הוה כי הוה אתו לקמיה דרב הונא אמר להו אי דינא בעיתו אי פשרה בעיתו מאי מצוה נמי דקאמר רבי יהושע בן קרחה

Earlier, the Tosefta stated that once the verdict has been issued, it is not permitted for the judge to arrange a compromise. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a verdict, i.e., what is the formal action that signifies the conclusion of the case? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is when the judge says: So-and-so, you are liable; so-and-so, you are exonerated. Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who said it is a mitzva to mediate a dispute. The Gemara asks: Is that so? And was it not that Rav Huna was a student of Rav, and when litigants would come before Rav Huna he would say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? Evidently, Rav’s student Rav Huna did not hold that it is a mitzva to specifically arrange a compromise. The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa mean that he says it is a mitzva?

מצוה למימרא להו אי דינא בעיתו אי פשרה בעיתו היינו תנא קמא איכא בינייהו מצוה רבי יהושע בן קרחה סבר מצוה ת"ק סבר רשות

He means that it is a mitzva to say to them: Do you want a strict judgment, or do you want a compromise? The Gemara objects: Since this opinion is the same as that of the first tanna, who also allows compromise, it is redundant to teach it. The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them with regard to the question of whether it is a mitzva to arrange a compromise. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa holds that it is a mitzva to offer them the option of compromise, and the first tanna holds that it is merely permitted.

היינו דר"ש בן מנסיא איכא בינייהו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו

The Gemara objects: If so, the opinion of the first tanna is the same as that of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. The Gemara answers that there is a difference between them with regard to the principle: After you hear their statements and you know where the judgment is leaning, it is not permitted for you to say to them: Go out and mediate. In that instance, the first tanna holds that it is still not too late to suggest mediation.

ופליגא דרבי תנחום בר חנילאי דאמר רבי תנחום בר חנילאי לא נאמר מקרא זה אלא כנגד מעשה העגל שנאמר (שמות לב, ה) וירא אהרן ויבן מזבח לפניו מה ראה א"ר בנימין בר יפת א"ר אלעזר ראה חור שזבוח לפניו

§ And the various Sages who offered interpretations of the verse: “And the covetous blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3), disagree with the explanation of Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai. As Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai says: This verse was stated only with regard to the incident of the Golden Calf, as it is stated: “And Aaron saw this, and he built [vayyiven] an altar [mizbe’aḥ] before it…and said: Tomorrow shall be a feast to the Lord” (Exodus 32:5). What did Aaron see? Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet says that Rabbi Elazar says: He saw Hur, who had been appointed together with Aaron by Moses to lead the people during Moses’ absence (see Exodus 24:14), slaughtered before him, as he had protested the plan to fashion a calf and had been murdered by the people as a result. The verse is therefore interpreted not as: Aaron built an altar before the calf, but rather: He understood [vayyaven] from the slaughter [mizavuaḥ] before his own eyes; and he then called for a feast.

אמר אי לא שמענא להו השתא עבדו לי כדעבדו בחור ומיקיים בי (איכה ב, כ) אם יהרג במקדש ה' כהן ונביא ולא הויא להו תקנתא לעולם מוטב דליעבדו לעגל אפשר הויא להו תקנתא בתשובה

Aaron said to himself: If I do not listen to them now, they will do to me as they did to Hur, and the verse: “Shall the priest and the prophet be slain in the sanctuary of the Lord?” (Lamentations 2:20), will be fulfilled through me, and they will never have a remedy for such a sin. It is better for them to worship the calf, as it is possible they will have a remedy through repentance. Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai, whoever praises Aaron for this compromise is provoking God.

והני תנאי (משלי יז, יד) פוטר מים ראשית מדון מאי דרשי ביה כדרב המנונא דאמר רב המנונא אין תחילת דינו של אדם נידון אלא על דברי תורה שנאמר פוטר מים ראשית מדון אמר רב הונא האי תיגרא דמיא לצינורא דבידקא דמיא כיון דרווח רווח

And with regard to those tanna’im who did not interpret the verse: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water” (Proverbs 17:14), with regard to compromise, what do they derive from this verse? They understand the verse in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says: The beginning of a person’s judgment after he dies is that he is judged only concerning matters of Torah, as it is stated: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water.” Based on this verse, Rav Huna says: This quarrel between people is comparable to a split in a hose caused by a burst of water, emptying into a field; once the split in the hose widens, it widens even more and can no longer be repaired. To save the field, the hose must be repaired as soon as it splits. The same is true with regard to a quarrel; it must be stopped as soon as it begins.

אביי קשישא אמר דמי לגודא דגמלא כיון דקם קם:

Abaye the Elder makes a similar point with a different metaphor, and says: A quarrel is comparable to a board in a wooden bridge. Once it has stood in its place and been stabilized, it continues to stand and becomes ever more rigid and stable. Consequently, the best time to address and end the dispute is at the very beginning.

שמע"י ושת"י שב"ע זמירו"ת הו"א סימן:

§ Apropos the previous discussion, the Gemara recounts several incidents in which passersby recited popular proverbs. Shimi ushti, sheva zemirot hu is a mnemonic device for these incidents.

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל טוביה דשמע ואדיש חלפוה בישתיה מאה א"ל שמואל לרב יהודה קרא כתיב פוטר מים ראשית מדון ריש מאה דיני

There was a certain man who was saying as he walked: It is good for a person who hears statements said against him and yet remains silent, as a hundred misfortunes pass him by as a result. Upon hearing this, Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: A verse is written that conveys the message of this aphorism: “The beginning of strife is as when one releases water” (Proverbs 17:14). The words “beginning [poter] of strife [reishit madon]” allude to: The beginning of one hundred litigations [reish me’a dinei]. Troubles are avoided if one overlooks and excuses [poter] an offense.

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל אתרתי תלת גנבא לא מיקטל א"ל שמואל לרב יהודה קרא כתיב (עמוס ב, ו) כה אמר ה' על שלשה פשעי ישראל ועל ארבעה לא אשיבנו

There was a certain man who was saying as he walked by: For only two or three thefts, the thief is not executed by the heavenly court. Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: A verse is written that conveys the message of this aphorism: “So says the Lord: For three transgressions of Israel, or for four, I will not repay it” (Amos 2:6). Shmuel interprets the verse rhetorically, as if saying: Will I not repay the fourth offense? Accordingly, before the fourth offense, it is still possible to rectify the sins.

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל שב בירי לשלמנא וחדא לעביד ביש א"ל שמואל לרב יהודה קרא כתיב (משלי כד, טז) כי שבע יפול צדיק וקם (ורשע יפול באחת)

There was a certain man who was saying as he walked: Seven pits are dug for the man of peace, and he escapes all of them, and one pit is dug for the evildoer, and he cannot escape it. Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: A verse is written that conveys the message of this aphorism: “For a righteous man falls seven times, and rises up again, but the wicked shall fall at once” (see Proverbs 24:16, 28:18).

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל דאזיל מבי דינא שקל גלימא ליזמר זמר וליזיל באורחא א"ל שמואל לרב יהודה קרא כתיב (שמות יח, כג) וגם כל העם הזה על מקומו יבא בשלום

There was a certain man who was saying as he walked: With regard to one who goes from the court, and his cloak has been taken from him in the course of the proceedings, i.e., he lost all his money due to a ruling against him, let him sing a song and go happily on the way. Although he lost the case, he has benefited from justice being served. Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: A verse is written with regard to Yitro’s advice for judiciary reforms that conveys the message of this aphorism: “And all these people shall also go to their place in peace” (Exodus 18:23). If justice is served, all the litigants, not only those who emerge victorious, can leave in peace.

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל היא ניימא ודיקולא שפיל אמר ליה שמואל לרב יהודה קרא כתיב (קהלת י, יח) בעצלתים ימך המקרה וגו'

There was a certain man who was saying as he walked: If a woman is carrying a basket on her head, when she is dozing the reed basket falls. Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: A verse is written that conveys the message of this aphorism: “By laziness the rafters sink in; and through idleness of the hands the house leaks” (Ecclesiastes 10:18).

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל גברא דרחיצנא עליה אדייה לגזיזיה וקם א"ל שמואל לרב יהודה קרא כתיב (תהלים מא, י) גם איש שלומי אשר בטחתי בו וגו'

There was a certain man who was saying as he walked: The man upon whom I relied has lifted his fist [ligzizeih] and stood against me. Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: A verse is written that conveys the message of this aphorism: “Indeed, my own familiar friend, in whom I trusted, who did eat of my bread, has lifted up his heel against me” (Psalms 41:10).

ההוא דהוה קאמר ואזיל כי רחימתין הוה עזיזא אפותיא דספסירא שכיבן השתא דלא עזיזא רחימתין פוריא בר שיתין גרמידי לא סגי לן אמר רב הונא קראי כתיבי מעיקרא כתיב (שמות כה, כב) ונועדתי לך שם ודברתי אתך מעל הכפורת ותניא ארון תשעה וכפורת טפח הרי כאן עשרה

There was a certain man who was saying about his marriage as he walked: When our love was strong, we could have slept on a bed that was the width of a sword. Now that our love is not strong, a bed of sixty cubits is not sufficient for us. Rav Huna said: Verses are written that convey these sentiments. Initially, it was written: “I will meet with you there and I will speak with you from above the Ark Cover” (Exodus 25:22), and it is taught in a baraita: The Ark of the Covenant was itself nine handbreadths high, and the Ark Cover was one handbreadth thick. There is a total height of ten handbreadths here. At first, when God had great affection for Israel, the Divine Presence was revealed within the confines of this limited space.

וכתיב (מלכים א ו, ב) והבית אשר בנה המלך שלמה לה' ששים אמה ארכו ועשרים רחבו ושלשים אמה קומתו ולבסוף כתיב (ישעיהו סו, א) כה אמר ה' השמים כסאי והארץ הדום רגלי איזה בית אשר תבנו לי וגו'

And it is written: “And the house that King Solomon built for the Lord, its length was sixty cubits, and its breadth twenty cubits, and its height thirty cubits” (I Kings 6:2). And at the end, when Israel sinned, the whole of the space of the Temple was not expansive enough for the Divine Presence to rest within it, as it is written: “Thus says the Lord: The heaven is My throne, and the earth is My footstool; where is the house that you may build for Me? And where is the place that may be My resting place?” (Isaiah 66:1). In times of discord, the Temple is an insufficient resting place for the Divine Presence.

מאי משמע דהאי לא תגורו לישנא דכנושי הוא אמר רב נחמן אמר קרא (דברים כח, לט) ויין לא תשתה ולא תאגור רב אחא בר יעקב אמר מהכא (משלי ו, ח) תכין בקיץ לחמה אגרה בקציר מאכלה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר מהכא (משלי י, ה) אוגר בקיץ בן משכיל:

The Gemara returns to analyzing the Tosefta. From where may it be inferred that this expression: “You shall not be afraid [taguru]” (Deuteronomy 1:17), is a term for gathering in, so that the term may be interpreted to mean that a judge may not keep his ruling to himself? Rav Naḥman said: The verse states: “You shalt plant vineyards and dress them, but you shall neither drink of the wine, nor gather [te’egor]” (Deuteronomy 28:39). Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says it is derived from here: “She provides her bread in the summer, and gathers [agra] her food in the harvest” (Proverbs 6:8). Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says it is derived from here: “A wise son gathers [oger] in the summer” (Proverbs 10:5).

אמ"ת ממו"ן ירא"ה סימן: אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני אמר רבי יונתן כל דיין שדן דין אמת לאמיתו משרה שכינה בישראל שנאמר (תהלים פב, א) אלהים נצב בעדת אל בקרב אלהים ישפוט וכל דיין שאינו דן דין אמת לאמיתו גורם לשכינה שתסתלק מישראל שנאמר (תהלים יב, ו) משוד עניים מאנקת אביונים עתה אקום יאמר ה' וגו'

§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic device indicating the following series of statements about judges and their functions: Emet mamon yireh. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: Any judge who judges a judgment according to absolute truth [emet] causes the Divine Presence to rest among Israel, as it is stated: “God stands in the congregation of God; in the midst of the judges He judges” (Psalms 82:1), indicating that the Divine Presence is in the midst of the court. And every judge who does not judge a judgment according to absolute truth causes the Divine Presence to withdraw from Israel, as it is stated: “For the oppression of the poor, for the sighing of the needy, now will I arise, says the Lord” (Psalms 12:6). God will arise and leave the people as a result of oppression.

ואמר רבי שמואל בר (נחמן) אמר רבי יונתן כל דיין שנוטל מזה ונותן לזה שלא כדין הקדוש ברוך הוא נוטל ממנו נפשו שנאמר (משלי כב, כב) אל תגזול דל כי דל הוא ואל תדכא עני בשער כי ה' יריב ריבם וקבע את קובעיהם נפש

And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: With regard to any judge who takes disputed property or money [mamon] from this litigant and gives it to that other litigant unlawfully, the Holy One, Blessed be He, takes his soul from him as punishment for his corruption, as it is stated: “Rob not the weak, because he is weak, neither crush the poor in the gate; for the Lord will plead their cause and despoil of life those who despoil them” (Proverbs 22:22–23). God cautions that He will take the life of one who steals from the poor at the gate, meaning in the courtroom, as the city gate was the traditional site of the community’s court.

ואמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני אמר רבי יונתן לעולם יראה דיין עצמו כאילו חרב מונחת לו בין ירכותיו וגיהנם פתוחה לו מתחתיו

And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: A judge should always view [yireh] himself as if a sword is placed between his thighs, so that if he leans to the right or to the left he will be injured, and as if Gehenna is opened up beneath him,

שנאמר (שיר השירים ג, ז) הנה מטתו שלשלמה ששים גבורים סביב לה מגבורי ישראל כולם אחוזי חרב מלומדי מלחמה איש חרבו על יריכו מפחד בלילות מפחדה של גיהנם שדומה ללילה

as it is stated: “Behold, it is the bed of Solomon; sixty mighty men are around it, of the mighty men of Israel. They all handle the sword, and are expert in war; every man has his sword upon his thigh due to dread in the night” (Song of Songs 3:7–8). The words “due to dread in the night” mean due to the dread of Gehenna, which is similar to the night. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani interprets this verse as referring to judges, who are called: Mighty men of Israel, as they preside in the Temple, which is termed: The bed of God. In this verse, God is referred to as: Solomon [Shlomo], the King to Whom peace [shalom] belongs.

דרש ר' יאשיה ואיתימא רב נחמן בר יצחק מאי דכתיב (ירמיהו כא, יב) בית דוד כה אמר ה' דינו לבקר משפט והצילו גזול מיד עושק וכי בבקר דנין וכל היום אין דנין אלא אם ברור לך הדבר כבקר אמרהו ואם לאו אל תאמרהו ר' חייא בר אבא א"ר יונתן מהכא (משלי ז, ד) אמור לחכמה אחותי את אם ברור לך הדבר כאחותך שהיא אסורה לך אומרהו ואם לאו אל תאמרהו

Rabbi Yoshiya, and some say Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, interpreted a verse homiletically. What is the meaning of that which is written: “House of David, so says the Lord: Execute justice in the morning, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor” (Jeremiah 21:12)? And is it so that a court may judge in the morning, and all the rest of the day a court may not judge? Why does the verse specifically relate to judging in the morning? Rather, the meaning is: If the matter is as clear to you as the morning, state the verdict; and if not, do not state it. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yonatan says this principle may be derived from here: “Say to wisdom: You are my sister” (Proverbs 7:4). If the matter is as clear to you as the fact that your sister is forbidden to you, state it, and if not, do not state it.

אמר ר' יהושע בן לוי עשרה שיושבין בדין קולר תלוי בצואר כולן פשיטא לא צריכא אלא לתלמיד היושב לפני רבו

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: If ten judges are sitting in judgment, a prisoner’s collar [kolar], referring to responsibility for the consequences of an incorrect verdict, hangs around all of their necks. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that all of the judges bear joint responsibility for the verdict? The Gemara answers: It is necessary only in order to include a student who is sitting in front of his teacher in the court, and notices that his teacher erred. Although he is not formally part of the court, he nevertheless bears responsibility if he remains silent.

רב הונא כי הוה אתי דינא לקמיה מיכניף ומייתי עשרה רבנן מבי רב אמר כי היכי דלימטיי' שיבא מכשורא רב אשי כי הוה אתי טריפתא לקמיה מכניף ומייתי להו לכולהו טבחי דמתא מחסיא אמר כי היכי דלימטיין שיבא מכשורא

The Gemara relates concerning Rav Huna that when a case would come before him for judgment, he would gather and bring ten rabbis from Rav’s study hall. He would say: I do this so that only a small part of the responsibility, comparable to a splinter from a beam, will reach each of us. The greater the number of judges, the less responsibility each one assumes for the verdict. Similarly, with Rav Ashi, when a person would come before him with meat suspected to be from an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifta], he would gather and bring together all the butchers of Mata Meḥasya and consult with them before ruling on the status of the meat. He would say to them: I do this so that only a small part of the responsibility, comparable to a splinter from a beam, will reach each of us.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר דרש רב נחמן בר כהן מאי דכתיב (משלי כט, ד) מלך במשפט יעמיד ארץ ואיש תרומות יהרסנה אם דיין דומה למלך שאינו צריך לכלום יעמיד ארץ ואם דומה לכהן שמחזר בבית הגרנות יהרסנה

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: Rav Naḥman bar Kohen interpreted a verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The king by justice establishes the land; but he who exacts gifts [terumot] overthrows it” (Proverbs 29:4)? This teaches that if the judge is like a king in that he does not need anything and is not dependent on anyone, he establishes the land, i.e., he can serve as a judge. But if he is like a priest who seeks out his terumot from various granaries, as he is dependent on others, he overthrows the land.

דבי נשיאה אוקמו דיינא דלא הוה גמיר א"ל ליהודה בר נחמני מתורגמניה דריש לקיש קום עליה באמורא קם גחין עליה ולא א"ל ולא מידי

In the house of the Nasi, they appointed a judge who was not learned. This judge said to Yehuda bar Naḥmani, who was the interpreter of Reish Lakish and whose role was to repeat and explain the Sage’s lectures: Stand over me as an interpreter, and I will lecture. Yehuda bar Naḥmani arose and bent over him in the conventional manner, to hear the judge’s words. And, being ignorant, the judge did not say anything to him.

פתח ואמר (חבקוק ב, יט) הוי אומר לעץ הקיצה עורי לאבן דומם הוא יורה הנה הוא תפוש זהב וכסף וכל רוח אין בקרבו ועתיד הקב"ה ליפרע ממעמידין שנאמר (חבקוק ב, כ) וה' בהיכל קדשו הס מפניו כל הארץ

The interpreter began and said: The verse states: “Woe to him who says to the wood: Awake, to the dumb stone: Arise. Can this teach? Behold, it is overlaid with gold and silver, and there is no breath at all in the midst of it” (Habakkuk 2:19). So is this judge, appointed to teach the public for gold, i.e., for payment, but no more qualified than wood and stone. And in the future, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will punish those who appoint such judges, as it is stated in the next verse: “But the Lord is in His holy Sanctuary; let all the earth be silent before Him” (Habakkuk 2:20). God, Who is above everything, will judge those responsible for such appointments.

אמר ריש לקיש כל המעמיד דיין (על הציבור) שאינו הגון כאילו נוטע אשירה בישראל שנאמר (דברים טז, יח) שופטים ושוטרים תתן לך וסמיך ליה (דברים טז, כא) לא תטע לך אשירה כל עץ אמר רב אשי ובמקום שיש תלמידי חכמים כאילו נטעו אצל מזבח שנאמר (דברים טז, כא) אצל מזבח ה' אלהיך

Reish Lakish says: With regard to anyone who appoints over the community a judge who is not fit, it is as though he plants a tree used as part of idolatrous rites [ashera] among the Jewish people, as it is stated: “You shall make judges and officers for yourself” (Deuteronomy 16:18), and juxtaposed to it, it is written: “You shall not plant yourself an ashera of any kind of tree” (Deuteronomy 16:21). By implication, appointing unfit judges is akin to planting a tree for idolatry. Rav Ashi says: And in a place where there are Torah scholars, it is as though he planted the tree next to the altar, as it is stated: “You shall not plant yourself an ashera…beside the altar of the Lord your God.”

כתיב (שמות כ, כג) לא תעשון אתי אלהי כסף ואלהי זהב אלהי כסף ואלהי זהב הוא דלא עבדי הא דעץ שרי אמר רב אשי אלוה הבא בשביל כסף ואלוה הבא בשביל זהב

It is written: “You shall not make with Me gods of [elohei] silver and gods of gold” (Exodus 20:20). The Gemara asks: It is gods of silver and gods of gold that you may not make, but are gods of wood permitted? Rather, Rav Ashi says: This verse discusses a judge, called elohim, who comes, i.e., is appointed, due to payment of silver, and a judge who comes due to payment of gold.

רב כי הוה אתי לבי דינא אמר הכי ברעות נפשיה לקטלא נפיק וצבי ביתיה לית הוא עביד וריקן לביתיה עייל ולואי שתהא ביאה כיציאה

The Gemara relates that Rav, when he would come to court to judge a case, would say this about himself: By his own will he goes out to danger of death, as a judge who misjudges a case is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven; and he does not do what is necessary to provide for the needs of his house, and he enters his home empty-handed, because a judge does not receive a salary. He said: If only it should be so that his entry into his home will be the same as his departure, without sin or transgression.

כי הוי חזי אמבוהא (דספרי) אבתריה אמר (איוב כ, ו) אם יעלה לשמים שיאו [וגו'] כגללו לנצח יאבד (וגו') מר זוטרא חסידא כי הוו מכתפי ליה בשבתא דריגלא אמר הכי (משלי כז, כד) כי לא לעולם חוסן ואם נזר לדור ודור

In a similar demonstration of humility, when Rav would see a convoy [ambuha] of scribes following after him to honor him, he would say: “Though his excellency mount up to the heavens and his head reach the clouds, yet he shall perish forever like his own dung; they who have seen him shall say: Where is he?” (Job 20:6–7). It is said of Mar Zutra the Pious that when the people would carry him to his lectures on their shoulders during Shabbat of the Festival, he would say this to avoid becoming arrogant: “For power is not forever, and does the crown endure for all generations?” (Proverbs 27:24).

דרש בר קפרא מנא הא מילתא דאמרו רבנן הוו מתונין בדין דכתיב (שמות כ, כו) לא תעלה במעלות וסמיך ליה (שמות כא, א) ואלה המשפטים אמר ר' אליעזר מניין לדיין שלא יפסע על ראשי עם קודש שנא' לא תעלה במעלות וסמיך ליה ואלה המשפטים

Bar Kappara taught, based on a homiletical interpretation of a verse: From where is this matter that the Sages stated derived: Be temperate in judgment (Avot 1:1)? As it is written: “Neither shall you go up by steps onto My altar” (Exodus 20:23), i.e., do not ascend hurriedly, and juxtaposed to it, it is written: “Now these are the ordinances that you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1). Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that a judge may not step over the heads of the sacred nation, walking among those assembled for the lecture, who would sit upon the floor, in such a manner that he has the appearance of stepping on them? It is derived from that which is stated: “Neither shall you go up by steps,” and juxtaposed to it is an introduction to civil laws and courtroom regulations: “Now these are the ordinances.” This indicates that the prohibition against ascending upon steps applies to judges.

אשר תשים אשר תלמדם מיבעי ליה אמר רבי ירמיה ואיתימא רבי חייא בר אבא אלו כלי הדיינין רב הונא כי הוה נפק לדינא אמר הכי אפיקו לי מאני חנותאי מקל ורצועה ושופרא וסנדלא

The Gemara interprets the second part of the verse cited above: “Now these are the ordinances that you shall set before them.” The verse should have stated: That you shall teach them. What is indicated by the phrase: “Set before them”? Rabbi Yirmeya, and some say Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, says: These are the judges’ tools. To illustrate this, the Gemara relates that Rav Huna, when he would go out to a judgment, would say this: Take out for me tools from my shop: A rod and strap, with which to flog transgressors; and a shofar, necessary in the event that someone must be excommunicated; and a sandal, necessary in the event of ḥalitza, the procedure by which a levirate marriage is rejected.

(דברים א, טז) ואצוה את שופטיכם בעת ההיא אמר רבי יוחנן כנגד מקל ורצועה תהא זריז (דברים א, טז) שמוע בין אחיכם ושפטתם אמר רבי חנינא אזהרה לבית דין שלא ישמע דברי בעל דין קודם שיבא בעל דין חבירו ואזהרה לבעל דין שלא יטעים דבריו לדיין קודם שיבא בעל דין חבירו קרי ביה נמי שמע בין אחיכם

The Gemara interprets other verses related to the topic of adjudicating cases. “And I charged your judges at that time, saying: Hear the causes between your brethren, and judge righteously between a man and his brother, and the stranger who is with him” (Deuteronomy 1:16). Understanding that the word “charged” indicates alacrity, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Moses urged the judges: With regard to the rod and the strap, be vigilant. With regard to the clause “Hear the causes between your brethren, and judge,” Rabbi Ḥanina says: This is a warning to a court that it may not hear the statement of one litigant before the other litigant comes, and it is a warning to a litigant that he may not explain his statement to the judge before the other litigant comes. Read into the phrase in the verse: “Hear the causes between your brethren,” that it is also concerning the litigant. Although he is not the judge, he is also required to assure that the case is conducted in the presence of both parties.

רב כהנא אמר מהכא (שמות כג, א) מלא תשא לא תשיא

Rav Kahana says the litigant’s responsibility may be derived from here: From “you shall not bear [tissa] a false report” (Exodus 23:1). Although conjugated in this manner the verb would seem to be addressed to the judges, commanding them not to lend credence to a false report, the term may also be read as: You shall not deliver [tassi] a false report, conjugated so that it addresses the litigants and the witnesses.

(דברים א, טז) ושפטתם צדק אמר ריש לקיש צדק את הדין ואחר כך חתכהו (דברים א, טז) בין איש ובין אחיו (ובין גרו) אמר רב יהודה אפילו בין בית לעלייה

The Gemara returns to the verse in Deuteronomy cited above: “And I charged your judges at that time, saying: Hear the causes between your brethren, and judge righteously.” Reish Lakish says: Verify the judgment by meticulously examining the particulars of the case, and only afterward, implement it. The verse continues: “Between a man and his brother, and the stranger who is with him.” Rav Yehuda says: The judge must distinguish even between the merits of a house and the upper story when dividing a two-floor property among inheriting brothers.

ובין גרו אמר רב יהודה אפילו בין תנור לכירים

With regard to the clause in the verse: “And the stranger who is with him [gero],” the word gero resembles the word: Dwell [gur], and Rav Yehuda says: This word teaches that the judge must distinguish even between the merits of an oven and a stove. The judge must carefully weigh how to divide even these domestic items in a case of inheritance, to ensure that the distribution of property is absolutely equitable.

(דברים א, יז) לא תכירו פנים במשפט רבי יהודה אומר לא תכירהו רבי אלעזר אומר לא תנכרהו

The next verse states: “You shall not respect [takiru] people in judgment; you shall hear the small and the great alike; you shall not be afraid before any man, for the judgment is God’s; and the cause that is too hard for you, you shall bring to me, and I will hear it” (Deuteronomy 1:17). Rabbi Yehuda says: Do not recognize him [takirehu], i.e., do not acknowledge the litigant as a friend in your role as a judge. Rabbi Elazar says: Even if he is your opponent, do not estrange him [tenakerehu] in such a way as to prejudge him as liable, but treat him as though you do not know him at all.

אושפיזכניה דרב אתא לקמיה לדינא אמר לו לאו אושפיזכני את אמר לו אין אמר ליה דינא אית לי אמר ליה

Rav’s host [ushpizekhaneih], with whom he would stay occasionally, came before him for a judgment. Rav said to the host: Are you not my host? He said to him: Yes, I am. The host then said to him: I have a dispute with another that needs a judgment. Rav said to him:

פסילנא לך לדינא אמר ליה רב לרב כהנא פוק דייניה חזייה דהוה קא גאיס [ביה] א"ל אי צייתא צייתא ואי לא מפיקנא לך רב מאונך

I am disqualified to judge for you, because I may be partial to you due to what you’ve done for me. Rav said to Rav Kahana: Go out and judge the case. Rav Kahana saw that Rav’s host was acting haughtily due to his relationship with Rav, as he presumed that Rav Kahana was predisposed to favor him. Rav Kahana said to the host: If you are prepared to listen, then listen to me and follow my instructions. And if not, I will take Rav out of your ears. I will treat you harshly, and you will understand that your relationship with Rav will not help you at all.

(דברים א, יז) כקטן כגדול תשמעון אמר ריש לקיש שיהא חביב עליך דין של פרוטה כדין של מאה מנה למאי הלכתא אילימא לעיוני ביה ומיפסקיה פשיטא אלא לאקדומיה

§ The Gemara continues to interpret clauses from the verse cited above. “You shall hear the small and the great alike” (Deuteronomy 1:17). Reish Lakish says: This teaches that the judgment of one peruta should be as dear, i.e., important, to you as the judgment of one hundred maneh, i.e., ten thousand dinars. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is this said? If we say it is with regard to the need to study it carefully and to decide the case justly, it is obvious that even cases relating to small sums must be judged thoroughly. Rather, Reish Lakish was speaking with regard to giving it precedence: The small claims case may not be deferred in favor of the larger claim merely because the disputed sum is smaller.

(דברים א, יז) לא תגורו מפני איש (א"ר חנן אל תכניס דבריך מפני איש) (דברים א, יז) כי המשפט לאלהים הוא א"ר חמא ברבי חנינא אמר הקב"ה לא דיין לרשעים שנוטלין מזה ממון ונותנים לזה שלא כדין אלא שמטריחין אותי להחזיר ממון לבעליו

The Gemara continues the interpretation of the verse: “You shall not be afraid before any man.” Rabbi Ḥanan says: Do not suppress your statement of opinion due to any person. The verse continues: “For the judgment is God’s.” Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, says: It is not enough for the wicked judges, that they take money from this person and they give it to that person unlawfully, but they even trouble Me to return the money to its rightful owners. As proper justice is ultimately in the hands of God, He takes responsibility to bring about the rectification of the errors of unfit judges.

(דברים א, יז) והדבר אשר יקשה מכם א"ר חנינא ואיתימא רבי יאשיה על דבר זה נענש משה שנאמר (במדבר כז, ה) ויקרב משה את משפטן לפני ה' מתקיף לה רב נחמן בר יצחק מי כתיב ואשמיעכם (דברים א, יז) ושמעתיו כתיב אי גמירנא גמירנא ואי לא אזלינא וגמירנא

The verse continues: “And the cause that is too hard for you, you shall bring to me, and I will hear it.” Rabbi Ḥanina, and some say Rabbi Yoshiya, says: On account of this matter, which displayed a degree of presumptuousness, Moses was punished, as it is stated: “And Moses brought their cause before the Lord” (Numbers 27:5). In this instance, when Zelophehad’s daughters presented their case to Moses, he did not know the answer himself and was compelled to ask God. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak objects to this critique of Moses: Is it written: “And I will tell you,” which would indicate that Moses assumed the authority for himself? No, it is written: “And I will hear it,” meaning: If I have learned the halakha, I have learned it. And if not, I will go and learn it. Consequently, there was no presumptuousness in Moses’ statement.

אלא כדתניא ראויה פרשת נחלות שתיכתב על ידי משה רבינו אלא שזכו בנות צלפחד ונכתב על ידן ראויה היתה פרשת מקושש שתיכתב ע"י משה רבינו אלא שנתחייב מקושש ונכתבה על ידו ללמדך שמגלגלין חובה ע"י חייב וזכות על ידי זכאי

Rather, the unusual manner in which the halakha of women’s inheritance (see Numbers, chapter 27) was revealed may be understood as it is taught in a baraita: It would have been fitting for the Torah portion about inheritances to have been written by attributing it to Moses, our teacher, i.e., to introduce the halakha with the standard formulation: And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying. But the daughters of Zelophehad achieved merit as a result of their initiative in pursuing a portion in Eretz Yisrael, and therefore the halakha was written by attributing it to them. Similarly, it would have been fitting for the Torah portion concerning the punishment of the wood gatherer (see Numbers 15:32–36) to have been written by attributing it to Moses, our teacher. But the wood gatherer was found guilty, and the halakha was written by attributing it to him. This serves to teach you that guilt is engendered by means of the guilty and merit by means of the innocent.

כתיב (דברים א, טז) ואצוה את שופטיכם בעת ההיא וכתיב (דברים א, יח) ואצוה אתכם בעת ההיא אמר רבי אלעזר אמר רבי שמלאי אזהרה לציבור שתהא אימת דיין עליהן ואזהרה לדיין שיסבול את הציבור עד כמה אמר רבי חנן ואיתימא רבי שבתאי (במדבר יא, יב) כאשר ישא האומן את היונק

The Gemara continues to interpret verses pertaining to judges and judgment. It is written: “And I charged your judges at that time” (Deuteronomy 1:16), and it is written soon thereafter: “And I commanded you at that time all the things that you should do” (Deuteronomy 1:18). There is an apparent contradiction between these verses, as one indicates God commanded the judges and the other indicates He commanded the people. Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Simlai says: Moses issued a warning to the community that the awe of the judge must be upon them, and Moses issued a warning to the judge that he must bear the burden of the community. Up to what degree must the judge bear this burden? Rabbi Ḥanan, and some say Rabbi Shabbtai, says: It is as Moses said, that he carried Israel “as a nursing father carries the sucking child” (Numbers 11:12).

כתיב (דברים לא, ז) כי אתה תבוא וכתיב (דברים לא, כג) כי אתה תביא אמר רבי יוחנן אמר לו משה ליהושע אתה והזקנים שבדור עמהם אמר לו הקב"ה טול מקל והך על קדקדם דבר אחד לדור ואין שני דברין לדור

Similarly, a distinction is drawn between two verses where Moses commanded Joshua concerning his impending leadership: It is written: “For you shall go with these people into the land” (Deuteronomy 31:7), and it is written: “For you shall bring the children of Israel into the land” (Deuteronomy 31:23). Rabbi Yoḥanan reconciled the difference between these two charges and said: Moses said to Joshua, in the first verse: You and the elders of the generation will enter into Eretz Yisrael together with the people, i.e., the elders will assist you in the leadership. Subsequently, in the second verse, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Joshua: You yourself must bring the people: Take a rod and strike the people upon their skulls. There must be one clear and authoritative leader for the generation, and there may not be two or more leaders for the generation.

תנא זימון בשלשה מאי זימון אילימא ברכת זימון והתניא זימון וברכת זימון בשלשה וכי תימא פרושי קמפרש מאי זימון ברכת זימון והתניא זימון בשלשה ברכת זימון בשלשה

§ The Gemara returns to the discussion of halakhic matters related to the mishna. The Sages taught in a baraita: A zimmun is to be issued with three people. The Gemara analyzes: What is meant by the term zimmun in the baraita? If we say it is referring to the invitation to recite Grace after Meals jointly, which is called the zimmun blessing, that is difficult. But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Zimmun and the zimmun blessing are to be issued with three people? As the baraita lists these halakhot separately, it indicates that the term zimmun is referring to a different matter. And if you would say that the baraita explains itself, by clarifying: What is meant by the term zimmun? It is the zimmun blessing, another source indicates even more clearly that these terms are referring to two different procedures. But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Zimmun is performed with three people, and the zimmun blessing is performed with three people? Evidently, therefore, zimmun is not referring to the zimmun blessing.

אלא מאי זימון אזמוני לדין כי הא דאמר רבא הני בי תלתא דייני דיתבי ואזיל שליחא דבי דינא ואמר מפומא דחד לא אמר כלום עד דאמר משמיה דכולהו הני מילי בלא יומא דדינא אבל ביומא דדינא לית לן בה:

Rather, what is zimmun? It is a summons to appear in court for judgment. The Gemara notes that this is similar to that which Rava said: With regard to this court of three judges who are sitting and waiting to adjudicate a case, and the agent of the court went and said to one of the litigants that he is summoned in the name of only one of the judges, the summons is insufficient. It is as if the agent did not say anything, unless he said it in the name of all of them. That is what is meant when it is taught that zimmun is issued by three. The Gemara clarifies: That statement applies only when it is not the day set for judgment. But on the day set for judgment, when it is understood that a summons in the name of only one judge actually indicates a summons from an assembled court, we have no problem with it. Someone who ignores such a summons is subject to the full censure of the court.

תשלומי כפל כו': שלח ליה רב נחמן בר רב חסדא לרב נחמן בר יעקב ילמדנו רבינו דיני קנסות בכמה מאי קמיבעיא ליה הא אנן תנן בשלשה אלא יחיד מומחה קמיבעיא ליה דאין דיני קנסות או לא

§ The mishna teaches: Cases involving payment of double the principal must be adjudicated by a court of three judges. Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda sent an inquiry to Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov: Let our teacher instruct us: With regard to cases involving laws of fines, by how many judges must such cases be adjudicated? The Gemara asks: What is the dilemma he is raising? Didn’t we learn in the mishna that such cases are judged by three judges? Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda is raising a dilemma with regard to a single expert judge: May he adjudicate cases involving laws of fines by himself or not?

אמר ליה תניתוה תשלומי כפל ותשלומי ארבעה וחמשה בשלשה מאי שלשה אילימא שלשה הדיוטות האמר אבוה דאבוך משמיה דרב אפילו עשרה והן הדיוטות פסולין לדיני קנסות אלא מומחין וקאמר שלשה:

Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov said to him: You already learned this in the mishna: Cases involving payment of double the principal and payment of four or five times the principal must be adjudicated by three judges. What is meant by three? If we say it means three non-ordained lay judges, didn’t your father’s father say in the name of Rav: Even if there are ten judges, if they are lay judges they are unfit for adjudicating cases involving laws of fines? Rather, the mishna is discussing expert judges, and it says that three are necessary. Therefore, a single expert judge may not adjudicate such cases.

וחכמים אומרים מוציא שם רע בעשרים ושלשה:

§ The mishna records a dispute concerning the number of judges required to judge the case of a defamer (see Deuteronomy 22:13–19), which generally involves a man defaming his wife by falsely accusing her of having committed adultery while she was betrothed. Rabbi Meir says the case must be tried by three judges, and the Rabbis say: An accused defamer is judged by a court of twenty-three judges. It is obvious that in a case in which the husband’s accusation has the potential to result in the woman’s execution, Rabbi Meir agrees that as this is a case of capital law, it must be tried by twenty-three judges. Therefore, the dispute in the mishna must involve a lesser claim, such as a case where there are no witnesses to the alleged adultery, but the husband claims she was not a virgin when they married and is suing for monetary compensation.

וכי יש בו דיני נפשות מאי הוי

The Gemara asks: But although the halakha of a defamer contains the potential to qualify as a case of capital law, what of it? As long as this particular case has no such potential, why do the Rabbis require twenty-three judges?

אמר עולא בחוששין ללעז קמיפלגי רבי מאיר סבר אין חוששין ללעז ורבנן סברי חוששין ללעז

Ulla said: Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the question of whether one needs to be concerned with the possibility of rumors, meaning that if the husband raises the claim that his wife committed adultery, although he has no witnesses and there is no potential for a capital conviction, should the court be concerned with the possibility that the publicity generated by the proceedings may lead to the emergence of witnesses, which would make it a capital case? Rabbi Meir holds that one need not be concerned with the possibility of rumors. And the Rabbis hold that one does need to be concerned with the possibility of rumors.

רבא אמר כולי עלמא ללעז לא חיישינן והכא בחוששין לכבודן של ראשונים קמיפלגי והב"ע כגון דאיכניף בי עשרין ותלתא למידן דיני נפשות ואיבדור ואמר להו דיינו לי מיהא דיני ממונות

Rava says: Everyone agrees that one need not be concerned with the possibility of rumors. And here they disagree about whether one need be concerned for the honor of the first judges. And with what are we dealing here? We are dealing, for example, with a case where a court of twenty-three judges was convened to judge a case of capital law, because the husband accused his wife of committing adultery. As there were no witnesses to the alleged adultery, the court of twenty-three judges was disbanded, and then the husband said to them: At least adjudicate for me the aspect of monetary law, to reduce the sum in her marriage contract to the amount for a non-virgin. At that point, it became strictly a case of monetary law, which would normally be tried by three judges. Nevertheless, the Rabbis hold that the court of twenty-three judges must be reconvened, out of concern for their honor, since they had already begun to hear the case. Rabbi Meir disagrees, as he does not view this as an affront to the honor of the judges.

מיתיבי וחכמים אומרים תבעו ממון בשלשה תבעו נפשות בעשרים ושלשה בשלמא (לרבא) תבעו ממון תחלה בשלשה תבעו נפשות תחלה אפילו ממון בעשרים ושלשה אלא לעולא קשיא

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita (Tosefta 1:2): And the Rabbis say: If he took her to court and claimed money, the case is to be adjudicated by three judges. But if he took her to court and claimed that she was liable to receive the death penalty, the case must be judged by twenty-three judges. Granted, according to Rava, the baraita can be read as referring to the terms of the beginning of the trial: If he claimed money at the outset, the case must be judged by three judges. Since the case concerns a financial claim, three are sufficient. But if he initially claimed she should be subject to the death penalty, even if the case becomes transformed into a financial case, it must be judged by twenty-three judges out of concern for their honor. But according to Ulla, who says the requirement for twenty-three judges is based on concern about rumors, it is difficult.

אמר רבא אני וארי שבחבורה תרגימנא ומנו רב חייא בר אבין הכא במאי עסקינן שהביא הבעל עדים שזינתה והביא האב עדים והזימום לעדי הבעל בא לגבות ממון מבעל בשלשה ובמקום נפשות בעשרים ושלשה

Rava said: I and the lion of the group both explained this. The Gemara asks: And who is the lion of the group? It is Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin. He and Rava explained: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the husband brought witnesses to testify that the wife committed adultery, and the wife’s father brought witnesses, and through their testimony that they were with the first witnesses in some other place at the time of the alleged transgression, they classified the husband’s witnesses as conspiring witnesses. In that case, if the father comes to collect monetary restitution from the husband for defamation, the case may be adjudicated by three judges. And in a case of capital punishment, such as the trial of the husband’s witnesses, the case must be judged by twenty-three judges. In this way, Ulla’s interpretation may be reconciled with the Tosefta.

אביי אמר דכולי עלמא חיישינן ללעז ומשום כבודן של ראשונים הכא במאי עסקינן כגון דאתרו בה סתם

Abaye said: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis can be explained in another manner. According to everyone, one need be concerned for rumors, and also for the honor of the first judges. And with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, here we are dealing with a case where the witnesses to the adultery warned her that adultery is a capital transgression without specification as to the exact manner of death penalty she would receive.

והאי תנא הוא דתניא ושאר כל חייבי מיתות שבתורה אין ממיתין אותם אלא בעדה ועדים והתראה ועד שיודיעוהו שהוא חייב מיתה בבית דין

And the matter is in accordance with this tanna, whose statement follows: As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to all the others, those who are liable for the various death penalties stated in the Torah other than the inciter to idol worship, the court executes them only when the following elements are present: The congregation, represented by the court; and witnesses; and forewarning just before the defendant commits the transgression. And the court does not execute him unless the witnesses had informed the defendant that he is liable to receive the death penalty from the court.

ר' יהודה אומר עד שיודיעוהו באיזה מיתה הוא נהרג

Rabbi Yehuda says: The defendant is not executed unless the witnesses had informed the defendant by which form of the death penalty he is to be killed. According to the opinion of Abaye, the dispute in the mishna involves a case in which it was known that the witnesses forewarned the woman, but they did not specify the specific death penalty she would be liable to receive. In this case, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Meir holds there can be no death penalty, and therefore the case may be tried by three judges.

רב פפא אמר הכא באשה חבירה עסקינן וקמיפלגי בפלוגתא דרבי יוסי בר יהודה ורבנן דתניא ר' יוסי בר יהודה אומר חבר א"צ התראה לפי שלא ניתנה התראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד

Rav Pappa said a similar explanation: Here we are dealing with a woman who is a ḥaveira, meaning that she is knowledgeable with regard to Torah matters. And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and the Rabbis. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: A ḥaver, as he is knowledgeable in Torah, does not need to be issued a forewarning by the witnesses, because forewarning is given only to distinguish between unintentional sin and intentional sin, and in the case of a ḥaver it is clear that he is aware of the halakha. The Rabbis maintain that even a ḥaver may not be punished unless he has been forewarned. Rav Pappa suggests that Rabbi Meir holds that a ḥaveira must be forewarned, and the mishna discussed a case where this forewarning did not take place, and consequently the trial of her alleged defamer could not lead to capital punishment.

רב אשי אמר כגון

Rav Ashi says a different explanation: The dispute in the mishna concerns a case where

דאתרו ביה מלקות ולא אתרו ביה קטלא

the witnesses warned her that she would be liable to receive lashes, but they did not warn her that she would be liable to receive the death penalty. In that case, the court would try her for adultery, and if found guilty she would receive lashes and not the death penalty.

וקמיפלגי בפלוגתא דרבי ישמעאל ורבנן דתנן מכות בשלשה משום רבי ישמעאל אמרו בעשרים ושלשה

And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis, as we learned in the mishna: One who is accused of violating a prohibition that would render him liable to receive lashes must be judged by three judges. In the name of Rabbi Yishmael it was stated: Cases involving lashes must be adjudicated by twenty-three judges. Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that the case of the defamer may be adjudicated by three judges, because he holds that a court of three may administer lashes. The dissenting opinion, which holds that lashes may be administered only by twenty-three judges, also holds that this case must be adjudicated by a court of twenty-three.

רבינא אמר כגון שנמצא אחד מן העדים קרוב או פסול וקמיפלגי בפלוגתא דרבי יוסי ורבי אליבא דר' עקיבא דתנן רבי עקיבא אומר לא בא שלישי אלא להחמיר עליו לעשות דינו כיוצא באלו

Ravina says a different explanation: The case in the mishna is discussing a situation where one of the witnesses is found to be a close relative or a disqualified witness, but two valid witnesses still remain. And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. As we learned in a mishna (Makkot 5b) that Rabbi Akiva says: When the verse states: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 17:6), the third witness is mentioned only to be stringent with him, to make his status like these other two witnesses. If a group of three witnesses is found to be conspiring witnesses, the third one might claim that his testimony was unnecessary and therefore did no harm. The Torah nevertheless imposes upon him the same strict punishment as his peers.

א"כ ענש הכתוב את הניטפל לעוברי עבירה כעוברי עבירה על אחת כמה וכמה שישלם שכר את הניטפל לעושה מצוה כעושה מצוה

Rabbi Akiva elaborates upon the implications of this halakha. If so, the Torah punishes the one who acts as an accessory to transgressors with the same punishment as the primary transgressors. All the more so, God will grant the reward to an individual who acts as an accessory to one who performs a mitzva like the primary one who performs a mitzva, for the measure of good is always greater than the measure of suffering (see Sota 11a).

ומה שנים נמצא אחד מהן קרוב או פסול עדותן בטלה אף שלשה נמצא אחד מהן קרוב או פסול עדותן בטלה ומניין שאפי' מאה ת"ל עדים

Additionally, this teaches that just as in the case of two witnesses, if one of them is found to be a close relative or a disqualified witness their testimony is nullified, as the single remaining witness is not able to testify alone, so too, in the case of three witnesses, if one of them is found to be a close relative or a disqualified witness their testimony is nullified. And from where is it derived that this applies even to a group of one hundred witnesses? The verse states: “Witnesses.”

א"ר יוסי בד"א בדיני נפשות אבל בדיני ממונות תתקיים עדות בשאר רבי אומר אחד דיני ממונות ואחד דיני נפשות ואימתי בזמן שהתרו בהן אבל בזמן שלא התרו בהן

The tanna’im discussed how Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is to be understood. Rabbi Yosei says: In what situation is this statement, that if one of them is found to be a close relative or a disqualified witness their testimony is nullified, said? In cases of capital law. But in cases of monetary law, the testimony may be upheld with the other witnesses. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Rabbi Akiva’s opinion applies to both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. And when is this so? When the relatives or disqualified witnesses also warned the transgressors and therefore actively included themselves in the group of witnesses; but when they did not warn the transgressors, they are not counted as witnesses at all.

מה יעשו שני אחים ואחד שראו באחד שהרג את הנפש

If this were not to be so, what should two brothers and one other person do, if they saw someone kill another person? If the mere fact that they saw the event invalidates the testimony, then no one can ever be tried for a transgression committed in the presence of relatives. If one may decide whether or not he will be a witness, one of the brothers may join with the third person in warning the potential transgressor and, thereafter, constitute a pair of valid witnesses. Similarly, the mishna is understood as discussing a case in which a betrothed woman committed adultery, and of the three witnesses, two were brothers. If one of the brothers refrained from warning her, the remaining two witnesses may still testify against her, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. In this situation, the case must be tried by twenty-three judges. According to Rabbi Yosei the case may be tried by three judges, because with regard to capital law, the two brothers invalidate the testimony merely by seeing the event together.

ואיבעית אימא כגון שהתרו בה אחרים ולא התרו בה עדים וקמיפלגי בפלוגתא דרבי יוסי ורבנן דתנן רבי יוסי אומר לעולם אינו נהרג עד שיהו פי שני עדיו מתרין בו שנאמר (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים

And if you wish, say instead: The mishna discusses a case where others warned her, and the witnesses themselves did not warn her. And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna (Makkot 6b), Rabbi Yosei says: A defendant is never executed unless the mouths of his two witnesses are those who warn him, as it is stated: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6). The verse’s emphasis on the phrase “at the mouth of” teaches that the witnesses must issue the warning themselves. Rabbi Meir may agree with Rabbi Yosei that the woman cannot be executed if others gave the warning. Therefore the trial of the defamer needs only three judges, whereas the Rabbis in the mishna agree with the Rabbis in Makkot who disagree with Rabbi Yosei. Since she may be tried for adultery, the case requires twenty-three judges.

ואיבעית אימא כגון דאיתכחוש בבדיקות ולא איתכחוש בחקירות

And if you wish, say instead a different explanation: The mishna discusses a case where the testimony about the adultery was found to be contradictory with regard to the examinations concerning minor details of the incident, but the testimony was not found to be contradictory with regard to the interrogations concerning the time and place of the incident, which is the primary substance of the testimony.

וקמיפלגי בפלוגתא דבן זכאי ורבנן דתנן מעשה ובדק בן זכאי בעוקצי תאנים

And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna (40a): An incident occurred, and Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai examined the witnesses with regard to the stems of figs, as to their color and shape, in order to expose a contradiction between the witnesses. When he found a discrepancy in their reports about the figs, he dismissed the testimony. Rabbi Meir adopts this opinion, and therefore a woman cannot be tried for adultery if the witnesses disagree about details like these. The Rabbis accept such testimony, and consequently, they require a court of twenty-three judges.

אמר רב יוסף הביא הבעל עדים שזינתה והביא האב עדים והזימום לעדי הבעל עדי הבעל נהרגין ואין משלמין ממון

§ The Gemara discusses scenarios concerning the testimony about a woman’s committing adultery and allegations that the husband is guilty of defamation. Rav Yosef says: If the husband brought witnesses who testified that his wife committed adultery, and the wife’s father brought witnesses, and they testified that the husband’s witnesses were conspiring witnesses, then the husband’s witnesses are executed, but they or their estates do not pay money. Although their testimony, if accepted, would also have lowered the value of her marriage contract, they do not incur liability, based on the principle that if someone commits a transgression that renders him liable to receive more than one punishment, he receives the greater punishment.

חזר והביא הבעל עדים והזימום לעדי האב עדי האב נהרגין ומשלמין [ממון] ממון לזה ונפשות לזה

If the husband came back before his witnesses were executed and brought new witnesses, and they testified that the father’s witnesses were conspiring witnesses, the father’s witnesses are executed, and they must also pay money to the husband, as they attempted to make him liable to pay the fine for defamation. They are not exempt from the payment because the money is for this victim, i.e., the husband, and their lives are for that set of witnesses, who would have been killed. Since their liability to receive the death penalty and their financial liability were caused by their offenses against different people, these are deemed separate transgressions, and consequently they receive both punishments.

ואמר רב יוסף פלוני רבעו לאונסו הוא ואחר מצטרפין להרגו

And Rav Yosef also says, with regard to distinguishing between the different aspects of a single testimony: If a man testifies that so-and-so sodomized him against his will, he and another witness may combine as a valid pair of witnesses to kill the defendant for the sin of homosexual sodomy (see Leviticus 18:22).

לרצונו רשע הוא והתורה אמרה אל תשת רשע עד רבא אמר אדם קרוב אצל עצמו ואין אדם משים עצמו רשע

But if the one who was sodomized testified that the accused sodomized him with his consent, he is testifying that he himself is wicked, having been complicit in the forbidden act, and the Torah said: “Do not put your hand with a wicked person to be an unrighteous witness” (Exodus 23:1). Therefore, the testimony is rejected. Rava says: A person is his own relative and therefore may not testify about himself. Therefore, a person cannot render himself wicked by his own testimony. As a result, he is deemed credible with regard to the sodomizer, but not with regard to himself. He remains a valid witness to convict the sodomizer in combination with another.

אמר רבא

And similarly, Rava says:

10a

פלוני בא על אשתי הוא ואחר מצטרפין להורגו אבל לא להורגה

If someone testifies: So-and-so engaged in intercourse with my wife, he and another may combine to execute him, the accused man, with his testimony, but the woman’s husband is not accepted as a witness to execute her. A person cannot testify concerning his wife or any other close relative.

מאי קא משמע לן דמפלגינן בדיבורא היינו הך מהו דתימא אדם קרוב אצל עצמו אמרינן אצל אשתו לא אמרינן קא משמע לן

The Gemara asks: What is this last scenario teaching us? Is it that we divide the statement of the witness in order to accept part of the testimony while rejecting the inadmissible part? This cannot be, as the principle in this case is identical to that case, in which the witness is not accepted to incriminate himself. The Gemara answers: The second case is necessary, lest you say: With regard to his own self, since a person is his own relative, we say that we divide the testimony. But with regard to his wife, one might think we do not say so, and the entire testimony must be either accepted or rejected. Therefore, the second case teaches us that even with regard to one’s wife, the statement is divided, and the testimony concerning his wife is disregarded.

ואמר רבא פלוני בא על נערה המאורסה והוזמו נהרגין ואין משלמין ממון בתו של פלוני והוזמו נהרגין ומשלמין ממון ממון לזה ונפשות לזה

And Rava also says: If witnesses testify: So-and-so engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman (see Deuteronomy 22:25), without specifying the young woman in question, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed, and they are not liable to pay money. Since they never specified the identity of the young woman, they were never in a position to cause anyone to lose part or all of her marriage contract. But if they specified: The young woman was the daughter of so-and-so, and they are rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed, and they also pay money. Since in this case, the money is for this victim, i.e., the father of the young woman who stood to lose part or all of her marriage contract, and their lives are for that victim, i.e., the man and woman accused of adultery, they are liable to receive both punishments.

ואמר רבא פלוני רבע השור והוזמו נהרגין ואין משלמין ממון שורו של פלוני והוזמו נהרגין ומשלמין ממון ממון לזה ונפשות לזה

And Rava also says: If they testify: So-and-so engaged in bestiality with an ox (see Leviticus 18:23), which would theoretically result in the execution of both the person and the animal, without specifying which ox, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed, as their testimony would have put the accused to death, and yet they are not liable to pay money for the ox, because their testimony did not pertain to any ox in particular. But if they specify: He engaged in bestiality with so-and-so’s ox, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed, and they also pay money to the owner of the ox they sought to have killed. Since the money is for this victim, the owner whose ox would have been killed by the court, and their lives are for that victim, the man accused of engaging in bestiality with an animal, they are liable to receive both punishments.

הא תו למה לי היינו הך משום דקא בעי בעיא עלויה דבעי רבא פלוני רבע שורי מהו מי אמרינן אדם קרוב אצל עצמו ואין אדם קרוב אצל ממונו או דילמא אמרינן אדם קרוב אצל ממונו בתר דבעיא הדר פשטה אדם קרוב אצל עצמו ואין אדם קרוב אצל ממונו:

The Gemara asks: It seems that the case of the ox exemplifies the same principle as the case of the betrothed young woman. Why do I also need this case? This is essentially identical to that. The Gemara answers: The second case was necessary to clarify a point, because Rava raised a dilemma about it, as Rava raised a dilemma: If someone testifies: So-and-so engaged in bestiality with my ox, what is the halakha? Do we say: A person is his own relative concerning testimony, but a person does not have the status of a relative with regard to his property, and consequently the ox would also be executed because his testimony about his own animal is admissible? Or perhaps we say: A person has the status of a relative with regard to his property, and therefore his testimony about his ox is inadmissible? The Gemara says: After he raised the dilemma, he then resolved it: A person is his own relative, but a person does not have the status of a relative with regard to his property, so the ox is executed.

מכות בשלשה כו': מנהני מילי אמר רב הונא אמר קרא (דברים כה, א) ושפטום שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהם עוד אחד הרי כאן שלשה

§ The mishna teaches: Cases concerning one who is accused of violating a prohibition that would render him liable to receive lashes must be judged by three judges. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rav Huna says: The verse states: “If there will be a controversy between men, and they come to judgment, and the judges judge them, and they shall justify the just, and they shall condemn the wicked. Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten, that the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face” (Deuteronomy 25:1–2). When it states: “And the judges judge them,” in the plural, this indicates a minimum of two judges. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, the court adds to them one more, and there are a total of three judges here.

אלא מעתה (דברים כה, א) והצדיקו שנים והרשיעו שנים הרי כאן שבעה ההוא מיבעי ליה כדעולא דאמר עולא רמז לעדים זוממין מן התורה מניין

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the plural verbs in the verse each indicate two judges, the term: “And they shall justify,” indicates another two, and the term: “And they shall condemn,” indicates another two, so that there are a total of seven here. The Gemara answers: Rav Huna requires that pair of terms in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: From where in the Torah is there an allusion to the halakha of conspiring witnesses?

רמז לעדים זוממין והא כתיב (דברים יט, יט) כאשר זמם אלא רמז לעדים זוממין שלוקין מניין דכתיב (דברים כה, א) והצדיקו את הצדיק והרשיעו את הרשע

The Gemara interrupts with a question: An allusion to the halakha of conspiring witnesses? But it is written explicitly: “Then you shall do to him as he had planned to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). Why would there be a need for an allusion? Rather, Ulla meant: From where in the Torah is there an allusion to the halakha that conspiring witnesses are flogged? Ulla answers: As it is written: “And they shall justify the just, and they shall condemn the wicked. Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten, that the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face.”

משום דהצדיקו את הצדיק והרשיעו את הרשע והיה אם בן הכות הרשע אלא עדים שהרשיעו את הצדיק ואתו עדי אחריני והצדיקו את הצדיק דמעיקרא ושוינהו להנך רשעים והיה אם בן הכות הרשע

The Gemara explains the derivation: Due to the fact that the terms in the verse: “They shall justify the just, and they shall condemn the wicked” indicate a financial dispute in which one party is vindicated and the other is required to pay, does it follow that, as the verse continues: “Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten”? Why would the verdict’s being rendered in the other party’s favor mean that the losing party is flogged? Rather, the verse must be discussing the witnesses and not the litigants. If conspiring witnesses condemned the just one, and other witnesses came and justified the one who was really the just one from the beginning and rendered these conspiring witnesses wicked, then, as the verse continues: “Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten, that the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face.” This indicates that the witnesses are subject to lashes.

ותיפוק ליה (שמות כ, יב) מלא תענה משום דהוה ליה לאו שאין בו מעשה וכל לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו:

The Gemara asks: Why does this halakha require a specific derivation? But since there is a principle that one is subject to lashes for violating any prohibition, why not derive this punishment from the prohibition: “You shall not testify as a false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13)? The Gemara answers: That verse is insufficient, because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, but only speech, and with regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for it.

משום ר' ישמעאל אמרו בעשרים ושלשה: מ"ט דרבי ישמעאל אמר אביי אתיא רשע רשע מחייבי מיתות כתיב הכא (דברים כה, ב) והיה אם בן הכות הרשע וכתיב התם (במדבר לה, לא) אשר הוא רשע למות מה להלן בעשרים ושלשה אף כאן בעשרים ושלשה

§ The mishna teaches: It was stated in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Cases concerning lashes must be adjudicated by twenty-three judges. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yishmael? Abaye said: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between one instance of the term wicked and another instance of the term wicked, from the halakha of those liable to receive death penalties. It is written here, with regard to lashes: “Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten,” and it is written there, with regard to a murderer: “That is a wicked man guilty of death” (Numbers 35:31). Just as there, with regard to the trial of the murderer, the case is tried by twenty-three judges, so too here, the case of lashes must be tried by twenty-three judges.

רבא אמר מלקות במקום מיתה עומדת אמר רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי אי הכי אומדנא למה לי למחייה ואי מאית לימות

Rava says: A verbal analogy is unnecessary. Conceptually, lashes stand in place of execution. As corporal punishment is a kind of replacement for capital punishment, it must be judged in the manner of capital punishments, by a court of twenty-three. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If so, that lashes stand in place of execution, why do I need an assessment? Before administering lashes, the court consults with a physician to assess how many lashes the transgressor can withstand and adjusts the number of lashes so that the transgressor’s life will not be threatened. But if Rava is correct, why is this necessary? Let the court strike him, and if the transgressor dies, let him die.

א"ל אמר קרא (דברים כה, ג) ונקלה אחיך לעיניך כי מחית אגבא דחיי מחית אלא הא דתניא אמדוהו לקבל עשרים אין מכין אותו אלא מכות הראויות להשתלש וכמה הן תמני סרי

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: The verse states: “Then your brother will be dishonored before your eyes” (Deuteronomy 25:3). This teaches that when you strike, you strike upon the back of a live person. After he is dead, he is not called: Your brother. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, continued to ask Rav Ashi: But with regard to that which is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 4:6): If they assessed him to be strong enough to absorb twenty lashes, they flog him only with a number of lashes that can be divided into threes, as lashes are administered in sets of three, two behind and one in front. And how many are they? Eighteen.

10b

למחייה עשרים וחדא וכי מיית בהך חדא לימות דהא כי מחית אגבא דחייא קא מחית אמר ליה אמר קרא (דברים כה, ג) ונקלה אחיך לעיניך אחר שלקה אחיך בעינא וליכא:

Let the court strike him with twenty-one lashes, and if he dies with this last one, let him die. According to the medical evaluation, he will still be alive after the twentieth lash. There would be no concern of flogging a dead man, as when the court strikes him with the twenty-first lash, it is upon the back of a living man that the court is striking. If so, why should he not receive the last blow? Rav Ashi said to him: The verse states: “Then your brother will be dishonored before your eyes.” The verse means: Even after he is hit, I need him to remain your brother; and if he dies, he is no longer your brother.

עיבור החדש בשלשה: חישוב לא קתני קידוש לא קתני אלא עיבור לא ליקדשא וממילא לעבר

§ The mishna teaches: The intercalation of the month is performed by a panel of three judges. The Gemara extrapolates: The tanna does not teach: The calculation to determine if the month must be extended is performed by three judges, and he does not teach: The sanctification of the new month is performed by three judges; rather, he teaches: The intercalation of the month, referring to the decision to extend the month by an extra day and begin the following month on the thirty-first day instead of the thirtieth, is performed by a panel of three judges. The Gemara asks: Why are judges necessary to extend the month? Simply do not sanctify the new month, and let the previous month be intercalated by itself. When the thirtieth day of any month is not declared the first day of the new month, the earlier month is extended by default. Why, then, does the mishna specify: Intercalation?

אמר אביי תני קידוש החדש תניא נמי הכי קידוש החדש ועיבור השנה בשלשה דברי רבי מאיר אמר רבא והא עיבור קתני אלא אמר רבא קידוש ביום עיבור בשלשה אחר עיבור ליכא קידוש

Abaye said: Emend the text of the mishna and teach: The sanctification of the new month is performed by three judges. This is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:1): The sanctification of the new month and the intercalation of the year is performed by three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rava said in objection to Abaye’s explanation: But the mishna teaches: Intercalation, not sanctification. Rather, Rava said: Explain the mishna this way: If there will be sanctification of the new month on the thirtieth day of the first month, which is the day that would otherwise be the intercalation, this is done by three judges. But after the day of the intercalation, i.e., if the month is sanctified on the thirty-first day, there is no active sanctification necessary.

ומני רבי אלעזר (בן) צדוק היא דתניא רבי אלעזר (בן) צדוק אומר אם לא נראה בזמנו אין מקדשין אותו שכבר קידשוהו בשמים

And in accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok, as it is taught in a mishna (Rosh HaShana 24a): Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok says: If the new moon was not seen at its anticipated time, the court does not formally sanctify the New Moon on the following day, as the celestial court in Heaven has already sanctified it, precluding the need for the additional sanctification by the earthly court.

רב נחמן אמר קידוש אחר עיבור בשלשה ביום עיבור ליכא קידוש ומני פלימו היא דתניא פלימו אומר בזמנו אין מקדשין אותו שלא בזמנו מקדשין אותו

Taking the opposite opinion, Rav Naḥman says: In the instance of sanctification of the new moon after the intercalation of the month through the addition of a thirtieth day to the previous month, the sanctification is performed by three judges. But if the New Moon is declared on the day of the intercalation, so that the previous month is left with only twenty-nine days, there is no active sanctification. This is the standard time for the New Moon, and no intervention is necessary. And in accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Peleimu, as it is taught in a baraita: Peleimu says: If the new moon was reported at its anticipated time, the court does not sanctify the New Moon. But if the new moon was reported not at its anticipated time, the court sanctifies the New Moon.

רב אשי אמר לעולם חישוב קתני ומאי עיבור חישוב דעיבור ואיידי דקבעי למיתני עיבור שנה תנא נמי עיבור חודש

Rav Ashi said: Actually, the mishna teaches that three judges are necessary for the calculation to determine when the New Moon should be declared. And what is the term: Intercalation, that is mentioned in the mishna? It is the calculation of the intercalation. And although the wording of the mishna is imprecise, it is written this way for a reason: Since the mishna needed to teach the number of judges necessary for the intercalation of the year, the mishna also taught: The intercalation of the month, so as to describe the similar processes of adding to the year and adding to the month with the same verb.

חישוב חודש אין קידוש חודש לא מני ר' אליעזר היא דתניא ר' אליעזר אומר בין בזמנו בין שלא בזמנו אין מקדשין אותו שנאמר (ויקרא כה, י) וקדשתם את שנת החמשים שנה שנים אתה מקדש ואי אתה מקדש חדשים:

The Gemara notes: With regard to the calculation of the month, yes, this requires three judges. But with regard to the sanctification of month, this does not require three judges. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: Whether it was reported in its anticipated time or whether it was reported not in its anticipated time, we do not sanctify the New Moon formally, as it is stated: “And you shall sanctify the fiftieth year” (Leviticus 25:10), which teaches: You must formally sanctify years, but you do not formally sanctify months, as they are sanctified automatically. In any case, calculation, when necessary, is performed by three judges.

רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר בשלשה כו': תניא כיצד אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל בשלשה מתחילין ובחמשה נושאין ונותנין וגומרין בשבעה אחד אומר לישב ושנים אומרים שלא לישב בטל יחיד במיעוטו

§ The mishna teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that intercalation is performed in stages: The deliberations begin with three judges, they debate the matter with five judges, and they conclude the matter with seven judges. The Gemara elaborates: It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:1): How does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel say the intercalation is to be conducted? The court begins the deliberation with three judges, and they debate the matter with five, and they conclude with seven. At first, three judges convene for a preliminary discussion with regard to the necessity of adding a month to the year. If one says it is necessary to sit and deliberate the question of intercalation and two say that there is not a need to sit and continue, the single opinion in favor of intercalation is negated in its minority, i.e., it is the minority opinion, and the process ends.

שנים אומרים לישב ואחד אומר שלא לישב מוסיפין עליהם עוד שנים ונושאין ונותנין בדבר שנים אומרים צריכה ושלשה אומרים אינה צריכה בטלו שנים במיעוטן שלשה אומרים צריכה ושנים אומרים אינה צריכה מוסיפין עליהם עוד שנים שאין המנין פחות משבעה

The baraita continues: If two say to sit and one says not to sit, the majority decision causes the process to move to the next stage, and the court then adds another two judges to them and all five debate the matter. If two say: The year needs the extra month, and three say: It does not need it, the opinions of the two are negated in their minority. If three say: The year needs it, and two say: It does not need it, the court adds to them another two judges, as the quorum for declaring an intercalation may not be fewer than seven.

הני שלשה חמשה ושבעה כנגד מי פליגי בה רבי יצחק בר נחמני וחד דעימיה ומנו רבי שמעון בן פזי ואמרי לה רבי שמעון בן פזי וחד דעימיה ומנו ר' יצחק בר נחמני חד אמר כנגד ברכת כהנים וחד אמר שלשה כנגד שומרי הסף חמשה מרואי פני המלך שבעה רואי פני המלך

The Gemara asks: Corresponding to what was it determined that the intercalation procedure should incorporate these numbers of three, five, and seven judges? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani and one other Sage who was with him disagree about this. And who is that other scholar? Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi. And some say that this was a matter of dispute between Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi and one other scholar who was with him. And who is that other scholar? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani. One said: These numbers correspond to the number of Hebrew words in each of the three verses of the priestly benediction (see Numbers 6:24–26). And one said: Three corresponds to the three guards of the door (see II Kings 25:18), five corresponds to five of the officers who saw the king’s face (see II Kings 25:19), and seven corresponds to seven officers who saw the king’s face (see Jeremiah 52:25). Since these numbers represent appointments of distinction, the Rabbis saw fit to employ them in the composition of the court as well.

תני רב יוסף הני שלשה וחמשה ושבעה שלשה כנגד שומרי הסף חמשה מרואי פני המלך שבעה רואי פני המלך א"ל אביי לרב יוסף עד האידנא מאי טעמא לא פריש לן מר הכי אמר להו לא הוה ידענא דצריכיתו מי בעיתו מנאי מילתא ולא אמרי לכו:

Similarly, Rav Yosef taught a baraita: These numbers: Three, five, and seven members of the court for intercalation, are adopted from different numbers of the king’s servants. Three corresponds to: Guards of the door; five corresponds to: Of those officers who saw the king’s face, mentioned in the book of II Kings; and seven corresponds to: Officers who saw the king’s face, mentioned in the book of Jeremiah. When Rav Yosef taught this, Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reason that until now the Master did not explain the matter to us this way, although you have taught this material before? Rav Yosef said to Abaye and the others with him: I did not know that you needed this information, as I thought that you were already familiar with the baraita. Have you ever asked me something and I did not tell you?

זמן נשיא צריך גדי סימן: ת"ר אין מעברין את השנה אלא

§ The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for several other sources cited with regard to the intercalation of the year: Zeman, Nasi, tzarikh, gedi. The Sages taught in a baraita: The year may be intercalated only

11a

במזומנין לה מעשה ברבן גמליאל שאמר השכימו לי שבעה לעלייה השכים ומצא שמונה אמר מי הוא שעלה שלא ברשות ירד

by those who were invited by the Nasi, the president of the Great Sanhedrin, for that purpose. There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, who said to the Sages: Bring me seven of the Sages early tomorrow morning to the loft designated for convening a court to intercalate the year. He went to the loft early the next morning and found eight Sages there. Rabban Gamliel said: Who is it who ascended to the loft without permission? He must descend immediately.

עמד שמואל הקטן ואמר אני הוא שעליתי שלא ברשות ולא לעבר השנה עליתי אלא ללמוד הלכה למעשה הוצרכתי אמר לו שב בני שב ראויות כל השנים כולן להתעבר על ידך אלא אמרו חכמים אין מעברין את השנה אלא במזומנין לה ולא שמואל הקטן הוה אלא איניש אחרינא ומחמת כיסופא הוא דעבד

Shmuel HaKatan stood up and said: I am he who ascended without permission; and I did not ascend to participate and be one of those to intercalate the year, but rather I needed to observe in order to learn the practical halakha. Rabban Gamliel said to him: Sit, my son, sit. It would be fitting for all of the years to be intercalated by you, as you are truly worthy. But the Sages said: The year may be intercalated only by those who were invited for that purpose. The Gemara notes: And it was not actually Shmuel HaKatan who had come uninvited, but another person. And due to the embarrassment of the other, Shmuel HaKatan did this, so that no one would know who had come uninvited.

כי הא דיתיב רבי וקא דריש והריח ריח שום אמר מי שאכל שום יצא עמד רבי חייא ויצא עמדו כולן ויצאו בשחר מצאו רבי שמעון בר' לרבי חייא אמר ליה אתה הוא שציערת לאבא אמר לו לא תהא כזאת בישראל

The Gemara relates that the story about Shmuel HaKatan is similar to an incident that occurred when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was sitting and teaching, and he smelled the odor of garlic. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was very sensitive and could not tolerate this odor. He said: Whoever ate garlic should leave. Rabbi Ḥiyya stood up and left. Out of respect for Rabbi Ḥiyya, all of those in attendance stood up and left. The next day, in the morning, Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, found Rabbi Ḥiyya, and he said to him: Are you the one who disturbed my father by coming to the lecture with the foul smell of garlic? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: There should not be such behavior among the Jewish people. I would not do such a thing, but I assumed the blame and left so that the one who did so would not be embarrassed.

ורבי חייא מהיכא גמיר לה מרבי מאיר דתניא מעשה באשה אחת שבאתה לבית מדרשו של ר"מ אמרה לו רבי אחד מכם קדשני בביאה עמד רבי מאיר וכתב לה גט כריתות ונתן לה עמדו כתבו כולם ונתנו לה

And from where did Rabbi Ḥiyya learn that characteristic of being willing to implicate himself in order to save someone else from being embarrassed? He learned it from Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving a certain woman who came to the study hall of Rabbi Meir. She said to him: My teacher, one of you, i.e., one of the men studying in this study hall, betrothed me through intercourse. The woman came to Rabbi Meir to appeal for help in identifying the man, so that he would either marry her or grant her a divorce. As he himself was also among those who studied in the study hall, Rabbi Meir arose and wrote her a bill of divorce, and he gave it to her. Following his example, all those in the study hall arose and wrote bills of divorce and gave them to her. In this manner, the right man also gave her a divorce, freeing her to marry someone else.

ור"מ מהיכא גמיר לה משמואל הקטן ושמואל הקטן מהיכא גמיר לה משכניה בן יחיאל דכתיב (עזרא י, ב) ויען שכניה בן יחיאל מבני עילם ויאמר לעזרא אנחנו מעלנו באלהינו ונושב נשים נכריות מעמי הארץ ועתה יש מקוה לישראל על זאת

And from where did Rabbi Meir learn that characteristic? From Shmuel HaKatan, in the incident outlined above. And from where did Shmuel HaKatan learn it? From Shecaniah ben Jehiel, as it is written: “And Shecaniah, the son of Jehiel, one of the sons of Elam, answered and said to Ezra: We have broken faith with our God, and have married foreign women of the peoples of the land; yet now there is hope for Israel concerning this” (Ezra 10:2). And although he confessed, Shecaniah is not listed among those who took foreign wives (Ezra 10:18–44). Evidently, he confessed only to spare the others from public embarrassment.

ושכניה בן יחיאל מהיכא גמר לה מיהושע דכתיב (יהושע ז, י) ויאמר ה' אל יהושע קום לך למה זה אתה נופל על פניך חטא ישראל אמר לפניו רבש"ע מי חטא אמר לו וכי דילטור אני לך הטל גורלות ואיבעית אימא ממשה דכתיב (שמות טז, כח) עד אנה מאנתם

The Gemara continues: And from where did Shecaniah ben Jehiel learn it? From an incident involving Joshua, as it is written: “And the Lord said to Joshua: Get yourself up; why do you fall upon your face? Israel has sinned” (Joshua 7:10–11). Joshua said before Him: Master of the Universe, who sinned? God said to him: And am I your informer? Rather, cast lots to determine who is guilty. In this way, God did not directly disclose the identity of the sinner to Joshua. And if you wish, say instead that Shecaniah ben Jehiel learned this from an incident involving Moses, as it is written: “And the Lord said to Moses: How long do you refuse to keep My mitzvot and My laws?” (Exodus 16:28). Although only a small number of people attempted to collect the manna on Shabbat, God spoke as though the entire nation were guilty, so as not to directly expose the guilty.

ת"ר משמתו נביאים האחרונים חגי זכריה ומלאכי נסתלקה רוח הקודש מישראל ואף על פי כן היו משתמשין בבת קול פעם אחת היו מסובין בעליית בית גוריה ביריחו ונתנה עליהם בת קול מן השמים יש כאן אחד שראוי שתשרה עליו שכינה (כמשה רבינו) אלא שאין דורו זכאי לכך נתנו חכמים את עיניהם בהלל הזקן וכשמת אמרו עליו הי חסיד הי עניו תלמידו של עזרא

§ Since Shmuel HaKatan and his great piety were mentioned, the Gemara now relates several incidents that shed additional light on his personality. The Sages taught: After the last of the prophets, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, died, the Divine Spirit of prophetic revelation departed from the Jewish people. But nevertheless, they were still utilizing a Divine Voice, which they heard as a kind of echo of prophecy. One time, a group of Sages were reclining in the loft of the house of Gurya in Jericho, and a Divine Voice was bestowed upon them from Heaven, saying: There is one here who is fit for the Divine Presence to rest upon him as it rested upon Moses our teacher, but his generation is not deserving of this distinction. The Sages set their eyes upon Hillel the Elder, trusting that he was the one indicated by the Divine Voice. And when he died, the Sages said about him: Alas, the pious man, alas, the humble man, a disciple of Ezra.

שוב פעם אחת היו מסובין בעליה ביבנה ונתנה עליהם בת קול מן השמים יש כאן אחד שראוי שתשרה עליו שכינה אלא שאין דורו זכאי לכך נתנו חכמים את עיניהם בשמואל הקטן וכשמת אמרו עליו הי חסיד הי עניו תלמידו של הלל אף הוא אמר בשעת מיתתו שמעון וישמעאל לחרבא וחברוהי לקטלא ושאר עמא לביזא ועקן סגיאן עתידן למיתי על עלמא

The baraita continues: Another time, a group of Sages were reclining in the loft in Yavne, and a Divine Voice was bestowed upon them from Heaven, saying: There is one here who is fit for the Divine Presence to rest upon him in prophecy, but his generation is not deserving of this distinction. The Sages set their eyes upon Shmuel HaKatan. And when he died, the Sages said about him: Alas, the pious man, alas, the humble man, a disciple of Hillel. Additionally, he said at the time of his death, under the influence of the Divine Spirit: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the Nasi of the Great Sanhedrin, and Rabbi Yishmael, the High Priest, will die by the sword, and their friends will die by other executions, and the rest of the nation will be despoiled, and great troubles will ultimately come upon the world.

ועל יהודה בן בבא בקשו לומר כן אלא שנטרפה שעה שאין מספידין על הרוגי מלכות

And they also wished to say thus: Alas, the pious man, alas, the humble man, about Yehuda ben Bava, in their eulogy for him, but the hour was torn, i.e., the opportunity was lost, as one does not eulogize those executed by the government. As will be explained (14a), Yehuda ben Bava was executed by the government.

ת"ר אין מעברין את השנה אלא אם כן ירצה נשיא ומעשה ברבן גמליאל שהלך ליטול רשות אצל שלטון אחד שבסוריא ושהה לבא ועיברו את השנה על מנת שירצה רבן גמליאל וכשבא ר"ג ואמר רוצה אני נמצאת שנה מעוברת

§ The Gemara returns to the discussion about intercalation of the year. The Sages taught: The year may be intercalated only if the Nasi of the Sanhedrin wants to intercalate it. And there was once an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, who went to ask permission for some communal matter from an officer [hegmon] in Syria, and he tarried in returning until after it was too late to intercalate the year. And because they did not know what his opinion on the matter was, they intercalated the year on the condition that Rabban Gamliel would want to do so. And when Rabban Gamliel came back and said: I want to intercalate the year, the year was found to be retroactively intercalated.

תנו רבנן אין מעברין את השנה אלא אם כן היתה צריכה מפני הדרכים ומפני הגשרים ומפני תנורי פסחים ומפני גליות ישראל שנעקרו ממקומן ועדיין לא הגיעו אבל לא מפני השלג ולא מפני הצינה ולא מפני גליות ישראל שלא עקרו ממקומן

The Sages taught: The year may be intercalated only if it is necessary due to damage to the roads, if the rain has damaged them in such a way that they are inaccessible for those ascending to Jerusalem for Passover; or due to the bridges that are likewise in disrepair; or due to the ovens for the Paschal offerings that are damaged and unfit for roasting the offerings; or due to the Diaspora Jews who have left their homes and still have not arrived due to delays in travel. But the year may not be intercalated due to the snow, and not due to the cold, and not due to the Diaspora Jews who have not yet left from their homes, even if they no longer have enough time to reach Jerusalem for the Festival.

ת"ר אין מעברין את השנה לא מפני הגדיים ולא מפני הטלאים ולא מפני הגוזלות שלא פירחו אבל עושין אותן סעד לשנה כיצד רבי ינאי אומר משום רבן שמעון בן גמליאל מהודעין אנחנא לכון דגוזליא רכיכין ואימריא דערקין וזימנא דאביבא לא מטא ושפרת מילתא באנפאי ואוסיפית על שתא דא תלתין יומין

The Sages taught: The year may not be intercalated due to the young goats and not due to the lambs, to allow them to grow larger before they are to be sacrificed as Paschal offerings; and not due to the fledgling doves who have not yet developed sufficiently to fly, so that there won’t be enough of them to supply all those who wish to bring bird offerings at the Festival. But all these considerations may be made supporting factors in the decision to intercalate the year. The Gemara asks: How so? Rabbi Yannai says in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, i.e., this is the language Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel used in his declaration of the intercalation: We are notifying you that the fledglings are tender, and that the lambs are thin [de’arkin], and time for the spring has not yet arrived. And consequently, the matter is good in my eyes, and I have therefore added thirty days onto this year.

מיתיבי כמה עיבור השנה שלשים יום רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר חדש אמר רב פפא רצו חדש רצו שלשים יום

The Gemara raises an objection to the report that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds the intercalated month is thirty days long. It is taught in a baraita: How long is the additional month in an intercalated leap year? The Rabbis say: Thirty days. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A standard month, which is twenty-nine days long. What, then, does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel hold? Rav Pappa said: Rabban Gamliel holds that if the court wants, it may add a standard month, and if it wants, it may add a month of thirty days.

תא חזי מאי איכא בין

Concerning the declaration of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the Gemara observes: Come and see what difference there is between

11b

תקיפאי קדמאי לעינוותני בתראי

the earlier, stern authorities and the later, humble authorities, for although Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was known as particularly humble, his proclamation was written with less modesty than that of his father, Rabban Gamliel, who was known to be particularly stern.

דתניא מעשה ברבן גמליאל שהיה יושב על גב מעלה בהר הבית והיה יוחנן סופר הלז עומד לפניו ושלש איגרות חתוכות לפניו מונחות

As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:6): There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, who was sitting on a step on the Temple Mount, and Yoḥanan, that scribe, was standing before him, and three blank documents cut from parchment and ready for writing were set before him.

אמר לו טול איגרתא חדא וכתוב לאחנא בני גלילאה עילאה ולאחנא בני גלילאה תתאה שלומכון יסגא מהודעין אנחנא לכון דזמן ביעורא מטא לאפרושי מעשרא ממעטנא דזיתא וטול איגרתא חדא וכתוב לאחנא בני דרומא שלומכון יסגא מהודעין אנחנא לכון דזמן ביעורא מטא לאפרושי מעשרא מעומרי שיבליא

Rabban Gamliel said to the scribe: Take one document, and write: To our brothers, the people of the Upper Galilee, and to our brothers, the people of the Lower Galilee, may your peace increase. We are informing you that the time has come for eradication of tithes that had been separated from produce but not yet given to their designated recipients, as is to be done in the fourth and seventh years of the Sabbatical-Year cycle, to separate the tithe from the vat of olives, because most of the local olives were grown in the Galilee. Rabban Gamliel continued, instructing the scribe: And take one document, and write: To our brothers, the people of the South, meaning the area of Judea and its environs, may your peace increase. We are informing you that the time has come for eradication, to separate the tithe from the mounds of stalks of grains, because most of the local grain was grown in the Judea region.

וטול איגרתא חדא וכתוב לאחנא בני גלוותא בבבל ולאחנא דבמדי ולשאר כל גלוותא דישראל שלומכון יסגא לעלם מהודעין אנחנא לכון דגוזליא רכיכין ואימריא ערקין וזמנא דאביבא לא מטא ושפרא מילתא באנפאי ובאנפי חביריי ואוסיפית על שתא דא יומין תלתין דילמא בתר דעברוהו:

Rabban Gamliel continued to instruct the scribe: And take one document, and write: To our brothers, the people of the Diaspora in Babylonia, and to our brothers who are in Medea, and to the rest of the entire Jewish Diaspora, may your peace increase forever. We are informing you that the fledglings are tender, and the lambs are thin, and time for the spring has not come. And consequently, the matter is good before me and before my colleagues, i.e., in our estimation, and I have consequently added thirty days to this year. The third letter indicates that evidently Rabban Gamliel included others in his decision. The Gemara rejects this, and explains: Perhaps this incident occurred after they deposed Rabban Gamliel from his position as Nasi. When he was reinstated, he shared his office with Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Therefore, he wrote the decision in the name of his colleagues as well.

תנו רבנן על שלשה דברים מעברין את השנה על האביב ועל פירות האילן ועל התקופה על שנים מהן מעברין ועל אחד מהן אין מעברין

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:2): The court may intercalate the year for three matters: For the ripening of the grain, if it is not yet time for the barley to ripen; for the fruit of the trees, if they have not yet ripened; and for the equinox, i.e., to ensure that the autumnal equinox will precede Sukkot. If two of these concerns apply, the court intercalates the year even if the third factor does not apply; but for only one of them the court does not intercalate the year.

ובזמן שאביב אחד מהן הכל שמחין רבי שמעון בן גמליאל אומר על התקופה איבעיא להו על התקופה שמחין או על התקופה מעברין תיקו:

The baraita continues: And when the ripening of the grain is one of the concerns, everyone is happy. Since the grain is not yet ripe, the people do not mind waiting an extra month for Nisan. If the grain is already ripe, however, the extra month would simply prolong the period during which the grain may not be eaten due to the prohibition of the new crop, as the new crop may be harvested and eaten only after the sacrifice of the omer offering on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:14). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For the equinox. The Gemara seeks to clarify this statement: A dilemma was raised before the Sages. When he said: For the equinox, did he mean this is the reason that everyone is happy, or did he mean that only for the equinox may the court intercalate the year? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

ת"ר על שלשה ארצות מעברין את השנה יהודה ועבר הירדן והגליל על שתים מהן מעברין ועל אחת מהן אין מעברין ובזמן שיהודה אחת מהן הכל שמחין שאין עומר בא אלא מיהודה

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:2): The court may intercalate the year for three regional lands of Eretz Yisrael, meaning that the court considers the agricultural situation in three regions: Judea, and Transjordan, and the Galilee. If there is a concern about two of them, the court intercalates the year even if the third region does not need it, but if there is a concern about only one of them the court does not intercalate the year. And when Judea is one of them, everyone is happy, because the omer offering comes only from Judea. If the court therefore ensures that the crops in Judea ripen just before the omer is brought, the crops will certainly be ripe in the other regions as well, and there will be no complications with the prohibition of the new crop.

ת"ר אין מעברין את השנים אלא ביהודה ואם עיברוה בגליל מעוברת העיד חנניה איש אונו אם עיברוה בגליל אינה מעוברת א"ר יהודה בריה דרבי שמעון בן פזי מאי טעמא דחנניה איש אונו אמר קרא (דברים יב, ה) לשכנו תדרשו ובאת שמה כל דרישה שאתה דורש לא יהיו אלא בשכנו של מקום

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:2): The court may intercalate the years only when located in Judea. And if they intercalated it when located in the Galilee, the year is nevertheless intercalated. Ḥananya of Ono testified: Even if the court already formally intercalated the year when located in the Galilee, it is not intercalated. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, says: What is the reasoning of Ḥananya of Ono? The verse states: “But to the place that the Lord your God shall choose out of all your tribes to put His name there, to His abode shall you seek, and there you shall come” (Deuteronomy 12:5). This is interpreted as: Every pursuit that you shall pursue in the area of halakha must be only in the abode of the Omnipresent, in close proximity to Jerusalem, i.e., in Judea.

ת"ר אין מעברין את השנה אלא ביום ואם עיברוה בלילה אינה מעוברת ואין מקדשין את החדש אלא ביום ואם קידשוהו בלילה אינו מקודש א"ר אבא מאי קרא (תהלים פא, ד) תקעו בחדש שופר בכסה ליום חגנו איזהו חג שהחדש מתכסה בו הוי אומר זה ראש השנה וכתיב כי חוק לישראל הוא משפט לאלהי יעקב מה משפט ביום אף קידוש החדש ביום

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:7): The court may intercalate the year only during the day; and if the court intercalated it at night, it is not intercalated. And the court may sanctify the month only during the day; and if the court sanctified it at night, it is not sanctified. Rav Abba says: What is the verse from which this halakha is derived? “Sound the shofar at the New Moon, at the concealed time for our Festival day” (Psalms 81:4). On which Festival is the new moon concealed? You must say it is Rosh HaShana, which occurs on the first of the month, before the moon is visible, whereas the moon is visible during the other Festivals, which occur later in the month. And it is written in the next verse: “For it is a statute for Israel, a judgment of the God of Jacob” (Psalms 81:5). Just as all civil judgment is done during the day, so too is the sanctification of Rosh HaShana, and the sanctification of the month in general, done during the day.

ת"ר אין מעברין את השנה

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:5): The court does not intercalate the year

12a

בשני רעבון

during years of famine. When grain is scarce, intercalating the year would exacerbate the food shortage by delaying the omer offering, which is brought in Nisan, thereby prolonging the period during which the new crop is forbidden.

תניא רבי אומר (מלכים ב ד, מב) ואיש בא מבעל שלישה ויבא לאיש האלהים לחם בכורים עשרים לחם שעורים וגו'

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that this principle can be demonstrated based on an incident related in the Bible. The verse states with regard to the prophet Elisha: “And there came a man from Ba’al Shalisha, and he brought to the man of God bread of the first fruits, twenty loaves of barley, and fresh ears of corn in his sack. And he said: Give to the people, that they may eat” (II Kings 4:42).

ואין לך קלה בכל ארץ ישראל לבשל פירותיה יותר מבעל שלישה ואף על פי כן לא בכרה אלא מין אחד שמא תאמר חטים תלמוד לומר שעורים שמא תאמר לפני העומר תלמוד לומר (מלכים ב ד, מב) תן לעם ויאכלו אחר העומר היה

The incident is analyzed: You do not have in all of Eretz Yisrael an environment in which fruit ripens more swiftly than in Ba’al Shalisha, and even so, only one of the seven species had ripened at that time, as the verse testifies that he brought him “bread of the first fruits.” Lest you say the verse speaks of wheat, which ripens close to the time of the festival of Shavuot, the verse states “barley.” Lest you say that the incident took place before the omer offering was sacrificed, the verse states: “Give to the people, that they may eat.” As they were permitted to eat, it must be that the incident was after the omer offering was brought.

אמור מעתה ראויה היתה אותה שנה שתתעבר ומפני מה לא עיברה אלישע ששנת בצורת היתה והיו הכל רצין לבית הגרנות

Based on this, say that even in the place in which fruit ripened the fastest in all of Eretz Yisrael, after the omer had been brought, only the barley had ripened. Evidently, the year was fit to be intercalated, because the spring produce was not sufficiently mature in time. And for what reason did the prophet Elisha not intercalate it? Because it was a year of scarcity, as described in the Bible (see II Kings 4:38), and everyone was running to the granary. Intercalating the year would have made it even more difficult to obtain produce.

ת"ר אין מעברין את השנה לפני ראש השנה ואם עיברוה אינה מעוברת אבל מפני הדחק מעברין אותה אחר ראש השנה מיד ואעפ"כ אין מעברין אלא אדר

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:3): The court may not intercalate the year before Rosh HaShana. And if the court intercalated it this early, it is not intercalated. But if there was a need to intercalate it early due to exigent circumstances, e.g., religious persecution, they may intercalate it immediately after Rosh HaShana. Even so, they may intercalate it only by adding a second month of Adar.

איני והא שלחו ליה לרבא זוג בא מרקת ותפשו נשר ובידם דברים הנעשה בלוז ומאי ניהו תכלת בזכות הרחמים ובזכותם יצאו בשלום

The Gemara asks: Is that so, that intercalation may be determined only after Rosh HaShana? But the Sages of Eretz Yisrael sent the following encoded message to Rava during the time of Roman persecution: A pair of Torah scholars came from Rakkath, the biblical name for Tiberias (see Joshua 19:35), which was the seat of the Sanhedrin in Rava’s time. They meant to reach the Diaspora community, but the pair was apprehended by the eagle, i.e., Roman soldiers, whose symbol was the eagle; and in their possession were precious items made in Luz. The Gemara interrupts the story to explain: And what are those items from Luz? Sky-blue dye, which is necessary for ritual fringes. The message continued: In the merit of divine mercy and in their merit, they were spared execution and emerged in peace. Nevertheless, they did not reach their destination.

ועמוסי יריכי נחשון בקשו לקבוע נציב אחד ולא הניחן אדומי הלז אבל בעלי אסופות נאספו וקבעו לו נציב אחד בירח שמת בו אהרן הכהן חשובי מחשבי גלויי לא מגלו

The message continued: And the offspring of Nahshon, meaning the Sages of the court of the Nasi, who was descended from the prince of Judah, Nahshon ben Amminadab (see Numbers 7:12), sought to establish a pillar, i.e., they sought to add a month to the year. But that Edomite, the local Roman governor, did not allow them to intercalate the year. Nevertheless, the members of the assembly gathered, and they established a pillar, in the month in which Aaron the priest died, i.e., the Sages of Eretz Yisrael convened in the month of Av, which is before Rosh HaShana, and determined that the following year should be intercalated. Evidently, then, in exigent circumstances, intercalation may be done even before Rosh HaShana. The Gemara answers: The court may calculate the need for an extra month even before Rosh HaShana, but they may not reveal and publicize the decision until after Rosh HaShana.

מאי משמע דהאי נציב לישנא דירחא הוא דכתיב (מלכים א ד, ז) ולשלמה שנים עשר נציבים על כל ישראל וכלכלו את המלך ואת (אנשיו) חדש בשנה והכתיב (מלכים א ד, יט) ונציב אחד [אשר] בארץ רב יהודה ורב נחמן חד אמר אחד ממונה על כולם וחד אמר כנגד חדש העיבור

The Gemara asks about the language of the coded message. From where may it be inferred that this word pillar [netziv] is a term for the month? As it is written: “And Solomon had twelve officers [netzivim] over all Israel, and they provided for the king and his household for a month in the year” (I Kings 4:7). This indicates that each netziv was responsible for a particular month. Once this verse was quoted, the Gemara inquires: But isn’t it written afterward: “And one officer that was in the land” (I Kings 4:19), indicating that there were more than twelve netzivim? Rav Yehuda and Rav Naḥman offer answers. One says: One officer was appointed over all of the others. And one says: The extra officer corresponded to the intercalated month. If the year had an additional month, he was responsible for the king’s provisions during that month.

ת"ר אין מעברין את השנה לא משנה לחברתה ולא שלש שנים זו אחר זו אמר רבי שמעון מעשה ברבי עקיבא שהיה חבוש בבית האסורים ועיבר שלש שנים זו אחר זו אמרו לו משם ראיה ב"ד ישבו וקבעו אחת אחת בזמנה

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:4): The court may not intercalate the year from one year to another, and it does not intercalate three successive years, one directly after the other. Rabbi Shimon says: There was an incident involving Rabbi Akiva at the time when he was incarcerated in prison, and he intercalated three years, one after the other. The Sages said to Rabbi Shimon: Is there any proof from there? Rabbi Akiva merely made the calculations, but a special court sat and established each one at its time.

תנו רבנן אין מעברין את השנה לא בשביעית ולא במוצאי שביעית אימתי רגילין לעבר ערב שביעית של בית רבן גמליאל היו מעברין במוצאי שביעית

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:5): The court may not intercalate the year in the Sabbatical Year, so as not to prolong the prohibitions of the Sabbatical Year, nor in the year after the Sabbatical Year, when there is not much produce available, and delaying the consumption of the new crop would also cause hardship. When is the court accustomed to intercalate? On the eve of the Sabbatical Year, which causes no particular challenges. Nevertheless, the courts of the house of Rabban Gamliel would intercalate the year in the year after the Sabbatical Year.

ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי דתניא אין מביאין ירק מחוצה לארץ ורבותינו התירו מאי בינייהו אמר רבי ירמיה חוששין לגושיהן איכא בינייהו

And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One may not import vegetables in the Sabbatical Year from outside Eretz Yisrael, and our Rabbis permitted importing such produce. According to the opinion that permits importing produce from outside Eretz Yisrael, there is no concern that the food supply will be exhausted. Therefore, the year following the Sabbatical Year may be intercalated. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the difference between these two opinions concerning importing produce from outside Eretz Yisrael? Rabbi Yirmeya says: The difference between them relates to whether one is concerned for their clods of earth. Although all agree that the earth outside Eretz Yisrael conveys ritual impurity, the tanna’im dispute whether it is therefore forbidden to bring vegetables into Eretz Yisrael due to concern that small clods of earth may cling to them.

תנו רבנן אין מעברין את השנה מפני הטומאה

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:10): The court may not intercalate the year due to ritual impurity, i.e., in the event that most of the Jewish people are in a state of impurity, to give them enough time to become ritually pure before Passover.

רבי יהודה אומר מעברין אמר רבי יהודה מעשה בחזקיה מלך יהודה שעיבר את השנה מפני הטומאה ובקש רחמים על עצמו דכתיב (דברי הימים ב ל, יח) כי מרבית העם רבת מאפרים ומנשה יששכר וזבולון לא הטהרו

Rabbi Yehuda says: The court may intercalate the year due to ritual impurity. Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Hezekiah, king of Judea, who intercalated the year due to ritual impurity (II Chronicles 30:2). And after doing so, he requested compassion for himself, as it is written: “For a multitude of the people, even many of Ephraim and Manasseh, Issachar and Zebulun, had not cleansed themselves,

12b

(דה"ב ל, יח) כי אכלו את הפסח בלא ככתוב כי התפלל חזקיהו עליהם לאמר ה' הטוב יכפר בעד

yet they ate the Paschal lamb not as is written. For Hezekiah had prayed for them, saying: May the good Lord pardon everyone who sets his heart to seek God…though he not be cleansed according to the purification that pertains to sacred items” (II Chronicles 30:18–19).

רבי שמעון אומר אם מפני הטומאה עיברוה מעוברת אלא מפני מה ביקש רחמים על עצמו שאין מעברין אלא אדר והוא עיבר ניסן בניסן ר' שמעון בן יהודה אומר משום ר"ש מפני שהשיא את ישראל לעשות פסח שני:

Rabbi Shimon says: If the court intercalated the year due to ritual impurity, it is indeed intercalated. But if ritual impurity is ultimately a legitimate reason for intercalating the year, for what reason did Hezekiah request compassion for himself? Because the court may intercalate only the month of Adar, and he intercalated the month of Nisan during the month of Nisan itself. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: The incident did not involve the intercalation of the year; rather he appealed for mercy because he encouraged the Jewish people to bypass the standard first Pesaḥ and instead to perform the second Pesaḥ.

אמר מר רבי יהודה אומר מעברין אלמא אית ליה לרבי יהודה טומאה דחויה היא בציבור

Having quoted the Tosefta in its entirety, the Gemara now clarifies several of its details. The Master said above: Rabbi Yehuda says: The court may intercalate the year due to ritual impurity, in order to delay the Paschal offerings, so that the people can perform them in a state of purity. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the prohibition against performing the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity is merely overridden in cases involving the public. Although the offerings may be brought when most of the public is in a state of impurity, this course of action is not ideally permitted; one must attempt to find another way to perform the offerings in purity.

והא תניא ציץ בין שישנו על מצחו ובין שאינו על מצחו מרצה דברי רבי שמעון ר' יהודה אומר עודו על מצחו מרצה אין עודו על מצחו אינו מרצה

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The frontplate effects acceptance whether it is on the forehead of the High Priest or whether it is not on the forehead of the High Priest; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: As long as it is on his forehead it effects acceptance; if it is no longer on his forehead it does not effect acceptance.

א"ל ר' שמעון כהן גדול ביום הכיפורים יוכיח שאינו על מצחו ומרצה אמר לו רבי יהודה הנח ליום הכיפורים שטומאה הותרה בציבור

Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yehuda: The case of the High Priest on Yom Kippur can prove that your statement is incorrect, as on Yom Kippur the frontplate is not on the forehead of the High Priest during the time that he wears only linen garments, and it still effects acceptance. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: Leave aside the case of the High Priest on Yom Kippur, as since the Temple service consists wholly of public offerings the atonement of the frontplate is unnecessary. Even without the frontplate, performing the Temple service in a state of impurity is permitted in cases involving the public. If Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is readily permitted to perform Temple service in the instance of public impurity, then why would he sanction intercalating the year in order to give the public more time to become ritually pure?

וליטעמיך תיקשי לך היא גופה ר' יהודה אומר מעברין ואמר ר' יהודה מעשה בחזקיה מלך יהודה שעיבר את השנה מפני הטומאה וביקש רחמים על עצמו אלא חסורי מחסרא והכי קתני אין מעברין את השנה מפני הטומאה ואם עיברוה מעוברת רבי יהודה אומר אינה מעוברת ואמר רבי יהודה וכו'

The Gemara rejects the question concerning the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: And according to your reasoning, the Tosefta itself should pose a difficulty for you. The Tosefta states: Rabbi Yehuda says: The court may intercalate the year due to impurity. And Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Hezekiah, king of Judea, who intercalated the year due to ritual impurity, and afterward he requested compassion for himself. Why would he request compassion after having made a legitimate decision? Rather, it must be concluded that the Tosefta is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: The court does not intercalate the year due to impurity, but if the court intercalated it, it is intercalated. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the court intercalated it, it is not intercalated. And to prove his point, Rabbi Yehuda said that there was an incident involving Hezekiah, who intercalated the year due to impurity and subsequently appealed for mercy.

אי הכי ר' שמעון אומר אם מפני הטומאה עיברוה מעוברת היינו תנא קמא אמר רבא לכתחלה איכא בינייהו תניא נמי הכי אין מעברין את השנה מפני הטומאה לכתחילה ר' שמעון אומר מעברין אלא מפני מה בקש רחמים על עצמו שאין מעברין אלא אדר והוא עיבר ניסן בניסן

The Gemara asks: If that is so, meaning if this is the correct way to understand the Tosefta, then the next statement in the Tosefta cannot be reconciled: Rabbi Shimon says: If they intercalated the year due to ritual impurity, it is indeed intercalated. According to this explanation, this is identical to the opinion of the first tanna, who also says that the intercalation is effective. Rava said: The difference between these two opinions is whether the year may be intercalated due to impurity ab initio. According to the first tanna, although the intercalation is valid after the fact, impurity is not an appropriate reason to intercalate the year. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is an appropriate reason. This is also taught in a baraita: The court may not intercalate the year due to impurity ab initio. Rabbi Shimon says: The court may intercalate the year due to impurity, even ab initio. Rather, according to this opinion, for what reason did Hezekiah request compassion for himself? Because the court may intercalate only Adar, but he intercalated Nisan during Nisan.

אמר מר שאין מעברין אלא אדר והוא עיבר ניסן בניסן ולית ליה לחזקיה (שמות יב, ב) החדש הזה לכם זה ניסן ואין אחר ניסן טעה בדשמואל דאמר שמואל אין מעברין את השנה ביום שלשים של אדר הואיל וראוי לקובעו ניסן

The Master said above: Hezekiah requested compassion because the court, when intercalating the year, may intercalate only Adar, and he intercalated Nisan during Nisan. How could Hezekiah act in this way? But doesn’t Hezekiah accept the following interpretive tradition: The verse states: “This month shall be for you the beginning of months; it shall be the first month of the year for you” (Exodus 12:2). This teaches that this month is Nisan, and another month cannot be Nisan. Therefore, the court cannot add another month of Nisan. The Gemara answers: Hezekiah erred with regard to the halakha that would later be expounded by Shmuel. As Shmuel says: The court may not intercalate the year on the thirtieth day of Adar, since although it is part of Adar, it is fit to establish it as the first day of Nisan. As the day that may be assigned as the New Moon of Nisan, it has the same status as does Nisan, and the year may not be intercalated then.

ואיהו סבר הואיל וראוי לא אמרינן תניא נמי הכי אין מעברין את השנה ביום שלשים של אדר הואיל וראוי לקובעו ניסן:

And Hezekiah held: We do not say the principle: Since it is fit. Since it was technically still Adar, he initially thought it was permitted to intercalate the year on that day. The Gemara notes: This opinion is also taught in a baraita: The court may not intercalate the year on the thirtieth day of Adar, since it is fit to establish it as the first day of Nisan.

רבי שמעון בן יהודה אומר משום רבי שמעון מפני שהשיא את ישראל לעשות פסח שני היכי דמי אמר רב אשי כגון שהיו ישראל מחצה טמאים ומחצה טהורים ונשים משלימות לטהורים ועודפות עליהם

The Gemara further analyzes the Tosefta quoted above: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Hezekiah requested compassion because he encouraged the Jewish people to perform the second Pesaḥ. What are the circumstances, such that Hezekiah acted in this unusual manner and later regretted his decision? Rav Ashi said: It was a case where half the Jewish people were impure and half were pure. And the women among them completed the ranks of the pure and the combined total then exceeded the impure ones. A majority of the men were impure, but as most of the women were pure, if they were included in the tally the majority of the public was then pure. Hezekiah was unsure whether the women should be counted, as he was unsure if they are obligated to bring the Paschal offering.

מעיקרא סבר נשים בראשון חובה דהוו מיעוטן טמאים ומיעוטן מידחו לפסח שני ולבסוף סבר נשים בראשון רשות דהוו להו טמאים רובא ורובא לא מדחו לפסח שני:

Initially, he thought women have an obligation to participate in the first Pesaḥ on the fourteenth of Nisan, so the minority of Jews are impure and the minority should be deferred to the second Pesaḥ. Therefore, he deferred most of the men, as they were ritually impure, to bypass the first Pesaḥ. In the end, he thought women are permitted but not obligated to participate in the first Pesaḥ. So when counting only the men, the impure were the majority of those obligated to bring the offering, and the majority is not deferred to the second Pesaḥ. Instead, they should have sacrificed the offering on the first Pesaḥ despite their impurity. Consequently, having deferred the majority when they should not have been deferred, he regretted his decision.

גופא אמר שמואל אין מעברין את השנה ביום שלשים של אדר הואיל וראוי לקובעו ניסן עיברוה מאי אמר עולא אין מקדשין את החדש קידשו מאי אמר רבא בטל העיבור רב נחמן אמר מעובר ומקודש

§ With regard to the question of intercalating the year on the thirtieth of Adar, the Gemara discusses the matter itself. Shmuel says: The court may not intercalate the year on the thirtieth day of Adar, although it is part of Adar, since it is fit to establish the day as the first of Nisan. If they intercalated the year on that day, after the fact, what is the halakha? Ulla says: The intercalation is effective and the court does not sanctify the month on that day, so that the intercalation will have been performed in Adar. The Gemara asks: If another court sanctified the month, what is the halakha? Rava says: The intercalation is void, as it turns out that the intercalation was performed in Nisan. Rav Naḥman disagrees and says: The year is intercalated and the month is also sanctified, because each court has performed an independently valid function.

א"ל רבא לרב נחמן מכדי מפוריא לפיסחא תלתין יומין הוו ומפוריא דרשינן בהלכות הפסח דתניא שואלין בהלכות הפסח קודם לפסח שלשים יום רשב"ג אומר שתי שבתות וכי מטי ריש ירחא מרחקין ליה אתי לזלזולי בחמץ

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Now, from Purim to Passover is thirty days, and from the time of Purim, we teach the community the halakhot of Passover. As it is taught in a baraita: The people ask questions with regard to the halakhot of Passover beginning thirty days before Passover. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: They ask two weeks before Passover. If so, even during Adar, people know that Passover is approaching. And when the New Moon comes, if the court will distance the Passover holiday another month by adding another Adar at so late a date, then the people will come to treat the Passover prohibitions of leavened bread lightly, believing that the stated time of Passover is incorrect because the Sages decided the dates capriciously.

אמר ליה מידע ידיעי דשתא מעברתא בחושבנא תליא מילתא אמרי חושבנא הוא דלא סליק להו לרבנן עד השתא

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: The masses know that the intercalated year is a matter dependent upon the calculation, which is determined by a complex process. Therefore they say: It is the calculation that did not conclusively emerge for the Sages until now, and they will therefore understand when the true date of Passover is.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל אין מעברין את השנה אלא א"כ היתה תקופה חסירה רובה של חודש וכמה רובה של חודש ששה עשר יום דברי רבי יהודה

§ With regard to intercalation on the basis of the season, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The court intercalates the year only if the season of Tammuz, i.e., the summer, was lacking its completion for most of the month of Tishrei, meaning that the summer season had begun so late in the calendar that the autumnal equinox would occur only after most of the month of Tishrei has passed. Since the festival of Sukkot, beginning on the fifteenth of Tishrei, must fall after the autumnal equinox, a month is added to the previous year, therefore causing the summer season to end and the autumn to begin at an earlier point on the Jewish calendar. This allows Sukkot to begin after the autumnal equinox, within the season of Tishrei. And how much is: Most of the month? Sixteen days; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

13a

רבי יוסי אומר אחד ועשרים יום ושניהם מקרא אחד דרשו (שמות לד, כב) חג האסיף תקופת השנה מר סבר כוליה חג בעינן בתקופה חדשה ומר סבר מקצת חג בעינן בתקופה חדשה

Rabbi Yosei says: The year must be intercalated only if twenty-one days of Tishrei will pass before the autumnal equinox. The Gemara explains: And both of them expounded the same verse to arrive at their respective opinions: “And the Festival of the Ingathering at the turn of the year” (Exodus 34:22). They both interpret the verse to mean that the Festival of the Ingathering, which is referring to the intermediate days of Sukkot, must take place during the season of Tishrei, i.e., autumn. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that we require all of the Festival to take place in the new season, after the equinox. And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that we require only some of the Festival, even one day, to take place in the new season, so the year must be intercalated only if the equinox would fall on the twenty-second of Tishrei or later.

מאי קא סברי אי קסברי יום תקופה גומר בלאו הכי נמי לא למ"ד כוליה חג איכא ולא למאן דאמר מקצת חג איכא אלא קסברי יום תקופה מתחיל

The Gemara asks: What do they each hold? If they hold that the day of the equinox concludes the season, meaning that it is counted as part of the preceding season, then even if the season of Tammuz is not lacking more than this number of days until its completion, the year would need to be intercalated. According to the one who says that we require all of the Festival to take place in the new season, this is not sufficient to rectify the problem, as the sixteenth of Tishrei, which is the beginning of the Festival of the Ingathering, is still in the old season. And even according to the one who says we require only some of the Festival to take place in the new season, this is also not sufficient to rectify the problem, since if the equinox occurs on the twenty-first of Tishrei, the new season begins only on the twenty-second, after the Festival of the Ingathering is over. Rather, they certainly both hold that the day of the equinox begins the new season.

מיתיבי יום תקופה גומר דברי רבי יהודה רבי יוסי אומר יום תקופה מתחיל

The Gemara raises an objection to this conclusion from a different baraita: The day of the equinox concludes the season; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: The day of the equinox begins the season. It is therefore clear that they disagree about this issue, and that the previous baraita must be explained differently.

ועוד תניא אין מעברין את השנה אלא א"כ היתה תקופה חסירה רובו של חודש וכמה רובו של חדש ששה עשר יום ר' יהודה אומר שתי ידות בחודש וכמה שתי ידות בחדש כ' יום

And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:7): The court intercalates the year only if the season of Tammuz was lacking its completion for most of the month of Tishrei. And how much is: Most of the month? Sixteen days. Rabbi Yehuda says: Two parts, meaning two-thirds, of the month. And how much is: Two parts of the month? Twenty days, since in that case the day of the equinox would fall on the twenty-first, and since according to Rabbi Yehuda the day of the equinox concludes the season, the new season would begin on the following day, after the Festival of the Ingathering has ended.

ר' יוסי אומר מחשבין ששה עשר לפני הפסח מעברין ששה עשר לפני החג אין מעברין ר"ש אומר אף ששה עשר לפני החג מעברין אחרים אומרים מיעוטו וכמה מיעוטו ארבעה עשר יום קשיא

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei says: The court calculates the seasons, and if the winter season of Tevet, which is before Passover, is lacking its completion for sixteen days into the month of Nisan, the court intercalates the year, so that Passover will occur within the season of Nisan, i.e., the spring. But if the summer season of Tammuz, which is before the Festival of the Ingathering, is lacking its completion for sixteen days into the month of Tishrei, the court does not intercalate it. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the season before the Festival of the Ingathering is lacking its completion for sixteen days into the month of Tishrei, the court does intercalate the year. The tanna referred to as Aḥerim says: The year is intercalated even on account of a minority of the month, and how much is a minority of the month? Fourteen days. The Gemara concludes: Comparing the various baraitot poses a difficulty, as they appear to contradict one another.

אמר מר רבי יהודה אומר שתי ידות בחודש עשרים יום רבי יוסי אומר מחשבין ששה עשר יום לפני הפסח מעברין היינו רבי יהודה

The Gemara analyzes the baraita: The Master said that Rabbi Yehuda says: The year must be intercalated if the season of Tammuz is lacking its completion for two parts of the month of Tishrei, which is twenty days. Rabbi Yosei says: The court calculates the seasons, and if the season of Tevet, which is before Passover, is lacking its completion for sixteen days into the month of Nisan, the court intercalates the year. The Gemara challenges: That is the same as the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, since a calculation that shows the winter season of a given year to be lacking its completion for sixteen days of Nisan will also show the summer season of that year will be lacking its completion for twenty days of Tishrei.

יום תקופה גומר ויום תקופה מתחיל איכא בינייהו

The Gemara explains: The difference between them concerns the question of whether the day of the equinox concludes the season, or the day of the equinox begins the season. Rabbi Yehuda holds that the day of the equinox concludes the season, and therefore in the given scenario the year must be intercalated so that some of the Festival of the Ingathering will occur in the season of Tishrei. But according to Rabbi Yosei this is not a concern, as the day of the equinox begins the season. Nevertheless, the year must be intercalated so that Passover will occur in the season of Nisan.

אמר מר ששה עשר לפני החג אין מעברין אלא לרבי יוסי ששה עשר לפני החג הוא דלא הא שיבסר ותמניסר מעברין

The Master says: In the continuation of his statement, Rabbi Yosei said: If the summer season of Tammuz, which is before the Festival of the Ingathering, is lacking its completion for sixteen days into the month of Tishrei, the court does not intercalate the year. The Gemara challenges: Rather, according to Rabbi Yosei, if the season before the Festival is lacking its completion for sixteen days into the month of Tishrei, this is the situation when the court does not intercalate the year. But can one therefore infer that if it is lacking its completion for seventeen or eighteen days into the month of Tishrei, the court does intercalate the year?

והאמר ששה עשר לפני הפסח אין בציר לא

The Gemara explains the difficulty: But doesn’t he say: The court calculates the seasons, and if the winter season of Tevet, which is before Passover, is lacking its completion for sixteen days into the month of Nisan, yes, the court intercalates the year; but if it is lacking its completion for less than that, it should not be intercalated, even if the season before the Festival of the Ingathering will be lacking seventeen or eighteen days? The two elements of Rabbi Yosei’s statement appear to contradict one another.

לא אידי ואידי אין מעברין ואיידי דתנא רישא ששה עשר לפני הפסח תנא נמי ששה עשר לפני החג

The Gemara answers: No, those inferences are not correct. Rather, in both this case and that case, the court does not intercalate the year, and since it taught in the first clause: Sixteen days before Passover, it also taught: Sixteen days before the Festival of the Ingathering, but one cannot infer from this that it means sixteen days and no more.

ר"ש אומר אף ששה עשר לפני החג מעברין היינו תנא קמא

The baraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: Even if the season before the Festival of the Ingathering is lacking its completion for sixteen days into the month of Tishrei, the court does intercalate the year. The Gemara asks: If so, this is apparently the same as the opinion of the first tanna; what is the difference between Rabbi Shimon’s opinion and that of the first tanna?

13b

איכא בינייהו יום תקופה מתחיל ויום תקופה גומר ולא מסיימי

The Gemara answers: Also here, the difference between them concerns the question of whether the day of the equinox begins the season or whether the day of the equinox concludes the season, but their opinions are not defined. Although it is apparent from the baraita that these two tanna’im disagree about this issue, it is not clear from their words which tanna ascribes to which of these opinions.

אחרים אומרים מיעוטו וכמה מיעוטו ארבעה עשר יום מאי קסברי אי קסברי יום תקופה גומר וכוליה חג בעינן האיכא אמר רב שמואל בר רב יצחק אחרים בתקופת ניסן קיימי דכתיב (דברים טז, א) שמור את חדש האביב שמור אביב של תקופה שיהא בחדש ניסן

The baraita teaches: The tanna referred to as Aḥerim says: The year is intercalated even on account of a minority of the month, and how much is a minority of the month? Fourteen days. The Gemara asks: What do Aḥerim hold? If they hold that the day of the equinox concludes the season, and also that we require all of the Festival to take place in the new season, this condition is fulfilled even if the season is lacking fifteen days. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: Aḥerim are standing in, i.e., discussing, the season of Nisan. As it is written: “Observe the month of spring and keep the Pesaḥ” (Deuteronomy 16:1), from which it is inferred: Preserve the day of the equinox of the spring, to ensure that it will be in the month of Nisan, meaning that the equinox must occur during the first part of the month of Nisan, by the fourteenth, the day the Paschal offering is sacrificed.

וליעבריה לאדר אמר רב אחא בר יעקב תנא מלמעלה למטה קחשיב והכי קאמר עד מיעוטו מעברין וכמה מיעוטו ארבעה עשר יום

The Gemara asks: In a situation like this, why is it necessary to intercalate the year? But let them intercalate the month of Adar by adding a day to it, and this will cause the day of the equinox to occur during the first half of Nisan. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: The tanna whom the baraita here refers to as Aḥerim calculated from the top, meaning the maximum number of days downward, and this is what he is saying: Up to a minority of the month, meaning, if the equinox would occur during the final days of Nisan, the court would intercalate the year and would also do so if the equinox would occur earlier in the month, unless it would be early enough that only a minority of the month would be in the previous season. And how much is a minority? Fourteen days. But if the equinox would occur on the fourteenth, the year is not to be intercalated, but instead a day should be added to the month of Adar.

רבינא אמר לעולם אחרים בתשרי קיימי וקסברי אחרים כוליה חג בעינן ויו"ט ראשון יום טוב ראשון חג האסיף כתיב חג הבא בזמן אסיפה:

Ravina said: Actually, it can be explained that Aḥerim are standing in the season of Tishrei, and were discussing Sukkot as opposed to Passover. Aḥerim hold that we require all of the festival of Sukkot, including the Festival on the first day, to take place in the new season. Since Sukkot begins on the fifteenth of Tishrei, the equinox must fall no later than the fourteenth. The Gemara asks: How is it possible to say that the Festival on the first day must also be in the new season? It is written: “The Festival of Ingathering” (Exodus 23:16), which is referring to the time when the crops are gathered. This can refer only to the intermediate days of Sukkot, since it is prohibited to gather crops on a Festival. The Gemara answers: They interpret the verse to mean: The Festival that comes at the time of ingathering, meaning in the autumn.

סמיכת זקנים: ת"ר (ויקרא ד, טו) וסמכו זקני יכול זקני השוק ת"ל עדה

§ The mishna teaches: The laying of hands by the Sages is performed by a court of three judges according to Rabbi Shimon and five according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the elders of the congregation shall lay their hands on the head of the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 4:15). One might have thought that the verse is referring to any elders in the marketplace, meaning people who are not members of the Sanhedrin. Therefore, the verse states: “Elders of the congregation,” meaning from among the leaders and judges of the people.

אי עדה יכול קטני עדה ת"ל העדה מיוחדין שבעדה וכמה הן וסמכו שנים זקני שנים ואין ב"ד שקול מוסיפין עליהם עוד אחד הרי כאן חמשה דברי רבי יהודה רבי שמעון אומר זקני שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחד הרי כאן שלשה

If it had written only “congregation,” one might have thought they may be the minor ones of the congregation, i.e., members of the lesser Sanhedrin. Therefore, the verse states: “The congregation,” which indicates the unique ones of the congregation, meaning that they must be members of the Great Sanhedrin. And how many must they be? The verse states: “Shall lay” in the plural form, which indicates a minimum of two; “elders” in the plural form, indicating another two; and as a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add an additional one to them, so there are five judges here; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The verse states: “Elders,” indicating two, and as a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add an additional one to them, so there are three judges here.

ור' שמעון הכתיב וסמכו ההוא מיבעי ליה לגופיה ורבי יהודה לגופיה לא צריך דאם כן דלא אתי וסמכו לדרשה ליכתוב זקני העדה ידיהם על ראש הפר

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, isn’t it written: “And the elders of the congregation shall lay”? This word should be included in the derivation. The Gemara answers: That word is necessary for the matter itself, to indicate that the elders of the congregation must lay their hands on the bull, and therefore it is not part of the phrase from which the number of judges is derived. The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda respond to this? The Gemara answers: It is not necessary to use this word for the matter itself, as if this would be so, that the phrase: “And the elders of the congregation shall lay” does not come to be interpreted, let it write: The elders of the congregation, their hands on the head of the bull, and it could be understood that the elders lay their hands on the head of the bull.

ור' שמעון אי כתיב הכי הוה אמינא מאי על בסמוך ורבי יהודה גמר ראש ראש מעולה ור"ש לא גמר ראש ראש מעולה

And what does Rabbi Shimon respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: If it were written so, I would say: What is the meaning of: “On [al] the head of the bull”? It means adjacent to the head of the bull, as the term al often means next to or nearby. And what does Rabbi Yehuda respond to this claim? He learns that the hands are placed directly on the bull’s head by means of a verbal analogy, from the word “head” in this verse and the word “head” written in the verse discussing a burnt-offering, where the halakha states that the one bringing the offering must lay his hands literally and forcefully on the animal’s head. And what does Rabbi Shimon respond to that? He does not learn this verbal analogy from the word “head” in the verse about the elders and the word “head” in the verse discussing a burnt-offering, as he did not receive this tradition from his teachers.

תנא סמיכה וסמיכת זקנים בג' מאי סמיכה ומאי סמיכת זקנים א"ר יוחנן מיסמך סבי

§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 10:15): The laying of hands and the laying of hands by the Sages are performed by three judges. What is the laying of hands, and what is the laying of hands by the Sages? It is clear that one of these terms is referring to the elders laying their hands on the bull offered for an unwitting communal sin, but what is the meaning of the other expression? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is referring to the ordination of elders, meaning, to appoint Sages and grant them the title Rabbi.

א"ל אביי לרב יוסף מיסמך סבי בשלשה מנלן אילימא מדכתיב (במדבר כז, כג) ויסמוך את ידיו עליו אי הכי תסגי בחד וכי תימא משה במקום שבעים וחד קאי אי הכי ליבעי שבעים וחד קשיא

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: From where do we derive that the ordination of elders is performed by three judges? If we say it is from the fact that it is written with regard to Moses when he appointed Joshua: “And he laid his hands on him and he commanded him” (Numbers 27:23), if so, it should be enough for one man to ordain the new Sage, as Moses ordained Joshua. And if you would say: Moses stood in place of seventy-one, meaning that no Sage in a later generation could fill the place of Moses, and only the Great Sanhedrin can fill that role, if so, then every ordination should require seventy-one judges. The Gemara responds: The matter is difficult; there is no clear source for this halakha.

אמר ליה רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי בידא ממש סמכין ליה אמר ליה סמכין ליה בשמא קרי ליה רבי ויהבי ליה רשותא למידן דיני קנסות

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Do they ordain him literally with the hand? Rav Ashi said to him: They ordain him by name by announcing it publicly; he is called: Rabbi, and they give him permission to adjudicate cases involving laws of fines.

וחד לא סמיך והא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב ברם זכור אותו האיש לטוב ורבי יהודה בן בבא שמו שאילמלא הוא נשתכחו דיני קנסות מישראל נשתכחו נגרוסינהו אלא

The Gemara asks: And is it so that one man alone is not able to ordain a rabbi? But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: Indeed [beram], that man will be remembered favorably, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava is his name, as had it not been for him the laws of fines would have been forgotten from among the Jewish people. The Gemara challenges that assertion: Would the laws of fines actually have been forgotten? Let them study them, so they will not be forgotten. Rather, his intention was to say that

14a

בטלו דיני קנסות מישראל שפעם אחת גזרה מלכות הרשעה גזירה על ישראל שכל הסומך יהרג וכל הנסמך יהרג ועיר שסומכין בה תיחרב ותחומין שסומכין בהן יעקרו

the laws of fines would have ceased to be implemented from among the Jewish people, as they would not have been able to adjudicate cases involving these laws due to a lack of ordained judges. This is because at one time the wicked kingdom of Rome issued decrees of religious persecution against the Jewish people with the aim of abolishing the chain of ordination and the authority of the Sages. They said that anyone who ordains judges will be killed, and anyone who is ordained will be killed, and the city in which they ordain the judges will be destroyed, and the signs identifying the boundaries of the city in which they ordain judges will be uprooted. These measures were intended to discourage the Sages from performing or receiving ordination due to fear for the welfare of the local population.

מה עשה יהודה בן בבא הלך וישב לו בין שני הרים גדולים ובין שתי עיירות גדולות ובין שני תחומי שבת בין אושא לשפרעם וסמך שם חמשה זקנים ואלו הן ר"מ ור' יהודה ור' שמעון ור' יוסי ור' אלעזר בן שמוע רב אויא מוסיף אף ר' נחמיה

What did Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava do? He went and sat between two large mountains, between two large cities, and between two Shabbat boundaries: Between Usha and Shefaram, i.e., in a desolate place that was not associated with any particular city so that he not endanger anyone not directly involved, and there he ordained five elders. And they were: Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua. Rav Avya adds that Rabbi Neḥemya was also among those ordained. This incident indicates that ordination can be performed by a single Sage.

כיון שהכירו אויביהם בהן אמר להן בניי רוצו אמרו לו רבי מה תהא עליך אמר להן הריני מוטל לפניהם כאבן שאין לה הופכים אמרו לא זזו משם עד שנעצו בו שלש מאות לונביאות של ברזל ועשאוהו ככברה

When their enemies discovered them, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava said to the newly ordained Sages: My sons, run for your lives. They said to him: My teacher, what will be with you? Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was elderly and unable to run. He said to them: In any case, I am cast before them like a stone that cannot be overturned; even if you attempt to assist me I will not be able to escape due to my frailty, but if you do not escape without me you will also be killed. People say about this incident: The Roman soldiers did not move from there until they had inserted three hundred iron spears [lunkhiyot] into him, making him appear like a sieve pierced with many holes.

רבי יהודה בן בבא אחריני הוו בהדיה והאי דלא חשיב להו משום כבודו דרבי יהודה בן בבא ור"מ ר' יהודה בן בבא סמכיה והא אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן כל האומר ר"מ לא סמכו ר' עקיבא אינו אלא טועה סמכיה ר' עקיבא ולא קיבלו סמכיה ר' יהודה בן בבא וקיבלו

This proof is refuted: There may have been other Sages performing the ordination with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who were added in order to reach the quota of three Sages, and this fact that they were not mentioned is due to the honor of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who was the greatest among them. The Gemara asks: And with regard to Rabbi Meir, did Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava actually ordain him? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who says that Rabbi Akiva did not ordain Rabbi Meir is nothing other than mistaken. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva in fact ordained Rabbi Meir, but the people did not accept the appointment, as Rabbi Meir was still very young. Therefore, some time later, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava ordained him a second time, and they accepted it.

אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי אין סמיכה בחוצה לארץ מאי אין סמיכה אילימא דלא דייני דיני קנסות כלל בחוצה לארץ והא תנן סנהדרין נוהגת בין בארץ ובין בחוצה לארץ אלא דלא סמכינן בחוצה לארץ

§ Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: There is no ordination outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: There is no ordination? If we say that they may not adjudicate cases involving laws of fines at all outside of Eretz Yisrael, that is difficult: Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Makkot 7a): The Sanhedrin and its authority functions both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael? Rather, the intention is that we do not ordain judges outside of Eretz Yisrael.

פשיטא סומכין בחוצה לארץ ונסמכין בארץ הא אמרינן דלא אלא סומכין בארץ ונסמכין בחוצה לארץ מאי

The Gemara comments: It is obvious that if those ordaining the new judges were outside of Eretz Yisrael, and those being ordained were inside Eretz Yisrael, we say that they may not perform the ordination. But if those ordaining the new judges were inside Eretz Yisrael, and those being ordained were outside of Eretz Yisrael, what is the halakha? May ordination be conferred from a distance in this situation?

ת"ש דרבי יוחנן הוה מצטער עליה דרב שמן בר אבא דלא הוה גבייהו דליסמכיה ר"ש בן זירוד וחד דעימיה ומנו ר' יונתן בן עכמאי ואמרי לה רבי יונתן בן עכמאי וחד דעימיה ומנו ר"ש בן זירוד חד דהוה גבייהו סמכוהו וחד דלא הוה גבייהו לא סמכוהו

The Gemara clarifies: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan was distressed concerning Rav Shemen bar Abba, as the latter was not with the other Sages at the time they received the consent of the Nasi so that Rabbi Yoḥanan could ordain him. In addition, concerning Rabbi Shimon ben Zeirud and one who was with him, the Gemara interjects: And who is he? Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Akhmai. And some say that it was Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Akhmai and one who was with him; the Gemara interjects: And who is he? Rabbi Shimon ben Zeirud. The Gemara continues: Although these two Sages were equal in stature, the Sages ordained only the one who was with them in Eretz Yisrael, and they did not ordain the other one, who was not with them. This indicates that ordination can be granted only in Eretz Yisrael.

ר' חנינא ורבי הושעיא הוה קא משתקיד רבי יוחנן למיסמכינהו לא הוה מסתייעא מילתא הוה קא מצטער טובא אמרו ליה לא נצטער מר דאנן מדבית עלי קאתינן

The Gemara relates several other incidents with regard to ordination. Rabbi Yoḥanan persistently tried to ordain Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Hoshaya, as they were scholars and righteous people. But he was not successful with regard to the matter, as various incidents repeatedly interfered with his plan, and he was very distressed about this. They said to him: Do not be distressed, our Master, as we come from, i.e., are descendants of, the house of the High Priest Eli.

דא"ר שמואל בר נחמן א"ר יונתן מניין שאין נסמכין לבית עלי שנאמר (שמואל א ב, לב) לא יהיה זקן בביתך כל הימים מאי זקן אילימא זקן ממש והכתיב (שמואל א ב, לג) כל מרבית ביתך ימותו אנשים אלא סמיכה

As Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥman says that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it known that there are not to be ordained Sages from the house of Eli? As it is stated with regard to the house of Eli: “And there shall not be an elder in your house forever” (I Samuel 2:32). The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of “elder” in this verse? If we say it means an actual elder, meaning an old person, but isn’t it already written: “And all those raised in your house shall die young men” (I Samuel 2:33)? Rather, the term “elder” is an honorary term for a Sage, and it means that ordination will not be granted to descendants of the House of Eli.

רבי זירא הוה מיטמר למיסמכיה דאמר רבי אלעזר לעולם הוי קבל וקיים כיון דשמעה להא דא"ר אלעזר אין אדם עולה לגדולה אלא א"כ מוחלין לו על כל עונותיו אמצי ליה אנפשיה

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Zeira would habitually hide himself so that they would not ordain him. He did this due to the fact that Rabbi Elazar said: Always be obscure and remain alive, meaning the more humble and unknown you make yourself, the longer you will live. When he heard that which Rabbi Elazar also said: A person does not rise to greatness unless all his sins are forgiven, he understood that there are also benefits to greatness, and he presented himself to the Nasi in order that he would ordain him.

כי סמכוה לר' זירא שרו ליה הכי לא כחל ולא שרק ולא פירכוס ויעלת חן כי סמכוה לרבי אמי ולרבי אסי שרו להו הכי כל מן דין כל מן דין סמוכו לנא לא תסמכו לנא לא מסרמיטין ולא מסרמיסין ואמרי לה לא מחמיסין ולא מטורמיסין

The Gemara relates: When they ordained Rabbi Zeira the Sages who were present at the ceremony sang to him this paean of praise traditionally sung to a bride at her wedding: She wears no blue eye shadow and no rouge on her face and no hair dye, and nevertheless she radiates grace. The bride is described as so beautiful that she does not need any cosmetics or adornments, and metaphorically Rabbi Zeira is praised as exceptionally and recognizably qualified for his appointment. Similarly, when they ordained Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi, they sang to them this paean of praise: Anyone like these, anyone like these, ordain for us, as they epitomized the ideal candidate for ordination. But do not ordain for us those counted among the rags [misarmitin] or among the distorters [misarmisin]. And some say that they said: Do not ordain for us those counted among the robbers [meḥamisin] or among the tramplers [miturmisin].

ר' אבהו כי הוה אתי ממתיבתא לבי קיסר נפקי מטרוניתא דבי קיסר ומשריין ליה רבה דעמיה מדברנא דאומתיה בוצינא דנהורא בריך מתייך לשלם:

Since the songs composed for various Sages were mentioned, the Gemara also recounts that when Rabbi Abbahu would come from the yeshiva to the house of the emperor, the ladies from the emperor’s house would go out and sing before him: O great one of his people, leader of his nation, illuminating candle, may your arrival be blessed in peace.

עריפת עגלה בשלשה: ת"ר (דברים כא, ב) ויצאו זקניך ושופטיך זקניך שנים שופטיך שנים ואין ב"ד שקול מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחד הרי כאן חמשה דברי ר' יהודה רבי שמעון אומר זקניך שנים ואין ב"ד שקול מוסיפין עליהם עוד אחד הרי כאן שלשה

§ The mishna teaches that the breaking of the heifer’s neck is performed in front of a panel of three judges, and that Rabbi Yehuda says there must be five judges. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And your elders and your judges shall go out and they shall measure to the cities that are around the corpse” (Deuteronomy 21:2). “Your elders” is in the plural, which indicates a minimum of two, and “your judges” is also plural, indicating another two, and as a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add an additional one to them, so there are five judges here; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: “Your elders,” indicate two, and as a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add an additional one to them, so there are three judges here.

ור"ש האי שופטיך מאי עביד ליה ההוא מיבעי ליה למיוחדין שבשופטיך ור' יהודה מזקני זקניך נפקא

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, what does he do with this extra expression: “Your judges”? The Gemara answers: He requires it to teach that these judges must be of the unique ones among your judges, meaning that they must be members of the Sanhedrin. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda derive the halakha that the judges must be members of the Sanhedrin? He derives it from the fact that the verse did not merely state: “Elders,” but rather: “Your elders,” which indicates the elders that are unique to all of the Jewish people, meaning the Sages of the Sanhedrin.

ור"ש אי מזקני הוה אמינא זקני השוק כתב רחמנא זקניך ואי כתיב זקניך הוה אמינא סנהדרי קטנה כתב רחמנא ושופטיך ממיוחדין שבשופטיך ורבי יהודה גמר זקני זקני מוסמכו זקני העדה את ידיהם מה להלן מיוחדין שבעדה אף כאן מיוחדין שבזקניך

And how does Rabbi Shimon respond to this claim? He holds that had the verse written only: “Elders,” I would say that the verse is referring to any elders in the marketplace who are not members of the Sanhedrin. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Your elders.” And if it was written: “Your elders,” I would say that it is referring to members of a lesser Sanhedrin. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And your judges,” to indicate that they must be of the unique ones among your judges. And how would Rabbi Yehuda respond to this claim? He learns it by means of a verbal analogy from the word “elders” written in this verse and the word “elders” written in the verse: “And the elders of the congregation shall lay their hands on the head of the bull” (Leviticus 4:15). Just as there it is referring to the unique ones of the congregation, so too here, it is referring to the unique ones among your elders.

אי יליף לילף כולה מהתם זקניך ושופטיך למה לי אלא וי"ו ושופטיך למניינא ורבי שמעון וי"ו לא דריש

The Gemara asks: If he learns this verbal analogy, he should learn all of it, i.e., the entire halakha, including the number of judges as well as their rank, from there, i.e., the verse in Leviticus, and if so why do I need the extra expressions: “Your elders” and: “And your judges”? Rather, certainly he does not accept this verbal analogy. Rather, he holds that the additional letter vav, corresponding to the word “and” in the expression: “And your judges,” is there for the tally, meaning that the expression “your judges” teaches that they must be members of the Great Sanhedrin, and the additional vav serves to add an additional two to the number of judges. And how does Rabbi Shimon respond to that? He does not expound the additional letter vav.

אלא מעתה ויצאו שנים ומדדו שנים לרבי יהודה הרי תשעה לרבי שמעון שבעה ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדתניא ויצאו הן ולא שלוחן ומדדו שאפילו נמצא

The Gemara asks: If that is so, if the verbs in the plural form are each understood as adding an additional two judges, then the expression: “And they shall go out,” in the continuation of the verse (Deuteronomy 21:2) indicates another two, and the expression: “And they shall measure,” adds another two, meaning that according to Rabbi Yehuda there should be nine judges, and according to Rabbi Shimon, seven. The Gemara answers: He needs this exposition for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And they shall go out,” to emphasize that they must go out, and not their agents, and the verse states: “And they shall measure,” to teach that this measurement is itself a mitzva, such that even if the corpse is found

14b

בעליל לעיר צריך לעסוק במדידה

clearly close to the city, so that there is no need to measure in order to determine the closest city, nevertheless they must involve themselves with the measurement.

מתניתין דלא כי האי תנא דתניא רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר (דברים כא, ב) ויצאו זקניך ושופטיך זקניך זו סנהדרין ושופטיך זה מלך וכהן גדול מלך דכתיב (משלי כט, ד) מלך במשפט יעמיד ארץ כהן גדול דכתיב (דברים יז, ט) ובאת אל הכהנים הלוים ואל השופט

§ The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: With regard to the breaking of the neck of the heifer, the verse states: “And your elders and your judges shall go out” (Deuteronomy 21:2). “Your elders,” this is referring to the Sanhedrin; “and your judges,” this is referring to the king and the High Priest. The baraita explains the assertion that the king is called a judge, as it is written: “The king by justice establishes the land” (Proverbs 29:4), and the High Priest is also called a judge, as it is written: “And you shall come to the priests the Levites, and to the judge that will be in those days” (Deuteronomy 17:9), referring to the High Priest.

איבעיא להו רבי אליעזר בן יעקב בחדא פליג או בתרתי פליג במלך וכהן גדול פליג אבל בסנהדרי אי כר' יהודה אי כרבי שמעון או דילמא בסנהדרי נמי פליג דאמר כולה סנהדרי בעינן

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov disagree with the tanna’im of the mishna only with regard to one matter, or does he disagree with regard to two matters? Does he disagree only with regard to the requirement for the king and the High Priest to participate in the measurement, but with regard to the Sanhedrin he holds either in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda or in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Or perhaps he disagrees with regard to the Sanhedrin, too, as he says we require all of the members of the Sanhedrin to participate in the measurement.

אמר רב יוסף ת"ש מצאן אבית פגי והמרה עליהן יכול תהא המראתו המראה ת"ל (דברים יז, ח) וקמת ועלית אל המקום מלמד שהמקום גורם

Rav Yosef said: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from a baraita discussing the case of a rebellious elder, a Sage who publicly teaches a halakha against the ruling of the Great Sanhedrin: If the rebellious elder found the members of the Sanhedrin in Beit Pagei outside of Jerusalem and rebelled against them by rejecting their decision, one might have thought that his rebellion is deemed a rebellion and he will be liable to receive the death penalty if he instructs the public to follow his opinion. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall arise and go up to the place that the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 17:8), and this teaches that the location determines the authority of the Sanhedrin; to a certain extent this authority exists only when the Sanhedrin is situated in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, adjacent to the Temple.

דנפוק כמה אילימא מקצתן דילמא הנך דאיכא גואי קיימי כוותיה אלא פשיטא דנפוק כולהו למאי אילימא לדבר הרשות מי מצו נפקי והכתיב (שיר השירים ז, ג) שררך אגן הסהר אל יחסר המזג אלא פשיטא לדבר מצוה

The Gemara clarifies: In the case discussed in the baraita, how many members of the Sanhedrin went out to Beit Pagei? If we say that only some of them went out, there is no significance in such a ruling issued by the rebellious elder, as perhaps those who are inside the Chamber of Hewn Stone are the majority and hold in accordance with his opinion; in which case he certainly would not be deemed a rebellious elder. Rather, it is obvious that they all went out. And for what reason did they go out? If we say that they did so for an optional matter, may they go out? But isn’t it written: “Your navel is like a round goblet wherein no blended wine is lacking” (Song of Songs 7:3), from which it is inferred that the Sanhedrin sit in a half-circle, and there must never be more than two-thirds of them lacking, as this is the measure of wine blended in water. Rather, since the Sanhedrin may not leave the chamber unnecessarily, it is obvious that they went out for a matter relating to a mitzva.

היכי דמי לאו למדידת עגלה ורבי אליעזר בן יעקב היא דאמר כולי סנהדרי בעינן אמר ליה אביי לא כגון שיצאו להוסיף על העיר ועל העזרות כדתנן אין מוסיפין על העיר ועל העזרות אלא בבית דין של שבעים ואחד

What are the circumstances? Is it not that they went out to measure the distance between a murder victim and the nearest city, in order to perform the ritual of the breaking of the neck of the heifer, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, from which it can be deduced that he says: We require all of the Sanhedrin to participate? Abaye said to him: No, that cannot be proven from here, as perhaps it is a case where they went out to extend the city of Jerusalem or the courtyards of the Temple, as we learned in the mishna: They may extend the city or the courtyards of the Temple only in accordance with the ruling of a court of seventy-one judges.

תניא כוותיה דרב יוסף מצאן אבית פאגי והמרה עליהן כגון שיצאו למדידת עגלה ולהוסיף על העיר ועל העזרות יכול שתהא המראתו המראה ת"ל וקמת ועלית אל המקום מלמד שהמקום גורם:

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef: If he found them in Beit Pagei and rebelled against them, such as in a situation where they went out to measure the distance between a murder victim and the nearest city, in order to perform the ceremony of the breaking of the neck of the heifer or to extend the city or the courtyards, one might have thought that his rebellion is deemed a rebellion. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall arise and go up to the place,” which teaches that the location determines the authority of the Sanhedrin. This proves that there is a tanna who maintains that all of the members of the Sanhedrin must participate in the measurement.

נטע רבעי ומעשר שני שאין דמיו ידועין בשלשה: תנו רבנן איזהו מעשר שני שאין דמיו ידועין פירות שהרקיבו ויין שהקרים ומעות שהחלידו תנו רבנן מעשר שני שאין דמיו ידועין פודין אותו בשלשה לקוחות אבל לא בשלשה שאין לקוחות אפילו נכרי אחד מהן אפילו אחד מהם בעלים

§ The mishna teaches: Valuations of the fruits of a fourth-year sapling or second-tithe produce in cases where their value is not known is performed by three judges. The Sages taught in a baraita: What is the second tithe whose value is not known and requires a special court to assess it? This is fruit that has decomposed, and wine that has developed a film, and coins that have become rusted and cannot be traded at full value. Therefore, there is a need for expert assessment. The Sages taught in another baraita: The second tithe whose value is not known may be redeemed by three purchasers, i.e., experts in trade, but not by three ordinary people who are not purchasers. This may be done even if one of them is a gentile, and even if one of them is the owner.

בעי רבי ירמיה שלשה ומטילין לתוך כיס אחד מהו תא שמע איש ושתי נשיו פודין מעשר שני שאין דמיו ידועין דילמא כגון רב פפא ובת אבא סוראה:

Rabbi Yirmeya asks: Concerning three people who deposit their funds into one single purse, meaning they are partners in expenses and profits, what is the halakha? With regard to valuations, are they considered as three people or as one? The Gemara answers: Come and hear a solution to the matter from a baraita: A man and his two wives may redeem produce of the second tithe where its value is unknown. It is apparent that three partners are considered a court for this matter. The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps this was a case of a marriage with special arrangements, such as that between Rav Pappa and his wife, the daughter of Abba of Sura. Rav Pappa and his wife handled their finances independently; she had her own property and was responsible for her own expenses.

ההקדשות בשלשה: מתניתין דלא כי האי תנא דתניא ר' אליעזר בן יעקב אומר אפילו צינורא של הקדש צריכה עשרה בני אדם לפדותה

§ The mishna teaches that the valuation of consecrated property is performed by three judges. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Even a simple item such as a small fork of consecrated property requires a valuation by ten people in order to redeem it.

א"ל רב פפא לאביי בשלמא לרבי אליעזר בן יעקב דאמר כשמואל דאמר שמואל עשרה כהנים כתובין בפרשה אלא לרבנן שלשה מנא להו

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov can be understood, since what he says is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: Ten priests are written in this Torah portion, meaning the word “priest” appears ten times in the passage discussing consecrated property and redeeming consecrated property (Leviticus, chapter 27). For each time the word “priest” is stated, a judge is added to the court that must endorse the calculation of the redemption, leading to a total of ten judges. But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, from where do they derive a requirement for three judges?

וכי תימא דכתיב בהו שלשה קרקעות דכתיב בהו ארבעה תיסגי בארבעה וכי תימא הכי נמי אלמה תנן הקרקעות תשעה וכהן

And if you would say that the word “priest” is written with regard to them, i.e., with regard to the specific halakha of redeeming a consecrated animal, which can be generalized to any case of movable property, only three times (Leviticus 27:11–12), then in a case of redeeming land, with regard to which the word “priest,” is written four times (Leviticus 27:14, 18, 23), it should be enough to perform the valuation in a court of four judges. And if you would say: Indeed that is the case, why did we learn in the mishna that the valuation of consecrated land is performed by nine judges and one priest?

אלא מאי דמשלמי בהו עשרה הקדשות דמשלמי בהו שיתא ליבעו שיתא קשיא:

Rather, what would you say? That the count of ten instances of the word “priest” written in the section is completed with these, meaning that there is a cumulative calculation of all mentions of the word since the beginning of the passage? If so, concerning consecrated items such as animals, given that a similar cumulative count of six is completed with them, they should require six judges to perform the valuation. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the matter is difficult.

הערכין כו': מאי ערכין המטלטלין א"ר גידל אמר רב באומר ערך כלי זה עלי דא"ר גידל אמר רב

§ The mishna teaches that the valuations that are movable property are performed by three judges. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Valuations that are movable property? The term: Valuations, generally is referring to a unique type of calculation in which one vows to contribute the value of a person, according to the set amounts explicitly stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 27:1–8). This type of calculation does not apply to property, so to what does the mishna refer? Rav Giddel says that Rav says: The mishna was discussing a case where one says: The valuation of this utensil is incumbent upon me to contribute. As Rav Giddel says that Rav says:

15a

האומר ערך כלי זה עלי נותן דמיו מ"ט אדם יודע שאין ערך לכלי וגמר ואמר לשום דמים משום הכי נותן דמיו האי ערכין המטלטלין ערכין של מטלטלין מיבעיא ליה תני ערכין של מטלטלין

With regard to one who says: The valuation of this utensil is incumbent upon me to donate, he must give the monetary value of the utensil to the Temple treasury. What is the reason for this halakha? A person knows that a utensil has no valuation, i.e., that the term valuation is not relevant to a utensil, and therefore it must be that he decided to donate money and says this expression as a reference to its monetary value, using the term imprecisely. Due to that reason, he gives its monetary value. The Gemara challenges: According to this explanation, this term: Valuations that are movable property, is not precise; the tanna should have used the term: Valuations of movable property. The Gemara answers: Emend the statement and teach: Valuations of movable property.

רב חסדא אמר אבימי במתפיס מטלטלין לערכין האי ערכין המטלטלין מטלטלין של ערכין מיבעי ליה תני מטלטלין של ערכין

Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says a different explanation: Rav’s statement is discussing one who associates the object of his vow with movable property for the valuation. In other words, he took a vow to pay a valuation, and did not have actual money to pay the vow, so he consecrates movable property for this purpose. This property is then appraised by three experts. The Gemara challenges: According to this explanation, this term: Valuations that are movable property, is not precise; the tanna should have used the term: Movable property of valuations. The Gemara answers: Emend the statement and teach: Movable property of valuations.

רבי אבהו אמר באומר ערכי עלי בא כהן לגבות ממנו מטלטלין בשלשה קרקעות בעשרה אמר ליה רב אחא מדיפתי לרבינא בשלמא לאפוקי מהקדש בעינן שלשה אלא לעיולי להקדש שלשה למה לי

Rabbi Abbahu says: Rav’s statement is discussing a case of one who says: My monetary valuation is incumbent upon me to donate. If the priest came to collect movable property from him to pay the vow, it must be evaluated by three experts, and if he came to collect land it must be evaluated by ten. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Granted, to take out property from consecration by redeeming it we require a panel of three experts, because if an error is made in the calculation, this will lead to the sin of misuse of consecrated property. But to elevate property to the status of consecration, why do I need three judges?

א"ל סברא הוא מה לי עיולי מה לי אפוקי אפוקי מ"ט דילמא טעי עיולי נמי דילמא טעי:

Ravina said to him: This is based on logical reasoning: What difference is it to me if he is elevating the property to consecration, and what difference is it to me if he is removing it? If he is removing it, what is the reason a court is needed? It is because perhaps he will err and set a price that is too low. When he is elevating it to consecration there is also a concern that perhaps he will err and cause a loss for the Temple treasury.

רבי יהודה אומר כו': א"ל רב פפא לאביי בשלמא לר' יהודה היינו דכתיב כהן אלא לרבנן כהן למה להו קשיא:

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says that when calculating the valuation of consecrated property, one of the people consulted must be a priest. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this is understandable, as it is written in the Torah portion about redeeming consecrated property: “Priest” (see, e.g., Leviticus 27:14). But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that any person is fit for this, why do they need the word “priest”? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the matter is difficult.

הקרקעות תשעה וכהן: מנהני מילי אמר שמואל עשרה כהנים כתובין בפרשה חד לגופיה הנך הוי מיעוט אחר מיעוט ואין מיעוט אחר מיעוט אלא לרבות דאפילו ט' ישראל ואחד כהן

§ The mishna teaches that valuations of consecrated land are be made by nine judges and one priest. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Shmuel says: Priests are written in this Torah portion ten times (Leviticus, chapter 27). One instance of the word “priest” is for the matter itself, i.e., to teach that there is a need for a priest. These other instances of the word are a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, as every additional instance of “priest” is a restrictive term. And there is a hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify and include other matters, in this case teaching that even nine Israelites and one priest may perform the valuation.

מתקיף לה רב הונא בריה דרב נתן אימא חמשה כהנים וחמשה ישראלים קשיא:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, objects to this explanation: According to the principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify, say that the procedure should require five priests and five Israelites, as the first incidence of the word “priest” indicates an actual priest, the second time the term serves to amplify and teach that even an Israelite is fitting, and then the third time it again indicates specifically a priest. According to this analysis, the final result would require five priests and five Israelites. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it poses a difficulty.

ואדם כיוצא בהן: אדם מי קדוש אמר ר' אבהו באומר דמי עלי דתניא האומר דמי עלי שמין אותו כעבד הנמכר בשוק ועבד אתקש לקרקעות

§ The mishna teaches that just as the valuation of consecrated land is performed by nine judges and one priest, the valuation of a person for the purpose of a vow is performed in a similar manner. The Gemara asks: Can a person be consecrated? It is not possible to consecrate a person, and therefore it is unclear what sort of valuation would be necessary. Rabbi Abbahu says: The mishna is referring to one who says: My monetary value is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says: My monetary value is incumbent upon me, the court appraises him as a slave who is sold in the market, and the price that would be paid for him as a slave is the amount he must give to the Temple treasury. And as a slave is compared to land with regard to halakhot of transactions, the valuation is performed by a panel of nine experts and a priest, as is done when land is appraised.

בעי רבי אבין שער העומד ליגזוז בכמה כגזוז דמי ובשלשה או כמחובר דמי ובעשרה

Rabbi Avin raises a dilemma: With regard to a person’s hair that was consecrated and which is ready to be shorn, by how many judges is the appraisal made? Is such hair deemed similar to hair that has already been shorn, and accordingly it is appraised like other movable property, i.e., by three judges, or is it considered as hair still attached to the body and accordingly appraised by ten judges?

ת"ש המקדיש את עבדו אין מועלין בו רשב"ג אומר מועלין בשערו וקיימא לן דבשערו העומד ליגזוז פליגי ש"מ

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: Concerning one who consecrates his slave, a person who derives benefit from the slave is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, since the slave’s body does not become consecrated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who derives benefit from the slave’s hair is liable for misuse of consecrated property. And we maintain that it is with regard to hair that is ready to be shorn that they disagree. The Gemara concludes: Learn from here that the question of whether such hair is viewed as already shorn is a dispute between tanna’im.

נימא הני תנאי כהני תנאי דתנן ר"מ אומר יש דברים שהן כקרקע ואינן כקרקע ואין חכמים מודים לו כיצד עשר גפנים טעונות מסרתי לך והלה אומר אינן אלא חמש ר' מאיר מחייב וחכ"א כל המחובר לקרקע הרי הוא כקרקע

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinion of these tanna’im is like the opinion of those tanna’im. As we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 42b): Rabbi Meir says: There are entities that are like land in one aspect, and are not like land in other aspects; and the Rabbis do not concede to him. How so? If one said to another: I gave you ten vines laden with grapes and I want to receive their value, and the other says: There were only five, Rabbi Meir deems the defendant liable to take an oath, in accordance with the halakha concerning one who admits to part of a claim. And the Rabbis say: Any item that is attached to the land is viewed as the land itself, and the halakha is that there is no oath in cases of claims with regard to land.

ואמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא בענבים העומדות ליבצר עסקינן מר סבר כבצורות דמיין ומר סבר לאו כבצורות דמיין לא אפילו תימא ר' מאיר עד כאן לא קאמר רבי מאיר התם כל כמה דשבקה להו מיכחש כחשי אבל שערו כל כמה דשבקה להו אשבוחי משבח:

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In this mishna, we are dealing with grapes that are ready to be picked. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds they are considered as grapes that have been picked, i.e., movable property, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds they are not considered as grapes that have been picked. This suggestion is rejected: No, this cannot be proven from here, as you may even say that the opinion of the Rabbis with regard to the hair is similar to the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the mishna. Only there, with regard to the vines, Rabbi Meir says that they are viewed as already picked, because the more he leaves them on the vine, the more they become lean and deteriorate. Consequently, the grapes are viewed as picked. But in the case of his hair, the more he leaves it on his head the more it improves, as longer hair has a greater value. Consequently, it cannot be said that hair that is ready to be shorn is viewed as already shorn.

דיני נפשות כו': קא פסיק ותני ל"ש רובע זכר ול"ש רובע נקבה בשלמא רובע נקבה דכתיב (ויקרא כ, טז) והרגת את האשה ואת הבהמה אלא רובע זכר מנא לן

§ The mishna teaches that cases of capital law are judged by twenty-three judges, and that an animal that copulated with a person is also judged by twenty-three judges. The Gemara comments: The mishna categorically teaches this halakha, indicating that there is no difference if this was an ox that copulated with a male, and there is no difference if it was an ox that copulated with a female. The Gemara asks: Granted, the source for this halakha is clear in the case where it copulated with a female, as it is written explicitly: “And if a woman approaches any animal and lies down with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal” (Leviticus 20:16). But with regard to an ox that copulated with a male, from where do we derive that the animal is to be killed?

דכתיב (שמות כב, יח) כל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת אם אינו ענין לשוכב תניהו ענין לנשכב ואפקיה רחמנא בלשון שוכב לאקושי נשכב לשוכב מה שוכב הוא ובהמתו בעשרי' ושלשה אף נשכב הוא ובהמתו בעשרים ושלשה:

The Gemara answers: As it is written: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). If this verse is not needed for the matter of the one who actively lies with the animal, i.e., a male who sexually penetrates the animal, apply it to the matter of the one who causes the animal to lie with him, by being penetrated by the animal. There is another verse (Leviticus 20:15) that explicitly addresses a man penetrating the animal sexually; this verse from Exodus is therefore understood to be referring to the case where he causes the animal to penetrate him. And the Merciful One brought this forth using the active term “lies,” to compare one who causes the animal to lie with him to one who actively lies with the animal, in order to teach that just as in a case of one who lies with an animal, he and his animal are to be judged by twenty-three judges, so too, in the case of one who causes an animal to lie with him, he and his animal are to be judged by twenty-three judges.

שור הנסקל בעשרים ושלשה: שנא' (שמות כא, כט) השור יסקל וגם בעליו יומת כמיתת הבעלים כך מיתת השור: א"ל אביי לרבא ממאי דהאי וגם בעליו יומת לכמיתת בעלים כך מיתת השור הוא דאתא

§ The mishna teaches that an ox that is to be stoned is judged by twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “The ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). From this verse it is derived that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox. Consequently, it follows that twenty-three judges are necessary to adjudicate the case of the ox that is to be stoned. Abaye said to Rava: From where do we know that this phrase: “And also its owner shall be put to death,” comes to teach that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox?

15b

אימא לקטלא הוא דאתא א"כ ליכתוב וגם בעליו ולישתוק

Why not say instead that it comes to teach that the owner of the ox is liable to receive the death penalty? Rava responded: If so, let it write in the same verse only: “The ox shall be stoned and also its owner,” and let it be silent and not add more. It would be clear that the owner is also to be put to death. Since the verse added the explicit term: “Shall be put to death,” it is clear that the intention is to teach that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox.

אי כתב רחמנא הכי הוה אמינא בסקילה בסקילה ס"ד קטל איהו בסייף ממונו בסקילה

Abaye said: Had the Merciful One written the verse in this manner, I would say that the owner is executed by stoning. The Gemara rejects this: Would it enter your mind to say he should be executed by stoning? If he killed the person himself he would be executed by the sword, which is deemed a lighter punishment; if his property killed the victim, could he be given the more severe execution by stoning?

ודילמא האי דכתב רחמנא יומת לאקולי עילויה לאפוקי מסייף לחנק הניחא למאן דאמר חנק חמור אלא למאן דאמר חנק קיל מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara asks: But perhaps this term that the Merciful One wrote: “Shall be put to death,” is to be lenient with him, to remove his sentence from the category of execution by the sword and instead to sentence him to death by strangulation. This works out well according to the one who says that strangulation is more severe than the sword. According to that opinion there is no place for such a claim, as the punishment is certainly not more severe than that of an actual murderer. But according to the one who says that strangulation is a lighter punishment, what is there to say?

לא ס"ד דכתיב (שמות כא, ל) אם כופר יושת עליו ואי ס"ד בר קטלא הוא והכתיב (במדבר לה, לא) לא תקחו כופר לנפש רוצח

The Gemara responds: It would not enter your mind to think this, as it is written: “If a ransom be placed upon him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatever is placed upon him” (Exodus 21:30), and if it enters your mind to say that he is liable to receive the death penalty, that verse would not be understood, for the following reason: But isn’t it written: “You shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer who was convicted to die, for he shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:31)? Since in this case there is a ransom payment, it is clear that there is no actual death penalty involved.

אדרבה משום היא גופה קטל איהו לא תיסגי ליה בממונא אלא בקטלא קטל שורו ליפרוק נפשיה בממונא אלא אמר חזקיה וכן תנא דבי חזקיה אמר קרא (במדבר לה, כא) מות יומת המכה רוצח הוא על רציחתו אתה הורגו ואי אתה הורגו על רציחת שורו

This line of reasoning is rejected: On the contrary, the additional phrase in the verse is necessary due to this argument itself. If one killed a person himself, it would not be enough for him to make a payment of money; he must be punished only with actual execution. But if his ox killed someone, I would say he should redeem himself with money, but that if he does not pay money, he would receive the death penalty. Rather, the matter cannot be decided on the basis of these verses, and it must be proven by what Ḥizkiyya says, and so the school of Ḥizkiyya taught this baraita: The verse states: “He that struck him shall be put to death; he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21), from which it is inferred: You execute him for his act of murder, but you do not execute him for his ox’s act of murder.

איבעיא להו שור סיני בכמה מי גמר שעה מדורות או לא תא שמע דתני רמי בר יחזקאל (שמות יט, יג) אם בהמה אם איש לא יחיה מה איש בכ"ג אף בהמה בכ"ג:

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: By how many judges would an ox at Mount Sinai have been judged? At the time of the giving of the Torah it was forbidden to ascend onto Mount Sinai, as it is written: “No hand shall touch him, but he shall be stoned or shot through; whether animal or man, it shall not live” (Exodus 19:13). If an ox did ascend the mountain, how many judges would be necessary to sentence it to execution by stoning? The Gemara explains the question: Do we derive a halakha that applies only to a specific time from a halakha that applies for all generations, and accordingly any animal that is to be stoned is judged by twenty-three judges; or not? The Gemara answers: Come and hear a solution from that which Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: The verse states: “Whether animal or man it shall not live.” The comparison serves to teach that just as a person is judged by twenty-three judges, so too an animal is judged by twenty-three judges.

הארי והזאב כו': אמר ר"ל והוא שהמיתו אבל לא המיתו לא אלמא קסבר יש להן תרבות ויש להן בעלים רבי יוחנן אמר אע"פ שלא המיתו אלמא קסבר אין להם תרבות ואין להם בעלים

§ The mishna records a dispute with regard to the judgment of a lion and or a wolf: Does this judgment require twenty-three judges? Reish Lakish says: And that dispute concerns a lion or wolf that has killed a person. But if they have not killed, then no, they may not be executed. Apparently, Reish Lakish holds that they have the capability of being tamed and domesticated, and consequently they might have owners, so it is not permitted to kill them without due cause. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute applies even if they have not killed. Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that they do not have the capability of being tamed, and therefore they do not have owners.

תנן רבי אליעזר אומר כל הקודם להורגן זכה בשלמא לר' יוחנן למאי זכה זכה לעורן אלא לר"ל למאי זכה כיון שהמיתו שוינהו רבנן כמאן דגמר דינייהו ואיסורי הנאה נינהו

We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: Anyone who kills them first merits. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he merit? It can be explained that he merits, i.e., acquires, their hides; since these animals are by definition ownerless, whoever kills them first may take the hide for himself. But according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, what does he merit? Since according to Reish Lakish the mishna is discussing a case where they have already killed, the Sages made their status equivalent to those whose verdicts have been issued in court, and oxen that are stoned are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited.

מאי זכה זכה לשמים תניא כוותיה דר"ל אחד שור שהמית ואחד בהמה וחיה שהמיתו בכ"ג ר' אליעזר אומר שור שהמית בעשרים ושלשה ושאר בהמה וחיה שהמיתו כל הקודם להורגן זכה בהן לשמים:

The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of: Merits, according to Reish Lakish? It means that he merits according to Heaven, meaning that he has performed a mitzva by destroying a harmful animal. The Gemara relates: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish (Tosefta 3:1): Both an ox that killed and a different domesticated animal or undomesticated animal that killed are sentenced by twenty-three judges. Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox that killed is sentenced by twenty-three judges, but with regard to other domesticated animals and undomesticated animals that killed, anyone who kills them first merits, with that act, according to Heaven. It is therefore apparent that the disagreement concerns only animals that have killed, and that, as Reish Lakish explained, the term: Merits, indicates only a moral achievement but not a financial acquisition.

ר"ע אומר כו': ר"ע היינו ת"ק איכא בינייהו נחש:

§ The mishna states that with regard to these dangerous animals, Rabbi Akiva says: Their death is decreed by twenty-three judges. The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabbi Akiva is identical to the opinion of the first tanna; what is the novelty of his statement? The Gemara answers: The difference between them relates to the halakha concerning a snake. According to the first tanna, a snake is also sentenced by twenty-three judges, whereas Rabbi Akiva holds that all domesticated and undomesticated animals other than snakes are included in this requirement.

אין דנין כו': האי שבט דחטא במאי אילימא שבט שחלל את השבת אימר דפליג רחמנא בין יחידים למרובין לענין עבודת כוכבים בשאר מצות מי פליג אלא בשבט שהודח

§ The mishna teaches that the court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned only in the Great Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: With regard to this tribe that sinned, in what way did it sin? If we say that it was a tribe that transgressed most prohibitions, e.g., they desecrated Shabbat, this is difficult. There is a source to say that the Merciful One distinguishes between individuals and multitudes with regard to idol worship, as there is a special halakha with regard to an idolatrous city. But with regard to other mitzvot, does He distinguish between individuals and multitudes? Rather, it must be that the mishna is discussing a tribe that was subverted and which engaged in idol worship.

למימרא דבדינא דרבים דיינינן ליה כמאן לא כרבי יאשיה ולא כרבי יונתן דתניא עד כמה עושין עיר הנדחת מי' ועד ק' דברי רבי יאשיה רבי יונתן אומר מק' ועד רובו של שבט

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that we judge such a tribe with the halakha of a multitude, meaning that an entire idolatrous tribe is subject to the same treatment as an idolatrous city? If so, in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan. As it is taught in a baraita: How many people in a city must engage in idol worship for it to be designated as an idolatrous city? From ten until one hundred people; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says: From one hundred people until a majority of a tribe.

ואפילו ר' יונתן לא קאמר אלא רובו אבל כולו לא אמר רב מתנה הכא

And it is therefore apparent that even Rabbi Yonatan, who allows a larger community to be declared an idolatrous city, said this only with regard to a majority of the tribe at most, but if it was all of the tribe that was idolatrous, then the halakha of an idolatrous city does not apply. Rav Mattana said: Here, in the mishna,

16a

בנשיא שבט שחטא עסקינן מי לא אמר רב אדא בר אהבה (שמות יח, כב) כל הדבר הגדול יביאו אליך דבריו של גדול האי נמי גדול הוא

we are dealing with the Nasi of a tribe who has sinned. Doesn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava say: The verse states: “They shall bring every great matter to you” (Exodus 18:22), meaning: Matters of a great one, i.e., in any case where a great person is accused of a transgression whose punishment is death, he is tried by the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges. And this Nasi of the tribe is also a great one, so his trial is by seventy-one judges.

עולא אמר רבי אלעזר בבאין על עסקי נחלות וכתחילתה של ארץ ישראל מה תחילתה שבעים ואחד אף כאן שבעים ואחד

Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said a different explanation: The mishna discusses a case where two tribes came to adjudicate a dispute about matters of inheritance, i.e., territory claimed by each tribe on the border between them, and this dispute is handled by the Great Sanhedrin consisting of seventy-one judges, as was done at the beginning of the settlement in Eretz Yisrael during the time of Joshua. Just as the beginning, the initial division, was performed by seventy-one Elders of the congregation, so too here, when there is a dispute about the borders determined by that initial division, the case is adjudicated by the seventy-one judges of the Great Sanhedrin.

אי מה תחילתה קלפי אורים ותומים וכל ישראל אף כאן קלפי אורים ותומים וכל ישראל אלא מחוורתא כדרב מתנה

The Gemara asks: If this logic is employed, then just as the beginning was performed by casting lots [kalpei], with the Urim VeTummim, and with all of the Jewish people present, so too here, in a dispute between tribes, there should be a need for lots, the Urim VeTummim, and the presence of all of the Jewish people. Since this is not required by halakha, it is apparent that a border dispute between tribes need not be adjudicated using the same procedures as the original division of the inheritances. Consequently, there is no reason to require seventy-one judges. Rather, it is clear that this must be explained in accordance with the explanation of Rav Mattana, who says that the mishna is discussing the Nasi of a tribe who has sinned.

רבינא אמר לעולם בשבט שהודח ודקא קשיא לך בדינא דרבים דיינינן ליה אין אע"ג דקטלינן ביחיד בי דינא דרבים דיינינן ליה

Ravina said: The mishna is actually discussing a tribe that was subverted and which engaged in idol worship, and with regard to that which poses a difficulty for you, the question of whether we judge such a tribe with the halakha of a multitude, it can be answered: Yes, although we execute them as individuals by stoning, and their money is not confiscated, nevertheless we judge them in a court of the multitude, i.e., each one of them is tried by the Great Sanhedrin.

מי לא א"ר חמא בר' יוסי א"ר אושעיא (דברים יז, ה) והוצאת את האיש ההוא או את האשה ההיא וגו' איש ואשה אתה מוציא לשעריך ואי אתה מוציא כל העיר כולה לשעריך הכא נמי איש ואשה אתה מוציא לשעריך ואי אתה מוציא כל השבט כולו לשעריך:

Ravina continues: Doesn’t Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Yosei, say that Rabbi Oshaya says: The verse that discuses an individual who serves idol worship states: “And you shall take out that man or that woman who did that evil thing to your gates, even the man or the woman, and you shall stone them until they die” (Deuteronomy 17:5), and it is inferred: You take out a man or a woman to your gates to judge them in the court that is located at the gates of the city, which is a lesser Sanhedrin, but you do not take out an entire city to your gates; rather they are to be judged by the large court. Here also with regard to a tribe that has sinned: You take out a man or a woman to your gates, but you do not take out the entire tribe to your gates; rather they are judged by a court of seventy-one.

לא את נביא השקר מנהני מילי

§ The mishna teaches that a false prophet may be judged only by the Great Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived?

א"ר יוסי בר' חנינא אתיא הזדה הזדה מזקן ממרא מה להלן בשבעים ואחד אף כאן בשבעים ואחד

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy, with the meaning of presumptuousness stated in the context of a false prophet learned from presumptuousness stated in the context of a rebellious elder. With regard to a false prophet the verse states: “But the prophet who shall speak a word presumptuously in My name, which I have not commanded him to speak, or who shall speak in the name of other gods, that prophet shall die” (Deuteronomy 18:20), and with regard to a rebellious elder it states: “And the man that acts presumptuously, by not listening to the priest that stands to minister there before the Lord your God, or to the judge, that man shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:12). Just as there, with regard to a rebellious elder, he is presumptuous against a court of seventy-one judges, so too here, with regard to a false prophet, he is judged by a court of seventy-one judges.

והא הזדה כי כתיבא בקטלא הוא דכתיבא וקטלא בעשרין ותלתא הוא אלא אמר ריש לקיש גמר דבר דבר מהמראתו

The Gemara challenges: But when presumptuousness is written with regard to a rebellious elder, it is written with regard to the death penalty, and a death sentence may be issued by a court of twenty-three judges. Rather, Reish Lakish said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy, with the meaning of the term word stated in the context of a false prophet learned from the term word, used when describing the rebellious elder’s rebellion. The rebellious elder transgresses by violating the mitzva: “And you shall do according to the word that they will tell you” (Deuteronomy 17:10), and with regard to the false prophet the verse states: “Who shall speak a word presumptuously in My name” (Deuteronomy 18:20). Just as the rebellious elder rebels against a court of seventy-one judges, so too, a false prophet who speaks a word that is not in the name of God is sentenced to death by a court of seventy-one judges.

ולהדר זקן ממרא ולגמר הזדה הזדה מנביא השקר דבר דבר גמיר הזדה הזדה לא גמיר:

The Gemara asks: And let the halakha of a rebellious elder return, and let it be derived by means of a verbal analogy, with the meaning of presumptuousness stated in the context of a rebellious elder learned from presumptuousness stated in the context of a false prophet, to indicate that a rebellious elder is also sentenced by a court of seventy-one judges. The Gemara answers: This tanna derives halakhot through the verbal analogy comparing the terms word and word, but he does not derive halakhot through a verbal analogy between the terms presumptuousness and presumptuousness, as he did not receive it as an authentic tradition.

ולא את כהן גדול: מנהני מילי אמר רב אדא בר אהבה דאמר קרא (שמות יח, כב) כל הדבר הגדול יביאו אליך דבריו של גדול

§ The mishna teaches that the High Priest may be judged only by the Great Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rav Adda bar Ahava says that the verse states: “They shall bring every great matter to you” (Exodus 18:22). This means that Moses, or the Great Sanhedrin with seventy-one judges, which served the parallel role to that of Moses, adjudicates all matters relating to a great one, i.e., the High Priest.

מיתיבי דבר גדול דבר קשה אתה אומר דבר קשה או אינו אלא דבריו של גדול כשהוא אומר (שמות יח, כו) את הדבר הקשה יביאון אל משה הרי דבר קשה אמור

The Gemara raises an objection to this from a baraita: The verse states: “They shall bring every great matter to you,” which is interpreted to mean that a difficult matter is judged by the Great Sanhedrin. The baraita asks: Do you say that the verse is actually referring to a difficult matter, or is it only referring to the matters relating to a great one? The baraita answers: When it states in a different verse that Moses implemented Yitro’s advice: “They brought the difficult matter to Moses” (Exodus 18:26), a difficult matter is stated explicitly. As Moses was following the directive of Yitro, it is therefore apparent that the term “great matter” is referring to a difficult matter.

הוא דאמר כי האי תנא דתניא דבר גדול דבריו של גדול אתה אומר דבריו של גדול או אינו אלא דבר הקשה כשהוא אומר הדבר הקשה הרי דבר קשה אמור הא מה אני מקיים דבר גדול דבריו של גדול

The Gemara answers: Rav Adda bar Ahava states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of that other tanna, as it is taught in a different baraita: The meaning of “great matter” in the verse is matters relating to a great one. The baraita asks: Do you say that it is referring to matters relating to a great one, or is it only referring to a difficult matter? The baraita explains: When it says further on: “They brought the difficult matter to Moses,” a difficult matter is stated, so how do I realize the meaning of “great matter”? It is referring to matters relating to a great one.

והאי תנא תרי קראי למה לי חד לצואה בעלמא וחד לעשייה ואידך א"כ לכתוב או גדול גדול או קשה קשה מאי גדול ומאי קשה שמע מינה תרתי

The Gemara asks: And as for this tanna in the first baraita who maintains that “great matter” and “difficult matter” are referring to the same halakha, why do I need two verses to express the same idea? The Gemara answers: One is for the command in general, and one is to state that the execution of the matter was carried out correctly. And why does the other tanna not accept this explanation? The Gemara explains: He would claim that if so, if both verses were actually referring to the same thing, let it write either “great” in one verse and great in the other, or difficult in one verse and “difficult” in the other. What is the significance of writing “great” in one verse and what is the significance of writing “difficult” in the other? Conclude two conclusions from it; one verse is referring to difficult matters and the other to matters relating to a great one.

בעי רבי אלעזר שורו של כהן גדול בכמה למיתת בעלים דידיה מדמינן ליה או דילמא למיתת בעלים דעלמא מדמינן ליה אמר אביי מדקא מבעיא ליה שורו מכלל דממונו פשיטא ליה

Rabbi Elazar asked: If the ox of a High Priest killed a person, by how many judges is it sentenced? Do we compare it to a trial that could result in the death of its owner, the High Priest, which would have to be judged by seventy-one judges, or perhaps we compare it to a trial that could result in the death of owners in general, which could be judged by twenty-three judges? Abaye said: Since he asked the question only with regard to the High Priest’s ox, where there is a specific reason to say that its judicial proceedings should have the same halakhot as those concerning its owner, by inference it can be derived that it was obvious to him that court hearings related to the High Priest’s other property may be deliberated by an ordinary court.

פשיטא מהו דתימא הואיל וכתב כל הדבר הגדול כל דבריו של גדול קא משמע לן:

The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Why should it not be so? The Gemara answers: Abaye needed to clarify this, lest you say that since it writes: “Every great matter,” one might have thought that the verse is referring to all matters relating to a great one, meaning that any case involving the High Priest is adjudicated by the Great Sanhedrin. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that this is not the halakha.

אין מוציאין כו': מנהני מילי אמר ר' אבהו דאמר קרא (במדבר כז, כא) ולפני אלעזר הכהן יעמוד

§ The mishna teaches that the king may bring the nation out to an optional war only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Abbahu says: It is as the verse states with regard to the appointment of Joshua: “And he shall stand before Elazar the priest, and he shall ask counsel of the Urim before the Lord; by his word they shall go out, and by his word they shall come in, he and all of the children of Israel with him and all of the congregation” (Numbers 27:21).

הוא זה מלך וכל בני ישראל אתו זה משוח מלחמה וכל העדה זה סנהדרי

Rabbi Abbahu analyzes the end of the verse. With regard to the word “he,” this is the king, referring to Joshua and to any other leader who brings the nation out to war. With regard to the word “him” in the verse “And all of the children of Israel with him,” this is the priest anointed for war, who was anointed specially to stand and instruct the people before the war (see Deuteronomy 20:2). “And all of the congregation”; this is the Sanhedrin. Consequently, the king can embark on an optional war only if the Great Sanhedrin is present and grants authority to him.

ודילמא לסנהדרי הוא דקאמר להו רחמנא דלישיילו באורים ותומים

The Gemara challenges: But perhaps this mention of the Sanhedrin simply means that the Merciful One says that the Sanhedrin may ask a question of the Urim VeTummim, as may the king or the priest anointed for war, as opposed to an ordinary person; but with regard to the decision to go to war, perhaps the king may do so without the agreement of the Sanhedrin.

אלא כי הא דאמר רב אחא בר ביזנא אמר רבי שמעון חסידא כנור היה תלוי למעלה ממטתו של דוד כיון שהגיע חצות לילה רוח צפונית מנשבת בו והיה מנגן מאליו מיד היה דוד עומד ועוסק בתורה עד שעלה עמוד השחר כיון שעלה עמוד השחר נכנסו חכמי ישראל אצלו

Rather, the proof is like that which Rav Aḥa bar Bizna says that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida says: A lyre hung above David’s bed, and once midnight arrived, the northern midnight wind would blow on it and cause the lyre to play on its own. David would immediately rise from his bed and study Torah until the dawn arrived. Once dawn arrived, the Sages of Israel would enter to advise him with regard to the various concerns of the nation and the economy.

אמרו לו אדונינו המלך עמך ישראל צריכין לפרנסה אמר להן לכו והתפרנסו זה מזה אמרו לו אין הקומץ משביע את הארי ואין הבור מתמלא מחולייתו אמר להם לכו פשטו ידיכם בגדוד

One time they said to him: Our master the king, your nation, Israel, requires sustenance. King David said to them: Go and sustain one another, i.e., provide each other with whatever is lacking. The Sages said to him in response, citing a parable: A single handful [hakometz] of food does not satisfy a lion, and a cistern will not be filled merely from the rain that falls directly into its mouth, but other water must be channeled in. So too, the nation cannot sustain itself using its own resources. King David then told them: Go and take up arms with the troops in battle in order to expand our borders and provide our people with the opportunity to earn a livelihood.

מיד יועצין באחיתופל ונמלכין בסנהדרין ושואלין באורים ותומים אמר רב יוסף מאי קרא

The Sages immediately sought advice from Ahithophel to determine whether or not it was appropriate to go to war at that time and how they should conduct themselves; and they consulted the Sanhedrin in order to receive the requisite permission to wage a war under those circumstances; and they asked the Urim VeTummim whether or not they should go to war, and whether or not they would be successful. Rav Yosef says: What is the verse from which this aggada is derived?

16b

(דברי הימים א כז, לד) ואחרי אחיתופל בניהו בן יהוידע ואביתר ושר צבא למלך יואב אחיתופל זה יועץ וכן הוא אומר (שמואל ב טז, כג) ועצת אחיתופל אשר יעץ וגו' ובניהו בן יהוידע זו סנהדרין אביתר אלו אורים ותומים

It is: And after Ahithophel was Benaiah, son of Jehoiada; and Ebiathar; and the general of the king’s army, Yoav (see I Chronicles 27:34). The individuals named in this verse correspond to the roles in the aggada as follows: Ahithophel is the advisor whose counsel they sought first with regard to going to war, and so it says: “Now the advice of Ahithophel, which he counseled in those days, was like that of a man who inquires of the word of God; so was the counsel of Ahithophel both with David and with Absalom” (II Samuel 16:23). And Benaiah, son of Jehoiada corresponds to the Sanhedrin, since he was the head of the Sanhedrin, and Ebiathar corresponds to the Urim VeTummim, as Ebiathar, son of Ahimelech the priest would oversee inquiries directed to the Urim VeTummim (see I Samuel 23:9).

וכן הוא אומר (דברי הימים א יח, יז) ובניהו בן יהוידע על הכרתי ועל הפלתי ולמה נקרא שמן כרתי ופלתי כרתי שכורתין דבריהן ופלתי שמופלאין מעשיהן ואחר כך שר הצבא למלך יואב

And so it says with regard to the position of Benaiah, son of Jehoiada, as head of the Sanhedrin: “And Benaiah, son of Jehoiada, was over the Kereti and over the Peleti” (II Samuel 20:23). And why was the Sanhedrin called Kereti and Peleti? It was called Kereti because they were decisive [shekoretin] in their pronouncements. It was called Peleti because their actions and wisdom were wondrous [shemufla’in], as Peleti and mufla’in share the same root. According to the order of the verse, upon being instructed by King David to go to war, the Sages first consulted with Ahithophel, then with the Sanhedrin, and then they would ask the Urim VeTummim; and only thereafter was the general of the king’s army, Yoav, given the command to ready the army for battle.

א"ר יצחק בריה דרב אדא ואמרי לה א"ר יצחק בר אבודימי מאי קרא (תהלים נז, ט) עורה כבודי עורה הנבל וכנור אעירה שחר:

Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rav Adda, and some say Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avudimi, said: What is the verse from which it is derived that David’s lyre would awaken him at midnight? “Awake, my glory; awake, harp and lyre; I will awaken the dawn” (Psalms 57:9). This means that the self-playing lyre has already awoken, and now I must engage in Torah study until dawn.

ואין מוסיפין על העיר: מנהני מילי אמר רב שימי בר חייא אמר קרא (שמות כה, ט) ככל אשר אני מראה אותך את תבנית המשכן וכן תעשו לדורות הבאין

§ The mishna teaches: They may extend the city of Jerusalem or the courtyards of the Temple only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya says: The verse states: “According to all that I show you, the pattern of the Tabernacle and the pattern of all its vessels, and so shall you do” (Exodus 25:9). “And so shall you do” means for future generations; just as the Tabernacle was fashioned in all of its details according to Moses’ instructions, so too later, the Temple is fashioned according to the instructions of the Great Sanhedrin, whose members stand in place of Moses.

מתיב רבא כל הכלים שעשה משה משיחתן מקדשן מיכן ואילך עבודתן מחנכתן ואמאי נימא וכן תעשו לדורות הבאין

Rava raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to all of the utensils that Moses fashioned, their anointment with the sacred oil is what consecrates them, rendering them fit for service in the Tabernacle. From that point forward, i.e., in future generations, there is no need for anointment, but rather their service in and of itself dedicates them, meaning that when they are used for the first time in sacred service they become consecrated. Rava explains the objection: And why is this so? Let us say instead that since the verse states: “And so shall you do,” this teaches that it must be done for future generations as in the Tabernacle, and therefore anointment with sacred oil should be required in the Temple as in the Tabernacle.

שאני התם דאמר קרא (במדבר ז, א) וימשחם ויקדש אותם אותם במשיחה ולא לדורות במשיחה

The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse states: “And it came to pass on the day that Moses completed erecting the Tabernacle that he anointed it and sanctified it and all its vessels, and the altar and all its vessels, and he anointed them and he sanctified them” (Numbers 7:1). The verse emphasizes that he sanctified “them,” and from this it is inferred that only those utensils need sanctification by anointment, but for future generations there is not a requirement of sanctification by anointment.

ואימא אותם במשיחה ולדורות אי במשיחה אי בעבודה אמר רב פפא אמר קרא (במדבר ד, יב) אשר ישרתו בם בקודש הכתוב תלאן בשירות

The Gemara asks: And say instead: Those vessels require sanctification specifically by anointment, but for future generations it could be done either by anointment or by service. Rav Pappa says: The verse states with regard to this: “And they shall take all service vessels with which they shall serve in the sanctuary” (Numbers 4:12). The verse renders it dependent upon service, meaning that the service is what sanctifies them.

אלא אותם למה לי אי לאו אותם הוה אמינא לדורות במשיחה ובעבודה דהא כתיב וכן תעשו כתב רחמנא אותם אותם במשיחה ולא לדורות במשיחה:

The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the extra word “them”? This emphasis seems superfluous. The Gemara answers: Had the verse not added the word “them,” I would say: For future generations the sanctification is accomplished by anointment and by service together, as it is written: “And so shall you do.” Therefore, the Merciful One writes “them,” to teach: They alone are consecrated by anointment, but for future generations the vessels are not consecrated by anointment.

ואין עושין סנהדראות כו': מנא לן כדאשכחן במשה דאוקי סנהדראות ומשה במקום שבעים וחד קאי

§ The mishna teaches that they may appoint a lesser Sanhedrin for the tribes only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this matter? The Gemara answers: It is as we find with regard to Moses, who established lesser courts for all of the people (see Exodus 18:25–26), and Moses stands in place of the seventy-one judges on the Great Sanhedrin. Consequently, a lesser Sanhedrin that stands at the head of a tribe is appointed by the Great Sanhedrin.

תנו רבנן מניין שמעמידין שופטים לישראל תלמוד לומר (דברים טז, יח) שופטים תתן שוטרים לישראל מניין תלמוד לומר שוטרים תתן שופטים לכל שבט ושבט מניין תלמוד לומר שופטים לשבטיך שוטרים לכל שבט ושבט מניין ת"ל שוטרים לשבטיך

The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that society must establish judges for the Jewish people? The verse states: “You shall place judges and officers over you in all of your gates that the Lord your God gives you for your tribes, and they shall judge the people with righteous judgment” (Deuteronomy 16:18). From where is it derived that society must also establish officers for the Jewish people? The same verse states: “You shall place judges and officers.” From where is it derived that society must also establish judges not only for the entire Jewish people but also for each and every tribe? The verse states: “You shall place judges and officers…for your tribes.” From where is it derived that society must also establish officers for each and every tribe? The same verse states: “You shall place judges and officers…for your tribes.”

שופטים לכל עיר ועיר מניין ת"ל שופטים לשעריך שוטרים לכל עיר ועיר מניין ת"ל שוטרים לשעריך רבי יהודה אומר אחד ממונה על כולן שנאמר תתן לך רשב"ג אומר לשבטיך ושפטו מצוה בשבט לדון את שבטו:

From where is it derived that society must also establish judges for each and every city? The verse states: You shall place judges and officers…for your gates, as the gate of the city is the seat of the elders of the city and its judges. From where is it derived that society must also establish officers for each and every city? The verse states: You shall place Judges and officers…for your gates. Rabbi Yehuda says: You must also have one court appointed over all of them, as it is stated: “You shall place over you,” meaning that there must be a single institution that is responsible for all of these appointments. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Another halakha is derived from the verse: “For your tribes, and they shall judge.” This teaches that it is a mitzva for a tribe to judge the sinners from within its tribe, and not to delegate the responsibility to other tribes.

ואין עושין עיר הנדחת: מנה"מ אמר ר' חייא בר יוסף אמר רבי אושעיא דאמר קרא (דברים יז, ה) והוצאת את האיש ההוא או את האשה ההיא איש ואשה אתה מוציא לשעריך ואי אתה מוציא כל העיר כולה לשעריך:

§ The mishna states that a city may be designated as an idolatrous city only in accordance with the ruling of the Great Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says that Rabbi Oshaya says: As the verse states with regard to one who engages in idol worship: “And you shall take out that man or that woman who did that evil thing to your gates” (Deuteronomy 17:5), and it is inferred: You take out a man or a woman to your gates for the lesser Sanhedrin to judge them, but you do not take out the entire city to your gates; rather, they are to be judged by the Great Sanhedrin.

אין עושין עיר הנדחת בספר: מ"ט (דברים יג, יד) מקרבך אמר רחמנא ולא מן הספר:

§ The mishna teaches that the court may not designate a city as an idolatrous city if it is on the frontier. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “Certain worthless people have gone out from your midst and have led astray the inhabitants of their city” (Deuteronomy 13:14). The Merciful One states that this halakha applies when they come from your midst, meaning from within your country, but not from the frontier.

ולא שלש (ערי הנדחת): דכתיב אחת אבל עושין אחת או שתים דכתיב (דברים יג, יג) עריך תנו רבנן אחת אחת ולא שלש אתה אומר אחת ולא שלש או אינו אלא אחת ולא שתים כשהוא אומר עריך הרי שתים אמור הא מה אני מקיים אחת אחת ולא שלש

§ The mishna teaches: And three adjoining cities may not be designated as idolatrous cities. The source for this ruling is as it is written: “If you shall hear concerning one of your cities that the Lord your God has given you” (Deuteronomy 13:13), and not three cities. The mishna continues: But the court may designate one city, or two adjoining cities as idolatrous cities. The source for this is as it is written: “Your cities,” in the plural. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “One,” from which it is inferred: One, but not three. Do you say that the meaning is one, but not three, or rather, is this not the meaning of the verse, that it is one, but not two? The baraita explains that this cannot be. When the verse states: “Your cities,” two are stated. How do I realize the meaning of: “One”? One, but not three.

זימנין אמר רב בב"ד אחד הוא דאין עושין הא בשנים ושלשה בתי דינין עושין וזימנין אמר רב אפילו בשנים ושלשה בתי דינין לעולם אין עושין מ"ט דרב משום קרחה אמר ר"ל לא שנו אלא במקום אחד אבל בשנים ושלשה מקומות עושין רבי יוחנן אמר אין עושין משום קרחה

At times Rav said: It is in one court that they may not designate more than two adjoining cities as idolatrous cities, but in two or three courts they may designate them. And at times Rav said: Even in two or three courts they may never designate them. What is the reasoning of Rav? It is due to desolation, to ensure there will not be large swaths of uninhabited land in Eretz Yisrael. Reish Lakish says: They taught only that the court may not designate three adjoining cities as idolatrous cities in one region, but in two or three regions they may designate them. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They may not designate them, due to desolation.

תניא כוותיה דר"י אין עושין שלש עיירות מנודחות בארץ ישראל אבל עושין אותם שתים כגון אחת ביהודה ואחת בגליל אבל שתים ביהודה ושתים בגליל אין עושין וסמוכה לספר אפילו אחת אין עושין מאי טעמא שמא ישמעו נכרים ויחריבו את ארץ ישראל

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 14:1) in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The court may not designate three adjoining cities as idolatrous cities in Eretz Yisrael, but they may designate two, such as one in Judea and one in the Galilee. But they may not designate two in Judea or two in the Galilee. And if the city is near the frontier, they may not designate even one. What is the reason for this? Perhaps the gentiles will hear that there is a city on the border that is desolate, and they will seize the opportunity to invade and destroy Eretz Yisrael.

ותיפוק לי דמקרבך אמר רחמנא ולא מן הספר רבי שמעון היא דדריש טעמא דקרא:

The Gemara asks: But let him derive this halakha from the fact that the Merciful One states: “From your midst,” from which it is inferred: But not from the frontier. The Gemara answers: This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as he interprets the reason for the mitzva in the verse and draws halakhic conclusions based on that interpretation.

סנהדרי גדולה היתה: מ"ט דרבנן דאמרי ומשה על גביהן אמר קרא (במדבר יא, טז) והתיצבו שם

§ The mishna teaches that the Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy-one judges, and that Rabbi Yehuda holds that it was composed of only seventy, as Moses gathered seventy men of the Elders of the Jewish people, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, Moses himself was not counted as part of the group. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis, who say that when Moses gathered seventy men, he was at the head of the court and is therefore counted among them? The verse states: “And the Lord said to Moses: Gather Me seventy men from the Elders of Israel, whom you know to be the Elders of the people and officers over them, and bring them to the Tent of Meeting and they shall stand there

17a

עמך עמך ואת בהדייהו ורבי יהודה עמך משום שכינה

with you” (Numbers 11:16), i.e., they will stand “with you,” and you are to be counted with them, leading to a total number of seventy-one. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the term “with you” is mentioned due to the Divine Presence that rested on Moses. According to Rabbi Yehuda, Moses was instructed to remain with the seventy Elders in order for the Divine Presence to rest upon them as well. He was not formally part of their court and therefore the number of Sages on the Great Sanhedrin is seventy.

ורבנן אמר קרא (במדבר יא, יז) ונשאו אתך במשא העם אתך ואת בהדייהו ורבי יהודה אתך בדומין לך

The Gemara asks: And how would the Rabbis respond to this line of reasoning? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And they shall bear the burden of the people with you” (Numbers 11:17), which indicates: “With you,” and you are to be counted with them. And how would Rabbi Yehuda respond to that? He would explain that the term “with you” means similar to you, meaning, that the Elders appointed to the court had to be of fit lineage and free of blemish, like Moses.

ורבנן (שמות יח, כב) מוהקל מעליך ונשאו אתך נפקא וילפא סנהדרי גדולה מסנהדרי קטנה

And from where do the Rabbis derive that halakha? They derive it from what was stated with regard to the appointment of the ministers of thousands and the ministers of hundreds: “And they shall make it easier for you, and bear the burden with you” (Exodus 18:22), understanding the term “with you” to mean: Similar to you. And the halakha of the judges of the Great Sanhedrin of seventy is derived from the halakha of the judges of the lesser Sanhedrin, i.e., those ministers, that Moses appointed.

ת"ר (במדבר יא, כו) וישארו שני אנשים במחנה יש אומרים בקלפי נשתיירו

§ Apropos the appointment of the Elders by Moses, the Gemara discusses additional aspects of that event. There were seventy-two candidates for Elder but only seventy were needed. They were chosen by lots with their names put into a box. The Sages taught: The verse states: “And there remained two men in the camp; the name of one was Eldad and the name of the other Medad, and the spirit rested upon them, and they were among those who were written but who did not go out to the tent, and they prophesied in the camp” (Numbers 11:26). Where did they remain? Some say this means they, i.e., their names, remained excluded from those selected from the lots in the box.

שבשעה שאמר לו הקב"ה למשה אספה לי שבעים איש מזקני ישראל אמר משה כיצד אעשה אברור ששה מכל שבט ושבט נמצאו שנים יתירים אברור חמשה חמשה מכל שבט ושבט נמצאו עשרה חסרים אברור ששה משבט זה וחמשה משבט זה הריני מטיל קנאה בין השבטים

The baraita explains: At the time that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: “Gather for Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel” (Numbers 11:16), Moses said: How shall I do it? If I select six from each and every tribe, there will be a total of seventy-two, which will be two extra. But if I select five from each and every tribe, there will be a total of sixty, lacking ten. And if I select six from this tribe and five from that tribe, I will bring about envy between the tribes, as those with fewer representatives will resent the others.

מה עשה בירר ששה ששה והביא שבעים ושנים פיתקין על שבעים כתב זקן ושנים הניח חלק בללן ונתנן בקלפי אמר להם בואו וטלו פיתקיכם כל מי שעלה בידו זקן אמר כבר קידשך שמים מי שעלה בידו חלק אמר המקום לא חפץ בך אני מה אעשה לך

What did he do? He selected six from every tribe and he brought seventy-two slips [pitakin]. On seventy of them he wrote: Elder, and he left two of them blank. He mixed them and placed them in the box. He then said to the seventy-two chosen candidates: Come and draw your slips. Everyone whose hand drew up a slip that said: Elder, he said to him: Heaven has already sanctified you. And everyone whose hand drew up a blank slip, he said to him: The Omnipresent does not desire you; what can I do for you?

כיוצא בדבר אתה אומר (במדבר ג, מז) ולקחת חמשת חמשת שקלים לגולגולת אמר משה כיצד אעשה להן לישראל אם אומר לו תן לי פדיונך וצא יאמר לי כבר פדאני בן לוי

The Gemara comments: You can say something similar to this to explain the verse about the redemption of the firstborn by the Levites: “Take the Levites in place of all of the firstborn of the children of Israel…and as for the redemption of the 273 of the firstborn of the children of Israel who are in excess over the number of the Levites…you shall take five shekels per head” (Numbers 3:45–47). It can be explained that Moses said: How shall I do this for the Jews? If I say to one of the firstborns: Give me money for your redemption and you may leave, as you are among the 273 extra firstborns, he will say to me: A Levite already redeemed me; what is the reason you think that I am among those who were not redeemed?

מה עשה הביא עשרים ושנים אלפים פיתקין וכתב עליהן בן לוי ועל שלשה ושבעים ומאתים כתב עליהן חמשה שקלים בללן ונתנן בקלפי אמר להן טלו פיתקיכם מי שעלה בידו בן לוי אמר לו כבר פדאך בן לוי מי שעלה בידו חמשת שקלים אמר לו תן פדיונך וצא

What did he do? He brought 22,000 slips (see Numbers 3:39), and he wrote on them: Levite, and on 273 additional ones he wrote: Five shekels. He mixed them up and placed them in a box. He said to them: Draw your slips. Everyone whose hand drew up a slip that said: Levite, he said to him: A Levite already redeemed you. Everyone whose hand drew up a slip that said: Five shekels, he said to him: Pay your redemption money and you may leave.

רבי שמעון אומר במחנה נשתיירו בשעה שאמר לו הקב"ה למשה אספה לי שבעים איש אמרו אלדד ומידד אין אנו ראויין לאותה גדולה אמר הקב"ה הואיל ומיעטתם עצמכם הריני מוסיף גדולה על גדולתכם ומה גדולה הוסיף להם שהנביאים כולן נתנבאו ופסקו והם נתנבאו ולא פסקו

Rabbi Shimon says: Eldad and Medad remained in the camp, as they did not want to come to the lottery for the Elders. At the time that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Gather for me seventy Elders, Eldad and Medad said: We are not fitting for that level of greatness; we are not worthy of being appointed among the Elders. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Since you have made yourselves humble, I will add greatness to your greatness. And what is the greatness that he added to them? It was that all of the prophets, meaning the other Elders, who were given prophecy, prophesied for a time and then stopped prophesying, but they prophesied and did not stop.

ומה נבואה נתנבאו אמרו משה מת יהושע מכניס את ישראל לארץ אבא חנין אומר משום רבי אליעזר על עסקי שליו הן מתנבאים עלי שליו עלי שליו

Apropos Eldad and Medad being prophets, the Gemara asks: And what prophecy did they prophesy? They said: Moses will die, and Joshua will bring the Jewish people into Eretz Yisrael. Abba Ḥanin says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: They prophesied about the matter of the quail that came afterward (Numbers 11:31–33), saying: Arise quail, arise quail, and then the quail came.

רב נחמן אמר על עסקי גוג ומגוג היו מתנבאין שנאמר (יחזקאל לח, ג) כה אמר ה' אלהים האתה הוא אשר דברתי בימים קדמונים ביד עבדי נביאי ישראל הנבאים בימים ההם שנים להביא אותך עליהם וגו' אל תיקרי שנים אלא שנים ואיזו הן שנים נביאים שנתנבאו בפרק אחד נבואה אחת הוי אומר אלדד ומידד

Rav Naḥman says: They were prophesying about the matter of Gog and Magog, as it is stated with regard to Gog and Magog: “So says the Lord God: Are you the one of whom I spoke in ancient days, through my servants, the prophets of Israel, who prophesied in those days for many years [shanim] that I would bring you against them?” (Ezekiel 38:17). Do not read it as: “Years [shanim]”; rather, read it as: Two [shenayim]. And who are the two prophets who prophesied the same prophecy at the same time? You must say: Eldad and Medad.

אמר מר כל הנביאים כולן נתנבאו ופסקו והן נתנבאו ולא פסקו מנא לן דפסקו אילימא מדכתיב (במדבר יא, כה) ויתנבאו ולא יספו אלא מעתה (דברים ה, יח) קול גדול ולא יסף ה"נ דלא אוסיף הוא אלא דלא פסק הוא

The Master says: The baraita said: All of the prophets prophesied and then stopped, but Eldad and Medad prophesied and did not stop. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the other prophets stopped prophesying? If we say it is from that which is written about them: “And they prophesied but they did so no more [velo yasafu]” (Numbers 11:25), that is difficult: But if that is so, then concerning that which is stated in relation to the giving of the Torah: “These words the Lord spoke to all your assembly…with a great voice, and it went on no more [velo yasaf]” (Deuteronomy 5:19), so too shall it be understood that the great voice did not continue? Rather, the intention there is that it did not stop, interpreting the word yasafu as related to sof, meaning: End. Consequently, with regard to the seventy Elders as well, the word can be interpreted to mean that they did not stop prophesying.

אלא הכא כתיב ויתנבאו התם כתיב (במדבר יא, כז) מתנבאים עדיין מתנבאים והולכים

Rather, the proof is as follows: It is written here with regard to the seventy Elders: “They prophesied” (Numbers 11:25), and it is written there: “Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp” (Numbers 11:27), from which it can be derived that they were continuously prophesying.

בשלמא למ"ד משה מת היינו דכתיב (במדבר יא, כח) אדוני משה כלאם אלא למ"ד הנך תרתי מאי אדני משה כלאם דלאו אורח ארעא דהוה ליה כתלמיד המורה הלכה לפני רבו

With regard to the content of Eldad and Medad’s prophecy, the Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says their prophecy was that Moses will die, this is the reason for that which is written there: “And Joshua, son of Nun, the servant of Moses from his youth, answered and said: My master Moses, imprison them” (Numbers 11:28), as their prophecy appeared to be a rebellion against Moses. But according to the one who says those other two opinions with regard to the content of the prophecy, according to which their prophecy had no connection to Moses, what is the reason that Joshua said: “My master Moses, imprison them”? The Gemara answers: He said this because it is not proper conduct for them to prophesy publicly in close proximity to Moses, as by doing so they are like a student who teaches a halakha in his teacher’s presence, which is inappropriate.

בשלמא למ"ד הנך תרתי היינו דכתיב מי יתן אלא למ"ד משה מת מינח הוה ניחא ליה לא סיימוה קמיה

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says those other two opinions, this is the reason for that which is written: “And Moses said to him: Are you jealous for my sake? Would that all of the Lord’s people were prophets” (Numbers 11:29). But according to the one who says that Eldad and Medad prophesied that Moses will die and Joshua will bring Israel into the land, would it have been satisfactory to Moses that all of the people of God would utter similar prophecies? The Gemara answers: They did not conclude it before him. Moses was not aware of what they had said, but only that they were prophesying.

מאי כלאם א"ל הטל עליהן צרכי ציבור והן כלין מאיליהן:

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: “Imprison them [kela’em]”? The Gemara answers: Joshua said to him: Place responsibility for the needs of the public upon them, so that they will be occupied like the other Elders of Israel and they will cease [kalin] prophesying, on their own. Due to the burden of public responsibility they would not be able to be prophets.

מניין להביא עוד שלשה:

§ The mishna derives the halakha that there are twenty-three judges on a lesser Sanhedrin from the verses: “And the congregation shall judge,” and: “And the congregation shall save” (Numbers 35:24–25). The mishna understands that the term “congregation” is referring to ten judges, so that the two congregations, one in each verse, total twenty judges. The mishna then asks: From where is it derived to bring three more judges to the court? The mishna answers: The implication of the verse: “You shall not follow a multitude to convict” (Exodus 23:2), is that your inclination after a majority to exonerate is not like your inclination after a majority to convict, and a conviction must be by a majority of two.

סוף סוף לרעה ע"פ שנים לא משכחת לה אי אחד עשר מזכין ושנים עשר מחייבין אכתי חד הוא אי עשרה מזכין ושלשה עשר מחייבין תלתא הוו א"ר אבהו אי אתה מוצא אלא במוסיפין ודברי הכל ובסנהדרי גדולה ואליבא דרבי יהודה דאמר שבעים

The Gemara objects: Ultimately, you do not find an occurrence of the inclination for evil according to a majority of two judges. If eleven judges vote to acquit the defendant and twelve vote to convict, this is still only a majority of one, and if ten vote to acquit and thirteen vote to convict, they are a majority of three. With a court of twenty-three judges, there is no possible way to convict with a majority of two. Rabbi Abbahu says: You do not find such a scenario except in a case where they add two additional judges because one of the judges abstained from the deliberation, the other judges are split in their decisions, and the two added judges both vote to convict. And this is a possibility according to all tanna’im, and in a case tried by the Great Sanhedrin according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says there are seventy judges on the Great Sanhedrin. With an even number, it is possible to have a majority of two.

וא"ר אבהו במוסיפין עושין ב"ד שקול לכתחילה פשיטא מהו דתימא האי דקאמר איני יודע כמאן דאיתיה דמי ואי אמר מילתא שמעינן ליה קמ"ל דהאי דקאמר איני יודע כמאן דליתיה דמי ואי אמר טעמא לא שמעינן ליה

And Rabbi Abbahu says: When they add additional judges, they create a court consisting of an even number of judges ab initio. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? What is the novelty in Rabbi Abbahu’s statement? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: This judge who says: I do not know, is viewed as one who is still there, and if he says something afterward, we listen to him and include him in the count, so there are actually an odd number of judges on the court; therefore, Rabbi Abbahu teaches us that this judge who says: I do not know, is viewed as one who is not still there, and if he says a reason to rule in a certain manner afterward, we do not listen to him. Consequently, the court consists of an even number of judges.

אמר רב כהנא סנהדרי שראו כולן לחובה פוטרין אותו מ"ט כיון דגמירי הלנת דין למעבד ליה זכותא והני תו לא חזו ליה

§ Rav Kahana says: In a Sanhedrin where all the judges saw fit to convict the defendant in a case of capital law, they acquit him. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for this halakha? It is since it is learned as a tradition that suspension of the trial overnight is necessary in order to create a possibility of acquittal. The halakha is that they may not issue the guilty verdict on the same day the evidence was heard, as perhaps over the course of the night one of the judges will think of a reason to acquit the defendant. And as those judges all saw fit to convict him they will not see any further possibility to acquit him, because there will not be anyone arguing for such a verdict. Consequently, he cannot be convicted.

א"ר יוחנן אין מושיבין בסנהדרי אלא בעלי קומה ובעלי חכמה ובעלי מראה ובעלי זקנה ובעלי כשפים ויודעים בע' לשון שלא תהא סנהדרי שומעת מפי המתורגמן

§ Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They place on the Great Sanhedrin only men of high stature, and of wisdom, and of pleasant appearance, and of suitable age so that they will be respected. And they must also be masters of sorcery, i.e., they know the nature of sorcery, so that they can judge sorcerers, and they must know all seventy languages in order that the Sanhedrin will not need to hear testimony from the mouth of a translator in a case where a witness speaks a different language.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אין מושיבין בסנהדרין אלא מי שיודע לטהר את השרץ מה"ת אמר רב אני אדון ואטהרנו

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: They place on the Sanhedrin only one who knows how to render a carcass of a creeping animal pure by Torah law. The judges on the Sanhedrin must be so skilled at logical reasoning that they could even produce a convincing argument that creeping animals, which the Torah states explicitly are ritually impure, are actually pure. Rav said: I will discuss the halakha of the creeping animal and render it pure, i.e., I am able to demonstrate how it is possible to construct such a proof:

17b

ומה נחש שממית ומרבה טומאה טהור שרץ שאינו ממית ומרבה טומאה אינו דין שיהא טהור ולא היא מידי דהוה אקוץ בעלמא

If a snake, which kills other creatures whose carcasses are impure and thereby increases impurity in the world, is itself nevertheless pure, as it is not included in the list of impure creeping animals, then concerning a creeping animal that does not kill and does not increase impurity, isn’t it logical that it should be pure? This argument is rejected: But it is not so; the logic of the halakha of a creeping animal is just as it is concerning the halakha with regard to an ordinary thorn, which can injure people or animals and can even kill and thereby increase impurity, but is nevertheless pure. It is therefore apparent that this consideration is not relevant to the halakhot of impurity.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב כל עיר שאין בה שנים לדבר ואחד לשמוע אין מושיבין בה סנהדרי ובביתר הוו שלשה וביבנה ארבעה רבי אליעזר ורבי יהושע ור"ע ושמעון התימני דן לפניהם בקרקע

§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to any city that does not have among its residents two men who are able to speak all seventy languages and one additional man who is able to listen to and understand statements made in all the languages, even if he cannot speak all of them, they do not place a lesser Sanhedrin there. The members of the Sanhedrin do not all need to know all of the languages, but there must be at least this minimum number. And in Beitar there were three individuals who were able to speak all seventy languages, and in Yavne there were four, and they were: Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Akiva, and Shimon HaTimni, who was not an ordained Sage, and he would therefore deliberate before the other judges while seated on the ground, not among the rows of Sages.

מיתיבי שלישית חכמה רביעית אין למעלה הימנה הוא דאמר כי האי תנא דתניא שניה חכמה שלישית אין למעלה הימנה

The Gemara raises an objection to this from a baraita: A third, i.e., a Sanhedrin that has three individuals who can speak all seventy languages, is a wise Sanhedrin, and if it also has a fourth such person, there is no court above it, meaning that there is no need for additional language experts. Apparently the minimum requirement is three people who can speak the languages, not two. The Gemara answers: Rav states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of the following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: A Sanhedrin that has a second language expert is wise; and if it also has a third, there is no court above it.

למידין לפני חכמים לוי מרבי דנין לפני חכמים שמעון בן עזאי ושמעון בן זומא וחנן המצרי וחנניא בן חכינאי רב נחמן בר יצחק מתני חמשה שמעון שמעון ושמעון חנן וחנניה

§ Since the baraita stated that Shimon HaTimni would deliberate before them on the ground, the Gemara now lists various standard formulations used to introduce the statements of various Sages throughout the generations. If a source says: It was learned from the Sages, the intention is that this was a statement made by the Sage Levi who sat before and learned from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If it says: They deliberated before the Sages, this is referring to Shimon ben Azzai, and Shimon ben Zoma, and Ḥanan the Egyptian, and Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak would teach five names for this list: Shimon ben Azzai, Shimon ben Zoma, and Shimon HaTimni, Ḥanan the Egyptian, and Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai.

רבותינו שבבבל רב ושמואל רבותינו שבארץ ישראל רבי אבא דייני גולה קרנא דייני דארץ ישראל רבי אמי ורבי אסי דייני דפומבדיתא רב פפא בר שמואל דייני דנהרדעא רב אדא בר מניומי סבי דסורא רב הונא ורב חסדא סבי דפומבדיתא רב יהודה ורב עינא חריפי דפומבדיתא עיפה ואבימי בני רחבה אמוראי דפומבדיתא רבה ורב יוסף אמוראי דנהרדעי רב חמא

The expression: Our Rabbis that are in Babylonia, is referring to Rav and Shmuel. The expression: Our Rabbis that are in Eretz Yisrael, is referring to Rabbi Abba. The expression: The judges of the Diaspora, is a reference to the Sage Karna. The phrase: The judges of Eretz Yisrael, is a reference to Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi. The phrase: The judges of Pumbedita, is referring to Rav Pappa bar Shmuel, who was the head of the court there, and: The judges of Neharde’a, is a reference to the court headed by Rav Adda bar Minyumi. The term: The Elders of Sura, is referring to Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda, and: The Elders of Pumbedita, is referring to Rav Yehuda and Rav Eina. The sharp ones of Pumbedita are Eifa and Avimi, the sons of Raḥava. The expression: The amora’im of Pumbedita, is referring to Rabba and Rav Yosef, and the phrase: The amora’im of Neharde’a, is referring to Rav Ḥama.

נהרבלאי מתנו רמי בר ברבי אמרי בי רב רב הונא והאמר רב הונא אמרי בי רב אלא רב המנונא אמרי במערבא רבי ירמיה שלחו מתם ר' יוסי בר חנינא מחכו עלה במערבא ר' אלעזר

If it says: The Sages of Neharbela taught, this is referring to Rami bar Berabi, and the statement: They say in the school of Rav, is a reference to Rav Huna. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Huna sometimes say with regard to a given halakha: They say in the school of Rav? From this, it is apparent that a statement introduced by that formula cannot be made by Rav Huna himself, as Rav Huna quotes someone else with that introduction. The Gemara responds: Rather, the expression: They say in the school of Rav, must be referring to Rav Hamnuna. The formula: They say in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, is referring to Rabbi Yirmeya; the expression: They sent a message from there, meaning from Eretz Yisrael, is referring to Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina; and the statement: They laughed at it in the West, means that Rabbi Elazar did not accept a particular opinion.

והא שלחו מתם לדברי רבי יוסי בר חנינא אלא איפוך שלחו מתם ר' אלעזר מחכו עלה במערבא רבי יוסי בר חנינא:

The Gemara asks: But in one instance it is reported that: They sent a message from there that began: According to the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina. This indicates that the expression: They sent from there, is not itself a reference to a statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina. The Gemara answers: Rather, reverse the statements. The phrase: They sent from there, is a reference to Rabbi Elazar, and: They laughed at it in the West, means that Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina did not accept a particular opinion.

וכמה יהא בעיר ויהא ראויה לסנהדרין מאה ועשרים וכו': מאה ועשרים מאי עבידתייהו עשרים ושלשה כנגד סנהדרי קטנה ושלש שורות של עשרים ושלשה הרי תשעים ותרתי ועשרה בטלנין של בית הכנסת הרי מאה ותרי

§ The mishna teaches: And how many men must be in the city for it to be eligible for a lesser Sanhedrin? The opinion of the first tanna is that there must be 120 men. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of the number 120? The Gemara explains that 23 are needed to correspond to the number of members of the lesser Sanhedrin, and it is necessary for there to be three rows of 23 students who sit before the lesser Sanhedrin to learn and also to advise them; that is a total of 92 people. And since there also need to be 10 idlers of the synagogue, people who are free from urgent work and are always sitting in the synagogue to take care of its repair and the other needs of the public, that would be 102.

ושני סופרים ושני חזנין ושני בעלי דינין ושני עדים ושני זוממין ושני זוממי זוממין הרי מאה וארביסר

And in addition there are two scribes required for the Sanhedrin, and two bailiffs, and two litigants who will come to be judged. And there are two witnesses for one side, and two witnesses who could render those witnesses conspiring witnesses by testifying that they were elsewhere at the time of the alleged incident, and two additional witnesses could testify against the witnesses who rendered the first witnesses conspiring witnesses, rendering the second pair conspiring witnesses. All of these are necessary in order for a trial to take place, as is described in Deuteronomy 19:15–21. Therefore, there are so far a total of 114 men who must be in the city.

ותניא כל עיר שאין בה עשרה דברים הללו אין תלמיד חכם רשאי לדור בתוכה בית דין מכין ועונשין וקופה של צדקה נגבית בשנים ומתחלקת בשלשה ובית הכנסת ובית המרחץ וביהכ"ס רופא ואומן ולבלר (וטבח) ומלמד תינוקות משום ר' עקיבא אמרו אף מיני פירא מפני שמיני פירא מאירין את העינים:

And it is taught in a baraita: A Torah scholar is not permitted to reside in any city that does not have these ten things: A court that has the authority to flog and punish transgressors; and a charity fund for which monies are collected by two people and distributed by three, as required by halakha. This leads to a requirement for another three people in the city. And a synagogue; and a bathhouse; and a public bathroom; a doctor; and a bloodletter; and a scribe [velavlar] to write sacred scrolls and necessary documents; and a ritual slaughterer; and a teacher of young children. With these additional requirements there are a minimum of 120 men who must be residents of the city. They said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: The city must also have varieties of fruit, because varieties of fruit illuminate the eyes.

ר' נחמיה אומר וכו': תניא רבי אומר

The mishna teaches that Rabbi Neḥemya says: There must be 230 men in the city in order for it to be eligible for a lesser Sanhedrin, corresponding to the ministers of tens appointed in the wilderness by Moses at the suggestion of his father-in-law, Yitro (see Exodus 18:21). Each member of the Sanhedrin can be viewed as a judge with responsibility for ten men. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says:

18a

מאתים ושבעים ושבעה

The number of people needed in a city for it to be eligible for a lesser Sanhedrin is 277. This number is based on the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who requires 230 men, but requires an additional 47 men in case it happens that the Sages of the court reach a situation where they are not able to arrive at a verdict, and pairs of judges need to be added, potentially increasing the number of judges on the court from 23 to 70, a maximum of 47 additional judges.

והתניא רבי אומר מאתים שבעים ושמנה לא קשיא הא רבי יהודה הא רבנן

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The number of men needed in a city for it to be eligible for a lesser Sanhedrin is 278? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita that said Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi requires 277 residents is stated in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there are 70 judges on the Great Sanhedrin, and this baraita that quoted the number as 278 is stated in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that there are 71.

Apropos the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, which links the issue of the lesser Sanhedrin with the appointment of the ministers in the wilderness, the Gemara relates: The Sages taught: The verse states: “And place over them ministers of thousands, ministers of hundreds, ministers of fifties, and ministers of tens” (Exodus 18:21). The number of ministers of thousands was 600, as there were 600,000 men in total; the number of ministers of hundreds was 6,000; of ministers of fifties, 12,000, and of ministers of tens, 60,000. Therefore, it is found that the total number of judges of the Jewish people was 78,600, and suitable people were found to fill all of these positions.

הדרן עלך דיני ממונות

מתני׳ כהן גדול דן ודנין אותו מעיד ומעידין אותו חולץ וחולצין לאשתו ומייבמין את אשתו אבל הוא אינו מייבם מפני שהוא אסור באלמנה

MISHNA: The High Priest judges others if he is sufficiently wise, and others judge him when he transgresses. He testifies before the court and others testify concerning him. He performs ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother performs ḥalitza with his wife; and his brother consummates levirate marriage with his wife. But he does not consummate levirate marriage with his brother’s widow, because it is prohibited for him to marry a widow (see Leviticus 21:14), and can therefore never fulfill the mitzva of levirate marriage, as a yevama is by definition a widow.

מת לו מת אינו יוצא אחר המטה אלא הן נכסין והוא נגלה הן נגלין והוא נכסה ויוצא עמהן עד פתח שער העיר דברי ר"מ

If a relative of the High Priest dies, he does not follow the bier carrying the corpse, since it is prohibited for the High Priest to become ritually impure even for immediate relatives (see Leviticus 21:11). Rather, once the members of the funeral procession are concealed from sight by turning onto another street, he is revealed on the street they departed, and when they are revealed, then he is concealed, and in this way, he goes out with them until the entrance of the gate of the city, from where they would take out the corpse, since the dead were not buried in Jerusalem. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רבי יהודה אומר אינו יוצא מן המקדש משום שנאמר (ויקרא כא, יב) ומן המקדש לא יצא

Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not emerge from the Temple at all for the burial of his relatives, as it is stated: “And from the Temple he shall not emerge and will not desecrate the Temple of his God; for the separateness of the oil of the anointment of his God is on him” (Leviticus 21:12).

The mishna continues: And when he consoles others in their mourning when they return from burial, the way of all the people is that they pass by one after another and the mourners stand in a line and are consoled, and the appointed person stands in the middle, between the High Priest and the people. And when he is consoled by others in his mourning, all the people say to him: We are your atonement. And he says to them: May you be blessed from Heaven. And when they comfort him with the first meal after the burial of one of his relatives, all the people recline on the ground as if they are taking his mourning on themselves, and he reclines on the bench out of respect for his status as High Priest.

המלך לא דן ולא דנין אותו לא מעיד ולא מעידין אותו לא חולץ ולא חולצין לאשתו לא מייבם ולא מייבמין לאשתו רבי יהודה אומר אם רצה לחלוץ או לייבם זכור לטוב אמרו לו אין שומעין לו

The mishna continues, enumerating the halakhot pertaining to the king in similar matters: The king does not judge others as a member of a court and others do not judge him, he does not testify and others do not testify concerning him, he does not perform ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother does not perform ḥalitza with his wife, and he does not consummate levirate marriage with his brother’s widow and his brother does not consummate levirate marriage with his wife, as all these actions are not fitting to the honor of his office. Rabbi Yehuda says: These are not restrictions, but his prerogative: If he desired to perform ḥalitza or to consummate levirate marriage, he is remembered for good, as this is to the benefit of his brother’s widow. The Sages said to him: They do not listen to him if he desires to do so, as this affects not only his own honor but that of the kingdom.

ואין נושאין אלמנתו ר' יהודה אומר נושא המלך אלמנתו של מלך שכן מצינו בדוד שנשא אלמנתו של שאול שנאמר (שמואל ב יב, ח) ואתנה לך את בית אדוניך ואת נשי אדוניך בחיקך:

And no one may marry a king’s widow, due to his honor. Rabbi Yehuda says: Another king may marry the widow of a king, as we found that King David married the widow of King Saul, as it is stated: “And I have given you the house of your master and the wives of your master in your bosom” (II Samuel 12:8).

גמ׳ כהן גדול דן פשיטא דנין אותו איצטריכא ליה הא נמי פשיטא אי לא דיינינן ליה איהו היכי דיין והכתיב (צפניה ב, א) התקוששו וקושו ואמר ר"ל קשט עצמך ואחר כך קשט אחרים

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the High Priest judges others as a member of a court. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Why would one think that he would be unfit to serve as a judge? The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to mention the latter clause: And others judge him, and therefore, it taught the related halakha with it. The Gemara objects: This is also obvious; if others do not judge him, how can he judge others? But isn’t it written: “Gather yourselves together, yea, gather together [hitkosheshu vakoshu]” (Zephaniah 2:1); and Reish Lakish says: This verse teaches a moral principle: Adorn [kashet] yourself first, and then adorn others, i.e., one who is not subject to judgment may not judge others.

Rather, neither halakha concerning the High Priest is a novelty. But since the tanna wants to teach that the king does not judge others and others do not judge him, he also taught that the High Priest judges others and others judge him. And if you wish, say instead that this teaches us the halakha as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 4:1): A High Priest who killed a person intentionally is killed; if he killed unintentionally, he is exiled to a city of refuge, and he transgresses a positive mitzva and a prohibition, and he is like an ordinary person concerning all of his halakhot.

במזיד נהרג פשיטא בשוגג גולה איצטריכא ליה

The Gemara analyzes the baraita: A High Priest who killed another intentionally is killed. Isn’t that obvious? Why would he be punished differently than other murderers? It was necessary for it to mention the latter clause: If he killed unintentionally, he is exiled, so it taught the related case with it.

הא נמי פשיטא איצטריך ס"ד אמינא הואיל וכתיב (במדבר לה, כה) וישב בה עד מות הכהן הגדול אימא כל דאית ליה תקנתא בחזרה ליגלי דלית ליה תקנתא בחזרה לא ליגלי דתנן

The Gemara objects: This is also obvious. The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the baraita to state the latter clause, lest it enter your mind to say: Since it is written about one who kills unintentionally and is exiled to a city of refuge: “And he should dwell in it until the death of the High Priest” (Numbers 35:25), say: Anyone for whom there is a rectification by returning from the city of refuge is exiled, but one for whom there is no rectification by returning is not exiled. The High Priest has no such rectification, as we learned in a mishna (Makkot 11b):

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Daf 84b

מתני׳ אלו הן הנחנקין המכה אביו ואמו וגונב נפש מישראל וזקן ממרא ע"פ ב"ד ונביא השקר והמתנבא בשם עבודת כוכבים והבא על אשת איש וזוממי בת כהן ובועלה: MISHNA: These are the transgressors who are strangled in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: One who strikes his father or his mother, and one who abducts a Jewish person, and a rebellious elder according to the court, and a false prophet, and one who prophesies in the name of idol worship, and one who engages in intercourse with a married woman, and conspiring witnesses who testify that the daughter of a priest committed adultery, even though were she guilty, she would be executed by burning. And her paramour is also executed via strangulation as in any case where a man engages in intercourse with a married woman.

גמ׳ מכה אביו ואמו מנלן דכתיב (שמות כא, טו) מכה אביו ואמו מות יומת וכל מיתה האמורה בתורה סתם אינה אלא חנק GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One who strikes his father or his mother is executed by strangulation. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “One who strikes his father or his mother shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:15), and every death stated in the Torah without specification is referring to nothing other than strangulation.

אימא עד דקטיל ליה מיקטל ס"ד קטל חד בסייף ואביו בחנק The Gemara suggests: Say that one is not executed for striking his father or mother unless he kills him or her. The Gemara explains: Does it enter your mind to say that if one kills one other person, he is executed by beheading with a sword, but if he kills his father or mother he is executed by strangulation? That is not reasonable.

הניחא למ"ד חנק קל אלא למאן דאמר חנק חמור מאי איכא למימר The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that strangulation is a more lenient form of execu-tion than decapitation. But according to the one who said that strangulation is a more severe form of execution than decapitation, what is there to say? Perhaps one is liable to receive the death penalty for striking his father or mother only if he kills the parent, and the added severity for killing a parent is in terms of the specific form of death penalty.

אלא מדכתיב (שמות כא, יב) מכה איש ומת מות יומת וכתיב (במדבר לה, כא) או באיבה הכהו בידו וימות שמע מינה כל היכא דאיכא הכאה סתם לאו מיתה הוא The Gemara answers: Rather, prove that one is executed by strangulation for striking his father or mother even if he does not kill them from the fact that it is written: “One who strikes a man and he dies shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:12), and it is written: “Or if in enmity he struck him with his hand and he died he shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:21). Learn from these verses in which it states: Strikes and he dies, that anywhere that there is mention of striking without specifying a resultant death, it is not referring to a case where the blow caused one’s death.

ואצטריך למיכתב מכה איש ואיצטריך למכתב כל מכה נפש דאי כתב רחמנא מכה איש ומת הוה אמינא איש דבר מצוה אין קטן לא כתב רחמנא כל מכה נפש ואי כתב רחמנא כל מכה נפש הוה אמינא אפילו נפלים אפילו בן שמונה צריכי The Gemara notes: And it was necessary for the Torah to write: “One who strikes a man,” and it was necessary for the Torah to write: “Anyone who kills a soul, the murderer shall be slain on the basis of witnesses” (Numbers 35:30), since if the Merciful One wrote only: “One who strikes a man and he dies,” I would say that one who strikes a man, i.e., an adult, who is obligated in the fulfillment of mitzvot, yes, he is executed, but one who kills a minor, no, he is not executed. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Anyone who kills a soul.” And if the Merciful One wrote only: “Anyone who kills a soul,” I would say that one is executed even if he killed a non-viable newborn, or even if he killed a child born after a gestation period of eight months, who, in talmudic times, was also considered non-viable. Consequently, both verses are necessary.

ואימא אע"ג דלא עביד ביה חבורה אלמה תנן המכה אביו ואמו אינו חייב עד שיעשה בהן חבורה The Gemara asks: But if that is the source for the halakha that one is liable for striking his father or mother, why not say that he is liable even though he did not wound him or her and draw blood? Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (85b): One who strikes his father and his mother is not liable unless he wounds them?

אמר קרא (ויקרא כד, כא) מכה אדם ומכה בהמה מה מכה בהמה עד דעביד בה חבורה דכתיב בה נפש אף מכה אדם עד דעביד חבורה The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And one who strikes an animal shall pay for it; and one who strikes a person shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), juxtaposing one who strikes an individual with one who strikes an animal. An earlier verse states: “One who strikes the soul of an animal shall pay for it” (Leviticus 24:18). Based on this it is derived: Just as one who strikes an animal is not liable unless he wounds it and draws blood, as “soul” is written concerning it, and it can be derived from the verse: “For the blood is the soul” (Deuteronomy 12:23), that the term “soul” is a reference to blood, so too, one who strikes a person is not liable unless he causes a wound and draws blood.

מתקיף לה רב ירמיה אלא מעתה הכחישה באבנים הכי נמי דלא מיחייב אלא אם אינו ענין לנפש בהמה דהא אי נמי הכחישה באבנים חייב תניהו ענין לנפש אדם Rav Yirmeya objects to this proof: If that is so, then in a case where one weakened the animal by placing a burden of stones upon it and thereby injured or killed it, would one say that so too in that case he is not liable because he did not draw blood? Clearly he is liable to pay for the damage that he caused. Rather, with regard to the term soul in the verse: “One who strikes the soul of an animal,” if it is not a matter that is relevant to the soul of an animal, as even in a case where one weakens the animal by placing a burden of stones upon it, he is liable, apply it to the matter of the soul of a person, and thereby derive that one who strikes his parent is liable to be executed only if he wounds his parent and draws blood.

אלא הקישא למה לי לכדתניא דבי חזקיה The Gemara asks: But if the fact that one who strikes his parent is liable only if he draws blood is derived based on the principle: If it is not a matter, why do I need the juxtaposition between the striking of a man and the striking of an animal? The Gemara answers: The juxtaposition is necessary in order to derive the halakha for that which is taught in a baraita in the school of Ḥizkiyya: Just as in the case of one who strikes an animal there is no distinction between one who does so unwittingly and one who does so intentionally, and in both cases he is liable to pay damages, so too, in the case of one who strikes a person there is no distinction between one who does so intentionally and is executed, and one who does so unwittingly and is not executed. In both cases he is exempt from paying damages based on the principle that one receives only the greater punishment.

הניחא למאן דאית ליה תנא דבי חזקיה אלא למאן דלית ליה תנא דבי חזקיה היקישא למה לי The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who holds in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya, but according to the one who does not hold in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya, why do I need the juxtaposition between the striking of a man and the striking of an animal?

מה מכה בהמה לרפואה פטור אף מכה אדם לרפואה פטור The Gemara answers: He derives that just as one who strikes an animal for medical purposes is exempt from payment of restitution, so too, one who strikes a person for medical purposes is exempt, even if it results in the death of the one that he treated.

דאיבעיא להו בן מהו שיקיז דם לאביו רב מתנא אמר (ויקרא יט, יח) ואהבת לרעך כמוך רב דימי בר חיננא אמר מכה אדם ומכה בהמה מה מכה בהמה לרפואה פטור אף מכה אדם לרפואה פטור The Gemara explains: As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may let blood for his father? Is he liable for wounding his father? Rav Mattana says that it is written: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18); just as one would want others to heal him when the need arises, one must heal others when the need arises. It is prohibited for one to do to others only those actions that he would not want done to him. Therefore, it is permitted for one to heal his father even if the procedure entails wounding him. Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana says: This is derived from the juxtaposition between one who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal. Just as one who strikes an animal for medical purposes is exempt from paying restitution, so too, one who strikes a person for medical purposes is exempt from liability.

רב לא שביק לבריה למישקל ליה סילוא מר בריה דרבינא לא שביק לבריה למיפתח ליה כוותא דילמא חביל והוה ליה שגגת איסור The Gemara relates: Rav did not allow his son to extract a thorn from him, due to the concern that his son would unwittingly wound him. Mar, son of Ravina, did not allow his son to pierce his blister, lest he wound him, which would be an unwitting violation of a prohibition.

אי הכי אחר נמי אחר שיגגת לאו בנו שגגת חנק The Gemara challenges this: If so, this should be a concern when another who is not his son treats him as well, as it is prohibited for one Jew to injure another. The Gemara explains: There is a distinction, as when another treats him, the concern is that the individual would be in unwitting violation of a prohibition. By contrast, when his son treats him, the concern is that he would be in unwitting violation of a prohibition punishable by strangulation.

והדתנן מחט של יד ליטול בה את הקוץ ליחוש דילמא חביל והויא לה שגגת סקילה The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 122b): It is permitted on Shabbat to move an ordinary hand needle used for sewing garments to extract a thorn with it, why is it permitted to extract a thorn on Shabbat? Let us be concerned lest he wound the individual in the process, which would be an unwitting violation of a prohibition punishable by stoning.

התם מקלקל הוא The Gemara answers: There, even if one wounds the individual, he is unwittingly performing a labor for a destructive purpose, i.e., he is causing an injury, and one is liable to be executed only for the performance of a labor for a constructive purpose on Shabbat.

הניחא למאן דאמר מקלקל פטור אלא למ"ד חייב מאי איכא למימר The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that one who performs a labor on Shabbat for a destructive purpose is exempt. But according to the one who said that even when performing the labor for a destructive purpose, there are cases where one is liable if he benefits from the action, what is there to say?

מאן שמעת ליה דאמר מקלקל בחבורה חייב ר' שמעון היא The Gemara answers: Whom did you hear that said that one who is destructive in causing a wound is liable to be executed if there is a constructive element to his action? It is Rabbi Shimon,

Daf 85a

ורבי שמעון האמר כל מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה פטור עליה and doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say: With regard to one who performs any prohibited labor that is not necessary for its own sake, it is labor for which he is exempt? In this case, causing the wound was inadvertent and was not his objective when performing the action.

בעו מיניה מרב ששת בן מהו שיעשה שליח לאביו להכותו ולקללו § The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may be designated an agent of the court in order to flog his father or to curse him if the court sentenced him to ostracism?

א"ל ואחר מי התירו אלא כבוד שמים עדיף הכא נמי כבוד שמים עדיף Rav Sheshet said to them: And did the Torah render it permitted to flog or curse another who is not his father? The Torah prohibited such actions. Rather, the reason that an agent of the court may flog or curse the one found liable is that the honor of Heaven takes precedence over the honor due to another. Here too, a son may serve as an agent of the court because the honor of Heaven takes precedence over the honor due to his father.

מיתיבי ומה מי שמצוה להכותו מצוה שלא להכותו מי שאינו מצוה להכותו אינו דין שמצוה שלא להכותו The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: And just as with regard to one who is commanded to strike him there is a mitzva not to strike him under other circumstances, with regard to one who is not commanded to strike him is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him?

מאי לאו אידי ואידי במקום מצוה הא בבנו הא באחר The Gemara explains the baraita: What, is it not that both this first clause of the statement of the baraita and that latter clause of the statement of the baraita are referring to a situation where striking another is a mitzva, e.g., where the other is liable to receive lashes. The distinction between them is that this latter clause, which is referring to one who is not commanded to strike him, is concerning a case where the agent is his son and is therefore prohibited from striking his father even in that capacity, while that first clause, which is referring to one who is commanded to strike him, is concerning a case where the agent is another individual and not his son. This indicates that it is prohibited for a son to flog his father as an agent of the court.

לא אידי ואידי לא שנא בנו ולא שנא אחר ולא קשיא כאן במקום מצוה כאן שלא במקום מצוה The Gemara answers: No, in both this clause and that clause it is no different if the agent is his son and it is no different if the agent is another. And it is not difficult to distinguish between the clauses: Here, in the first clause, the reference is to a situation where striking another is a mitzva, as he is an agent of the court; there, in the latter clause, the reference is not to a situation where striking another is a mitzva.

והכי קתני ומה במקום מצוה שמצוה להכותו מצוה שלא להכותו שלא במקום מצוה שאינו מצוה להכותו אינו דין שמצוה שלא להכותו And accordingly, this is what the baraita is teaching: And just as in a situation where striking another is a mitzva, where the agent of the court is commanded to strike him, there is a mitzva not to strike him even one lash beyond the number determined by the court, as it is written: “Forty lashes shall he strike him, he shall not exceed, lest if he shall exceed to strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:3), accordingly, in a situation where striking another is not a mitzva, where one is not commanded to strike him, is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him? The general prohibition against striking another in any situation is derived from this verse.

תא שמע היוצא ליהרג ובא בנו והכהו וקיללו חייב בא אחר והכהו וקיללו פטור והוינן בה מאי שנא בנו ומאי שנא אחר ואמר רב חסדא במסרבין בו לצאת ואינו יוצא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of one who emerges from the court condemned to be executed and his son came and struck him or cursed him, the son is liable to be executed for striking or cursing his father. If another came and struck him or cursed him, he is exempt. And we discussed it as follows: What is different about the case where his son strikes or curses him that he is liable, and what is different about the case where another strikes or curses him that he is exempt? And Rav Ḥisda says: The baraita is referring to a case where they are imploring the condemned man to emerge from the court to be executed but he is not emerging. Therefore, it is necessary to employ force. Apparently, even under those circumstances, where the use of force is sanctioned by the court, it is prohibited for the son to strike his father.

רב ששת מוקי לה בשאין מסרבין בו לצאת The Gemara rejects this proof: Rav Sheshet interprets this baraita as referring to a case where they are not imploring him to emerge from the court for his execution. It is referring to a case where the condemned man is proceeding willingly, and it is not an agent of the court but someone else who strikes and curses him at his own initiative.

אי הכי אחר נמי אחר גברא קטילא הוא The Gemara challenges: If so, even another who strikes one who is condemned to death should be liable, as it is prohibited to strike or curse another. The Gemara responds: If another does so he is exempt, since the legal status of the one condemned to death is that of a dead man. Therefore, one is not liable for striking or humiliating him.

והאמר רב ששת ביישו ישן ומת חייב הכא במאי עסקינן בשהכהו הכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Sheshet himself say: If one humiliates another who is sleeping and the individual never awakens and dies, the one who humiliated him is liable to compensate his heirs for that humiliation? Apparently, even if the status of the condemned is that of a dead person, the one who cursed him should be liable to compensate his heirs. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta, in which case no compensation is paid.

והאמר רבי אמי אמר ר' יוחנן הכהו הכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה לוקה מאי פטור דקאמר פטור מממון The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Ami say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case where one struck another with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta, he is flogged for violating the prohibition: “He shall not exceed”? Why does the baraita exempt another entirely? The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the term exempt that is stated in this baraita? It means that he is exempt from monetary restitution, but he is liable to receive lashes.

מכלל דבנו חייב בממון אלא בדינו הכא נמי בדינו The Gemara asks: If the clause of the baraita that discusses a case where another individual strikes or curses him and states that he is exempt only from payment of restitution, one may conclude by inference that the clause of the baraita that discusses his son states that he is liable to pay monetary restitution. That is certainly not the case. Rather, the clause of the baraita that discusses his son states that he is liable to be punished in accordance with his appropriate sentence; here too, the clause of the baraita that discusses another individual states that he is exempt from punishment in accordance with his appropriate sentence. The question remains: Why is another exempt from receiving lashes in a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta?

אלא אחר היינו טעמא דפטור דאמר קרא (שמות כב, כז) ונשיא בעמך לא תאור בעושה מעשה עמך The Gemara answers: Rather, this is the reason that another is exempt: As the verse states: “Nor curse a ruler of your people” (Exodus 22:27), from which it is inferred that this prohibition applies only with regard to one who performs an action of “your people,” i.e., an action befitting a Jew. There is no prohibition against cursing one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew.

התינח קללה הכאה מנלן דמקשינן הכאה לקללה The Gemara asks: This explanation works out well with regard to cursing, as that is the prohibition mentioned in that verse. From where do we derive that the halakha is the same with regard to striking? The Gemara answers: We derive that the halakha is the same for both, as we liken striking to cursing based on the juxtaposition between the verses that address the cases of one who strikes his father (Exodus 21:15) and one who curses his father (Exodus 21:17).

אי הכי בנו נמי כדאמר רב פינחס בשעשה תשובה הכא נמי בשעשה תשובה The Gemara challenges: If so, and the prohibition does not apply to one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew, his son too should be exempt if he strikes or curses his father whose conduct is inappropriate. The Gemara explains: As Rav Pineḥas says in another context that the reference is to a case where the one in question repented, so too, the baraita is referring to a case where the condemned man repented. Although he is being taken to his execution, because he repented he is considered as one who performs actions “of your people,” and his son is liable for striking or cursing him.

אי הכי אחר נמי אמר רב מרי בעמך במקוים שבעמך The Gemara challenges: If so, and the baraita is referring to one who repented, another should be rendered liable as well. Rav Mari says: One derives from the expression “of your people” that the prohibition applies only to one enduring among your people, not to one whose execution is imminent.

אי הכי בנו נמי The Gemara challenges: If so, his son should be exempt as well, since his father’s execution is imminent.

Daf 85b

מידי דהוה לאחר מיתה The Gemara answers: The halakha here is just as it is after the death of his father, and the son is liable for cursing his father even after his death. Therefore, he is also liable when his father’s death is imminent.

מאי הוה עלה אמר רבה בר רב הונא וכן תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל לכל אין הבן נעשה שליח לאביו להכותו ולקללו חוץ ממסית שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים יג, ט) לא תחמול ולא תכסה עליו: Despite several attempts to cite proof contradicting his opinion, there is no conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Sheshet that a son may serve as an agent of the court to punish his father. The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rabba bar Rav Huna says, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: With regard to all cases a son is not designated as an agent to strike his father or to curse him, except in a case where his father incites others to worship idols, as the Torah states: “Neither shall you spare, nor shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9).

מתני׳ המכה אביו ואמו אינו חייב עד שיעשה בהן חבורה זה חומר במקלל מבמכה שהמקלל לאחר מיתה חייב והמכה לאחר מיתה פטור: MISHNA: One who strikes his father or his mother is not liable to be executed unless he wounds one of them. This is a stringency with regard to one who curses his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who strikes his father, as one who curses his father or his mother after his or her death is liable, but one who strikes one of them after his or her death is exempt, as he did not cause a wound.

גמ' ת"ר (ויקרא כ, ט) אביו ואמו קלל לאחר מיתה שיכול הואיל וחייב במכה וחייב במקלל מה מכה אינו חייב אלא מחיים אף המקלל אינו חייב אלא מחיים GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: “For any man who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him who curses his father and his mother shall die; he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him” (Leviticus 20:9). This is referring to one who curses his parents even after their death, as one might have thought: Since one is liable for striking and one is liable for cursing, just as one who strikes is liable only when his father or mother are alive, so too, one who curses is liable only when they are alive.

ועוד ק"ו ומה מכה שעשה בו שלא בעמך כבעמך לא חייב בו לאחר מיתה מקלל שלא עשה בו שלא בעמך כבעמך אינו דין שלא חייב בו לאחר מיתה Furthermore, one may draw an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to one who strikes another, where the Torah deemed the status of striking one who performs actions not of your people, i.e., a sinner, like that of striking one who performs actions that are of your people, yet the Torah did not deem him liable for striking another after death, then with regard to one who curses, where the Torah deemed the status of cursing one who performs actions not of your people like that of cursing one who performs actions that are of your people, is it not right that the Torah did not deem him liable for cursing another after their death?

ת"ל אביו ואמו קלל לאחר מיתה Therefore, the verse states the extraneous phrase: “He has cursed his father and his mother,” to include even one who curses his father or mother after that parent’s death.

הניחא לר' יונתן דמייתר ליה קרא אביו ואמו אלא לר' יאשיה מאי איכא למימר The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, for whom the phrase “his father and his mother” is extraneous. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, who disagrees with him, what is there to say?

דתניא (ויקרא כ, ב) איש איש מה ת"ל איש איש לרבות בת טומטום ואנדרוגינוס אשר יקלל את אביו ואת אמו אין לי אלא אביו ואמו אביו שלא אמו אמו שלא אביו מניין ת"ל אביו ואמו קלל אביו קלל אמו קלל דברי ר' יאשיה This is as it is taught in a baraita that it is written: “For any man [ish ish] who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him.” What is the meaning when the verse states redundantly: “Ish ish”? It serves to include not only a son, but also a daughter, one whose sexual organs are indeterminate [tumtum], and a hermaphrodite who curse their parent. When the verse states: “Who curses his father and his mother,” I have derived only liability for cursing both his father and his mother. From where is liability derived for one who cursed his father but who did not curse his mother, or one who cursed his mother but who did not curse his father? The verse states: “He has cursed his father and his mother,” from which it is derived that the halakha is as if the verse states: He cursed his father or he cursed his mother. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

ר' יונתן אומר משמע שניהן כאחד ומשמע אחד ואחד בפני עצמו עד שיפרט לך הכתוב יחדיו Rabbi Yonatan says: In verses of this kind when two subjects are joined with a prefix of the letter vav, that prefix indicates the conjunction “and,” meaning both subjects together, and it also indicates the conjunction “or,” meaning each one by itself, unless the verse specifies with the word: “Together,” in which case the meaning is both together. Therefore, the phrase “he has cursed his father and his mother” is extraneous.

מנא ליה נפקא ליה מומקלל אביו ואמו מות יומת Since according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, the phrase is not redundant, from where does he derive that one is liable for cursing his father after his death? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which is written: “And one who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:17).

ואידך ההוא מיבעי ליה לרבות בת טומטום ואנדרוגינוס The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yonatan, what does he derive from that verse? The Gemara answers: He requires the other verse to include a daughter, a tumtum, and a hermaphrodite in the prohibition against cursing a parent.

ותיפוק ליה מאיש איש דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם The Gemara challenges: But let him derive that halakha from the redundant use of “ish ish,” as Rabbi Yoshiya does. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yonatan holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people. The repetition of the term ish is merely a rhetorical flourish commonly employed in speech, and no additional halakhot can be derived from it.

וליתני חומר במכה מבמקלל שהמכה עשה בו שלא בעמך כבעמך משא"כ במקלל קסבר מקשינן הכאה לקללה § The Gemara asks with regard to the mishna: And let the tanna teach a second stringency in the mishna: This is a stringency with regard to one who strikes his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who curses his father, that with regard to one who strikes a parent the Torah deemed the status of striking one who performs actions not of your people to be like that of striking one who performs actions of your people, which is not so with regard to one who curses a parent. The Gemara responds: The tanna of the mishna disagrees and holds that we liken striking to cursing based on the juxtaposition of the verses.

לימא הני תנאי כהני תנאי דתני חדא כותי אתה מצווה על הכאתו ואי אתה מצווה על קללתו ותניא אידך אי אתה מצווה לא על קללתו ולא על הכאתו The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinions of these following tanna’im are parallel to the opinions of those following tanna’im, as it is taught in one baraita: With regard to a Samaritan, you are commanded to refrain from striking him, but you are not commanded to refrain from cursing him. And it is taught in another baraita: You are commanded neither to refrain from cursing him nor to refrain from striking him.

סברוה דכולי עלמא כותים גירי אמת הן מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מקשינן הכאה לקללה ומר סבר לא מקשינן הכאה לקללה It is assumed that everyone, i.e., the tanna of each baraita, agrees that Samaritans are true converts. Since their conversion was sincere, their status is that of a Jew who sinned. Based on that assumption, the Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree about this: That one Sage, the tanna of the second baraita, holds that we liken striking to cursing and the halakha is the same with regard to both, and therefore it is neither prohibited to strike a Samaritan, nor is it prohibited to curse him; and one Sage, the tanna of the first baraita, holds that we do not liken striking to cursing, and there is no prohibition against cursing a sinner, but there is a prohibition against striking him?

לא דכ"ע לא מקשינן הכאה לקללה והכא בהא קמיפלגי מר סבר כותים גירי אמת הן ומר סבר כותים גירי אריות הן The Gemara rejects the parallel between the two tannaitic disputes. No, everyone, i.e., the tanna’im in each baraita, agrees that we do not liken striking to cursing, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, the tanna of the first baraita, holds that Samaritans are true converts and their status is that of a Jew who sinned. Therefore, there is no prohibition against cursing him, but there is a prohibition against striking him. And one Sage, the tanna of the second baraita, holds that Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat of lions (see II Kings, chapter 17) and their conversion was never valid. Therefore, their legal status is that of a gentile and it is neither prohibited to strike a Samaritan nor to curse him.

אי הכי היינו דקתני עלה ושורו כישראל אלא שמע מינה בהיקישא פליגי ש"מ: The Gemara asks: If so, is that consistent with that which is taught with regard to the second baraita: And in terms of damage caused to his ox his status is like that of a Jew? Apparently, even the tanna of the second baraita holds that the conversion of the Samaritans was sincere. Rather, learn from it that the two tanna’im disagree with regard to the juxtaposition of the two prohibitions, as initially suggested; their dispute is not with regard to the status of a Samaritan. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is the crux of their dispute.

מתני' הגונב נפש מישראל אינו חייב עד שיכניסנו לרשותו רבי יהודה אומר עד שיכניסנו לרשותו וישתמש בו שנאמר (דברים כד, ז) והתעמר בו ומכרו הגונב את בנו רבי ישמעאל בנו של ר' יוחנן בן ברוקה מחייב וחכמים פוטרין גנב מי שחציו עבד וחציו בן חורין ר' יהודה מחייב וחכמים פוטרין: MISHNA: One who abducts a Jewish person is not liable to be executed unless he brings the abductee into his domain. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable unless he brings him into his domain and exploits him, as it is stated: “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7). The phrase “exploited him” indicates using him for labor. With regard to one who abducts his own son and sells him, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. If one abducted one who is a half-slave half-freeman, i.e., a Canaanite slave who belonged to two owners and was emancipated by one of them, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

גמ׳ ותנא קמא לא בעי עימור א"ר אחא בריה דרבא עימור פחות משוה פרוטה איכא בינייהו GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And does the first tanna not require exploitation as a condition for liability? The Torah states it explicitly in the verse in Deuteronomy. Rabbi Aḥa, son of Rava, says: The difference between them is in a case of exploitation worth less than the value of one peruta. The first tanna holds that one is liable for any exploitation and there is no minimum value in order to establish liability. Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable only if one derives benefit equal to at least one peruta from his exploitation.

בעי ר' ירמיה גנבו ומכרו ישן מהו מכר אשה לעוברה מהו יש דרך עימור בכך או אין דרך עימור בכך Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one abducted another and sold him while he was asleep, what is the halakha? If one abducted and sold a pregnant woman solely for benefit from her fetus, what is the halakha? Is that a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed or is that not a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed?

ותיפוק ליה דליכא עימור כלל לא צריכא ישן דזגא עליה אשה דאוקמא באפי זיקא דרך עימור בכך או אין דרך עימור בכך מאי תיקו The Gemara asks with regard to the dilemmas raised by Rabbi Yirmeya: But let him derive that the abductor is not liable, as there is no exploitation at all of a sleeping individual or a fetus. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma only with regard to the sleeping individual in a case where one reclines on him, and with regard to the pregnant woman where one stands her in the face of the wind to protect himself from the wind. In those cases, is that a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed or is that not a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed? What is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [teiku] unresolved.

ת"ר (דברים כד, ז) כי ימצא איש גונב נפש מאחיו אין לי אלא איש שגנב אשה מניין ת"ל וגונב איש The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7). I have derived only that a man who abducted another is liable. From where is it derived that a woman who abducts another is liable as well? It is derived from the verse that states: And one who abducts a man, and sells him, if he be found in his hand, he shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:16), where the sex of the abductor is not specified.

אין לי אלא איש שגנב בין אשה ובין איש ואשה שגנבה איש אשה שגנבה אשה מניין ת"ל ומת הגנב ההוא מכל מקום I have derived only that a man who abducted another, whether a man or a woman, is liable, as it is written: “If a man shall be found abducting a person”; the abductor is male but the sex of the abductee is not specified. And I derived that a woman who abducted a man is liable, as it is written: “And one who abducts a man”; the sex of the abductor is not specified but the abductee is male. From where is it derived that a woman who abducted a woman is liable as well? It is derived from the verse that states: “Then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7); the abductor shall die in any case, regardless of the sex of the one who was abducted.

תניא אידך כי ימצא איש גונב נפש מאחיו אחד הגונב את האיש ואחד הגונב את האשה ואחד גר ואחד עבד משוחרר וקטן חייב גנבו ולא מכרו מכרו ועדיין ישנו ברשותו פטור מכרו לאביו או לאחיו או לאחד מן הקרובים חייב הגונב את העבדים פטור It is taught in another baraita that it is written: “If a man is found abducting a person of his brethren,” from which it is derived that whether he abducts a man, or whether he abducts a woman, or whether he abducts a convert, or whether he abducts an emancipated slave or a minor, he is liable. If he abducted another but did not sell him, or if he sold him but he remains in his domain, the abductor is exempt. If he sold him to the father of the abductee, or to his brother, or to one of his other relatives, the abductor is liable. One who abducts slaves is exempt.

Daf 86a

תני תנא קמיה דרב ששת א"ל אני שונה רבי שמעון אומר מאחיו עד שיוציאנו מרשות אחיו ואת אמרת חייב תני פטור A tanna who recited mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall recited that baraita, where the tanna holds that one is liable for abducting another and selling him to the abductee’s father, before Rav Sheshet. Rav Sheshet said to him: I teach that Rabbi Shimon says: From the term “of his brethren” it is derived that there is no liability unless he removes the abductee from the domain of his brethren, and you say that one who sells the abductee to his father is liable? Emend the baraita and teach instead: He is exempt.

מאי קושיא דילמא הא ר"ש הא רבנן The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty raised by Rav Sheshet? Perhaps that statement that he cited is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, while this baraita is the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him.

לא ס"ד דאמר ר' יוחנן סתם מתני' ר' מאיר סתם תוספתא ר' נחמיה סתם ספרא רבי יהודה סתם ספרי ר"ש וכולהו אליבא דר"ע: The Gemara responds: That should not enter your mind, as the unattributed baraita that was cited is a passage from the halakhic midrash on the books of Numbers and Deuteronomy entitled Sifrei, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir; an unattributed baraita in the Tosefta is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya; an unattributed baraita in the Sifra, the halakhic midrash on the book of Leviticus, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; and an unattributed baraita in the Sifrei is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And all of these are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as all the Sages mentioned were his disciples. Therefore, it is unlikely that an unattributed baraita from the Sifrei would run counter to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

הגונב בנו: מאי טעמא דרבנן § The mishna teaches that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to the liability of one who abducts his son. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem him exempt?

אמר אביי דאמר קרא (דברים כד, ז) כי ימצא פרט למצוי Abaye said: It is derived from the verse that states: “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren” (Deuteronomy 24:7), to exclude one who is already found in the custody of the abductor before the abduction. Since the son is already in the custody of his father, the father is not liable for abducting him.

א"ל רב פפא לאביי אלא מעתה (דברים כב, כב) כי ימצא איש שוכב עם אשה בעולת בעל הכי נמי כי ימצא פרט למצוי כגון של בית פלוני דשכיחן גבייהו הכי נמי דפטירי Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If that is so, then the verse: “If a man shall be found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall both of them die” (Deuteronomy 22:22), may also be interpreted: “If a man shall be found,” to exclude one who was already found. So too, would one say that adulterers are exempt from liability if they commit adultery in, for example, the house of so-and-so, where married women are commonly found and they have a preexisting reputation for licentiousness?

א"ל אנא מונמצא בידו קאמינא Abaye said to Rav Pappa: The Rabbis’ opinion is derived from the phrase: “Or if he is found in his possession, he shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:16), from which I am saying my inference, that it is derived: If he is found, to the exclusion of one who was already found.

אמר רבא הלכך הני מיקרי דרדקי ומתנו רבנן כמצויין בידן דמו ופטירי: Rava said: Therefore, with regard to those teachers of children [dardekei] and those who recite mishnayot to Torah scholars, the status of their students is as though they are found in their possession, and the teachers are exempt from liability for abducting them.

גנב מי שחציו וכו': תנן התם רבי יהודה אומר אין לעבדים בושת § The mishna teaches that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to liability if one abducted one who is half-slave half-freeman. We learned in a mishna there (Bava Kamma 87a) that Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no indemnity for the humiliation of a slave, since he is not a full-fledged Jew.

מאי טעמא דר' יהודה אמר קרא (דברים כה, יא) כי ינצו אנשים יחדיו איש ואחיו מי שיש לו אחוה יצא עבד שאין לו אחוה The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is derived from the verse that states: “When men struggle together, a man and his brother, and the wife of the one drew near to deliver her husband from the hand of the one who smites him, and extended her hand, and grabbed his genitals” (Deuteronomy 25:11). This is the source for liability to pay restitution for humiliating another. From the term “his brother” it is derived that one who has brotherhood, i.e., who is halakhically related to his biological family, receives payment for humiliation. A slave is excluded, as he has no brotherhood, i.e., he is not halakhically related to his family.

ורבנן אחיו הוא במצות And what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis? They hold that although the slave has no family ties, he is the brother of the assailant with regard to the fulfillment of mitzvot, as a Canaanite slave is obligated to fulfill the same mitzvot that a woman is obligated to fulfill.

והכא היכי דריש ר' יהודה The Gemara asks: And here, with regard to abduction, how does Rabbi Yehuda interpret the verses and arrive at the conclusion that one is liable for abducting one who is half-slave half-freeman? Shouldn’t the term “from his brethren” render exempt from liability one who abducts a slave?

סבר מאחיו לאפוקי עבדים בני ישראל למעוטי מי שחציו עבד וחציו בן חורין מבני ישראל למעוטי מי שחציו עבד וחציו בן חורין הוי מיעוט אחר מיעוט ואין מיעוט אחר מיעוט אלא לרבות The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the term in the verse: “From his brethren” (Deuteronomy (24:7), serves to exclude from liability one who abducts slaves. Had the verse continued: The children of Israel, that phrase would have been interpreted to exclude from liability one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman. Since the verse states: “From the children of Israel,” the prefix letter mem, meaning from, indicates that there are some from the children of Israel for whose abduction one is liable and there are some for whose abduction one is exempt. That prefix also serves to exclude from liability one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman. Therefore, this is an example of a restriction following a restriction, and there is a hermeneutical principle that a restriction following a restriction serves only to amplify the halakha and to include in the category of those who are liable one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman.

ורבנן מאחיו לאפוקי עבדים לא משמע להו דהא אחיו הוא במצות בני ישראל מבני ישראל חד למעוטי עבד וחד למעוטי מי שחציו עבד וחציו בן חורין And the Rabbis, who deem one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman exempt, how do they interpret the verse? They do not exclude slaves based on the term “from his brethren,” as the slave is the brother of the abductor with regard to the fulfillment of mitzvot. Concerning the expression “children of Israel” and the more expanded expression “from the children of Israel,” one serves to exclude from liability one who abducts slaves, as the slave is not a full-fledged Jew, and one serves to exclude from liability one who abducts one who is half-slave half-freeman.

אזהרה לגונב נפש מנין רבי יאשיה אמר (שמות כ, יב) מלא תגנב רבי יוחנן אמר (ויקרא כה, מב) מלא ימכרו ממכרת עבד ולא פליגי מר קא חשיב לאו דגניבה ומר קא חשיב לאו דמכירה § The Gemara asks: From where is a prohibition against abducting a person derived? Rabbi Yoshiya says that it is derived from the verse: “You shall not steal” (Exodus 20:13). Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is derived from the verse: “They shall not be sold as slaves” (Leviticus 25:42). The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree, as each requires both verses to derive the prohibition. One Sage, Rabbi Yoshiya, enumerates the prohibition against abduction, and one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, enumerates the prohibition against selling the abductee into slavery.

ת"ר (שמות כ, יב) לא תגנוב בגונב נפשות הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בגונב נפשות או אינו אלא בגונב ממון אמרת צא ולמד משלש עשרה מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן דבר הלמד מעניינו במה הכתוב מדבר בנפשות אף כאן בנפשות The Sages taught in a baraita: “You shall not steal” (Exodus 20:13), and it is with regard to one who abducts people that the verse is speaking. Do you say that the verse is speaking with regard to one who abducts people, or perhaps the verse is speaking only with regard to one who steals property? You say: Go out and learn from one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles: A matter derived from its context. With regard to what context are the adjacent prohibitions “You shall not kill; you shall not commit adultery” in the verse speaking? They are speaking with regard to capital cases. So too here, the prohibition is speaking with regard to a capital case of abduction.

תניא אידך (ויקרא יט, יא) לא תגנובו בגונב ממון הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בגונב ממון או אינו אלא בגונב נפשות אמרת צא ולמד משלש עשרה מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן דבר הלמד מעניינו במה הכתוב מדבר בממון אף כאן בממון It is taught in another baraita: “You shall not steal” (Leviticus 19:11), and it is with regard to one who steals property that the verse is speaking. Do you say that the verse is speaking with regard to one who steals property, or perhaps the verse is speaking only with regard to one who abducts people? You say: Go out and learn from one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles: A matter derived from its context. With regard to what context is the subsequent verse: “You shall neither exploit your neighbor nor rob him” (Leviticus 19:13), speaking? It is speaking with regard to property. So too here, the verse is speaking with regard to property.

איתמר עידי גניבה ועידי מכירה בנפש שהוזמו חזקיה אמר אין נהרגין רבי יוחנן אמר נהרגין It was stated: If the witnesses to the abduction and the witnesses to the sale of a person were rendered conspiring witnesses, Ḥizkiyya says: The typical sentence of conspiring witnesses is not implemented and they are not executed. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They are executed.

חזקיה דאמר כר"ע דאמר דבר ולא חצי דבר ורבי יוחנן אמר כרבנן דאמרי דבר ואפי' חצי דבר The Gemara elaborates: It is Ḥizkiyya who said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said one derives from the verse: “On the basis of two witnesses…shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15), that the testimony of witnesses is valid only when they attest to an entire matter, but not to half a matter. Since each pair of witnesses provides testimony concerning only half the transgression for which the perpetrator would be liable, i.e., they each testify to only the abduction or the sale, the testimony of each pair is not valid. Therefore, when they are deemed conspiring witnesses, they are not executed. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says his statement in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that one derives from the verse that the testimony is valid when they testify with regard to an entire matter, and even when they testify with regard to half a matter. Since the testimony of the two pairs of witnesses together constitutes a complete testimony, if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed.

ומודה חזקיה בעדים האחרונים של בן סורר ומורה שהוזמו שנהרגין מתוך שיכולים לומר הראשונים The Gemara notes: And Ḥizkiyya concedes with regard to the final witnesses of a stubborn and rebellious son who were rendered conspiring witnesses that they are executed. A stubborn and rebellious son is executed only if witnesses testified that he engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct and he was flogged, and then a second pair of witnesses testifies that he again engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct. His death sentence is based solely on the testimony of the second pair, as the first witnesses could say:

Daf 86b

להלקותו באנו והני אחריני כולי דבר קא עבדי ליה It is in order to flog him, not to execute him, that we came to court. And these other witnesses, through their testimony, are the ones who did this to him, i.e., they are responsible for the entire matter of his execution, and are therefore liable to be executed for giving conspiring testimony.

מתקיף לה רב פפא אי הכי עידי מכירה נמי ליקטליה מתוך שיכולין עידי גניבה לומר להלקותו באנו וכי תימא דקסבר חזקיה דלא לקי Rav Pappa objects to this: If so, and Ḥizkiyya concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan in the case of the final testimony of the stubborn and rebellious son, let them also execute the witnesses to the sale of one who was abducted, as the witnesses to the abduction could say: It is in order to flog the abductor, not to execute him, that we came to court. And if you would say that Ḥizkiyya holds that one who abducts another and does not sell him is not flogged, that is difficult.

והא איתמר עידי גניבה בנפש שהוזמו חזקיה ורבי יוחנן חד אמר לוקין וחד אמר אין לוקין ואמרינן תסתיים דחזקיה דאמר לוקין מדאמר חזקיה אין נהרגין But wasn’t it stated: With regard to witnesses to the abduction who were rendered conspiring witnesses prior to the testimony of the witnesses to the sale, Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree. One says: They are flogged, and one says: They are not flogged. And we say: It may be concluded that it is Ḥizkiyya who said that they are flogged, from the fact that Ḥizkiyya said: They are not executed.

דאי ר' יוחנן כיון דאמר נהרגין הוה ליה לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד וכל לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד אין לוקין עליו איהו לא לקי אינהו היכי לקו Since if one were to suggest that it is Rabbi Yoḥanan who said that they are flogged, that cannot be. Since he says that conspiring witnesses are executed in this case, it is a prohibition that is given as a warning of liability for a court-imposed death penalty, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that is given as a warning of liability for a court-imposed death penalty, one is not flogged for its violation, even in a case where the transgressor is not executed. The abductor is not flogged. How then could the conspiring witnesses be flogged for testifying against them, as the punishment for conspiring witnesses is identical to the punishment of the one against whom they testified? Rather, it is certain that Ḥizkiyya holds that the conspiring witnesses to the abduction are flogged, and therefore everyone agrees that the conspiring witnesses to the sale are executed.

אלא אמר רב פפא בעידי מכירה דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דנהרגין כי פליגי בעידי גניבה חזקיה אמר אין נהרגין גניבה לחודה קיימא ומכירה לחודה קיימא ר' יוחנן אמר נהרגין גניבה אתחלתא דמכירה היא Rather, Rav Pappa says: The previous explanation is rejected, and instead the dispute must be explained as follows: With regard to the witnesses to the sale of the abductee, it is clear that everyone agrees that they are executed, as theirs is testimony concerning an entire matter and would have led to his execution. When they disagree, it is with regard to the witnesses to the abduction. Ḥizkiyya says: They are not executed, as he holds that abduction stands discrete as an independent prohibition punishable by lashes, and the sale stands discrete as an independent prohibition punishable by strangulation. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They are executed, as the abduction is the beginning of the process that culminates with the sale. The witnesses testifying to the abduction are testifying to a transgression that will culminate with the sale of the abductee.

ומודה רבי יוחנן בעדים הראשונים של בן סורר ומורה שהוזמו שאין נהרגין מתוך שיכולין לומר להלקותו באנו The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes with regard to the initial witnesses concerning a stubborn and rebellious son who testified that he engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct and who were rendered conspiring witnesses that they are not executed, as they could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct, not to execute him for actions that he might perform in the future, that we came to court. Therefore, there is no connection between their testimony and punishment for future actions.

אמר אביי הכל מודים בבן סורר ומורה והכל מודים בבן סורר ומורה ומחלוקת בבן סורר ומורה Abaye said in summary: All concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son, and all concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son, and there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son.

הכל מודים בבן סורר ומורה בעדים הראשונים שאין נהרגין מתוך שיכולין לומר להלקותו באנו The Gemara elaborates: With regard to the initial witnesses, all, even Rabbi Yoḥanan, concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son that they are not executed if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, as they could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct, not to execute him, that we came to court.

והכל מודים בבן סורר ומורה בעדים אחרונים שנהרגים מתוך שעדים הראשונים יכולין לומר להלקותו באנו והני כוליה דבר קא עבדי ליה And with regard to the final witnesses, all, even Ḥizkiyya, concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son that they are executed if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, due to the fact that the initial witnesses could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct that we came to court, and these final witnesses are the ones who did this to him, i.e., they are responsible for the entire matter of his execution and are therefore liable to be executed.

ומחלוקת בבן סורר ומורה שנים אומרים בפנינו גנב ושנים אומרים בפנינו אכל And there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son in a case where two of the final witnesses, who testify after the son was already flogged for engaging in gluttonous and drunken conduct, say: He stole in our presence, and two other witnesses say: He ate in our presence. The dispute is whether the testimony of these two pairs of witnesses is testimony concerning an entire matter or testimony concerning half a matter.

אמר רב אסי עידי מכירה בנפש שהוזמו אין נהרגין מתוך שיכול לומר עבדי מכרתי Rav Asi says: The witnesses to the sale of a person who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, due to the fact that the one against whom they testified could say: Although they testified that I sold an individual, it was my slave that I sold. In that case, the witnesses are not testifying that he violated a capital transgression, as they cannot attest to the fact that the individual he sold was first abducted.

אמר רב יוסף כמאן אזלא הא שמעתא דרב אסי כר"ע דאמר דבר ולא חצי דבר א"ל אביי דאי כרבנן נהרגין הא מתוך קאמר Rav Yosef says: In accordance with whose opinion is that halakha of Rav Asi? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: The testimony of witnesses is valid only when they attest to an entire matter and not to half a matter. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: According to your explanation, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold: The testimony is valid when they testify to an entire matter and even when they testify to half a matter, are the conspiring witnesses executed? Doesn’t Rav Asi say that they are not executed due to the fact that the one against whom they testified could say: Although they testified that I sold an individual, it was my slave that I sold? According to that reasoning, even the Rabbis would concede that they are not executed.

אלא אפילו תימא רבנן ובדלא אתו עידי גניבה אי הכי מאי למימרא לא צריכא דאע"ג דאתו לבסוף Rather, you may even say that Rav Asi’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and it is concerning a case where only witnesses to the sale came to testify and witnesses to the abduction did not come to testify. In that case the accused can avoid punishment; therefore, the conspiring witnesses are not executed. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating that halakha? Obviously, in that case they are not executed, as there is no way to determine that the one he sold is not a slave. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that they are not executed even if witnesses to the abduction ultimately came after the witnesses to the sale had testified and testified that he sold a freeman, not his slave.

ואכתי מאי למימרא לא צריכא דקא מרמזי רמוזי מהו דתימא רמיזא מילתא היא קמ"ל רמיזא לאו כלום הוא: The Gemara asks: But still, what is the purpose of stating that halakha? When the witnesses to the sale testified, their testimony was not sufficient to execute the accused. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach the halakha in a case where they are not executed even where the first and second pairs of witnesses gesture to one another, ostensibly indicating that the conspiring witnesses to the sale were aware that the witnesses to the abduction would follow and that therefore the initial witnesses are part of the conspiracy to testify and execute the accused. And consequently, it is necessary to teach this halakha lest you say: Gesturing is a significant matter, and the legal status of the two testimonies is that of a single testimony. Therefore, Rav Asi teaches us that gesturing is nothing of significance.

מתני׳ זקן ממרא על פי ב"ד שנאמר (דברים יז, ח) כי יפלא ממך דבר למשפט שלשה בתי דינין היו שם אחד יושב על פתח הר הבית ואחד יושב על פתח העזרה ואחד יושב בלשכת הגזית MISHNA: A rebellious elder according to the court, who does not observe the ruling of the court, is executed by strangulation, as it is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment…and you shall arise and ascend unto the place that the Lord your God shall choose…and you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you…and the man that shall do so intentionally, not to listen…and that man shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:8–12). There were three courts there in Jerusalem. One convenes at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one convenes at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, and one convenes in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

באין לזה שעל פתח הר הבית ואומר כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך לימדתי וכך לימדו חבירי אם שמעו אמר להם An elder who issues a ruling contrary to the ruling of his colleagues and his colleagues come to that court that is at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them.

ואם לאו באין להן לאותן שעל פתח עזרה ואומר כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך לימדתי וכך לימדו חבירי אם שמעו אמר להם And if not, they come to those judges who are convened at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, which is a more significant tribunal. And the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them.

ואם לאו אלו ואלו באין לב"ד הגדול שבלשכת הגזית שממנו יוצא תורה לכל ישראל שנאמר (דברים יז, י) מן המקום ההוא אשר יבחר ה' חזר לעירו שנה ולמד בדרך שהיה למד פטור ואם הורה לעשות חייב שנאמר (דברים יז, יב) והאיש אשר יעשה בזדון אינו חייב עד שיורה לעשות And if not, these judges and those judges come to the High Court, the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges that is in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah emerges to the entire Jewish people, as it is stated: “And you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you from that place that the Lord shall choose and you shall observe to perform according to all that they shall teach you” (Deuteronomy 17:10). They are the ultimate arbiters who establish the halakha that is binding. If they ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless, he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed, as it is stated: “And the man that shall do so intentionally not to listen” (Deuteronomy 17:12), meaning that one is not liable unless he instructs others to act.

תלמיד שהורה לעשות פטור נמצא חומרו קולו: A student who is not yet an elder, i.e., he has not been ordained, who instructs others to act contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, is exempt, as a ruling given prior to ordination is not a valid ruling. It follows that his stringency is his leniency. The stringency imposed upon the student that he is not sanctioned to issue rulings results in the leniency that if he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling that is contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is exempt.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן כי יפלא ממך דבר GEMARA: The Sages taught with regard to that which is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between mark and mark, even matters of controversy within your gates, then you shall arise, and ascend to the place that the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 17:8). “If there shall be a matter too hard [yippaleh] for you”;

Daf 87a

במופלא שבב"ד הכתוב מדבר ממך זה יועץ וכן הוא אומר (נחום א, יא) ממך יצא חושב על ה' רעה יועץ בליעל דבר זו הלכה למשפט זה הדין it is with regard to the most distinguished [mufla] member of the court, an ordained, expert judge, that the verse is speaking. “For you [mimmekha]”; this is a reference to an adviser, who is consulted with regard to significant matters, e.g., intercalation of the year; and likewise it says: “From you [mimmekh] he emerged, who devised evil against the Lord, an adviser of wickedness” (Nahum 1:11). “A matter”; this a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. “In judgment”; this is a logical inference, which is one of the hermeneutical principles.

בין דם לדם בין דם נדה דם לידה דם זיבה בין דין לדין בין דיני נפשות דיני ממונות דיני מכות בין נגע לנגע בין נגעי אדם נגעי בתים נגעי בגדים “Between blood and blood”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to the blood of a menstruating woman, the blood of childbirth, and the blood of a gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva]. “Between plea and plea”; this is the ability to discern between cases of capital law and cases of monetary law, with regard to which there are differences in evidence protocols, and laws involving the liability to receive lashes. “Between mark and mark”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to leprous marks of a person, leprous marks on houses, and leprous marks on garments (see Leviticus, chapter 14).

דברי אלו החרמים והערכין וההקדשות ריבות זו השקאת סוטה ועריפת עגלה וטהרת מצורע בשעריך זו לקט שכחה ופאה “Matters of [divrei]”; these are the dedications to God or to a priest, and the valuations of one’s value to the Temple, and the consecrations, all of which are matters of speech [dibbur]. “Controversy”; this is the giving of the bitter waters to a sota (see Numbers, chapter 5), which results from a dispute between husband and wife; and the heifer whose neck is broken, which results from an unresolved murder (Deuteronomy 21:1–9); and the purification of a leper, who is afflicted due to evil speech. “Within your gates”; this is referring to gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of the field [pe’a], all of which are given to the poor who eat at the gates of the city.

וקמת מב"ד ועלית מלמד שבית המקדש גבוה מא"י וא"י גבוה מכל הארצות אל המקום מלמד שהמקום גורם “Then you shall arise” from the court where he sits as a judge. “And ascend”; this teaches that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is higher than all the other lands. Therefore, the language of ascent is employed with regard to travel to Eretz Yisrael. “To the place that the Lord, your God, shall choose”; this teaches that the location that God chose for the Sanhedrin to convene causes their rulings to be authoritative, in the sense here in the mishna that the rebellious elder who instructs others to act contrary to a ruling issued there is liable.

בשלמא בית המקדש גבוה מא"י דכתיב ועלית אלא א"י גבוה מכל הארצות מנא ליה דכתיב (ירמיהו כג, ז) לכן הנה ימים באים נאם ה' (לא יאמר) חי ה' אשר העלה את בני ישראל מארץ מצרים כי אם חי ה' אשר העלה ואשר הביא את זרע בית ישראל מארץ צפונה ומכל הארצות אשר הדחתים שם וישבו על אדמתם The Gemara asks: Granted, the fact that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And ascend.” But from where does the tanna derive the fact that Eretz Yisrael is higher than all the other lands? The Gemara answers that it is derived from this verse, as it is written: “Therefore, behold, the days come, says the Lord, and they will no longer say: As the Lord lives, Who brought up the children of Israel from the land of Egypt; rather, as the Lord lives, Who brought up and led the descendants of the house of Israel from the north country and from all the countries where I had driven them, and they shall dwell upon their land” (Jeremiah 23:7–8). Apparently, coming from other countries to Eretz Yisrael is also characterized as ascent.

תנו רבנן זקן ממרא אינו חייב אלא על דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת דברי ר"מ רבי יהודה אומר על דבר שעיקרו מדברי תורה ופירושו מדברי סופרים ר"ש אומר אפילו דקדוק אחד מדקדוקי סופרים The Sages taught in a baraita: A rebellious elder is liable only for instructing another to perform an action involving a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: One is liable for a matter whose essence is known from the words of the Torah itself and whose explanation is understood from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah. The elder is not liable if the essence of the matter with regard to which he issues his ruling does not appear in the Torah or if the entire matter is written in the Torah. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he differs with regard to one of the minutiae of the scribes in interpreting the Torah, the elder is liable, irrespective of the severity of the transgression.

מאי טעמא דר"מ גמר דבר דבר כתיב הכא (דברים יז, ח) כי יפלא ממך דבר למשפט וכתיב התם (ויקרא ד, יג) ונעלם דבר מעיני הקהל מה להלן דבר שחייב על זדונו כרת ועל שגגתו חטאת אף כאן דבר שחייב על זדונו כרת ועל שגגתו חטאת The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? He derives a verbal analogy between the term matter written here and the term matter that is written elsewhere. Here, matter is written in the verse: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment” (Deuteronomy 17:8), and there, it is written: “And the matter shall be concealed from the eyes of the assembly” (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there, in the verse in Leviticus, the sin-offering of the congregation is brought only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the rebellious elder is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

ור' יהודה (דברים יז, יא) על פי התורה אשר יורוך עד דאיכא תורה ויורוך And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “According to the Torah that they shall instruct you” (Deuteronomy 17:11), indicating that there is no liability until it is a matter that consists of elements of both the Written Torah and in that the Sages shall instruct you in interpretation of the Written Torah.

ור"ש אשר יגידו לך מן המקום ההוא אפילו כל דהו And what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? It is as it is written with regard to the rebellious elder: “That they shall declare unto you from that place” (Deuteronomy 17:10), from which Rabbi Shimon derives that one is liable even if he deviates from the ruling of the Sanhedrin to any degree whatsoever.

א"ל רב הונא בר חיננא לרבא תרגמא לי להא מתניתא אליבא דר"מ א"ל רבא לרב פפא פוק תרגמא ליה Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said to Rava: Interpret for me that baraita, in which the liability of the rebellious elder for rulings in different areas of halakha is derived from the verses, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the rebellious elder is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. How is such a prohibition found in each of the categories enumerated in the baraita? Rava said to Rav Pappa his student: Go and interpret it for him.

כי יפלא במופלא שבב"ד הכתוב מדבר ממך זה יועץ שיודע לעבר שנים ולקבוע חדשים כדתנן הן העידו שמעברים את השנה כל אדר שהיו אומרים עד הפורים Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna: “If there shall be a matter too hard”; there the verse is speaking with regard to the most distinguished member of the court. “For you”; this is referring to an adviser, who knows how to intercalate years and establish months. How is there liability in this matter for karet or a sin-offering? It is as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 7:7): Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappeyas testified that the judges may intercalate the year throughout the entire month of Adar, as the other Sages would say that the judges may do so only until the day of Purim.

דאי להאי גיסא קא שרי חמץ בפסח ואי להאי גיסא קא שרי חמץ בפסח A ruling contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin could result in a matter for which one is liable to receive karet, as, if his disagreement is to this side, e.g., the court intercalated the year and the rebellious elder ruled that the year is not intercalated, his ruling permits consumption of leavened bread on Passover according to the calendar established by the Sanhedrin. And if his disagreement is to that side, e.g., the court did not intercalate the year and the rebellious elder ruled that the year is intercalated, his ruling permits consumption of leavened bread on Passover according to the calendar established by the Sanhedrin. One who intentionally eats leavened bread on Passover is liable to receive karet, and one who does so unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering.

דבר זה הלכה זו הלכות אחד עשר דאיתמר עשירי ר' יוחנן אמר עשירי כתשיעי ור"ש בן לקיש אמר עשירי כאחד עשר “A matter”; this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. This is a matter involving karet in the case of the halakhot of eleven days, which is the minimal number of days between one menstrual period and another, when if a woman experiences a flow of blood on three consecutive days during those eleven days, she assumes the status of a greater zava, with regard to whom there are unique halakhot, e.g., the passage of seven clean days before purification by Torah law. When the woman experiences a discharge of blood for one or two days, she is a lesser zava, and if she observes the third day clean from the discharge of blood she may immerse immediately and she is ritually pure. As it was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of blood on the tenth of those eleven days. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the ninth day, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the eleventh day.

רבי יוחנן אמר עשירי כתשיעי מה תשיעי בעי שימור אף עשירי בעי שימור The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the ninth day: Just as a discharge on the ninth day requires the woman to examine herself the following day and requires the observance of a day clean from discharges, so too does a discharge on the tenth day require observance of a day clean from discharges on the eleventh day before immersing in a ritual bath. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, a woman who experiences a discharge on the tenth day assumes the status of a woman who observes a clean day for one or two days after she experiences a discharge.

ר"ל אמר עשירי כאחד עשר מה אחד עשר לא בעי שימור אף עשירי לא בעי שימור And Reish Lakish says: The status of the tenth day is like that of the eleventh day: Just as a discharge on the eleventh day does not require observance of a day clean from discharge before immersing in a ritual bath, so too does a discharge on the tenth day not require observance of a day clean from discharges on the eleventh day. Even if she were to experience a discharge of blood on the days that follow, the eleventh and the twelfth days, she would not assume the status of a greater zava, as in that case the blood that she saw on the twelfth day would be the blood of menstruation and not the discharge of a zava. According to Reish Lakish, she does not assume that status. Therefore, if the Sanhedrin issued a ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, one who engages in intercourse with that woman before her purification is liable to receive karet. If the rebellious elder issued a ruling in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, then one who intentionally engaged in intercourse with the woman is liable to receive karet. If he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

משפט זה הדין “In judgment”; this is a logical inference, which is one of the hermeneutical principles,

Daf 87b

דין בתו מאנוסתו for example, the halakha of the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter born from the victim of his rape.

דאמר רבא א"ל רב יצחק בר אבודימי אתיא הנה הנה As Rava says: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi said to me: This prohibition is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word henna, in the verse: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, even their nakedness you shall not uncover; for theirs [henna] is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), and the word henna in a different verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness: They [henna] are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). This verbal analogy indicates that just as intercourse with one’s granddaughter and with one’s wife’s daughter or granddaughter is forbidden, so too, intercourse with one’s daughter is prohibited.

אתיא זימה זימה Furthermore, it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word “lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17) and the word “lewdness” in the verse: “And if a man take with his wife also her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire, both he and they, so that there be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14), that one who engages in sexual intercourse with his daughter or granddaughter is liable to be executed by burning.

בין דם לדם בין דם נדה דם לידה דם זיבה דם נדה בפלוגתא עקביא בן מהללאל ורבנן דתנן דם הירוק עקביא בן מהללאל מטמא וחכמים מטהרין “Between blood and blood”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to the blood of menstruation, the blood of childbirth, and the blood of a gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva]. In each of these cases, there is a dispute between the Sages with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet. In the case of the blood of menstruation, it is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nidda 19a): With regard to blood that is green that is discharged by a woman, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems it blood of menstruation and impure, and the Rabbis deem it pure. According to Akavya ben Mahalalel, one who engages in intercourse with a woman who discharged green blood is liable to receive karet, while according to the Rabbis, he is exempt.

דם לידה בפלוגתא דרב ולוי דאתמר רב אמר מעין אחד הוא התורה טימאתו והתורה טיהרתו In the case of the blood of childbirth, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rav and Levi. This is as it was stated that Rav says: Blood that a woman discharges after childbirth is all from one source; the Torah deemed ritually impure the blood discharged for one week after the birth of a male and two weeks after the birth of a female, and the Torah deemed ritually pure the blood that is discharged for the subsequent thirty-three days for a male and sixty-six days for a female. Even if the blood flows continuously, the status of the blood changes after the conclusion of the period of impurity.

ולוי אמר שני מעיינות הן נסתם הטמא נפתח הטהור נסתם הטהור נפתח הטמא: And Levi says: It is from two sources; the impure source is sealed after one week for a male and two weeks for a female, and then the pure source is opened, and at the conclusion of the period of the discharge of pure blood, the pure source is sealed and the impure source is opened. Only if the flow of impure blood ceases is a subsequent discharge deemed pure. Therefore, if one engaged in intercourse with a woman who experienced a continuous flow of blood beyond the time of the conclusion of the period of the flow of pure blood, according to Levi, he is liable to receive karet, and according to Rav, he is exempt.

דם זיבה בפלוגתא דר"א ורבי יהושע דתנן קישתה שלשה ימים בתוך אחד עשר יום אם שפתה מעת לעת וילדה הרי זו יולדת בזוב דברי ר"א In the case of the blood of ziva, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned in a mishna (Nidda 36b): In a case where a woman experienced labor pain accompanied by an emission of blood lasting three consecutive days within the eleven days between the periods when her emissions render her a menstruating woman, during which the emission of blood renders the woman a zava, if she ceased experiencing labor for a twenty-four-hour period, indicating that the blood was not the result of imminent birth, and then she gave birth, that woman gives birth as a zava and is liable to bring the purification offerings of both a woman after childbirth and a zava; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

ור' יהושע אומר לילה ויום כלילי שבת ויומו ששפתה מן הצער ולא מן הדם The mishna continues: And Rabbi Yehoshua says: That is her status only if she ceased experiencing labor for a twenty-four-hour period that is a night and the day that follows, like Shabbat evening and the day that follows it. When the mishna says that she ceased, it is referring to a case where she ceased from having labor pains and not from having the flow of blood. The dispute is whether the woman who gave birth has the status of a zava, who is required to count seven clean days before immersing in flowing water, or whether she has the status of a woman after childbirth. If the two weeks of the blood of impurity after childbirth elapsed and she did not immerse in flowing water, according to Rabbi Eliezer, she remains a zava, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, at that point the blood becomes the blood of purity, and one who engages in intercourse with her is not liable to receive karet.

בין דין לדין בין דיני ממונות דיני נפשות דיני מכות דיני ממונות בפלוגתא דשמואל ורבי אבהו דאמר שמואל שנים שדנו דיניהם דין אלא שנקראין בית דין חצוף ורבי אבהו אמר לדברי הכל אין דיניהן דין “Between plea and plea”; this is the ability to discern between cases of capital law, cases of monetary law, and cases of laws involving lashes. The Gemara elaborates: In cases of monetary law, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu, as Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who sat in judgment and issued a ruling in cases of monetary law, their ruling is a valid ruling, but they are characterized as an impudent court. And Rabbi Abbahu says: Everyone agrees that their ruling is not a valid ruling. If a tribunal of two judges rules that one of the litigants must pay the other money, and that litigant uses the money to betroth a woman, according to Shmuel she is betrothed, and one who intentionally engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Abbahu she is not betrothed, and one who engages in intercourse with her is not liable.

דיני נפשות בפלוגתא דרבי ורבנן דתניא רבי אומר (שמות כא, כג) ונתת נפש תחת נפש ממון In cases of capital law, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says with regard to that which is written: “If men struggle and they hurt a pregnant woman…and if there shall be a tragedy you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:22–23), the reference is to a monetary payment for the life that he took. The tragedy referenced is the unintentional killing of the mother.

אתה אומר ממון או אינו אלא נפש ממש נאמר נתינה למעלה ונאמר נתינה למטה מה להלן ממון אף כאן ממון The tanna deliberates: Do you say that the reference is to a monetary payment, or perhaps the reference is only to giving his actual life? Based on the language employed in the verse, it can be determined that the reference is to monetary payment. In these verses, giving is stated above: “And you shall give a life for a life,” and giving is stated below: “He shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:23). Just as there, in the phrase “Give as the judges determine,” the reference is to monetary payment, so too here, in the phrase “Give a life for a life,” the reference is to monetary payment. The Rabbis hold that the reference is to giving his actual life. If an heir of the victim betrothed a woman with money seized from the assailant, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the woman is betrothed, while according to the Rabbis she is not betrothed.

דיני מכות בפלוגתא דרבי ישמעאל ורבנן דתנן מכות בג' משום רבי ישמעאל אמרו בכ"ג In cases of laws involving lashes, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (2a): Cases concerning the violation of prohibitions that render one liable to receive lashes are adjudicated by three judges. The Sages stated in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Cases concerning lashes are adjudicated by twenty-three judges. According to Rabbi Yishmael, if a tribunal of three sentences an individual to lashes, that individual can claim damages for any injury caused as a result of the lashes, and if he betroths a woman with that money the betrothal is valid. According to the Rabbis, he cannot claim damages, as the court is authorized to sentence him to receive lashes.

בין נגע לנגע בין נגעי אדם נגעי בתים נגעי בגדים “Between mark and mark”; this is the ability to discern between the disparate halakhot relevant to leprous marks of a person, leprous marks on houses, and leprous marks on garments.

נגעי אדם בפלוגתא דרבי יהושע ורבנן דתנן אם בהרת קדם לשער הלבן טמא אם שער לבן קדם לבהרת טהור ספק טמא רבי יהושע אומר כהה מאי כהה אמר רבא כהה טהור In the case of leprous marks of a person, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 4:11): If the snow-white leprous mark [baheret] preceded the white hair, the individual is impure with leprosy, as that is the order of events that appears in the Torah, and if the white hair preceded the baheret, the individual is pure. If there is uncertainty concerning which appeared first, the Rabbis say: He is impure, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It has darkened. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: It has darkened? Rava says: Its status is like that of a baheret that darkened, with regard to which the Torah says that he is pure. If one with a baheret and a white hair entered the Temple, and there is uncertainty concerning which appeared first, according to the Rabbis he is liable to receive karet, and according to Rabbi Yehoshua he is not liable.

נגעי בתים בפלוגתא דרבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון ורבנן דתנן רבי אליעזר ברבי שמעון אומר לעולם אין הבית טמא עד שיראה כשני גריסין על שתי אבנים בשתי כתלים בקרן זוית ארכו כשני גריסין ורחבו כגריס In the case of leprous marks of houses, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 12:3): Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: A house is never deemed impure with leprosy unless the leprous mark will be seen to be the size of two Cilician beans, on two stones, on two walls, in a corner between two walls. The length of the mark is that of two Cilician beans and its width is that of one Cilician bean.

מאי טעמא דר' אלעזר בר"ש כתיב קיר וכתיב קירות איזהו קיר שהוא כקירות הוי אומר זה קרן זוית The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara answers: The word wall is written in the verse and the word walls is written in the same verse: And he shall see the leprous mark…in the walls of the house with hollow streaks, greenish or reddish, and their appearance is lower than the wall” (Leviticus 14:37). Which is one wall that is like multiple walls? You must say: This is a corner between two walls. The Rabbis hold that it is a leprous house even if the mark appears on one wall. Therefore, one who entered a house with a leprous mark on one wall and then entered the Temple is liable to receive karet according to the Rabbis; according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, he is not liable.

נגעי בגדים בפלוגתא דר' (יונתן) בן אבטולמוס ורבנן דתניא ר' (יונתן) בן אבטולמוס אומר מנין In the case of leprous marks on garments, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos says: From where is it derived

Daf 88a

לפריחה בבגדים שהיא טהורה with regard to a case where there is a spread of leprosy in garments that culminates with the garment’s being completely covered with leprous marks that the garment is pure, just as it is with regard to leprosy of a person?

נאמרה קרחת וגבחת באדם ונאמרה קרחת וגבחת בבגדים מה להלן פרח בכולו טהור אף כאן פרח בכולו טהור Karaḥat and gabbaḥat are stated with regard to leprosy of a person (see Leviticus 13:42), in the sense of baldness on the back of one’s head and forehead, and karaḥat and gabbaḥat are stated with regard to leprosy of garments (see Leviticus 13:55), in the sense of the newer and the older sections of the garment. Just as there, with regard to leprosy of a person, if the leprosy spread to his entire body he is pure, so too here, with regard to leprosy of garments, if the leprosy spread to the entire garment it is pure. The Rabbis disagree and hold that even if the leprosy spreads, the garment remains impure. Therefore, if one touches the garment throughout which the leprosy spread and enters the Temple, according to the Rabbis, he is liable to receive karet, while according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos, he is not liable.

דברי אלו הערכין והחרמים והקדישות הערכין בפלוגתא דר"מ ורבנן דתנן המעריך פחות מבן חדש ר"מ אומר נותן דמיו וחכמים אומרים לא אמר כלום “Matters of”; these are the valuations, and the dedications, and the consecrations. The Gemara elaborates: In the case of valuations, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, as we learned in a baraita: In the case of one who valuates a child less than one month old, for whom the Torah does not specify a value, Rabbi Meir says: He gives the monetary value of the child, as it is apparent that his intent was to give a donation, not a valuation. And the Rabbis say: He did not say anything. If the money is consecrated and one betrothed a woman with it, she is not betrothed, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet.

החרמים בפלוגתא דרבי יהודה בן בתירה ורבנן דתנן ר' יהודה בן בתירה אומר סתם חרמים לבדק הבית שנאמר (ויקרא כז, כח) כל חרם קדש קדשים הוא לה' In the case of dedications, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 28b): Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Dedications dedicated without specification of their purpose are designated for Temple maintenance, as it is stated: “Every dedicated item is most sacred unto the Lord” (Leviticus 27:28).

וחכמים אומרים סתם חרמים לכהן שנאמר (ויקרא כז, כא) כשדה החרם לכהן תהיה אחוזתו אם כן מה תלמוד לומר קדש קדשים הוא לה' שחל על קדשי קדשים ועל קדשים קלים And the Rabbis say: Dedications dedicated without specification of their purpose are designated for the priest, as it is stated with regard to one who consecrated a field and did not redeem it: “As a field dedicated; to the priest shall be its possession” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why must the verse state: “Every dedicated item is most sacred unto the Lord”? It is to teach that dedication takes effect on offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity. According to the Rabbis, the property is not consecrated, and if a woman is betrothed with that property, the betrothal takes effect, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, the property is consecrated and he is not liable.

הקדשות בפלוגתא דרבי אליעזר בן יעקב ורבנן דתניא ר' אליעזר בן יעקב אומר אפילו צינורא של הקדש צריכה עשרה בני אדם לפדותה In the case of consecrations, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Even a small fork that is consecrated property requires a court consisting of ten people in order to redeem it. The Rabbis say: A court of three judges is sufficient. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, if it is redeemed before a court of three, the property remains consecrated. According to the Rabbis, the property is not consecrated, and if a woman is betrothed with that property, the betrothal takes effect, and one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive karet. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, the property is consecrated and he is not liable.

ריבות זה השקאת סוטה ועריפת העגלה וטהרת מצורע השקאת סוטה בפלוגתא דרבי אליעזר ור' יהושע דתנן המקנא לאשתו ר"א אומר מקנא על פי שנים ומשקה על פי עד אחד או על פי עצמו “Disputes”; this is the giving of the bitter waters to a sota to drink, and the heifer whose neck is broken, and the purification of a leper. In the case of giving the bitter waters to a sota to drink, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (Sota 2a): With regard to one who issues a warning to his wife not to seclude herself with a particular man, Rabbi Eliezer says: He issues a warning to her based on the presence of two witnesses; only then is the warning effective. And the husband gives her the bitter waters based on the testimony of one witness who saw the seclusion, or even based on his own testimony.

ר' יהושע אומר מקנא על פי שנים ומשקה על פי שנים Rabbi Yehoshua says: He both issues a warning to her based on the presence of two witnesses and gives her the bitter waters to drink based on the testimony of two witnesses to the seclusion. If the seclusion took place in the presence of one witness, according to Rabbi Eliezer, she is a sota and not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, she is not a sota and she is entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract. The difference is whether the money of her marriage contract is hers. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if she gave that money to another who betrothed a woman with it, it is a betrothal with stolen property and the woman is not betrothed. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, the betrothal would not take effect.

עריפת עגלה בפלוגתא דרבי אליעזר ורבי עקיבא דתנן מאין היו מודדין רבי אליעזר אומר מטיבורו ר' עקיבא אומר מחוטמו ר' אליעזר בן יעקב אומר ממקום שנעשה חלל מצוארו In the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, as we learned in a mishna (Sota 45b): From where on the body of the murder victim would they measure the distance to determine which city is closest? Rabbi Eliezer says: From his navel. Rabbi Akiva says: From his nose. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From the place where he became a slain person, which is from his neck. According to all of these tanna’im, if the corpse was measured from a place on the body other than the place prescribed, the heifer is not consecrated for its purpose. According to Rabbi Akiva, if the measurement was taken from his navel, the heifer is not consecrated for its purpose, while according to Rabbi Eliezer, it is consecrated for its purpose. This has clear ramifications with regard to a situation in which one attempts to betroth a woman with that heifer.

טהרת מצורע בפלוגתא דר' שמעון ורבנן דתנן אין לו בהן יד בהן רגל אוזן ימנית אין לו טהרה עולמית ר' אליעזר אומר נותן לו על מקומו ויוצא רבי שמעון אומר נותן על של שמאל ויוצא In the case of the purification of a leper, the dispute concern-ing such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 14:9): If a leper does not have a thumb, or a big toe, or a right ear upon which the Torah says that blood and oil must be placed as part of the purification process for a leper, he has no possibility of purification forever. Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest places the blood and oil for him on its place, i.e., where those body parts would have been if they were intact, and he fulfills his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: The priest places the blood and oil on his left thumb, toe, and ear, and he fulfills his obligation. Both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon maintain that it is possible to purify such a leper, who would then not be liable to be punished with karet if he were to enter the Temple. The Rabbis, who maintain that such a leper has no possibility of purification, hold that if he enters the Temple he is liable to be punished with karet.

בשעריך זה לקט שכחה פיאה לקט דתנן שני שבלין לקט שלשה אינן לקט שכחה שני עומרין שכחה שלשה אינן שכחה “In your gates”; this is gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce in the corner of the field [pe’a]. In the case of gleanings, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is as we learned in a mishna (Pe’a 6:5): Two stalks that were not cut with the sheaves and are then found in a field by a poor person are gleanings and belong to the poor person. Three stalks are not gleanings and the owner of the field can take them, if he chooses. In the case of forgotten sheaves, the same mishna teaches that if he forgot two sheaves, they are forgotten sheaves and belong to the poor, whereas three or more bundles are not forgotten sheaves and belong to the owner of the field.

ועל כולן ב"ש אומרים שלש לעני וארבע לבעל הבית And with regard to all of them, Beit Shammai say: If there are three, it belongs to the poor person, and if there are four, it belongs to the owner. According to Beit Hillel, if a poor person took three stalks or sheaves, they do not belong to him, and if he betrothed a woman with them, the betrothal does not take effect. According to Beit Shammai, she is betrothed.

פיאה בפלוגתא דר' ישמעאל ורבנן דתנן מצות פיאה להפריש מן הקמה לא הפריש מן הקמה יפריש מן העומרין לא הפריש מן העומרין יפריש מן הכרי עד שלא מירחו מירחו מעשר ונותן לו In the case of pe’a, the dispute concerning such a prohibition is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis, as we learned in a baraita: The mitzva of pe’a is to designate it from the standing grain still growing from the ground. If he did not designate it from the standing grain, but reaped the entire field, he designates a portion from the sheaves as pe’a. If he did not designate it from the sheaves, he designates it from the pile where one places the kernels after threshing, before he smooths the pile, at which point the produce is considered grain from which one is obligated to take terumot and tithes. If he already smoothed the pile before designating the pe’a, he tithes the grain in the pile and then gives the pe’a to the poor. If he ground the kernels into flour, he no longer designates pe’a.

משום רבי ישמעאל אמרו אף מפריש מן העיסה: In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said: One designates pe’a even from the dough. If a poor person takes pe’a from the dough and betroths a woman with the dough, according to the Rabbis the betrothal does not take effect, while according to Rabbi Yishmael, she is betrothed.

ג' בתי דינין וכו': אמר רב כהנא הוא אומר מפי השמועה והן אומרין מפי השמועה אינו נהרג § The mishna teaches: There were three courts there in Jerusalem. The mishna then details the procedure followed when a rebellious elder appeared before these courts. Rav Kahana says: If the rebellious elder says his ruling on the basis of the tradition he received from his teacher, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition they received from their teachers, the rebellious elder is not executed, because there is a legitimate basis for his ruling.

הוא אומר כך הוא בעיני והן אומרין כך הוא בעינינו אינו נהרג וכל שכן הוא אומר מפי השמועה והן אומרין כך הוא בעינינו אינו נהרג עד שיאמר כך הוא בעיני והן אומרים מפי השמועה תדע שהרי לא הרגו את עקביא בן מהללאל If the rebellious elder says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and does not claim that his ruling is based on tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is not executed. And all the more so if he says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is not executed. He is not executed unless he flouts tradition on the basis of his understanding and says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition. Know that this is so, as Akavya ben Mahalalel was not executed despite the fact that he ruled contrary to the consensus ruling of his contemporaries, because he based his ruling on a tradition that he received.

ור' אלעזר אומר אפילו הוא אומר מפי השמועה והן אומרין כך הוא בעינינו נהרג כדי שלא ירבו מחלוקות בישראל ואם תאמר מפני מה לא הרגו את עקביא בן מהללאל מפני שלא הורה הלכה למעשה And Rabbi Elazar says: Even if the rebellious elder says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes, he is executed, so that discord will not proliferate among Israel and to ensure that there will be a standard halakhic ruling. And if you say: For what reason was Akavya ben Mahalalel not executed? It is due to the fact that he did not issue his ruling as practical halakha; he merely claimed that his understanding was correct in theory, which is always permitted.

תנן כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך למדתי וכך למדו חבירי מאי לאו דהוא אמר מפי השמועה והם אומרין כך הוא בעינינו לא הוא אומר כך הוא בעיני והם אומרים מפי השמועה We learned in the mishna that the rebellious elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. The Gemara asks: What, is it not including a case where he says his ruling on the basis of the tradition, and the members of the court say: This is the correct understanding in our eyes? The Gemara rejects this: No, the reference is to a case where he says: This is the correct understanding in my eyes, and the members of the court say their ruling on the basis of the tradition.

ת"ש דאמר רבי יאשיה שלשה דברים סח לי זעירא מאנשי ירושלים בעל שמחל על קינויו קינויו מחול Come and hear proof from that which Rabbi Yoshiya says: There are three matters that Zeira, one of the residents of Jerusalem, said to me: The first is that in the case of a husband who, after warning his wife not to enter into seclusion with a certain man, retracted his warning, his warning is retracted, and if she enters into seclusion with that man, she is not rendered forbidden to her husband.

Daf 88b

בן סורר ומורה שרצו אביו ואמו למחול לו מוחלין לו The second matter is that in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son whose father and mother sought to forgive him for his gluttonous and drunken conduct and decided not to bring him to court, they can forgive him.

זקן ממרא שרצו בית דינו למחול לו מוחלין לו וכשבאתי אצל חבירי שבדרום על שנים הודו לי על זקן ממרא לא הודו לי כדי שלא ירבו מחלוקת בישראל תיובתא The third is that in the case of a rebellious elder whom his court sought to forgive for his deviation from their ruling, they can forgive him. And when I came to my colleagues in the South, with regard to two of the cases they agreed with me, but with regard to a rebellious elder they did not agree with me, so that discord would not proliferate in Israel. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Kahana.

תניא אמר רבי יוסי מתחילה לא היו מרבין מחלוקת בישראל אלא בית דין של שבעים ואחד יושבין בלשכת הגזית ושני בתי דינין של עשרים ושלשה אחד יושב על פתח הר הבית ואחד יושב על פתח העזרה ושאר בתי דינין של עשרים ושלשה יושבין בכל עיירות ישראל It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei said: Initially, discord would not proliferate among Israel. Rather, the court of seventy-one judges would sit in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. And there were two additional courts each consisting of twenty-three judges; one would convene at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one would convene at the entrance to the Temple courtyard. And all the other courts consisting of twenty-three judges would convene in all cities inhabited by the Jewish people.

הוצרך הדבר לשאול שואלין מבית דין שבעירן אם שמעו אמרו להן ואם לאו באין לזה שסמוך לעירן אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו באין לזה שעל פתח הר הבית אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו באין לזה שעל פתח העזרה If the matter was unclear and it was necessary to ask and clarify it, those uncertain of the halakha would ask the court that is in their city. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to a court that is adjacent to their city. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to the court at the entrance to the Temple Mount. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, they would come to the court at the entrance to the Temple courtyard.

ואומר כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך למדתי וכך למדו חבירי אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו אלו ואלו באין ללשכת הגזית ששם יושבין מתמיד של שחר עד תמיד של בין הערבים And the elder whose ruling deviated from the ruling of his colleagues says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they said it to them, and if not, these judges and those judges would come to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, where the Sanhedrin would be convened from the time that the daily morning offering is sacrificed until the time that the daily afternoon offering is sacrificed.

ובשבתות ובימים טובים יושבין בחיל נשאלה שאלה בפניהם אם שמעו אמרו להם ואם לאו עומדין למנין רבו המטמאים טמאו רבו המטהרין טהרו And on Shabbatot and Festivals, when court is not in session, the members of the court would sit at the rampart. When a question was asked before them, if the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling with regard to that matter, they would say it to them, and if not they would stand for a vote on the matter. If the judges who deemed the item in question ritually impure outnumbered those who deemed it pure, the court would deem the item impure. If the judges who deemed the item in question ritually pure outnumbered those who deemed it impure, the court would deem the item pure.

משרבו תלמידי שמאי והלל שלא שמשו כל צרכן רבו מחלוקת בישראל ונעשית תורה כשתי תורות From the time that the disciples of Shammai and Hillel grew in number, and they were disciples who did not attend to their masters to the requisite degree, dispute proliferated among the Jewish people and the Torah became like two Torahs. Two disparate systems of halakha developed, and there was no longer a halakhic consensus with regard to every matter.

משם כותבין ושולחין בכל מקומות כל מי שהוא חכם ושפל ברך ודעת הבריות נוחה הימנו יהא דיין בעירו משם מעלין אותו להר הבית משם לעזרה משם ללשכת הגזית The baraita continues its discussion of the workings of the Sanhedrin: From there, the Sanhedrin writes and dispatches the following statement to all places: Anyone who is wise and humble and the minds of people are at ease with him shall be a judge in his city. If he is successful in his city, from there, they promote him to the court at the entrance to the Temple Mount if there is a vacant seat on the court, and from there they promote him to the court at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, and from there to the court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

שלחו מתם איזהו בן העולם הבא ענוותן ושפל ברך שייף עייל שייף ונפיק וגריס באורייתא תדירא ולא מחזיק טיבותא לנפשיה יהבו ביה רבנן עינייהון ברב עולא בר אבא: Apropos the appointment of judges, the Gemara relates that they sent the following statement from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael: Who is the one destined to receive a place in the World-to-Come? It is one who is modest and humble, who bows and enters and bows and exits, and who studies Torah regularly, and who does not take credit for himself. The Sages cast their eyes on Rav Ulla bar Abba, as they perceived him as the embodiment of all these characteristics.

חזר לעירו ושנה: ת"ר אינו חייב עד שיעשה כהוראתו או שיורה לאחרים ויעשו כהוראתו The mishna teaches: If the rebellious elder returned to his city and he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment, unless he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling. The Sages taught: He is not liable unless he acts in accordance with his ruling, or he instructs others and they act in accordance with his ruling.

בשלמא יורה לאחרים ויעשו כהוראתו מעיקרא לאו בר קטלא הוא והשתא בר קטלא הוא אלא שיעשה כהוראתו מעיקרא נמי בר קטלא הוא התינח היכא דאורי בחלב ודם דמעיקרא לאו בר קטלא הוא והשתא בר קטלא הוא אלא היכא דאורי בחייבי מיתות ב"ד מעיקרא נמי בר קטלא הוא The Gemara challenges: Granted, if he instructs others and they act in accordance with his ruling there is a novel element in the fact that he is liable to be executed, as initially, before he was deemed a rebellious elder, he is not liable to receive the death penalty for instructing others to perform the transgression, and now, he is to receive the death penalty. But if he acts in accordance with his ruling, initially, before he was deemed a rebellious elder, he is also liable to receive the death penalty for performing that action. The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: This works out well in a case where he ruled with regard to forbidden fat and blood, as initially he would not have been liable to receive the death penalty; rather, he would have been liable to receive karet, and now he is liable to receive the death penalty. But in a case where he ruled with regard to a transgression for which one is liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, initially, he is also liable to receive the death penalty.

מעיקרא בעי התראה השתא לא בעי התראה The Gemara explains: There is a novel element even in a case where he acts in accordance with his ruling, as initially, before he is deemed a rebellious elder, he requires forewarning in order to be executed; now, he does not require forewarning in order to be executed.

מסית דלא בעי התראה מאי איכא למימר מעיקרא אי אמר טעמא מקבלינן מיניה השתא אי אמר טעמא לא מקבלינן מיניה: The Gemara asks: If the rebellious elder’s ruling was with regard to one who instigates others to engage in idol worship, who does not require forewarning, what is there to say? Both before and after he is deemed a rebellious elder he is executed without forewarning. The Gemara answers: Initially, before the rebellious elder ruled that instigating others to engage in idol worship is permitted, if after he instigated others, he stated a reason why he thought that it is permitted, we accept his explanation from him and exempt him. Now, after he issued the divergent ruling, if he stated a reason, we do not accept the explanation from him, since he already indicated that he holds that instigating others to engage in idol worship incitement is permitted and that is the reason that he engaged in instigation.

מתני׳ חומר בדברי סופרים מבדברי תורה האומר אין תפילין כדי לעבור על ד"ת פטור חמש טוטפות להוסיף על דברי סופרים חייב: MISHNA: With regard to the rulings of the rebellious elder the mishna states: There is greater stringency with regard to traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah than with regard to matters of Torah. If one states: There is no mitzva to don phylacteries, and his intention is in order to have others violate matters of Torah, he is exempt from punishment as a rebellious elder. One who disputes matters written explicitly in the Torah is not considered an elder and a Torah scholar, and therefore does not assume the status of a rebellious elder. If, however, he disputed a matter based on rabbinic tradition, e.g., he stated that there should be five compartments in the phylacteries of the head, in order to add an extra compartment to the four established according to traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah, he is liable.

גמ׳ אמר ר' אלעזר אמר ר' אושעיא אינו חייב אלא על דבר שעיקרו מדברי תורה ופירושו מדברי סופרים ויש בו להוסיף ואם הוסיף גורע ואין לנו אלא תפילין אליבא דרבי יהודה GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: One is liable only for issuing a ruling with regard to a matter whose essence, whose basic obligation, is from matters of Torah and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah and which includes the possibility to add to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation. And we have only the mitzva to don phylacteries that meets those criteria. And Rabbi Oshaya’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A rebellious elder is liable only for a matter whose essence is from matters of Torah and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations of the Torah.

והאיכא לולב דעיקרו מדברי תורה ופירושו מדברי סופרים ויש בו להוסיף ואם הוסיף גורע The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the mitzva of lulav and the other species that one takes on the festival of Sukkot, whose essence is from matters of Torah, and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations that establish the identity and the number of the four species enumerated in the Torah, and which includes the possibility to add other species to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation?

בלולב מאי סבירא לן אי סבירא לן דלולב אין צריך אגד האי לחודיה קאי והאי לחודיה קאי ואי סבירא לן דצריך אגד גרוע ועומד הוא The Gemara rejects this possibility: That is not the case, as with regard to the mitzva of lulav, what do we hold? If we hold that fundamentally a lulav does not require binding of the species together in order to fulfill the mitzva, then adding an additional species is inconsequential, as these species with which he fulfills the mitzva stand alone and that additional species stands alone. It is as though he were holding the species of the mitzva and an additional unrelated item that does not affect fulfillment of the mitzva. And if we hold that a lulav requires binding of the four species together in order to fulfill the mitzva, fulfillment of the mitzva is already compromised from the outset. The rebellious elder is liable only when the object of the mitzva was as it should be and the addition compromised that object and disqualifies it. In this case, the object was never as it should be.

והאיכא ציצית דעיקרו מדברי תורה ופירושו מדברי סופרים ויש בו להוסיף ואם הוסיף גורע The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the mitzva of ritual fringes, whose essence is from matters of Torah, and whose explanation is from traditional rabbinic interpretations that establish the number of fringes enumerated in the Torah and the number of threads in each fringe, and which includes the possibility to add fringes or threads to it, and if one added to it, one compromises his fulfillment of the mitzva and does not satisfy his obligation?

בציצית מאי סבירא לן אי סבירא לן דקשר העליון לאו דאורייתא האי לחודיה קאי והאי לחודיה קאי ואי סבירא לן The Gemara rejects this possibility: That is not the case, as with regard to ritual fringes, what do we hold? If we hold that the upper knot is not mandated by Torah law, and one fulfills his obligation by placing the threads on the corner of the garment, these threads with which he fulfills the mitzva are independent and that additional thread is independent and does not compromise fulfillment of the mitzva. The additional string is not considered as joined to the required strings. And if we hold

Daf 89a

דקשר העליון דאורייתא גרוע ועומד that the upper knot is mandated by Torah law, then fulfillment of the mitzva is already compromised from the outset when the additional string is tied together with the other threads.

אי הכי תפילין נמי אי עביד ארבעה בתי ואייתי אחרינא ואנח גבייהו האי לחודיה קאי והאי לחודיה קאי ואי עביד חמשה בתי גרוע ועומד הוא האמר ר' זירא בית חיצון שאינו רואה את האויר פסול: The Gemara challenges: If so, the status of phylacteries is also the same. If one crafts phylacteries of the head with four compartments, and he then brings another compartment and places it alongside them, these compartments with which he fulfills the mitzva stand alone and that additional compartment stands alone and does not compromise the fulfillment of the mitzva. And if one crafts phylacteries of the head with five compartments, the fulfillment of the mitzva is already compromised from the outset. The Gemara answers: But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say: If there is an obstruction which creates an outer compartment of the phylacteries of the head that is not exposed to the air, the phylacteries of the head are unfit for use in the fulfillment of the mitzva? Therefore, adding a fifth compartment to the four compartments of the phylacteries of the head always compromises the fulfillment of the mitzva.

מתני׳ אין ממיתין אותו לא בבית דין שבעירו ולא בבית דין שביבנה אלא מעלין אותו לבית דין הגדול שבירושלים ומשמרין אותו עד הרגל וממיתין אותו ברגל שנאמר (דברים יז, יג) וכל העם ישמעו ויראו ולא יזידון עוד דברי ר' עקיבא ר' יהודה אומר אין מענין את דינו של זה אלא ממיתין אותו מיד וכותבין ושולחין שלוחין בכל המקומות איש פלוני מתחייב מיתה בבית דין: MISHNA: One does not execute the rebellious elder, neither in the court that is in his city, nor in the court that is in Yavne, although that was the seat of the Sanhedrin after the destruction of the Second Temple. Rather, one takes him up to the High Court in Jerusalem. And they guard him in incarceration until the pilgrimage Festival, and the court executes him during the pilgrimage Festival, as it is stated: “And all the nation shall hear, and fear, and no longer sin intentionally” (Deuteronomy 17:13); this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not delay administering justice to this individual. Rather, the court executes him immediately, and the judges write reports and dispatch agents to all the places, informing them: So-and-so is liable to be punished with the court-imposed death penalty for disobeying the court.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן אין ממיתין אותו לא בבית דין שבעירו ולא בבית דין שביבנה אלא מעלין אותו לב"ד הגדול שבירושלים ומשמרין אותו עד הרגל וממיתין אותו ברגל שנאמר וכל העם ישמעו ויראו דברי רבי עקיבא GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 11:3): One does not execute the rebellious elder, neither in the court that is in his city, nor in the court that is in Yavne. Rather, one takes him up to the High Court that is in Jerusalem. And they guard him in incarceration until the pilgrimage Festival, and the court executes him during the pilgrimage Festival, as it is stated: “And all the nation shall hear, and fear” (Deuteronomy 17:13); this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

אמר לו ר' יהודה וכי נאמר יראו וייראו והלא לא נאמר אלא ישמעו וייראו למה מענין דינו של זה אלא ממיתין אותו מיד וכותבין ושולחין בכל מקום איש פלוני נתחייב מיתה בבית דין Rabbi Yehuda said to Rabbi Akiva: Is it stated: And all the nation shall see and fear, which would indicate that the entire nation must actually witness his execution? But isn’t it stated only: “And all the nation shall hear and fear,” indicating that merely informing the people of the execution is sufficient? Why delay administering justice to this individual? Rather, the court executes him immediately, and the judges write reports and dispatch agents to all the places informing them: So-and-so was sentenced and found liable to be punished with execution in court.

ת"ר ארבעה צריכין הכרזה המסית ובן סורר ומורה וזקן ממרא ועדים זוממין בכולהו כתיב בהו וכל העם וכל ישראל בעדים זוממין כתיב והנשארי' דלא כולי עלמא חזו לסהדותא: The Sages taught: There are four transgressors condemned to be executed whose verdicts require a proclamation to inform the public: One who instigates others to engage in idol worship, and the stubborn and rebellious son, and the rebellious elder, and conspiring witnesses. In all of these cases, it is written concerning them: “And all the nation” (Deuteronomy 17:13), or: “And all Israel” (Deuteronomy 13:12, 21:21), except with regard to conspiring witnesses, where it is written: “And those who remain shall hear and fear” (Deuteronomy 19:20), as not everyone is fit for providing testimony. Therefore, rather than saying that all of the nation or all of Israel must be informed, only those remaining who are not disqualified from providing testimony are those who must heed the verse: “Hear and fear and shall henceforth commit no more such evil in the midst of you” (Deuteronomy 19:20).

מתני׳ נביא השקר המתנבא מה שלא שמע ומה שלא נאמר לו מיתתו בידי אדם MISHNA: The false prophet mentioned in the Torah includes one who prophesies that which he did not hear from God and one who prophesies that which was not said to him, even if it was said to another prophet. In those cases, his execution is at the hand of man, through strangulation imposed by the court.

אבל הכובש את נבואתו והמוותר על דברי נביא ונביא שעבר על דברי עצמו מיתתו בידי שמים שנאמר (דברים יח, יט) אנכי אדרש מעמו But with regard to one who suppresses his prophecy because he does not want to share it with the public, and one who contemptuously forgoes the statement of a prophet and refuses to heed it, and a prophet who violated his own statement and failed to perform that which he was commanded to do, his death is at the hand of Heaven, as it is stated: “And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall not hearken unto My words that he shall speak in My name, I will exact it of him” (Deuteronomy 18:19).

המתנבא בשם עבודת כוכבים ואומר כך אמרה עבודת כוכבים אפי' כוון את ההלכה לטמא את הטמא ולטהר את הטהור One who prophesies in the name of idol worship and says: This is what the idol said, even if he approximated the correct halakha in the name of the idol to deem ritually impure that which is ritually impure and to deem ritually pure that which is ritually pure, is executed by strangulation.

הבא על אשת איש כיון שנכנסה לרשות הבעל לנשואין אע"פ שלא נבעלה הבא עליה הרי זה בחנק In the case of one who engages in intercourse with a married woman once she entered her husband’s domain for the purposes of marriage, even if the marriage was not yet consummated, as she did not yet engage in intercourse with him, one who engages in intercourse with her is executed by strangulation. Before marriage, one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to be executed by stoning.

וזוממי בת כהן ובועלה שכל המוזמין מקדימין לאותה מיתה חוץ מזוממי בת כהן ובועלה: And conspiring witnesses who testified that the daughter of a priest committed adultery are executed by strangulation, even though were she guilty, she would be executed by burning. And her paramour is also executed by strangulation, as in any case where one engages in intercourse with a married woman. As all those who are rendered conspiring witnesses are led to their deaths via the same mode of execution with which they conspired to have their victim executed, except for conspiring witnesses who testified that the daughter of a priest and her paramour committed adultery. In that case, although the priest’s daughter who commits adultery is executed by burning, the conspiring witnesses who sought to have her executed are executed by strangulation, as is the paramour whom they also conspired to have executed.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן שלשה מיתתן בידי אדם ושלשה מיתתן בידי שמים המתנבא מה שלא שמע ומה שלא נאמר לו והמתנבא בשם עבודת כוכבים מיתתן בידי אדם הכובש את נבואתו והמוותר על דברי נביא ונביא שעבר על דברי עצמו מיתתן בידי שמים GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita about the punishment of those who sin concerning prophecy: With regard to three of them, their execution is at the hand of man, and with regard to three of them, their execution is at the hand of Heaven. In the case of one who prophesies that which he did not hear from God, and one who prophesies that which was not stated to him, and one who prophesies in the name of idol worship, their execution is at the hand of man. In the case of one who suppresses his prophecy, and one who contemptuously forgoes the statement of a prophet, and a prophet who violated his own statement, their execution is at the hand of Heaven.

מנהני מילי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב דאמר קרא (דברים יח, כ) אך הנביא אשר יזיד לדבר דבר בשמי זה המתנבא מה שלא שמע ואשר לא צויתיו הא לחבירו צויתיו זה המתנבא מה שלא נאמר לו ואשר ידבר בשם אלהים אחרים זה המתנבא בשם עבודת כוכבים וכתיב ומת הנביא ההוא וכל מיתה האמורה בתורה סתם אינה אלא חנק The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says that it is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “But the prophet who shall sin intentionally to speak a word in My name that I have not commanded him to speak, or who shall speak in the name of other gods, that prophet shall die” (Deuteronomy 18:20). The Gemara analyzes the verse: “But the prophet who shall sin intentionally to speak a word in My name”; this is a reference to one who prophesies that which he did not hear. The verse then states: “That I have not commanded him,” from which it is inferred: But I did command another. This is a reference to one who prophesies that which was not stated to him. “Or who shall speak in the name of other gods”; this is a reference to one who prophesies in the name of idol worship. And it is written with regard to all of these: “That prophet shall die.” And every death stated in the Torah without specification is referring to nothing other than strangulation.

הכובש את נבואתו והמוותר על דברי נביא ונביא שעבר על דברי עצמו מיתתן בידי שמים דכתיב (דברים יח, יט) והאיש אשר לא ישמע קרי ביה לא ישמיע וקרי ביה לא ישמע אל דברי וכתיב אנכי אדרש מעמו בידי שמים: One who suppresses his prophecy, and one who contemptuously forgoes the statement of a prophet, and a prophet who violated his own statement, their execution is at the hand of Heaven, as it is written: “And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall not hearken [yishma] unto My words that he shall speak in My name, I will exact from him” (Deuteronomy 18:19). The reference is to one who forgoes the statement of a prophet. Read into the verse: Who shall not voice [yashmia]; the reference is to one who suppresses the prophecy. And read into the verse: Shall not heed [yishama]; the reference is to one who violated his own statement. And it is written with regard to all of these: “I will exact from him,” meaning he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven.

המתנבא מה שלא שמע: כגון צדקיה בן כנענה דכתיב (דברי הימים ב יח, י) ויעש לו צדקיה בן כנענה קרני ברזל מאי הוה ליה למיעבד רוח נבות אטעיתיה דכתיב (מלכים א כב, כ) ויאמר ה' מי יפתה את אחאב ויעל ויפול ברמות גלעד ויצא הרוח ויעמד לפני ה' ויאמר אני אפתנו ויאמר תפתה וגם תוכל צא ועשה כן § The mishna lists among those liable to be executed as a false prophet one who prophesies that which he did not hear. The Gemara comments: For example, Zedekiah, son of Chenaanah, who prophesied that Ahab should wage war against the kingdom of Aram and would be successful, as it is written: “And Zedekiah, son of Chenaanah, made for him horns of iron, and said: So says the Lord: With these shall you gore the Arameans, until they are consumed” (II Chronicles 18:10). The Gemara asks: What was Zedekiah, son of Chenaanah, to do? Why was he held responsible? After all, the spirit of Naboth misled him, as it is written: “And the Lord said: Who shall entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth Gilead…and there came forth the spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said: I will entice him. And He said…You shall entice him, and shall prevail also; go forth, and do so” (I Kings 22:20–22).

אמר רב יהודה מאי צא צא ממחיצתי מאי רוח אמר רבי יוחנן רוחו של נבות היזרעאלי Rav Yehuda says: What is the meaning of the apparently unnecessary term: “Go forth”? Could the Lord not have sufficed with telling the spirit: Do so? The term means: Go forth from My proximity. Since the spirit volunteered to engage in deceit, it was no longer fit to stand in proximity to God. What is the identity of the spirit that undertook to entice Ahab? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It was the spirit of Naboth the Jezreelite, who was eager to take revenge upon Ahab.

הוה ליה למידק כדרבי יצחק דאמר רבי יצחק סיגנון אחד עולה לכמה נביאים ואין שני נביאים מתנבאין בסיגנון אחד The Gemara comments: It was incumbent upon Zedekiah to discern between actual prophecies and false prophecies, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A prophetic vision relating to one and the same subject matter [sigenon] may appear to several prophets, but two prophets do not prophesy employing one and the same style of expression.

עובדיה אמר (עובדיה א, ג) זדון לבך השיאך ירמיה אמר (ירמיהו מט, טז) תפלצתך השיא אותך זדון לבך והני מדקאמרי כולהו כהדדי שמע מינה לא כלום קאמרי An example of identical content expressed in different styles is the prophecy where Obadiah said: “The pride of your heart has beguiled you” (Obadiah 1:3), and Jeremiah said a similar message employing slightly different language: “Your terribleness has deceived you, even the pride of your heart” (Jeremiah 49:16). And with regard to these false prophets, from the fact that in their case all the prophets are saying their prophecies like each other, i.e., employing an identical style, conclude from it that they are saying nothing of substance and that it is a false prophecy.

דילמא לא הוה ידע ליה להא דרבי יצחק יהושפט הוה התם וקאמר להו דכתיב (מלכים א כב, ז) ויאמר יהושפט האין פה נביא (עוד לה') אמר ליה הא איכא כל הני אמר ליה כך מקובלני מבית אבי אבא סיגנון אחד עולה לכמה נביאים ואין שני נביאים מתנבאים בסיגנון אחד The Gemara asks: Perhaps Zedekiah, son of Chenaanah, did not know this statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and therefore should not have been held responsible? The Gemara answers: Jehoshaphat, king of Judea, was there, and he said to them that they were false prophets, as it is written: “But Jehoshaphat said: Is there not here besides a prophet of the Lord, that we might inquire of him?” (I Kings 22:7). Ahab said to him: But aren’t there all these prophets here? Why seek others? Jehoshaphat said to Ahab: This is the tradition that I received from the house of the father of my father, the house of David: A prophetic vision relating to one and the same subject matter may appear to several prophets, but two prophets do not prophesy employing one and the same style of expression. They are false prophets, as they employed the same language when stating their prophecy.

המתנבא מה שלא נאמר לו כגון חנניה בן עזור דקאי ירמיה בשוק העליון וקאמר (ירמיהו מט, א) כה אמר ה' [צבאות] הנני שובר את קשת עילם נשא חנניה ק"ו בעצמו מה עילם שלא בא אלא לעזור את בבל אמר הקב"ה הנני שובר את קשת עילם כשדים עצמן על אחת כמה וכמה אתא איהו בשוק התחתון אמר (ירמיהו כח, ב) כה אמר ה' וגו' שברתי את עול מלך בבל § The mishna lists among those liable to be executed as false prophets one who prophesies that which was not stated to him. The Gemara comments: For example, Hananiah, son of Azzur, as Jeremiah was standing in the upper market in Jerusalem and saying: “So says the Lord of hosts: Behold, I will break the bow of Elam, the chief of their might” (Jeremiah 49:35). Hananiah raised an a fortiori inference himself: If, with regard to Elam, which came only to assist Babylonia, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: “Behold, I will break the bow of Elam,” all the more so are the Chaldeans, i.e., the Babylonians, themselves, destined to fall. Hananiah came to the lower market and said: “So speaks the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, saying: I have broken the yoke of the king of Babylon” (Jeremiah 28:2). As a result, Hananiah, son of Azzur, was killed at the hand of Heaven (Jeremiah 28:16).

א"ל רב פפא לאביי האי לחבירו נמי לא נאמר א"ל כיון דאיתיהיב ק"ו למידרש כמאן דאיתמר ליה דמי הוא ניהו דלא נאמר לו Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Referring to this case as one who prophesies that which was not said to him is not precise, as not only was it not said to Hananiah, neither was this prophecy stated to another prophet. Abaye said to him: Since this matter can be inferred by means of an a fortiori inference, it is like a prophecy that was said to Jeremiah, as inferring matters a fortiori is a legitimate manner of derivation. It is Hananiah who misrepresented the prophecy, as it was not stated to him, i.e., to Hananiah, and then he presented the prophecy as though he heard it from God.

המתנבא בשם עבודת כוכבים כגון נביאי הבעל The mishna lists among those liable to be executed as false prophets one who prophesies in the name of idol worship. The Gemara comments: For example, the prophets of the Baal (see I Kings, chapter 18).

הכובש את נבואתו כגון יונה בן אמיתי והמוותר על דברי נביא כגון The mishna lists among those liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven one who suppresses his prophecy. The Gemara comments: For example, Jonah, son of Amittai (Jonah 1:1–3). The mishna also lists: And one who forgoes the statement of a prophet. The Gemara comments: For example,

Daf 89b

חבריה דמיכה דכתיב (מלכים א כ, לה) ואיש אחד מבני הנביאים אמר אל רעהו בדבר ה' הכני נא וימאן האיש להכותו וכתיב (מלכים א כ, לו) ויאמר לו יען אשר לא שמעת [וגו'] the colleague of the prophet Micah, son of Imla (see II Chronicles 18:7–8), as it is written: “And a certain man of the sons of the prophets said unto his colleague by the word of the Lord: Strike me, please. And the man refused to strike him” (I Kings 20:35). And it is written: “Then he said he to him: Because you have not listened to the voice of the Lord, behold, as soon as you leave me, a lion shall slay you. And as soon as he left from him, a lion found him; and slew him” (I Kings 20:36).

ונביא שעבר על דברי עצמו כגון עדו הנביא דכתיב (מלכים א יג, ט) כי כן צוה אותי וכתיב (מלכים א יג, יח) ויאמר לו גם אני נביא כמוך וכתיב (מלכים א יג, יט) וישב אתו וכתיב (מלכים א יג, כד) וילך וימצאהו אריה The mishna lists among those liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven: And a prophet who violated his own statement. The Gemara comments: For example, Iddo the prophet, who, according to tradition, prophesied the punishment of Jeroboam in Bethel, as it is written: “I will neither eat bread nor drink water in this place, for it so was commanded me by the word of the Lord” (I Kings 13:8–9). And it is written: “And he said to him: I too am a prophet like you; and an angel spoke unto me by the word of the Lord, saying: Bring him back with you into your house, that he may eat bread and drink water” (I Kings 13:18). And it is written: “And he went back with him, and ate bread in his house, and drank water” (I Kings 13:19). And it is written that he died at the hand of Heaven: “And he went, and a lion met him by the way, and killed him” (I Kings 13:24).

תני תנא קמיה דרב חסדא הכובש את נבואתו לוקה אמר ליה מאן דאכיל תמרי בארבלא לקי מאן מתרי ביה אמר אביי חבריה נביאי § A tanna taught a baraita before Rav Ḥisda: One who suppresses his prophecy is flogged. Rav Ḥisda said a parable to him: Is one who eats dates in a sieve flogged? How can he be flogged? Who forewarns him if he eats dates infested with worms that no one sees? Likewise, as no one knows whether the prophet received a prophecy, how can he be forewarned? Abaye said: His fellow prophets forewarn him.

מנא ידעי אמר אביי דכתיב (עמוס ג, ז) כי לא יעשה ה' [אלהים] דבר כי אם גלה סודו ודילמא הדרי ביה אם איתא דהדרי ביה אודועי הוו מודעי לכלהו נביאי The Gemara asks: From where do they know that he received a prophecy? Abaye says: They know, as it is written: “For the Lord God will do nothing, unless He reveals His counsel to His servants the prophets” (Amos 3:7). The Gemara challenges: And perhaps the heavenly court reconsidered with regard to the prophecy, and the prophet is no longer commanded to disseminate the prophecy. The Gemara answers: If it is so that they reconsidered with regard to the prophecy, the heavenly court would have informed all the prophets.

והא יונה דהדרי ביה ולא אודעוהו יונה מעיקרא נינוה נהפכת אמרי ליה איהו לא ידע אי לטובה אי לרעה The Gemara challenges: But in the case of Jonah, they reconsidered it and did not inform them that the people of Nineveh had repented for their sins and were therefore spared the foretold destruction. The Gemara explains: In the case of Jonah, from the outset, the heavenly court told him to say: “Nineveh will be overturned” (Jonah 3:4). Still, he did not know if the sentence would be for the good, as their corruption would be overturned through repentance, or if it would be for the bad, as the city would be overturned through destruction. Therefore, the prophecy was never revoked, but simply fulfilled in accordance with one of its possible interpretations.

המוותר על דברי נביא מנא ידע דאיענש דיהב ליה אות והא מיכה דלא יהיב ליה אות ואיענש היכא דמוחזק שאני The Gemara asks: In the case of one who forgoes the statement of a prophet, from where does he know that the one prophesying is actually a prophet and that he will be punished for failing to comply with the prophecy? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where the prophet provides him with a sign indicating that he is a prophet. The Gemara asks: But in the case of Micah, who did not provide him with a sign, and yet he was punished, how could he have known that Micah was a prophet? A case where he has already assumed the presumptive status of a prophet is different, and no sign is necessary.

דאי לא תימא הכי אברהם בהר המוריה היכי שמע ליה יצחק אליהו בהר הכרמל היכי סמכי עליה ועבדי שחוטי חוץ אלא היכא דמוחזק שאני The Gemara continues: Since if you do not say so, and claim that even the prophecy of one established as a prophet requires a sign, then in the case of Abraham at Mount Moriah, how did Isaac listen to him and submit to being slaughtered as an offering? Likewise, in the case of Elijah at Mount Carmel, how did the people rely upon him and enable him to engage in the sacrifice of animals slaughtered outside the Temple, which is prohibited? Rather, perforce, a case where he has already assumed the presumptive status of a prophet is different.

(בראשית כב, א) ויהי אחר הדברים האלה והאלהים נסה את אברהם (אחר מאי) § Apropos the binding of Isaac, the Gemara elaborates: It is written: “And it came to pass after these matters [hadevarim] that God tried Abraham” (Genesis 22:1). The Gemara asks: After what matters? How does the binding of Isaac relate to the preceding events?

א"ר יוחנן משום רבי יוסי בן זימרא אחר דבריו של שטן דכתיב (בראשית כא, ח) ויגדל הילד ויגמל וגו' אמר שטן לפני הקב"ה רבונו של עולם זקן זה חננתו למאה שנה פרי בטן מכל סעודה שעשה לא היה לו תור אחד או גוזל אחד להקריב לפניך אמר לו כלום עשה אלא בשביל בנו אם אני אומר לו זבח את בנך לפני מיד זובחו מיד והאלהים נסה את אברהם Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Zimra: This means after the statement [devarav] of Satan, as it is written: “And the child grew, and was weaned, and Abraham prepared a great feast on the day that Isaac was weaned” (Genesis 21:8). Satan said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, this old man, you favored him with a product of the womb, i.e., a child, at one hundred years of age. From the entire feast that he prepared, did he not have even one dove or one pigeon to sacrifice before You as a thanks-offering? God said to Satan: Did Abraham prepare the feast for any reason but for his son? If I say to him: Sacrifice your son before Me, he would immediately slaughter him. Immediately, after these matters, the verse states: “And God tried Abraham.”

ויאמר קח נא את בנך אמר רבי שמעון בר אבא אין נא אלא לשון בקשה משל למלך בשר ודם שעמדו עליו מלחמות הרבה והיה לו גבור אחד ונצחן לימים עמדה עליו מלחמה חזקה אמר לו בבקשה ממך עמוד לי במלחמה זו שלא יאמרו ראשונות אין בהם ממש אף הקב"ה אמר לאברהם ניסיתיך בכמה נסיונות ועמדת בכלן עכשיו עמוד לי בנסיון זה שלא יאמרו אין ממש בראשונים The Torah continues: “And He said: Take, please [na], your son” (Genesis 22:2). Rabbi Shimon bar Abba says: The word na is nothing other than an expression of entreaty. Why did God request rather than command that Abraham take his son? The Gemara cites a parable of a flesh-and-blood king who confronted many wars. And he had one warrior fighting for him, and he overcame his enemies. Over time, there was a fierce war confronting him. The king said to his warrior: I entreat you, stand firm for me in this war, so that others will not say: There is no substance in the first victories, and you are not a true warrior. Likewise, the Holy One, Blessed be He, also said to Abraham: I have tried you with several ordeals, and you have withstood them all. Now, stand firm in this ordeal for Me, so that others will not say: There is no substance in the first ordeals.

את בנך ב' בנים יש לי את יחידך זה יחיד לאמו וזה יחיד לאמו אשר אהבת תרוייהו רחימנא להו את יצחק וכל כך למה כדי שלא תטרף דעתו עליו God said to Abraham: “Please take your son, your only, whom you love, Isaac” (Genesis 22:2). When God said: “Your son,” Abraham said: I have two sons. When God said: “Your only,” Abraham said: This son is an only son to his mother, and that son is an only son to his mother. When God said: “Whom you love,” Abraham said: I love both of them. Then God said: “Isaac.” And why did God prolong His command to that extent? Why did He not say Isaac’s name from the outset? God did so, so that Abraham’s mind would not be confused by the trauma.

קדמו שטן לדרך אמר לו (איוב ד, ב) הנסה דבר אליך תלאה הנה יסרת רבים וידים רפות תחזק כושל יקימון מליך כי עתה תבא אליך ותלא אמר לו (תהלים כו, יא) אני בתומי אלך Satan preceded Abraham to the path that he took to bind his son and said to him: “If one ventures a word to you, will you be weary…you have instructed many, and you have strengthened the weak hands. Your words have upheld him that was falling…but now it comes upon you, and you are weary” (Job 4:2–5). Do you now regret what you are doing? Abraham said to him in response: “And I will walk with my integrity” (Psalms 26:11).

אמר לו הלא יראתך כסלתך אמר לו זכר נא מי הוא נקי אבד כיון דחזא דלא קא שמיע ליה אמר ליה ואלי דבר יגונב כך שמעתי מאחורי הפרגוד השה לעולה ואין יצחק לעולה אמר לו כך עונשו של בדאי שאפילו אמר אמת אין שומעין לו Satan said to Abraham: “Is not your fear of God your foolishness?” (Job 4:6). In other words, your fear will culminate in the slaughter of your son. Abraham said to him: “Remember, please, whoever perished, being innocent” (Job 4:7). God is righteous and His pronouncements are just. Once Satan saw that Abraham was not heeding him, he said to him: “Now a word was secretly brought to me, and my ear received a whisper thereof” (Job 4:12). This is what I heard from behind the heavenly curtain [pargod], which demarcates between God and the ministering angels: The sheep is to be sacrificed as a burnt-offering, and Isaac is not to be sacrificed as a burnt-offering. Abraham said to him: Perhaps that is so. However, this is the punishment of the liar, that even if he speaks the truth, others do not listen to him. Therefore, I do not believe you and will fulfill that which I was commanded to perform.

ר' לוי אמר אחר דבריו של ישמעאל ליצחק אמר לו ישמעאל ליצחק אני גדול ממך במצות שאתה מלת בן שמנת ימים ואני בן שלש עשרה שנה אמר לו ובאבר אחד אתה מגרה בי אם אומר לי הקב"ה זבח עצמך לפני אני זובח מיד והאלהים נסה את אברהם The Gemara cites an alternative explanation of the verse: “And it came to pass after these matters that God tried Abraham” (Genesis 22:1). Rabbi Levi says: This means after the statement of Ishmael to Isaac, during an exchange between them described in the verse: “And Sarah saw the son of Hagar…mocking” (Genesis 21:9). Ishmael said to Isaac: I am greater than you in the fulfillment of mitzvot, as you were circumcised at the age of eight days, without your knowledge and without your consent, and I was circumcised at the age of thirteen years, with both my knowledge and my consent. Isaac said to Ishmael: And do you provoke me with one organ? If the Holy One, Blessed be He, were to say to me: Sacrifice yourself before Me, I would sacrifice myself. Immediately, God tried Abraham, to confirm that Isaac was sincere in his offer to give his life.

תנו רבנן נביא שהדיח בסקילה רבי שמעון אומר בחנק מדיחי עיר הנדחת בסקילה רבי שמעון אומר בחנק § The Sages taught: A prophet who incites others to worship idols is executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: He is executed by strangulation. Those who incite residents of a city to worship idols, leading the city to be declared an idolatrous city, are executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: They are executed by strangulation.

נביא שהדיח בסקילה מ"ט דרבנן אתיא הדחה הדחה ממסית מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה The Gemara elaborates: A prophet who incites others to worship idols is executed by stoning. What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis? They derive a verbal analogy to clarify the meaning of the word incitement written with regard to a prophet who incites others to worship idols from the word incitement written with regard to a layman who instigates others to worship idols. Just as there, the layman who incites others to worship idols is executed by stoning, so too here, the prophet who incites others to worship idols is executed by stoning.

ור"ש מיתה כתיבא ביה וכל מיתה האמורה בתורה סתם אינה אלא חנק And Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to a prophet, the term death is written concerning him. And every death stated in the Torah without specification is referring to nothing other than strangulation.

מדיחי עיר הנדחת בסקילה מ"ט דרבנן גמרי הדחה הדחה או ממסית או מנביא שהדיח The Gemara continues: Those who incite residents of a city to worship idols, leading the city to be declared an idolatrous city, are executed by stoning. What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis? They derive a verbal analogy to clarify the meaning of the word incitement written with regard to those who incite residents of a city to worship idols, leading the city to be declared an idolatrous city, from the word incitement written either with regard to a layman who instigates others to worship idols or from the word incitement written with regard to a prophet who incites others to worship idols. Just as there, the layman who incites others to worship idols is executed by stoning, so too here, the prophet who incites others to worship idols is executed by stoning.

ור"ש גמר הדחה הדחה מנביא And Rabbi Shimon derives a verbal analogy to clarify the meaning of the word incitement written with regard to those who incite residents of a city to worship idols, leading the city to be declared an idolatrous city, from the word incitement written with regard to a prophet who incites others to worship idols, who, in his opinion, is executed by strangulation.

וליגמר ממסית דנין מסית רבים ממסית רבים ואין דנין מסית רבים ממסית יחיד אדרבה דנין הדיוט מהדיוט ואין דנין הדיוט מנביא The Gemara challenges: Let him derive the punishment from the punishment of one who is not a prophet who instigates others to worship idols, as those cases are similar. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon derives the punishment for one who instigates the multitudes from the punishment of one who instigates the multitudes, and does not derive the punishment for one who instigates the multitudes from the punishment of one who instigates an individual. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, one derives the punishment for an ordinary person, i.e., one who is not a prophet, who instigates others from the punishment of an ordinary person who incites an idolatrous city, and one does not derive the punishment for an ordinary person who instigates others from the punishment of a prophet who instigates others.

ור"ש כיון שהדיח אין לך הדיוט גדול מזה And Rabbi Shimon holds that in this case there is no distinction between prophet and layman; once the prophet has incited others to idol worship, you have no greater example of an ordinary person than that.

אמר רב חסדא Rav Ḥisda says:

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Daf 90a

מחלוקת בעוקר הגוף דעבודת כוכבים וקיום מקצת וביטול מקצת דעבודת כוכבים דרחמנא אמר (דברים יג, ו) מן הדרך אפילו מקצת הדרך The dispute is with regard to a prophet who prophesies to abolish the essence of the prohibition of idol worship, or a prophet who espouses fulfillment of part of the prohibition and nullification of part of the prohibition of idol worship, asserting that idol worship is permitted in certain circumstances, as the Merciful One says: “And that prophet…shall be put to death; because he has spoken perversion against the Lord…to divert you from the way on which the Lord your God commanded you to walk” (Deuteronomy 13:6). It may be inferred from this verse: If he diverts you even from part of the way. In these cases, Rabbi Shimon holds that he is executed by strangulation, and the Rabbis hold that he is executed by stoning.

אבל עוקר הגוף דשאר מצות דברי הכל בחנק וקיום מקצת וביטול מקצת דבשאר מצות דברי הכל פטור But if a prophet abolishes the essence of the rest of the mitzvot, everyone agrees that he is executed by strangulation. And if the prophet espouses fulfillment of part and nullification of part of other mitzvot, everyone agrees that he is exempt from punishment. If a true prophet espouses temporary nullification of a specific mitzva, one must heed his words.

מתיב רב המנונא (דברים יג, ו) ללכת זו מצות עשה בה זו מצות לא תעשה ואי סלקא דעתך בעבודת כוכבים עשה בעבודת כוכבים היכי משכחת לה תרגמה רב חסדא (דברים יב, ג) ונתצתם Rav Hamnuna raises an objection from a baraita that interprets the phrase in the verse “to divert you from the way on which the Lord your God commanded you to walk.” “To walk”; this is a reference to a positive mitzva. “On which”; this is a reference to a prohibition. And if it enters your mind that the verse is stated with regard to idol worship, how can you find a positive mitzva relating to idol worship? The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda interpreted that the positive mitzva referred to in the verse is: “And you shall smash their altars, and break their pillars, and burn their asherim in fire; and you shall hew down the graven images of their gods; and you shall destroy their name from that place” (Deuteronomy 12:3). A prophet is liable to receive the death penalty if he abolishes this mitzva.

רב המנונא אמר מחלוקת בעוקר הגוף בין בעבודת כוכבים בין בשאר מצות וקיום מקצת וביטול מקצת דעבודת כוכבים דרחמנא אמר מן הדרך אפילו מקצת הדרך Although his objection was resolved, Rav Hamnuna suggests an alternative explanation of the dispute and says: The dispute is with regard to a prophet who prophesies to abolish the essence of a mitzva, whether it is with regard to idol worship or with regard to the rest of the mitzvot; or a prophet who espouses fulfillment of part of the prohibition and nullification of part of the prohibition of idol worship. This is as the Merciful One says: “From the way,” from which it may be inferred: If he diverts you from even part of the way. In these cases, Rabbi Shimon holds that he is executed by strangulation, and the Rabbis hold that he is executed by stoning.

אבל קיום מקצת וביטול מקצת דבשאר מצות דברי הכל פטור But if the prophet espouses fulfillment of part and nullification of part of other mitzvot, everyone agrees that he is exempt from punishment, as that is within the prophet’s mandate.

ת"ר המתנבא לעקור דבר מן התורה חייב לקיים מקצת ולבטל מקצת ר"ש פוטר ובעבודת כוכבים אפילו אומר היום עיבדוה ולמחר בטלוה דברי הכל חייב The Sages taught: In the case of one who prophesies to abolish a matter from the Torah, he is deemed a false prophet and is liable to be executed by strangulation. If he prophesies to fulfill part or to nullify part of a matter in the Torah, Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from execution. And with regard to idol worship, even if he says: Worship it today and tomorrow nullify it, everyone agrees that he is liable.

אביי סבר לה כרב חסדא ומתרץ לה כרב חסדא רבא סבר לה כרב המנונא ומתרץ לה כרב המנונא The Gemara comments: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda and explains the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda. Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna and explains the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna.

אביי סבר לה כרב חסדא ומתרץ לה כרב חסדא המתנבא לעקור דבר מן התורה דברי הכל בחנק לקיים מקצת ולבטל מקצת ר"ש פוטר והוא הדין לרבנן ובעבודת כוכבים אפילו אמר היום עיבדוה ולמחר בטלוה חייב מר כדאית ליה ומר כדאית ליה The Gemara elaborates: Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda and explains the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda. In the case of one who prophesies to abolish a matter from the Torah, everyone agrees that he is executed by strangulation. If he prophesies to fulfill part or to nullify part of a Torah law, Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from execution, and the same is true of the Rabbis, who also hold that he is exempt. And with regard to idol worship, even if he says: Worship it today and nullify it tomorrow, everyone agrees that he is liable to be executed. What form of death penalty is imposed? One Sage, the Rabbis, rules in accordance with what he holds, i.e., stoning, and one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, rules in accordance with what he holds, i.e., strangulation.

רבא סבר לה כרב המנונא ומתרץ לה כרב המנונא המתנבא לעקור דבר מן התורה בין בעבודת כוכבים בין בשאר מצות חייב מר כדאית ליה ומר כדאית ליה לקיים מקצת ולבטל מקצת בשאר מצות ר"ש פוטר והוא הדין לרבנן ובעבודת כוכבים אפילו אומר היום עיבדוה ולמחר בטלוה חייב מר כדאית ליה ומר כדאית ליה Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna and explains the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna. In the case of one who prophesies to abolish a matter from the Torah, whether it is with regard to idol worship or with regard to the rest of the mitzvot, he is liable to be executed. What form of death penalty is imposed? One Sage, the Rabbis, rules in accordance with what he holds, i.e., stoning, and one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, rules in accordance with what he holds, i.e., strangulation. If he prophesies to fulfill part or to nullify part of a Torah law other than idol worship, Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from execution, and the same is true of the Rabbis, who also hold that he is exempt. And with regard to idol worship, even if he says: Worship it today and nullify it tomorrow, everyone agrees that he is liable to be executed. What form of death penalty is imposed? One Sage, the Rabbis, rules in accordance with what he holds, i.e., stoning, and one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, rules in accordance with what he holds, i.e., strangulation.

א"ר אבהו א"ר יוחנן בכל אם יאמר לך נביא עבור על דברי תורה שמע לו חוץ מעבודת כוכבים שאפילו מעמיד לך חמה באמצע הרקיע אל תשמע לו תניא רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר הגיע תורה לסוף דעתה של עבודת כוכבים לפיכך נתנה תורה ממשלה בה שאפילו מעמיד לך חמה באמצע הרקיע אל תשמע לו Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, in summary: With regard to all mitzvot, if a prophet will say to you: Violate matters of Torah on a provisional basis, heed him, except for idol worship, as even if he establishes that he is a bona fide prophet and stops the sun for you in the middle of the sky, do not heed him. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The Torah ascertained the depth of the mentality of idol worship, the danger that it presents, and the lure of its ideology. Therefore, the Torah ascribed the false prophet with dominion in its regard, recognizing that a false prophet could perform wonders on the basis of idol worship. Therefore, even if the false prophet stops the sun for you in the middle of the sky, do not heed him.

תניא א"ר עקיבא חס ושלום שהקדוש ב"ה מעמיד חמה לעוברי רצונו אלא כגון חנניה בן עזור שמתחלתו נביא אמת ולבסוף נביא שקר: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: Heaven forfend that the Holy One, Blessed be He, would stop the sun for those who violate His will. A false prophet could never perform an actual miracle. Rather, this warning is relevant only in the case of a prophet, for example, Hananiah, son of Azzur, whose origin was as a true prophet, at which point he could perform miracles; and ultimately, he was a false prophet. Therefore, although he had already been established as a true prophet, once he espouses idol worship, it is clear that he is a false prophet.

וזוממי בת כהן: מנהני מילי אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא דתניא ר' יוסי אומר מה ת"ל (דברים יט, יט) ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו לפי שכל המזוממין שבתורה זוממיהן ובועליהן כיוצא בהן § The mishna teaches: And conspiring witnesses who testified that the daughter of a priest and her paramour committed adultery are executed by strangulation. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says: It is derived as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19)? The verse is formulated in this manner due to the fact that in all cases involving those rendered conspiring witnesses who are mentioned in the Torah, e.g., forbidden relatives, the sentences of their conspiring witnesses and their paramours are similar to their own sentences, and the witnesses are executed by strangulation.

בת כהן היא בשריפה ואין בועלה בשריפה זוממין איני יודע אם לו הוקשו אם לה הוקשו כשהוא אומר לעשות לאחיו לאחיו ולא לאחותו: The baraita continues: The daughter of a priest is an exception, as she is executed by burning if she commits adultery, and her paramour is not executed by burning. With regard to conspiring witnesses who testified that they committed adultery, I do not know if the witnesses are likened to the paramour or if they are likened to the daughter of the priest, in terms of punishment. When the verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “As he conspired to do to his brother,” one infers: As he conspired to do to his brother, but not as he conspired to do to his sister. The execution of the conspiring witnesses is likened to the execution of the paramour, who is executed by strangulation, and is not likened to the execution of the daughter of the priest, who is executed by burning.

הדרן עלך אלו הן הנחנקין

מתני׳ כל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (ישעיהו ס, כא) ועמך כולם צדיקים לעולם יירשו ארץ נצר מטעי מעשה ידי להתפאר ואלו שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא האומר אין תחיית המתים מן התורה ואין תורה מן השמים ואפיקורוס MISHNA: All of the Jewish people, even sinners and those who are liable to be executed with a court-imposed death penalty, have a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And your people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever; the branch of My planting, the work of My hands, for My name to be glorified” (Isaiah 60:21). And these are the exceptions, the people who have no share in the World-to-Come, even when they fulfilled many mitzvot: One who says: There is no resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah, and one who says: The Torah did not originate from Heaven, and an epikoros, who treats Torah scholars and the Torah that they teach with contempt.

ר"ע אומר אף הקורא בספרים החיצונים והלוחש על המכה ואומר (שמות טו, כו) כל המחלה אשר שמתי במצרים לא אשים עליך כי אני ה' רופאך אבא שאול אומר אף ההוגה את השם באותיותיו Rabbi Akiva says: Also included in the exceptions are one who reads external literature, and one who whispers invocations over a wound and says as an invocation for healing: “Every illness that I placed upon Egypt I will not place upon you, for I am the Lord, your Healer” (Exodus 15:26). By doing so, he shows contempt for the sanctity of the name of God and therefore has no share in the World-to-Come. Abba Shaul says: Also included in the exceptions is one who pronounces the ineffable name of God as it is written, with its letters.

שלשה מלכים וארבעה הדיוטות אין להן חלק לעולם הבא שלשה מלכים ירבעם אחאב ומנשה ר' יהודה אומר מנשה יש לו חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (דברי הימים ב לג, יג) ויתפלל אליו וישמע תחנתו וישיבהו ירושלים למלכותו אמרו לו למלכותו השיבו ולא לחיי העולם הבא השיבו ארבעה הדיוטות בלעם ודואג ואחיתופל וגחזי: Three prominent kings mentioned in the Bible and four prominent commoners who are described in the Bible as men of great wisdom have no share in the World-to-Come. The three kings are: Jeroboam, son of Nebat, and Ahab, both of whom were kings of Israel, and Manasseh, king of Judea. Rabbi Yehuda says: Manasseh has a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated concerning Manasseh: “And he prayed to Him, and He received his entreaty, and heard his supplication and brought him back to Jerusalem unto his kingdom” (II Chronicles 33:13), indicating that he repented wholeheartedly and effectively. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: He regretted his actions, and his repentance was effective to the extent that God restored him to his kingdom, but God did not restore him to his share in life in the World-to-Come. The four commoners are: Balaam, son of Beor; Doeg the Edomite; Ahithophel; and Gehazi.

גמ׳ וכל כך למה תנא הוא כפר בתחיית המתים לפיכך לא יהיה לו חלק בתחיית המתים שכל מדותיו של הקב"ה מדה כנגד מדה GEMARA: And why is one punished to that extent for saying that there is no resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah? The Sages taught in a baraita: He denied the resurrection of the dead; therefore he will not have a share in the resurrection of the dead, as all measures dispensed by the Holy One, Blessed be He, to His people are dispensed measure for measure, i.e., the response is commensurate with the action.

דאמר ר' שמואל בר נחמני אמר ר' יונתן מניין שכל מדותיו של הקב"ה מדה כנגד מדה שנאמר (מלכים ב ז, א) ויאמר אלישע שמעו דבר ה' [וגו'] כעת מחר סאה סלת בשקל וסאתים שעורים בשקל בשער שומרון וכתיב (מלכים ב ז, ב) ויען השליש אשר (המלך) נשען על ידו את איש האלהים ויאמר הנה ה' עושה ארובות בשמים היהיה הדבר הזה ויאמר הנך רואה בעיניך ומשם לא תאכל This is based on that which Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it derived that all measures dispensed by the Holy One, Blessed be He, are dispensed measure for measure? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated concerning the siege of Jerusalem: “And Elisha said: Hear the word of the Lord; so said the Lord: Tomorrow at this time one se’a of fine flour will be sold for one shekel and two se’a of barley for one shekel in the gate of Samaria” (II Kings 7:1). And it is written: “And the officer on whose hand the king leaned answered the man of God and said: Will the Lord make windows in heaven? Might this thing be? And he said: You shall see it with your eyes, but you shall not eat from there” (II Kings 7:2).

Daf 90a

הדרן עלך אלו הן הנחנקין

Daf 90b

וכתיב (מלכים ב ז, כ) ויהי לו כן וירמסו אותו העם בשער וימות ודילמא קללת אלישע גרמה ליה דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב קללת חכם אפי' על חנם היא באה אם כן לכתוב קרא וירמסוהו וימות מאי בשער על עסקי שער And it is written: “And it was for him so, and the people trampled him in the gate, and he died” (II Kings 7:20). The Gemara challenges: Perhaps it was the curse of Elisha that caused the officer to die in that manner, not the principle of punishment measure for measure for his lack of belief, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The curse of a Sage, even if baseless, comes to be fulfilled? This is all the more so true concerning the curse of Elisha, which was warranted. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse write: And they trampled him and he died. What does the term “in the gate” serve to teach? It teaches that he died over matters relating to the gate [sha’ar]. It was for the cynical dismissal of the prophecy of Elisha that the officer voiced at the city gate that he was punished measure for measure and was trampled at the city gate.

(אמר ר' יוחנן) מניין לתחיית המתים מן התורה שנאמר (במדבר יח, כח) ונתתם ממנו [את] תרומת ה' לאהרן הכהן וכי אהרן לעולם קיים והלא לא נכנס לארץ ישראל שנותנין לו תרומה אלא מלמד שעתיד לחיות וישראל נותנין לו תרומה מכאן לתחיית המתים מן התורה § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From where is the resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah? It is derived from this verse, as it is stated with regard to teruma of the tithe: “And you shall give the teruma of the Lord to Aaron the priest” (Numbers 18:28). And does Aaron exist forever so that one can fulfill the mitzva by giving him the teruma of the tithe? But is it not so that Aaron did not enter Eretz Yisrael, the only place where the people would give him teruma? Rather, the verse teaches that Aaron is destined to live in the future and the Jewish people will give him teruma. From here it is derived that the resurrection of the dead is from the Torah.

דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא לאהרן כאהרן מה אהרן חבר אף בניו חברים The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a different derivation from this verse. From the term “to Aaron” one derives that teruma must be given to a priest like Aaron; just as Aaron is one devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, particularly those relating to ritual purity, teruma, and tithes [ḥaver], so too one gives teruma to his descendants who are ḥaverim.

א"ר שמואל בר נחמני אמר רבי יונתן מניין שאין נותנין תרומה לכהן עם הארץ שנאמר (דברי הימים ב לא, ד) ויאמר לעם ליושבי ירושלים לתת מנת (לכהנים ולוים) למען יחזקו בתורת ה' כל המחזיק בתורת ה' יש לו מנת ושאינו מחזיק בתורת ה' אין לו מנת Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it derived that one does not give teruma to a priest who is an am ha’aretz? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he commanded the people who dwelled in Jerusalem to give the portion of the priests and of the Levites, so that they may firmly adhere to the Torah of the Lord” (II Chronicles 31:4). Everyone who firmly adheres to the Torah of the Lord has a portion, and anyone who does not firmly adhere to the Torah of the Lord does not have a portion.

אמר רב אחא בר אדא אמר רב יהודה כל הנותן תרומה לכהן עם הארץ כאילו נותנה לפני ארי מה ארי ספק דורס ואוכל ספק אינו דורס ואוכל אף כהן עם הארץ ספק אוכלה בטהרה ספק אוכלה בטומאה Rav Aḥa bar Adda says that Rav Yehuda says: With regard to anyone who gives teruma to a priest who is an am ha’aretz, it is as though he placed the teruma before a lion. Just as with regard to a lion, there is uncertainty whether it will maul its prey and eat it, and uncertainty whether it will not maul its prey and instead eat it alive, so too, with regard to a priest who is an am ha’aretz to whom one gives teruma, there is uncertainty whether he will eat it in purity, and there is uncertainty whether he will eat it in impurity, thereby violating a prohibition by Torah law.

ר' יוחנן אמר אף גורם לו מיתה שנאמר (ויקרא כב, ט) ומתו בו כי יחללוהו דבי ר"א בן יעקב תנא אף משיאו עון אשמה שנאמר (ויקרא כב, טז) והשיאו אותם עון אשמה באכלם את קדשיהם Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who gives teruma to a priest who is an am ha’aretz even causes the priest’s death, as it is stated with regard to teruma: “And die therefore if they profane it” (Leviticus 22:9). Priests who partake of teruma in a state of ritual impurity profane it and are liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. The school of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov taught: By giving teruma to a priest who is an am ha’aretz, one also brings upon him a sin of guilt, i.e., a sin that will lead to additional sins, as it is stated: “And so bring upon them a sin of guilt when they eat their sacred items” (Leviticus 22:16).

תניא ר' סימאי אומר מניין לתחיית המתים מן התורה שנאמר (שמות ו, ד) וגם הקימותי את בריתי אתם לתת להם את ארץ כנען לכם לא נאמר אלא להם מכאן לתחיית המתים מן התורה: § It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Simai says: From where is resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated with regard to the Patriarchs: “I have also established My covenant with them to give to them the land of Canaan” (Exodus 6:4). The phrase: To give to you the land of Canaan, is not stated, as the meaning of the verse is not that God fulfilled the covenant with the Patriarchs when he gave the land of Canaan to the children of Israel; rather, it is stated: “To give to them the land of Canaan,” meaning to the Patriarchs themselves. From here is it derived that the resurrection of the dead is from the Torah, as in the future the Patriarchs will come to life and inherit the land.

(צד"ק ג"ם גש"ם ק"ם סימן): שאלו מינין את רבן גמליאל מניין שהקדוש ברוך הוא מחיה מתים אמר להם מן התורה ומן הנביאים ומן הכתובים ולא קיבלו ממנו The Gemara records a mnemonic for those cited in the upcoming discussion: Tzadi, dalet, kuf; gimmel, mem; gimmel, shin, mem; kuf, mem.Heretics asked Rabban Gamliel: From where is it derived that the Holy One, Blessed be He, revives the dead? Rabban Gamliel said to them that this matter can be proven from the Torah, from the Prophets, and from Writings, but they did not accept the proofs from him.

מן התורה דכתיב (דברים לא, טז) ויאמר ה' אל משה הנך שוכב עם אבותיך וקם אמרו לו ודילמא וקם העם הזה וזנה The proof from the Torah is as it is written: “And the Lord said to Moses, behold, you shall lie with your fathers and arise” (Deuteronomy 31:16). The heretics said to him: But perhaps the verse should be divided in a different manner, and it should be read: “Behold, you shall lie with your fathers, and this people will arise and stray after the foreign gods of the land.”

מן הנביאים דכתיב (ישעיהו כו, יט) יחיו מתיך נבלתי יקומון הקיצו ורננו שוכני עפר כי טל אורות טלך וארץ רפאים תפיל ודילמא מתים שהחיה יחזקאל The proof from the Prophets is as it is written: “Your dead shall live, my corpse shall arise. Awake and sing, you that dwell in the dust, for your dew is as the dew of vegetation, and the land shall cast out the dead” (Isaiah 26:19). The heretics said to him: But perhaps the prophecy was fulfilled with the dead that Ezekiel revived. No proof may be cited from that verse with regard to any future resurrection.

מן הכתובים דכתיב (שיר השירים ז, י) וחכך כיין הטוב הולך לדודי למישרים דובב שפתי ישנים ודילמא רחושי מרחשן שפוותיה בעלמא כר' יוחנן דאמר ר' יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יהוצדק כל מי שנאמרה הלכה בשמו בעולם הזה שפתותיו דובבות בקבר שנאמר דובב שפתי ישנים The proof from Writings is as it is written: “And your palate is like the best wine that glides down smoothly for my beloved, moving gently the lips of those that sleep” (Song of Songs 7:10), indicating that the dead will ultimately rise and speak. The heretics said to him: But perhaps merely their lips will move, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Anyone in whose name a halakha is stated in this world, his lips move in the grave as if repeating the statement cited in his name, as it is stated: “Moving gently the lips of those that sleep.” No proof may be cited from that verse, as it is unrelated to resurrection.

עד שאמר להם מקרא זה (דברים יא, כא) אשר נשבע ה' לאבותיכם לתת להם לכם לא נאמר אלא להם מיכן לתחיית המתים מן התורה This exchange continued until Rabban Gamliel stated to them this verse: “That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children, upon the land that the Lord took an oath to your forefathers to give them” (Deuteronomy 11:21). The phrase: To give you, is not stated; rather, it is stated: “To give them,” to the Patriarchs themselves, as in the future the Patriarchs will come to life and inherit the land. From here resurrection of the dead is derived from the Torah.

וי"א מן המקרא הזה אמר להם (דברים ד, ד) ואתם הדבקים בה' אלהיכם חיים כלכם היום (פשיטא דחיים כולכם היום אלא אפילו ביום שכל העולם כולם מתים אתם חיים) מה היום כולכם קיימין אף לעוה"ב כולכם קיימין And there are those who say that it is from this following verse that he said to them his ultimate proof: “But you who cleave to the Lord your God every one of you is alive this day” (Deuteronomy 4:4). Wasn’t it obvious with regard to the children of Israel whom God was addressing, that “every one of you is alive this day”? Rather, the meaning of the verse is: Even on the day when everyone is dead you will live; just as today every one of you is alive, so too, in the World-to-Come every one of you will be alive.

שאלו רומיים את רבי יהושע בן חנניה מניין שהקב"ה מחיה מתים ויודע מה שעתיד להיות אמר להו תרווייהו מן המקרא הזה שנאמר (דברים לא, טז) ויאמר ה' אל משה הנך שוכב עם אבותיך וקם העם הזה וזנה The Romans asked Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya: From where is it derived that the Holy One, Blessed be He, revives the dead, and from where is it derived that He knows what is destined to be? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya said to them: Both of those matters are derived from this verse, as it is stated: “And the Lord said to Moses, Behold, you shall lie with your fathers and arise; this people will go astray” (Deuteronomy 31:16). This indicates that Moses will die and then arise from the dead and that the Holy One, Blessed be He, knows what the children of Israel are destined to do.

ודילמא וקם העם הזה וזנה אמר להו נקוטו מיהא פלגא בידייכו דיודע מה שעתיד להיות איתמר נמי א"ר יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יוחאי מניין שהקדוש ברוך הוא מחיה מתים ויודע מה שעתיד להיות שנאמר הנך שוכב עם אבותיך וקם וגו' The Romans asked: But perhaps the verse should be divided in a different manner, and it should be read: “Behold, you shall lie with your fathers and this people will arise and go astray after the foreign gods of the land.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya said to them: Take at least a response to half of your question in your hands from that verse, that God knows what is destined to be. The Gemara comments: It was also stated on a similar note by an amora citing a tanna, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: From where is it derived that the Holy One, Blessed be He, revives the dead, and from where is it derived that He knows what is destined to be? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “Behold, you shall lie with your fathers and arise.”

תניא א"ר אליעזר בר' יוסי בדבר זה זייפתי ספרי מינים שהיו אומרים אין תחיית המתים מן התורה אמרתי להן זייפתם תורתכם ולא העליתם בידכם כלום שאתם אומרים אין תחיית המתים מן התורה הרי הוא אומר (במדבר טו, לא) הכרת תכרת הנפש ההיא עונה בה הכרת תכרת בעולם הזה עונה בה לאימת לאו לעולם הבא It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: With this following matter, I refuted the books of the Samaritans, as they would say that there is no source for the resurrection of the dead from the Torah. I said to them: You falsified your torah and you accomplished nothing, as you say there is no source for the resurrection of the dead from the Torah, and the Torah states: “That soul shall be excised; his iniquity shall be upon him” (Numbers 15:31). You interpret the phrase “that soul shall be excised” to mean that a sinner will be punished with death in this world. If so, with regard to the phrase “his iniquity shall be upon him,” for when is that destined to be? Is it not for the World-to-Come, i.e., the world as it will exist after the resurrection of the dead? Apparently, there is a World-to-Come and there is an allusion to it in the Torah.

א"ל רב פפא לאביי ולימא להו תרוייהו מהכרת תכרת אינהו הוו אמרי ליה דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And let Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, say to the Samaritans that both of those matters can be derived from the phrase “shall be excised [hikkaret tikkaret].” “Hikkaret” indicates that the sinner is excised from this world, and “tikkaret” indicates that the sinner is excised from the World-to-Come. Abaye answered: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, preferred not to cite proof from the compound verb, because the Samaritans would say: The Torah spoke in the language of people, and the compound verb is merely a stylistic flourish.

כתנאי הכרת תכרת הכרת בעולם הזה תכרת לעולם הבא דברי ר"ע אמר לו ר' ישמעאל והלא כבר נאמר (במדבר טו, ל) את ה' הוא מגדף ונכרתה וכי שלשה עולמים יש אלא ונכרתה בעולם הזה הכרת לעולם הבא הכרת תכרת דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם The Gemara notes: These derivations of Rabbi Eliezer and Rav Pappa are parallel to a dispute between tanna’im with regard to “hikkaret tikkaret,” as follows: “Hikkaret” indicates that the sinner is excised in this world, and “tikkaret” indicates that the sinner is excised in the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: Isn’t it already stated in the previous verse: “That person that blasphemes the Lord, that soul shall be excised [venikhreta]” (Numbers 15:30), and are there three worlds from which the sinner is excised? Rather, from the term “venikhreta” it is derived that the sinner is excised in this world, from “hikkaret” it is derived that the sinner is excised in the World-to-Come, and from the compound verb “hikkaret tikkaret” nothing is derived, as the Torah spoke in the language of people.

בין ר' ישמעאל ובין ר"ע עונה בה מאי עבדי ביה לכדתניא יכול אפילו עשה תשובה ת"ל עונה בה לא אמרתי אלא בזמן שעונה בה The Gemara asks: According to both Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva, what do they do with, i.e., what do they derive from, the phrase “His iniquity shall be upon him”? The Gemara answers: That phrase is necessary for that derivation which is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that the sinner is excised even after he repented. Therefore, the verse states: “His iniquity shall be upon him.” God states: I said that the sinner will be excised only when his iniquity remains upon him.

שאלה קליאופטרא מלכתא את ר"מ אמרה ידענא דחיי שכבי דכתיב (תהלים עב, טז) ויציצו מעיר כעשב הארץ אלא כשהן עומדין עומדין ערומין או בלבושיהן עומדין אמר לה ק"ו מחיטה ומה חיטה שנקברה ערומה יוצאה בכמה לבושין צדיקים שנקברים בלבושיהן על אחת כמה וכמה § The Gemara relates: Queen Cleopatra asked Rabbi Meir a question. She said: I know that the dead will live, as it is written: “And may they blossom out of the city like grass of the earth” (Psalms 72:16). Just as grass grows, so too, the dead will come to life. But when they arise, will they arise naked or will they arise with their garments? Rabbi Meir said to her: It is derived a fortiori from wheat. If wheat, which is buried naked, meaning that the kernel is sown without the chaff, emerges with several garments of chaff, all the more so will the righteous, who are buried with their garments, arise with their garments.

א"ל קיסר לרבן גמליאל אמריתו דשכבי חיי הא הוו עפרא ועפרא מי קא חיי The Roman emperor said to Rabban Gamliel: You say that the dead will live. Aren’t they dust? And does dust come to life?

Daf 91a

אמרה ליה ברתיה שבקיה ואנא מהדרנא ליה שני יוצרים יש בעירנו אחד יוצר מן המים ואחד יוצר מן הטיט איזה מהן משובח א"ל זה שיוצר מן המים א"ל מן המים צר מן הטיט לא כל שכן The daughter of the emperor said to Rabban Gamliel: Leave him, and I will respond to him with a parable. She said: There are two craftsmen in our city; one fashions vessels from water, and one fashions vessels from mortar. Which is more noteworthy? The emperor said to her: It is that craftsman that fashions vessels from water. His daughter said to him: If he fashions a vessel from the water, all the more so is it not clear that he can fashion vessels from mortar? By the same token, if God was able to create the world from water, He is certainly able to resurrect people from dust.

דבי ר' ישמעאל תנא ק"ו מכלי זכוכית מה כלי זכוכית שעמלן ברוח בשר ודם נשברו יש להן תקנה בשר ודם שברוחו של הקב"ה על אחת כמה וכמה The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that resurrection of the dead a fortiori from glass vessels: If concerning glass vessels, which are fashioned by the breath of those of flesh and blood, who blow and form the vessels, and yet if they break they can be repaired, as they can be melted and subsequently blown again, then with regard to those of flesh and blood, whose souls are a product of the breath of the Holy One, Blessed be He, all the more so can God restore them to life.

א"ל ההוא מינא לר' אמי אמריתו דשכבי חיי והא הוו עפרא ועפרא מי קא חיי א"ל אמשול לך משל למה הדבר דומה למלך בשר ודם שאמר לעבדיו לכו ובנו לי פלטרין גדולים במקום שאין מים ועפר הלכו ובנו אותו לימים נפלו אמר להם חזרו ובנו אותו במקום שיש עפר ומים אמרו לו אין אנו יכולין The Gemara relates that a certain heretic said to Rabbi Ami: You say that the dead will live. Aren’t they dust? And does dust come to life? Rabbi Ami said to him: I will tell you a parable. To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a flesh-and-blood king who said to his servants: Go and construct for me a great palace [palterin] in a place where there is no water and earth available. They went and constructed it. Sometime later, the palace collapsed. The king said to them: Return to your labor and construct the palace in a place where there is earth and water available. They said to him: We are unable to do so.

כעס עליהם ואמר להן במקום שאין מים ועפר בניתם עכשיו שיש מים ועפר על אחת כמה וכמה ואם אי אתה מאמין צא לבקעה וראה עכבר שהיום חציו בשר וחציו אדמה למחר השריץ ונעשה כלו בשר שמא תאמר לזמן מרובה עלה להר וראה שהיום אין בו אלא חלזון אחד למחר ירדו גשמים ונתמלא כולו חלזונות The king became angry at them and said to them: If in a place where there is no water and earth available you constructed a palace, now that there is water and earth available all the more so should you be able to do so. Similarly, concerning man, whom God created ex nihilo, all the more so will God be able to resurrect him from dust. And if you do not believe that a being can be created from dust, go out to the valley and see an akhbar, a creature that today is half flesh and half earth, and tomorrow the being will develop and all of it will become flesh. Lest you say that creation of living creatures is a matter that develops over an extended period, ascend a mountain and see that today there is only one snail there; then ascend tomorrow, after rain will have fallen, and see that it will be entirely filled with snails.

א"ל ההוא מינא לגביהא בן פסיסא ווי לכון חייביא דאמריתון מיתי חיין דחיין מיתי דמיתי חיין א"ל ווי לכון חייביא דאמריתון מיתי לא חיין דלא הוו חיי דהוי חיי לא כ"ש א"ל חייביא קרית לי אי קאימנא בעיטנא בך ופשיטנא לעקמותך מינך א"ל אם אתה עושה כן רופא אומן תקרא ושכר הרבה תטול The Gemara relates that a certain heretic said to Geviha ben Pesisa: Woe unto you, the wicked, as you say: The dead will come to life. The way of the world is that those who are alive die. How can you say that the dead will come to life? Geviha ben Pesisa said to him: Woe unto you, the wicked, as you say: The dead will not come to life. If those who were not in existence come to life, is it not reasonable all the more so that those who were once alive will come to life again? The heretic said to Geviha ben Pesisa angrily: You called me wicked? If I stand, I will kick you and flatten your hump, as Geviha ben Pesisa was a hunchback. Geviha ben Pesisa said to him jocularly: If you do so, you will be called an expert doctor and will take high wages for your services.

ת"ר בעשרים וארבעה בניסן איתנטילו דימוסנאי מיהודה ומירושלים כשבאו בני אפריקיא לדון עם ישראל לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אמרו לו ארץ כנען שלנו היא דכתיב (במדבר לד, ב) ארץ כנען לגבולותיה וכנען אבוהון דהנהו אינשי הוה § Apropos Geviha ben Pesisa and his cleverness in debate, the Gemara cites additional incidents where he represented the Jewish people in debates. The Sages taught in Megillat Ta’anit: On the twenty-fourth day in Nisan it is a joyous day, since the usurpers [dimusana’ei] were expelled from Judea and Jerusalem. When the people of Afrikiya came to judgment with the Jewish people before the emperor, Alexander of Macedon, they said to him: The land of Canaan is ours, as it is written: “This is the land that shall fall to you as an inheritance, the land of Canaan according to its borders” (Numbers 34:2). And the people of Afrikiya said, referring to themselves: Canaan is the forefather of these people.

אמר להו גביהא בן פסיסא לחכמים תנו לי רשות ואלך ואדון עמהן לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אם ינצחוני אמרו הדיוט שבנו נצחתם ואם אני אנצח אותם אמרו להם תורת משה נצחתכם נתנו לו רשות והלך ודן עמהם Geviha ben Pesisa said to the Sages: Give me permission and I will go and deliberate with them before Alexander of Macedon. If they will defeat me, say to them: You have defeated an ordinary person from among us, and until you overcome our Sages, it is no victory. And if I will defeat them, say to them: The Torah of Moses defeated you, and attribute no significance to me. The Sages gave him permission, and he went and deliberated with them.

אמר להם מהיכן אתם מביאים ראייה אמרו לו מן התורה אמר להן אף אני לא אביא לכם ראייה אלא מן התורה שנאמר (בראשית ט, כה) ויאמר ארור כנען עבד עבדים יהיה לאחיו עבד שקנה נכסים עבד למי ונכסים למי ולא עוד אלא שהרי כמה שנים שלא עבדתונו Geviha ben Pesisa said to them: From where are you citing proof that the land of Canaan is yours? They said to him: From the Torah. Geviha ben Pesisa said to them: I too will cite proof to you only from the Torah, as it is stated: “And he said: Cursed will be Canaan; a slave of slaves shall he be to his brethren” (Genesis 9:25). And with regard to a slave who acquired property, the slave belongs to whom and the property belongs to whom? The slave and his property belong to the master. And moreover, it is several years now that you have not served us. Therefore, not only are you not entitled to the land, there are additional debts that must be repaid, as well as a return to enslavement.

אמר להם אלכסנדרוס מלכא החזירו לו תשובה אמרו לו תנו לנו זמן שלשה ימים נתן להם זמן בדקו ולא מצאו תשובה מיד ברחו והניחו שדותיהן כשהן זרועות וכרמיהן כשהן נטועות ואותה שנה שביעית היתה Alexander the king said to the people of Afrikiya: Provide Geviha ben Pesisa with a response to his claims. They said to Alexander: Give us time; give us three days to consider the matter. The emperor gave them the requested time and they examined the matter and did not find a response to the claims. Immediately, they fled and abandoned their fields when they were sown and their vineyards when they were planted. The Gemara adds: And since that year was a Sabbatical Year, with the accompanying restrictions on agricultural activity, this benefited the Jewish people, as they were able to consume the produce of those fields and vineyards.

שוב פעם אחת באו בני מצרים לדון עם ישראל לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אמרו לו הרי הוא אומר (שמות יב, לו) וה' נתן את חן העם בעיני מצרים וישאילום תנו לנו כסף וזהב שנטלתם ממנו The Gemara relates: On another occasion, the people of Egypt came to judgment with the Jewish people before Alexander of Macedon. The Egyptian people said to Alexander: It says in the Torah: “And the Lord gave the people favor in the eyes of Egypt, and they lent them” (Exodus 12:36). Give us the silver and gold that you took from us; you claimed that you were borrowing it and you never returned it.

אמר גביהא בן פסיסא לחכמים תנו לי רשות ואלך ואדון עמהן לפני אלכסנדרוס אם ינצחוני אמרו להם הדיוט שבנו נצחתם ואם אני אנצח אותם אמרו להם תורת משה רבינו נצחתכם נתנו לו רשות והלך ודן עמהן Geviha ben Pesisa said to the Sages: Give me permission and I will go and deliberate with them before Alexander of Macedon. If they will defeat me, say to them: You have defeated an ordinary person from among us, and until you overcome our Sages, it is no victory. And if I will defeat them, say to them: The Torah of Moses, our teacher, defeated you, and attribute no significance to me. The Sages gave him permission, and he went and deliberated with them.

אמר להן מהיכן אתם מביאין ראייה אמרו לו מן התורה אמר להן אף אני לא אביא לכם ראייה אלא מן התורה שנאמר (שמות יב, מ) ומושב בני ישראל אשר ישבו במצרים שלשים שנה וארבע מאות שנה תנו לנו שכר עבודה של ששים ריבוא ששיעבדתם במצרים שלשים שנה וארבע מאות שנה Geviha ben Pesisa said to them: From where are you citing proof that you are entitled to the silver and gold? They said to him: From the Torah. Geviha ben Pesisa said to them: I too will cite proof to you only from the Torah, as it is stated: “And the sojourning of the children of Israel, who dwelt in Egypt, was four hundred and thirty years” (Exodus 12:40), during which they were enslaved to Egypt, engaged in hard manual labor. Give us the wages for the work performed by the 600,000 men above the age of twenty (see Exodus 12:37) whom you enslaved in Egypt for four hundred and thirty years.

אמר להן אלכסנדרוס מוקדון החזירו לו תשובה אמרו לו תנו לנו זמן שלשה ימים נתן להם זמן בדקו ולא מצאו תשובה מיד הניחו שדותיהן כשהן זרועות וכרמיהן כשהן נטועות וברחו ואותה שנה שביעית היתה Alexander of Macedon said to the people of Egypt: Provide Geviha ben Pesisa with a response to his claims. They said to him: Give us time; give us three days to consider the matter. The emperor gave them the requested time and they examined the matter and did not find a response to the claims. Immediately, they abandoned their fields when they were sown and their vineyards when they were planted, and fled. The Gemara adds: And that year was a Sabbatical Year.

ושוב פעם אחת באו בני ישמעאל ובני קטורה לדון עם ישראל לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אמרו לו ארץ כנען שלנו ושלכם דכתיב (בראשית כה, יב) ואלה תולדות ישמעאל בן אברהם וכתיב (בראשית כה, יט) אלה תולדות יצחק בן אברהם The Gemara relates: And on another occasion, the descendants of Ishmael and the descendants of Keturah came to judgment with the Jewish people before Alexander of Macedon. They said to the Jewish people before Alexander: The land of Canaan is both ours and yours, as it is written: “And these are the generations of Ishmael, son of Abraham, whom Hagar the Egyptian, Sarah’s maidservant, bore unto Abraham” (Genesis 25:12), and it is written: “And these are the generations of Isaac, son of Abraham” (Genesis 25:19). Therefore, the land should be divided between Abraham’s heirs.

אמר להן גביהא בן פסיסא לחכמים תנו לי רשות ואלך ואדון עמהם לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אם ינצחוני אמרו הדיוט שבנו נצחתם ואם אני אנצח אותם אמרו להם תורת משה רבינו נצחתכם נתנו לו רשות הלך ודן עמהן Geviha ben Pesisa said to the Sages: Give me permission and I will go and deliberate with them before Alexander of Macedon. If they will defeat me, say to them: You have defeated an ordinary person from among us, and until you overcome our Sages, it is no victory. And if I will defeat them, say to them: The Torah of Moses, our teacher, defeated you, and attribute no significance to me. The Sages gave him permission, and he went and deliberated with them.

אמר להם מהיכן אתם מביאין ראייה אמרו לו מן התורה אמר להן אף אני לא אביא ראייה אלא מן התורה שנאמר (בראשית כה, ה) ויתן אברהם את כל אשר לו ליצחק ולבני הפילגשים אשר לאברהם נתן אברהם מתנות אב שנתן אגטין לבניו בחייו ושיגר זה מעל זה כלום יש לזה על זה כלום מאי מתנות אמר ר' ירמיה בר אבא מלמד שמסר להם שם טומאה Geviha ben Pesisa said to the descendants of Ishmael: From where are you citing proof that the land of Canaan belongs to both you and the Jewish people? They said to him: From the Torah. Geviha ben Pesisa said to them: I too will cite proof to you only from the Torah, as it is stated: “And Abraham gave all that he had to Isaac. But to the sons of the concubines that Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and he sent them away from his son, while he yet lived, eastward, to the east country” (Genesis 25:5–6). In the case of a father who gave a document of bequest [agatin] to his sons during his lifetime and sent one of the sons away from the other, does the one who was sent away have any claim against the other? The father himself divided his property. The Gemara asks: What were these gifts that Abraham gave to the sons of the concubines? Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: This teaches that Abraham provided them with the name of the supernatural spirit of impurity, enabling them to perform witchcraft.

אמר ליה אנטונינוס לרבי גוף ונשמה יכולין לפטור עצמן מן הדין כיצד גוף אומר נשמה חטאת שמיום שפירשה ממני הריני מוטל כאבן דומם בקבר ונשמה אומרת גוף חטא שמיום שפירשתי ממנו הריני פורחת באויר כצפור אמר ליה אמשול לך משל למה הדבר דומה למלך בשר ודם שהיה לו פרדס נאה והיה בו § Apropos exchanges with prominent gentile leaders, the Gemara cites an exchange where Antoninos, the Roman emperor, said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The body and the soul are able to exempt themselves from judgment for their sins. How so? The body says: The soul sinned, as from the day of my death when it departed from me, I am cast like a silent stone in the grave, and do not sin. And the soul says: The body sinned, as from the day that I departed from it, I am flying in the air like a bird, incapable of sin. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: I will tell you a parable. To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a king of flesh and blood who had a fine orchard, and in it there were

Daf 91b

בכורות נאות והושיב בו שני שומרים אחד חיגר ואחד סומא אמר לו חיגר לסומא בכורות נאות אני רואה בפרדס בא והרכיבני ונביאם לאכלם רכב חיגר על גבי סומא והביאום ואכלום fine first fruits of a fig tree, and he stationed two guards in the orchard, one lame, who was unable to walk, and one blind. Neither was capable of reaching the fruit on the trees in the orchard without the assistance of the other. The lame person said to the blind person: I see fine first fruits of a fig tree in the orchard; come and place me upon your shoulders. I will guide you to the tree, and we will bring the figs to eat them. The lame person rode upon the shoulders of the blind person and they brought the figs and ate them.

לימים בא בעל פרדס אמר להן בכורות נאות היכן הן אמר לו חיגר כלום יש לי רגלים להלך בהן אמר לו סומא כלום יש לי עינים לראות מה עשה הרכיב חיגר על גבי סומא ודן אותם כאחד Sometime later the owner of the orchard came to the orchard. He said to the guards: The fine first fruits of a fig tree that were in the orchard, where are they? The lame person said: Do I have any legs with which I would be able to walk and take the figs? The blind person said: Do I have any eyes with which I would be able to see the way to the figs? What did the owner of the orchard do? He placed the lame person upon the shoulders of the blind person just as they did when they stole the figs, and he judged them as one.

אף הקב"ה מביא נשמה וזורקה בגוף ודן אותם כאחד שנאמר (תהלים נ, ד) יקרא אל השמים מעל ואל הארץ לדין עמו יקרא אל השמים מעל זו נשמה ואל הארץ לדין עמו זה הגוף: So too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, brings the soul on the day of judgment and casts it back into the body, as they were when they sinned, and He judges them as one, as it is stated: “He calls to the heavens above and to the earth that He may judge His people” (Psalms 50:4). “He calls to the heavens above”; this is the soul, which is heavenly. “And to the earth that He may judge His people”; this is the body, which is earthly.

א"ל אנטונינוס לרבי מפני מה חמה יוצאה במזרח ושוקעת במערב א"ל אי הוה איפכא נמי הכי הוה אמרת לי א"ל הכי קאמינא לך מפני מה שוקעת במערב The Gemara relates another exchange. Antoninos said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: For what reason does the sun emerge in the east and set in the west? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: If it were the reverse, you would have also said that to me, as the sun must emerge from one direction and set in the other. Antoninos said to him: This is what I am saying to you: For what reason does the sun set in the west and not occasionally deviate and set elsewhere?

א"ל כדי ליתן שלום לקונה שנאמר (נחמיה ט, ו) וצבא השמים לך משתחוים א"ל ותיתי עד פלגא דרקיע ותתן שלמא ותיעול משום פועלים ומשום עוברי דרכים Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: The sun always sets in the west in order to greet its Creator, as it is stated: “And the hosts of heaven worship You” (Nehemiah 9:6). Setting is a form of worship; it is as though the sun is bowing to God. The Divine Presence rests in the west, as is evident from the fact that the Holy of Holies in the Temple, in which the Ark, the resting place of the Divine Presence, is located in the west. Antoninos said to him: If so, let the sun come until the midpoint of the sky, set slightly and greet its Creator, and return and enter its place of origin in the east and set there. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi answered him: The sun sets in the west due to workers and due to travelers, as, if the sun did not proceed from east to west with the light of day gradually waning, they would not know that it is time to return home or to find an inn.

וא"ל אנטונינוס לרבי נשמה מאימתי ניתנה באדם משעת פקידה או משעת יצירה א"ל משעת יצירה א"ל אפשר חתיכה של בשר עומדת שלשה ימים בלא מלח ואינה מסרחת אלא משעת פקידה אמר רבי דבר זה למדני אנטונינוס ומקרא מסייעו שנאמר (איוב י, יב) ופקודתך שמרה רוחי And Antoninos said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From when is the soul placed in a person? Is it from the moment of conception or from the moment of the formation of the embryo, forty days after conception? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: It is from the moment of the formation of the embryo. Antoninos said to him: That is inconceivable. Is it possible that a piece of meat could stand for even three days without salt as a preservative and would not rot? The embryo could not exist for forty days without a soul. Rather, the soul is placed in man from the moment of conception. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Antoninos taught me this matter, and there is a verse that supports him, as it is stated: “And Your Providence [pekudatekha] has preserved my spirit” (Job 10:12) indicating that it is from the moment of conception [pekida] that the soul is preserved within a person.

ואמר ליה אנטונינוס לרבי מאימתי יצה"ר שולט באדם משעת יצירה או משעת יציאה א"ל משעת יצירה א"ל א"כ בועט במעי אמו ויוצא אלא משעת יציאה אמר רבי דבר זה למדני אנטונינוס ומקרא מסייעו שנאמר (בראשית ד, ז) לפתח חטאת רובץ And Antoninos said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From when does the evil inclination dominate a person? Is it from the moment of the formation of the embryo or from the moment of emergence from the womb? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: It is from the moment of the formation of the embryo. Antoninos said to him: If so, the evil inclination would cause the fetus to kick his mother’s innards and emerge from the womb. Rather, the evil inclination dominates a person from the moment of emergence from the womb. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Antoninos taught me this matter, and there is a verse that supports him, as it is stated: “Sin crouches at the entrance” (Genesis 4:7), indicating that it is from the moment of birth, when the newborn emerges from the entrance of his mother’s womb, that the evil inclination lurks.

ר"ל רמי כתיב (ירמיהו לא, ח) בם עור ופסח הרה ויולדת יחדו וכתיב (ישעיהו לה, ו) אז ידלג כאיל פסח ותרון לשון אלם כי נבקעו במדבר מים ונחלים בערבה הא כיצד עומדין במומן ומתרפאין § Reish Lakish raises a contradiction between two verses written with regard to the resurrection of the dead. It is written: “I will bring them from the north country and gather them from the ends of the earth, and with them the blind and the lame, the woman with child and the woman giving birth together” (Jeremiah 31:7), indicating that at the end of days there will still be people with physical defects. And it is written: “Then shall the lame man leap as a deer and the tongue of the mute sing; for in the wilderness shall waters break out, and streams in the desert” (Isaiah 35:6), indicating that at the end of days there will be no people with physical defects. How so? When resurrected, the dead will arise still afflicted with their defects, and they will then be healed.

עולא רמי כתיב (ישעיהו כה, ח) בלע המות לנצח ומחה ה' דמעה מעל כל פנים וכתיב (ישעיהו סה, כ) כי הנער בן מאה שנה ימות לא יהיה משם עוד עול ימים לא קשיא כאן בישראל כאן בעובדי כוכבים ועובדי כוכבים מאי בעו התם הנך דכתיב בהו (ישעיהו סא, ה) ועמדו זרים ורעו צאנכם ובני נכר אכריכם וכורמיכם Ulla raises a contradiction. It is written: “He will swallow death forever; and the Lord God will wipe tears from all faces” (Isaiah 25:8), indicating that death will no longer exist at the end of days. And it is written: “There shall be no more an infant a few days old then…for the youngest shall die one hundred years old” (Isaiah 65:20). The Gemara answers that this contradiction is not difficult. The verse here, in Isaiah chapter 25, is written with regard to the Jewish people, who will live forever after resurrection; the verse there, in Isaiah chapter 65, is written with regard to gentiles, who will ultimately die after an extremely long life. The Gemara asks: And what do gentiles seek, i.e., why will they merit to live, in that era? The Gemara answers that the verse is referring to those gentiles about whom it is written: “And strangers shall stand and feed your flocks, and aliens shall be your plowmen and vinedressers” (Isaiah 61:5).

רב חסדא רמי כתיב (ישעיהו כד, כג) וחפרה הלבנה ובושה החמה כי מלך ה' צבאות וכתיב (ישעיהו ל, כו) והיה אור הלבנה כאור החמה ואור החמה יהיה שבעתים כאור שבעת הימים לא קשיא כאן לימות המשיח כאן לעוה"ב Rav Ḥisda raises a contradiction. It is written: “Then the moon shall be confounded and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts will reign in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem, and before His elders shall be His glory” (Isaiah 24:23), indicating that the sun and the moon will no longer shine at the end of days. And it is written: “And the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, as the light of seven days” (Isaiah 30:26), indicating that the sun and the moon will exist then and they will shine more brightly. The Gemara answers that this is not difficult. The verse here, in Isaiah chapter 30, is written with regard to the days of the Messiah, when the sun and moon will shine more brightly; the verse there, in Isaiah chapter 24, is written with regard to the World-to-Come, when the only light will be the light of God.

ולשמואל דאמר אין בין העוה"ז לימות המשיח אלא שיעבוד גליות בלבד לא קשיא כאן במחנה צדיקים כאן במחנה שכינה The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, who says: The difference between this world and the messianic era is only subjugation of the exiles, as during that era the Jewish people will be freed from that subjugation, how is the contradiction resolved? The Gemara answers that even according to Shmuel this contradiction is not difficult. The verse here, in Isaiah chapter 30, is written with regard to the light in the camp of the righteous; the verse there, in Isaiah chapter 24, the verse is written with regard to the camp of the Divine Presence, when the only light will be the light of God.

רבא רמי כתיב (דברים לב, לט) אני אמית ואחיה וכתיב (דברים לב, לט) מחצתי ואני ארפא אמר הקב"ה מה שאני ממית אני מחיה והדר מה שמחצתי ואני ארפא Rava raises a contradiction. It is written: “I will kill and I will bring to life” (Deuteronomy 32:39), indicating that God is capable of reviving the dead. And it is written immediately afterward: “I wounded and I will heal,” which indicates that God will only heal the wounded. Rather, it should be understood: The Holy One, Blessed be He, is saying: What I kill, I bring to life, indicating that God revives the dead. And then what I wounded, I will heal.

ת"ר אני אמית ואחיה יכול שתהא מיתה באחד וחיים באחד כדרך שהעולם נוהג ת"ל מחצתי ואני ארפא מה מחיצה ורפואה באחד אף מיתה וחיים באחד מיכן תשובה לאומרין אין תחיית המתים מן התורה § The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “I will kill and I will bring to life.” One might have thought that it means that there will be death for one person and life for one other person, in the typical manner that the world operates. Therefore, the verse states: “I wounded and I will heal.” Just as wounding and healing take place in one person, so too, death and bringing back to life take place in one person. From here there is a response to those who say that there is no resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah.

תניא אמר רבי מאיר מניין לתחיית המתים מן התורה שנאמר (שמות טו, א) אז ישיר משה ובני ישראל את השירה הזאת לה' שר לא נאמר אלא ישיר מכאן לתחיית המתים מן התורה כיוצא בדבר אתה אומר (יהושע ח, ל) אז יבנה יהושע מזבח לה' בנה לא נאמר אלא יבנה מכאן לתחיית המתים מן התורה It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir said: From where is resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “Then Moses and the children of Israel will sing this song to the Lord” (Exodus 15:1). It is not stated: Sang, in the verse; rather, the term “they will sing” is stated, indicating that Moses will come back to life and sing the song in the future. From here it is proved that resurrection of the dead is derived from the Torah. On a similar note, you can say: “Then Joshua will build an altar to the Lord God of Israel on Mount Ebal” (Joshua 8:30). It is not stated: Built, in the verse; rather, the term “will build” is stated. From here, resurrection of the dead is derived from the Torah.

אלא מעתה (מלכים א יא, ז) אז יבנה שלמה במה לכמוש שקוץ מואב הכי נמי דיבנה אלא מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו בנה The Gemara challenges: If that is so, then in the verse: “Then Solomon will build an altar for Chemosh the abomination of Moab” (I Kings 11:7), does this also mean that Solomon will build in the future? Rather, the use of the future tense here should be understood differently. Solomon did not build an altar to the idol; rather, the use of the future tense teaches that the verse ascribes him blame as though he built it, since he did not prevent his wives from doing so. Therefore, no proof for the resurrection of the dead may be cited from this verse.

א"ר יהושע בן לוי מניין לתחיית המתים מן התורה שנאמר (תהלים פד, ה) אשרי יושבי ביתך עוד יהללוך סלה היללוך לא נאמר אלא יהללוך מכאן לתחיית המתים מן התורה וא"ר יהושע בן לוי כל האומר שירה בעוה"ז זוכה ואומרה לעולם הבא שנאמר אשרי יושבי ביתך עוד יהללוך סלה Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: From where is resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “Happy are they who dwell in Your house; they will yet praise You, Selah” (Psalms 84:5). It is not stated: They praised you, in the verse; rather, the term “they will praise you” is stated. From here, resurrection of the dead is derived from the Torah. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Anyone who recites song to God in this world is privileged and recites it in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Happy are they who dwell in Your house; they will yet praise You, Selah.”

א"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן מניין לתחיית המתים מן התורה שנאמר (ישעיהו נב, ח) קול צופיך נשאו קול יחדו ירננו וגו' ריננו לא נאמר אלא ירננו מכאן לתחיית המתים מן התורה וא"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן עתידין כל הנביאים כולן אומרים שירה בקול אחד שנאמר קול צופיך נשאו קול יחדו ירננו Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From where is resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “Your watchmen, they raise the voice; together shall they sing, for they shall see eye to eye the Lord returning to Zion” (Isaiah 52:8). It is not stated: They sang, in the verse; rather, the term “together shall they sing” is stated. From here resurrection of the dead is derived from the Torah. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All the prophets are all destined to recite song in one voice, as it is stated: “Your watchmen, they raise the voice; together shall they sing.”

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב כל המונע הלכה מפי תלמיד כאילו גוזלו מנחלת אבותיו שנאמר (דברים לג, ד) תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהילת יעקב מורשה היא לכל ישראל מששת ימי בראשית אמר רב חנא בר ביזנא אמר רבי שמעון חסידא כל המונע הלכה מפי תלמיד אפילו עוברין שבמעי אמו מקללין אותו שנאמר (משלי יא, כו) מונע בר Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to anyone who withholds halakha from being studied by the mouth of a student who seeks to study Torah, it is as though he robs him of the inheritance of his ancestors, as it is stated: “Moses commanded us the Torah, an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob” (Deuteronomy 33:4), indicating that the Torah is an inheritance for all of the Jewish people from the six days of Creation. Rav Ḥana bar Bizna says that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida says: With regard to anyone who withholds halakha from being studied by the mouth of a student who seeks to study Torah, even fetuses in their mother’s womb curse him, as it is stated: “He who withholds bar,

Daf 92a

יקבוהו לאום ואין לאום אלא עוברין שנאמר (בראשית כה, כג) ולאום מלאום יאמץ ואין קבה אלא קללה שנאמר (במדבר כג, ח) מה אקב לא קבה אל ואין בר אלא תורה שנאמר (תהלים ב, יב) נשקו בר פן יאנף the people [leom] shall curse him [yikkevuhu], but blessing shall be upon the head of one who provides” (Proverbs 11:26). And the term leom is referring to nothing other than fetuses, as it is stated: “Two nations are in your womb, and two peoples shall be separated from your bowels; and the one leom shall overcome the other leom” (Genesis 25:23). And kabbo is referring to nothing other than curse, as it is stated in the statement of Balaam: “How can I curse one who is not cursed [kabbo] by God?” (Numbers 23:8). And bar is referring to nothing other than Torah, as it is stated: “Pay homage to bar lest He be angry” (Psalms 2:12), i.e., observe the Torah to avoid God’s wrath.

עולא בר ישמעאל אומר מנקבין אותו ככברה כתיב הכא (משלי יא, כו) יקבוהו לאום וכתיב התם (מלכים ב יב, י) ויקב חור בדלתו ואמר אביי כי אוכלא דקצרי Ulla bar Yishmael says: One perforates like a sieve a person who withholds halakha from a student. It is written here: “He who withholds bar, the people yikkevuhu” (Proverbs 11:26), and it is written there: “And he bored [vayyikkov] a hole in its lid of it” (II Kings 12:10). And Abaye says: One perforates him like a launderers’ utensil used for sprinkling water on garments.

ואם למדו מה שכרו אמר רבא אמר רב ששת זוכה לברכות כיוסף שנאמר (משלי יא, כו) וברכה לראש משביר ואין משביר אלא יוסף שנאמר (בראשית מב, ו) ויוסף הוא [השליט על הארץ הוא] המשביר לכל עם הארץ And if one teaches the student halakha rather than withholding it, what is his reward? Rava says that Rav Sheshet says: He is privileged to receive blessings like Joseph, as it is stated at the end of that verse: “But blessing shall be upon the head of one who provides [mashbir]” (Proverbs 11:26). And mashbir is referring to no one other than Joseph, as it is stated: “And Joseph was the governor of the land, and he was the provider [hamashbir] to all the people of the land” (Genesis 42:6).

אמר רב ששת כל המלמד תורה בעוה"ז זוכה ומלמדה לעולם הבא שנאמר (משלי יא, כה) ומרוה גם הוא יורה Rav Sheshet says: Anyone who teaches Torah in this world is privileged and teaches it in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And he who satisfies abundantly [umarveh] shall be satisfied himself [yoreh]” (Proverbs 11:25). Rav Sheshet interprets the verse homiletically: By transposing the letters of the word marveh: Mem, reish, vav, heh, one arrives at the word moreh, meaning teaches. The verse means that one who teaches [moreh] will teach [yoreh] in the future as well.

אמר רבא מניין לתחיית המתים מן התורה שנאמר (דברים לג, ו) יחי ראובן ואל ימות יחי ראובן בעולם הזה ואל ימות לעולם הבא רבינא אמר מהכא (דניאל יב, ב) ורבים מישני אדמת עפר יקיצו אלה לחיי עולם ואלה לחרפות לדראון עולם רב אשי אמר מהכא (דניאל יב, יג) ואתה לך [לקץ] ותנוח ותעמוד לגורלך לקץ הימין The Gemara returns to the topic of the source for resurrection in the Torah. Rava says: From where is resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “Let Reuben live and not die, in that his men become few” (Deuteronomy 33:6). This is interpreted: “Let Reuben live” in this world “and not die” in the World-to-Come. Ravina says that resurrection is derived from here: “And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awaken, some to everlasting life, and some to reproaches and everlasting disgrace” (Daniel 12:2). Rav Ashi says proof is derived from here: “But go you your way until the end be; and you shall rest, and arise to your lot at the end of days” (Daniel 12:13).

אמר רבי אלעזר כל פרנס שמנהיג את הצבור בנחת זוכה ומנהיגם לעוה"ב שנאמר (ישעיהו מט, י) כי מרחמם ינהגם ועל מבועי מים ינהלם § Rabbi Elazar says: Any communal leader who leads the community calmly, without anger and honestly, is privileged and leads them in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “For he that has compassion upon them will lead them, even by the springs of water shall he guide them” (Isaiah 49:10). Just as he led them in this world, so too will he guide them in the World-to-Come.

וא"ר אלעזר גדולה דעה שניתנה בין שתי אותיות שנאמר (שמואל א ב, ג) כי אל דעות ה' The Gemara proceeds to cite additional statements of Rabbi Elazar relating to recommended conduct. And Rabbi Elazar says: Great is knowledge, as it was placed between two letters, two names of God, as it is stated: “For a God of knowledge is the Lord” (I Samuel 2:3).

וא"ר אלעזר גדול מקדש שניתן בין שתי אותיות שנאמר (שמות טו, יז) פעלת ה' מקדש ה' כוננו ידיך מתקיף לה רב אדא קרחינאה אלא מעתה גדולה נקמה שניתנה בין שתי אותיות דכתיב (תהלים צד, א) אל נקמות ה' אל נקמות הופיע And Rabbi Elazar says: Great is the Holy Temple, as it too was placed between two letters, two names of God, as it is stated: “The place in which to dwell that You have made, Lord, the Temple, Lord, which Your hands have prepared” (Exodus 15:17). Rav Adda Karḥina’a objects to the explanation that being placed between two names of God accords significance. If that is so, the same should hold true for vengeance. Shall one say: Great is vengeance, as it was placed between two letters, as it is written: “God of vengeance, Lord, God of vengeance shine forth” (Psalms 94:1)?

אמר ליה למילתיה הכי נמי כדעולא דאמר עולא שתי הופעיות הללו למה אחת למדת טובה ואחת למדת פורענות Rabbi Elazar said to him: In its context, indeed, vengeance is great, in accordance with the statement of Ulla. As Ulla says with regard to these two appearances: “O Lord, God to Whom vengeance belongs; God to Whom vengeance belongs, appear” (Psalms 94:1), and: “He appeared from Mount Paran” (Deuteronomy 33:2), why are both necessary? One, the second verse, is necessary for the attribute of divine good, with which God gave the Torah at Sinai, and one, the first verse, is necessary for the attribute of divine punishment, with which God exacts vengeance against the enemies and oppressors of the Jewish people.

ואמר ר' אלעזר כל אדם שיש בו דעה כאילו נבנה בית המקדש בימיו שזה ניתן בין שתי אותיות וזה ניתן בין שתי אותיות And Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to any person in whom there is knowledge, it is as though the Temple was built in his days, as this, knowledge, was placed between two letters and that, the Temple, was placed between two letters.

ואמר ר' אלעזר כל אדם שיש בו דעה לסוף מתעשר שנאמר (משלי כד, ד) ובדעת חדרים ימלאו כל הון יקר ונעים And Rabbi Elazar says: Any person in whom there is knowledge ultimately becomes wealthy, as it is stated: “And by knowledge are the chambers filled with all precious and pleasant riches” (Proverbs 24:4).

ואמר ר' אלעזר כל אדם שאין בו דעה אסור לרחם עליו שנאמר (ישעיהו כז, יא) כי לא עם בינות הוא על כן לא ירחמנו עושהו ויוצרו לא יחוננו And Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to any person in whom there is no knowledge, it is prohibited to have mercy upon him, as it is stated: “For it is a people of no understanding; therefore its Maker will have no mercy on them, and its Creator will show them no favor” (Isaiah 27:11). If God has no mercy upon them, all the more so should people not show them mercy.

וא"ר אלעזר כל הנותן פיתו למי שאין בו דעה יסורין באין עליו שנאמר (עובדיה א, ז) לחמך ישימו מזור תחתיך אין תבונה בו ואין מזור אלא יסורין שנאמר (הושע ה, יג) וירא אפרים את חליו ויהודה את מזורו And Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to anyone who gives his bread to one without knowledge, afflictions befall him, as it is stated: “They who eat your bread will place mazor under you, in whom there is no discernment” (Obadiah 1:7). And mazor means nothing other than afflictions, based on the parallel with another verse, as it is stated: “And Ephraim saw his sickness and Judah his wound [mezoro]” (Hosea 5:13). This indicates that one who gives his bread to one without discernment will ultimately fall ill.

ואמר ר' אלעזר כל אדם שאין בו דעה לסוף גולה שנאמר (ישעיהו ה, יג) לכן גלה עמי מבלי דעת And Rabbi Elazar says: Any person in whom there is no knowledge is ultimately exiled, as it is stated: “Therefore my people are exiled, for lack of knowledge” (Isaiah 5:13).

ואמר ר"א כל בית שאין דברי תורה נשמעים בו בלילה אש אוכלתו שנאמר (איוב כ, כו) כל חשך טמון לצפוניו תאכלהו אש לא נופח ירע שריד באהלו אין שריד אלא ת"ח שנאמר (יואל ג, ה) ובשרידים אשר ה' קורא And Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to any house in which there are no matters of Torah heard at night, the fire of Gehenna consumes it, as it is stated: “All darkness is laid up for his treasures, a fire not fanned shall consume him; it shall go ill with a sarid in his tent” (Job 20:26). Sarid is referring to no one but a Torah scholar, as it is stated: “And among the seridim, those whom the Lord shall call” (Joel 3:5). A house that is dark at night and in which no Torah is heard will be consumed by a fire that does not require fanning with a bellows, the fire of Gehenna.

ואמר ר' אלעזר כל שאינו מהנה תלמידי חכמים מנכסיו אינו רואה סימן ברכה לעולם שנאמר (איוב כ, כא) אין שריד לאכלו על כן לא יחיל טובו אין שריד אלא תלמידי חכמים שנאמר ובשרידים אשר ה' קורא And Rabbi Elazar says: Anyone who does not benefit Torah scholars from his property never sees a sign of blessing, as it is stated: “None of his food shall remain [sarid]; therefore his prosperity shall not endure” (Job 20:21). Sarid is referring to no one but Torah scholars, as it is stated: “And among the seridim, those whom the Lord shall call.” No prosperity will come to one who does not share his food with a Torah scholar.

ואמר רבי אלעזר כל שאינו משייר פת על שלחנו אינו רואה סימן ברכה לעולם שנאמר אין שריד לאכלו על כן לא יחיל טובו And Rabbi Elazar says: Anyone who does not leave bread on his table at the end of his meal indicating his gratitude to God for providing him more than enough never sees a sign of blessing, as it is stated: “None of his food shall remain; therefore his prosperity shall not endure.”

והאמר רבי אלעזר כל המשייר פתיתים על שלחנו כאילו עובד ע"ז שנאמר (ישעיהו סה, יא) העורכים לגד שלחן והממלאים למני ממסך לא קשיא הא דאיכא שלימה בהדיה הא דליכה שלימה בהדיה The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: With regard to anyone who leaves pieces of bread on his table, it is as if he worships idols, as it is stated: “Who prepare a table for Fortune [Gad] and offer blended wine for Destiny” (Isaiah 65:11). The people would leave pieces of bread on the table as an offering to the constellation Gad, which they believed influences the fortune of the home. This practice was a form of idol worship. The Gemara answers: This apparent contradiction is not difficult: This case, where leaving pieces of bread is a form of idol worship, applies when there is a whole loaf together with the pieces, as the addition of the pieces is clearly for idol worship; that case, where failure to leave bread on the table is criticized, applies when there is no whole loaf together with the pieces.

ואמר רבי אלעזר כל המחליף בדבורו כאילו עובד ע"ז כתיב הכא (בראשית כז, יב) והייתי בעיניו כמתעתע וכתיב התם (ירמיהו י, טו) הבל המה מעשה תעתועים And Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to anyone who amends the truth in his speech, it is as though he worships idols. As, it is written here, in the verse where Jacob sought to resist taking his father’s blessing from Esau: “And I shall seem to him a deceiver [metate’a]” (Genesis 27:12), and it is written there with regard to idol worship: “They are vanity, the work of deception [tatuim]” (Jeremiah 10:15).

ואמר רבי אלעזר כל המסתכל בערוה קשתו ננערת שנאמר (חבקוק ג, ט) עריה תעור קשתך And Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to anyone who looks at nakedness [erva], his bow is emptied, i.e., he will be robbed of his potency, as it is stated: “Your bow is stripped bare [erya]” (Habakkuk 3:9).

ואמר רבי אלעזר לעולם הוי קבל וקיים אמר רבי זירא אף אנן נמי תנינא בית אפל אין פותחין לו חלונות לראות נגעו ש"מ And Rabbi Elazar says: Forever be in the dark, i.e., anonymous, and you will continue to exist. Rabbi Zeira says: We learn a similar idea in a mishna as well (Nega’im 2:3): In a dark house, one does not open windows to illuminate it in order to see whether or not its blemish is leprosy, and the house retains the presumptive status of ritual purity. Those matters that are obscured are allowed to continue. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from that mishna that this is so.

אמר ר' טבי אמר ר' יאשיה מאי דכתיב (משלי ל, טז) שאול ועוצר רחם ארץ לא שבעה מים וכי מה ענין שאול אצל רחם אלא לומר לך מה רחם מכניס ומוציא אף שאול מכניס ומוציא § The Gemara returns to the topic of the source for resurrection in the Torah. Rabbi Tavi says that Rabbi Yoshiya says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “There are three that are never satisfied…the grave, and the barren womb, and earth that does not receive sufficient water” (Proverbs 30:15–16)? And what does a grave have to do with a womb? Rather, they are juxtaposed to say to you: Just as a womb takes in and gives forth, so too a grave takes in and also gives forth, with the resurrection of the dead.

והלא דברים קל וחומר ומה רחם שמכניסין בו בחשאי מוציאין ממנו בקולי קולות שאול שמכניסין בו בקולות אינו דין שמוציאין ממנו בקולי קולות מיכן תשובה לאומרין אין תחיית המתים מן התורה And are these matters not inferred a fortiori: If with regard to a womb, into which one introduces the embryo in secret, one removes the baby from it accompanied by the loud sounds of the woman crying out during childbirth, then with regard to the grave, into which one introduces the corpse with sounds of wailing and mourning the dead, is it not right that one removes from it the resurrected dead accompanied by the loud sounds of the resurrected multitudes? From here there is a response to those who say: There is no resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah.

תנא דבי אליהו צדיקים שעתיד הקדוש ברוך הוא להחיותן אינן חוזרין לעפרן שנאמר (ישעיהו ד, ג) והיה הנשאר בציון והנותר בירושלים קדוש יאמר לו כל הכתוב לחיים בירושלים מה קדוש לעולם קיים אף הם לעולם קיימין The school of Eliyahu taught: The righteous whom the Holy One, Blessed be He, is destined to resurrect do not return to their dust, as it is stated: “And it shall come to pass, that he who remains in Zion and he who remains in Jerusalem shall be called holy, anyone who is written unto life in Jerusalem” (Isaiah 4:3). Just as the Holy One exists forever, so too will they exist forever.

Daf 92b

ואם תאמר אותן שנים שעתיד הקב"ה לחדש בהן את עולמו שנאמר (ישעיהו ב, יא) ונשגב ה' לבדו ביום ההוא צדיקים מה הן עושין הקב"ה עושה להם כנפים כנשרים ושטין על פני המים שנאמר (תהלים מו, ג) על כן לא נירא בהמיר ארץ במוט הרים בלב ימים ושמא תאמר יש להם צער ת"ל (ישעיהו מ, לא) וקווי ה' יחליפו כח יעלו אבר כנשרים ירוצו ולא ייגעו ילכו ולא ייעפו And if you say: During those years when the Holy One, Blessed be He, is destined to renew His world, as it is stated: “And the Lord alone shall be exalted on that day” (Isaiah 2:11), what are the righteous to do? How will they survive? The Holy One, Blessed be He, will make wings like eagles for them and they will fly over the surface of the water, as it is stated: “Therefore, we will not fear when God changes the land, and when the mountains are moved in the midst of the sea” (Psalms 46:3). Although God will renew the land, they will not fear, because they will be in the sky over the sea at that time. And lest you say that they will endure suffering from flying uninterrupted for an extended period, the verse states: “But they who wait for the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary; they shall walk, and not tire” (Isaiah 40:31).

ונילף ממתים שהחיה יחזקאל סבר לה כמאן דאמר באמת משל היה The Gemara suggests: And let us derive from the dead that Ezekiel revived (see Ezekiel, chapter 37) that the resurrected dead will not live forever, but will die at some point. The Gemara explains: The school of Eliyahu holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says: In truth, Ezekiel’s depiction of the dry bones that came to life was a parable, from which nothing can be derived with regard to the nature of resurrection.

דתניא ר"א אומר מתים שהחיה יחזקאל עמדו על רגליהם ואמרו שירה ומתו מה שירה אמרו ה' ממית בצדק ומחיה ברחמים ר' יהושע אומר שירה זו אמרו (שמואל א ב, ו) ה' ממית ומחיה מוריד שאול ויעל ר' יהודה אומר אמת משל היה This is as it is taught in a baraita, that Rabbi Eliezer says: The dead that Ezekiel revived stood on their feet and recited song to God and died. And what song did they recite? The Lord kills with justice and gives life with mercy. Rabbi Yehoshua says that it was this song that they recited: “The Lord kills, and gives life; He lowers to the grave and elevates” (I Samuel 2:6). Rabbi Yehuda says: Ezekiel’s depiction of the dry bones that came to life was truth and it was a parable.

אמר לו רבי נחמיה אם אמת למה משל ואם משל למה אמת אלא באמת משל היה ר"א בנו של ר' יוסי הגלילי אומר מתים שהחיה יחזקאל עלו לארץ ישראל ונשאו נשים והולידו בנים ובנות עמד ר"י בן בתירא על רגליו ואמר אני מבני בניהם והללו תפילין שהניח לי אבי אבא מהם Rabbi Neḥemya said to Rabbi Yehuda: If it was truth, why do you refer to it as a parable, and if it was a parable, why do you refer to it as truth? Rather, it means: In truth, it was a parable. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: Not only was it not a parable, the dead that Ezekiel revived ascended to Eretz Yisrael and married wives and fathered sons and daughters. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira stood on his feet and said: I am a descendant of their sons, and these are phylacteries that my father’s father left me from them.

ומאן נינהו מתים שהחיה יחזקאל The Gemara asks: And who are the dead that Ezekiel revived?

אמר רב אלו בני אפרים שמנו לקץ וטעו שנאמר (דברי הימים א ז, כ) ובני אפרים שותלח וברד בנו ותחת בנו ואלעדה בנו ותחת בנו וזבד בנו ושותלח בנו ועזר (ואלעזר) [ואלעד] והרגום אנשי גת הנולדים בארץ וגו' וכתיב (דברי הימים א ז, כב) ויתאבל אפרים אביהם ימים רבים ויבאו אחיו לנחמו Rav says: These were the descendants of Ephraim who calculated the time of the end of the enslavement and the redemption from Egypt and erred in their calculation. They left before the appointed time and were killed, as it is stated: “And the sons of Ephraim; Shuthelah, and Bered his son, and Tahath his son, and Eleadah his son, and Tahath his son. And Zabad his son, and Shuthelah his son, and Ezer and Elead whom the men of Gath that were born in the land slew, because they came down to take their cattle” (I Chronicles 7:20–21), and it is written: “And Ephraim their father mourned many days, and his brothers came to comfort him” (I Chronicles 7:22).

ושמואל אמר אלו בני אדם שכפרו בתחיית המתים שנאמר (יחזקאל לז, יא) ויאמר אלי בן אדם העצמות האלה כל בית ישראל המה הנה אומרים יבשו עצמותינו ואבדה תקותנו נגזרנו לנו And Shmuel says: These dead that Ezekiel revived were people who denied the resurrection of the dead, as it is stated: “Then He said to me: Son of man, these bones are the whole house of Israel; behold, they say: Our bones are dried and our hope is lost; we are cut off” (Ezekiel 37:11). God tells Ezekiel that these were people who had lost hope for resurrection.

ר' ירמיה בר אבא אמר אלו בני אדם שאין בהן לחלוחית של מצוה שנאמר (יחזקאל לז, ד) העצמות היבשות שמעו דבר ה' Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: These were people in whom there was not even the moist residue of a mitzva, as it is stated: “The dry bones, hear the word of the Lord” (Ezekiel 37:4). Even during their lifetime they were comparable to dry bones.

ר' יצחק נפחא אמר אלו בני אדם שחיפו את ההיכל כולו שקצים ורמשים שנאמר (יחזקאל ח, י) ואבוא ואראה והנה כל תבנית רמש ובהמה שקץ וכל גלולי בית ישראל מחוקה על הקיר סביב וגו' וכתיב התם (יחזקאל לז, ב) והעבירני עליהם סביב סביב Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: These are the people who covered the Sanctuary with repugnant creatures and creeping animals, as it is stated: “So I entered and saw and behold, every form of creeping animal and repugnant animal, and all the idols of the house of Israel, etched upon the wall around” (Ezekiel 8:10), and it is written there with regard to the prophecy of the dry bones: “And he passed me over them around and around” (Ezekiel 37:2). By means of a verbal analogy between: Around, in one verse and the identical term in the other it is derived that the two verses are referring to the same people.

ר' יוחנן אמר אלו מתים שבבקעת דורא וא"ר יוחנן מנהר אשל עד רבת בקעת דורא שבשעה שהגלה נבוכדנצר הרשע את ישראל היו בהן בחורים שהיו מגנין את החמה ביופיין והיו כשדיות רואות אותן ושופעות זבות אמרו לבעליהן ובעליהן למלך צוה המלך והרגום ועדיין היו שופעות זבות צוה המלך ורמסום Rabbi Yoḥanan says: These are the dead from the Dura Valley (see Daniel, chapter 3). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: These corpses filled the area from the Eshel River to Rabat, which constitutes the Dura Valley. As, at the time that Nebuchadnezzar the wicked exiled the Jewish people to Babylonia, there were among them youths who overshadowed the sun with their beauty, and the Chaldean women would see them, and desire them, and discharge the flow of a zava. These women told their husbands, and their husbands told the king. The king ordered the youths executed, and his servants executed them. And their execution did not resolve the problem, as the women were still discharging the flow of a zava. Even after death, the youths’ beauty remained intact. The king ordered that their corpses be taken to the valley, and his servants trampled them so that their form would no longer be visible.

תנו רבנן בשעה שהפיל נבוכדנצר הרשע את חנניה מישאל ועזריה לכבשן האש אמר לו הקב"ה ליחזקאל לך והחייה מתים בבקעת דורא כיון שהחייה אותן באו עצמות וטפחו לו לאותו רשע על פניו אמר מה טיבן של אלו אמרו לו חבריהן של אלו מחיה מתים בבקעת דורא פתח ואמר (דניאל ג, לג) אתוהי כמה רברבין ותמהוהי כמה תקיפין מלכותיה מלכות עלם ושלטניה עם דר ודר וגו' § The Sages taught in a baraita: At the moment that Nebuchadnezzar the wicked cast Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah into the fiery furnace, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Ezekiel: Go and revive the dead in the Dura Valley. Once Ezekiel revived them, the bones came and struck Nebuchadnezzar, that wicked man, in his face. Nebuchadnezzar said: What is the nature of these? His servants said to him: The friend of these three, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, is reviving the dead in the Dura Valley. Nebuchadnezzar began and said: “How great are His signs and how mighty are His wonders; His kingdom is an everlasting kingdom and His dominion is from generation to generation” (Daniel 3:33).

א"ר יצחק יוצק זהב רותח לתוך פיו של אותו רשע שאילמלא (לא) בא מלאך וסטרו על פיו ביקש לגנות כל שירות ותושבחות שאמר דוד בספר תהלים Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Molten gold should be poured into the mouth of that wicked person. His mouth should be sealed in the course of an extraordinary death; in deference to royalty, Rabbi Yitzḥak suggested that gold would be used to accomplish that task. The reason is that if an angel had not come and struck him on his mouth to prevent him from continuing his praise, he would have sought to overshadow all the songs and praises that David recited in the book of Psalms.

ת"ר ששה נסים נעשו באותו היום ואלו הן צף הכבשן ונפרץ הכבשן והומק סודו ונהפך צלם על פניו ונשרפו ארבע מלכיות והחייה יחזקאל את המתים בבקעת דורא The Sages taught in a baraita: Six miracles were performed on that day that Hananiah, Mishael, and Azarya were delivered from the furnace, and they are: The furnace rose from where it was sunken to ground level; and the furnace was breached; and its limestone dissipated; and the graven image that Nebuchadnezzar established, which he commanded his subjects to worship (see Daniel 3:5–6), fell on its face; and four ranks of officials from monarchies, who stood around the furnace, were burned; and Ezekiel revived the dead in the Dura Valley.

וכולהו גמרא וארבע מלכיות קרא דכתיב (דניאל ג, ב) ונבוכדנצר מלכא שלח למכנש לאחשדרפניא סגניא ופחוותא אדרגזריא גדבריא דתבריא תפתיא וכל שלטוני מדינתא וגו' וכתיב איתי גוברין יהודאין וכתיב ומתכנשין אחשדרפניא סגניא ופחוותא והדברי מלכא חזיין לגבריא אלך וגו' And the knowledge that all of the miracles were performed is based on tradition. And the four ranks of officials from monarchies that were burned is related in a verse, as it is written: “Then Nebuchadnezzar the king sent to gather together the satraps, the prefects and the governors, the counselors, the treasurers, the justices, the magistrates and all the rulers of the provinces” (Daniel 3:2). And it is written: “There are certain Jews…they do not serve your gods, nor worship the golden image you have erected” (Daniel 3:12). And it is written in the verse after Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah left the fiery furnace: “And the satraps, the prefects, the governors, and the king’s counselors gathered and saw these men” (Daniel 3:27) who emerged from the fire unscathed. Nebuchadnezzar sent to gather eight ranks of officials, and only four ranks witnessed Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah emerge from the furnace. Apparently, the other four ranks were burned in the fire.

תני דבי רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אפילו בשעת הסכנה לא ישנה אדם את עצמו מן הרבנות שלו שנאמר (דניאל ג, כא) באדין גבריא אלך כפתו בסרבליהון פטשיהון וכרבלתהון וגו' The school of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov teaches: Even during a period of danger, a person should not deviate from his prominence and demean himself, as it is stated: “Then these men were bound in their mantles, their tunics, and their hats, and their other garments, and they were cast into the blazing fiery furnace” (Daniel 3:21). Even when cast into the furnace, they donned garments befitting their station.

אמר רבי יוחנן Rabbi Yoḥanan says:

Daf 93a

גדולים צדיקים יותר ממלאכי השרת שנאמר (דניאל ג, כה) ענה ואמר הא אנא חזי גוברין ארבעה שריין מהלכין בגו נורא וחבל לא איתי בהון ורויה די רביעאה דמה לבר אלהין The righteous are greater than the ministering angels, as it is stated: “He answered and said: I see four men unbound, walking in the midst of the fire, and they have no hurt; and the appearance of the fourth is like a son of the gods” (Daniel 3:25). Nebuchadnezzar saw three righteous people and an angel in the fire of the furnace and noted the presence of the righteous people before noting the presence of the angel.

אמר ר' תנחום בר חנילאי בשעה שיצאו חנניה מישאל ועזריה מכבשן האש באו כל אומות העולם וטפחו לשונאיהן של ישראל על פניהם אמרו להם יש לכם אלוה כזה ואתם משתחוים לצלם מיד פתחו ואמרו (דניאל ט, ז) לך ה' הצדקה ולנו בושת הפנים כיום הזה § Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai says: At the moment that Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah emerged from the fiery furnace, all the nations of the world came and struck the enemies of Israel, a euphemism for the Jewish people, in the face and said to them: You have a God with capabilities like that and you bow to the graven image? Immediately Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah began and said: “Lord, righteousness is Yours, but we are shamefaced, as of this day” (Daniel 9:7).

אמר ר' שמואל בר נחמני אמר ר' יונתן מאי דכתיב (שיר השירים ז, ט) אמרתי אעלה בתמר אוחזה בסנסניו אמרתי אעלה בתמר אלו ישראל ועכשיו לא עלה בידי אלא סנסן אחד של חנניה מישאל ועזריה Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says on a similar note: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I said: I will climb into the palm tree; I will grasp its boughs” (Song of Songs 7:9)? “I said: I will climb into the palm tree”; this is a reference to the Jewish people, who are likened to a palm tree, as they are upright and have one heart directed toward their Father in Heaven. God continues: And now that I have tested them by means of the decrees of Nebuchadnezzar, I have succeeded in grasping in My hand only the one bough of Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, as only they were willing to give their lives.

אמר רבי יוחנן מאי דכתיב (זכריה א, ח) ראיתי הלילה והנה איש רוכב על סוס אדום והוא עומד בין ההדסים אשר במצולה [וגו'] מאי ראיתי הלילה ביקש הקב"ה להפוך את כל העולם כולו ללילה והנה איש רוכב אין איש אלא הקב"ה שנאמר (שמות טו, ג) ה' איש מלחמה ה' שמו על סוס אדום ביקש הקב"ה להפוך את העולם כולו לדם Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I saw the night, and behold, a man riding upon a red horse, and he stood among the myrtle bushes that were in the depths” (Zechariah 1:8)? What is the meaning of the phrase “I saw the night”? The Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to transform the entire world into night and destroy it, as there were no righteous people. “And behold, a man riding”; the word “man” is referring to no one but the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is stated: “The Lord is a man of war, The Lord is His name” (Exodus 15:3). “Upon a red horse” alludes to the fact that the Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to transform the whole world into blood.

כיון שנסתכל בחנניה מישאל ועזריה נתקררה דעתו שנאמר (זכריה א, ח) והוא עומד בין ההדסים אשר במצולה ואין הדסים אלא צדיקים שנאמר (אסתר ב, ז) ויהי אומן את הדסה ואין מצולה אלא בבל שנאמר (ישעיהו מד, כז) האומר לצולה חרבי ונהרותיך אוביש מיד מלאים רוגז נעשים שרוקים ואדומים נעשו לבנים אמר רב פפא שמע מינה סוסיא חיורא מעלי לחלמא: Once He looked at Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah He was placated, as it is stated: “And he stood among the myrtle bushes [hadassim] that were in the depths [bametzula].” And hadassim is referring to no one but the righteous, as it is stated: “And he raised Hadassah, that is Esther, his uncle’s daughter” (Esther 2:7). Hadassah is an appellation for the righteous Esther. And metzula is referring to no place but Babylonia, as it is stated with regard to the downfall of Babylonia: “That says to the deep [latzula]: Be dry, and I will dry up your rivers” (Isaiah 44:27). Immediately those messengers, in the form of horses, filled with anger and became gray, and those who were red became white. Rav Pappa says: Conclude from it that seeing a white horse in a dream is a good portent for that dream, as it presages peace and quiet.

ורבנן להיכא (אזול) [אזלו] אמר רב בעין [הרע] מתו ושמואל אמר ברוק טבעו ור' יוחנן אמר עלו לארץ ישראל ונשאו נשים והולידו בנים ובנות The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Sages, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, where did they go after their miraculous deliverance, as there is no further mention of them? Rav says: They died as the result of the evil eye, as everyone was jealous of their deliverance. And Shmuel says: They drowned in the spittle of the nations of the world who held the Jewish people in contempt due to their failure to serve God in the appropriate manner. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They ascended to Eretz Yisrael and married women and fathered sons and daughters.

כתנאי ר' אליעזר אומר בעין [הרע] מתו ר' יהושע אומר ברוק טבעו וחכ"א עלו לא"י ונשאו נשים והולידו בנים ובנות שנאמר (זכריה ג, ח) שמע נא יהושע הכהן הגדול אתה ורעיך היושבים לפניך כי אנשי מופת המה איזו הם אנשים שנעשה להן מופת הוי אומר זה חנניה מישאל ועזריה The Gemara comments: This amoraic dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. Rabbi Eliezer says: They died as the result of the evil eye. Rabbi Yehoshua says: They drowned in the spittle. And the Rabbis say: They ascended to Eretz Yisrael and married women and fathered sons and daughters, as it is stated: “Hear now, Joshua the High Priest, you and your fellows who sit before you, for they are men of wonder” (Zechariah 3:8). Who are the people who had a wonder performed for them in that generation? You must say that it is Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah.

ודניאל להיכן אזל אמר רב למיכרא נהרא רבא בטבריא ושמואל אמר לאתויי ביזרא דאספסתא ור' יוחנן אמר לאתויי חזירי דאלכסנדריא של מצרים איני והתניא תודוס הרופא אמר אין פרה וחזירה יוצא מאלכסנדריא של מצרים שאין חותכין האם שלה בשביל שלא תלד זוטרי אייתי בלא דעתייהו The Gemara asks: And where did Daniel go? He certainly did not bow to the graven image, and he was not cast into the furnace. Apparently, he was elsewhere. Rav says: He went to dig the great river in Tiberias. And Shmuel says: Daniel went to bring choice alfalfa seed from a distance, and therefore he was not in Babylonia. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He went to bring the high-quality pigs of Alexandria of Egypt. The Gemara asks: Is that so that he went to bring the pigs? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Theodosius the doctor says: No cow or sow emerges from Alexandria of Egypt whose womb is not severed so that it will not give birth? The Gemara answers: They were small pigs that he brought without the knowledge of the people of Alexandria.

ת"ר שלשה היו באותה עצה הקב"ה ודניאל ונבוכדנצר הקב"ה אמר ניזיל דניאל מהכא דלא לימרו בזכותיה איתנצל The Sages taught: Three were partners in that plan to ensure that Daniel would not be in Babylonia when the decree of persecution was in effect: The Holy One, Blessed be He; Daniel; and Nebuchadnezzar. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Let Daniel go from here, so that people would not say that Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah were delivered from the fiery furnace due to the virtue of Daniel, rather than due to their own righteousness.

ודניאל אמר איזיל מהכא דלא ליקיים בי (דברים ז, כה) פסילי אלהיהם תשרפון באש And Daniel said to himself: I will go away from here so that this verse will not be fulfilled in my regard: “The graven images of their gods shall you burn with fire” (Deuteronomy 7:25). Daniel was concerned that because Nebuchadnezzar worshipped him like a deity, his legal status was that of an idol, and he would be burned.

ונבוכדנצר אמר יזיל דניאל מהכא דלא לימרו קלייה לאלהיה בנורא ומניין דסגיד ליה דכתיב (דניאל ב, מו) באדין מלכא נבוכדנצר נפל על אנפוהי ולדניאל סגיד וגו': And Nebuchadnezzar said: Daniel should go away from here so that the people will not say: Nebuchadnezzar burned his god in fire. And from where is it derived that Nebuchadnezzar worshipped Daniel? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “Then the king Nebuchadnezzar fell upon his face and worshipped Daniel and commanded that they should offer an offering and pleasing aromas to him” (Daniel 2:46).

(ירמיהו כט, כא) כה אמר ה' צבאות אלהי ישראל אל אחאב בן קוליה ואל צדקיה בן מעשיה הנבאים לכם בשמי לשקר וגו' וכתיב (ירמיהו כט, כב) ולוקח מהם קללה לכל גלות יהודה אשר בבבל לאמר ישימך ה' כצדקיהו וכאחאב אשר קלם מלך בבל באש אשר שרפם לא נאמר אלא אשר קלם אמר רבי יוחנן משום ר' שמעון בן יוחי מלמד שעשאן כקליות § Apropos the deliverance of Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, the Gemara cites the verses: “So says the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, concerning Ahab, son of Kolaiah, and of Zedekiah, son of Maaseiah, who prophesy to you a lie in My name: Behold, I will deliver them into the hand of Nebuchadrezzar, king of Babylonia; and he shall slay them before your eyes” (Jeremiah 29:21). And it is written: “And of them shall be taken a curse by all the captivity of Judea, who are in Babylonia, saying: May the Lord make you like Zedekiah and like Ahab, whom the king of Babylonia toasted in the fire” (Jeremiah 29:22). It is not stated: Whom the king of Babylonia burned, but “whom the king of Babylonia toasted.” Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: This teaches that he rendered them like toasted wheat, which is toasted on all sides.

(ירמיהו כט, כג) יען אשר עשו נבלה בישראל וינאפו את נשי רעיהם מאי עבוד אזול לגבי ברתיה דנבוכדנצר אחאב אמר לה כה אמר ה' השמיעי אל צדקיה וצדקיה אמר כה אמר ה' השמיעי אל אחאב אזלה ואמרה ליה לאבוה אמר לה אלהיהם של אלו שונא זימה הוא כי אתו לגבך שדרינהו לגבאי The verse states: “Because they have committed baseness in Israel, and have committed adultery with the wives of their neighbors” (Jeremiah 29:23). What did they do? The Gemara relates: They went to the daughter of Nebuchadnezzar. Ahab said to her: So says the Lord: Submit to Zedekiah and engage in intercourse with him. And Zedekiah said to her: So says the Lord: Submit to Ahab and engage in intercourse with him. She went and said to her father what they said to her. Nebuchadnezzar said to her: The God of these people abhors lewdness, so this is likely a false prophecy. When they come to you, send them to me.

כי אתו לגבה שדרתנהו לגבי אבוה אמר להו מאן אמר לכון אמרו הקדוש ברוך הוא והא חנניה מישאל ועזריה שאלתינהו ואמרו לי אסור אמרו ליה אנן נמי נביאי כוותייהו לדידהו לא אמר להו לדידן אמר לן אמר להו אנא בעינא דאיבדקינכו כי היכי דבדקתינהו לחנניה מישאל ועזריה When they came to her, she sent them to her father. Nebuchadnezzar said to them: Who told you to do this? They said: It was the Holy One, Blessed be He. Nebuchadnezzar said: But haven’t I have asked Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah about this and they said to me: It is prohibited? They said to him: We too are prophets like they are. God did not say this prophecy to them; He said it to us. Nebuchadnezzar said to them: If so, I wish to put you to the test to determine if you are righteous, just as I put Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah to the test.

אמרו ליה אינון תלתא הוו ואנן תרין אמר להו בחרו לכון מאן דבעיתו בהדייכו אמרו יהושע כהן גדול סברי ליתי יהושע דנפיש זכותיה ומגנא עלן Ahab and Zedekiah said to Nebuchadnezzar: They were three and we are only two, and our merit is not great enough to save us from the fire. Nebuchadnezzar said to them: Choose for yourselves a third person, whomever you wish, to be put to the test with you. They said to him: We choose Joshua the High Priest. They chose him because they thought: Let Joshua the High Priest come with us, since his merit is great and it will protect us.

אחתיוהו שדינהו אינהו איקלו יהושע כהן גדול איחרוכי מאניה שנאמר (זכריה ג, א) ויראני את יהושע הכהן הגדול עומד לפני מלאך ה' וגו' וכתיב (זכריה ג, ב) ויאמר ה' אל השטן יגער ה' בך וגו' They took the three of them down and cast them into the furnace. They were burned, and as for Joshua the High Priest, his garments were singed, as it is stated: “And He showed me Joshua the High Priest, standing before the angel of the Lord, and Satan was standing at his right to thwart him” (Zechariah 3:1). And it is written: “And the Lord said to Satan, the Lord shall rebuke you, Satan, the Lord Who has chosen Jerusalem shall rebuke you; is this man not a firebrand plucked from fire?” (Zechariah 3:2). This is an allusion to the fact that he was delivered from the fiery furnace, although he was slightly singed.

א"ל ידענא דצדיקא את אלא מאי טעמא אהניא בך פורתא נורא חנניה מישאל ועזריה לא אהניא בהו כלל א"ל אינהו תלתא הוו ואנא חד א"ל והא אברהם יחיד הוה התם לא הוו רשעים בהדיה ולא אתיהיב רשותא לנורא הכא הוו רשעים בהדי ואתיהיב רשותא לנורא היינו דאמרי אינשי תרי אודי יבישי וחד רטיבא אוקדן יבישי לרטיבא Nebuchadnezzar said to Joshua the High Priest: I know you are righteous because you were delivered from the fire, but what is the reason that the fire was slightly effective concerning you, and for Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah the fire was not effective concerning them at all, and their garments were not singed? Joshua the High Priest said to him: They were three righteous people, and I am one. Nebuchadnezzar said to him: But wasn’t Abraham one person, and when he was cast into the furnace the fire had no effect? Joshua answered him: There, in the case of Abraham, there were no wicked people with him, and license to cause damage was not given to the fire. Here, in this case, there were wicked people with me, and license to cause damage was given to the fire. The Gemara adds that this explains the adage that people say: If there are two dry firebrands and one moist one in a fire, the dry firebrands burn the moist one.

מאי טעמא איענש אמר רב פפא שהיו בניו נושאין נשים שאינן הגונות לכהונה ולא מיחה בהן שנאמר (זכריה ג, ג) ויהושע היה לבוש בגדים צואים וכי דרכו של יהושע ללבוש בגדים צואים אלא מלמד שהיו בניו נושאים נשים שאינן הגונות לכהונה ולא מיחה בהן The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Joshua the High Priest was punished and was cast into the furnace? Rav Pappa says: It was due to the fact that his sons would marry women who were not fit for marriage into the priesthood, and he did not reprimand them, as it is stated: “And Joshua was clothed in filthy garments, and he stood before the angel” (Zechariah 3:3). And was it the typical manner of Joshua to wear filthy garments? Rather this verse teaches an allusion that his sons would marry women who were not fit for marriage into the priesthood, and he did not reprimand them. That is why he appeared with soiled garments in the vision of the prophet Zechariah.

אמר רבי תנחום דרש בר קפרא בציפורי מאי דכתיב (רות ג, יז) שש השעורים האלה נתן לי מאי שש השעורים אילימא שש שעורים ממש וכי דרכו של בועז ליתן מתנה שש שעורים § Apropos Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Tanḥum says that bar Kappara taught in Tzippori: What is the meaning of that which is written with regard to the statement of Ruth to Naomi concerning Boaz: “These six grains of barley he gave me” (Ruth 3:17). What is the meaning of the phrase “six grains of barley”? If we say that the reference is to six actual grains of barley, is it the typical manner of Boaz to give a minimal gift of six grains of barley?

Daf 93b

אלא שש סאין Rather, he gave her six se’a.

וכי דרכה של אשה ליטול שש סאין אלא רמז [רמז] לה שעתידין ששה בנים לצאת ממנה שמתברכין בשש [שש] ברכות ואלו הן דוד ומשיח דניאל חנניה מישאל ועזריה דוד דכתיב (שמואל א טז, יח) ויען אחד מהנערים ויאמר הנה ראיתי בן לישי בית הלחמי יודע נגן וגבור חיל ואיש מלחמה ונבון דבר ואיש תואר וה' עמו וגו' The Gemara asks: And is it the typical manner of a woman to take a heavy burden of six se’a of barley? Rather, Boaz alluded to Ruth that six descendants are destined to emerge from her who would each be blessed with six blessings, and these are they: David, and the Messiah, Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah. The Gemara elaborates: David was blessed with six virtues, as it is written: “And one of the servants answered and said: Behold, I have seen a son of Yishai of the house of Bethlehem who knows to play, and is a fine warrior, and a man of war, and prudent in speech, and a comely man, and the Lord is with him” (I Samuel 16:18).

ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב כל הפסוק הזה לא אמרו דואג אלא בלשון הרע יודע נגן שיודע לישאל גבור שיודע להשיב איש מלחמה שיודע לישא וליתן במלחמתה של תורה (איש תואר שמראה פנים בהלכה ונבון דבר שמבין דבר מתוך דבר) וה' עמו שהלכה כמותו בכל מקום Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Doeg the Edomite, one of Saul’s servants, stated this entire verse only as malicious speech, in an attempt to incite Saul to be jealous of David. “Who knows how to play” means that he knows how to ask complex and germane questions about Torah matters. “A fine warrior” means that he knows how to answer questions raised with regard to matters of Torah. “A man of war,” means that he knows to negotiate his way in the battle to understand the Torah. “A comely man” is one who displays understanding in facets of halakha and explains it well. “And prudent in speech [davar]” means that he infers one matter [davar] from another matter. “And the Lord is with him” means that the halakha is ruled in accordance with his opinion in every area of halakha.

בכולהו אמר להו יהונתן בני כמוהו כיון דאמר ליה [וה' עמו] מילתא דבדידיה נמי לא הוה ביה חלש דעתיה ואיקניא ביה דבשאול כתיב (שמואל א יד, מז) ובכל אשר יפנה ירשיע ובדוד כתיב ובכל אשר יפנה יצליח The Gemara relates: In response to all of these virtues listed in praise of David, Saul said to his servants: My son Jonathan is his equal. Once Doeg said to Saul: “And the Lord is with him,” meaning that the halakha is ruled in accordance with his opinion in every area of halakha, a matter that did not apply even to Saul himself, he was offended and grew jealous of David. As with regard to Saul it is written: “And wherever he turned he put them to the worse” (I Samuel 14:47), and with regard to David it is written: And wherever he turns he does prosper. Although the verse about Saul is referring to his victories and his prominence in Torah, he was not privileged to have all of his conclusions accepted as halakha.

מנלן דדואג הוה כתיב הכא (שמואל א טז, יח) ויען אחד מהנערים מיוחד שבנערים וכתיב התם (שמואל א כא, ח) ושם איש מעבדי שאול ביום ההוא נעצר לפני ה' ושמו דואג האדומי אביר הרועים אשר לשאול The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that it was Doeg who listed the virtues in this verse? The Gemara answers that it is written here: “And one [eḥad] of the servants answered,” meaning the most notable [meyuḥad] of the servants. And it is written there: “And a certain man of the servants of Saul was there that day, detained before the Lord, and his name was Doeg the Edomite, the chief of the herdsmen that belonged to Saul” (I Samuel 21:8).

משיח דכתיב (ישעיהו יא, ב) ונחה עליו רוח ה' רוח חכמה ובינה רוח עצה וגבורה רוח דעת ויראת ה' וגו' וכתיב (ישעיהו יא, ג) והריחו ביראת ה' The Messiah was blessed with six virtues, as it is written: “And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord” (Isaiah 11:2); and it is written: “And his delight [vahariḥo] shall be the fear of the Lord, and he shall neither judge after the sight of his eyes, nor decide after the hearing of his ears” (Isaiah 11:3).

אמר רבי אלכסנדרי מלמד שהטעינו מצות ויסורין כריחיים רבא אמר דמורח ודאין דכתיב (ישעיהו יא, ג) ולא למראה עיניו ישפוט (ישעיהו יא, ד) ושפט בצדק דלים והוכיח במישור לענוי ארץ Rabbi Alexandri says that the term hariḥo teaches that God burdened the Messiah with mitzvot and afflictions like millstones [reiḥayim]. Rava says that hariḥo teaches that the Messiah will smell [demoraḥ] and then judge on that basis, sensing who is right, as it is written: “And he shall neither judge after the sight of [lemareh] his eyes, nor decide after the hearing of his ears; and with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and decide equity for the meek of the earth” (Isaiah 11:3–4).

בר כוזיבא מלך תרתין שנין ופלגא אמר להו לרבנן אנא משיח אמרו ליה במשיח כתיב דמורח ודאין נחזי אנן אי מורח ודאין כיון דחזיוהו דלא מורח ודאין קטלוהו The Gemara relates: Bar Koziva, i.e., bar Kokheva, ruled for two and a half years. He said to the Sages: I am the Messiah. They said to him: With regard to the Messiah it is written that he is able to smell and judge, so let us see ourselves whether he, bar Kokheva, is able to smell and judge. Once they saw that he was not able to smell and judge, the gentiles killed him.

דניאל חנניה מישאל ועזריה דכתיב בהו (דניאל א, ד) אשר אין בהם כל מאום וטובי מראה ומשכילים בכל חכמה ויודעי דעת ומביני מדע ואשר כח בהם לעמוד בהיכל המלך וללמדם ספר ולשון כשדים Six virtues were ascribed to Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, as it is written in their regard: “Youths in whom was found no blemish, and well favored, and skillful in all wisdom, and discerning in knowledge, and perceptive in understanding, and who had strength in them to stand in the king’s palace, and whom they might teach the learning and the tongue of the Chaldeans” (Daniel 1:4).

מאי אשר אין בהם כל מום אמר רבי חמא (בר חנניא) אפילו כריבדא דכוסילתא לא הוה בהו מאי ואשר כח בהם לעמוד בהיכל המלך אמר רבי חמא ברבי חנינא מלמד שהיו אונסין את עצמן מן השחוק ומן השיחה ומן השינה ומעמידין על עצמן בשעה שנצרכין לנקביהם מפני אימת מלכות The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase “in whom was found no blemish”? Rabbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina says: Even a scratch like the wound that remains after bloodletting was not found in them. What is the meaning of the phrase “and who had strength in them to stand in the king’s place”? What strength is needed to do so? Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: This teaches that they would force themselves to refrain from laughter, and from conversation, and from sleep, and would restrain themselves when they felt the urge to relieve themselves via their orifices, due to fear of the monarchy.

(דניאל א, ו) ויהיו בהם מבני יהודה דניאל חנניה מישאל ועזריה אמר רבי (אליעזר) כולן מבני יהודה הם ורבי שמואל בר נחמני אמר דניאל מבני יהודה חנניה מישאל ועזריה משאר שבטים § The Gemara explores more of their attributes. The verse states: “Now among these were, of the descendants of Judah: Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah” (Daniel 1:6). Rabbi Eliezer says: They were all of the descendants of Judah. And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: Daniel was of the descendants of Judah, and Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah were descendants of other tribes.

(ישעיהו לט, ז) ומבניך אשר יצאו ממך אשר תוליד יקחו והיו סריסים בהיכל מלך בבל מאי סריסים רב אמר סריסים ממש ורבי חנינא אמר שנסתרסה ע"ז בימיהם Isaiah prophesied to Hezekiah: “And of your sons that shall issue from you, they shall be taken away; and they shall be officers [sarisim] in the palace of the king of Babylonia” (Isaiah 39:7). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of sarisim? Rav says: It means literally eunuchs, whom the Babylonians castrated to render them suitable for employment in all aspects of the king’s service. And Rabbi Ḥanina says: It means that idol worship was emasculated during their lifetime, as it became clear to all that it lacks substance.

בשלמא למאן דאמר שנסתרסה ע"ז בימיהם היינו דכתיב (דניאל ג, כה) וחבל לא איתי בהון אלא למאן דאמר סריסים ממש מאי וחבל לא איתי בהון חבלא דנורא והכתיב (דניאל ג, כז) וריח נור לא עדת בהן לא חבלא ולא ריחא The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that idol worship was emasculated during their lifetime, that is as it is written: “And they have no hurt” (Daniel 3:25), indicating that the bodies of Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah were intact and they were not castrated. But according to the one who says that they were literally eunuchs, what is the meaning of the phrase “And they have no hurt”? The Gemara answers: It means they had no hurt from the fire of the furnace, not that their bodies were completely intact. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it already written: “Nor had the odor of fire passed over them” (Daniel 3:27)? There was no need to repeat that they were unaffected by the fire. The Gemara answers: This means that there was neither hurt from the fire nor harm from the odor of the fire.

בשלמא למאן דאמר שנסתרסה ע"ז בימיהם היינו דכתיב (ישעיהו נו, ד) כה אמר ה' לסריסים אשר ישמרו את שבתותי וגו' אלא למאן דאמר סריסים ממש משתעי קרא בגנותא דצדיקי הא והא הוה בהו The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that idol worship was emasculated during their lifetime, that is as it is written: “For so says the Lord to the sarisim who observe My Shabbatot, and choose what pleases Me, and keep My covenant” (Isaiah 56:4). This verse calls them sarisim due to their miraculous deliverance from the furnace. But according to the one who says that they were literally eunuchs, would the verse speak in denigration of the righteous? Would the verse identify Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah by their blemish rather than by their names? The Gemara answers: According to the one who says that they were literally eunuchs, both this, the physical imperfection, and that, the fact that idol worship was emasculated during their lifetime, were true concerning them.

בשלמא למאן דאמר סריסים ממש היינו דכתיב (ישעיהו נו, ה) בביתי ובחומותי יד ושם טוב מבנים ומבנות אלא למאן דאמר שנסתרסה ע"ז בימיהם מאי טוב מבנים ומבנות אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק מבנים שהיו להם כבר ומתו מאי שם עולם אתן לו אשר לא יכרת אמר ר' תנחום דרש בר קפרא בצפורי זה ספר דניאל שנקרא על שמו The Gemara asks from another perspective: Granted, according to the one who says that they were literally eunuchs, that is as it is written in the next verse: “And to them I will give in My house and within My walls a memorial better than sons and daughters: I will give him an everlasting name, that shall not be excised” (Isaiah 56:5). But according to the one who says that idol worship was emasculated during their lifetime, what is the meaning of the phrase “better than sons and daughters”? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: It is consolation that concerning children that they already had and who died, that they would also be memorialized. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase “an everlasting name that shall not be excised”? Rabbi Tanḥum says that bar Kappara taught in Tzippori: This is referring to the book of Daniel, which is called by his name.

מכדי כל מילי דעזרא נחמיה בן חכליה אמרינהו ונחמיה בן חכליה מ"ט לא איקרי סיפרא על שמיה אמר רבי ירמיה בר אבא מפני שהחזיק טובה לעצמו שנאמר (נחמיה ה, יט) זכרה לי אלהי לטובה דוד נמי מימר אמר (תהלים קו, ד) זכרני ה' ברצון עמך פקדני בישועתך דוד רחמי הוא דקבעי § Apropos books of the Bible named for a prominent person, the Gemara asks: Now with regard to all the matters of the book of Ezra, Nehemiah, son of Hacaliah, said them and wrote most of them; and with regard to Nehemiah, son of Hacaliah, what is the reason that a book was not called by his name? Over the course of many generations, extending many years after the talmudic period, the book that is today named for Nehemiah was not a separate book and was included in the book of Ezra. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: The book was not named for Nehemiah because he took credit for himself and boasted about his good deeds, as it is stated: “Remember me, God, for good” (Nehemiah 13:31). The Gemara asks: Is that a shortcoming? King David also said: “Remember me, Lord, when You show favor to Your people; visit me with Your salvation” (Psalms 106:4). The Gemara answers: David was asking for compassion and formulated his words as a prayer. Nehemiah stated them as a fact and a demand.

רב יוסף אמר מפני שסיפר בגנותן של ראשונים שנאמר (נחמיה ה, טו) והפחות הראשונים אשר לפני הכבידו על העם ויקחו מהם בלחם ויין אחד כסף שקלים ארבעים וגו' ואף על דניאל שגדול ממנו סיפר Rav Yosef says: Nehemiah was punished because he spoke in denigration of his predecessors, as it is stated: “But the former governors who were before me placed burdens upon the people, and took from them for bread and wine beyond forty shekels of silver; even their servants ruled over the people; but I did not do so, due to the fear of God” (Nehemiah 5:15). And he related these disparaging statements even about Daniel, who was greater than he was.

ומנלן דגדול ממנו דכתיב (דניאל י, ז) וראיתי אני דניאל לבדי את המראה והאנשים אשר היו עמי לא ראו את המראה אבל חרדה גדולה נפלה עליהם ויברחו בהחבא והאנשים אשר היו עמי לא ראו את המראה ומאן נינהו אנשים אמר רבי ירמיה ואיתימא ר' חייא בר אבא זה חגי זכריה ומלאכי The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that Daniel was greater than he was? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And I, Daniel, alone saw the vision, and the men who were with me did not see the vision; but a great trembling fell upon them, and they fled to hide” (Daniel 10:7). The Gemara asks: “And the men who were with me did not see the vision”; and who were these men? Rabbi Yirmeya, and some say Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, says: That is referring to Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, who were with him and did not see. Evidently, Daniel was greater than these prophets, and all the more so was he greater than Nehemiah, who was never privileged to prophesy.

Daf 94a

אינהו עדיפי מיניה ואיהו עדיף מנייהו אינהו עדיפי מיניה דאינהו נביאי ואיהו לאו נביא ואיהו עדיף מנייהו דאיהו חזא ואינהו לא חזו Apropos Daniel, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, the Gemara notes: In certain respects, the latter three were greater than Daniel, and in certain respects, Daniel was greater than the latter three. They were greater than he, as they were prophets and he was not a prophet. Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi were designated to transmit their visions of God to the Jewish people, but Daniel was not designated to share his visions with others. And he was greater than they, as he saw this vision, and they did not see this vision.

וכי מאחר דלא חזו מאי טעמא איבעות אע"ג דאינהו לא חזו מידי מזלייהו חזי אמר רבינא ש"מ האי מאן דמבעית אף על גב דאיהו לא חזי מזליה חזי The Gemara asks: And since they did not see the vision, what is the reason that they were frightened? The Gemara answers: Although they did not see the vision, their guardian angels saw it, and they were overcome with fear and fled. Ravina said: Conclude from it that in the case of this person who becomes frightened with no apparent cause, although he does not see what causes his fear, his guardian angel sees it.

מאי תקנתיה לינשוף מדוכתיה ארבעה גרמידי אי נמי ליקרי קרית שמע ואי קאי במקום הטנופת לימא הכי עיזא דבי טבחא שמינא מינאי What is his remedy? Let him leap four cubits from his current location to distance himself from the perceived danger. Alternatively, let him recite Shema, which will afford him protection. And if he is standing in a place of filth, where it is prohibited to recite verses from the Torah, let him say this formula: The goat of the slaughterhouse is fatter than I, and let the demon harm the goat instead.

(ישעיהו ט, ו) למרבה המשרה ולשלום אין קץ וגו' א"ר תנחום דרש בר קפרא בציפורי מפני מה כל מ"ם שבאמצע תיבה פתוח וזה סתום ביקש הקב"ה לעשות חזקיהו משיח וסנחריב גוג ומגוג § Apropos Hezekiah, the Gemara cites that which is stated: “That the government may be increased [lemarbe] and of peace there be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to establish it and uphold it through justice and through righteousness, from now and forever; the zeal of the Lord of hosts does perform this” (Isaiah 9:6). Rabbi Tanḥum says that bar Kappara taught in Tzippori: Due to what reason is it that every letter mem in the middle of a word is open and this mem, of the word lemarbe, is closed? In the Masoretic text, the letter mem in the word “lemarbe” is written in the form of a mem that appears at the end of a word, closed on all four sides. This is because the Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to designate King Hezekiah as the Messiah and to designate Sennacherib and Assyria, respectively, as Gog and Magog, all from the prophecy of Ezekiel with regard to the end of days (Ezekiel, chapter 38), and the confrontation between them would culminate in the final redemption.

אמרה מדת הדין לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע ומה דוד מלך ישראל שאמר כמה שירות ותשבחות לפניך לא עשיתו משיח חזקיה שעשית לו כל הנסים הללו ולא אמר שירה לפניך תעשהו משיח לכך נסתתם The attribute of justice said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, and if with regard to David, king of Israel, who recited several songs and praises before You, You did not designate him as the Messiah, then with regard to Hezekiah, for whom You performed all these miracles, delivering him from Sennacherib and healing his illness, and he did not recite praise before You, will You designate him as the Messiah? It is for that reason that the mem was closed, because there was an opportunity for redemption that was thwarted.

מיד פתחה הארץ ואמרה לפניו רבש"ע אני אומרת לפניך שירה תחת צדיק זה ועשהו משיח פתחה ואמרה שירה לפניו שנאמר (ישעיהו כד, טז) מכנף הארץ זמירות שמענו צבי לצדיק וגו' Immediately, the earth began and stated before Him: Master of the Universe, I will recite song before You in place of that righteous person, i.e., Hezekiah, and designate him as the Messiah. The earth began and recited a song before Him, as it is stated: “From the uttermost part of the earth have we heard songs: Glory to the righteous. But I said, my secret is mine, my secret is mine, woe unto me. The treacherous deal treacherously; the treacherous deal very treacherously” (Isaiah 24:16).

אמר שר העולם לפניו רבש"ע צביונו עשה לצדיק זה יצאה בת קול ואמרה רזי לי רזי לי אמר נביא אוי לי אוי לי עד מתי יצאה בת קול ואמרה (ישעיהו כד, טז) בוגדים בגדו ובגד בוגדים בגדו ואמר רבא ואיתימא ר' יצחק עד דאתו בזוזי ובזוזי דבזוזי The angel appointed to oversee the world said before Him: Master of the Universe, perform the will of this righteous person. A Divine Voice emerged and said: “My secret is Mine, My secret is Mine”; this matter will remain secret, as I am not yet bringing the redemption. The prophet said: “Woe unto me,” woe unto me; until when will the exile continue? A Divine Voice emerged and said: “The treacherous deal treacherously; the treacherous deal very treacherously” (Isaiah 24:16). And Rava, and some say Rabbi Yitzḥak, says: Until looters and looters of looters come, the Messiah will not come.

(ישעיהו כא, יא) משא דומה אלי קורא משעיר שומר מה מלילה שומר מה מליל וגו' א"ר יוחנן אותו מלאך הממונה על הרוחות דומה שמו נתקבצו כל הרוחות אצל דומה אמרו לו שומר מה מלילה שומר מה מליל אמר שומר אתא בקר וגם לילה אם תבעיון בעיו שובו אתיו On a similar note, Isaiah said: “The burden of Dumah. One calls to me out of Seir: Watchman, what of the night? Watchman, what of the night? The Watchman said: The morning comes and also the night; if you will inquire, inquire; return, come” (Isaiah 21:11–12). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: That angel, who is appointed over the spirits [seirim], his name is Dumah. All the spirits assembled near Dumah and said to him: “Watchman of the night, what of the night? Does God, Guardian of Israel, say that the time for redemption has arrived?” The angel answered: “The Watchman said: The morning comes and also the night; if you will inquire, inquire; return, come.” The Holy One, Blessed be He, said that the morning of redemption has come as well as the night of the exile. If you inquire and seek repentance, inquire and repent, and return to God and redemption will come.

תנא משום רבי פפייס גנאי הוא לחזקיה וסייעתו שלא אמרו שירה עד שפתחה הארץ ואמרה שירה שנא' מכנף הארץ זמירות שמענו צבי לצדיק וגו' כיוצא בדבר אתה אומר (שמות יח, י) ויאמר יתרו ברוך ה' אשר הציל אתכם תנא משום רבי פפייס גנאי הוא למשה וששים ריבוא שלא אמרו ברוך עד שבא יתרו ואמר ברוך ה' It was taught in the name of Rabbi Pappeyas: It is a disgrace for Hezekiah and his associates that they did not recite a song themselves and that a song was not recited until the earth began and recited a song, as it is stated: “From the uttermost part of the earth have we heard songs: Glory to the righteous” (Isaiah 24:16). On a similar note, you say: “And Jethro said: Blessed be the Lord, Who has delivered you out of the hand of Egypt and out of the hand of Pharaoh” (Exodus 18:10). It was taught in the name of Rabbi Pappeyas: It is a disgrace for Moses and the six hundred thousand adult men of the children of Israel whom he led out of Egypt that they did not say: Blessed, until Yitro came and said: “Blessed be the Lord.”

ויחד יתרו רב ושמואל רב אמר שהעביר חרב חדה על בשרו ושמואל אמר שנעשה חדודים חדודים כל בשרו אמר רב היינו דאמרי אינשי גיורא עד עשרה דרי לא תבזה ארמאי קמיה It is written in the previous verse: “Vayyiḥad Yitro for all the goodness that the Lord had done to Israel, whom He had delivered out of the hand of Egypt” (Exodus 18:9). Rav and Shmuel disagreed with regard to the meaning of vayyiḥad. Rav says: He passed a sharp [ḥad] sword over his flesh, i.e., he circumcised himself and converted. And Shmuel says: He felt as though cuts [ḥiddudim] were made over his flesh, i.e., he had an unpleasant feeling due to the downfall of Egypt. Rav says with regard to this statement of Shmuel that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: With regard to a convert, for ten generations after his conversion one should not disparage a gentile before him and his descendants, as they continue to identify somewhat with gentiles and remain sensitive to their pain.

(ישעיהו י, טז) לכן ישלח האדון ה' צבאות במשמניו רזון מאי במשמניו רזון אמר הקב"ה יבא חזקיהו שיש לו שמונה שמות ויפרע מסנחריב שיש לו שמונה שמות חזקיה דכתיב (ישעיהו ט, ה) כי ילד יולד לנו בן ניתן לנו ותהי המשרה על שכמו ויקרא שמו פלא יועץ אל גבור אבי עד שר שלום והאיכא חזקיה שחזקו יה דבר אחר חזקיה שחיזק את ישראל לאביהם שבשמים § The verse states: “Therefore shall the Master, the Lord of hosts, send among his fat ones [mishmanav] leanness” (Isaiah 10:16). What is the meaning of the phrase “send among his fat ones leanness”? The meaning is that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Let Hezekiah, who has eight [shemona] names, come, and exact retribution from Sennacherib, who has eight names. The Gemara elaborates: The eight names of Hezekiah are as it is written: “For to us a child is born, to us a son is given; and the government is upon his shoulder; and his name is called Pele Joez El Gibbor Abi Ad Sar Shalom” (Isaiah 9:5). The Gemara asks: But isn’t there an additional name, Hezekiah? The Gemara explains: That was not a given name; rather, it is an appellation based on the fact that God strengthened him [ḥizzeko]. Alternatively, he was called Hezekiah due to the fact that he strengthened the devotion of the Jewish people to their Father in Heaven.

סנחריב דכתיב ביה (מלכים ב טו, כט) תגלת פלאסר (דברי הימים ב כח, כ) פלנאסר (מלכים ב יז, ג) שלמנאסר (מלכים ב טו, יט) פול (ישעיהו כ, א) סרגון (סרגין) (עזרא ד, י) אסנפר רבא ויקירא והאיכא סנחריב שסיחתו ריב דבר אחר שסח וניחר דברים כלפי מעלה The eight names of Sennacherib are as it is written in his regard among the kings of Assyria: “Tiglath-Pileser” (II Kings 15:29), “Tiglath-Pilneser” (II Chronicles 28:20), “Shalmaneser” (II Kings 17:3), “Pul” (II Kings 15:19), “Sargon” (Isaiah 20:1), and “the great and noble Asenappar” (Ezra 4:10). And the Gemara asks: But isn’t there an additional name, Sennacherib [Sanḥeriv]? The Gemara explains: That was not a given name; rather, it is an appellation based on the fact that his speech is contentious [siḥato riv], leading to quarrel and shame. Alternatively, he was called Sanḥeriv due to the fact that he spoke [saḥ] and snorted out [niḥer] contemptuous statements vis-à-vis the Transcendent.

א"ר יוחנן מפני מה זכה אותו רשע לקרותו אסנפר רבא ויקירא מפני שלא סיפר בגנותה של ארץ ישראל שנאמר (מלכים ב יח, לב) עד בואי ולקחתי אתכם אל ארץ כארצכם Rabbi Yoḥanan says: For what reason was that wicked person privileged to be named “the great and noble Asenappar”? It was due to the fact that he did not speak [sipper] in disparagement of Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: “Until I come and take you to a land like your own” (II Kings 18:32), and he did not say that he was taking them to a superior land.

רב ושמואל חד אמר מלך פקח היה וחד אמר מלך טיפש היה למאן דאמר מלך פקח היה אי אמינא להו עדיפא מארעייכו אמרו קא משקרת ומאן דאמר מלך טיפש היה אם כן מאי רבותיה Rav and Shmuel disagreed with regard to that statement of Sennacherib: One says he was a clever king and one says he was a foolish king. According to the one who says he was a clever king, he said that he is taking them to a land like their own, as he thought: If I say to them: I am taking you to a land that is superior to your land, they will say: You are lying. And as for the one who says he was a foolish king, he explains: If so, if he said that he is not taking them to a superior land, what is his greatness and how would they be convinced to go into exile?

להיכא אגלי להו מר זוטרא אמר לאפריקי ורבי חנינא אמר להרי סלוג אבל ישראל ספרו בגנותה של ארץ ישראל כי מטו שוש אמרי שויא כי ארעין כי מטו עלמין אמרו כעלמין כי מטו שוש תרי אמרי על חד תרין The Gemara asks: To where did Sennacherib exile the ten tribes? Mar Zutra says: He exiled them to Afrikei, and Rabbi Ḥanina says: To the Selug Mountains. The Gemara adds: But those exiled from the kingdom of Israel spoke in disparagement of Eretz Yisrael and extolled the land of their exile. When they arrived at one place, they called it Shosh, as they said: It is equal [shaveh] to our land. When they arrived at another place, they called it Almin, as they said: It is like our world [almin], as Eretz Yisrael is also called beit olamim. When they arrived at a third place they called it Shosh the second [terei], as they said: For one measure of good in Eretz Yisrael, there are two [terein] here.

(ישעיהו י, טז) ותחת כבודו [יקד] יקוד כיקוד אש א"ר יוחנן תחת כבודו ולא כבודו ממש כי הא דרבי יוחנן קרי ליה למאני מכבדותי רבי אלעזר אמר תחת כבודו ממש כשריפת בני אהרן מה להלן שריפת נשמה וגוף קיים אף כאן שריפת נשמה וגוף קיים The Gemara cites additional verses written with regard to Sennacherib. “And beneath his glory shall be kindled a blaze like the blaze of a fire” (Isaiah 10:16). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A blaze was kindled beneath his glory, but it was not actually kindled on his glory. The blaze consumed the bodies of the troops of Sennacherib beneath their garments, which were referred to as glory, as in that practice of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who would call his garments: My glory. Rabbi Elazar says: It means beneath his actual glory, i.e., the blaze consumed their souls, and their flesh was not consumed, like the burning of the sons of Aaron. Just as there, the death of the sons of Aaron entailed the burning of the soul, and the body remained intact, so too here, the death of the troops of Sennacherib entailed the burning of the soul, and the body remained intact.

תנא משמיה דרבי יהושע בן קרחה פרעה שחירף בעצמו נפרע הקב"ה ממנו בעצמו סנחריב שחירף It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa: With regard to Pharaoh, who himself blasphemed God, the Holy One, Blessed be He, Himself exacted retribution from him. With regard to Sennacherib, who blasphemed God

Daf 94b

ע"י שליח נפרע הקב"ה ממנו ע"י שליח by means of an agent, the Holy One, Blessed be He, exacted retribution from him by means of an agent.

פרעה דכתיב ביה (שמות ה, ב) מי ה' אשר אשמע בקולו נפרע הקב"ה ממנו בעצמו דכתיב (שמות יד, כז) וינער ה' את מצרים בתוך הים וכתיב (חבקוק ג, טו) דרכת בים סוסיך וגו' סנחריב דכתיב (מלכים ב יט, כג) ביד מלאכיך חרפת ה' נפרע הקב"ה ממנו ע"י שליח דכתיב (מלכים ב יט, לה) ויצא מלאך ה' ויך במחנה אשור מאה ושמונים וחמשה אלף וגו' Pharaoh blasphemed God, as it is written that he said to Moses and Aaron: “Who is the Lord that I should obey His voice?” (Exodus 5:2) The Holy One, Blessed be He, Himself exacted retribution from him, as it is written: “And the Lord overthrew Egypt in the midst of the sea” (Exodus 14:27), and it is written: “You have trodden through the sea with Your horses” (Habakkuk 3:15). Sennacherib blasphemed God by means of an agent, as it is written: “By your messengers you have taunted the Lord” (II Kings 19:23). The Holy One, Blessed be He, exacted retribution from him by means of an agent, as it is written: “Then the angel of the Lord went forth and smote in the camp of the Assyrians one hundred and eighty-five thousand” (II Kings 19:35).

ר' חנינא בר פפא רמי כתיב (ישעיהו לז, כד) מרום קיצו וכתיב (מלכים ב יט, כג) מלון קיצו אמר אותו רשע בתחלה אחריב דירה של מטה ואחר כך אחריב דירה של מעלה Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa raises a contradiction. It is written that Sennacherib said: “And I will enter into its farthest height” (Isaiah 37:24), and it is written in a parallel verse that he said: “And I have entered into its farthest lodge” (II Kings 19:23). The Gemara resolves the contradiction. That wicked person said: Initially, I will destroy the earthly dwelling place below, i.e., the Temple, its farthest lodge, and thereafter, I will destroy the heavenly dwelling place above, its farthest height.

א"ר יהושע בן לוי מאי דכתיב (מלכים ב יח, כה) עתה המבלעדי ה' עליתי על המקום הזה להשחיתו ה' אמר אלי עלה אל הארץ הזאת והשחיתה מאי היא דשמע לנביא דקאמר (ישעיהו ח, ו) יען כי מאס העם הזה את מי השילוח ההולכים לאט ומשוש את רצין ובן רמליהו § Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: What is the meaning of that which is written in the statement of Rab-shakeh, emissary of Sennacherib: “Have I now come up without the Lord against this place to destroy it? The Lord said to me: Go up against this land and destroy it” (II Kings 18:25). What is this command to destroy the land? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains: It is referring to the fact that he heard the prophet who said: “Since the people rejected the waters of Shiloah that flow slowly and rejoice with Rezin and the son of Remaliah. Now therefore, behold, the Lord brings upon them…the king of Assyria” (Isaiah 8:6–7).

אמר רב יוסף אלמלא תרגומא דהאי קרא לא הוה ידענא מאי קאמר חלף דקץ עמא הדין במלכותא דבית דוד דמדבר להון בנייח כמי שילוחא דנגדין בנייח ואיתרעיאו ברצין ובר רמליה Rav Yosef says: Were it not for the Aramaic translation of this verse I would not know what it is saying. It is translated: Since this people loathed the reign of the house of David that led them gently, like the waters of the Shiloah, which flow gently, and they preferred Rezin and the son of Remaliah, who were kings from the northern kingdom of Israel. And the verse continues: “Now therefore, behold, the Lord brings upon them…the king of Assyria.”

א"ר יוחנן מאי דכתיב (משלי ג, לג) מארת ה' בבית רשע ונוה צדיקים יבורך מארת ה' בבית רשע זה פקח בן רמליהו שהיה אוכל מ' סאה גוזלות בקינוח סעודה ונוה צדיקים יבורך זה חזקיה מלך יהודה שהיה אוכל ליטרא ירק בסעודה Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked, but He blesses the habitation of the just” (Proverbs 3:33)? “The curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked”; this is a reference to Pekah, son of Remaliah, who would eat forty se’a of fledglings for dessert and would still not be satiated, as his property was cursed. “But He blesses the habitation of the just”; this is a reference to Hezekiah, king of Judea, who would eat a litra of vegetables at his meal and was satiated, as his property was blessed.

(ישעיהו ח, ז) ולכן הנה ה' מעלה עליהם את מי הנהר העצומים והרבים את מלך אשור וכתיב (ישעיהו ח, ח) וחלף ביהודה שטף ועבר עד צואר יגיע It is written in the verse: “Now therefore, behold, the Lord brings up upon them the strong and abundant waters of the river, the king of Assyria” (Isaiah 8:7). And it is written: “And he shall sweep through Judea; he shall inundate and pass through, reaching even the neck” (Isaiah 8:8). Rab-shakeh alluded to that prophecy when he said in the verse in Kings that the Lord said to destroy the land.

אלא מ"ט איעניש נביא אעשרת השבטים איתנבי איהו יהיב דעתיה על כולה ירושלים בא נביא וא"ל (ישעיהו ח, כג) כי לא מועף לאשר מוצק לה א"ר אלעזר בר ברכיה אין נמסר עם עייף בתורה ביד מי המציק לו The Gemara asks: But what is the reason that Sennacherib was punished if he was merely fulfilling God’s command? The Gemara answers: The prophet prophesied about the destruction of the kingdom of Israel and the exile of the ten tribes, but he directed his attention to destroy all of Jerusalem. The prophet came and said to him: “For there is no weariness [mu’af ] that is set [mutzak] against her” (Isaiah 8:23). Rabbi Elazar bar Berekhya says that the verse is interpreted homiletically: A nation that is weary [ayef ] from its constant engagement in Torah study is not delivered into the hands of one who oppresses [metzik] it.

מאי (ישעיהו ח, כג) כעת הראשון הקל ארצה זבולון וארצה נפתלי והאחרון הכביד דרך הים עבר הירדן גליל הגוים לא כראשונים שהקלו מעליהם עול תורה אבל אחרונים שהכבידו עליהן עול תורה וראויין הללו לעשות להם נס כעוברי הים וכדורכי הירדן אם חוזר בו מוטב ואם לאו אני אעשה לו גליל בגוים What is the meaning of the continuation of the verse, which states: “Now the former has lightly afflicted [hakel] the land of Zebulun and the land of Naphtali but the latter has dealt a more grievous blow [hikhbid] by way of the sea, beyond the Jordan in the district [gelil] of the nations”? The generation in Judea in the time of Hezekiah is not like the former generation of Ahaz, who eased [hekellu] the yoke of Torah from upon the people. But the latter generation of Hezekiah, who intensified [hikhbidu] the yoke of Torah upon the people, is fit for God to perform a miracle for them like the miracles performed for those who crossed the Red Sea and those who trod through the Jordan River. God is saying: If Sennacherib reconsiders his planned conquest, good, but if he does not, I will render him wallowing [galil] in shame among the nations.

(דברי הימים ב לב, א) אחרי הדברים והאמת האלה בא סנחריב מלך אשור ויבא ביהודה ויחן על הערים הבצורות ויאמר לבקעם אליו האי רישנא להאי פרדשנא The verse states: “After these matters and this truth, Sennacherib, king of Assyria, came and entered Judea and encamped against the fortified cities and sought to breach them for himself” (II Chronicles 32:1). The Gemara asks: Is this gift [rishna], the invasion of Sennacherib, appropriate compensation for that gift [pardashna], Hezekiah’s restoration of the Temple and the worship of God in Judea?

אחרי הדברים והאמת (אחר מאי) אמר רבינא לאחר שקפץ הקב"ה ונשבע ואמר אי אמינא ליה לחזקיה מייתינא ליה לסנחריב ומסרנא ליה בידך השתא אמר לא הוא בעינא ולא ביעתותיה בעינא The Gemara explains: When the verse states: “After these matters and this truth [emet],” after what matters is the verse referring to? Ravina says: This is referring to after the Holy One, Blessed be He, preempted and took an oath, referenced with the term emet, that He will deliver the spoils of the army of the king of Assyria into the hands of Hezekiah. And this was because He had said: If I say to Hezekiah: I will bring Sennacherib and I will deliver him into your hands; he will then say: I neither want him delivered into my hands nor do I want the accompanying fear of him.

מיד קפץ הקב"ה ונשבע דמייתינא ליה שנאמר (ישעיהו יד, כד) נשבע ה' צבאות לאמר אם לא כאשר דמיתי כן היתה וכאשר יעצתי היא תקום לשבור אשור בארצי ועל הרי אבוסנו וסר מעליהם עולו וסבלו מעל שכמו יסור א"ר יוחנן אמר הקב"ה יבא סנחריב וסיעתו ויעשה אבוס לחזקיהו ולסיעתו Immediately, the Holy One, Blessed be He, preempted Hezekiah and took an oath: I take an oath that I will deliver him, as it is stated: “The Lord of hosts has taken an oath, saying: Is it not as I imagined it, so has it come to pass; and as I have proposed, so shall it arise, that I will break Assyria in My land, and upon My mountains subdue him [avusennu]; then shall his yoke depart from them, and his burden depart from its shoulder” (Isaiah 14:24–25). Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Sennacherib and his entourage shall come and be transformed into a feeding trough [evus], in the sense of a source of sustenance for Hezekiah and his entourage.

(ישעיהו י, כז) והיה ביום ההוא יסור סבלו מעל שכמך ועולו מעל צוארך וחובל עול מפני שמן א"ר יצחק נפחא חובל עול של סנחריב מפני שמנו של חזקיהו שהיה דולק בבתי כנסיות ובבתי מדרשות § It is stated with regard to the downfall of Assyria: “And it shall come to pass on that day, his burden shall be taken from on your shoulder, and his yoke from on your neck, and the yoke shall be destroyed due to fatness [shamen]” (Isaiah 10:27). Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: The yoke of Sennacherib was destroyed due to the oil [shemen] of Hezekiah that would burn in the synagogues and study halls when the Jewish people were engaged in Torah study at night.

מה עשה נעץ חרב על פתח בית המדרש ואמר כל מי שאינו עוסק בתורה ידקר בחרב זו בדקו מדן ועד באר שבע ולא מצאו עם הארץ מגבת ועד אנטיפרס ולא מצאו תינוק ותינוקת איש ואשה שלא היו בקיאין בהלכות טומאה וטהרה What did Hezekiah do to ensure Torah study? He inserted a sword at the entrance of the study hall and said: Anyone who does not engage in Torah study shall be stabbed with this sword. As a result, they searched from Dan in the north to Beersheba in the south, and did not find an ignoramus. They searched from Gevat to Antipatris and did not find a male child, or a female child, or a man, or a woman who was not expert even in the complex halakhot of ritual purity and impurity.

ועל אותו הדור הוא אומר (ישעיהו ז, כא) והיה ביום ההוא יחיה איש עגלת בקר ושתי צאן וגו' ואומר (ישעיהו ז, כג) והיה ביום ההוא יהיה כל מקום אשר יהיה שם אלף גפן באלף כסף לשמיר ולשית יהיה אע"פ שאלף גפן באלף כסף לשמיר ולשית יהיה And it is about that generation that the prophet says: “And it shall come to pass in that day, that a man shall nourish a young calf and two sheep. And it shall come to pass, from the abundance of milk that they produce, he shall eat butter, for butter and honey shall everyone eat, everyone who remains in the midst of the land” (Isaiah 7:21–22). And the prophet continues and says: “And it shall come to pass in that day that every place where there were one thousand vines for one thousand silver coins, it shall be for briars and thorns” (Isaiah 7:23). Although one thousand vines are worth one thousand silver coins and one could earn substantial profits through agricultural labor, the fields will grow briars and thorns due to neglect. The people of that generation were devoted to the study of Torah and engaged in labor only minimally to sustain themselves.

(ישעיהו לג, ד) ואוסף שללכם אוסף החסיל אמר להם נביא לישראל אספו שללכם אמרו לו לבזוז או לחלוק אמר להם כאוסף החסיל מה אוסף החסיל כל אחד ואחד לעצמו אף שללכם כל אחד ואחד לעצמו It is written: “And your spoils shall be gathered like the gathering of the locusts; as the advance of the locusts shall he advance” (Isaiah 33:4). The prophet said to the Jewish people: Gather your spoils from the army of Sennacherib. They said to him: Are we to pillage the spoils, each person for himself, or are we to divide the spoils with the monarchy? He said to them: Gather the spoils like the gathering by the locusts. Just as in the gathering by the locusts, each and every one of the locusts takes food for itself, so too, in gathering your spoils, each and every one of you shall take spoils for himself.

אמרו לו והלא ממון עשרת השבטים מעורב בו אמר להם (ישעיהו לג, ד) כמשק גבים שוקק בו מה גבים הללו מעלין את האדם מטומאה לטהרה אף ממונם של ישראל כיון שנפל ביד עובדי כוכבים מיד טיהר (כדרב פפא דאמר רב פפא) עמון ומואב טהרו בסיחון They said to him: Since the army of Sennacherib came to Jerusalem after its conquest of the kingdom of Israel, isn’t the property of the ten tribes intermingled with it, and therefore, gathering the spoils would be robbery? He said to them: “As the advance of the locusts [gevim] shall he advance” (Isaiah 33:4). Just as these pools of water elevate a person up from a state of ritual impurity to a state of purity through immersion, so too the property of the Jewish people, once it falls into the hands of gentiles, it immediately purifies the property, in the sense that it is no longer considered robbery to take it, as its owners despair of its recovery. This is in accordance with the statement of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa says: The property of Ammon and Moab was purified through the conquest of Sihon. Although the Torah rendered it prohibited to conquer the land of Ammon and Moab, once Sihon conquered their land, it was permitted for the Jewish people to conquer it.

אמר רב הונא עשר מסעות נסע אותו רשע באותו היום שנאמר (ישעיהו י, כח) בא על עית עבר במגרון למכמש יפקיד כליו עברו מעברה גבע מלון לנו חרדה הרמה גבעת שאול נסה (ישעיהו י, ל) צהלי קולך בת גלים הקשיבה לישה עניה ענתות נדדה מדמנה יושבי הגבים העיזו ((ישעיהו י, לב) עוד היום בנוב לעמוד ינופף ידו הר בת ציון גבעת ירושלם) § Rav Huna says: That wicked Sennacherib traveled ten journeys on that day, as it is stated: “He is come to Aiath, he is passed through Migron; at Michmas he deposited his baggage. They passed [averu] Mabara; they have taken up their lodging at Geba; Ramah trembles; Gibeath Shaul has fled. Cry with a shrill voice, daughter of Gallim; hearken, Laish; poor Anathoth. Madmenah is in flight; the inhabitants of Gebim flee to cover. This very day shall he halt at Nov; he shall shake his hand against the mountain of the daughter of Zion, the hill of Jerusalem” (Isaiah 10:28–32). He traveled to all these places on the same day.

הני טובא הויין צהלי קולך בת גלים נביא הוא דקאמר לה לכנסת ישראל צהלי קולך בת גלים בתו של אברהם יצחק ויעקב שעשו מצות כגלי הים הקשיבה לישה מהאי לא תסתפי אלא איסתפי מנבוכדנצר הרשע דמתיל כאריה שנא' (ירמיהו ד, ז) עלה אריה מסובכו וגו' The Gemara asks: Aren’t these more than ten? The Gemara answers that in the verse: “Cry with a shrill voice, daughter of Gallim,” it is the prophet who is saying it to the congregation of Israel: “Cry with a shrill voice, daughter of Gallim,” daughter of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who performed mitzvot as numerous as the waves of the sea. “Hearken, Laish”; from this king, Sennacherib, fear not; but fear Nebuchadnezzar, the wicked who is likened to a lion, as it is stated: “The lion [arye] is gone up from its thicket” (Jeremiah 4:7).

מאי The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase:

Daf 95a

(ישעיהו י, ל) עניה ענתות עתיד ירמיה בן חלקיה ומתנבא עלה מענתות דכתיב (ירמיהו א, א) דברי ירמיהו בן חלקיהו מן הכהנים אשר בענתות בארץ בנימין “Poor [aniyya] Anathoth” (Isaiah 10:30)? Jeremiah, son of Hilkiah, is destined to prophesy about Nebuchadnezzar from Anathoth, as it is written: “The statements of Jeremiah, son of Hilkiah, of the priests who were in Anathoth in the land of Benjamin” (Jeremiah 1:1).

מי דמי התם ארי הכא ליש אמר רבי יוחנן ששה שמות יש לארי אלו הן (בראשית מט, ט) ארי (שופטים יד, ה) כפיר (בראשית מט, ט) לביא (ישעיהו ל, ו) ליש (תהלים צא, יג) שחל (איוב כח, ח) שחץ אי הכי בצרו להו עברו מעברה תרתי נינהו The Gemara asks: Are these matters comparable? There, in Jeremiah, Nebuchadnezzar is called ari, as the verse refers to him with the term arye, and here, in Isaiah, Nebuchadnezzar is called laish. The Gemara explains that the verses are not contradictory, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There are six Hebrew terms for the lion, and they are: Ari, kefir, lavi, layish, shaḥal, shaḥatz. The Gemara challenges: If it is so that this verse is unrelated to the journeys of Sennacherib, then the places listed in the verse are too few, as there are not ten. The Gemara explains: Averu and Mabara are in fact the names of two separate places.

מאי (ישעיהו י, לב) עוד היום בנוב לעמוד אמר רב הונא אותו היום נשתייר מעונה של נוב אמרי ליה כלדאי אי אזלת האידנא יכלת לה ואי לא לא יכלת לה אורחא דבעא לסגויי בעשרה יומא סגא בחד יומא The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: “This very day shall he halt at Nov” (Isaiah 10:32)? Rav Huna says: That was the final day that remained from the punishment that the Jewish people received from the sin of Nov (see I Samuel, chapter 22). The astrologers said to Sennacherib: If you go and conquer them now, you will overcome the Jewish people; and if not, you will not overcome the Jewish people. The Gemara relates: He walked and traversed in one day a road upon which one must walk for ten days in order to traverse it.

כי מטו לירושלם שדי ליה ביסתרקי עד דסליק ויתיב מעילוי שורה עד דחזיוה לכולה ירושלם כי חזייה איזוטר בעיניה אמר הלא דא היא קרתא דירושלם דעלה ארגישית כל משיריתי ועלה כבשית כל מדינתא הלא היא זעירא וחלשא מכל כרכי עממיא דכבשית בתקוף ידי עלה וקם ומניד ברישיה מוביל ומייתי בידיה על טור בית מקדשא דבציון ועל עזרתא דבירושלם When they arrived in Jerusalem they cast mats [bistarkei] for Sennacherib and piled them high until he ascended and sat above the wall, to the extent that he was able to see the entire city of Jerusalem. When he saw it, it seemed small in his eyes and he said: Is this the city of Jerusalem for which I have disrupted all my camps and for which I have conquered all these countries? Is it smaller and weaker than all the cities of the nations that I have conquered with my might? He went up and shook his head in contempt, and dismissively waved his hand at the Temple Mount that is in Zion and at the courtyard that is in Jerusalem.

אמרי נישדי ביה ידא האידנא אמר להו תמהיתו למחר אייתי לי כל חד וחד מינייכו גולמו הרג מיניה מיד (מלכים ב יט, לה) ויהי בלילה ההוא ויצא מלאך ה' ויך במחנה אשור מאה ושמונים וחמשה אלף וישכימו בבקר והנה כלם פגרים מתים אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי בת דינא בטל דינא His officers said to him: Let us attack now and begin the conquest of Jerusalem. Sennacherib said to them: You are weary. Tomorrow, each and every one of you will bring me a piece of a stone from the wall equivalent in size to the seal [gulmo harag] of a letter, and this will suffice to breach the wall and vanquish the city. The verse recounts that immediately: “And it came to pass that night, that the angel of the Lord went forth and smote in the camp of the Assyrians one hundred and eighty-five thousand; and when men arose in the morning, behold, they were all dead corpses” (II Kings 19:35). Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: When quarrel lies and is delayed overnight, the quarrel is nullified. Since Jerusalem was not conquered that day, the decree was voided.

(שמואל ב כא, טז) וישבי בנוב אשר בילידי הרפה ומשקל קינו שלש מאות משקל נחשת והוא חגור חדשה ויאמר להכות את דוד מאי וישבי בנוב אמר רב יהודה אמר רב איש שבא על עסקי נוב א"ל הקב"ה לדוד עד מתי יהיה עון זה טמון בידך על ידך נהרגה נוב עיר הכהנים ועל ידך נטרד דואג האדומי ועל ידך נהרגו שאול ושלשת בניו § Apropos the massacre of Nov, the Gemara relates: “And Ishbibenob, who was of the sons of the giant, the weight of whose spear was three hundred shekels of brass; and he was girded with new armor and planned to slay David” (II Samuel 21:16). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of Ishbibenob? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This is a man [ish] who came to punish David over matters of Nov. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to David: Until when will this sin be concealed in your hand without punishment? Through your actions the inhabitants of Nov, the city of priests, were massacred, and through your actions, Doeg the Edomite was banished from the World-to-Come, and through your actions Saul and his three sons were killed.

רצונך יכלו זרעך או תמסר ביד אויב אמר לפניו רבונו של עולם מוטב אמסר ביד אויב ולא יכלה זרעי God said to David: Your arrival in Nov and your misleading Ahimelech the priest generated the chain of events, and therefore you must be punished. You may choose the punishment. Is it your desire that your descendants will cease to exist or that you will be handed to the enemy? David said before Him: Master of the Universe, it is preferable that I will be handed to the enemy and my descendants will not cease to exist.

יומא חד נפק לשכור בזאי אתא שטן ואדמי ליה כטביא פתק ביה גירא ולא מטייה משכיה עד דאמטייה לארץ פלשתים כדחזייה ישבי בנוב אמר היינו האי דקטליה לגלית אחי כפתיה קמטיה אותביה ושדייה תותי בי בדייא אתעביד ליה ניסא מכא ליה ארעא מתותיה היינו דכתיב (תהלים יח, לז) תרחיב צעדי תחתי ולא מעדו קרסולי One day David went to hunt with a falcon [liskor bazzai]. Satan came and appeared to him as a deer. He shot an arrow at the deer, and the arrow did not reach it. Satan led David to follow the deer until he reached the land of the Philistines. When Ishbibenob saw David he said: This is that person who killed Goliath, my brother. He bound him, doubled him over, and placed him on the ground, and then he cast him under the beam of an olive press to crush him. A miracle was performed for him, and the earth opened beneath him so he was not crushed by the beam. That is the meaning of that which is written: “You have enlarged my steps beneath me, that my feet did not slip” (Psalms 18:37).

ההוא יומא אפניא דמעלי שבתא הוה אבישי בן צרויה הוה קא חייף רישיה בד' גרבי דמיא חזינהו כתמי דמא איכא דאמרי אתא יונה איטריף קמיה אמר כנסת ישראל ליונה אימתילא שנאמר (תהלים סח, יד) כנפי יונה נחפה בכסף שמע מינה דוד מלכא דישראל בצערא שרי אתא לביתיה ולא אשכחיה אמר תנן אין רוכבין על סוסו ואין יושבין על כסאו ואין משתמשין בשרביטו בשעת הסכנה מאי אתא שאיל בי מדרשא אמרו ליה בשעת הסכנה שפיר דמי The Gemara relates: That day at dusk on Shabbat eve, Abishai ben Zeruiah shampooed his hair with four jugs of water in preparation for Shabbat. He saw four bloodstains. There are those who say: A dove came and fluttered its wings before him. Abishai said: The congregation of Israel is likened to a dove, as it is stated: “You shall shine as the wings of a dove covered with silver and her pinions with yellow gold” (Psalms 68:14); conclude from it that David, king of Israel, is in a state of distress. He came to David’s house and did not find him. Abishai said that we learned in a mishna (22a): One may not ride on the king’s horse, and one may not sit on his throne, and one may not use his scepter. In a period of danger, what is the halakha? He came and asked in the study hall what the ruling is in that situation. They said to him: In a period of danger one may well do so.

רכביה לפרדיה וקם ואזל קפצה ליה ארעא בהדי דקא מסגי חזייה לערפה אמיה דהוות נוולא כי חזיתיה פסקתה לפילכה שדתיה עילויה סברא למקטליה אמרה ליה עלם אייתי לי פלך פתקיה בריש מוחה וקטלה He mounted the king’s mule and arose and went to the land of the Philistines. The land miraculously contracted for him and he arrived quickly. As he was progressing he saw Orpah, Ishbibenob’s mother, who was spinning thread with a spindle. When she saw him, she removed her spindle and threw it at him, intending to kill him. After failing to do so, she said to Abishai: Young man, bring me my spindle. He threw the spindle and struck her at the top of her brain and killed her.

כד חזייה ישבי בנוב אמר השתא הוו בי תרין וקטלין לי פתקיה לדוד לעילא ודץ ליה לרומחיה אמר ניפול עלה ונקטל אמר אבישי שם אוקמיה לדוד בין שמיא לארעא When Ishbibenob saw him, he said: Now they are two, David and Abishai, and they will kill me. He threw David up in the air, and stuck his spear into the ground. He said: Let David fall upon it and die. Abishai recited a sacred name of God and suspended David between heaven and earth so that he would not fall.

ונימא ליה איהו אין חבוש מוציא עצמו מבית האסורין The Gemara asks: And let David himself recite the name of God and save himself. Why did he need Abishai? The Gemara answers: A prisoner does not release himself from a prison but requires someone else to release him. Similarly, one in danger is incapable of rescuing himself.

א"ל מאי בעית הכא א"ל הכי אמר לי קודשא בריך הוא והכי אהדרי ליה א"ל אפיך צלותיך בר ברך קירא ליזבון ואת לא תצטער Abishai said to David: What do you seek here and why did you fall into Ishbibenob’s hands? David said to him: This is what the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to me, and this is what I responded to Him; the time to submit to my enemy has arrived. Abishai said to him: Reverse your prayer and pray that your descendants will cease to exist rather than that you will be handed to the enemy, in accordance with the adage that people say: Let your son’s son be a poor peddler and sell wax, and you will not suffer. Do not limit your expenses to leave an inheritance for your descendants.

א"ל אי הכי סייע בהדן היינו דכתיב (שמואל ב כא, יז) ויעזור לו אבישי בן צרויה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב שעזרו בתפלה אמר אבישי שם ואחתיה David said to him: If so, help me. That is the meaning of that which is written: “And Abishai, son of Zeruiah, came to his aid, and smote the Philistine and killed him” (II Samuel 21:17). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This means that he came to his aid in prayer. Abishai recited another sacred name of God and caused David to land safely after being suspended between heaven and earth, and they fled.

הוה קא רדיף בתרייהו כי מטא קובי אמרי קום ביה כי מטא בי תרי אמרי בתרי גוריין קטלוה לאריא אמרי ליה זיל אשתכח לערפה אימיך בקיברא כי אדכרו ליה שמא דאימיה כחש חיליה וקטליה היינו דכתיב (שמואל ב כא, יז) אז נשבעו אנשי דוד לו לאמר לא תצא עוד אתנו למלחמה ולא תכבה את נר ישראל Ishbibenob pursued them, intending to kill them. When they reached the place named Kuvi they said: The name of the place is an abbreviation for the phrase meaning: Stand and battle against him [kum beih]. When they reached a place called Bei Terei, David and Abishai said: With two [bitrei] cubs they killed the lion, meaning they expected to be successful. They said to Ishbibenob: Go find Orpah, your mother, in the grave. When they mentioned his mother’s name to him and told him she died, his strength diminished, and they killed him. The Gemara notes: It is after this that it is written: “Then David’s men took an oath to him saying: You shall not go with us to war anymore and you will not douse the lamp of Israel” (II Samuel 21:17).

ת"ר שלשה קפצה להם הארץ אליעזר עבד אברהם ויעקב אבינו ואבישי בן צרויה אבישי בן צרויה הא דאמרן אליעזר עבד אברהם דכתיב (בראשית כד, מב) ואבוא היום אל העין למימרא דההוא יומא נפק יעקב אבינו § The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to land contracting to shorten a journey: For three individuals the land contracted, and each one miraculously reached his destination quickly: Eliezer, servant of Abraham, and Jacob our forefather, and Abishai, son of Zeruiah. The Gemara elaborates: The case of Abishai, son of Zeruiah, is that which we said. The case of Eliezer, servant of Abraham, is as it is written: “And I came that day to the well” (Genesis 24:42). His intention was to say to the members of Rebecca’s family that on that day he left Canaan and on the same day he arrived, to underscore the miraculous nature of his undertaking on behalf of Abraham. The case of Jacob our forefather

Daf 95b

דכתיב (בראשית כח, י) ויצא יעקב מבאר שבע וילך חרנה וכתיב ויפגע במקום וילן שם כי בא השמש כי מטא לחרן אמר אפשר עברתי על מקום שהתפללו בו אבותי ואני לא התפללתי בו בעי למיהדר כיון דהרהר בדעתיה למיהדר קפצה ליה ארעא מיד ויפגע במקום is as it is written: “And Jacob departed from Beersheba and went to Haran” (Genesis 28:10), and it is written thereafter, ostensibly after he arrived in Haran: “And he encountered [vayyifga] the place, and he slept there, for the sun had set” (Genesis 28:11). This means that when Jacob arrived at Haran, he said: Is it possible that I bypassed a place where my forefathers prayed and I did not pray there? He sought to return to Beit El. Once he contemplated in his mind to return, the land contracted for him, and immediately: “And he encountered the place,” indicating that he arrived there unexpectedly, sooner than he would have arrived without a miracle.

דבר אחר אין פגיעה אלא תפלה שנאמר (ירמיהו ז, טז) ואתה אל תתפלל בעד העם הזה ואל תשא בעדם רנה ותפלה ואל תפגע בי Alternatively, encounter means nothing other than prayer, as it is stated: “And you, do not pray on behalf of this nation, and do not raise on their behalf song and prayer, and do not encounter [tifga] Me, for I do not hear you” (Jeremiah 7:16).

וילן שם כי בא השמש בתר דצלי בעי למיהדר אמר הקב"ה צדיק זה בא לבית מלוני יפטר בלא לינה מיד בא השמש והיינו דכתיב ויזרח לו השמש וכי לו בלבד זרחה והלא לכל העולם כולו זרחה אלא א"ר יצחק שמש שבא בעבורו זרחה בעבורו It is written: “And he slept there because the sun had set” (Genesis 28:11). After Jacob prayed and he sought to return to his travels, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: This righteous man came to My inn. Will I allow him to take leave without sleeping here? Immediately the sun set, not at the proper time, and that is the meaning of that which is written with regard to Jacob: “And the sun shone for him when he passed Penuel” (Genesis 32:32). The Gemara asks: And did the sun shine only for him? But didn’t the sun shine for the entire world? Rather, Rabbi Yitzḥak says: The sun that set not at the proper time exclusively for him shone not at the proper time exclusively for him in order to rectify the disparity created by the premature sunset.

ומנלן דכלה זרעיה דדוד דכתי' (מלכים ב יא, א) ועתליה אם אחזיהו ראתה כי מת בנה ותקם ותאבד את כל זרע הממלכה והא אשתייר ליה יואש התם נמי אשתייר אביתר דכתיב (שמואל א כב, כ) וימלט בן אחד לאחימלך בן אחיטוב ושמו אביתר אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אלמלא (לא) נשתייר אביתר לאחימלך בן אחיטוב לא נשתייר מזרעו של דוד שריד ופליט Apropos David’s prayer that his descendants cease, the Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that David’s descendants ceased to exist? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And Athaliah the mother of Ahaziah saw that her son was dead, and she arose and destroyed all the royal descendants” (II Kings 11:1). The Gemara asks: But didn’t Joash remain alive, and therefore, not all of David’s descendants ceased to exist? The Gemara answers: There too, in the massacre in Nov, Abiathar, one of the priests, remained alive, as it is written: “And one of the sons of Ahimelech, son of Ahitub, named Abiathar, escaped” (I Samuel 22:20). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Were it not for the fact that Abiathar remained alive for Ahimelech, son of Ahitub, there would have been no remnant or refugee remaining from the descendants of David.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב בא עליהם סנחריב הרשע בארבעים וחמשה אלף איש בני מלכים יושבים בקרונות של זהב ועמהן שגלונות וזונות ובשמנים אלף גבורים לבושי שריון קליפה ובששים אלף אחוזי חרב רצים לפניו והשאר פרשים וכן באו על אברהם וכן עתידין לבוא עם גוג ומגוג § Apropos Sennacherib, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Sennacherib the wicked came upon them with forty-five thousand men, sons of kings, sitting in carriages of gold, and with them were consorts and prostitutes, and with eighty thousand warriors each wearing a coat of mail, and with sixty thousand sword-bearers running before him, and the rest were cavalry. And likewise, when the four kings came upon Abraham to wage war in the land of Canaan (see Genesis, chapter 14), they brought forces of that magnitude. And likewise, forces of that magnitude are destined to come with Gog and Magog in the ultimate war.

במתניתא תנא אורך מחנהו ארבע מאות פרסי רחב צואר סוסיו ארבעים פרסי סך מחנהו מאתים וששים ריבוא אלפים חסר חד בעי אביי חסר חד ריבויא או חסר חד אלפא או חסר מאה או חסר חד תיקו It was taught in a baraita: The length of the camp of Sennacherib was four hundred parasangs and the width of the necks of his horses side by side was forty parasangs. The total number of soldiers in his camp was 260 ten thousands, i.e., 2,600,000, minus one. Abaye asks: Is the tanna saying minus one unit of ten thousand, or minus one unit of one thousand, or minus one unit of one hundred or minus one? The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.

תנא ראשונים עברו בשחי שנאמר (ישעיהו ח, ח) וחלף ביהודה שטף ועבר אמצעיים עברו בקומה שנאמר (ישעיהו ח, ח) עד צואר יגיע אחרונים העלו עפר ברגליהם ולא מצאו מים בנהר לשתות עד שהביאו מים ממקום אחר ושתו שנאמר (ישעיהו לז, כה) אני קרתי ושתיתי מים וגו' It was taught: The first set of soldiers in the army of Sennacherib crossed by swimming across the Jordan, as it is stated: “And he shall sweep through Judea; he shall overflow and pass” (Isaiah 8:8). Since the water level diminished with their crossing, the middle group of soldiers passed while standing upright, as it is stated: “It shall reach even the neck” (Isaiah 8:8). The last soldiers already kicked up dust with their feet, and they did not find water in the river to drink, and they had no water until they brought water from another place and drank it, as it is stated: “I dug and drank water” (Isaiah 37:25).

והכתיב (ישעיהו לז, לו) ויצא מלאך ה' ויכה במחנה אשור מאה ושמנים וחמשה אלף (ויקומו) [וישכימו] בבקר והנה כלם פגרים מתים אמר ר' אבהו הללו ראשי גייסות הן The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “Then the angel of the Lord went forth and smote in the camp of the Assyrians one hundred and eighty-five thousand. And when they arose early in the morning, behold, they were all dead corpses” (Isaiah 37:36)? Apparently, there were many fewer soldiers than the number listed in the baraita. Rabbi Abbahu says: These listed here are regiment leaders, who commanded numerous soldiers.

אמר רב אשי דיקא נמי דכתיב (ישעיהו י, טז) במשמניו רזון בשמינים דאית בהו אמר רבינא דיקא נמי דכתיב (דברי הימים ב לב, כא) וישלח ה' מלאך ויכחד כל גבור חיל ונגיד ושר במחנה וגו' ויבא בית אלהיו ומיציאי מעיו שם הפילוהו בחרב שמע מינה Rav Ashi says: It is also precise in the formulation of the verse, as it is written: “Therefore shall the Master, the Lord of hosts, send among his fat ones leanness” (Isaiah 10:16), indicating that it was the fat, i.e., significant, among them who were afflicted. Ravina says: The language is also precise in the formulation of another verse, as it is written: “And the Lord sent an angel, who obliterated the mighty men-at-arms and the leaders and captains in the camp of the king of Assyria. So he returned shamefacedly to his own land. And when he came into the house of his God, his own offspring slew him there with a sword” (II Chronicles 32:21). The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that the leaders of the regiment were the ones killed.

במה הכם רבי אליעזר אומר ביד הכם שנאמר (שמות יד, לא) וירא ישראל את היד הגדולה היד שעתידה ליפרע מסנחריב רבי יהושע אומר באצבע הכם שנאמר (שמות ח, טו) ויאמרו החרטמים אל פרעה אצבע אלהים היא היא אצבע שעתידה ליפרע מסנחריב ר' אליעזר בנו של ר' יוסי הגלילי אומר אמר לו הקב"ה לגבריאל מגלך נטושה אמר לפניו רבונו של עולם נטושה ועומדת מששת ימי בראשית שנאמר (ישעיהו כא, טו) מפני חרבות נדדו וגו' The Gemara asks: With what did the angel strike them? Rabbi Eliezer says: He struck them by hand, as it is stated: “And Israel saw the great hand” (Exodus 14:31), where the term for hand, yad, is preceded by the definite article ha, indicating that this was the hand that was destined to exact retribution from Sennacherib. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He struck them with His finger, as it is stated: “And the sorcerers said to Pharaoh: This is the finger of God” (Exodus 8:15), indicating that it is the finger that was destined to exact retribution from Sennacherib. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Gabriel: Is your scythe honed? Gabriel said before Him: Master of the Universe, it is standing honed from the six days of Creation, as it is stated: “For they have fled from the swords, from the honed sword” (Isaiah 21:15).

ר' שמעון בן יוחי אומר אותו הפרק זמן בישול פירות היה אמר לו הקב"ה לגבריאל כשאתה יוצא לבשל פירות הזקק להם שנאמר (ישעיהו כח, יט) מידי עברו יקח אתכם כי בבקר בבקר יעבור ביום ובלילה והיה רק זועה הבין שמועה וגו' אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי אגב אורחך לבעל דבבך אישתמע Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: That period was the season of the ripening of the fruit. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Gabriel: When you emerge to ripen the fruits, attend to the army of Assyria and destroy them, as it is stated: “As often as it passes through, it shall take you; for morning by morning shall it pass through, by day and by night; and the mere understanding of the report shall bring terror” (Isaiah 28:19), indicating that Gabriel was to kill them while engaged in another activity. Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: While on your path, appear before your enemy and afflict him.

ויש אומרים בחוטמן נשף בהן ומתו שנאמר (ישעיהו מ, כד) וגם נשף בהם ויבשו ר' ירמיה בר אבא אמר כפיים ספק להם ומתו שנאמר (יחזקאל כא, כב) וגם אני (הכתי) [אכה] כפי אל כפי והניחותי חמתי ר' יצחק נפחא אמר אזנים גלה להם ושמעו שירה מפי חיות ומתו שנאמר (ישעיהו לג, ג) מרוממתך נפצו גוים And there are those who say: The angel blew into the soldiers of the Assyrian army through their noses and they died, as it is stated: “When he blows upon them, and they wither” (Isaiah 40:24). Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: The angel clapped his hands to them and they died, as it is stated: “I will also strike My hands together and I will assuage My anger” (Ezekiel 21:22). Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: He revealed ears for them and they were able to hear the songs of praise from the mouths of the celestial creatures drawing the chariot of God, and they died, as it is stated: “From Your exaltation the nations were scattered” (Isaiah 33:3), indicating that their death was caused by the revelation of God’s greatness.

וכמה נשתייר מהם רב אמר עשרה שנאמר (ישעיהו י, יט) ושאר עץ יערו מספר יהיו ונער יכתבם כמה נער יכול לכתוב עשרה ושמואל אמר תשעה שנאמר (ישעיהו יז, ו) ונשאר בו עוללות כנוקף זית שנים שלשה גרגרים בראש אמיר ארבעה חמשה בסעיפיה And how many of the soldiers remained alive? Rav says: Ten soldiers, as it is stated: “And the rest of the trees of his forest shall be few, that a child may write them” (Isaiah 10:19). And what number can a child easily write? It is the number ten, represented by the letter yod, which is the smallest letter. And Shmuel says: Nine remained, as it is stated: “And gleanings shall be left of him, as in the beating of an olive tree, two or three berries in the top of the uppermost bough, four or five in the branches of a fruitful tree” (Isaiah 17:6). Four and five total nine.

ר' יהושע בן לוי אמר ארבעה עשר שנאמר שנים שלשה [וכו'] ארבעה וחמשה רבי יוחנן אמר חמשה סנחריב ושני בניו נבוכדנצר ונבוזר אדן נבוזר אדן גמרא נבוכדנצר דכתיב (דניאל ג, כה) ורוה דרביעאה דמי לבר אלהין ואי לאו דחזייה מנא הוה ידע סנחריב ושני בניו דכתיב (מלכים ב יט, לז) ויהי הוא משתחוה בית נסרוך אלהיו ואדרמלך ושראצר בניו הכוהו בחרב Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Fourteen remained, as it is stated: “Two or three…four or five,” which total fourteen. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Five remained: Sennacherib, and his two sons, and Nebuchadnezzar, and Nebuzaradan, the captain of the guard. The fact that Nebuzaradan was among them is learned through tradition. Nebuchadnezzar was among them, as it is written that Nebuchadnezzar said when he saw an angel with Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah: “And the appearance of the fourth is like that of an angel” (Daniel 3:25). And if he had not seen the angel that smote Sennacherib’s army, from where would he have known that the fourth person looked like an angel? Sennacherib and his two sons were among them, as it is written later in their regard: “And it came to pass as he was worshipping in the house of Nisroch his god that Adrammelech and Sarezer, his sons, smote him with the sword” (II Kings 19:37). Evidently, the three of them survived.

אמר רבי אבהו אלמלא מקרא כתוב אי אפשר לאמרו דכתיב (ישעיהו ז, כ) ביום ההוא יגלח ה' בתער השכירה בעברי נהר במלך אשור את הראש ושער הרגלים וגם את הזקן תספה § Rabbi Abbahu says: Were the following verse not written, it would have been impossible to say it, since it appears to be a desecration of the name of God, as it is written: “On that day shall the Lord shave with a hired razor in the parts beyond the river the king of Assyria, the head, and the hair of the legs, and it shall also sweep away the beard” (Isaiah 7:20). The blasphemous indication is that the Holy One, Blessed be He, will Himself shave Sennacherib.

אתא קודשא בריך הוא ואדמי ליה כגברא סבא א"ל כי אזלת לגבי מלכי מזרח ומערב דאייתיתינהו לבנייהו וקטלתינהו מאי אמרת להו אמר להו ההוא גברא בההוא פחדא נמי יתיב אמר ליה היכי נעביד א"ל זיל Rather, this is the incident depicted in the verse: The Holy One, Blessed be He, came and appeared to Sennacherib as an old man. God said to him: When you go to the kings of the east and the west whose children you brought and killed, what will you say to them? Sennacherib said to the Holy One, Blessed be He: That man, referring to himself, also sits overcome with the same fear, as I do not know what to say to them. Sennacherib said to the Holy One, Blessed be He: What should we do? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: Go

Daf 96a

ושני נפשך במאי אישני אמר ליה זיל אייתי לי מספרא ואיגזייך אנא מהיכא אייתי א"ל עול לההוא ביתא ואייתי אזל אשכחינהו אתו מלאכי שרת ואידמו ליה כגברי והוו קא טחני קשייתא and change your appearance so that they will not recognize you. Sennacherib asked him: With what shall I change it? God said to him: Go bring me scissors and I will shear you Myself. Sennacherib asked: From where should I bring the scissors? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: Go to that house and bring them. He went and found ministering angels, who came and appeared to Sennacherib as men; and the angels were grinding date pits.

א"ל הבו לי מספרא א"ל טחון חד גריוא דקשייתא וניתן לך טחן חד גריוא דקשייתא ויהבו ליה מספרתא עד דאתא איחשך א"ל זיל אייתי נורא אזל ואייתי נורא בהדי דקא נפח ליה אתלי ביה נורא בדיקניה אזל גזייה לרישיה ודיקניה אמרו היינו דכתיב (ישעיהו ז, כ) וגם את הזקן תספה אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי גרירתיה לארמאה שפיר ליה איתלי ליה נורא בדיקניה ולא שבעת חוכא מיניה Sennacherib said to them: Give me scissors. The ministering angels said to him: Grind a se’a of pits and we will give it to you. He ground a se’a of pits and they gave him scissors. By the time he came back with the scissors it grew dark. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Sennacherib: Go and bring fire to provide light. Sennacherib went and brought fire. While he was fanning it, the fire ignited his beard and it spread and sheared his head and his beard. The Sages said: This is the meaning of that which is written: “And it shall also destroy the beard” (Isaiah 7:20). Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: If you scorch a gentile and it is pleasant for him, ignite a fire in his beard and you will never tire of ridiculing him. It means that if one does not protest when others ridicule him, they will escalate the ridicule. The adage is based upon this incident involving Sennacherib.

אזל אשכח דפא מתיבותא דנח אמר היינו אלהא רבא דשיזביה לנח מטופנא אמר אי אזיל ההוא גברא ומצלח מקרב להו לתרין בנוהי קמך שמעו בנוהי וקטלוהו היינו דכתיב (מלכים ב יט, לז) ויהי הוא משתחוה בית נסרוך אלהיו ואדרמלך ושראצר בניו הכהו בחרב וגו' Sennacherib went and found a beam from Noah’s ark, from which he fashioned a god. He said: This beam is the great god who delivered Noah from the flood. He said: If that man, referring to himself, goes and succeeds, he will sacrifice his two sons before you. His sons heard his commitment and killed him. This is the meaning of that which is written: “And it came to pass as he was worshipping in the house of Nisroch his god that Adrammelech and Sarezer, his sons, smote him with the sword, and they fled to Ararat” (II Kings 19:37), where Noah’s ark had come to rest. The Gemara explains that this interpretation is based upon the etymological similarity between neser, the Hebrew term for beam, and Nisroch, the god that Sennacherib fashioned from a beam.

(בראשית יד, טו) ויחלק עליהם לילה הוא ועבדיו ויכם וגו' אמר רבי יוחנן אותו מלאך שנזדמן לו לאברהם לילה שמו שנאמר (איוב ג, ג) והלילה אמר הורה גבר ור' יצחק נפחא אמר שעשה עמו מעשה לילה שנאמר (שופטים ה, כ) מן שמים נלחמו הכוכבים ממסלותם נלחמו עם סיסרא אמר ריש לקיש טבא דנפחא מדבר נפחא § Apropos the war between the kings and Abraham mentioned above, the Gemara explains a verse: “And he pursued as far as Dan. And he divided himself against them by night [laila], he and his servants, and smote them” (Genesis 14:14–15). The term “by night” [laila] appears out of place in this verse. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: That angel that happened to come and assist Abraham in that war, Laila is his name, as it is stated: “And Laila said: A man-child is brought forth” (Job 3:3), indicating that there is an angel named Laila. And Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: God performed for him an act of night, i.e., the stars in heaven waged war on his behalf, as it is stated: “They fought from heaven; the stars in their courses fought against Sisera” (Judges 5:20). Reish Lakish said: The statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, the smith, is preferable to the statement of the son of the smith, Rabbi Yoḥanan.

וירדף עד דן אמר רבי יוחנן כיון שבא אותו צדיק עד דן תשש כחו ראה בני בניו שעתידין לעבוד ע"ז בדן שנאמר (מלכים א יב, כט) וישם את האחד בבית אל ואת האחד נתן בדן ואף אותו רשע לא נתגבר עד שהגיע לדן שנאמר (ירמיהו ח, טז) מדן נשמע נחרת סוסיו With regard to the previous verse: “And he pursued as far as Dan” (Genesis 14:14), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Once that righteous person, Abraham, came to Dan, his strength weakened. He saw through the Divine Spirit that his descendants were destined to worship idols in Dan, as it is stated: “And he fashioned two calves of gold…and he set one in Bethel, and the other one he placed in Dan” (I Kings 12:28–29). And even that wicked person, Nebuchadnezzar, did not prevail until he reached Dan, as it is stated: “From Dan the snorting of his horses is heard” (Jeremiah 8:16).

אמר רבי זירא אע"ג דשלח ר' (יהודה בן בתירא מנציבין) הזהרו בזקן ששכח תלמודו מחמת אונסו והזהרו בוורידין כר' יהודה והזהרו בבני עמי הארץ שמהן תצא תורה כי הא מילתא מודעינן להו Rabbi Zeira says: Even though Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira sent a statement from Netzivin: Be vigilant with regard to treating with deference an elder who forgot his studies due to circumstances beyond his control, and be vigilant with regard to cutting the jugular veins when slaughtering an animal in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and be vigilant with regard to treating with respect the children of ignoramuses, as from some of them Torah will emerge, we inform them of a message like this matter.

(ירמיהו יב, א) צדיק אתה ה' כי אריב אליך אך משפטים אדבר אותך מדוע דרך רשעים צלחה שלו כל בוגדי בגד נטעתם גם שורשו ילכו גם עשו פרי מאי אהדרו ליה (ירמיהו יב, ה) כי את רגלים רצתה וילאוך ואיך תתחרה את הסוסים ובארץ שלום אתה בוטח ואיך תעשה בגאון הירדן The verse states: “Right would you be, Lord, were I to contend with You; yet will I reason with You: Why does the path of the wicked prosper; why are all who deal treacherously secure? You have planted them, they have also taken root; they grow, they also bring forth fruit” (Jeremiah 12:1–2). What did they respond to Jeremiah from heaven? “If you have run with the pedestrians, and they have wearied you, how can you contend with horses? And though in a land of peace you feel secure, how will you do in the wild country of the Jordan?” (Jeremiah 12:5).

משל לאדם אחד שאמר יכול אני לרוץ ג' פרסאות לפני הסוסים בין בצעי המים נזדמן לו רגלי אחד רץ לפניו ג' מילין ביבשה ונלאה א"ל ומה לפני רגלי כך לפני הסוסים עאכ"ו ומה שלשת מילין כך ג' פרסאות על אחת כמה וכמה ומה ביבשה כך בין בצעי המים על אחת כמה וכמה The Gemara interprets the verse according to its straightforward meaning. This is a parable of a person who said: I can run three parasangs before the horses in the swamplands. He encountered a pedestrian and ran before him for three mil on dry land and wearied. The people said to him: And if running before a pedestrian you grew so weary, then if you were to run before horses, all the more so would you become weary. And if after running three mil you grew so weary, then if you were to run three parasangs, four times that distance, all the more so would you become weary. And if after running on dry land you grew so weary, then if you were to run in the swamplands, all the more so would you become weary.

אף אתה ומה בשכר ארבע פסיעות ששלמתי לאותו רשע שרץ אחר כבודי אתה תמיה כשאני משלם שכר לאברהם יצחק ויעקב שרצו לפני כסוסים עאכ"ו היינו דכתיב (ירמיהו כג, ט) לנביאים נשבר לבי בקרבי רחפו כל עצמותי הייתי כאיש שכור וכגבר עברו יין מפני ה' ומפני דברי קדשו The Gemara explains: So too, you, Jeremiah: And if with regard to the reward for four paces that I compensated that wicked person, Nebuchadnezzar, who ran in My honor, you are astonished at its magnitude, when I compensate Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who ran before Me like horses throughout their lives, all the more so will their reward be great. This teaches the potency of even a minor mitzva. That is the meaning of that which is written: “Concerning the prophets. My heart within me is broken; all my bones shake; I am like a drunken man and like a man whom wine has overcome, due to the Lord and due to His sacred words” (Jeremiah 23:9).

הני ד' פסיעות מאי היא דכתיב (ישעיהו לט, א) בעת ההיא שלח מרודך בלאדן בן בלאדן מלך בבל ספרים וגו' משום כי חלה חזקיהו ויחזק שדר ליה ספרים ומנחה (אין) (דברי הימים ב לב, לא) לדרוש (את) המופת אשר היה בארץ דאמר רבי יוחנן אותו היום שמת בו אחז שתי שעות היה The Gemara asks: With regard to these four paces of Nebuchadnezzar, what is the incident to which the Gemara alludes? The Gemara answers that the incident is as it is written: “At that time Merodach-Baladan, son of Baladan, king of Babylonia, sent a letter and a gift to Hezekiah, as he had heard that he had been ill and was recovered” (Isaiah 39:1). The Gemara asks: Due to the fact that Hezekiah had been ill and was recovered, he sent him a letter and a gift? The Gemara answers: Yes, and he did so in order “to inquire of the wonder that was in the land” (II Chronicles 32:31). As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: On that day that Hezekiah’s father, Ahaz, died, daylight lasted two hours, ten hours shorter than the standard day, so that the wicked Ahaz would be buried hurriedly, without the pomp typically accorded kings.

וכי חלה חזקיהו ואיתפח אהדרינהו קודשא בריך הוא להנך עשר שעי ניהליה דכתב (ישעיהו לח, ח) הנני משיב את צל המעלות אשר ירדה במעלות אחז בשמש אחורנית עשר מעלות ותשב השמש עשר מעלות במעלות אשר ירדה א"ל מאי האי א"ל חזקיהו חלש ואיתפח אמר איכא גברא כי האי ולא בעינא לשדורי ליה שלמא כתבו ליה שלמא למלכא חזקיה שלם לקרתא דירושלם שלם לאלהא רבא And when Hezekiah fell ill and recovered, the Holy One, Blessed be He, restored those ten hours to Hezekiah, as it is written: “Behold, I will return the shadow of the dial, which descended on the sundial of Ahaz, ten degrees backward. So the sun returned ten degrees, by which it had gone down” (Isaiah 38:8). Merodach said to his servants: What is this wonder that the day was extended? They said to him: Hezekiah fell ill and recovered, and the sun shone for him. Merodach said: There is a man like that and I do not need to send him greetings? The ministers of Merodach wrote to Hezekiah: Greetings to King Hezekiah, greetings to the city of Jerusalem, and greetings to the great God.

נבוכדנאצר ספריה דבלאדן הוה ההיא שעתא לא הוה התם כי אתא אמר להו היכי כתביתו אמרו ליה הכי כתבינן אמר להו קריתו ליה אלהא רבא וכתביתו ליה לבסוף אמר אלא הכי כתובו שלם לאלהא רבא שלם לקרתא דירושלם שלם למלכא חזקיה אמרי ליה קריינא דאיגרתא איהו ליהוי פרוונקא Nebuchadnezzar was the scribe of Baladan, and at that time he was not there. When he came there he said to the other scribes: How did you write the king’s message? They said to him: We wrote this: Greetings to King Hezekiah, greetings to the city of Jerusalem, and greetings to the great God, as we were commanded. Nebuchadnezzar said to the scribes: You called him: The great God, and you wrote Him at the end of the list of greetings? He said: Rather, write this: Greetings to the great God, greetings to the city of Jerusalem, and greetings to King Hezekiah. The scribes said to Nebuchadnezzar: The one who reads the letter, let him be the messenger. You gave the advice; you correct the text.

רהט בתריה כדרהיט ארבע פסיעות אתא גבריאל ואוקמיה אמר ר' יוחנן אילמלא (לא) בא גבריאל והעמידו לא היה תקנה לשונאיהם של ישראל Nebuchadnezzar pursued the messenger to take the letter from him and revise it. When he ran four paces, the angel Gabriel came and stopped his pursuit. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If Gabriel had not come and stopped his pursuit there would have been no remedy for the enemies of the Jewish people, a euphemism for the Jewish people. Had Nebuchadnezzar succeeded in revising the letter, his reward would have been so great that he would have been able to destroy the Jewish people, as he desired.

מאי בלאדן בן בלאדן אמרי בלאדן מלכא הוה ואישתני אפיה והוה כי דכלבא הוה יתיב בריה על מלכותא כי הוה כתיב הוה כתיב שמיה ושמיה דאבוה בלאדן מלכא היינו דכתיב (מלאכי א, ו) בן יכבד אב ועבד אדניו The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Merodach-Baladan, son of Baladan? If his name was Merodach it was not Baladan. The Sages say: Baladan was a king, and his visage was transformed and became like that of a dog. His son was sitting on the throne in his stead and when he would write a letter he would write his name and the name of his father, King Baladan. That is the meaning of that which is written with regard to the honor accorded by gentiles to their fathers: “A son honors his father and a servant his master” (Malachi 1:6).

בן יכבד אב הא דאמרן ועבד אדוניו דכתי' (ירמיהו נב, יב) ובחודש החמישי בעשור לחדש היא שנת תשע עשרה [שנה] למלך נבוכדנאצר מלך בבל בא נבוזראדן רב טבחים עמד לפני מלך בבל בירושלם וישרף את בית ה' ואת בית המלך The Gemara elaborates: “A son honors his father” is referring to that which we stated with regard to Baladan. “And a servant his master” is referring to a verse, as it is written: “And in the fifth month, on the tenth day of the month, which was the nineteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylonia, came Nebuzaradan, captain of the guard, who stood before the king of Babylonia, into Jerusalem. And he burned the House of the Lord, and the house of the king” (Jeremiah 52:12–13).

Daf 96b

ומי סליק נבוכד נצר לירושלים והכתיב (מלכים ב כה, ו) ויעלו אותו אל מלך בבל רבלתה ואמר ר' אבהו זו אנטוכיא רב חסדא ורב יצחק בר אבודימי חד אמר דמות דיוקנו היתה חקוקה לו על מרכבתו וחד אמר אימה יתירה היתה לו ממנו ודומה כמי שעומד לפניו The Gemara asks: And did Nebuchadnezzar ascend to Jerusalem? But isn’t it written with regard to Zedekiah: “And they took the king, and brought him up to the king of Babylonia, to Riblah” (II Kings 25:6), and Rabbi Abbahu says: This place called Riblah is a reference to Antioch. Apparently, Nebuchadnezzar was in Antioch, not in Jerusalem. Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi resolved this apparent contradiction. One says: An image of Nebuchadnezzar’s likeness was engraved on Nebuzaradan’s chariot, and he regarded that image as though Nebuchadnezzar were actually there. And one says: Nebuzaradan was in extreme fear of Nebuchadnezzar, and it was as though Nebuzaradan was always standing before Nebuchadnezzar. That is an example of the honor of a servant to his master mentioned in the verse.

אמר רבא טעין תלת מאה כודנייתא נרגא דפרזלא דשליט בפרזלא שדר ליה נבוכדנצר לנבוזראדן כולהו בלעתינהו חד דשא דירושלם שנאמר (תהלים עד, ו) פתוחיה יחד בכשיל וכילפות יהלומון בעי למיהדר אמר מסתפינא דלא ליעבדו בי כי היכי דעבדו בסנחריב § The Gemara proceeds to discuss the role of Nebuzaradan in the destruction of the Temple. Rava says: Nebuchadnezzar sent to Nebuzaradan three hundred mules laden with iron axes that cut iron. All of them were incapacitated in the attempt to breach one gate of Jerusalem, as it is stated: “And now they pound its carved work together with hatchet and with hammers” (Psalms 74:6). Nebuzaradan sought to return to Babylonia and said: I am afraid. I want to ensure that they will not do to me just as they did to Sennacherib, whose downfall was in Jerusalem.

נפקא קלא ואמר שוור בר שוור נבוזראדן שוור דמטא זימנא דמקדשא חריב והיכלא מיקלי פש ליה חד נרגא אתא מחייה בקופא ואיפתח שנאמר (תהלים עד, ה) יודע כמביא למעלה בסבך עץ קרדומות A Divine Voice emerged and said: Leaper, son of a leaper; Nebuzaradan, take the leap, as the time has arrived for the Temple to be destroyed and the Sanctuary to burn. One ax remained for him to use. He went and struck the gate with the dull end of the ax and it opened, as it is stated: “He became known as the wielder of axes upward in a thicket of trees” (Psalms 74:5). At the appropriate time the gate was breached as though the ax were cutting trees.

הוה קטיל ואזל עד דמטא להיכלא אדליק ביה נורא גבה היכלא דרכו ביה מן שמיא שנאמר (איכה א, טו) גת דרך ה' לבתולת בת יהודה קא זיחא דעתיה נפקא בת קלא ואמרה ליה עמא קטילא קטלת היכלא קליא קלית קימחא טחינא טחינת שנאמר (ישעיהו מז, ב) קחי רחים וטחני קמח גלי צמתך חשפי שובל גלי שוק עברי נהרות חטים לא נאמר אלא קמח He was proceeding and killing until he reached the Sanctuary. When he reached the Sanctuary, he ignited a fire in it. The Sanctuary rose, seeking to enter Heaven so that it would not burn. They trod upon it from Heaven and returned it to its place, as it is stated: “The Lord has trodden the virgin, the daughter of Judah, as in a winepress” (Lamentations 1:15). Nebuzaradan became haughty, taking pride in his conquest. A Divine Voice emerged and said to him: Your haughtiness is unwarranted, as you killed a nation that was already dead, you burned a Sanctuary that was already burned, and you ground flour that was already ground, as it is stated with regard to Babylonia: “Take millstones and grind flour; uncover your locks, tuck up the train, uncover the leg, pass over rivers” (Isaiah 47:2). It was not stated: Grind wheat, but “grind flour,” indicating that all the destruction had already been wrought by God, and the role played by the enemy was insignificant.

חזא דמיה דזכריה דהוה קא רתח אמר להו מאי האי אמרו ליה דם זבחים הוא דאישתפיך אמר להו אייתי ואנסי אי מדמו כסי ולא אידמו אמר להו גלו לי ואי לא סריקנא לכו לבשרייכו במסריקא דפרזלא When he reached the Sanctuary, he saw the blood of Zechariah the priest boiling. It had not calmed since he was killed in the Temple (see II Chronicles 24:20–22). Nebuzaradan said to the priests there: What is this? They said to him: It is the blood of offerings that was spilled. Nebuzaradan said to them: Bring animals and I will test to determine if the blood of the animals is similar to the blood that is boiling. He slaughtered the animals and their blood was not similar to the boiling blood. Nebuzaradan said to the priests: Reveal the source of that blood to me, and if not I will comb your flesh with an iron comb.

אמרו ליה האי כהן ונביא הוא דאינבי להו לישראל בחורבנא דירושלם וקטלוהו אמר להו אנא מפייסנא ליה אייתי רבנן קטיל עילויה ולא נח אייתי דרדקי דבי רב קטיל עילויה ולא נח אייתי פרחי כהונה קטיל עילויה ולא נח עד די קטל עילויה תשעין וארבעה ריבוא ולא נח The priests said to Nebuzaradan: This blood is the blood of a priest and a prophet who prophesied for the Jewish people with regard to the destruction of Jerusalem and whom they killed. He said to the priests: I will pacify the blood so the boiling will stop. He brought the Sages and killed them over the blood and its boiling did not cease. He brought schoolchildren and killed them over the blood and its boiling did not cease. He brought young priests and killed them over the blood and its boiling did not cease. He continued killing until he killed 940,000 people over the blood, and its boiling did not cease.

קרב לגביה אמר זכריה זכריה טובים שבהן איבדתים ניחא לך דאיקטלינהו לכולהו מיד נח הרהר תשובה בדעתיה אמר מה הם שלא איבדו אלא נפש אחת כך ההוא גברא מה תיהוי עליה ערק שדר פורטיתא לביתיה ואיתגייר Nebuzaradan approached the blood and said: Zechariah, Zechariah, the worthy among them I killed on your behalf. Is it satisfactory for you that I kill them all? Immediately the boiling ceased. Nebuzaradan contemplated repentance. He said: If they, who caused only one person to perish, gained atonement only after all this killing, then with regard to that man, referring to himself, what will be required for him to gain atonement? He deserted his army and dispatched a last will to his house and converted.

תנו רבנן נעמן גר תושב היה נבוזר אדן גר צדק היה מבני בניו של סיסרא למדו תורה בירושלים מבני בניו של סנחריב לימדו תורה ברבים ומאן נינהו שמעיה ואבטליון The Sages taught in a baraita: Naaman the Aramean (see II Kings, chapter 5) was a ger toshav, meaning that he accepted upon himself to refrain from idol worship but did not convert to Judaism. Nebuzaradan was a completely righteous convert. Among the descendants of Sisera (see Judges, chapter 4) were those who studied Torah in Jerusalem. Among the descendants of Sennacherib were those who taught Torah in public. The Gemara asks: And who are they? The Gemara answers: They were Shemaya and Avtalyon.

מבני בניו של המן למדו תורה בבני ברק ואף מבני בניו של אותו רשע ביקש הקב"ה להכניסן תחת כנפי השכינה אמרו מלאכי השרת לפני הקב"ה רבונו של עולם מי שהחריב את ביתך ושרף את היכלך תכניס תחת כנפי השכינה היינו דכתיב (ירמיהו נא, ט) רפינו את בבל ולא נרפתה עולא אמר זה נבוכדנצר רבי שמואל בר נחמני אמר אלו נהרות בבל ותרגמה דצינייתא (צרידתא) דבבלאי The baraita continues: Among the descendants of Haman were those who studied Torah in Bnei Brak. And even among the descendants of that wicked person, Nebuchadnezzar, were those whom the Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to bring beneath the wings of the Divine Presence and have them convert. The ministering angels said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe: The one who destroyed Your House and burned Your Sanctuary, will You introduce him beneath the wings of the Divine Presence? The Gemara explains: That is the meaning of that which is written: “We have healed Babylonia, but she is not healed” (Jeremiah 51:9). Ulla says: This verse is a reference to Nebuchadnezzar, none of whose children converted. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: This is not a reference to a person; rather, these are the rivers of Babylonia, and interpret it as referring to the bitter saltwater rivers of Babylonia.

אמר עולא עמון ומואב שיבבי בישי דירושלם הוו כיון דשמעינהו לנביאי דקא מיתנבאי לחורבנא דירושלם שלחו לנבוכדנצר פוק ותא אמר מסתפינא דלא ליעבדו לי כדעבדו בקמאי § On a related note, the Gemara describes the events that led to the destruction of the Temple. Ulla says: Ammon and Moab were bad neighbors of Jerusalem. Once they heard the prophets who prophesied about the destruction of the Jerusalem, they sent to Nebuchadnezzar: Emerge from your dwelling place and come conquer them. Nebuchadnezzar said to them: I am afraid. I want to ensure that they will not do to me just as they did to my predecessors.

שלחו ליה (משלי ז, יט) כי אין האיש בביתו הלך בדרך מרחוק ואין איש אלא הקדוש ברוך הוא שנאמר (שמות טו, ג) ה' איש מלחמה שלח להו בקריבא הוא ואתי שלחו ליה הלך בדרך מרחוק שלח להו אית להו צדיקי דבעו רחמי ומייתו ליה Ammon and Moab sent to him that it is written: “For the ish is not at home; he is gone on a long journey” (Proverbs 7:19), and ish is referring to no one but the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is stated: “The Lord is an ish of war” (Exodus 15:3). Nebuchadnezzar sent to them is response: He is in a nearby location, and He will come. They sent to Nebuchadnezzar: “He has gone on a journey from afar” (Proverbs 7:19). Nebuchadnezzar said to them: They have righteous among them who will pray for mercy and bring Him to return.

שלחו ליה (משלי ז, כ) צרור הכסף לקח בידו ואין כסף אלא צדיקים שנאמר (הושע ג, ב) ואכרה לי בחמשה עשר כסף וחומר שעורים ולתך שעורים Ammon and Moab sent to Nebuchadnezzar: “He has taken a bundle of kesef with him” (Proverbs 7:20), and kesef is referring to nothing other than the righteous, as it is stated: “So I bought her to me for fifteen pieces of kesef and for a kor of barley and a half-kor of barley” (Hosea 3:2). The inference is that God acquired the congregation of Israel due to the presence of righteous people among them, and Ammon and Moab sent a message to Nebuchadnezzar that God had already taken the righteous and they no longer offered protection.

שלח להו הדרי רשיעי בתשובה ובעו רחמי ומייתו ליה שלחו ליה כבר קבע להן זמן שנאמר (משלי ז, כ) ליום הכסא יבא (לביתו אין כסא אלא זמן שנאמר (תהלים פא, ד) בכסה ליום חגנו שלח להו סיתווא הוא ולא מצינא דאתי מתלגא וממיטרא Nebuchadnezzar sent to them: Perhaps the wicked will repent and become righteous and they will pray for mercy and they will bring Him to return. Ammon and Moab sent to Nebuchadnezzar: God already designated the time of their redemption, as it is stated: “On the day of the keseh, He will come home” (Proverbs 7:20), and keseh is referring to nothing other than a designated time, as it is stated: “Sound a shofar at the New Moon, at the keseh on the day of our feast” (Psalms 81:4). Since there is a time designated for redemption, until then you can do as you please. Nebuchadnezzar sent to them: It is winter now and I cannot come and conquer Jerusalem due to the snow and the rain.

שלחו ליה תא אשינא דטורא שנאמר (ישעיהו טז, א) שלחו כר מושל ארץ מסלע מדברה אל הר בת ציון שלח להו אי אתינא לית לי דוכתא דיתיבנא ביה שלחו ליה קברות שלהם מעולין מפלטירין שלך דכתיב (ירמיהו ח, א) בעת ההיא נאום ה' יוציאו את עצמות מלכי יהודה ואת עצמות שריו ואת עצמות הכהנים ואת עצמות הנביאים ואת עצמות יושבי ירושלים מקבריהם ושטחום לשמש ולירח ולכל צבא השמים אשר אהבום ואשר עבדום ואשר הלכו אחריהם Ammon and Moab sent to him: Come on the peaks of mountains, where the rain does not pool, as it is stated: “Send the lamb to the ruler of the land from the peaks of the wilderness to the mount of the daughter of Zion” (Isaiah 16:1). Nebuchadnezzar sent to them: If I come to Jerusalem, I will have no place to dwell while laying siege to the city. Ammon and Moab sent to him: Their burial caves are superior to your palaces, and you can clear the caves and dwell there, as it is written: “At that time, says the Lord, they shall remove the bones of the kings of Judea, and the bones of his princes, and the bones of the priests, and the bones of the prophets and the bones of the inhabitants of Jerusalem from their graves; and they shall spread them before the sun and the moon and all of the hosts of heaven, whom they have loved, and whom they have served, and after whom they have walked” (Jeremiah 8:1–2). Ultimately Nebuchadnezzar came to conquer Judea and removed the corpses to make room for his army.

אמר ליה רב נחמן לרבי יצחק מי שמיע לך אימת אתי בר נפלי אמר ליה מאן בר נפלי א"ל משיח משיח בר נפלי קרית ליה א"ל אין דכתיב (עמוס ט, יא) ביום ההוא אקים § Rav Naḥman said to Rabbi Yitzḥak: Have you heard when the son of giants [bar niflei] will come? Rabbi Yitzḥak said to him: Who is the son of giants? Rav Naḥman said to him: He is the Messiah. Rabbi Yitzḥak asked him: Do you call the Messiah son of giants? Rav Naḥman said to him: Yes, as it is written: “On that day I will establish

Daf 97a

את סוכת דוד הנופלת א"ל הכי אמר רבי יוחנן דור שבן דוד בא בו תלמידי חכמים מתמעטים והשאר עיניהם כלות ביגון ואנחה וצרות רבות וגזרות קשות מתחדשות עד שהראשונה פקודה שניה ממהרת לבא the Tabernacle of David that is fallen [hanofelet]” (Amos 9:11). That is why the Messiah is called bar nifli. Rabbi Yitzḥak said to him that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: During the generation in which the Messiah, son of David, comes, Torah scholars decrease; and as for the rest of the people, their eyes fail with sorrow and grief, and troubles increase. And the harsh decrees will be introduced; before the first passes the second quickly comes.

ת"ר שבוע שבן דוד בא בו שנה ראשונה מתקיים מקרא זה (עמוס ד, ז) והמטרתי על עיר אחת ועל עיר אחת לא אמטיר שניה חיצי רעב משתלחים שלישית רעב גדול ומתים אנשים ונשים וטף חסידים ואנשי מעשה ותורה משתכחת מלומדיה ברביעית שובע ואינו שובע בחמישית שובע גדול ואוכלין ושותין ושמחין ותורה חוזרת ללומדיה בששית קולות בשביעית מלחמות במוצאי שביעית בן דוד בא The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to the seven-year period, i.e., the Sabbatical cycle, during which the Messiah, son of David, comes: During the first year, this verse will be fulfilled: “And I will cause it to rain upon one city and cause it not to rain upon another city” (Amos 4:7). During the second year of that period, arrows of famine will be shot, indicating that there will be famine only in certain places. During the third year there will be a great famine, and men, women, children, the pious, and men of action will die, and the Torah is forgotten by those who study it. During the fourth year there will be plenty but not great plenty. During the fifth year there will be great plenty and they will eat, and drink, and rejoice, and the Torah will return to those who study it. During the sixth year, heavenly voices will be heard. During the Sabbatical Year, wars, e.g., the war of Gog and Magog, will be waged involving the Jewish people. During the year after the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, the son of David will come.

אמר רב יוסף הא כמה שביעית דהוה כן ולא אתא אמר אביי בששית קולות בשביעית מלחמות מי הוה ועוד כסדרן מי הוה Rav Yosef said: Haven’t there been several Sabbatical cycles during which events transpired in that manner and nevertheless, the Messiah did not come? Abaye said: Have the phenomena: During the sixth year, heavenly voices, and during the Sabbatical Year, wars, transpired? And furthermore, have all these phenomena transpired in the order in which they were listed in the baraita?

(תהלים פט, נב) (אשר חרפו אויביך ה' אשר חרפו עקבות משיחך) תניא ר' יהודה אומר דור שבן דוד בא בו בית הוועד יהיה לזנות והגליל יחרב והגבלן יאשם ואנשי גבול יסובבו מעיר לעיר ולא יחוננו וחכמת הסופרים תסרח ויראי חטא ימאסו ופני הדור כפני כלב The verse states: “That Your enemies taunted, Lord, that they have taunted the footsteps of Your anointed” (Psalms 89:52). It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: During the generation that the son of David comes, the hall of the assembly of the Sages will be designated for prostitution, and the Galilee will be destroyed, and the Gavlan, i.e., Bashan, will be desolate, and the residents of the border who flee the neighboring gentiles will circulate from city to city and will receive no sympathy. The wisdom of scholars will diminish, and sin-fearing people will be despised. And the face of the generation will be like the face of a dog in its impudence and shamelessness.

והאמת נעדרת שנאמר (ישעיהו נט, טו) ותהי האמת נעדרת (וסר מרע משתולל) מאי ותהי האמת נעדרת אמרי דבי רב מלמד שנעשית עדרים עדרים והולכת לה מאי וסר מרע משתולל אמרי דבי ר' שילא כל מי שסר מרע משתולל על הבריות And the truth will be lacking, as it is stated: “And the truth is lacking [ne’ederet], and he who departs from evil is negated” (Isaiah 59:15). What is the meaning of the phrase: And the truth is lacking [ne’ederet]? The Sages of the study hall of Rav said: This teaches that truth will become like so many flocks [adarim] and walk away. What is the meaning of the phrase: “And he that departs from evil is negated”? The Sages of the study hall of Rabbi Sheila said: Anyone who deviates from evil is deemed insane by the people.

אמר רבא מריש הוה אמינא ליכא קושטא בעלמא אמר לי ההוא מרבנן ורב טבות שמיה ואמרי לה רב טביומי שמיה דאי הוו יהבי ליה כל חללי דעלמא לא הוה משני בדבוריה זימנא חדא איקלעי לההוא אתרא וקושטא שמיה ולא הוו משני בדיבורייהו ולא הוה מיית איניש מהתם בלא זימניה נסיבי איתתא מינהון והוו לי תרתין בנין מינה § Concerning the lack of truth, Rava says: Initially I would say that there is no truth anywhere in the world. There was a certain one of the Sages, and Rav Tavut is his name, and some say Rav Tavyomei is his name, who was so honest that if they were to give him the entire world, he would not deviate from the truth in his statement. He said to me: One time I happened to come to a certain place, and Truth is its name, and its residents would not deviate from the truth in their statements, and no person from there would die prematurely. I married a woman from among them, and I had two sons from her.

יומא חד הוה יתבא דביתהו וקא חייפא רישה אתאי שיבבתה טרפא אדשא סבר לאו אורח ארעא אמר לה ליתא הכא שכיבו ליה תרתין בנין אתו אינשי דאתרא לקמיה אמרו ליה מאי האי אמר להו הכי הוה מעשה א"ל במטותא מינך פוק מאתרין ולא תגרי בהו מותנא בהנך אינשי One day his wife was sitting and washing the hair on her head. Her neighbor came and knocked on the door. He thought: It is not proper conduct to tell the neighbor that his wife is bathing. He said to her: She is not here. Since he deviated from the truth his two sons died. The people residing in that place came before him and said to him: What is the meaning of this? He said to them: This was the nature of the incident, and told them what happened. They said to him: Please leave our place and do not provoke premature death upon these people.

תניא ר' נהוראי אומר דור שבן דוד בא בו נערים ילבינו פני זקנים וזקנים יעמדו לפני נערים ובת קמה באמה וכלה בחמותה ופני הדור כפני כלב ואין הבן מתבייש מאביו The Gemara resumes its discussion of the messianic period. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Nehorai says: During the generation in which the son of David comes, youths will humiliate elders and elders will stand in deference before youths, and a daughter will rebel against her mother, and a bride against her mother-in-law, and the face of the generation will be like the face of a dog, and a son will not be ashamed before his father.

תניא ר' נחמיה אומר דור שבן דוד בא בו העזות תרבה והיוקר יעות והגפן יתן פריו והיין ביוקר ונהפכה כל המלכות למינות ואין תוכחה מסייע ליה לר' יצחק דא"ר יצחק אין בן דוד בא עד שתתהפך כל המלכות למינות אמר רבא מאי קרא (ויקרא יג, יג) כולו הפך לבן טהור הוא It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Neḥemya says: During the generation that the son of David comes, arrogance will proliferate and the cost of living will corrupt people so they will engage in deceit. The vine will produce its fruit, and nevertheless, the wine will be costly. And the entire gentile monarchy will be converted to the heresy of Christianity, and there will be no inclination among the people to accept rebuke. This baraita supports the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: The son of David will not come until the entire kingdom will be converted to heresy. Rava says: What is the verse from which this statement is derived? It is the verse: “It is all turned white; he is ritually pure” (Leviticus 13:13). One is a leper and ritually impure only if he has a leprous mark, however small, but not if his skin is completely leprous. Similarly, the world will be redeemed only when the Jewish people reach their lowest point.

ת"ר (דברים לב, לו) כי ידין ה' עמו [וגו'] כי יראה כי אזלת יד ואפס עצור ועזוב אין בן דוד בא עד שירבו המסורות ד"א עד שיתמעטו התלמידים ד"א עד שתכלה פרוטה מן הכיס ד"א עד שיתייאשו מן הגאולה שנאמר ואפס עצור ועזוב כביכול אין סומך ועוזר לישראל The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “For the Lord shall judge His people and atone for His servants, when He sees that their power is gone and there is none shut up or left” (Deuteronomy 32:36). From the phrase “their power is gone” it is derived that the son of David will not come until informers will proliferate. Alternatively, the Messiah will not come until the number of students of Torah diminishes. Alternatively, the Messiah will not come until the peruta will cease from the purse. Alternatively, the Messiah will not come until they despair from the redemption, as it is stated: “And there is none shut up or left,” as though there were no supporter or helper for the Jewish people.

כי הא דר' זירא כי הוה משכח רבנן דמעסקי ביה אמר להו במטותא בעינא מנייכו לא תרחקוה דתנינא ג' באין בהיסח הדעת אלו הן משיח מציאה ועקרב This is as in that practice of Rabbi Zeira, who, when he would find Sages who were engaging in discussions about the coming of the Messiah, said to them: Please, I ask of you, do not delay his coming by calculating the end of days. As we learn in a baraita: There are three matters that come only by means of diversion of attention from those matters, and these are they: The Messiah, a lost item, and a scorpion.

אמר רב קטינא שית אלפי שני הוו עלמא וחד חרוב שנאמר (ישעיהו ב, יא) ונשגב ה' לבדו ביום ההוא אביי אמר תרי חרוב שנאמר (הושע ו, ב) יחיינו מיומים ביום השלישי יקימנו ונחיה לפניו § Rav Ketina says: Six thousand years is the duration of the world, and it is in ruins for one thousand years. The duration of the period during which the world is in ruins is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And the Lord alone shall be exalted on that day” (Isaiah 2:11), and the day of God lasts one thousand years. Abaye says: It is in ruins for two thousand years, as it is stated: “After two days He will revive us; in the third day He will revive us, and we shall live in His presence” (Hosea 6:2).

תניא כותיה דרב קטינא כשם שהשביעית משמטת שנה אחת לז' שנים כך העולם משמט אלף שנים לשבעת אלפים שנה שנאמר ונשגב ה' לבדו ביום ההוא ואומר (תהלים צב, א) מזמור שיר ליום השבת יום שכולו שבת ואומר (תהלים צ, ד) כי אלף שנים בעיניך כיום אתמול כי יעבור It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ketina: Just as the Sabbatical Year abrogates debts once in seven years, so too, the world abrogates its typical existence for one thousand years in every seven thousand years, as it is stated: “And the Lord alone shall be exalted on that day,” and it states: “A psalm, a song for the Shabbat day” (Psalms 92:1), meaning a day, i.e., one thousand years, that is entirely Shabbat. And it says in explanation of the equation between one day and one thousand years: “For a thousand years in Your eyes are but like yesterday when it is past, and like a watch in the night” (Psalms 90:4).

תנא דבי אליהו ששת אלפים שנה הוי עלמא שני אלפים תוהו שני אלפים תורה שני אלפים ימות המשיח The school of Eliyahu taught: Six thousand years is the duration of the world. Two thousand of the six thousand years are characterized by chaos; two thousand years are characterized by Torah, from the era of the Patriarchs until the end of the mishnaic period; and two thousand years are the period of the coming of the Messiah.

Daf 97b

ובעונותינו שרבו יצאו מהם מה שיצאו That is the course that history was to take, but due to our sins that time frame increased. The Messiah did not come after four thousand years passed, and furthermore, the years that elapsed since then, which were to have been the messianic era, have elapsed.

אמר ליה אליהו לרב יהודה אחוה דרב סלא חסידא אין העולם פחות משמונים וחמשה יובלות וביובל האחרון בן דוד בא אמר ליה בתחילתו או בסופו אמר ליה איני יודע כלה או אינו כלה אמר ליה איני יודע רב אשי אמר הכי א"ל עד הכא לא תיסתכי ליה מכאן ואילך איסתכי ליה Elijah the prophet said to Rav Yehuda, brother of Rav Sala Ḥasida: The world will exist no fewer than eighty-five Jubilee cycles, or 4,250 years. And during the final Jubilee, the son of David will come. Rav Yehuda said to Elijah: Will the Messiah come during the beginning of the Jubilee or during its end? Elijah said to Rav Yehuda: I do not know. Rav Yehuda asked: Will this last Jubilee cycle end before the Messiah comes or will it not yet end before his coming? Elijah said to him: I do not know. Rav Ashi says: This is what Elijah said to him: Until that time do not anticipate his coming; from this point forward anticipate his coming. Elijah did not inform Rav Yehuda of the date of the coming of the Messiah.

שלח ליה רב חנן בר תחליפא לרב יוסף מצאתי אדם אחד ובידו מגילה אחת כתובה אשורית ולשון קדש אמרתי לו זו מניין לך אמר לי לחיילות של רומי נשכרתי ובין גינזי רומי מצאתיה וכתוב בה לאחר ד' אלפים ומאתים ותשעים ואחד שנה לבריאתו של עולם העולם יתום מהן מלחמות תנינים מהן מלחמות גוג ומגוג ושאר ימות המשיח ואין הקב"ה מחדש את עולמו אלא לאחר שבעת אלפים שנה רב אחא בריה דרבא אמר לאחר חמשת אלפים שנה איתמר Rav Ḥanan bar Taḥlifa sent a message to Rav Yosef: I found one man, and in his hand there was one scroll written in Ashurit script and in the sacred tongue, Hebrew. I said to him: From where did this scroll come into your possession? He said to me: I was hired to serve in the Roman army and I found the scroll among the Roman archives. It was clear that the scroll was written by Jews, not Romans. And it is written in the scroll: After 4,291 years have elapsed from the creation of the world, the world will end; during those years there will be the wars of the sea monsters between the leviathan and the animals, and among those years there will be the wars of Gog and Magog and the remaining years of the messianic period. Then the world will be destroyed. And the Holy One, Blessed be He, will renew His world only after the passage of seven thousand years. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, says that it was stated: After the passage of five thousand years.

תניא רבי נתן אומר מקרא זה נוקב ויורד עד תהום (חבקוק ב, ג) כי עוד חזון למועד ויפח לקץ ולא יכזב אם יתמהמה חכה לו כי בא יבא לא יאחר § It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: This verse penetrates and descends until the depths; just as the depths are unfathomable, so too, the period depicted in the following verse is unquantifiable. “For the vision is yet for the appointed time; and it declares of the end, and does not lie; though it tarry, wait for it, because it will surely come; it will not delay” (Habakkuk 2:3).

לא כרבותינו שהיו דורשין (דניאל ז, כה) עד עידן עידנין ופלג עידן The Messiah will come not in accordance with the opinion of our Rabbis, who would interpret the verse: “For a period and periods and a half period” (Daniel 7:25), to mean that the duration of the ultimate exile will be three and a half times the duration of the period of the exile in Egypt.

ולא כר' שמלאי שהיה דורש (תהלים פ, ו) האכלתם לחם דמעה ותשקמו בדמעות שליש And the Messiah will come not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Simlai, who would interpret the verse: “You have fed them with the bread of tears and have given them tears to drink in great measure [shalish]” (Psalms 80:6), to mean that the duration of the ultimate exile will be three times the duration of the period of the exile in Egypt.

ולא כרבי עקיבא שהיה דורש (חגי ב, ו) עוד אחת מעט היא ואני מרעיש את השמים ואת הארץ And the Messiah will come not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who would interpret the verse: “Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the heavens and the earth” (Haggai 2:6), to mean that the redemption would transpire soon after the destruction of the Temple.

אלא מלכות ראשון שבעים שנה מלכות שניה חמשים ושתים ומלכות בן כוזיבא שתי שנים ומחצה Rather, the first, great, Hasmonean monarchy ruled seventy years. The second kingdom, of Herod and his descendants, ruled fifty-two years, and the duration of the monarchy of bar Koziva, or bar Kokheva, was two and a half years. The duration of the exile that follows is unknown.

מאי ויפח לקץ ולא יכזב א"ר שמואל בר נחמני אמר ר' יונתן תיפח עצמן של מחשבי קיצין שהיו אומרים כיון שהגיע את הקץ ולא בא שוב אינו בא אלא חכה לו שנאמר אם יתמהמה חכה לו שמא תאמר אנו מחכין והוא אינו מחכה ת"ל (ישעיהו ל, יח) לכן יחכה ה' לחננכם ולכן ירום לרחמכם The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase “And it declares [veyafe’aḥ] of the end, and does not lie”? Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: May those who calculate the end of days be cursed [tippaḥ], as they would say once the end of days that they calculated arrived and the Messiah did not come, that he will no longer come at all. Rather, the proper behavior is to continue to wait for his coming, as it is stated: “Though it tarry, wait for it.” Lest you say we are expectantly awaiting the end of days and the Holy One, Blessed be He, is not awaiting the end of days and does not want to redeem His people, the verse states: “And therefore will the Lord wait, to be gracious to you; and therefore will He be exalted, to have mercy upon you; for the Lord is a God of judgment; happy are all they who wait for Him” (Isaiah 30:18).

וכי מאחר שאנו מחכים והוא מחכה מי מעכב מדת הדין מעכבת וכי מאחר שמדת הדין מעכבת אנו למה מחכין לקבל שכר שנאמר (ישעיהו ל, יח) אשרי כל חוכי לו And seemingly, since we are awaiting the end of days and the Holy One, Blessed be He, is also awaiting the end of days, who is preventing the coming of the Messiah? It is the divine attribute of judgment that prevents his coming, as it is written: “For the Lord is a God of judgment,” and we are not worthy. And since the attribute of judgment prevents the coming of the Messiah and we are not worthy of redemption, why do we await his coming daily? We do so in order to receive a reward for awaiting his coming, as it is stated: “Happy are all they who wait for Him.”

אמר אביי לא פחות עלמא מתלתין ושיתא צדיקי דמקבלי אפי שכינה בכל דרא שנאמר אשרי כל חוכי לו לו בגימטריא תלתין ושיתא הוו איני והאמר רבא דרא דקמי קודשא בריך הוא תמני סרי אלפי [פרסא] הואי שנאמר (יחזקאל מח, לה) סביב שמנה עשר אלף לא קשיא הא דמסתכלי באיספקלריא המאירה הא דמסתכלי באיספקלריא שאינה מאירה Apropos that verse, Abaye said: The world has no fewer than thirty-six righteous people in each generation who greet the Divine Presence, as it is stated: “Happy are all they who wait for Him [lo]” (Isaiah 30:18). The numerical value of lo, spelled lamed vav, is thirty-six. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rava say: The row of the righteous before the Holy One, Blessed be He, extends eighteen thousand parasangs, as it is stated with regard to the city of God at the end of days: “It shall be eighteen thousand reeds round about, and the name of the city from that day shall be: The Lord is there” (Ezekiel 48:35)? The Gemara answers: It is not difficult; this statement of Abaye refers to the thirty-six righteous people who view the Divine Presence through a luminous crystal [be’ispaklarya], and that statement of Rava refers to the multitudes who view the Divine Presence through a crystal that is not luminous.

ומי נפישי כולי האי והאמר חזקיה א"ר ירמיה משום רשב"י ראיתי בני עלייה והן מועטין אם אלף הם אני ובני מהם אם מאה הם אני ובני מהם אם שנים הם אני ובני הם The Gemara asks: And are those who view the Divine Presence through a crystal that is luminous so numerous? But doesn’t Ḥizkiyya say that Rabbi Yirmeya says in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai: I have seen members of the group of the spiritually prominent, who are truly righteous, and they are few. If they number one thousand, I and my son are among them. If they number one hundred, I and my son are among them; and if they number two, I and my son are they. Apparently, it is conceivable that there are no more than two who view the Divine Presence through a luminous crystal.

לא קשיא הא דעיילי בבר הא דעיילי בלא בר The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This statement of Abaye is referring to those who may enter to view the Divine Presence only by requesting and being granted permission [bar] from the angels. That statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai is referring to the select few who may enter to view the Divine Presence even without requesting permission, for whom the gates of Heaven are open at all times.

אמר רב כלו כל הקיצין ואין הדבר תלוי אלא בתשובה ומעשים טובים ושמואל אמר דיו לאבל שיעמוד באבלו כתנאי ר' אליעזר אומר אם ישראל עושין תשובה נגאלין ואם לאו אין נגאלין אמר ליה רבי יהושע אם אין עושין תשובה אין נגאלין אלא הקב"ה מעמיד להן מלך שגזרותיו קשות כהמן וישראל עושין תשובה ומחזירן למוטב § Rav says: All the ends of days that were calculated passed, and the matter depends only upon repentance and good deeds. When the Jewish people repent, they will be redeemed. And Shmuel says: It is sufficient for the mourner to endure in his mourning to bring about the coming of the Messiah. Even without repentance, they will be worthy of redemption due to the suffering they endured during the exile. The Gemara notes: This dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im: Rabbi Eliezer says: If the Jewish people repent they are redeemed, and if not they are not redeemed. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: If they do not repent, will they not be redeemed at all? Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will establish a king for them whose decrees are as harsh as those issued by Haman, and the Jewish people will have no choice but to repent, and this will restore them to the right path.

תניא אידך ר' אליעזר אומר אם ישראל עושין תשובה נגאלין שנאמר (ירמיהו ג, כב) שובו בנים שובבים ארפא משובותיכם אמר לו רבי יהושע והלא כבר נאמר (ישעיהו נב, ג) חנם נמכרתם ולא בכסף תגאלו חנם נמכרתם בעבודת כוכבים ולא בכסף תגאלו לא בתשובה ומעשים טובים It is taught in another baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If the Jewish people repent they are redeemed, as it is stated: “Return, wayward children, I will heal your iniquities” (Jeremiah 3:22). Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “So says the Lord: You were sold for naught, and without money you shall be redeemed” (Isaiah 52:3)? Rabbi Yehoshua explains: “You were sold for naught” means you were sold for idol worship, which is a sin with no basis. “And without money you shall be redeemed” means you will be redeemed not through repentance and good deeds, but through the will of God.

אמר לו רבי אליעזר לר' יהושע והלא כבר נאמר (מלאכי ג, ז) שובו אלי ואשובה אליכם אמר ליה רבי יהושע והלא כבר נאמר (ירמיהו ג, יד) כי אנכי בעלתי בכם ולקחתי אתכם אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה והבאתי אתכם ציון Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: But isn’t it already stated: “Return to me and I will return to you” (Malachi 3:7)? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “For I have taken you to Myself; and I will take you one from a city and two from a family, and I will bring you to Zion” (Jeremiah 3:14), unconditionally?

אמר לו ר' אליעזר והלא כבר נאמר (ישעיהו ל, טו) בשובה ונחת תושעון אמר לו ר' יהושע לרבי אליעזר והלא כבר נאמר (ישעיהו מט, ז) כה אמר ה' גואל ישראל וקדושו לבזה נפש למתעב גוי לעבד מושלים Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “In ease [beshuva] and rest shall you be saved” (Isaiah 30:15), indicating that redemption is dependent upon repentance [teshuva]? Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: But isn’t it already stated: “So says the Lord, Redeemer of Israel, his Holy One, to him who is despised of man, to him who is abhorred of the nation, to a servant of rulers:

Daf 98a

מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו Kings shall see and arise, princes shall prostrate themselves, because of the Lord, Who is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, Who has chosen you” (Isaiah 49:7), indicating that redemption will come independent of repentance?

אמר לו רבי אליעזר והלא כבר נאמר (ירמיהו ד, א) אם תשוב ישראל נאום ה' אלי תשוב אמר לו רבי יהושע והלא כבר נאמר (דניאל יב, ז) ואשמע את האיש לבוש הבדים אשר ממעל למימי היאור וירם ימינו ושמאלו אל השמים וישבע בחי העולם כי למועד מועדים וחצי וככלות נפץ יד עם קדש תכלינה כל אלה וגו' ושתק רבי אליעזר Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “If you will return, Israel, says the Lord, return to Me” (Jeremiah 4:1), indicating that redemption is contingent upon repentance? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “And I heard the man clothed in linen, who was above the waters of the river, when he lifted up his right hand and his left hand to heaven and swore by the One Who lives forever that it shall be for a period, periods, and a half; when the crushing of the power of the holy people shall have been completed, all these things shall be finished” (Daniel 12:7), indicating that the time for redemption is set and unrelated to repentance? And Rabbi Eliezer was silent, unable to refute the proof from that verse.

ואמר רבי אבא אין לך קץ מגולה מזה שנאמר (יחזקאל לו, ח) ואתם הרי ישראל ענפכם תתנו ופריכם תשאו לעמי ישראל וגו' רבי (אליעזר) אומר אף מזה שנאמר (זכריה ח, י) כי לפני הימים (האלה) [ההם] שכר האדם לא נהיה ושכר הבהמה איננה וליוצא ולבא אין שלום מן הצר § And Rabbi Abba says: You have no more explicit manifestation of the end of days than this following phenomenon, as it is stated: “But you, mountains of Israel, you shall give your branches, and yield your fruit to My people of Israel, for they will soon be coming” (Ezekiel 36:8). When produce will grow in abundance in Eretz Yisrael, it is an indication that the Messiah will be coming soon. Rabbi Eliezer says: You have no greater manifestation of the end of days than this following phenomenon as well, as it is stated: “For before these days there was no hire for man, nor any hire for beast; nor was there peace from the oppressor to him who exits and to him who enters” (Zechariah 8:10). When there are no wages for work and no rent paid for use of one’s animal, that is an indication that the coming of the Messiah is at hand.

מאי ליוצא ולבא אין שלום מן הצר רב אמר אף תלמידי חכמים שכתוב בהם שלום דכתיב (תהלים קיט, קסה) שלום רב לאהבי תורתך אין שלום מפני צר ושמואל אמר עד שיהיו כל השערים כולן שקולין The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: “Nor was there peace from the oppressor to him who exits and to him who enters”? Rav says: It means that even for Torah scholars, with regard to whom the promise of peace is written, as it is written: “Great peace have they who love Your Torah; and there is no obstacle for them” (Psalms 119:165), there will be no peace from the oppressor. And Shmuel says: It means that the Messiah will not come until all the prices are equal.

אמר רבי חנינא אין בן דוד בא עד שיתבקש דג לחולה ולא ימצא שנאמר (יחזקאל לב, יד) אז אשקיע מימיהם ונהרותם כשמן אוליך וכתב (בתריה) (יחזקאל כט, כא) ביום ההוא אצמיח קרן לבית ישראל Rabbi Ḥanina says: The son of David will not come until a fish will be sought for an ill person and will not be found, as it is stated with regard to the downfall of Egypt: “Then I will make their waters clear and cause their rivers to run like oil” (Ezekiel 32:14), meaning that the current in the rivers will come to a virtual standstill. And it is written thereafter: “On that day I will cause the glory of the house of Israel to flourish” (Ezekiel 29:21).

אמר רבי חמא בר חנינא אין בן דוד בא עד שתכלה מלכות הזלה מישראל שנאמר (ישעיהו יח, ה) וכרת הזלזלים במזמרות וכתיב בתריה בעת ההיא יובל שי לה' צבאות עם ממשך ומורט Rabbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina says: The son of David will not come until the contemptuous [hazalla] kingdom of Rome will cease from the Jewish people, as it is stated: “And He shall sever the sprigs [hazalzallim] with pruning hooks” (Isaiah 18:5). And it is written thereafter: “At that time shall a present be brought to the Lord of hosts, by a people scattered and hairless” (Isaiah 18:7).

אמר זעירי אמר רבי חנינא אין בן דוד בא עד שיכלו גסי הרוח מישראל שנאמר (צפניה ג, יא) כי אז אסיר מקרבך עליזי גאותך וכתיב (צפניה ג, יב) והשארתי בקרבך עם עני ודל וחסו בשם ה' Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The son of David will not come until the arrogant will cease to exist from among the Jewish people, as it is stated: “For then I will remove from your midst your proudly exulting ones” (Zephaniah 3:11), and it is written afterward: “And I will leave in your midst a poor and lowly people, and they shall take refuge in the name of the Lord” (Zephaniah 3:12).

אמר רבי שמלאי משום רבי אלעזר בר"ש אין בן דוד בא עד שיכלו כל שופטים ושוטרים מישראל שנאמר (ישעיהו א, כה) ואשיבה ידי עליך ואצרוף כבור סיגיך וגו' ואשיבה שופטיך Rabbi Simlai says in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: The son of David will not come until all the judges and officers will cease to exist from among the Jewish people, and there will be no more autonomous government in Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: “And I will turn My hand against you and purge away your dross as with lye and take away your base alloy. And I will restore your judges as at the first” (Isaiah 1:25–26).

אמר עולא אין ירושלים נפדית אלא בצדקה שנאמר (ישעיהו א, כז) ציון במשפט תפדה ושביה בצדקה אמר רב פפא אי בטלי יהירי בטלי אמגושי אי בטלי דייני בטלי גזירפטי אי בטלי יהירי בטלי אמגושי דכתיב (ישעיהו א, כה) ואצרוף כבור סיגיך ואסירה כל בדיליך ואי בטלי דייני בטלי גזירפטי דכתיב (צפניה ג, טו) הסיר ה' משפטיך פנה אויבך Ulla says: Jerusalem is redeemed only by means of righteousness, as it is stated: “Zion shall be redeemed with justice and those who return to it with righteousness” (Isaiah 1:27). Rav Pappa says: If the arrogant will cease to exist, the Persian sorcerers will cease to exist as well. If the deceitful judges will cease to exist, the royal officers [gazirpatei] and taskmasters will cease to exist. Rav Pappa elaborates: If the arrogant will cease, the Persian sorcerers will cease, as it is written: “And I will purge away your dross [sigayikh] as with lye, and I will remove all your alloy [bedilayikh].” When the arrogant [sigim] are purged, the sorcerers, who are separated [muvdalim] from the fear of God, will also cease. And if the deceitful judges cease to exist, the royal officers and taskmasters will cease to exist, as it is written: “The Lord has removed your judgments; cast out your enemy” (Zephaniah 3:15).

אמר ר' יוחנן אם ראית דור שמתמעט והולך חכה לו שנאמר (שמואל ב כב, כח) ואת עם עני תושיע וגו' אמר רבי יוחנן אם ראית דור שצרות רבות באות עליו כנהר חכה לו שנאמר (ישעיהו נט, יט) כי יבא כנהר צר (ו) רוח ה' נוססה בו וסמיך ליה ובא לציון גואל Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If you saw a generation whose wisdom and Torah study is steadily diminishing, await the coming of the Messiah, as it is stated: “And the afflicted people You will redeem” (II Samuel 22:28). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If you saw a generation whose troubles inundate it like a river, await the coming of the Messiah, as it is stated: “When distress will come like a river that the breath of the Lord drives” (Isaiah 59:19). And juxtaposed to it is the verse: “And a redeemer will come to Zion” (Isaiah 59:20).

ואמר רבי יוחנן אין בן דוד בא אלא בדור שכולו זכאי או כולו חייב בדור שכולו זכאי דכתיב (ישעיהו ס, כא) ועמך כולם צדיקים לעולם יירשו ארץ בדור שכולו חייב דכתיב (ישעיהו נט, טז) וירא כי אין איש וישתומם כי אין מפגיע וכתיב (ישעיהו מח, יא) למעני אעשה And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The son of David will come only in a generation that is entirely innocent, in which case they will be deserving of redemption, or in a generation that is entirely guilty, in which case there will be no alternative to redemption. He may come in a generation that is entirely innocent, as it is written: “And your people also shall be all righteous; they shall inherit the land forever” (Isaiah 60:21). He may come in a generation that is entirely guilty, as it is written: “And He saw that there was no man, and was astonished that there was no intercessor; therefore His arm brought salvation to Him, and His righteousness, it sustained Him” (Isaiah 59:16). And it is written: “For My own sake, for My own sake will I do it; for how should it be profaned? And My glory I will not give it to another” (Isaiah 48:11).

אמר רבי אלכסנדרי רבי יהושע בן לוי רמי כתיב (ישעיהו ס, כב) בעתה וכתיב אחישנה זכו אחישנה לא זכו בעתה § Rabbi Alexandri says: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi raises a contradiction in a verse addressing God’s commitment to redeem the Jewish people. In the verse: “I the Lord in its time I will hasten it” (Isaiah 60:22), it is written: “In its time,” indicating that there is a designated time for the redemption, and it is written: “I will hasten it,” indicating that there is no set time for the redemption. Rabbi Alexandri explains: If they merit redemption through repentance and good deeds I will hasten the coming of the Messiah. If they do not merit redemption, the coming of the Messiah will be in its designated time.

אמר רבי אלכסנדרי רבי יהושע בן לוי רמי כתיב (דניאל ז, יג) וארו עם ענני שמיא כבר אינש אתה וכתיב (זכריה ט, ט) עני ורוכב על חמור זכו עם ענני שמיא לא זכו עני רוכב על חמור Rabbi Alexandri says: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi raises a contradiction between two depictions of the coming of the Messiah. It is written: “There came with the clouds of heaven, one like unto a son of man…and there was given him dominion and glory and a kingdom…his dominion is an everlasting dominion” (Daniel 7:13–14). And it is written: “Behold, your king will come to you; he is just and victorious; lowly and riding upon a donkey and upon a colt, the foal of a donkey” (Zechariah 9:9). Rabbi Alexandri explains: If the Jewish people merit redemption, the Messiah will come in a miraculous manner with the clouds of heaven. If they do not merit redemption, the Messiah will come lowly and riding upon a donkey.

אמר ליה שבור מלכא לשמואל אמריתו משיח על חמרא אתי אישדר ליה סוסיא ברקא דאית לי אמר ליה מי אית לך בר חיור גווני King Shapur of Persia said to Shmuel mockingly: You say that the Messiah will come on a donkey; I will send him the riding [barka] horse that I have. Shmuel said to him: Do you have a horse with one thousand colors [bar ḥivar gavanei] like the donkey of the Messiah? Certainly his donkey will be miraculous.

ר' יהושע בן לוי אשכח לאליהו דהוי קיימי אפיתחא דמערתא דרבי שמעון בן יוחאי אמר ליה אתינא לעלמא דאתי אמר ליה אם ירצה אדון הזה אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי שנים ראיתי וקול ג' שמעתי Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi found Elijah the prophet, who was standing at the entrance of the burial cave of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said to him: Will I be privileged to come to the World-to-Come? Elijah said to him: If this Master, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will wish it so. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Two I saw, Elijah and me, and the voice of three I heard, as the Divine Presence was also there, and it was in reference to Him that Elijah said: If this Master will wish it so.

אמר ליה אימת אתי משיח אמר ליה זיל שייליה לדידיה והיכא יתיב אפיתחא דקרתא ומאי סימניה יתיב ביני עניי סובלי חלאים וכולן שרו ואסירי בחד זימנא איהו שרי חד ואסיר חד אמר דילמא מבעינא דלא איעכב Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said to Elijah: When will the Messiah come? Elijah said to him: Go ask him. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi asked: And where is he sitting? Elijah said to him: At the entrance of the city of Rome. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi asked him: And what is his identifying sign by means of which I can recognize him? Elijah answered: He sits among the poor who suffer from illnesses. And all of them untie their bandages and tie them all at once, but the Messiah unties one bandage and ties one at a time. He says: Perhaps I will be needed to serve to bring about the redemption. Therefore, I will never tie more than one bandage, so that I will not be delayed.

אזל לגביה אמר ליה שלום עליך רבי ומורי אמר ליה שלום עליך בר ליואי א"ל לאימת אתי מר א"ל היום אתא לגבי אליהו א"ל מאי אמר לך א"ל שלום עליך בר ליואי א"ל אבטחך לך ולאבוך לעלמא דאתי א"ל שקורי קא שקר בי דאמר לי היום אתינא ולא אתא א"ל הכי אמר לך (תהלים צה, ז) היום אם בקולו תשמעו Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi went to the Messiah. He said to the Messiah: Greetings to you, my rabbi and my teacher. The Messiah said to him: Greetings to you, bar Leva’i. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said to him: When will the Master come? The Messiah said to him: Today. Sometime later, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi came to Elijah. Elijah said to him: What did the Messiah say to you? He said to Elijah that the Messiah said: Greetings [shalom] to you, bar Leva’i. Elijah said to him: He thereby guaranteed that you and your father will enter the World-to-Come, as he greeted you with shalom. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said to Elijah: The Messiah lied to me, as he said to me: I am coming today, and he did not come. Elijah said to him that this is what he said to you: He said that he will come “today, if you will listen to his voice” (Psalms 95:7).

שאלו תלמידיו את רבי יוסי בן קיסמא אימתי בן דוד בא אמר מתיירא אני שמא תבקשו ממני אות אמרו לו אין אנו מבקשין ממך אות § Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma’s students asked him: When will the son of David come? Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said: I am hesitant to answer you, lest you request from me a sign to corroborate my statement. They said to him: We are not asking you for a sign.

א"ל לכשיפול השער הזה ויבנה ויפול ויבנה ויפול ואין מספיקין לבנותו עד שבן דוד בא אמרו לו רבינו תן לנו אות אמר להם ולא כך אמרתם לי שאין אתם מבקשין ממני אות Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said to them: You will see when this existing gate of Rome falls and will be rebuilt, and will fall a second time and will be rebuilt, and will fall a third time. And they will not manage to rebuild it until the son of David comes. The students said to him: Our rabbi, give us a sign. Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said to them: But didn’t you say to me that you are not asking me for a sign?

אמרו לו ואף על פי כן אמר להם אם כך יהפכו מי מערת פמייס לדם ונהפכו לדם They said to him: And nevertheless, provide us with a sign. Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said to them: If it is as I say, the water of the Cave of Pamyas will be transformed into blood. The Gemara relates: And it was transformed into blood.

בשעת פטירתו אמר להן העמיקו לי ארוני At the time of his death, Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said to his students: Place my coffin deep in the ground,

Daf 98b

שאין כל דקל ודקל שבבבל שאין סוס של פרסיים נקשר בו ואין לך כל ארון וארון שבארץ ישראל שאין סוס מדי אוכל בו תבן as there is no palm tree that is in Babylonia to which a horse of the Persians will not be tethered when the Persians and Medes go to conquer other lands. And there is no coffin buried in Eretz Yisrael from which a Median horse will not eat straw. During wars, all the coffins will be removed from the ground and used as animal troughs. I do not want my coffin to be used for that purpose.

אמר רב אין בן דוד בא עד שתתפשט המלכות על ישראל תשעה חדשים שנאמר (מיכה ה, ב) לכן יתנם עד עת יולדה ילדה ויתר אחיו ישובון על בני ישראל Rav says: The son of David will not come until the evil Roman kingdom will disperse throughout Eretz Yisrael for nine months, as it is stated: “Therefore will He give them up, until the time when she who is in labor has given birth; then the remnant of his brethren shall return with the children of Israel” (Micah 5:2). Once a period equivalent to a term of pregnancy passes, the redemption will come.

אמר עולא ייתי ולא איחמיניה וכן אמר [רבה] ייתי ולא איחמיניה רב יוסף אמר ייתי ואזכי דאיתיב בטולא דכופיתא דחמריה § Ulla says: Let the Messiah come, but after my death, so that I will not see him, as I fear the suffering that will precede his coming. Likewise, Rabba says: Let the Messiah come, but after my death, so that I will not see him. Rav Yosef says: Let the Messiah come, and I will be privileged to sit in the shadow of his donkey’s excrement. I am willing to undergo all the pain and disgrace associated with his arrival.

אמר ליה אביי (לרבא) [לרבה] מאי טעמא אילימא משום חבלו של משיח והתניא שאלו תלמידיו את רבי אלעזר מה יעשה אדם וינצל מחבלו של משיח יעסוק בתורה ובגמילות חסדים ומר הא תורה והא גמילות חסדים Abaye said to Rabba: What is the reason that you are so concerned? If we say it is due to the pains preceding and accompanying the coming of the Messiah, but isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar’s students asked Rabbi Elazar: What shall a person do to be spared from the pains preceding the coming of the Messiah? Rabbi Elazar said to them: They shall engage in Torah study and acts of kindness. Abaye continued: And as far as the Master is concerned, isn’t there the Torah and aren’t there the acts of kindness that you performed?

אמר [ליה] שמא יגרום החטא כדר' יעקב בר אידי דר' יעקב בר אידי רמי כתיב (בראשית כח, טו) הנה אנכי עמך ושמרתיך בכל אשר תלך וכתיב (בראשית לב, ח) ויירא יעקב מאד וייצר לו Rabba said to him: I am concerned lest sin cause me to suffer the pain despite the Torah study and the good deeds in which I engage, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi. As Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi raises a contradiction. It is written that God said to Jacob: “And I am with you, and will keep you wherever you go” (Genesis 28:15), and it is written: “And Jacob was greatly afraid and distressed” (Genesis 32:8). If God assured Jacob that He would keep him, why was he concerned?

שהיה מתיירא שמא יגרום החטא כדתניא (שמות טו, טז) עד יעבור עמך ה' זו ביאה ראשונה עד יעבור עם זו קנית זו ביאה שניה Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi explains: He was afraid lest sin on his part cause that assurance to be abrogated, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Until Your people pass over, Lord, until Your people, whom You have acquired, pass over” (Exodus 15:16). “Until Your people pass over, Lord”; this is a reference to the first entry into the land, led by Joshua. “Until Your people, whom You have acquired, pass over”; this is a reference to the second entry into the land, when they returned to Zion from Babylonia.

אמור מעתה ראויים היו ישראל לעשות להם נס בביאה שניה כביאה ראשונה אלא שגרם החטא Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi explains: Say from now, based on this statement, that the Jewish people were worthy for God to perform a miracle on their behalf in the second entry into the land that was like the miracles that were performed during the exodus from Egypt and the first entry into the land, but the sin caused the second entry to take place in an unremarkable manner, with the Jewish people being subject to the dominion of the gentiles.

וכן אמר ר' יוחנן ייתי ולא איחמיניה א"ל ריש לקיש מ"ט אילימא משום דכתיב (עמוס ה, יט) כאשר ינוס איש מפני הארי ופגעו הדוב [ובא הבית] וסמך ידו אל הקיר ונשכו נחש בא ואראך דוגמתו בעולם הזה בזמן שאדם יוצא לשדה ופגע בו סנטר דומה כמי שפגע בו ארי נכנס לעיר פגע בו גבאי דומה כמי שפגעו דוב נכנס לביתו ומצא בניו ובנותיו מוטלין ברעב דומה כמי שנשכו נחש And so too Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Let the Messiah come, but after my death, so that I will not see him. Reish Lakish said to him: What is the reason that you are concerned? If we say it is because it is written with regard to the day of God: “As when a man did flee from a lion and a bear met him, or went into the house and leaned his arm on the wall and a snake bit him” (Amos 5:19), that is not a reason. Come, and I will show you a counterpart in this world to the situation described in this verse, as even today one encounters those situations. At a time when a person goes out to the field and is accosted by a guard [santar] who demands payment, his situation is similar to that of one who is accosted by a lion. He then enters the city and is accosted by a royal tax collector. His situation is similar to that of one who is accosted by a bear. He then enters his house and finds his sons and daughters afflicted with famine. His situation is similar to that of one whom a snake bit.

אלא משום דכתיב (ירמיהו ל, ו) שאלו נא וראו אם ילד זכר מדוע ראיתי כל גבר ידיו על חלציו כיולדה ונהפכו כל פנים לירקון Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Rather, the reason I am concerned is that it is written with regard to the day of God: “Ask now, and see whether a man gives birth. Why, then, do I see every man [kol gever] with his hands on his loins, as a woman in labor, and all faces turned green?” (Jeremiah 30:6).

מאי ראיתי כל גבר אמר רבא בר יצחק אמר רב מי שכל גבורה שלו ומאי ונהפכו כל פנים לירקון אמר רבי יוחנן פמליא של מעלה ופמליא של מטה בשעה שאמר הקב"ה הללו מעשה ידי והללו מעשה ידי היאך אאבד אלו מפני אלו The Gemara clarifies: What is the meaning of the phrase “I see kol gever”? Rava bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says: It is a reference to He Whom all strength is His. It is as though even God will suffer like a woman in labor due to the troubles of the Jewish people. And what is the meaning of the phrase “And all faces turned green”? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The reference is to the heavenly entourage above, i.e., angels, and the earthly entourage below, i.e., the Jewish people, who will all suffer at the time when the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: These, the Jewish people, are My handiwork, and those, the gentiles, are My handiwork. How shall I destroy those on account of these? It appears that the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not distinguish between the Jewish people and the gentiles. That is why Rabbi Yoḥanan was concerned with regard to the coming of the Messiah.

אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי רהיט ונפל תורא ואזיל ושדי ליה סוסיא באורייה Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: An ox runs and falls, and its owner goes and casts a horse in its place. Although the horse is an inferior work animal relative to the ox, when there is no ox available, a horse must suffice. So too, after the Jewish people sin, it is as though the Holy One, Blessed be He, transfers their prominence to the gentiles.

אמר רב גידל אמר רב עתידין ישראל דאכלי שני משיח אמר רב יוסף פשיטא ואלא מאן אכיל להו חילק ובילק אכלי להו לאפוקי מדרבי הילל דאמר אין משיח לישראל שכבר אכלוהו בימי חזקיה § Rav Giddel says that Rav says: The Jewish people are destined to eat from the bounty of, i.e., enjoy, the years of the Messiah. Rav Yosef says: Isn’t this obvious? And rather, who else will eat from them? Will Ḥillak and Billak, two shiftless characters, eat from them? The Gemara explains that Rav Giddel’s statement serves to exclude the statement of Rabbi Hillel, who says: There is no Messiah coming for the Jewish people, as they already ate from him, as all the prophecies relating to the Messiah were already fulfilled during the days of Hezekiah.

אמר רב לא אברי עלמא אלא לדוד ושמואל אמר למשה ורבי יוחנן אמר למשיח Rav says: The world was created only for the sake of David, by virtue of his merit. And Shmuel says: It was created by virtue of the merit of Moses. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It was created by virtue of the merit of the Messiah.

מה שמו דבי רבי שילא אמרי שילה שמו שנאמר (בראשית מט, י) עד כי יבא שילה דבי רבי ינאי אמרי ינון שמו שנאמר (תהלים עב, יז) יהי שמו לעולם לפני שמש ינון שמו דבי רבי חנינה אמר חנינה שמו שנאמר (ירמיהו טז, יג) אשר לא אתן לכם חנינה ויש אומרים מנחם בן חזקיה שמו שנאמר (איכה א, טז) כי רחק ממני מנחם משיב נפשי ורבנן אמרי חיוורא דבי רבי שמו שנאמר (ישעיהו נג, ד) אכן חליינו הוא נשא ומכאובינו סבלם ואנחנו חשבנוהו נגוע מוכה אלהים ומעונה Apropos the Messiah, the Gemara asks: What is his name? The school of Rabbi Sheila says: Shiloh is his name, as it is stated: “Until when Shiloh shall come” (Genesis 49:10). The school of Rabbi Yannai says: Yinnon is his name, as it is stated: “May his name endure forever; may his name continue [yinnon] as long as the sun; and may men bless themselves by him” (Psalms 72:17). The school of Rabbi Ḥanina says: Ḥanina is his name, as it is stated: “For I will show you no favor [ḥanina]” (Jeremiah 16:13). And some say that Menaḥem ben Ḥizkiyya is his name, as it is stated: “Because the comforter [menaḥem] that should relieve my soul is far from me” (Lamentations 1:16). And the Rabbis say: The leper of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is his name, as it is stated: “Indeed our illnesses he did bear and our pains he endured; yet we did esteem him injured, stricken by God, and afflicted” (Isaiah 53:4).

אמר רב נחמן אי מן חייא הוא כגון אנא שנאמר (ירמיהו ל, כא) והיה אדירו ממנו ומושלו מקרבו יצא אמר רב אי מן חייא הוא כגון רבינו הקדוש אי מן מתיא הוא כגון דניאל איש חמודות Rav Naḥman says: If the Messiah is among the living in this generation, he is a person such as me, who already has dominion over the Jewish people, as it is stated: “And their prince shall be of themselves, and their governor shall proceed from their midst” (Jeremiah 30:21), indicating that the redeemer is already in power. Rav says: If the Messiah is among the living in this generation, he is a person such as our saintly Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who was renowned for his sanctity, piety, and Torah knowledge. If the Messiah is among the dead he is a person such as Daniel, the beloved man.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב עתיד הקדוש ברוך הוא להעמיד להם דוד אחר שנאמר (ירמיהו ל, ט) ועבדו את ה' אלהיהם ואת דוד מלכם אשר אקים להם הקים לא נאמר אלא אקים א"ל רב פפא לאביי והכתיב (יחזקאל לז, כה) ודוד עבדי נשיא להם לעולם כגון קיסר ופלגי קיסר Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, is destined to establish another David for the Jewish people as the Messiah, as it is stated: “And they shall serve the Lord their God, and David their king, whom I will establish for them” (Jeremiah 30:9). It is not stated: I established, but “I will establish,” indicating that the name of the future king will be David. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But isn’t it written: “And my servant David shall be their prince forever” (Ezekiel 37:25), indicating that King David himself will rule over the Jewish people? Abaye said: They will rule in tandem like an emperor and a viceroy; the Messiah will be king and David will be second-in-command.

דרש רבי שמלאי מאי דכתיב (עמוס ה, יח) הוי המתאוים את יום ה' למה זה לכם יום ה' הוא חשך ולא אור משל לתרנגול ועטלף שהיו מצפין לאור א"ל תרנגול לעטלף אני מצפה לאורה שאורה שלי היא ואתה למה לך אורה § Rabbi Simlai taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Woe to you who desire the day of the Lord. Why would you have this day of the Lord? It is darkness, and not light” (Amos 5:18)? It is comparable to a rooster and a bat who were looking forward to the light of day. The rooster said to the bat: I look forward to light, as light is an indication of my time to be active. But as for you, why do you need light? Nighttime for you is like daytime for me.

Daf 99a

והיינו דא"ל ההוא מינא לרבי אבהו אימתי אתי משיח א"ל לכי חפי להו חשוכא להנהו אינשי א"ל מילט קא לייטת לי א"ל קרא כתיב (ישעיהו ס, ב) כי הנה החשך יכסה ארץ וערפל לאומים ועליך יזרח ה' וכבודו עליך יראה And that is the background for the following exchange, as a certain heretic said to Rabbi Abbahu: When will the Messiah come? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: He will come when the darkness will enshroud these people, i.e., you. The heretic said to him: Are you cursing me for no reason? Rabbi Abbahu said to him, I am merely relating to you a verse that is written: “For behold, the darkness shall cover the earth, and fog the peoples; but the Lord shall shine upon you, and His glory shall be seen upon you” (Isaiah 60:2).

תניא ר' אליעזר אומר ימות המשיח ארבעים שנה שנאמר (תהלים צה, י) ארבעים שנה אקוט בדור רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר שבעים שנה שנאמר והיה ביום ההוא ונשכחת צור שבעים שנה כימי מלך אחד איזהו מלך מיוחד הוי אומר זה משיח § It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: The messianic era will be forty years long, as it is stated: “Forty years will I strive with the generation” (Psalms 95:10). The forty years of strife with the gentiles will be followed by the glory days of the Messiah. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: The messianic era will last seventy years, as it is stated: “And it shall come to pass on that day, that Tyre shall be forgotten seventy years, according to the days of one king” (Isaiah 23:15). In this context, one [eḥad], means unique [meyuḥad]. Which is the unique king? You must say that this is a reference to the Messiah.

רבי אומר שלשה דורות שנאמר (תהלים עב, ה) ייראוך עם שמש ולפני ירח דור דורים ר' הילל אומר אין להם משיח לישראל שכבר אכלוהו בימי חזקיה Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The messianic era will last three generations, as it is stated: “May they fear You as long as the sun and moon endure, throughout the generations [dor dorim]” (Psalms 72:5). Dor is singular and dorim is plural, for a total of three generations. Rabbi Hillel says: There is no Messiah coming for the Jewish people, as they already ate from him, as all the prophecies relating to the Messiah were already fulfilled, during the days of Hezekiah.

אמר רב יוסף שרא ליה מריה לרבי הילל חזקיה אימת הוה בבית ראשון ואילו זכריה קא מתנבי בבית שני ואמר (זכריה ט, ט) גילי מאד בת ציון הריעי בת ירושלים הנה מלכך יבא לך צדיק ונושע הוא עני ורוכב על חמור ועל עיר בן אתונות Rav Yosef says: May the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel for stating matters with no basis. With regard to Hezekiah, when was his reign? It was during the First Temple period. Whereas Zechariah ben Berechiah, the prophet, prophesied during the Second Temple period and said: “Rejoice greatly, daughter of Zion; shout, daughter of Jerusalem; behold, your king will come to you; he is just and victorious; lowly and riding upon a donkey and upon a colt, the foal of a donkey” (Zechariah 9:9). In the generations after Hezekiah, there are prophecies about both redemption and the coming of the Messiah.

תניא אידך ר' אליעזר אומר ימות המשיח ארבעים שנה כתיב הכא (דברים ח, ג) ויענך וירעיבך ויאכילך וכתיב התם (תהלים צ, טו) שמחנו כימות עניתנו שנות ראינו רעה It is taught in another baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: The messianic era will be forty years long. It is written here with regard to the forty-year sojourn of the children of Israel in the wilderness: “And He afflicted you, and suffered you to hunger and fed you with manna” (Deuteronomy 8:3); and it is written there: “Make us glad according to the days that You afflicted us, the years that we saw evil” (Psalms 90:15).

רבי דוסא אומר ד' מאות שנה כתיב הכא (בראשית טו, יג) ועבדום וענו אותם ארבע מאות שנה וכתיב התם שמחנו כימות עניתנו Rabbi Dosa says: The messianic era will last four hundred years. It is written here with regard to the Covenant of the Pieces: “And they shall serve them, and they shall afflict them four hundred years” (Genesis 15:13); and it is written there: “Make us glad according to the days that You afflicted us.”

רבי אומר ג' מאות וששים וחמש שנה כמנין ימות החמה שנאמר (ישעיהו סג, ד) כי יום נקם בלבי ושנת גאולי באה Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The messianic era will last 365 years, corresponding to the number of days of the solar year, as it is stated: “For the day of vengeance is in My heart, and the year of My redeemed is come” (Isaiah 63:4).

מאי יום נקם בלבי א"ר יוחנן ללבי גליתי לאבריי לא גליתי ר"ש בן לקיש אמר ללבי גליתי למלאכי השרת לא גליתי The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: “For the day of vengeance is in My heart”? Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it means that God said: I revealed the day of vengeance to My heart, but I did not reveal it to My limbs, as it were, as I never stated it explicitly. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that it means that God said: I revealed this secret to My heart, but I did not reveal it to the ministering angels.

תני אבימי בריה דרבי אבהו ימות המשיח לישראל שבעת אלפים שנה שנאמר (ישעיהו סב, ה) ומשוש חתן על כלה (כן) ישיש עליך (ה') אלהיך Avimi, son of Rabbi Abbahu, taught: The messianic era for the Jewish people will last seven thousand years, as it is stated: “And as the bridegroom rejoices over the bride, so shall your God rejoice over you” (Isaiah 62:5). The bridegroom rejoices over the bride for seven days, and the day of the Holy One, Blessed be He, is one thousand years.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל ימות המשיח כמיום שנברא העולם ועד עכשיו שנאמר (דברים יא, כא) כימי השמים על הארץ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The duration of the messianic era is like the duration of the period that runs from the day the world was created until now, i.e., the day when the Messiah will come, as it is stated: “That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children, in the land that the Lord swore to your fathers to give them, as the days of heaven upon the earth” (Deuteronomy 11:21).

רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר כימי נח עד עכשיו שנאמר (ישעיהו נד, ט) כי מי נח זאת לי אשר נשבעתי Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The duration of the messianic era is like the duration of the period that runs from the days of Noah until now, i.e., the day when the Messiah will come, as it is stated with regard to redemption: “For this is as the seas of [ki mei] Noah to me; as I have sworn that the seas of Noah shall no more go over the earth, so have I sworn that I will not be angry with you nor rebuke you” (Isaiah 54:9). The words ki mei can be understood as one word, kimei, meaning: Like the days of.

אמר רבי חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן כל הנביאים כולן לא נתנבאו אלא לימות המשיח אבל לעולם הבא (ישעיהו סד, ג) עין לא ראתה אלהים זולתך (אלהים) יעשה למחכה לו ופליגא דשמואל דאמר שמואל אין בין העולם הזה לימות המשיח אלא שעבוד מלכיות בלבד § Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In their prophecies with regard to redemption and the end of days, all the prophets prophesied only about the messianic era, but with regard to the World-to-Come the reward is not quantifiable, as it states: “No eye has seen it, God, aside from You, Who will do for those who await Him” (Isaiah 64:3). The Gemara notes: And this statement disagrees with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: The difference between this world and the messianic era is only with regard to servitude to foreign kingdoms alone, as they will leave Eretz Yisrael.

ואמר רבי חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן כל הנביאים לא נתנבאו אלא לבעלי תשובה אבל צדיקים גמורים עין לא ראתה אלהים זולתך ופליגא דרבי אבהו דא"ר אבהו (א"ר) מקום שבעלי תשובה עומדין שם צדיקים אינן עומדין שם שנאמר (ישעיהו נז, יט) שלום שלום לרחוק ולקרוב ברישא רחוק והדר קרוב מאי רחוק רחוק דמעיקרא ומאי קרוב קרוב דמעיקרא ודהשתא And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All of the prophets prophesied their prophecies of consolation only with regard to penitents, but with regard to the reward of the completely righteous it is stated: “No eye has seen it, God, aside from You.” The Gemara notes: And the opinion expressed in this statement disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, who holds that penitents are superior to the righteous, as Rabbi Abbahu says that Rav says: In the place where penitents stand, even the completely righteous do not stand, as it is stated: “Peace, peace upon him who is far and him who is near” (Isaiah 57:19). Peace and greeting is extended first to him who is far, and only thereafter is peace extended to him who is near. What is the meaning of the term: “Upon him who is far”? It means: One who was initially far, i.e., the penitent. And what is the meaning of the term: “Him who is near”? It means: One who was initially near and continues to be near at present, i.e., the completely righteous individual.

ורבי יוחנן אמר לרחוק שהוא רחוק מעבירה קרוב שהוא קרוב מעבירה ונתרחק ממנה And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: “Upon him who is far” is referring to one who is distant from transgression, the completely righteous individual. “Him who is near” is referring to one who is near to transgression and distanced himself from it, the penitent.

וא"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן כל הנביאים כולן לא נתנבאו אלא למשיא בתו לתלמיד חכם ולעושה פרקמטיא לתלמיד חכם ולמהנה תלמיד חכם מנכסיו אבל תלמידי חכמים עצמן עין לא ראתה אלהים זולתך And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All of the prophets prophesied their prophecies of consolation only with regard to one who values wisdom and therefore marries his daughter to a Torah scholar, and to one who conducts business [perakmatya] on behalf of a Torah scholar, and to one who utilizes his wealth to benefit a Torah scholar from his property in some other way. But the prophets did not describe the extent of the reward for Torah scholars themselves, whose reward is not quantifiable, as it is stated: “No eye has seen it, God, aside from You.”

מאי עין לא ראתה אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי זה יין המשומר בענביו מששת ימי בראשית ר"ל אמר זה עדן לא ראתה עין מעולם וא"ת אדם היכן דר בגן ואם תאמר גן הוא עדן תלמוד לומר (בראשית ב, י) ונהר יוצא מעדן להשקות את הגן: The Gemara asks: What reward is indicated in the phrase “no eye has seen it”? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: This is wine preserved in its grapes from the six days of Creation. No person has drunk that wine and therefore no one can appreciate its quality. Reish Lakish says: This is Eden, which no eye has ever seen. And if you say: Where did Adam the first man live, if not in Eden, the answer is that he lived in the garden. And lest you say: The garden is Eden and they are indistinguishable, the verse states: “And a river emerged from Eden to irrigate the garden” (Genesis 2:10), indicating that they are two distinct places.

והאומר אין תורה מן השמים וכו': תנו רבנן (במדבר טו, לא) כי דבר ה' בזה ומצותו הפר הכרת תכרת זה האומר אין תורה מן השמים ד"א כי דבר ה' בזה זה אפיקורוס § The mishna teaches that those who have no share in the World-to-Come include: And one who says: The Torah did not originate from Heaven. The Sages taught in a baraita that with regard to the verse: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord and has breached His commandment; that soul shall be excised; his iniquity shall be upon him” (Numbers 15:31), this is a reference to one who says: The Torah did not originate from Heaven. Alternatively, one can explain: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord”; this is a reference to an epikoros, who treats the word of God with contempt.

ד"א כי דבר ה' בזה זה המגלה פנים בתורה ואת מצותו הפר זה המפר ברית בשר הכרת תכרת הכרת בעולם הזה תכרת לעולם הבא מכאן אמר רבי אליעזר המודעי המחלל את הקדשים והמבזה את המועדות והמפר בריתו של אברהם אבינו והמגלה פנים בתורה שלא כהלכה והמלבין פני חבירו ברבים אף על פי שיש בידו תורה ומעשים טובים אין לו חלק לעולם הבא Alternatively, one can explain: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord”; this is a reference to one who interprets the Torah inappropriately. “And has breached His commandment”; this is a reference to one who breaches the covenant of flesh, who refuses to circumcise his foreskin. “Shall be excised [hikkaret tikkaret]”; “hikkaret” refers to being excised in this world, and “tikkaret” refers to being excised from the World-to-Come. From here Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i says: With regard to one who desecrates consecrated items, e.g., intentionally rendering them impure; and one who treats the intermediate days of the Festivals with contempt; and one who breaches the covenant of Abraham our forefather; and one who reveals aspects in the Torah that are not in accordance with halakha; and one who humiliates another in public, even if he has to his credit Torah study and good deeds, he has no share in the World-to-Come.

תניא אידך כי דבר ה' בזה זה האומר אין תורה מן השמים ואפילו אמר כל התורה כולה מן השמים חוץ מפסוק זה שלא אמרו הקדוש ברוך הוא אלא משה מפי עצמו זהו כי דבר ה' בזה ואפילו אמר כל התורה כולה מן השמים חוץ מדקדוק זה מקל וחומר זה מגזרה שוה זו זה הוא כי דבר ה' בזה It is taught in another baraita: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord”; this is a reference to one who says the Torah did not originate from Heaven. And even if one says the entire Torah originated from Heaven except for this verse, i.e., any one verse, claiming that the Holy One, Blessed be He, did not say it but Moses himself said it on his own, this is included in the category of: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord.” And even if one says the entire Torah originated from Heaven except for this inference inferred by the Sages, or except for this a fortiori inference, or except for this verbal analogy, this is included in the category of: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord.”

תניא היה רבי מאיר אומר הלומד תורה ואינו מלמדה זה הוא דבר ה' בזה רבי נתן אומר כל מי שאינו משגיח על המשנה ר' נהוראי אומר כל שאפשר לעסוק בתורה ואינו עוסק It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: With regard to one who studies Torah and does not teach it to others, this person is included in the category of: “He has despised the word of the Lord,” as his conduct indicates that he does not consider the word of God significant enough to teach others. Rabbi Natan says: Anyone who does not pay the requisite attention to the Mishna and does not consider it essential halakha is included in the category of: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord.” Rabbi Nehorai says: Anyone for whom it is possible to engage in Torah study and who nevertheless does not engage in its study is included in the category of: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord.”

רבי ישמעאל אומר זה העובד עבודת כוכבים מאי משמעה דתנא דבי ר' ישמעאל כי דבר ה' בזה זה המבזה דבור שנאמר לו למשה מסיני (שמות כ, ב) אנכי ה' אלהיך לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים וגו' Rabbi Yishmael says: This verse: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord,” is a reference to an idol worshipper. The Gemara asks: From where in the verse is this inferred? The Gemara explains: It is derived from a verse, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: “Because he has despised the word [devar] of the Lord”; this is a reference to one who treats with contempt a statement [dibbur] that was stated to Moses at Sinai and heard by all of the Jewish people: “I am the Lord your God…You shall have no other gods beside me” (Exodus 20:2–3).

רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר כל הלומד תורה ואינו חוזר עליה דומה לאדם שזורע ואינו קוצר רבי יהושע אומר כל הלומד תורה ומשכחה דומה לאשה שיולדת וקוברת Apropos Torah study, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Anyone who studies Torah and does not review it is comparable to a person who sows and does not reap. Rabbi Yehoshua says: Anyone who studies Torah and causes himself to forget it is similar to a woman who gives birth and buries her newborn child.

רבי עקיבא אומר Rabbi Akiva says:

Daf 99b

זמר בכל יום זמר בכל יום אמר רב יצחק בר אבודימי מאי קרא שנאמר (משלי טז, כו) נפש עמל עמלה לו כי אכף עליו פיהו הוא עמל במקום זה ותורתו עומלת לו במקום אחר Sing every day, sing every day, i.e., review your studies like a song that one sings over and over. Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: From what verse is this derived? It is as it is stated: “The hunger of the laborer labors for him; for his mouth presses upon him” (Proverbs 16:26), i.e., he exhausts his mouth through constant review and study. He labors in Torah in this place, this world, and his Torah labors for him in another place, the World-to-Come.

אמר רבי אלעזר כל אדם לעמל נברא שנאמר (איוב ה, ז) כי אדם לעמל יולד איני יודע אם לעמל פה נברא אם לעמל מלאכה נברא כשהוא אומר כי אכף עליו פיהו הוי אומר לעמל פה נברא ועדיין איני יודע אם לעמל תורה אם לעמל שיחה כשהוא אומר (יהושע א, ח) לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך הוי אומר לעמל תורה נברא והיינו דאמר רבא כולהו גופי דרופתקי נינהו טובי לדזכי דהוי דרופתקי דאורייתא Rabbi Elazar says: Every man was created for labor, as it is stated: “Man is born for toil” (Job 5:7). Based on this verse, I do not know whether he was created for toil of the mouth, speech, or whether he was created for the toil of labor. When the verse states: “For his mouth presses upon him” (Proverbs 16:26), you must say that he was created for toil of the mouth. And still I do not know with regard to the toil of the mouth whether it is for the toil of Torah or for the toil of conversation. When the verse states: “This Torah scroll shall not depart from your mouth” (Joshua 1:8), you must say that he was created for the toil of Torah. And that is the meaning of what Rava said: All bodies are like receptacles to store items until use. Happy is one who is privileged, who is a receptacle for Torah.

(משלי ו, לב) ונואף אשה חסר לב אמר ריש לקיש זה הלומד תורה לפרקים שנאמר (משלי כב, יח) כי נעים כי תשמרם בבטנך יכונו יחדיו על שפתיך The verse states: “He who commits adultery with a woman lacks understanding” (Proverbs 6:32). Reish Lakish says: This is a reference to one who studies Torah intermittently, who is like an adulterer, who sins with the other woman intermittently, as it is stated about words of Torah: “For it is a pleasant thing if you keep them within your belly; let them be established on your lips” (Proverbs 22:18) and keep the Torah always available.

ת"ר (במדבר טו, ל) והנפש אשר תעשה ביד רמה זה מנשה בן חזקיה שהיה יושב ודורש בהגדות של דופי § The Sages taught in a baraita that with regard to the verse: “But the person who acts high-handedly, whether he is born in the land, or a stranger, that person blasphemes the Lord” (Numbers 15:30), this is a reference to Manasseh ben Hezekiah, king of Israel, who would sit and teach flawed interpretations of Torah narratives.

אמר וכי לא היה לו למשה לכתוב אלא (בראשית לו, כב) ואחות לוטן תמנע ותמנע היתה פלגש לאליפז (בראשית ל, יד) וילך ראובן בימי קציר חטים וימצא דודאים בשדה יצאה ב"ק ואמרה לו (תהלים נ, כ-כא) תשב באחיך תדבר בבן אמך תתן דופי אלה עשית והחרשתי דמית היות אהיה כמוך אוכיחך ואערכה לעיניך Manasseh said: But did Moses need to write only insignificant matters that teach nothing, for example: “And Lotan’s sister was Timna” (Genesis 36:22), or: “And Timna was concubine to Eliphaz, son of Esau” (Genesis 36:12), or: “And Reuben went in the days of the wheat harvest and found duda’im in the field” (Genesis 30:14)? A Divine Voice emerged and said to him: “You sit and speak against your brother; you slander your own mother’s son. These things you have done, and should I have kept silence, you would imagine that I was like you, but I will reprove you, and set the matter before your eyes” (Psalms 50:20–21). The verses in the Torah are not empty matters, with regard to which you can decide their import.

ועליו מפורש בקבלה (ישעיהו ה, יח) הוי מושכי העון בחבלי השוא וכעבות העגלה חטאה מאי כעבות העגלה א"ר אסי יצר הרע בתחלה דומה לחוט של כוביא ולבסוף דומה לעבות העגלה And about Manasseh ben Hezekiah it is stated explicitly in the texts of tradition, the Prophets: “Woe unto them who draw iniquity with cords of vanity, and sin as with a cart rope” (Isaiah 5:18). What is the meaning of the phrase “as with a cart rope”? Rabbi Asi says: This is a reference to the evil inclination. Initially, it seems like a flimsy spinning [kuveya] thread and ultimately it seems like a sturdy cart rope.

דאתן עלה מיהת אחות לוטן תמנע מאי היא תמנע בת מלכים הואי דכתיב (בראשית לו, כט) אלוף לוטן אלוף תמנע וכל אלוף מלכותא בלא תאגא היא Manasseh began by mocking a few verses and ultimately violated the entire Torah. The Gemara asks: With regard to that verse that we came to discuss, in any event, what is the significance of the phrase in the verse “And Lotan’s sister was Timna”? The Gemara explains: Timna was the daughter of kings, as it is written: “The chief of Lotan” (Genesis 36:29), and: “The chief of Timna” (Genesis 36:40), and each chief is a member of a monarchy, albeit without a crown. That is why they are called chief and not king.

בעיא לאיגיורי באתה אצל אברהם יצחק ויעקב ולא קבלוה הלכה והיתה פילגש לאליפז בן עשו אמרה מוטב תהא שפחה לאומה זו ולא תהא גבירה לאומה אחרת נפק מינה עמלק דצערינהו לישראל מאי טעמא דלא איבעי להו לרחקה Timna sought to convert. She came before Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and they did not accept her. She went and became a concubine of Eliphaz, son of Esau, and said, referring to herself: It is preferable that she will be a maidservant for this nation, and she will not be a noblewoman for another nation. Ultimately, Amalek, son of Eliphaz, emerged from her, and that tribe afflicted the Jewish people. What is the reason that the Jewish people were punished by suffering at the hand of Amalek? It is due to the fact that they should not have rejected her when she sought to convert. Therefore, the verse is significant.

וילך ראובן בימי קציר חטים אמר רבא בר' יצחק אמר רב מכאן לצדיקים שאין פושטין ידיהן בגזל וימצא דודאים בשדה מאי דודאים אמר רב יברוחי לוי אמר סיגלי ר' יונתן אמר (סיבסוך) [סביסקי]: “And Reuben went in the days of the wheat harvest” (Genesis 30:14). Rava, son of Rabbi Yitzḥak, says that Rav says: From here it can be seen that the righteous do not extend their hands to engage in robbery even of small items, as rather than taking wheat, Reuben took only the ownerless duda’im. The verse continues: “And he found duda’im in the field.” The Gemara asks: What are duda’im? Rav says: They are a plant called yavruḥei. Levi says: They are violets. Rabbi Yonatan says: They are seviskei.

א"ר אלכסנדרי כל העוסק בתורה לשמה משים שלום בפמליא של מעלה ובפמליא של מטה שנאמר (ישעיהו כז, ה) או יחזק במעוזי יעשה שלום לי שלום יעשה לי: § Apropos the significance of Torah study, Rabbi Alexandri says: Anyone who engages in the study of Torah for its own sake introduces peace into the heavenly entourage above and into the earthly entourage below, as it is stated: “Or let him take hold of My stronghold [ma’uzi], that he may make peace with Me; and he shall make peace with Me” (Isaiah 27:5). One who observes the Torah, which is called oz, introduces peace, even before the presence of God, as it were.

רב אמר כאילו בנה פלטרין של מעלה ושל מטה שנאמר (ישעיהו נא, טז) ואשים דברי בפיך ובצל ידי כסיתיך לנטוע שמים וליסד ארץ (אמר ריש לקיש) [רבי יוחנן אמר] אף מגין על כל העולם כולו שנאמר ובצל ידי כסיתיך ולוי אמר אף מקרב את הגאולה שנאמר (ישעיהו נא, טז) ולאמר לציון עמי אתה Rav says: It is as though he built a palace of heaven above and of earth below, as it is stated: “And I have placed My words in your mouth, and I have covered you in the shadow of My hand, to plant the heavens and lay the foundations of the earth, and say to Zion, you are My people” (Isaiah 51:16). One who has the word of God placed in his mouth through Torah study has established heaven and earth. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who engages in Torah study also protects the entire world, as it is stated: “And I have covered you in the shadow of My hand.” And Levi says: He also advances the coming of the redemption, as it is stated: “And say to Zion, you are My people.”

אמר ריש לקיש כל המלמד את בן חבירו תורה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשאו שנאמר (בראשית יב, ה) ואת הנפש אשר עשו בחרן ר' (אליעזר) אומר כאילו עשאן לדברי תורה שנאמר (דברים כט, ח) ושמרתם את דברי הברית הזאת ועשיתם אותם רבא אמר כאילו עשאו לעצמו שנאמר ועשיתם אותם אל תקרי אותם אלא אתם Reish Lakish said: With regard to anyone who teaches Torah to the son of another, the verse ascribes him credit as though he formed that student, as it is stated: “And Abram took Sarai his wife…and the souls that they formed in Haran” (Genesis 12:5). They are given credit for forming the students to whom they taught Torah. Rabbi Elazar says: It is as though he fashioned [asa’an] the words of Torah themselves, as it is stated: “Observe the words of this covenant, va’asitem otam” (Deuteronomy 29:8), indicating that studying the Torah is like fashioning it. Rava says: It is as though he fashioned himself, as it is stated: “Va’asitem otam.” Do not read “va’asitem otam” as: And you shall fashion them; rather, read it as va’asitem atem, meaning: You shall fashion yourself.

אמר רבי אבהו כל המעשה את חבירו לדבר מצוה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשאה שנאמר (שמות יז, ה) ומטך אשר הכית בו את היאר וכי משה הכהו והלא אהרן הכהו אלא לומר לך כל המעשה את חבירו לדבר מצוה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשאה: Rabbi Abbahu says: With regard to anyone who causes another to engage in a matter of a mitzva, the verse ascribes him credit as though he performed it himself, as it is stated: “And the Lord said to Moses…and your rod, with which you struck the river, take in your hand and go” (Exodus 17:5). And was it Moses who struck the river? But isn’t it written explicitly (see Exodus 7:19–20) that Aaron struck the river? Rather, that verse serves to say to you: Anyone who causes another to engage in a matter of a mitzva, the verse ascribes him credit as though he performed it himself.

אפיקורוס: רב ור' חנינא אמרי תרוייהו זה המבזה ת"ח רבי יוחנן ור' יהושע בן לוי אמרי זה המבזה חבירו בפני ת"ח § The mishna teaches that those who have no share in the World-to-Come include an epikoros. Rav and Rabbi Ḥanina both say: This is one who treats a Torah scholar with contempt. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: This is one who treats another with contempt before a Torah scholar.

בשלמא למ"ד המבזה חבירו בפני ת"ח אפיקורוס הוי מבזה תלמיד חכם עצמו מגלה פנים בתורה שלא כהלכה הוי אלא למ"ד מבזה תלמיד חכם עצמו אפיקורוס הוי מגלה פנים בתורה כגון מאי כגון מנשה בן חזקיה The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that one who treats another with contempt before a Torah scholar is the epikoros mentioned in the mishna, one who treats a Torah scholar with contempt is characterized as one who interprets the Torah inappropriately, due to his lowering of the status of a Torah scholar. But according to the one who says that one who treats a Torah scholar himself with contempt is the epikoros mentioned in the mishna, how would he characterize one who interprets the Torah inappropriately? Like what individual does such a person conduct himself? He is like Manasseh, son of Hezekiah, who would teach flawed interpretations of Torah narratives.

ואיכא דמתני לה אסיפא מגלה פנים בתורה רב ור' חנינא אמרי זה המבזה ת"ח רבי יוחנן וריב"ל אמרי זה המבזה את חבירו בפני תלמיד חכם And there are those who teach this dispute with regard to the latter clause of the baraita: From here Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i said: One who interprets the Torah inappropriately has no share in the World-to-Come. Rav and Rabbi Ḥanina say: This is one who treats a Torah scholar with contempt. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: This is one who treats another with contempt before a Torah scholar.

בשלמא למ"ד המבזה תלמיד חכם עצמו מגלה פנים בתורה הוי מבזה חבירו בפני ת"ח אפיקורוס הוי אלא למ"ד מבזה חבירו בפני תלמיד חכם מגלה פנים בתורה הוי אפיקורוס כגון מאן אמר רב יוסף כגון הני דאמרי מאי אהנו לן רבנן לדידהו קרו לדידהו תנו The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that one who treats a Torah scholar himself with contempt is the one mentioned in the baraita who interprets the Torah inappropriately, one who treats another with contempt before a Torah scholar is characterized as the epikoros mentioned in the mishna. But according to the one who says that one who treats another with contempt before a Torah scholar is the one mentioned in the baraita who interprets the Torah inappropriately, how would he characterize the epikoros mentioned in the mishna? Like whom does he conduct himself? Rav Yosef says: It is referring to one who conducts himself like those who say: In what manner have the Sages benefited us with all their Torah study? They read the Bible for their own benefit and they study the Mishna for their own benefit.

אמר ליה אביי האי מגלה פנים בתורה נמי הוא דכתיב (ירמיהו לג, כה) אם לא בריתי יומם ולילה חקות שמים וארץ לא שמתי אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק מהכא נמי שמע מינה שנאמר (בראשית יח, כו) ונשאתי לכל המקום בעבורם Abaye said to him: That person who questions the benefit provided by Sages is also in the category of one who interprets the Torah inappropriately, since with that statement he repudiates the Torah itself, as it is written: “If not for My covenant, I would not have appointed day and night, the laws of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25). The eternal covenant of the Torah is responsible for maintaining the existence of the entire world. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: From here too conclude the same concept from it, as it is stated: “If I find in Sodom fifty just men within the city, then I will spare the entire place for their sakes” (Genesis 18:26). The righteous protect the place where they reside.

אלא כגון דיתיב קמיה רביה ונפלה ליה שמעתא בדוכתא אחריתי ואמר הכי אמרינן התם ולא אמר הכי אמר מר רבא אמר כגון הני דבי בנימין אסיא דאמרי מאי אהני לן רבנן מעולם Rather, the epikoros mentioned in the mishna is referring to one who conducts himself like one who sits before his teacher and a halakha that he learned from another place happens to fall into his consciousness and the student says: This is what we say there, and he does not say deferentially: This is what the Master said, even if he did not learn that matter from his teacher. Rava said: The term epikoros is referring to one who conducts himself like those from the house of Binyamin the doctor, who say: In what manner have the Sages benefited us with all their Torah study? Never

Daf 100a

לא שרו לן עורבא ולא אסרו לן יונה have they permitted a raven for us nor have they prohibited a dove for us. They merely tell us matters stated explicitly in the Torah.

רבא כי הוו מייתי טריפתא דבי בנימין קמיה כי הוה חזי בה טעמא להיתירא אמר להו תחזו דקא שרינא לכו עורבא כי הוה חזי לה טעמא לאיסורא אמר להו תחזו דקא אסרנא לכו יונה The Gemara relates with regard to Rava: When they would bring a possible tereifa from the house of Binyamin before him, when he would see in it a reason to permit its consumption, Rava would say to them: See that I am permitting a raven for you, as this is an animal that appeared forbidden. When he would see in it a reason to prohibit its consumption, Rava would say to them: See that I am prohibiting a dove for you.

רב פפא אמר כגון דאמר הני רבנן רב פפא אישתלי ואמר כגון הני רבנן ואיתיב בתעניתא Rav Pappa says: The epikoros mentioned in the mishna is referring to one who conducts himself like one who says: Those Sages, with contemptuous overtones. The Gemara relates that Rav Pappa himself forgot in one instance and said: Like those Sages, and he observed a fast to achieve atonement for expressing himself in that manner.

לוי בר שמואל ורב הונא בר חייא הוו קא מתקני מטפחות ספרי דבי רב יהודה כי מטו מגילת אסתר אמרי הא [מגילת אסתר] לא בעי מטפחת אמר להו כי האי גוונא נמי מיחזי כי אפקירותא The Gemara relates: Levi bar Shmuel and Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya were mending mantles for the sacred scrolls of the school of Rav Yehuda. When they reached the scroll of Esther they said: This scroll of Esther does not require a mantle, as it is not as significant as the other sacred scrolls. Rav Yehuda said to them: A statement of that sort also seems to express irreverence like the irreverence typical of an epikoros, as you should not have referred to the scroll of Esther as: This scroll.

רב נחמן אמר זה הקורא רבו בשמו דאמר רבי יוחנן מפני מה נענש גיחזי מפני שקרא לרבו בשמו שנאמר (מלכים ב ח, ה) ויאמר גחזי אדני המלך זאת האשה וזה בנה אשר החיה אלישע Rav Naḥman says: An epikoros is one who calls his teacher by his name and does not call him Rabbi, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For what reason was Gehazi punished? It is due to the fact that he called his teacher by his name, as it is stated: “And Gehazi said: My lord the king, this is the woman, and this is her son, whom Elisha revived” (II Kings 8:5).

יתיב רבי ירמיה קמיה דרבי זירא ויתיב וקאמר עתיד הקב"ה להוציא נחל מבית קדשי הקדשים ועליו כל מיני מגדים שנאמר (יחזקאל מז, יב) ועל הנחל יעלה על שפתו מזה ומזה כל עץ מאכל לא יבול עלהו ולא יתם פריו לחדשיו יבכר כי מימיו מן המקדש [המה] יוצאים והיה פריו למאכל ועלהו לתרופה א"ל ההוא סבא יישר וכן אמר ר' יוחנן (יישר) אמר ליה ר' ירמיה לרבי זירא כי האי גונא מיחזי אפקרותא § The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yirmeya sat before Rabbi Zeira, and sat and said: The Holy One, Blessed be He, will cause a river to emerge from the Holy of Holies, and alongside it all sorts of delicacies will grow, as it is stated: “And the river upon its bank, on this side and on that side shall grow every tree for food, whose leaf shall not wither, neither shall its fruit fall; it shall bring forth new fruit every month, because their waters emerged from the Sanctuary; and its fruit shall be for food and its leaf for medicine” (Ezekiel 47:12). A certain elder said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Well done, and so Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Well done. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: Does a statement of that sort, when one who is not a Torah scholar says to a Sage that his statement is correct, seem like the irreverence typical of an epikoros?

אמר ליה הא [האי] סיועי קא מסייע (ליה) [לך] אלא אי שמיע לך הא שמיע לך כי הא דיתיב רבי יוחנן וקא דריש עתיד הקב"ה להביא אבנים טובות ומרגליות שהן שלשים על שלשים אמות וחוקק בהם עשר ברום עשרים ומעמידן בשערי ירושלים שנאמר (ישעיהו נד, יב) ושמתי כדכוד שמשותיך ושעריך לאבני אקדח וגו' לגלג עליו אותו תלמיד אמר השתא כביעתא דצילצלא לא משכחינן כולי האי משכחינן Rabbi Zeira said to him: But isn’t he supporting your statement? He meant no disrespect. Rather, if you heard that at times supporting the statement of a Sage is irreverent, this is what you heard: It is like that case in which Rabbi Yoḥanan sat and taught: The Holy One, Blessed be He, is destined to bring precious stones and jewels that are thirty by thirty cubits, and He will bore in them an opening ten cubits wide by twenty cubits in height and place them to serve as the gates of Jerusalem, as it is stated: “And I will make your pinnacles of rubies and your gates of carbuncles” (Isaiah 54:12). A certain student mocked him and said: Now, at present, we do not find precious stones comparable in size to the egg of a palm dove. Will we find stones as large as those that you described?

לימים הפליגה ספינתו בים חזינהו למלאכי השרת דקא מנסרי אבנים טובות ומרגליות אמר להו הני למאן אמרי עתיד הקב"ה להעמידן בשערי ירושלים כי הדר אשכחיה לר' יוחנן דיתיב וקא דריש א"ל רבי דרוש ולך נאה לדרוש כשם שאמרת כך ראיתי אמר לו ריקה אם לא ראית לא האמנת מלגלג על דברי חכמים אתה יהב ביה עיניה ועשאו גל של עצמות Sometime later that student’s ship set sail at sea. He saw the ministering angels cutting precious stones that size. He said to the angels: For whom are these stones? The angels said to him: The Holy One, Blessed be He, is destined to place them at the gates of Jerusalem. When the student returned, he found Rabbi Yoḥanan, who was sitting and teaching. The student said to him: My teacher, teach, and it is fitting for you to teach. Just as you said with regard to the precious stones, so I saw. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Good-for-nothing, if you did not see it, you would not believe it? You are one who mocks the statements of the Sages. Rabbi Yoḥanan directed his eyes toward him in anger and rendered him a pile of bones.

מיתבי (ויקרא כו, יג) ואולך אתכם קוממיות ר"מ אומר מאתים אמה כשתי קומות של אדם הראשון רבי יהודה אומר ק' אמה כנגד היכל וכותליו שנאמר (תהלים קמד, יב) אשר בנינו כנטיעים מגודלים בנעוריהם בנותינו כזויות מחוטבות תבנית היכל וגו' The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan that the gates will be twenty cubits high. The Sages engaged in a dispute concerning the interpretation of the verse: “And I made you go upright [komemiyyut]” (Leviticus 26:13). Rabbi Meir says that in the end of days people will be two hundred cubits tall, the equivalent of twice the height of Adam the first man, who was one hundred cubits tall. Rabbi Yehuda says: People will be one hundred cubits tall, corresponding to the height of the Sanctuary and its walls, as it is stated: “For our sons are as plants grown up in their youth; our daughters as cornerstones, carved in the fashion of a palace” (Psalms 144:12), indicating that the sons and daughters will be one hundred cubits tall, the height of the Sanctuary. If the people are that tall, how will they enter gates twenty cubits high?

כי קאמר ר' יוחנן לכוי דבי זיקא The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the openings would be twenty cubits high he is referring to the windows through which wind enters. The gates through which people enter will extend considerably higher.

מאי ועלהו לתרופה ר' יצחק בר אבודימי ורב חסדא חד אמר להתיר פה של מעלה וחד אמר להתיר פה של מטה § Apropos the river that will emerge from the Holy of Holies, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: And its leaf for medicine [literufa]? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avudimi and Rav Ḥisda disagree. One says: This is an abbreviation for the phrase: To unlock the mouth [lehattir peh] that is above, i.e., the leaf heals the mute. And one says: That is the abbreviation, but it means to unlock the mouth that is below, a euphemism for healing the womb of a barren woman.

איתמר (נמי) חזקיה אמר להתיר פה אילמין בר קפרא אמר להתיר פה עקרות ר' יוחנן אמר לתרופה ממש מאי לתרופה ר' שמואל בר נחמני אמר לתואר פנים של בעלי הפה It was also stated that other Sages engaged in a dispute concerning this matter. Ḥizkiyya says that the reference is: To unlock the mouth of mutes, and bar Kappara says that the reference is: To unlock the mouth of barren women. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The reference is to actual medicine. The Gemara asks: According to that opinion, what is the meaning of the term: For medicine [literufa]? Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: It is an abbreviation meaning to beautify the countenance [letoar panim] of the keepers of the mouth [peh], i.e., the Sages, who labored with their mouths to study Torah in this world.

דרש ר' יהודה ברבי סימון כל המשחיר פניו על דברי תורה בעולם הזה הקב"ה מבהיק זיויו לעולם הבא שנאמר (שיר השירים ה, טו) מראהו כלבנון בחור כארזים Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Simon, taught: For anyone who blackens his face while toiling over matters of Torah in this world, the Holy One, Blessed be He, shines his brightness in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “His locks are curly black as a raven” (Song of Songs 5:11), and thereafter it is written: “His countenance is like Lebanon, excellent as the cedars” (Song of Songs 5:15), followed by: “His palate is like sweets” (Song of Songs 5:16). One who engages in sweets, i.e., Torah study, in this world, until he is blackened, black as a raven, is privileged to shining brightness in the World-to-Come.

אמר ר' תנחום בר' חנילאי כל המרעיב עצמו על דברי תורה בעולם הזה הקב"ה משביעו לעולם הבא שנאמר (תהלים לו, ט) ירויון מדשן ביתך ונחל עדניך תשקם Rabbi Tanḥum, son of Rabbi Ḥanilai, says: With regard to anyone who starves himself over matters of Torah in this world, the Holy One, Blessed be He, satisfies him in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Your judgments are like the great deep” (Psalms 36:7), indicating that God is exacting with the righteous and does not reward them in this world, and it is stated thereafter: “They are abundantly satisfied with the plenty of Your house, and You feed them drink of the river of Your pleasures” (Psalms 36:9).

כי אתא רב דימי אמר עתיד הקב"ה ליתן לכל צדיק וצדיק מלא עומסו שנאמר (תהלים סח, כ) ברוך ה' יום יום יעמס לנו האל ישועתנו סלה א"ל אביי וכי אפשר לומר כן והלא כבר נאמר (ישעיהו מ, יב) מי מדד בשעלו מים ושמים בזרת תכן When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: The Holy One, Blessed be He, will give each and every righteous person His handful, as it is stated: “Blessed be the Lord, Who day by day bears our burden; God is our salvation, Selah” (Psalms 68:20). Abaye said to him: And is it possible to say so, that the Holy One, Blessed be He, will give them His handful? But wasn’t it already stated: “Who has measured the waters in the hollow of His hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure” (Isaiah 40:12)? And if the span of the Holy One, Blessed be He, is as great as the heavens, how can a person receive a handful from the Holy One, Blessed be He?

אמר מאי טעמא לא שכיחת באגדתא דאמרי במערבא משמיה דרבא בר מרי עתיד הקב"ה ליתן לכל צדיק וצדיק ג' מאות ועשרה עולמות שנא' (משלי ח, כא) להנחיל אוהבי יש ואוצרותיהם אמלא יש בגימטריא תלת מאה ועשרה הוי Rav Dimi said: What is the reason that you are not familiar with matters of aggada? As they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rava bar Mari: The Holy One, Blessed be He, will give every righteous person 310 worlds as it is stated: “To bequeath to those who love Me substance [yesh]; and I will fill their treasuries” (Proverbs 8:21). In terms of its numerical value, the word yesh, spelled yod, shin, is 310, indicating that God grants the righteous a full measure.

תניא ר' מאיר אומר במדה שאדם מודד מודדין לו דכתיב (ישעיהו כז, ח) בסאסאה בשלחה תריבנה In a related matter, it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir says: In accordance with the measure that a person metes out for others the heavenly court metes out for him, i.e., the response is commensurate with the action, as it is written: “In full measure [besasse’a] when You send her away do You contend with her” (Isaiah 27:8). The term besasse’a is interpreted as bese’a se’a, meaning that one receives a measure [se’a] commensurate with the measure [bese’a] that he meted out.

אמר ר' יהושע וכי אפשר לומר כן אדם נותן מלא עומסו לעני בעולם הזה הקב"ה נותן לו מלא עומסו לעולם הבא והכתיב (ישעיהו מ, יב) שמים בזרת תכן ואתה אי אומר כן איזו היא מדה מרובה מדת טובה מרובה או מדת פורענות Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Meir: And is it possible to say that if a person gives his handful to a pauper in this world, the Holy One, Blessed be He, gives him His handful in the World-to-Come? But isn’t it written: “And meted out heaven with the span” (Isaiah 40:12)? He asked how one can receive so bountiful a reward. Rabbi Meir answered him: And you do not say so? Which of God’s attributes is greater? Is the attribute of reward greater or is the attribute of punishment greater?

Daf 100b

הוי אומר מדה טובה מרובה ממדת פורענות במדה טובה כתיב (תהלים עח, כג) ויצו שחקים ממעל ודלתי שמים פתח וימטר עליהם מן לאכול ובמידת פורענות הוא אומר (בראשית ז, יא) וארובות השמים נפתחו You must say that the attribute of reward is greater than the attribute of punishment, as with regard to the attribute of reward it is written: “He commanded the clouds from above, and opened the doors of heaven, and rained upon them manna to eat” (Psalms 78:23–24). And with regard to the attribute of punishment at the time of the flood the verse says: “And the windows of the heavens were opened” (Genesis 7:11). To mete out punishment, God opened only windows, which are considerably smaller openings than doors, indicating that the attribute of reward is greater.

במידת פורענות כתיב (ישעיהו סו, כד) ויצאו וראו בפגרי האנשים הפושעים בי כי תולעתם לא תמות ואשם לא תכבה והיו דראון לכל בשר והלא אדם מושיט אצבעו באור בעולם הזה מיד נכוה אלא כשם שנותן הקב"ה כח ברשעים לקבל פורענותם כך נותן הקב"ה כח בצדיקים לקבל טובתן: With regard to the attribute of punishment it is written: “And they shall go forth, and look upon the carcasses of the men who have rebelled against Me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorrence to all flesh” (Isaiah 66:24). The Gemara asks: Is it not so that when a person extends his finger into the fire in this world, he is immediately burned? How, then, can one withstand the fire of Gehenna, which is never extinguished? Rather, just as the Holy One, Blessed be He, provides strength to the wicked to receive their punishment, so too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, provides strength to the righteous to receive their reward, His handful.

רבי עקיבא אומר אף הקורא בספרים החיצונים וכו': תנא בספרי מינים רב יוסף אמר בספר בן סירא נמי אסור למיקרי א"ל אביי מאי טעמא אילימא משום דכתב [ביה] לא תינטוש גילדנא מאודניה דלא ליזיל משכיה לחבלא אלא צלי יתיה בנורא ואיכול ביה תרתין גריצים § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva says: Also one who reads external literature has no share in the World-to-Come. The Sages taught in a baraita: This is a reference to reading books of heretics. Rav Yosef says: It is also prohibited to read the book of ben Sira, due to its problematic content. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reason that it is prohibited to read the book of ben Sira? If we say that it is prohibited due to the fact that ben Sira wrote in it: Do not flay the skin of the fish from its ear, so that its skin does not go to ruin, but roast it on the fire and eat with it two loaves of bread, and you believe it to be nonsense, that is not a sufficient reason.

אי מפשטיה באורייתא נמי כתב (דברים כ, יט) לא תשחית את עצה אי מדרשא אורח ארעא קמ"ל דלא ליבעול שלא כדרכה If your difficulty is from its literal meaning, that does not pose a difficulty, as in the Torah, God also wrote: “You shall not destroy its trees” (Deuteronomy 20:19). It is prohibited to destroy both trees and fish skin arbitrarily. If your difficulty is from its homiletic interpretation as a euphemism, ben Sira is teaching us proper conduct: A man should not engage in sexual intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, with his wife, as it causes her discomfort.

ואלא משום דכתיב בת לאביה מטמונת שוא מפחדה לא יישן בלילה בקטנותה שמא תתפתה בנערותה שמא תזנה בגרה שמא לא תינשא נישאת שמא לא יהיו לה בנים הזקינה שמא תעשה כשפים הא רבנן נמי אמרוה אי אפשר לעולם בלא זכרים ובלא נקבות אשרי מי שבניו זכרים אוי לו למי שבניו נקבות Rather, perhaps the book poses a difficulty because it is written there: A daughter is for her father false treasure; due to fear for her he will not sleep at night: During her minority, lest she be seduced; during her young womanhood lest she engage in licentiousness; once she has reached her majority, lest she not marry; once she marries, lest she have no children; once she grows old, lest she engage in witchcraft (Ben Sira 42:11–14). Perhaps you believe that one should not say this to the father of daughters. Didn’t the Sages also say it with regard to women? They said: It is impossible for the world to exist without males and without females; nevertheless, happy is one whose children are males and woe unto him whose children are females.

אלא משום דכתיב לא תעיל דויא בלבך דגברי גיברין קטל דויא הא שלמה אמרה (משלי יב, כה) דאגה בלב איש ישחנה ר' אמי ור' אסי חד אמר ישיחנה מדעתו וחד אמר ישיחנה לאחרים Rather, perhaps the book poses a difficulty because it is written there: Do not introduce anxiety into your heart, as anxiety has killed mighty men (Ben Sira 14:1; 30:29). Didn’t Solomon already say it in the verse: “Anxiety in a man’s heart dejects him [yashḥena]” (Proverbs 12:25)? Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi interpret the term homiletically and read it as yesiḥenna. One says that it means: He shall remove it [yesiḥenna] from his mind, and that will ease his anxiety. And one says: He shall tell it [yesiḥenna] to others, and that will ease his anxiety. Both agree with the statement of ben Sira.

ואלא משום דכתיב מנע רבים מתוך ביתך ולא הכל תביא אל ביתך והא רבי נמי אמרה דתניא רבי אומר לעולם לא ירבה אדם רעים בתוך ביתו שנאמר (משלי יח, כד) איש רעים להתרועע Rather, perhaps the book poses a difficulty because it is written there: Prevent the multitudes from inside your house, and do not bring everyone into your house (Ben Sira 11:37). But didn’t Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also say it, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A person should never have many friends inside his house, as it is stated: “There are friends that one has to his own detriment” (Proverbs 18:24), as through his association with them he will become weak and be ruined.

אלא משום דכתיב זלדקן קורטמן עבדקן סכסן דנפח בכסיה לא צחי אמר במאי איכול לחמא לחמא סב מיניה מאן דאית ליה מעברתא בדיקני' כולי עלמא לא יכלי ליה Rather, perhaps the book poses a difficulty because it is written there: A sparse-bearded man is clever; a thick-bearded man is a fool. One who blows on his cup is not thirsty. One who said: With what will I eat bread, take the bread from him. One who has a passage in his beard, the entire world is unable to overcome him. Abaye suggests: Due to all this nonsense, it is not appropriate to read this book.

אמר רב יוסף מילי מעלייתא דאית ביה דרשינן להו אשה טובה מתנה טובה בחיק ירא אלהים תנתן אשה רעה צרעת לבעלה מאי תקנתיה יגרשנה מביתו ויתרפא מצרעתו אשה יפה אשרי בעלה מספר ימיו כפלים Rav Yosef says: Even though there are passages in the book that are inappropriate, we teach the superior matters that are in it even in public. A good wife is a good gift; she will be given into the bosom of a God-fearing man (Ben Sira 26:3). A bad wife is leprosy for her husband. What is his remedy? He shall chase her from his house and will be healed from his leprosy (Ben Sira 25:30). A beautiful wife, happy is her husband; the number of his days is doubled (Ben Sira 26:1). Due to his happiness, it is as though his life is twice as long.

העלם עיניך מאשת חן פן תלכד במצודתה אל תט אצל בעלה למסוך עמו יין ושכר כי בתואר אשה יפיה רבים הושחתו ועצומים כל הרוגיה רבים היו פצעי רוכל המרגילים לדבר ערוה כניצוץ מבעיר גחלת (ירמיהו ה, כז) ככלוב מלא עוף כן בתיהם מלאים מרמה מנע רבים מתוך ביתך ולא הכל תביא ביתך רבים יהיו דורשי שלומך גלה סודך לאחד מאלף משוכבת חיקך שמור פתחי פיך אל תצר צרת מחר (משלי כז, א) כי לא תדע מה ילד יום שמא למחר איננו ונמצא מצטער על עולם שאינו שלו We also teach what it states there: Avert your eyes from a woman of grace, lest you be trapped in her snare. Turn not to her husband to mix wine and strong drink with him, as many have been corrupted by the beauty of the beautiful woman, and mighty are all her fatalities (Ben Sira 9:9–11). Many are the wounds of a peddler (Ben Sira 11:36), which in this context is referring to those who accustom others to matters of forbidden sexual relations. Like a spark ignites a coal (Ben Sira 11:43), like a cage full of birds, so too, their houses are filled with deceit (Ben Sira 11:36–37). Prevent the multitudes from inside your house, and do not bring everyone into your house (Ben Sira 11:37). Let many be those who greet you; reveal your secrets to one in a thousand. From she who lies in your bosom guard the openings of your mouth, i.e., do not tell her everything. Grieve not about tomorrow’s trouble, because you know not what a day may bring; perhaps tomorrow you will no longer be, and one will have worried about a world that is not his.

(משלי טו, טו) כל ימי עני רעים בן סירא אומר אף לילות בשפל גגים גגו ובמרום הרים כרמו ממטר גגים לגגו ומעפר כרמו לכרמים The verse states: “All the days of the poor are terrible” (Proverbs 15:15). The book of ben Sira says: Also the nights are terrible, as then the poor person worries. The poor person’s roof is among the lowest roofs in the city, and in the elevation of the hills is his vineyard, at the highest point, as those are of the lowest quality and consequently the least expensive places for each. From the rain on the roofs of the entire city, water will flow down to his roof and dampen it, and the soil of his vineyard is eroded by the rain and swept down to other vineyards.

[סימן זיר"א רב"א משרשי"א חנינ"א טובי"ה ינא"י יפ"ה יוחנ"ן מרח"ם יהוש"ע מקצ"ר] § The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the statements that follow, based primarily on those who authored those statements. Zeira; Rava; Mesharshiyya; Ḥanina toviyya, referring to Rabbi Ḥanina, who spoke of a good [tova] wife; Yannai yafe, referring to Rabbi Yannai, who spoke of one who is broad-minded [da’ato yafe]; Yoḥanan meraḥem, referring to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who spoke of one who is compassionate [meraḥem]; Yehoshua mekatzer, referring to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who spoke of one who is intolerant [da’ato ketzara].

אמר ר' זירא אמר רב מאי דכתיב (משלי טו, טו) כל ימי עני רעים אלו בעלי תלמוד וטוב לב משתה תמיד אלו בעלי משנה Rabbi Zeira says that Rav says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “All the days of the poor are terrible, and for the good-hearted it is always a feast” (Proverbs 15:15)? “All the days of the poor are terrible”; these are masters of the Talmud, who invest constant effort in their study and encounter endless difficulties and questions. “And for the good-hearted it is always a feast”; these are masters of the Mishna, who study only halakhic conclusions and encounter no difficulties.

רבא אמר איפכא והיינו דאמר רב משרשיא משמיה דרבא מאי דכתיב (קהלת י, ט) מסיע אבנים יעצב בהם אלו בעלי משנה (קהלת י, ט) ובוקע עצים יסכן בם אלו בעלי תלמוד Rava says that the opposite is true; and this is that which Rav Mesharshiyya said in the name of Rava: What is the meaning of that which is written: “One who quarries stones shall be saddened by them and he who chops wood shall be warmed by it” (Ecclesiastes 10:9)? “One who quarries stones shall be saddened by them”; these are masters of the Mishna, as they invest effort, but are unable to benefit from that effort, as they do not reach halakhic conclusions. “And he who chops wood shall be warmed by it”; these are masters of the Talmud, who invest considerable effort and benefit from it, as they reach halakhic conclusions.

רבי חנינא אומר כל ימי עני רעים זה מי שיש לו אשה רעה וטוב לב משתה תמיד זה שיש לו אשה טובה רבי ינאי אומר כל ימי עני רעים זה אסטניס וטוב לב משתה תמיד זה שדעתו יפה רבי יוחנן אמר כל ימי עני רעים זה רחמני וטוב לב משתה תמיד זה אכזרי רבי יהושע בן לוי אמר כל ימי עני רעים זה Rabbi Ḥanina says: “All the days of the poor are terrible”; this is referring to one who has a bad wife. “And for the good-hearted it is always a feast”; this is referring to one who has a good wife. Rabbi Yannai says: “All the days of the poor are terrible”; this is referring to one who is delicate [istenis], i.e., one who is sensitive to repulsive items. “And for the good-hearted it is always a feast”; this is referring to one who is broad-minded [da’ato yafe], i.e., he is not particular and will eat anything. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: “All the days of the poor are terrible”; this is referring to one who is compassionate [meraḥem], as he always senses the suffering in the world and is constantly anxious. “And for the good-hearted it is always a feast”; this is referring to one who is cruel and indifferent to suffering in the world. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: “All the days of the poor are terrible”; this is referring to

Daf 101a

שדעתו קצרה וטוב לב משתה תמיד זה שדעתו רחבה ואמר ר' יהושע בן לוי כל ימי עני רעים והאיכא שבתות וימים טובים כדשמואל דאמר שמואל שינוי וסת תחלת חולי מעיים one who is intolerant [da’ato ketzara] of others acting against his will. “And for the good-hearted it is always a feast”; this is referring to one who is tolerant and accepts the actions of others. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says with regard to the verse “All the days of the poor are terrible”: But aren’t there Shabbatot and Festivals, when he rests and eats festive meals? This can be explained in accordance with that statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: A change in routine in terms of eating and rest causes the onset of an intestinal ailment. Due to the dramatic deviation on Shabbat from the poor person’s routine he suffers.

תנו רבנן הקורא פסוק של שיר השירים ועושה אותו כמין זמר והקורא פסוק בבית משתאות בלא זמנו מביא רעה לעולם מפני שהתורה חוגרת שק ועומדת לפני הקב"ה ואומרת לפניו רבונו של עולם עשאוני בניך ככנור שמנגנין בו לצים § The Sages taught: One who reads a verse from Song of Songs and renders it a form of secular song, and not a sacred text, and one who reads any biblical verse at a banquet house, not at its appropriate time, but merely as a song, introduces evil to the world, as the Torah girds itself with sackcloth and stands before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and says before Him: Master of the Universe, Your children have rendered me like a harp on which clowns play.

אמר לה בתי בשעה שאוכלין ושותין במה יתעסקו אמרה לפניו רבונו של עולם אם בעלי מקרא הן יעסקו בתורה ובנביאים ובכתובים אם בעלי משנה הן יעסקו במשנה בהלכות ובהגדות ואם בעלי תלמוד הן יעסקו בהלכות פסח בפסח בהלכות עצרת בעצרת בהלכות חג בחג העיד רבי שמעון בן אלעזר משום רבי שמעון בן חנניא כל הקורא פסוק בזמנו מביא טובה לעולם שנאמר (משלי טו, כג) ודבר בעתו מה טוב: The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to the Torah: My daughter, during the time that they are eating and drinking, in what should they be engaged? The Torah says before Him: Master of the Universe, if they are masters of the Bible, let them engage in the study of the Torah, Prophets, and Writings. If they are masters of the Mishna, let them engage in the study of the Mishna, in the study of halakha, and in the study of aggada. And if they are masters of the Talmud, let them engage in the study of the halakhot of Passover on Passover, in the study of the halakhot of Shavuot on Shavuot, and in the study of the halakhot of Sukkot on Sukkot. They should not treat the Torah with contempt by using it for their own entertainment. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar testified in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Ḥananya: Anyone who reads a verse at its appropriate time and in the appropriate manner introduces good into the world, as it is stated: “And a word in its season, how good is it” (Proverbs 15:23).

והלוחש על המכה וכו': אמר ר' יוחנן וברוקק בה לפי שאין מזכירין שם שמים על הרקיקה איתמר רב אמר אפילו נגע צרעת ר' חנינא אמר אפילו ויקרא אל משה § The mishna teaches: And among those who have no share in the World-to-Come is one who whispers invocations over a wound. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And that is the case only where he spits into the wound while he whispers, as one does not mention the name of Heaven over spittle, and doing so is an act of contempt for God. It was stated that Rav says: Even the verse: “When a leprous mark is in a man, then he shall be brought to the priest” (Leviticus 13:9), in which there is no mention of the name of God, may not be whispered as an invocation. Rabbi Ḥanina says: Even a verse that is unrelated to the specific illness in question, for example: “And He called to Moses” (Leviticus 1:1), may not be whispered as an invocation.

תנו רבנן סכין וממשמשין בבני מעיים בשבת ולוחשין לחישת נחשים ועקרבים בשבת ומעבירין כלי על גב העין בשבת אמר רשב"ג במה דברים אמורים בכלי הניטל אבל בכלי שאינו ניטל אסור ואין שואלין בדבר שדים בשבת רבי יוסי אומר אף בחול אסור The Sages taught in a baraita: One may smear oil on and rub the intestinal area on Shabbat to ease pain, and it is not prohibited as a form of healing. One may whisper incantations of snakes and scorpions on Shabbat to ease the pain of their bite. And one may pass a cool vessel upon an infected eye on Shabbat, to soothe the inflammation. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In what case are these matters stated? They are stated in the case of a vessel that may be moved on Shabbat. But with regard to a vessel that may not be moved, it is prohibited to pass it upon the infected eye on Shabbat. And one may not consult the words of demons on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei says: Even during the week it is prohibited to consult demons.

אמר רב הונא (אין) הלכה כר' יוסי ואף רבי יוסי לא אמרה אלא משום סכנה כי הא דרב יצחק בר יוסף דאיבלע בארזא ואתעביד ליה ניסא פקע ארזא ופלטיה Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara notes: And even Rabbi Yosei did not say that it is due to the Torah prohibition of witchcraft that it is prohibited during the week; rather, it is prohibited due to danger, lest the demons harm him. This could happen, as in that incident concerning Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef, who consulted a demon and as a result was swallowed into a cedar tree, and a miracle was performed for him and the cedar split and expelled him.

ת"ר סכין וממשמשין בבני מעיים בשבת ובלבד שלא יעשה כדרך שהוא עושה בחול היכי עביד רבי חמא ברבי חנינא אמר סך ואחר כך ממשמש רבי יוחנן אמר סך וממשמש בבת אחת The Sages taught in a baraita: One may smear oil on and rub the intestinal area on Shabbat, and it is not a forbidden form of healing, provided that he does not do so in the manner in which he does during the week. The Gemara asks: How then does one do so on Shabbat? Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: One first smears oil and afterward rubs the body. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One smears oil and rubs the body simultaneously.

תנו רבנן שרי שמן ושרי ביצים מותרין לשאול בהן אלא מפני שמכזבין לוחשין על שמן שבכלי ואין לוחשין על שמן שביד לפיכך סכין משמן שביד ואין סכין משמן שבכלי The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to demons of oil and demons of eggs, i.e., demons consulted by means of oil and eggs, respectively, it is permitted to consult them; but it is futile to do so, due to the fact that they deceive. One may whisper an incantation for healing over oil that is in a vessel and one may not whisper an incantation over oil that is in one’s hand. Therefore, one may smear oil on his body from oil that is brought to him in another’s hand, and there is no concern that perhaps someone whispered over it; and one may not smear oil that is brought to him in a vessel, as perhaps someone whispered over it and it will cause him harm.

רב יצחק בר שמואל בר מרתא איקלע לההוא אושפיזא אייתי ליה מישחא במנא שף נפקן ליה צימחי באפיה נפק לשוק חזיתיה ההיא איתתא אמרה זיקא דחמת קא חזינא הכא עבדא ליה מלתא ואיתסי The Gemara relates: Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta happened to come to a certain inn, and they brought him oil in a vessel. He rubbed it on his face, and boils developed on his face. He went out to the marketplace, and a certain woman saw him and said: I see here the evil spirit of Ḥamat on your face. She performed an action, i.e., whispered an incantation, for him, and he was healed.

אמר ליה ר' אבא לרבה בר מרי כתיב (שמות טו, כו) כל המחלה אשר שמתי במצרים לא אשים עליך כי אני ה' רופאך וכי מאחר שלא שם רפואה למה אמר ליה הכי אמר ר' יוחנן מקרא זה מעצמו נדרש שנאמר (שמות טו, כו) ויאמר אם שמוע תשמע לקול ה' אלהיך אם תשמע לא אשים ואם לא תשמע אשים אעפ"כ כי אני ה' רופאך Rabbi Abba said to Rabba bar Mari that there is an apparent contradiction in a verse. It is written: “All the disease that I placed in Egypt I shall not place upon you, for I am the Lord, your Healer” (Exodus 15:26). And since God does not place the disease upon the Jewish people, why is healing necessary? Rabba bar Mari said to him that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This verse can be interpreted and the contradiction resolved from the contents of the verse itself, as it is stated: “And He said: If you will diligently hearken to the voice of the Lord, your God” (Exodus 15:26). If you hearken to God’s voice, I will not place the disease upon you, and if you do not hearken to God’s voice, I will place the disease upon you. Nevertheless, even if you do not hearken to the voice of God, and I place the disease upon you, know that I will heal you, “for I am the Lord, your Healer.”

אמר רבה בר בר חנה כשחלה ר' אליעזר נכנסו תלמידיו לבקרו אמר להן חמה עזה יש בעולם התחילו הן בוכין ורבי עקיבא משחק אמרו לו למה אתה משחק אמר להן וכי מפני מה אתם בוכים אמרו לו אפשר ספר תורה שרוי בצער ולא נבכה § Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: When Rabbi Eliezer fell ill, his students entered to visit him. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: There is intense wrath in the world, and it is due to that wrath of the Holy One, Blessed be He, Who is angry at His world, that I am suffering from these afflictions. His students began to cry due to their teacher’s suffering, and Rabbi Akiva was laughing. They said to him: Why are you laughing? Rabbi Akiva said to them: And for what reason are you crying? They said to him: Is it possible that Rabbi Eliezer, who is as much an exemplar of Torah as a Torah scroll, is afflicted with pain and we will not cry?

אמר להן לכך אני משחק כל זמן שאני רואה רבי שאין יינו מחמיץ ואין פשתנו לוקה ואין שמנו מבאיש ואין דובשנו מדביש אמרתי שמא חס ושלום קיבל רבי עולמו ועכשיו שאני רואה רבי בצער אני שמח אמר לו עקיבא כלום חיסרתי מן התורה כולה אמר לו לימדתנו רבינו (קהלת ז, כ) כי אדם אין צדיק בארץ אשר יעשה טוב ולא יחטא Rabbi Akiva said to them: It is for that reason that I am laughing. As long as I would see for my teacher that neither does his wine ferment and spoil, nor is his flax stricken, nor does his oil spoil, nor does his honey turn rancid, I would say to myself: Perhaps, Heaven forfend, my teacher has already received his world in reward for the mitzvot that he fulfilled, and will not receive a reward in the World-to-Come. But now that I see my teacher overcome with suffering, I am happy. He is receiving punishment in this world for the few transgressions that he might have committed, ensuring that he will receive a complete reward in the World-to-Come. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, have I failed to fulfill any portion of the entire Torah? Rabbi Akiva said to him, you taught us, our teacher: “For there is not a righteous man upon earth who does good and sins not” (Ecclesiastes 7:20).

ת"ר כשחלה ר' אליעזר נכנסו ארבעה זקנים לבקרו ר' טרפון ור' יהושע ור' אלעזר בן עזריה ור' עקיבא The Sages taught in a baraita: When Rabbi Eliezer fell ill, four Sages entered to visit him: Rabbi Tarfon, and Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva.

נענה ר' טרפון ואמר טוב אתה לישראל מטיפה של גשמים שטיפה של גשמים בעולם הזה ורבי בעולם הזה ובעולם הבא Rabbi Tarfon responded to the situation with words of encouragement and said: You are better for the Jewish people than a drop of rain, as a drop of rain provides benefit in this world, and my teacher provides them benefit in this world and in the World-to-Come.

נענה ר' יהושע ואמר טוב אתה לישראל יותר מגלגל חמה שגלגל חמה בעולם הזה ורבי בעולם הזה ובעולם הבא Rabbi Yehoshua responded and said: You are better for the Jewish people than the sphere of the sun, as the sphere of the sun provides benefit in this world, and my teacher provides benefit in this world and in the World-to-Come.

נענה רבי אלעזר בן עזריה ואמר טוב אתה לישראל יותר מאב ואם שאב ואם בעולם הזה ורבי בעולם הזה ובעולם הבא Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded and said: You are better for the Jewish people than a father and mother, as a father and mother provide benefit in this world, and my teacher provides benefit in this world and in the World-to-Come.

נענה רבי עקיבא ואמר חביבין יסורין אמר להם סמכוני ואשמעה דברי עקיבא תלמידי שאמר חביבין יסורין אמר לו עקיבא זו מנין לך אמר מקרא אני דורש (מלכים ב כא, א) בן שתים עשרה שנה מנשה במלכו וחמשים וחמש שנה מלך בירושלים [וגו'] ויעש הרע בעיני ה' וכתיב Rabbi Akiva responded and said: Afflictions are cherished. When Rabbi Eliezer heard this he said to his attendants: Support me so I can sit and hear the statement of Akiva my student, who said: Afflictions are cherished. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, from where do you derive this? Rabbi Akiva said: I interpret a verse in order to derive it. It is written: “Manasseh was twelve years old when he began to reign and he reigned fifty-five years in Jerusalem…And he performed that which was evil in the eyes of the Lord” (II Kings 21:1–2). And it is written:

Daf 101b

(משלי כה, א) גם אלה משלי שלמה אשר העתיקו אנשי חזקיה מלך יהודה וכי חזקיה מלך יהודה לכל העולם כולו לימד תורה ולמנשה בנו לא לימד תורה אלא מכל טורח שטרח בו ומכל עמל שעמל בו לא העלהו למוטב אלא יסורין שנאמר (דברי הימים ב לג, י) וידבר ה' אל מנשה ואל עמו ולא הקשיבו ויבא ה' עליהם את שרי הצבא אשר למלך אשור וילכדו את מנשה בחוחים ויאסרוהו בנחשתים ויוליכהו בבלה “These too are the proverbs of Solomon, which the men of Hezekiah, king of Judea, copied” (Proverbs 25:1), indicating that Hezekiah taught Torah and disseminated it to the multitudes. And is it conceivable that Hezekiah, king of Judea, taught Torah to the entire world and to Manasseh his son he did not teach Torah? Rather, Hezekiah certainly taught Manasseh much Torah; nevertheless, from all his exertion to teach him and from all his toil to teach him, it was only afflictions that elevated him to the path of good, as it is stated: “And the Lord spoke to Manasseh and to his people but they would not heed. And the Lord brought upon them the captains of the army of the king of Assyria, who took Manasseh with hooks, and bound him with chains, and carried him to Babylonia” (II Chronicles 33:10–11).

וכתיב (דברי הימים ב לג, יב) ובהיצר לו חילה את פני ה' אלהיו ויכנע מאד מלפני (ה') אלהי אבותיו ויתפלל אליו ויעתר לו וישמע תחינתו וישיבהו ירושלים למלכותו וידע מנשה כי ה' הוא האלהים הא למדת שחביבין יסורין And it is written thereafter: “And when he was in distress, he sought the Lord his God, and humbled himself greatly before the God of his fathers, and he prayed to Him and He was entreated of him, and He heard his supplication, and brought him back to Jerusalem into his kingdom; then Manasseh knew that the Lord He was God” (II Chronicles 33:12–13). You learned from this that afflictions are cherished.

ת"ר שלשה באו בעלילה אלו הן קין עשו ומנשה קין דכתיב (בראשית ד, יג) גדול עוני מנשוא אמר לפניו רבונו של עולם כלום גדול עוני מששים ריבוא שעתידין לחטוא לפניך ואתה סולח להם עשו דכתיב (בראשית כז, לח) הברכה אחת היא לך אבי מנשה בתחילה קרא לאלוהות הרבה ולבסוף קרא לאלהי אבותיו: Apropos Manasseh’s repentance, the Gemara cites that the Sages taught in a baraita: Three came with a demand, and these are they: Cain, Esau, and Manasseh. Cain came with a demand, as it is written: “My sin is too great to bear” (Genesis 4:13). Cain said before God: Master of the Universe, is my transgression greater than the transgression of the 600,000 who are destined to sin before You with the Golden Calf, and You will nevertheless forgive them? There should be atonement for my transgression as well. Esau came with a demand, as it is stated: “Have you but one blessing, my father?” (Genesis 27:38). With regard to Manasseh, initially he called to multiple gods, and his prayers were not answered, and ultimately he called to the God of his forefathers with the demand: If God does not answer my prayer, then apparently all the gods are equal to the God of my forefathers.

אבא שאול אומר אף ההוגה את השם באותיותיו וכו': תנא ובגבולין ובלשון עגה: § The mishna teaches: Abba Shaul says: Also among those who have no share in the World-to-Come is one who pronounces the ineffable name of God as it is written, with its letters. It is taught in a baraita: This is referring to one who pronounces the name in the outlying areas outside the Temple, and in colloquial [aga] language, for no particular purpose.

שלשה מלכים וארבעה הדיוטות וכו': ת"ר ירבעם שריבע עם ד"א ירבעם שעשה מריבה בעם דבר אחר ירבעם שעשה מריבה בין ישראל לאביהם שבשמים בן נבט בן שניבט ולא ראה In the mishna, the tanna enumerated three kings and four commoners who have no share in the World-to-Come. The Sages taught in a baraita: Jeroboam [Yorovam] is an abbreviation for one who debased the Jewish people [riba am]. Alternatively, Yorovam is an abbreviation for one who engendered strife among the people [meriva ba’am], causing the schism between the kingdoms of Judea and Israel. Alternatively, Yorovam is an abbreviation for one who engendered strife between the Jewish people [meriva bein ha’am] and their Heavenly Father, as he instituted the worship of the golden calves (I Kings 12:28–31). He is called son of Nebat because he is the son who looked [nibat] in an effort to assess the situation but did not see the situation accurately.

תנא הוא נבט הוא מיכה הוא שבע בן בכרי נבט שניבט ולא ראה מיכה שנתמכמך בבנין ומה שמו שבע בן בכרי שמו It is taught in a baraita: Based on a homiletic interpretation of their names, these three biblical figures are deemed to be the same person. He is called Nebat, he is called Micah, and he is called Sheba, son of Bichri. Nebat, who looked [nibat] but did not see, believed that he was destined for greatness, and that was achieved only by his son. Micah, who was crushed [nitmakhmekh] in the building of the storage cities of Pithom and Raamses, was miraculously saved. And what is his actual name? His name is Sheba, son of Bichri.

תנו רבנן שלשה ניבטו ולא ראו ואלו הן נבט ואחיתופל ואיצטגניני פרעה The Sages taught in a baraita: Three looked but did not see and as a result were mistaken in their prognostications. And these are they: Nebat, and Ahithophel, and the astrologers of Pharaoh.

נבט ראה אש שיוצאת מאמתו הוא סבר איהו מליך ולא היא ירבעם הוא דנפק מיניה The Gemara elaborates: Nebat saw fire that emerges from his penis. He thought that it meant that he would rule. But that is not so. It meant that it would be Jeroboam who would emerge from him and rule.

אחיתופל ראה צרעת שזרחה לו על אמתו הוא סבר איהו מלך ולא היא בת שבע בתו הוא דנפקא מינה שלמה Ahithophel saw leprosy that glowed on his penis and he thought that he would rule. But it is not so. Instead from Bathsheba his daughter, i.e., his son’s daughter, came Solomon the king.

איצטגניני פרעה דאמר רבי חמא ברבי חנינא מאי דכתיב (במדבר כ, יג) המה מי מריבה המה שראו איצטגניני פרעה וטעו ראו שמושיען של ישראל במים הוא לוקה אמר (שמות א, כב) כל הבן הילוד היאורה תשליכוהו והן לא ידעו שעל עסקי מי מריבה לוקה The astrologers of Pharaoh saw and were mistaken, as Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “These are the waters of contention” (Numbers 20:13)? These are the waters that the astrologers of Pharaoh saw, and they erred concerning them. As they saw in the stars that the savior of Israel would be stricken by water, Pharaoh said: “Every son that is born you shall cast into the river” (Exodus 1:22), assuming that any potential savior would be drowned. And they did not know that it was over matters involving the waters of Meribah that Moses would be stricken and would not be allowed to enter Eretz Yisrael.

ומנא לן דלא אתי לעלמא דאתי דכתיב (מלכים א יג, לד) ויהי בדבר הזה לחטאת בית ירבעם ולהכחיד ולהשמיד מעל פני אדמה להכחיד בעולם הזה ולהשמיד לעולם הבא The Gemara resumes its discussion of Jeroboam. And from where do we derive that Jeroboam does not enter into the World-to-Come? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And by this matter there was a sin to the house of Jeroboam, and to eradicate it and to destroy it from off the face of the earth” (I Kings 13:34). It can be interpreted to mean: To eradicate it in this world, and to destroy it for the World-to-Come.

אמר רבי יוחנן מפני מה זכה ירבעם למלכות מפני שהוכיח את שלמה ומפני מה נענש מפני שהוכיחו ברבים שנאמר (מלכים א יא, כז) וזה הדבר אשר הרים יד במלך שלמה בנה את המלוא סגר את פרץ עיר דוד אביו אמר לו דוד אביך פרץ פרצות בחומה כדי שיעלו ישראל לרגל ואתה גדרת אותם כדי לעשות אנגריא לבת פרעה Rabbi Yoḥanan says: For what virtue was Jeroboam privileged to ascend to monarchy? It is due to the fact that he rebuked Solomon for his sins. And for what misdeed was he punished and lost everything? It is due to the fact that he rebuked Solomon and humiliated him in public, as it is stated: “And this was the cause that he lifted his hand against the king: Solomon built the Millo, and repaired the breaches of the city of David his father” (I Kings 11:27). Jeroboam said to Solomon: David, your father, created breaches in the wall so that the Jewish people could ascend for the pilgrimage Festival, and you sealed them in order to marshal forced labor [angarya] for the daughter of Pharaoh, your wife.

ומאי וזה אשר הרים יד במלך אמר רב נחמן שחלץ תפיליו בפניו אמר רב נחמן גסות הרוח שהיה בו בירבעם טרדתו מן העולם שנאמר (מלכים א יב, כו) ויאמר ירבעם בלבו עתה תשוב הממלכה לבית דוד אם יעלה העם הזה לעשות זבחים בבית ה' בירושלים ושב לב העם הזה אל אדוניהם אל רחבעם מלך יהודה והרגוני ושבו אל רחבעם מלך יהודה And what is the meaning of the phrase “and this was the cause that he lifted his hand against the king”? Rav Naḥman says: He removed his phylacteries before Solomon, thereby demonstrating that he does not consider Solomon his superior. Rav Naḥman says: The arrogance that existed in Jeroboam drove him from the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And Jeroboam said in his heart: Now shall the kingdom return to the house of David. If this people go up to offer sacrifices in the House of the Lord in Jerusalem, then shall the heart of this people turn again to their lord, even to Rehoboam, king of Judea, and they shall kill me and return to Rehoboam, king of Judea” (I Kings 12:26–27).

אמר גמירי דאין ישיבה בעזרה אלא למלכי בית יהודה בלבד כיון דחזו ליה לרחבעם דיתיב ואנא קאימנא סברי הא מלכא והא עבדא ואי יתיבנא מורד במלכות הואי וקטלין לי ואזלו בתריה מיד (מלכים א יב, כח) ויועץ המלך ויעש שני עגלי זהב ויאמר אליהם רב לכם מעלות ירושלים הנה אלהיך ישראל אשר העלוך מארץ מצרים וישם את האחד בבית אל ואת האחד נתן בדן Jeroboam calculated and said: It is learned as a tradition that sitting in the Temple courtyard is permitted only for kings of the house of Judah alone. Once they see Rehoboam, who is sitting, and they see me standing, they will think: This, Rehoboam, is king, and that, Jeroboam, is the servant. And if I sit there, I will be considered a traitor against the throne, and they will kill me and follow him. Immediately, the following took place: “And the king took counsel, and made two calves of gold, and said to them: It is too much for you to ascend to Jerusalem; behold your gods, Israel, who brought you up from the land of Egypt. And he placed the one in Bethel and the other he placed in Dan” (I Kings 12:28–29).

מאי ויועץ אמר רבי יהודה שהושיב רשע אצל צדיק אמר להו חתמיתו על כל דעבידנא אמרו ליה הין אמר להו מלכא בעינא למיהוי אמרו ליה הין כל דאמינא לכו עבידתו אמרו ליה הין אפילו למפלח לעבודת כוכבים אמר ליה צדיק ח"ו אמר ליה רשע לצדיק ס"ד דגברא כירבעם פלח לעבודת כוכבים אלא למינסינהו הוא דקא בעי אי קבליתו למימריה What is the meaning of the phrase “and the king took counsel”? Rabbi Yehuda says: It means that he assembled the elders of the kingdom of Israel and seated a wicked person alongside a righteous person and consulted them. He said to the elders: Do you sign a writ of authorization for all that I am doing? They said to him: Yes. He said to them: I want to be the king. They said to him: Yes. Jeroboam said to them: Will you do everything I tell you to do? They said to him: Yes. He said to them: Even to worship idols? A righteous man said: Heaven forfend; idol worship is unacceptable. The wicked man seated alongside him said to the righteous man: Does it enter your mind that a man like Jeroboam would worship idols? Rather, he merely seeks to test those sitting here, to determine if they accept and will obey his pronouncements.

Daf 102a

ואף אחיה השילוני טעה וחתם דהא יהוא צדיקא רבה הוה שנאמר (מלכים ב י, ל) ויאמר ה' אל יהוא יען אשר הטיבות לעשות הישר בעיני ככל אשר בלבבי עשית לבית אחאב בני רביעים ישבו לך על כסא ישראל וכתיב (מלכים ב י, לא) ויהוא לא שמר ללכת בתורת ה' אלהי ישראל בכל לבבו לא סר מעל חטאת ירבעם אשר החטיא את ישראל And even Ahijah the Shilonite erred in this matter and signed that he would accept all of Jeroboam’s pronouncements. And generations later this caused Jehu to sin. The Gemara explains: As Jehu was an extremely righteous person. As it is stated: “And the Lord said to Jehu: Because you have done well, to perform what is right in My eyes, and have done to the house of Ahab according to all that was in My heart, your children of the fourth generation shall sit on the throne of Israel” (II Kings 10:30). And it is written: “But Jehu took no care to walk in the Torah of the Lord, God of Israel, with all his heart; he departed not from the sins of Jeroboam, who made Israel sin” (II Kings 10:31).

מאי גרמא ליה אמר אביי ברית כרותה לשפתים שנאמר (מלכים ב י, יח) אחאב עבד הבעל מעט יהוא יעבדנו הרבה רבא אמר חותמו של אחיה השילוני ראה וטעה What caused Jehu to do so? Abaye says: A covenant is made with the lips, as it is stated that Jehu said cunningly in an attempt to entrap the priests of the Baal: “Ahab worshipped Baal a little, but Jehu shall serve him much” (II Kings 10:18). Although it was not his intention, once the statement escaped his lips he began following the path to its fulfillment. Rava says: He saw the seal of Ahijah the Shilonite on the coronation document of Jeroboam and he erred and believed that it was permitted to act as Jeroboam did.

דכתיב (הושע ה, ב) ושחטה שטים העמיקו ואני מוסר לכולם אמר רבי יוחנן אמר הקב"ה הם העמיקו משלי אני אמרתי כל שאינו עולה לרגל עובר בעשה והם אמרו כל העולה לרגל ידקר בחרב The Gemara continues its discussion of Jeroboam. With regard to that which is written: “And the apostates are deep in slaughter and I am rejected by them all” (Hosea 5:2), Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: They issued decrees that are more profound and more extreme than my own. I said: Anyone who does not ascend to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festival violates a positive mitzva, and they said: Anyone who ascends to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festival will be stabbed with the sword. In that way, Jeroboam successfully prevented the residents of the kingdom of Israel from ascending to Jerusalem.

(מלכים א יא, כט) ויהי בעת ההיא וירבעם יצא מירושלם וימצא אותו אחיה השילוני הנביא בדרך והוא מתכסה בשלמה חדשה תנא משום רבי יוסי עת היא מזומנת לפורענות The verse states: “And it came to pass at that time, and Jeroboam left Jerusalem, and the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite found him on the way, and he was clad in a new garment, and the two were alone in the field” (I Kings 11:29). It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yosei: The phrase “at that time” indicates that it is a time ordained for calamity.

(ירמיהו נא, יח) בעת פקודתם יאבדו תנא משום רבי יוסי עת מזומנת לפורענות (ישעיהו מט, ח) בעת רצון עניתיך תנא משום ר' יוסי עת מזומנת לטובה (שמות לב, לד) וביום פקדי ופקדתי עליהם חטאתם תנא משום רבי יוסי עת היא מזומנת לפורענות (בראשית לח, א) ויהי בעת ההיא וירד יהודה מאת אחיו תנא משום ר' יוסי עת מזומנת לפורענות The verse states: “At the time of their punishment, they shall perish” (Jeremiah 51:18). It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yosei: The phrase “at the time” indicates that it is a time ordained for calamity. The verse states: “In an acceptable time have I answered you” (Isaiah 49:8). It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yosei: The phrase “in an acceptable time” indicates that it is a time ordained for good. The verse states: “On the day when I punish, I will punish their sin upon them” (Exodus 32:34). It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yosei: The phrase “on the day when I punish” indicates that it is a time ordained for calamity. The verse states: “And it came to pass at that time, and Judah descended from his brothers” (Genesis 38:1). It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yosei: The phrase “at that time” indicates that it is a time ordained for calamity.

(מלכים א יב, א) וילך רחבעם שכם כי שכם בא כל ישראל להמליך אותו תנא משום ר' יוסי מקום מזומן לפורענות בשכם עינו את דינה בשכם מכרו אחיו את יוסף בשכם נחלקה מלכות בית דוד The verse states: “And Rehoboam went to Shechem; for all Israel came to Shechem, to make him king” (I Kings 12:1). It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yosei: Shechem is a place ordained for calamity. In Shechem, they tormented and raped Dinah, in the outskirts of Shechem the brothers sold Joseph, in Shechem the kingdom of the house of David was divided.

(מלכים א יא, כט) וירבעם יצא מירושלים אמר ר' חנינא בר פפא שיצא מפיתקה של ירושלים With regard to the verse which states: “And Jeroboam left Jerusalem” (I Kings 11:29), Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa says: It means that he left the destiny of Jerusalem, meaning he removed himself from the category of the residents of Jerusalem, never to return.

(מלכים א יא, כט) וימצא אותו אחיה השילוני הנביא בדרך והוא מתכסה בשלמה חדשה ושניהם לבדם בשדה מאי בשלמה חדשה אמר רב נחמן כשלמה חדשה מה שלמה חדשה אין בה שום דופי אף תורתו של ירבעם לא היה בה שום דופי ד"א שלמה חדשה שחידשו דברים שלא שמעה אזן מעולם The verse states: “And the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite found him on the way, and he was clad in a new [ḥadasha] garment, and the two were alone in the field.” What is taught by the phrase “in a new garment”? Rav Naḥman says: It was like a new garment; just as a new garment has no imperfection, so too, the Torah studies of Jeroboam at that time had no imperfection. Alternatively, “a new garment” teaches that they introduced [sheḥideshu] matters that no ear had ever heard.

מאי ושניהם לבדם בשדה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב שכל תלמידי חכמים דומין לפניהם כעשבי השדה ואיכא דאמר שכל טעמי תורה מגולין להם כשדה What is taught by the phrase “and the two were alone in the field”? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It teaches that all the Torah scholars of that generation seemed, relative to them, like grass of the field, as they were wiser than all of them. And there are those who say: It teaches that all the rationales of the Torah were revealed to them like a field that is exposed for all to see.

(מיכה א, יד) לכן תתני שלוחים על מורשת גת בתי אכזיב לאכזב למלכי ישראל אמר ר' חנינא בר פפא יצאה בת קול ואמרה להן מי שהרג את הפלשתי והוריש אתכם גת תתנו שילוחים לבניו בתי אכזיב לאכזב למלכי ישראל The verse states: “Therefore shall you give parting gifts to Moresheth Gath; the houses of Achzib are a deceitful thing for the kings of Israel” (Micah 1:14). Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa says: When they crowned Jeroboam, a Divine Voice emerged and said to the subjects of the kingdom of Israel: He who killed the Philistine and bequeathed the city of Gath to you, i.e., King David, will you give parting gifts to his sons and revolt against them? Ultimately, the houses of Achzib are a deceitful thing for the kings of Israel, as the kings of Israel will also be forsaken by their subjects.

אמר רב חיננא בר פפא כל הנהנה מן העולם הזה בלא ברכה כאילו גוזל להקב"ה וכנסת ישראל שנאמר (משלי כח, כד) גוזל אביו ואמו ואומר אין פושע חבר הוא לאיש משחית ואין אביו אלא הקב"ה שנאמר (דברים לב, ו) הלא הוא אביך קנך ואין אמו אלא כנסת ישראל שנאמר (משלי א, ח) שמע בני מוסר אביך ואל תטוש תורת אמך Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa says: With regard to anyone who derives benefit from this world without reciting a blessing, it is as though he stole from the Holy One, Blessed be He, and the congregation of Israel, as it is stated: “Whoever robs his father and his mother and says: It is no transgression, he is the companion of a corrupter” (Proverbs 28:24). And the term “his father” is referring to none other than the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is stated: “Is He not your Father Who created you, Who made you and established you?” (Deuteronomy 32:6). And the term “his mother” is referring to none other than the congregation of Israel, as it is stated: “Hear, my son, the discipline of your father, and do not forsake the Torah of your mother” (Proverbs 1:8). The mention of the Torah as emanating from the mother indicates that the mother represents the congregation of Israel, and the Torah of the mother is the tradition of the Jewish people.

מאי חבר הוא לאיש משחית חבר הוא לירבעם בן נבט שהשחית ישראל לאביהם שבשמים What is the meaning of the phrase “He is the companion of a corrupter”? It means that he is a companion of Jeroboam, son of Nebat, who corrupted the people of Israel before their Father in Heaven by sinning and by causing others to sin.

(מלכים ב יז, כא) וידח ירבעם (בן נבט) את ישראל מאחרי ה' והחטיאם חטאה גדולה אמר רבי חנין כשתי מקלות המתיזות זו את זו With regard to the verse: “And Jeroboam drove Israel from following the Lord, and caused them to sin a great sin” (II Kings 17:21), Rabbi Ḥanin says: This is like two sticks that when they collide cause each other to carom, as due to the strife, Jeroboam caused the subjects of the kingdom of Israel to grow distant from God.

(דברים א, א) ודי זהב אמרו דבי ר' ינאי אמר משה לפני הקב"ה רבונו של עולם בשביל כסף וזהב שהשפעת להן לישראל עד שיאמרו דיי גרם להם לעשות להם אלהי זהב משל אין ארי דורס ונוהם מתוך קופה של תבן אלא מתוך קופה של בשר § Apropos the calves of Jeroboam, the Gemara discusses the Golden Calf discussed in the Torah. The verse states: “And Di Zahav” (Deuteronomy 1:1). The school of Rabbi Yannai said: Moses said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, because of the gold and silver that You lavished upon the Jewish people during the exodus from Egypt until they said enough [dai], this wealth caused the Jewish people to fashion for themselves gods of gold. The combination of wealth and leisure left them open to a transgression of that sort. There is a parable for this: A lion does not maul and roar over a basket of straw from which he derives no pleasure; rather, he mauls and roars over a basket of meat, as he roars only when satiated. In other words, the guilt is not exclusively theirs.

אמר ר' אושעיא עד ירבעם היו ישראל יונקים מעגל אחד מכאן ואילך משנים ושלשה עגלים אמר ר' יצחק אין לך כל פורענות ופורענות שבאה לעולם שאין בה אחד מעשרים וארבעה בהכרע ליטרא של עגל הראשון שנאמר (שמות לב, לד) וביום פקדי ופקדתי עליהם חטאתם Rabbi Oshaya says: Until Jeroboam, Israel was suckling, i.e., suffering the consequences, from worshipping one calf that they fashioned in the wilderness. From that point forward, they were suckling from two and three calves, as Jeroboam added the calves in Bethel and Dan. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: You have no punishment that comes to the world in which there is not one twenty-fourth of the surplus of a litra of the first calf. When weighing a substance, there would often be a disparity of up to one twenty-fourth of its weight. The point is that a minuscule portion of the sin of the Golden Calf is added to every punishment imposed upon the Jewish people, as it is stated: “On the day when I punish, I will punish their sin upon them” (Exodus 32:34), indicating that atonement for that sin is incomplete, and the Jewish people will continue to suffer for it.

אמר רבי חנינא לאחר עשרים וארבעה דורות נגבה פסוק זה שנאמר (יחזקאל ט, א) ויקרא באזני קול גדול לאמר קרבו פקדות העיר ואיש כלי משחתו בידו Rabbi Ḥanina says: After twenty-four generations elapsed from the sin of the Golden Calf, the debt referred to in this verse was collected, as it is stated: “And he cried in my ears with a loud voice, saying: Those who have charge over the city draw near, every man with his deadly weapon in his hand” (Ezekiel 9:1). This prophecy occurred twenty-four generations after the sin of the Golden Calf.

(מלכים א יג, לג) אחר הדבר הזה לא שב ירבעם מדרכו הרעה מאי אחר אמר ר' אבא אחר שתפשו הקב"ה לירבעם בבגדו ואמר לו חזור בך ואני ואתה ובן ישי נטייל בגן עדן אמר לו מי בראש בן ישי בראש אי הכי לא בעינא The verse states: “And after this matter, Jeroboam returned not from his evil way” (I Kings 13:33). To what event is the verse alluding, when it states: “After this matter”? Rabbi Abba says: It is after the Holy One, Blessed be He, grabbed Jeroboam by his garment, i.e., he sent prophets and implored him, and said to him: Repent, and you and I and the son of Yishai will stroll together in the Garden of Eden. Jeroboam said to Him: Who will walk in the lead? God said to Jeroboam: The son of Yishai will walk in the lead. Jeroboam said: If so, I do not wish to repent.

ר' אבהו הוה רגיל דהוה קא דריש בשלשה מלכים חלש קביל עליה דלא דריש כיון § The Gemara relates: Rabbi Abbahu was accustomed to lecture at great length about the three kings enumerated in the mishna, who have no share in the World-to-Come. He fell ill, and he undertook that he would not lecture about those kings. Once

Daf 102b

דאיתפח הדר קא דריש אמרי לא קבילת עלך דלא דרשת בהו אמר אינהו מי הדרו בהו דאנא אהדר בי he recovered, he then lectured on that topic. His students said to him: Did you not undertake that you will not lecture about them? Rabbi Abbahu said: Did they repent, that I will reconsider and refrain from condemning them?

רב אשי אוקי אשלשה מלכים אמר למחר נפתח בחברין אתא מנשה איתחזי ליה בחלמיה אמר חברך וחבירי דאבוך קרית לן One day Rav Ashi ended his lecture just before reaching the matter of the three kings. He said to his students: Tomorrow we will begin the lecture with our colleagues the three kings, who, although they were sinners, were Torah scholars like us. Manasseh, king of Judea, came and appeared to him in his dream. Manasseh said to him angrily: You called us your colleague and the colleagues of your father? How dare you characterize yourself as our equal?

מהיכא בעית למישרא המוציא אמר ליה לא ידענא א"ל מהיכא דבעית למישרא המוציא לא גמירת וחברך קרית לן א"ל אגמריה לי ולמחר דרישנא ליה משמך בפירקא א"ל מהיכא דקרים בישולא Manasseh said to him: I will ask you, from where are you required to begin cutting a loaf of bread when reciting the blessing: Who brings forth bread from the earth? Rav Ashi said to him: I do not know. Manasseh said to him: Even this, from where you are required to begin cutting a loaf of bread when reciting the blessing: Who brings forth bread from the earth, you did not learn, and yet you call us your colleague? Rav Ashi said to Manasseh: Teach me this halakha and tomorrow I will lecture and cite it in your name during my public lecture delivered on the Festival. Manasseh said to him: One cuts the loaf from where it crusts as a result of baking.

א"ל מאחר דחכימתו כולי האי מאי טעמא קא פלחיתו לעבודת כוכבים א"ל אי הות התם הות נקיטנא בשיפולי גלימא ורהטת אבתראי למחר אמר להו לרבנן נפתח ברבוותא Rav Ashi said to him: Since you were so wise, what is the reason you engaged in idol worship? Manasseh said to him: Had you been there at that time, you would have taken and lifted the hem of your cloak and run after me due to the fierce desire to engage in idol worship and due to the fact that it was a common faith. The next day Rav Ashi said to the Sages as a prelude to his lecture: We will begin with the treatment of our teachers, those kings who were greater than us in Torah knowledge but whose sins caused them to lose their share in the World-to-Come.

אחאב אח לשמים אב לעבודת כוכבים אח לשמים דכתיב (משלי יז, יז) אח לצרה יולד אב לעבודת כוכבים דכתיב (תהלים קג, יג) כרחם אב על בנים § The Gemara proceeds to discuss the second king enumerated in the mishna, Ahab. Ahab [Aḥav], although he was a brother [aḥ] to Heaven, he was a father [av] for idol worship. He was a brother to Heaven, as it is written: “And a brother is born for adversity” (Proverbs 17:17), and in desperate times, he turned to Heaven. He was a father for idolatry. This is the highest level of attachment, as it is written: “As a father has compassion for his children” (Psalms 103:13).

(מלכים א טז, לא) ויהי הנקל לכתו בחטאת ירבעם בן נבט אמר ר' יוחנן קלות שעשה אחאב כחמורות שעשה ירבעם ומפני מה תלה הכתוב בירבעם מפני שהוא היה תחילה לקלקלה (הושע יב, יב) גם מזבחותם כגלים על תלמי שדי א"ר יוחנן אין לך כל תלם ותלם בא"י שלא העמיד עליו אחאב עבודת כוכבים והשתחוה לו With regard to Ahab, it is written: “And it came to pass, the most minor of his transgressions was his walking in the sins of Jeroboam, son of Nebat” (I Kings 16:31). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The minor sins that Ahab performed were on par with the major sins that Jeroboam performed, as the transgressions committed by Ahab were much more serious than those committed by Jeroboam. And for what reason did the verse attribute the sins of all the kings of Israel to Jeroboam, even though the sins of Ahab were more substantial? It is due to the fact that he was first to engage in iniquity. With regard to the verse: “Their altars shall also be like droppings in the furrows of the field” (Hosea 12:12), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You do not have even one furrow in Eretz Yisrael upon which Ahab did not place an object of idol worship and bow to it.

ומנא לן דלא אתי לעלמא דאתי דכתיב (מלכים א כא, כא) והכרתי לאחאב משתין בקיר ועצור ועזוב בישראל עצור בעוה"ז ועזוב לעוה"ב The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that Ahab does not enter into the World-to-Come? The Gemara answers: It is derived as it is written: “And I will excise from Ahab every man, and him that is shut up and him that is abandoned in Israel” (I Kings 21:21). “Him that is shut up” indicates he will be excised in this world, while “and him that is abandoned” indicates he will be excised in the World-to-Come.

א"ר יוחנן מפני מה זכה עמרי למלכות מפני שהוסיף כרך אחד בארץ ישראל שנאמר (מלכים א טז, כד) ויקן את ההר שמרון מאת שמר בככרים כסף ויבן את ההר ויקרא [את] שם העיר אשר בנה על שם שמר אדני ההר שמרון Rabbi Yoḥanan says: For what virtue was Omri, king of Israel, who was Ahab’s father, privileged to ascend to the monarchy? It is due to the fact that he added one city in Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: “And he bought the hill of Samaria from Shemer for two talents of silver, and built on the hill, and called the name of the city that he built after Shemer, the owner of the hill, Samaria” (I Kings 16:24).

א"ר יוחנן מפני מה זכה אחאב למלכות כ"ב שנה Rabbi Yoḥanan says: For what virtue was Ahab privileged to ascend to the monarchy and rule for twenty-two years?

מפני שכיבד את התורה שניתנה בכ"ב אותיות שנאמר (מלכים א כ, ב) וישלח מלאכים אל אחאב מלך ישראל העירה ויאמר לו כה אמר בן הדד כספך וזהבך לי הוא ונשיך ובניך הטובים לי הם כי אם כעת מחר אשלח את עבדי אליך וחפשו את ביתך ואת בתי עבדיך והיה כל מחמד עיניך ישימו בידם ולקחו ויאמר למלאכי בן הדד אמרו לאדוני המלך כל אשר שלחת (לעבדך) [אל עבדך] בראשונה אעשה והדבר הזה לא אוכל לעשות It is due to the fact that he respected the Torah, which was given with twenty-two letters, as it is stated: “And he sent messengers to Ahab, king of Israel, into the city, and said to him: So says Ben-Hadad: Your silver and your gold are mine; your wives and also your good children, are mine. And the king of Israel answered and said: It is according to your saying, my lord, O king: I am yours, and all that I have. And the messengers came again, and said: So speaks Ben-Hadad, saying: I sent to you, saying: You shall deliver me your silver, and your gold, and your wives, and your children. Yet I will send my servants to you tomorrow about this time, and they shall search your house, and the houses of your servants, and it shall be, that they shall put in their hand all the delight of your eyes and take it…And he said to the messengers of Ben-Hadad, tell my lord the king: All that you did send for to your servant at the first I will do; but this thing I may not do” (I Kings 20:2–6, 9).

מאי מחמד עיניך לאו ס"ת The Gemara asks: What is “the delight of your eyes” that Ahab refused to give Ben-Hadad after agreeing to give him his wives and his gold? Is it not a Torah scroll? Ahab treated the Torah with deference.

דילמא עבודת כוכבים לא ס"ד דכתיב (מלכים א כ, ח) ויאמרו אליו כל הזקנים וכל העם (לא תאבה ולא תשמע) ודילמא סבי דבהתא הוו מי לא כתיב (שמואל ב יז, ד) ויישר הדבר בעיני אבשלום (והזקנים) [ובעיני כל זקני ישראל] ואמר רב יוסף סבי דבהתא The Gemara suggests: Perhaps the delight of his eyes was an object of idol worship. The Gemara answers: That could not enter your mind, as it is written that Ahab consulted the Sages with regard to this matter: “And all the elders and all the people said to him: Do not consent and heed not” (I Kings 20:8). The elders in this verse are presumably the Sages. The Gemara continues: But perhaps they were wicked elders, who worshipped idols. Isn’t it written: “And the saying pleased Absalom well and all the elders of Israel” (II Samuel 17:4), and Rav Yosef says: The elders of Israel mentioned in that verse were wicked elders. Perhaps the elders of Israel with whom Ahab consulted were also wicked.

התם לא כתיב וכל העם הכא כתיב וכל העם דאי אפשר דלא הוו בהון צדיקי וכתיב (מלכים א יט, יח) והשארתי בישראל שבעת אלפים כל הברכים אשר לא כרעו לבעל וכל הפה אשר לא נשק לו The Gemara rejects this: There, with regard to Absalom it is not written: “And all the people,” whereas here, with regard to Ahab, it is written: “And all the people.” As it is impossible that there were not among them righteous people, if the righteous people agreed, apparently, “the delight of your eyes” was sacred. And it is written: “And I will leave seven thousand in Israel; all the knees that have not bent to the Baal, and every mouth that has not kissed it” (I Kings 19:18), indicating that there were righteous people among them.

אמר ר"נ אחאב שקול היה שנאמר (מלכים א כב, כ) ויאמר ה' מי יפתה את אחאב ויעל ויפול ברמות גלעד ויאמר זה בכה וזה אומר בכה מתקיף לה רב יוסף מאן דכתב ביה (מלכים א כא, כה) רק לא היה כאחאב אשר התמכר לעשות הרע בעיני ה' אשר הסתה אותו איזבל אשתו ותנינא בכל יום היתה שוקלת שקלי זהב לעבודת כוכבים ואת אמרת שקול היה אלא אחאב וותרן בממונו היה ומתוך שההנה תלמידי חכמים מנכסיו כיפרו לו מחצה Rav Naḥman says: Ahab was balanced in terms of the mitzvot and transgressions that he performed, as it is stated: “And the Lord said, who shall entice Ahab that he may ascend and fall at Ramoth Gilead? And this one said in this manner, and that one said in that manner” (I Kings 22:20), indicating that it is unclear whether or not he was a full-fledged transgressor. Rav Yosef objects to this statement: This is the person about whom the prophet wrote: “But there was none like Ahab who devoted himself to do evil in the eyes of the Lord, whom Jezebel his wife had incited” (I Kings 21:25). And we learn in a baraita: Every day she would weigh gold shekels equal to Ahab’s weight for idol worship. And you say he was balanced? Rather, Ahab was generous with his money and did not scrimp, and since he also benefited Torah scholars with his property, the heavenly court expiated half his sins for him. The result was a balance between mitzvot and transgressions.

(מלכים א כב, כא) ויצא הרוח ויעמד לפני ה' ויאמר אני אפתנו ויאמר ה' אליו במה ויאמר אצא והייתי רוח שקר בפי כל נביאיו ויאמר תפתה וגם תוכל צא ועשה כן מאי רוח א"ר יוחנן רוחו של נבות היזרעאלי With regard to God’s search for a volunteer to entice Ahab, it is written: “And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said: I will entice him. And the Lord said to him: With what? And he said: I will go out, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And He said: You shall entice him, and also prevail; go out, and do so” (I Kings 22:21–22). The Gemara asks: What spirit was that? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It was the spirit of Naboth the Jezreelite, who sought to take revenge against Ahab.

מאי צא אמר רבינא צא ממחיצתי שכן כתיב (תהלים קא, ז) דובר שקרים לא יכון לנגד עיני אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי דפרע קיניה מחריב ביתיה The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term “go out” that God instructed the spirit? Ravina says that it means: Go out from within my partition and do not return, as so it is written: “He that speaks falsehoods shall not be established before My eyes” (Psalms 101:7). The spirit that volunteered to lie may no longer be before God. Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: One who avenges due to his zealotry destroys his own house. The spirit of Naboth that sought revenge was expelled from before God.

(מלכים א טז, לג) ויעש אחאב את האשרה ויוסף אחאב לעשות להכעיס את ה' אלהי ישראל מכל מלכי ישראל אשר היו לפניו א"ר יוחנן שכתב על דלתות שמרון אחאב כפר באלהי ישראל לפיכך אין לו חלק באלהי ישראל With regard to the verse: “And Ahab made the ashera; and Ahab did more to provoke the Lord, God of Israel, to anger than all the kings of Israel that were before him” (I Kings 16:33), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It means that he wrote on the doors of Samaria: Ahab denies the existence of the God of Israel, therefore he has no share in the God of Israel.

(דברי הימים ב כב, ט) ויבקש את אחזיהו וילכדהו והוא מתחבא בשמרון א"ר לוי שהיה קודר אזכרות וכותב עבודת כוכבים תחתיהן With regard to the verse: “And he sought Ahaziah, and they apprehended him, for he was hiding in Samaria” (II Chronicles 22:9), Rabbi Levi says: What would he do in hiding? He would excise mentions of God’s name in Torah scrolls and write the name of an object of idol worship in their stead.

מנשה שנשה יה ד"א מנשה שהנשי את ישראל לאביהם שבשמים ומנלן דלא אתי לעלמא דאתי דכתיב (דברי הימים ב לג, א) בן שתים עשרה שנה מנשה במלכו וחמשים וחמש שנה מלך בירושלים (מלכים ב כא, ג) ויעש (הרע) [אשרה] (בעיני ה') כאשר עשה אחאב מלך ישראל מה אחאב אין לו חלק לעוה"ב אף מנשה אין לו חלק לעוה"ב: The Gemara proceeds to discuss the third king enumerated in the mishna. He was called Manasseh [Menashe] because he forgot God [nasha yah]. Alternatively, he was called Manasseh since he caused the kingdom of Israel to forget [hinshi] their Father Who is in Heaven. And from where do we derive that Manasseh does not enter into the World-to-Come? The Gemara answers: It is derived as it is written: “Manasseh was twelve years old when he began to reign, and he reigned fifty-five years in Jerusalem…And he did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord…And he made an ashera, as did Ahab king of Israel” (II Kings 21:1–3). Just as Ahab has no share in the World-to-Come, so too, Manasseh has no share in the World-to-Come.

רבי יהודה אומר מנשה יש לו חלק לעוה"ב שנאמר (דברי הימים ב לג, יג) ויתפלל מנשה אל ה' ויעתר לו וכו': א"ר יוחנן ושניהם מקרא אחד דרשו שנאמר (ירמיהו טו, ד) ונתתים לזעוה לכל ממלכות הארץ בגלל מנשה בן יחזקיהו מר סבר בגלל מנשה שעשה תשובה ואינהו לא עבוד ומר סבר § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Manasseh has a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And he prayed to him and He was entreated of him, and heard his supplication and brought him back to Jerusalem unto his kingdom” (II Chronicles 33:13). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And both of them, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, who disagree with regard to whether Manasseh has a share in the World-to-Come, interpreted one and the same verse, as it is stated: “And I will make them into a horror for all the kingdoms of the earth, on account of Manasseh, son of Hezekiah” (Jeremiah 15:4). One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that “on account of Manasseh” means that the Jewish people will be judged harshly, as ultimately, one as wicked as Manasseh repented, and they did not do so. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that

Daf 103a

בגלל מנשה דלא עבד תשובה “on account of Manasseh” means because he did not repent, and the people followed in his footsteps.

א"ר יוחנן כל האומר מנשה אין לו חלק לעוה"ב מרפה ידיהן של בעלי תשובה דתני תנא קמיה דר' יוחנן מנשה עשה תשובה (ל) שלשים ושלש שנים דכתיב (מלכים ב כא, א) בן שתים עשרה שנה מנשה במלכו וחמשים וחמש שנה מלך בירושלים ויעש (הרע) [אשרה] כאשר עשה אחאב מלך ישראל כמה מלך אחאב עשרין ותרתין שנין מנשה כמה מלך חמשים וחמש דל מינייהו עשרים ותרתין פשו להו תלתין ותלת Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who says that Manasseh has no share in the World-to-Come discourages penitents, as Manasseh repented and according to them is nevertheless excluded from the World-to-Come. As the tanna taught a baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan: Manasseh repented for thirty-three years, as it is written: “Manasseh was twelve years old when he began to reign, and he reigned fifty-five years in Jerusalem…And he did that which was evil…And he made an ashera, as did Ahab king of Israel” (II Kings 21:1–3). How many years did Ahab reign? He reigned twenty-two years. How many years did Manasseh reign? He reigned fifty-five years. Deduct from them the twenty-two years during which he performed evil like Ahab, and thirty-three years remain for him to have repented.

א"ר יוחנן משום רשב"י מאי דכתי' (דברי הימים ב לג, יג) וישמע אליו ויחתר לו ויעתר לו מיבעי ליה מלמד שעשה לו הקב"ה כמין מחתרת ברקיע כדי לקבלו בתשובה מפני מדת הדין Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And he prayed to Him; and He made an opening for him” (II Chronicles 33:13)? Instead: And He received his entreaty, should have been written. Rather, this teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, crafted for him a type of opening in Heaven in order to accept him in repentance. It was necessary for Manasseh to enter the World-to-Come in a clandestine manner, due to the attribute of justice that sought to prevent his entry by claiming that his sentence was irreversible.

וא"ר יוחנן משום רשב"י מאי דכתיב (ירמיהו כו, א) בראשית ממלכות יהויקים בן יאשיהו וכתיב (ירמיהו כח, א) בראשית ממלכת צדקיה וכי עד האידנא לא הוו מלכי § And Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What is the meaning of that which is written: “In the beginning of the reign of Jehoiakim, son of Josiah” (Jeremiah 26:1), and it is written: “In the beginning of the reign of Zedekiah” (Jeremiah 28:1). But is it so that until now there were no kings? Why did the prophet use the term “in the beginning” exclusively with regard to these two kings, as opposed to: During the first year of his reign, or a similar formulation?

אלא בקש הקב"ה להחזיר את העולם כולו לתוהו ובוהו בשביל יהויקים נסתכל בדורו ונתקררה דעתו Rather, the reason for the unusual formulation is that the Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to restore the entire world to chaos and void, as it was in the beginning before Creation, on account of Jehoiakim the wicked; but He observed Jehoiakim’s generation, which included the righteous who had not yet been exiled to Babylonia, and His mind was set at ease. The term “in the beginning” is used to signify that it is as though the world had been created anew.

בקש הקב"ה להחזיר את העולם כולו לתוהו ובוהו בשביל דורו של צדקיה נסתכל בצדקיה ונתקררה דעתו בצדקיה נמי כתיב (מלכים ב כד, ט) ויעש הרע בעיני ה' שהיה בידו למחות ולא מיחה Likewise, the Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to restore the entire world to chaos and void, as it was in the beginning before Creation, on account of the generation of Zedekiah, as only the wicked remained after the exile of the righteous; but He observed Zedekiah and His mind was set at ease. The Gemara asks: With regard to Zedekiah it is also written: “And he did evil in the eyes of the Lord” (II Kings 24:19); why was God’s mind set at ease? The Gemara answers: Zedekiah was not wicked; rather, he had it in his power to rebuke the people of his generation and he did not rebuke them. Therefore, their sins are attributed to him.

וא"ר יוחנן משום רשב"י מאי דכתיב (משלי כט, ט) איש חכם נשפט את איש אויל ורגז ושחק ואין נחת אמר הקב"ה כעסתי על אחז ונתתיו ביד מלכי דמשק זיבח וקיטר [לאלהיהם] שנאמר (דברי הימים ב כח, כג) ויזבח לאלהי דרמשק המכים בו ויאמר [כי] אלהי מלכי ארם הם מעזרים אותם להם אזבח ויעזרוני והם היו [לו] להכשילו ולכל ישראל And Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What is the meaning of that which is written: “If a wise man contends with a foolish man, whether he is angry or laughs, there is no rest” (Proverbs 29:9)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I was angry with Ahaz and I delivered him into the hand of the kings of Damascus. He then sacrificed offerings and burned incense to their gods, as it is stated: “He sacrificed to the gods of Damascus that smote him; and he said: Because the gods of the kings of Aram help them, I will sacrifice to them, and they will help me. But they were the ruin of him, and of all Israel” (II Chronicles 28:23). When the Holy One, Blessed be He, was angry with Israel and caused them to lose a war to prompt them to repent of their sins, their response was to worship idols.

שחקתי עם אמציה ונתתי מלכי אדום בידו הביא אלהיהם והשתחוה להם שנאמר (דברי הימים ב כה, יד) ויהי אחרי (כן) בא אמציה מהכות את אדומים ויבא את אלהי בני שעיר ויעמידם [לו] לאלהים ולפניהם ישתחוה ולהם יקטר אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי בכיי ליה למר דלא ידע חייכי למר דלא ידע ווי ליה למר דלא ידע בין טב לביש I smiled upon Amaziah and I delivered the kings of Edom into his hand. In response, he brought their gods and bowed to them, as it is stated: “And it came to pass after Amaziah came from striking the Edomites, that he brought the gods of the children of Seir and set them up to be his gods and prostrated himself before them, and burned incense to them” (II Chronicles 25:14). The response to victory in war was the same, idol worship. They are incorrigible. Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: I cried for the master and he did not know, I smiled for the master and he did not know; woe unto the master who does not know the distinction between good and bad. The Jewish people also resorted to idol worship both when God rewarded them and when He afflicted them.

(ירמיהו לט, ג) ויבאו כל [שרי] מלך בבל (ויבאו) [וישבו] בשער התוך א"ר יוחנן משום רשב"י מקום שמחתכין בו הלכות אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי באתרא דמריה תלא ליה זייניה תמן קולבא רעיא קולתיה תלא With regard to the verse: “And all the princes of the king of Babylonia came in and sat in the middle gate [sha’ar hattavekh]” (Jeremiah 39:3), Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: Sha’ar hattavekh was the place in which they would decide [meḥattekhin] halakhot. Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: In the place that the master of the house hangs his weapons, there the despicable shepherd hangs his jug. In the place where the Sanhedrin convened, Nebuchadnezzar the wicked and his princes now assemble.

(סימן על שדה בתים לא תאונה) § The Gemara cites a mnemonic for the following statements that Rav Ḥisda said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: By the field, houses, shall not befall.

אמר רב חסדא אמר רבי ירמיה בר אבא מאי דכתיב (משלי כד, ל) על שדה איש עצל עברתי ועל כרם אדם חסר לב והנה עלה כולו קמשונים כסו פניו חרולים וגדר אבניו נהרסה על שדה איש עצל עברתי זה אחז ועל כרם אדם חסר לב זה מנשה והנה עלה כולו קמשונים זה אמון כסו פניו חרולים זה יהויקים וגדר אבניו נהרסה זה צדקיהו שנחרב בית המקדש בימיו Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I passed by the field of an indolent man, and by the vineyard of a man void of understanding; and behold, it was overgrown with thistles, and its surface was covered with nettles, and its stone wall was broken” (Proverbs 24:30–31)? The verse describes the spiritual and political decline of the kings of Judea. “I passed by the field of an indolent man”; this is a reference to Ahaz. “And by the vineyard of a man void of understanding”; this is a reference to Manasseh. “And behold, it was overgrown with thistles”; this is a reference to Amon. “And its surface was covered with nettles”; this is a reference to Jehoiakim. “And its stone wall was broken”; this is a reference to Zedekiah, in whose days the Temple was destroyed.

ואמר רב חסדא אמר רבי ירמיה בר אבא ארבע כיתות אין מקבלות פני שכינה כת לצים כת שקרנים כת חניפים כת מספרי לשון הרע כת לצים דכתיב (הושע ז, ה) משך ידו את לוצצים כת שקרנים דכתיב (תהלים קא, ז) דובר שקרים לא יכון לנגד עיני כת חניפים דכתיב (איוב יג, טז) כי לא לפניו חנף יבוא כת מספרי לשון הרע דכתיב (תהלים ה, ה) כי לא אל חפץ רשע אתה לא יגורך רע צדיק אתה ולא יהיה במגורך רע Apropos the previous statement, the Gemara cites an additional statement. And Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says that four groups do not receive the Divine Presence: This pertains to the group of cynics, the group of liars, the group of flatterers, and the group of slanderers. This pertains to the group of cynics, as it is written: “He withdrew His hand with cynics” (Hosea 7:5), indicating that God distanced Himself from them. This pertains to the group of liars, as it is written: “He that speaks falsehoods shall not be established before My eyes” (Psalms 101:7). This pertains to the group of flatterers, as it is written: “That a flatterer shall not come before Him” (Job 13:16). This pertains to the group of slanderers, as it is stated: “For You are not a God who desires wickedness; evil shall not dwell with You” (Psalms 5:5), which means: You are righteous, and there will be no form of evil in Your dwelling.

ואמר רב חסדא אמר רבי ירמיה בר אבא מאי דכתיב (תהלים צא, י) לא תאונה אליך רעה ונגע לא יקרב באהלך לא תאונה אליך רעה שלא ישלוט) בהן יצר הרע ונגע לא יקרב באהלך שלא תמצא אשתך ספק נדה בשעה שתבא מן הדרך And Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “No evil shall befall you, nor shall any plague come near your tent” (Psalms 91:10)? “No evil shall befall you” means that the evil inclination shall not dominate them. “Nor shall any plague come near your tent” means that you will never find your wife in a state of uncertainty whether she has the halakhic status of a menstruating woman when you return from a journey. After a period of separation, when a husband desires his wife, her uncertain status may prove more frustrating than a situation where the prohibition is clear-cut.

דבר אחר לא תאונה אליך רעה שלא יבעתוך חלומות רעים והרהורים רעים ונגע לא יקרב באהלך שלא יהא לך בן או תלמיד שמקדיח תבשילו ברבים [כגון ישו הנוצרי] Alternatively, the phrase “no evil shall befall you” means that you will be frightened neither by bad dreams nor by evil thoughts. “Nor shall any plague come near your tent” means that you will not have a child or student who overcooks his food in public, i.e., sins in public and causes others to sin, such as in the well-known case of Jesus the Nazarene.

עד כאן ברכו אביו מכאן ואילך ברכתו אמו (תהלים צא, יא) כי מלאכיו יצוה לך לשמרך בכל דרכיך על כפים ישאונך וגו' על שחל ופתן תדרוך וגו' Until this point in the psalm, Solomon’s father, David, blessed him, as these are blessings appropriate for a father to bless his son. From this point forward, his mother blessed him, as these are blessings appropriate for a mother to bless her son. “For he shall order His angels to preserve you in all your ways. They shall bear you on their hands, lest they dash your foot against a stone. You shall tread upon the lion and the adder; the young lion and the crocodile shall you trample under foot” (Psalms 91:11–13).

עד כאן ברכתו אמו מכאן ואילך ברכתו שמים Until this point in the psalm, his mother blessed him. From this point forward, God in Heaven blessed him, as the psalm proceeds to refer to God in the first person, as though speaking in His name:

Daf 103b

(תהלים צא, יד) כי בי חשק ואפלטהו אשגבהו כי ידע שמי יקראני ואענהו עמו אנכי בצרה אחלצהו ואכבדהו אורך ימים אשביעהו ואראהו בישועתי “Because he has desired Me, therefore I will deliver him; I will set him on high, because he has known My name. He shall call upon Me, and I will answer him; I will be with him in trouble; I will deliver him, and honor him. With long life I will satisfy him, and show him My salvation” (Psalms 91:14–16).

אמר ר"ש בן לקיש מאי דכתיב (איוב לח, טו) וימנע מרשעים אורם וזרוע רמה תשבר מפני מה עי"ן של רשעים תלויה כיון שנעשה אדם רש מלמטה נעשה רש מלמעלה Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And He will withhold their light from the wicked [resha’im], and the high arm shall be broken” (Job 38:15)? For what reason is the letter ayin of the word resha’im suspended slightly above the rest of the letters? It is suspended so that the word will be read rashim, meaning poor people. It means: Once a person becomes poor on earth below and the number of his enemies grows, he becomes poor in Heaven above, as he is certainly a sinner and that is why he is hated.

ולא נכתביה כלל ר' יוחנן ור"א חד אמר מפני כבודו של דוד וחד אמר משום כבודו של נחמיה בן חכליה The Gemara challenges: If that is the meaning, let the ayin not be written at all and let the verse say: Rashim. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar both explain why the ayin was not omitted. One says: It was due to the desire to preserve the honor of David, who had numerous enemies below despite the fact that he was a righteous person and had a place in the World-to-Come. And one says: It was due to the desire to preserve the honor of Nehemiah, son of Hacaliah, who also had numerous enemies below, despite his righteousness.

תנו רבנן מנשה היה שונה חמשים וחמשה פנים בתורת כהנים כנגד שני מלכותו אחאב שמנים וחמשה ירבעם מאה ושלשה § The Sages taught in a baraita: Manasseh, king of Judea, would study fifty-five different aspects in interpreting Torat Kohanim, the halakhic midrash on Leviticus, corresponding to the years of his reign, indicating that he possessed great knowledge. Ahab was greater and studied eighty-five aspects, and Jeroboam was greater still and studied one hundred and three aspects.

תניא היה ר"מ אומר אבשלום אין לו חלק לעוה"ב שנאמר (שמואל ב יח, טו) ויכו את אבשלום וימיתוהו ויכוהו בעוה"ז וימיתוהו לעוה"ב תניא ר"ש בן אלעזר אומר משום ר"מ אחז ואחזיה וכל מלכי ישראל שכתוב בהן ויעש הרע בעיני ה' לא חיין ולא נידונין It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: Absalom has no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And they smote Absalom and they killed him” (II Samuel 18:15). “And they smote Absalom” is referring to death in this world, while “and they killed him” is referring to death in the World-to-Come. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: Ahaz and Ahaziah, kings of Judea, and all of the kings of the kingdom of Israel about whom it is written: “And he did evil in the eyes of the Lord” (see, e.g., I Kings 15:34), neither live in the World-to-Come nor are sentenced to Gehenna.

(מלכים ב כא, טז) וגם דם נקי שפך מנשה הרבה מאד עד אשר מלא את ירושלים פה לפה לבד מחטאתו אשר החטיא את יהודה לעשות הרע בעיני ה' הכא תרגימו שהרג ישעיה במערבא אמרי שעשה צלם משאוי אלף בני אדם ובכל יום ויום הורג (את) כולם כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה שקולה נשמה של צדיק אחד כנגד כל העולם כולו כמ"ד ישעיה הרג It is stated: “And Manasseh shed a great deal of innocent blood, until he filled Jerusalem from one end to another [peh lafeh], beside his sin that he made Judea sin, to do evil in the eyes of the Lord” (II Kings 21:16). Here, in Babylonia, they interpret the verse to mean that he killed the prophet Isaiah (see Yevamot 49b). In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say that Manasseh crafted an idol so large that it was a burden requiring one thousand people to carry it, and each and every day he would require them to carry it, which would kill all of them. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: The soul of one righteous person is equal in value to the entire world? It is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says: He killed Isaiah.

כתיב (דברי הימים ב לג, ז) פסל וכתיב (דברי הימים ב לג, כב) פסילים א"ר יוחנן בתחלה עשה לו פרצוף אחד ולבסוף עשה לו ארבעה פרצופים כדי שתראה שכינה ותכעוס It is written that Manasseh crafted “an idol” (II Chronicles 33:7), and it is written that Manasseh crafted “idols” (II Chronicles 33:19). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Initially, he crafted one face [partzuf ] for the idol, and ultimately, he crafted four faces for it so that the Divine Presence would see it from each side and become angry.

אחז העמידו בעלייה שנאמר (מלכים ב כג, יב) ואת המזבחות אשר על הגג עליית אחז וגו' מנשה העמידו בהיכל שנאמר (מלכים ב כא, ז) וישם את פסל האשרה אשר עשה בבית אשר אמר ה' אל דוד ואל שלמה [בנו] בבית הזה ובירושלים אשר בחרתי מכל שבטי ישראל אשים את שמי לעולם אמון הכניסו לבית קדשי הקדשים שנאמר (ישעיהו כח, כ) כי קצר המצע מהשתרע והמסכה צרה כהתכנס Ahaz placed that idol in the upper chamber in the Temple, as it is stated: “And the altars that were on the roof of the upper chamber of Ahaz” (II Kings 23:12). Manasseh placed it in the Sanctuary itself, as it is stated: “And he set the graven image of the ashera that he had crafted, in that house of which the Lord said to David, and to Solomon his son: In this house, and in Jerusalem, which I have chosen from all the tribes of Israel, will I put My name forever” (II Kings 21:7). Amon introduced it into the Holy of Holies, as it is stated: “For the bed is too short for spreading, and the covering too narrow for when he gathers himself” (Isaiah 28:20).

מאי כי קצר המצע מהשתרע אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני אמר רבי יונתן [כי] קצר המצע זה מלהשתרר עליו שני רעים כאחד מאי והמסכה צרה וגו' אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני רבי יונתן כי הוה מטי להאי קרא הוה קא בכי מי שכתב בו (תהלים לג, ז) כונס כנד מי הים תעשה לו מסכה צרה What is the meaning of the phrase “For the bed is too short for spreading”? Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says that it means: For his bed is too narrow for two colleagues to spread upon it together, as it is impossible that service of God and idol worship will coexist there. What is the meaning of the phrase “and the covering [masekha] too narrow [tzara] for when he gathers himself [kehitkanes]”? Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: When Rabbi Yonatan would reach this verse he would cry. He about whom it is written: “He gathers [kones] the waters of the sea like a rampart” (Psalms 33:7), shall a graven image [masekha] be a rival [tzara]?

[אחז בטל את העבודה] וחתם את התורה שנאמר (ישעיהו ח, טז) צור תעודה חתום תורה בלמודי מנשה קדר את האזכרות והרס את המזבח אמון [שרף את התורה] והעלה שממית על גבי המזבח אחז התיר את הערוה מנשה בא על אחותו Ahaz nullified the Temple service and sealed the Torah, prohibiting its study, as it is stated: “Bind up the testimony, seal the Torah among my disciples” (Isaiah 8:16). Manasseh excised the mentions of God’s names from sacred books and destroyed the altar. Amon burned the Torah and sacrificed a gecko, an impure creeping animal, upon the altar. Ahaz permitted engaging in sexual intercourse with forbidden relatives, and announced that marriage between those relatives is permitted. Manasseh exploited that pronouncement and engaged in sexual intercourse with his sister.

אמון בא על אמו שנאמר (דברי הימים ב לג, כג) כי הוא אמון הרבה אשמה רבי יוחנן ור"א חד אמר ששרף את התורה וחד אמר שבא על אמו אמרה לו אמו כלום יש לך הנאה ממקום שיצאת ממנו א"ל כלום אני עושה אלא להכעיס את בוראי Amon engaged in sexual intercourse with his mother, as it is stated: “But Amon increased his guilt” (II Chronicles 33:23), indicating that he performed a greater and more disgraceful transgression than anyone else. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disagreed about his transgression; one says that he burned the Torah, and one says that he engaged in sexual intercourse with his mother. His mother said to him: Do you have any pleasure by engaging in intercourse from the place from which you emerged? He said to her: I am doing this only to express insolence to my Creator, not for my pleasure.

כי אתא יהויקים אמר קמאי לא ידעי לארגוזי כלום אנו צריכין אלא לאורו יש לנו זהב פרויים שאנו משתמשין בו יטול אורו אמרו לו והלא כסף וזהב שלו הוא שנאמר (חגי ב, ח) לי הכסף ולי הזהב נאם ה' צבאות אמר להם כבר נתנו לנו שנאמר (תהלים קטו, טז) השמים שמים לה' והארץ נתן לבני האדם When Jehoiakim came along and reigned, he said: My predecessors did not know how to express insolence to God. Do we need God even for his light? Since we have parvayim gold that we use that shines, let God take His light from the world. They said to him: Aren’t the silver and the gold His, as it is stated: “The silver is mine and the gold is mine says the Lord of hosts” (Haggai 2:8)? Jehoiakim said to them: He has already given it to us, as it is stated: “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but the earth He has given to the children of men” (Psalms 115:16).

א"ל רבא לרבה בר מרי מפני מה לא מנו את יהויקים משום דכתיב ביה (דברי הימים ב לו, ח) ויתר דברי יהויקים ותועבותיו אשר עשה והנמצא עליו מאי והנמצא עליו רבי יוחנן ור"א חד אמר שחקק שם עבודת כוכבים על אמתו וחד אמר שחקק שם שמים על אמתו § Rava said to Rabba bar Mari: For what reason did the tanna’im not enumerate Jehoiakim among the kings who have no share in the World-to-Come? One would imagine that he has no share in the World-to-Come, because it is written concerning him: “And the rest of the acts of Jehoiakim and his abominations that he did, and that which was found on him” (II Chronicles 36:8). The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the phrase “and that which was found on him”? Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree; one says that he etched the name of idols on his penis due to his devotion to them, and one says that he etched the name of Heaven on his penis in a display of contempt.

א"ל במלכים לא שמעתי בהדיוטות שמעתי מפני מה לא מנו את מיכה מפני שפתו מצויה לעוברי דרכים שנאמר כל העובר ושב אל הלוים Rabba bar Mari said to Rava: With regard to the list of kings, I did not hear why Jehoiakim was excluded; but with regard to the list of commoners, I heard why a certain sinner was excluded. For what reason did the tanna’im not enumerate Micah among those with no share in the World-to-Come? After all, he crafted idols that the Jewish people worshipped (see Judges, chapter 17). It is due to the fact that his bread was available for passersby, as it is stated: All those who pass by the Levites. He would provide sustenance to all hosted in his house.

(זכריה י, יא) ועבר בים צרה והכה בים גלים א"ר יוחנן זה פסלו של מיכה תניא רבי נתן אומר מגרב לשילה ג' מילין והיה עשן המערכה ועשן פסל מיכה מתערבין זה בזה With regard to that which is written: “And He shall pass through the sea with affliction and shall strike the waves in the sea” (Zechariah 10:11), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This affliction is a reference to the idol of Micah, as Micah passed through the sea during the exodus from Egypt. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: The distance from Gerav, where Micah resided, to Shiloh, where the Tabernacle was at that time, was three mil, and the smoke from the arrangement of wood on the altar in Shiloh and the smoke from the worship of the idol of Micah would intermingle with each other.

בקשו מלאכי השרת לדוחפו אמר להן הקב"ה הניחו לו שפתו מצויה לעוברי דרכים ועל דבר זה נענשו אנשי פלגש בגבעה אמר להן הקב"ה בכבודי לא מחיתם על כבודו של בשר ודם מחיתם The ministering angels sought to dismiss him from the world. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Leave him, as his bread is available for travelers. And it is for this matter, the sin of Micah’s idol, that the people involved in the incident of the concubine in Gibeah were punished. The tribes of Israel waged war with the tribe of Benjamin and forty thousand of them were killed. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: You did not protest for My honor and took no action to destroy Micah’s idol, but you protested for the honor of one of flesh and blood who was killed? Therefore, the other tribes were initially unsuccessful, and many of their soldiers were killed.

א"ר יוחנן משום רבי יוסי בן קסמא גדולה לגימה שהרחיקה שתי משפחות מישראל שנאמר (דברים כג, ה) על דבר אשר לא קדמו אתכם בלחם ובמים ורבי יוחנן דידיה אמר מרחקת את הקרובים ומקרבת את הרחוקים ומעלמת עינים מן הרשעים ומשרה שכינה על נביאי הבעל ושגגתו עולה זדון Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma: Great is eating, as it distanced two clans from the Jewish people, as it is stated: “An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord…because they met you not with bread and with water” (Deuteronomy 23:4–5). And Rabbi Yoḥanan himself says: Food distances the near, and draws near the distant, and averts eyes from the wicked, sparing them from punishment, and causes the Divine Presence to rest on the prophets of the Baal; and an unwitting transgression with regard to it is at times considered an intentional transgression.

מרחקת את הקרובים The Gemara elaborates: The fact that it distances the near is derived

Daf 104a

מעמון ומואב from Ammon and Moab. Although they were relatives of the Jewish people, as they descend from Lot, Abraham’s nephew, it is prohibited for a Jewish woman to marry a convert from either of those nations, because they failed to provide bread and water to the Jewish people in the wilderness.

ומקרבת את הרחוקים מיתרו דאמר ר' יוחנן בשכר (שמות ב, כ) קראן לו ויאכל לחם זכו בני בניו וישבו בלשכת הגזית שנאמר (דברי הימים א ב, נה) וממשפחות סופרים יושבי יעבץ תרעתים שמעתים סוכתים המה הקינים הבאים מחמת אבי בית רכב וכתיב התם (שופטים א, טז) ובני קיני חותן משה עלו מעיר התמרים את בני יהודה מדבר יהודה אשר בנגב ערד וילך וישב את העם And the fact that it draws near the distant is derived from Yitro, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In reward for Yitro telling his daughters: “Call him, that he may eat bread” (Exodus 2:20), inviting Moses to join them for a meal, Yitro’s descendants were privileged and sat as scribes in session with the Sanhedrin in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. As it is stated: “And the families of the scribes who dwelt in Jabez; the Tirathites, the Shimeathites, the Sucathites. These were the Kenites who came of Hammath, father of the house of Rechab” (I Chronicles 2:55). And it is written there with regard to the identity of the Kenites: “And the children of the Kenite, Moses’ father-in-law, went up from the city of the palm trees with the children of Judah into the wilderness of Judah, which is in the south of Arad; and they went and dwelt with the people” (Judges 1:16).

ומעלמת עינים מן הרשעים ממיכה And the fact that it averts eyes from the wicked is derived from Micah, who was not punished, because he provided bread to passersby.

ומשרה שכינה על נביאי הבעל מחבירו של עדו הנביא דכתיב (מלכים א יג, כ) ויהי הם יושבים אל השלחן ויהי דבר ה' אל הנביא אשר השיבו And the fact that it causes the Divine Presence to rest on the prophets of the Baal is derived from the colleague of Iddo the prophet, the elderly prophet who convinced Iddo to eat with him contrary to the directive of God, when Iddo went to Bethel to prophesy to Jeroboam, as it is written: “And it happened as they sat at the table, that the word of the Lord came to the prophet that brought him back” (I Kings 13:20). Although the elderly prophet was a false prophet, he was rewarded with true prophecy as a reward for hosting Iddo.

ושגגתה עולה זדון דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב אלמלי הלווהו יהונתן לדוד שתי ככרות לחם לא נהרגה נוב עיר הכהנים ולא נטרד דואג האדמי ולא נהרג שאול ושלשת בניו And the fact that an unwitting transgression with regard to it is at times considered an intentional transgression is derived as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Had Jonathan lent David two loaves of bread when he was fleeing Saul, David would not have sought sustenance from the priests in Nov. The residents of Nov, city of the priests, would not have been killed, and Doeg the Edomite would not have been banished from the World-to-Come, and Saul and his three sons would not have been killed as punishment for that massacre.

ומפני מה לא מנו את אחז אמר ר' ירמיה בר אבא מפני שמוטל בין שני צדיקים בין יותם לחזקיהו רב יוסף אמר מפני שהיה לו בשת פנים מישעיהו שנאמר (ישעיהו ז, ג) ויאמר ה' אל ישעיהו צא נא לקראת אחז אתה ושאר ישוב בנך אל קצה תעלת הברכה העליונה אל מסלת שדה כובס מאי כובס איכא דאמרי דכבשינהו לאפיה וחלף ואיכא דאמרי אוכלא דקצרי סחף ארישיה וחלף § The Gemara asks: And for what reason did the tanna’im not enumerate Ahaz among the kings with no share in the World-to-Come? His wickedness is extensively recounted in the Bible. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says: He is not enumerated because he is cast between two righteous people, between his father, Jotham, and his son, Hezekiah. Rav Yosef says: He is not enumerated because he had a sense of embarrassment from Isaiah the prophet, as it is stated: “And the Lord said to Isaiah: Go out now to meet Ahaz, you, and Shear-Jashub your son, at the end of the aqueduct of the upper pool in the highway of the launderer’s [koves] field” (Isaiah 7:3). What is the meaning of the term koves? There are those who say: It means concealed [kavash], as Ahaz concealed [dekhavshinhu] his face and passed by the prophet because he was embarrassed to be seen. And there are those who say: He placed a launderer’s vessel over his head and passed by the prophet so that Isaiah would be unable to identify him.

מפני מה לא מנו את אמון מפני כבודו של יאשיהו מנשה נמי לא נמני מפני כבודו של חזקיהו ברא מזכי אבא אבא לא מזכי ברא דכתיב (דברים לב, לט) ואין מידי מציל אין אברהם מציל את ישמעאל אין יצחק מציל את עשו השתא דאתית להכי אחז נמי לא אימני משום כבודו של חזקיהו The Gemara continues and asks: For what reason did the tanna’im not enumerate the wicked Amon among the kings with no share in the World-to-Come? The Gemara answers: He is not enumerated due to the honor of Josiah, his righteous son. The Gemara challenges: Let us also not enumerate Manasseh due to the honor of Hezekiah, his righteous father. The Gemara explains: The son confers merit upon the father, as it is to the father’s credit that he raised a righteous son; but the father does not confer merit upon the son, as it is written: “None delivers from My hand” (Deuteronomy 32:39). Abraham does not deliver his son Ishmael from the judgment of Heaven; Isaac does not deliver his son Esau from judgment. The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this understanding, Ahaz too was not enumerated in the mishna due to the honor of his son Hezekiah.

ומפני מה לא מנו את יהויקים משום דר' חייא בר' אבויה דאמר ר' חייא בר' אבויה כתיב על גולגלתו [של] יהויקים זאת ועוד אחרת זקינו דרבי פרידא אשכח גולגלתא דהוה קא שדיא בשערי ירושלים וכתיב בה זאת ועוד אחרת קברה ולא איקברא קברה ולא איקברא The Gemara asks: And for what reason did the tanna’im not enumerate Jehoiakim among the kings with no share in the World-to-Come? His extreme wickedness is described extensively in the Bible. The Gemara explains: It is due to that which was stated by Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Avuya, as Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Avuya, says: It was written on the skull of Jehoiakim: This and yet another, indicating that he will receive a double punishment. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Perida’s grandfather, apparently Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Avuya, found a skull that was cast near the gates of Jerusalem, and on it was written: This and yet another. He buried it, but it did not stay buried. He buried it again, and again it did not stay buried. Each time he buried the skull it emerged from the grave.

אמר גולגלתו של יהויקים היא דכתיב ביה (ירמיהו כב, יט) קבורת חמור יקבר סחוב והשלך וגו' אמר מלכא הוא ולא איכשר לזלזולי ביה כרכה בשיראי ואותבה בסיפתא חזיתא דביתהו סברא הא דאיתתא קמייתא הוה דהא לא קא מנשי לה שגרא תנורא וקלתה היינו דכתיב זאת ועוד אחרת He said: This is no doubt the skull of Jehoiakim, as it is written in his regard: “He shall be buried with the burial of a donkey, drawn and cast forth beyond the gates of Jerusalem” (Jeremiah 22:19). The fulfillment of this verse is exemplified in the inability to bury him. Rabbi Perida’s grandfather said: He is a king, and it is inappropriate to display contempt for it. He wrapped the skull in silk and placed it in a box. His wife saw the box and thought: This was the skull of his first wife, as he is not forgetting her. She ignited the oven and incinerated the skull. When she informed her husband what she had done, he said: That is the meaning of that which is written on the skull: This and yet another. Not only was his corpse discarded in a demeaning manner and not buried, but his skull was incinerated. That ordeal atoned for some of his transgressions, and he received a share in the World-to-Come.

תניא אמר רבי שמעון בן אלעזר בשביל (מלכים ב כ, ג) הטוב בעיניך עשיתי מה אות בשביל (מלכים ב כ, ח) מה אות נכרים אכלו על שולחנו בשביל שנכרים אכלו על שולחנו גרם גלות לבניו מסייע ליה לחזקיה דאמר חזקיה כל המזמן עובד כוכבים לתוך ביתו ומשמש עליו גורם גלות לבניו שנאמר (מלכים ב כ, יח) ובניך אשר יצאו ממך [אשר תוליד] יקחו והיו סריסים בהיכל מלך בבל § It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Because of Hezekiah’s boastful statement: “And I have done what is good in Your eyes” (II Kings 20:3), he also asked the prophet inappropriately: “What shall be the sign that the Lord shall heal me” (II Kings 20:8). Because of his question: “What shall be the sign,” gentiles ate at his table. The sign was that the sun reversed its path and appeared lower, rather than higher, on the sundial of Ahaz, leading the king of Babylonia to dispatch messengers to Hezekiah. Because gentiles ate at his table, it ultimately caused the exile of his descendants. The Gemara comments: This supports the statement of Ḥizkiyya, as Ḥizkiyya said: Anyone who invites an idol worshipper into his house and serves him causes the exile of his descendants, as it is stated: “And of your sons who shall issue from you, whom you shall beget, shall they take away; and they shall be eunuchs in the palace of the king of Babylonia” (II Kings 20:18).

(ישעיהו לט, ב) וישמח עליהם חזקיה ויראם את (כל) בית נכתה את הכסף ואת הזהב ואת הבשמים ואת השמן הטוב וגו' אמר רב מאי בית נכתה אשתו השקתה עליהם ושמואל אמר בית גנזיו הראה להם ור' יוחנן אמר זין אוכל זין הראה להן With regard to the verse: “And Hezekiah was glad of them, and showed them his treasury [beit nekhoto], the silver and the gold, and the spices and the precious ointment” (Isaiah 39:2), Rav says: What is the meaning of beit nekhoto? It means that his wife, who typically did not appear before strangers for reasons of modesty, poured drinks for them. And Shmuel says: It means that he showed them his actual treasury. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It means that he showed them a weapon so powerful that it breaks another weapon.

איכה ישבה בדד אמר רבא אמר רבי יוחנן מפני מה לקו ישראל באיכה מפני שעברו על שלשים ושש כריתות שבתורה § Apropos the exile of the descendants of the kings of Judea to Babylonia, the Gemara cites an aggadic statement about the destruction of the Temple and the sins of the Jewish people that caused it. With regard to the verse: “How [eikha] does the city sit solitary” (Lamentations 1:1), Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: For what reason were the Jewish people stricken and their plight bemoaned with the term eikha? It is due to the fact that they violated thirty-six prohibitions punishable with karet that are enumerated in the Torah, corresponding to the numerological value of eikha, spelled alef, yod, kaf, heh.

אמר רבי יוחנן מפני מה לקו באל"ף בי"ת מפני שעברו על התורה שניתנה באל"ף בי"ת Rabbi Yoḥanan says: For what reason were the Jewish people stricken, and their plight bemoaned with an acrostic based on the alef beit, as the book of Lamentations contains multiple alphabetical acrostics? It is due to the fact that they violated the Torah, which was given in the language of the alef beit.

ישבה בדד אמר רבא אמר רבי יוחנן אמר הקב"ה אני אמרתי (דברים לג, כח) וישכן ישראל בטח בדד עין יעקב אל ארץ דגן ותירוש אף שמיו יערפו טל עכשיו יהיה בדד מושבם (איכה א, א) העיר רבתי עם אמר רבא אמר רבי יוחנן שהיו משיאין קטנה לגדול וגדולה לקטן כדי שיהו להם בנים הרבה With regard to the phrase “Does the city sit solitary,” Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I said: “And Israel dwells in safety, the fountain of Jacob in solitude, to a land of grain and wine; also His heavens shall drop down dew” (Deuteronomy 33:28), indicating that their solitude shall be one of wealth and prominence. Now that they have rejected my directive and cleaved to and learned from the gentiles, their dwelling shall be solitary in sorrow. With regard to the phrase: “The city that was full of people” (Lamentations 1:1), Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They would marry a younger female to an older male and an older female to a younger male so that they would have many children.

(איכה א, א) היתה כאלמנה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב כאלמנה ולא אלמנה ממש אלא כאשה שהלך בעלה למדינת הים ודעתו לחזור אליה רבתי בגוים שרתי במדינות אמר רבא אמר רבי יוחנן כל מקום שהן הולכין נעשין שרים לאדוניהן With regard to the phrase describing Jerusalem: “She became like a widow” (Lamentations 1:1), Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Like a widow, but not an actual widow. Rather, Jerusalem is like a woman whose husband has gone to a country overseas, and yet he intends to return to her. With regard to the phrase: “Great among the nations, and princess among the provinces” (Lamentations 1:1), Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Every place they go, when exiled among the nations, the Jewish people become princes to their masters due to their wisdom.

ת"ר מעשה בשני בני אדם שנשבו בהר הכרמל והיה שבאי מהלך אחריהם The Sages taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving two Jewish people who were taken captive on Mount Carmel, and their captor was walking behind them.

Daf 104b

א"ל אחד מהם לחבירו גמל שמהלכת לפנינו סומא באחת מעיניה וטעונה שתי נודות אחת של יין ואחת של שמן ושני בני אדם המנהיגים אותה אחד ישראל ואחד נכרי אמר להן [שבאי] עם קשה עורף מאין אתם יודעין One of the captives said to the other: The camel that is walking ahead of us is blind in one of its eyes and laden with two wineskins, one filled with wine and one filled with oil. And two people are driving the camel, one a Jew and one a gentile. The captor said to them: Stiff-necked people, from where do you know these matters that you cannot see?

אמרו לו גמל מעשבים שלפניה מצד שרואה אוכלת מצד שאינה רואה אינה אוכלת וטעונה שתי נודות אחת של יין ואחת של שמן של יין מטפטף ושוקע ושל שמן מטפטף וצף ושני בני אדם המנהיגים אותה אחד נכרי ואחד ישראל נכרי נפנה לדרך וישראל נפנה לצדדין They said to him: We know that the camel is blind from the grass that is before it, as from the grass on the side that it sees, it eats, and from the grass on the side that it does not see, it does not eat, i.e., it eats grass from only one side. And we know that it is laden with two wineskins, one filled with wine and one filled with oil, as wine drips and sinks into the ground and oil drips and floats on the surface, and we see the difference on the ground. And we know that two people are driving the camel, one a Jew and one a gentile, as the gentile defecates on the road and the Jew, in the interests of modesty, goes to the sides of the road to defecate.

רדף אחריהם ומצא כדבריהם בא ונשקן על ראשן והביאן לביתן ועשה להן סעודה גדולה והיה מרקד לפניהם ואמר ברוך שבחר בזרעו של אברהם ונתן להם מחכמתו ובכל מקום שהן הולכים נעשין שרים לאדוניהם ופטרן [והלכו] לבתיהם לשלום The captor pursued the camel and its drivers to determine whether the statements of the captives were accurate, and found that the reality was in accordance with their statements. He came and respectfully kissed them on their head, and brought them to their house and prepared a great feast for them. And he was dancing before them and said: Blessed is He who chose the descendants of Abraham and granted of His wisdom to them, and in every place that they go they become princes to their lords. And he released them and they went to their houses in peace.

(איכה א, ב) בכה תבכה בלילה שתי בכיות הללו למה אמר רבה אמר רבי יוחנן אחד על מקדש ראשון ואחד על מקדש שני בלילה על עסקי לילה שנאמר (במדבר יד, א) ותשא כל העדה ויתנו את קולם ויבכו העם בלילה ההוא § The Gemara returns to its interpretation of verses in Lamentations: “She cries [bakho tivke] at night” (Lamentations 1:2). These two cries, indicated by the use of a compound verb, why are they written? Rabba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is a cry over the destruction of the First Temple, and one is a cry over the destruction of the Second Temple, which was destined to be destroyed. The term “at night” indicates that the crying is over matters of night, as it is stated with regard to the response of the Jewish people to the report of the spies after their return from the land of Canaan: “And all the congregation lifted up their voice, and the people cried that night” (Numbers 14:1).

אמר רבה א"ר יוחנן אותו (היום) ליל ט' באב היה אמר להן הקב"ה לישראל אתם בכיתם בכיה של חנם ואני אקבע לכם בכיה לדורות Rabba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: That day that they heard the spies’ report was the evening of the Ninth of Av. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people: You cried an unwarranted cry, and so I will establish for you a reason to cry for generations.

ד"א בלילה שכל הבוכה בלילה קולו נשמע ד"א בלילה שכל הבוכה בלילה כוכבים ומזלות בוכין עמו ד"א בלילה שכל הבוכה בלילה השומע קולו בוכה כנגדו מעשה באשה אחת שכנתו של רבן גמליאל שמת בנה והיתה בוכה עליו בלילה שמע רבן גמליאל קולה ובכה כנגדה עד שנשרו ריסי עיניו למחר הכירו בו תלמידיו והוציאוה משכונתו Alternatively, the term “at night” indicates that with regard to anyone who cries at night, his voice is heard due to the ambient silence. Alternatively, the term “at night” indicates that in the case of anyone who cries at night, the stars and the constellations cry with him. Alternatively, the term “at night” indicates that in the case of anyone who cries at night, one who hears his voice is touched by his suffering and cries with him. There was an incident involving one woman, the neighbor of Rabban Gamliel, whose son died, and she would cry over his death at night. Rabban Gamliel heard her voice and cried with her until his eyelashes fell out. The next day his students noticed that he had been crying, and they removed the woman from his neighborhood so that Rabban Gamliel could sleep.

(איכה א, ב) ודמעתה על לחיה אמר רבא אמר ר' יוחנן כאשה שבוכה על בעל נעוריה שנאמר (יואל א, ח) אלי כבתולה חגורת שק על בעל נעוריה (איכה א, ה) היו צריה לראש אמר רבא אמר רבי יוחנן כל המיצר לישראל נעשה ראש שנאמר (ישעיהו ח, כג) כי לא מועף לאשר מוצק לה כעת הראשון הקל ארצה זבולון וארצה נפתלי והאחרון הכביד דרך הים עבר הירדן גליל הגוים אמר רבא אמר ר' יוחנן כל המציק לישראל אינו עיף With regard to the verse: “And her tears are on her cheeks” (Lamentations 1:2), Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is like a woman who cries over the husband of her youth, as it is stated: “Lament like a virgin girded with sackcloth for the husband of her youth” (Joel 1:8). With regard to the verse: “Her adversaries have become the head” (Lamentations 1:5), Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This indicates that anyone who torments the Jewish people becomes a leader, as it is stated: “For there is no weariness to him that is set against her; at the first He lightly afflicted the land of Zebulun, and the land of Naphtali and afterward He afflicted her more grievously by the way of the sea, beyond the Jordan and the Galilee of the nations” (Isaiah 8:23). Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From this verse one derives that anyone who harasses Israel does not grow weary.

(איכה א, יב) לא אליכם כל עוברי דרך אמר רבא אמר ר' יוחנן מכאן לקובלנא מן התורה כל עוברי דרך אמר רב עמרם אמר רב עשאוני כעוברי על דת דאילו בסדום כתיב (בראשית יט, כד) וה' המטיר על סדום ואילו בירושלים כתיב (איכה א, יג) ממרום שלח אש בעצמותי וירדנה וגו' וכתיב (איכה ד, ו) ויגדל עון בת עמי מחטאת סדום With regard to the verse: “It is nothing to you, all you who pass by” (Lamentations 1:12), Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From here there is a source from the Torah for complaint, i.e., it is appropriate for one to make his suffering public so that others will have compassion for him. With regard to the phrase “all you who pass by,” Rav Amram says that Rav says that it is as though Jerusalem said: They have rendered me like a city of those who violate the most fundamental precepts of law and morality, as, with regard to Sodom, it is written: “Then the Lord rained upon Sodom brimstone and fire from the Lord out of Heaven” (Genesis 19:24), while with regard to Jerusalem, it is written: “From above He has sent fire into my bones, and it prevails against them” (Lamentations 1:13). In both cities, fire rained down from Heaven. And it is written: “For the iniquity of the daughter of my people is greater than the sin of Sodom” (Lamentations 4:6).

וכי משוא פנים יש בדבר אמר רבא אמר ר' יוחנן מדה יתירה היתה בירושלים שלא היתה בסדום דאילו בסדום כתיב (יחזקאל טז, מט) הנה זה היה עון סדום אחותך גאון שבעת לחם ויד עני ואביון לא החזיקה וגו' ואילו בירושלים כתיב (איכה ד, י) ידי נשים רחמניות בשלו ילדיהן The Gemara asks: And is there partiality in the matter? Why was Jerusalem not overturned like Sodom? Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is because there was an additional measure of suffering in Jerusalem that was not in Sodom, as with regard to Sodom it is written: “Behold this was the iniquity of your sister Sodom; pride, surfeit of bread and careless ease was in her and in her daughters; and yet she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and needy” (Ezekiel 16:49). The people of Sodom were not subject to the afflictions of hunger and famine. Whereas, with regard to Jerusalem it is written: “The hands of compassionate women cooked their own children” (Lamentations 4:10). The residents of Jerusalem were punished with great severity.

(איכה א, טו) סלה כל אבירי ה' בקרבי כאדם שאומר לחברו נפסלה מטבע זו The verse: “The Lord has spurned all my mighty men in the midst of me” (Lamentations 1:15), means that this is like a person who says to another: This coin was invalidated. The prominent residents of Jerusalem were crushed and discredited, and their reputations were irreversibly tainted.

(איכה ב, טז) פצו עליך פיהם אמר רבא אמר רבי יוחנן בשביל מה הקדים פ"א לעי"ן בשביל מרגלים שאמרו בפיהם מה שלא ראו בעיניהם With regard to the verse: “They have opened their mouths against you” (Lamentations 2:16), Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: For what reason did the prophet precede the verse beginning with the letter peh to the verse beginning with the letter ayin in several chapters of Lamentations? Since peh means mouth and ayin means eye, it is for the spies who said with their mouths [befihem] what they did not see with their eyes [be’eineihem].

(תהלים יד, ד) אוכלי עמי אכלו לחם ה' לא קראו אמר רבא אמר ר' יוחנן כל האוכל מלחמן של ישראל טועם טעם לחם ושאינו אוכל מלחמן של ישראל אינו טועם טעם לחם ה' לא קראו רב אמר אלו הדיינין ושמואל אמר אלו מלמדי תינוקות With regard to the verse: “The eaters of My people ate bread, and they call not upon the Lord” (Psalms 14:4), Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Any gentile thief who eats the bread of the Jewish people tastes the flavor of bread, and one who does not eat from the bread of the Jewish people does not taste the flavor of bread. Apparently they enjoy only what they steal from the Jewish people. With regard to the people referred to in the phrase “And they call not upon the Lord,” Rav says: These are the judges who are not God-fearing, and Shmuel says: These are schoolteachers who do not perform their job in the name of God.

מי מנאן אמר רב אשי אנשי כנסת הגדולה מנאום אמר רב יהודה אמר רב בקשו עוד למנות אחד באה דמות דיוקנו של אביו ונשטחה לפניהם ולא השגיחו עליה באה אש מן השמים ולחכה אש בספסליהם ולא השגיחו עליה § The Gemara resumes its discussion of the kings and commoners enumerated in the mishna who have no share in the World-to-Come. The Gemara asks: Who enumerated them? Rav Ashi says: The members of the Great Assembly enumerated them. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: They sought to enumerate one more, King Solomon, in the list of kings with no share in the World-to-Come. The image of the face of his father, King David, came and prostrated itself before them, pleading to omit Solomon from the list, and they paid it no heed. A fire came from Heaven and the fire scorched their benches [safseleihem], and they paid it no heed.

יצאה בת קול ואמרה להם (משלי כב, כט) חזית איש מהיר במלאכתו לפני מלכים יתיצב בל יתיצב לפני חשוכים מי שהקדים ביתי לביתו ולא עוד אלא שביתי בנה בשבע שנים וביתו בנה בשלש עשרה שנה לפני מלכים יתיצב [בל יתיצב] לפני חשוכים ולא השגיח עליה יצאה בת קול ואמרה (איוב לד, לג) המעמך ישלמנה כי מאסת כי אתה תבחר ולא אני וגו' A Divine Voice emerged and said to the members of the Great Assembly: “Do you see a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before kings; he shall stand not before obscure men” (Proverbs 22:29). See the greatness of Solomon, who preceded construction of My House, the Temple, to the construction of his house. Moreover, My House he built quickly, in just seven years, and his house he constructed in thirteen years. Therefore, “he shall stand before kings; he shall stand not before obscure men,” and it is inappropriate to enumerate him among the wicked. And they paid it no heed. A Divine Voice emerged and said: “Shall His recompense be as you will it? For you loathe it, so that you must choose, and not I? Therefore, speak what you know” (Job 34:33). Only God, and not the people, determines who has a share in the World-to-Come.

דורשי רשומות היו אומרים כולן באין לעולם הבא שנאמר (תהלים ס, ט) לי גלעד ולי מנשה ואפרים מעוז ראשי יהודה מחוקקי מואב סיר רחצי על אדום אשליך נעלי עלי פלשת התרועעי לי גלעד (ולי מנשה) זה אחאב שנפל ברמות גלעד מנשה כמשמעו אפרים מעוז ראשי זה ירבעם דקאתי מאפרים יהודה מחוקקי זה אחיתופל The Gemara adds: Those who interpret the Torah metaphorically would say: All of those enumerated who have no share ultimately enter the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Gilead is Mine, and Manasseh is Mine, and Ephraim also is the strength of My head; Judah is My scepter; Moab is My washing pot; over Edom I will cast My shoe; Philistia, cry aloud because of Me” (Psalms 60:9–10, and see 108:9–10). “Gilead is Mine and Manasseh is Mine”; this is referring to Ahab, who fell in Ramoth Gilead. “Manasseh”, in its plain meaning, is referring to King Manasseh. “Ephraim also is the strength of My head”; this is referring to Jeroboam, who comes from the tribe of Ephraim. “Judah is My scepter”; this is referring to Ahithophel,

Daf 105a

דקאתי מיהודה מואב סיר רחצי זה גחזי שלקה על עסקי רחיצה על אדום אשליך נעלי זה דואג האדומי עלי פלשת התרועעי אמרו מלאכי השרת לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע אם יבא דוד שהרג את הפלשתי והוריש את בניך גת מה אתה עושה לו אמר להן עלי לעשותן ריעים זה לזה who comes from the tribe of Judah. “Moab is My washing pot”; this is referring to Gehazi, who was afflicted with leprosy over matters of washing, as he took money from Naaman, who he instructed to immerse in the Jordan River. “Over Edom I will cast My shoe”; this is referring to Doeg the Edomite. “Philistia, cry aloud [hitroa’i] because of Me”; this is referring to the fact that the ministering angels said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, if David, who killed the Philistine and bequeathed the city of Gath to your sons, will come and complain that You gave a share in the World-to-Come to his enemies Doeg and Ahithophel, what will You do concerning him? Will you accept his complaint? God said to the ministering angels: It is upon me to render David and his enemies friends [re’im] with each other, and even David will agree.

(ירמיהו ח, ה) מדוע שובבה העם הזה ירושלים משובה נצחת וגו' אמר רב תשובה נצחת השיבה כנסת ישראל לנביא אמר להן נביא לישראל חזרו בתשובה אבותיכם שחטאו היכן הם אמרו להן ונביאיכם שלא חטאו היכן הם שנאמר (זכריה א, ה) אבותיכם איה הם והנביאים הלעולם יחיו אמר להן (אבותיכם) חזרו והודו שנאמר (זכריה א, ו) אך דברי וחוקי אשר צויתי את עבדי הנביאים וגו' § With regard to the verse: “Why is this people of Jerusalem slid back in perpetual backsliding?” (Jeremiah 8:5), Rav says: The congregation of Israel answered with a convincing response to the prophet. The prophet said to the Jewish people: Repent, as your ancestors sinned, and where are they? They said to the prophets: And your prophets who did not sin, where are they? They too died, as it is stated: “Your fathers, where are they, and the prophets; do they live forever?” (Zechariah 1:5). The prophet said to the Jewish people: Your ancestors reconsidered and conceded that the admonitions of the prophets were fulfilled, as it is stated: “By my words and My statutes, which I commanded My servants the prophets, did they not overtake your fathers? And they repented and said: As the Lord of hosts intended to do to us, according to our ways, and according to our doings, so has He dealt with us” (Zechariah 1:6).

שמואל אמר באו עשרה בני אדם וישבו לפניו אמר להן חזרו בתשובה אמרו לו עבד שמכרו רבו ואשה שגרשה בעלה כלום יש לזה על זה כלום אמר לו הקב"ה לנביא לך אמור להן (ישעיהו נ, א) איזה ספר כריתות אמכם אשר שלחתיה או מי מנושי אשר מכרתי אתכם לו הן בעונותיכם נמכרתם ובפשעכם שלחה אמכם Shmuel says that this was the convincing answer: Ten people came and sat before the prophet Ezekiel. He said to them: Repent. They said to Ezekiel: In the case of a slave sold by his owner to another master, or a woman divorced by her husband, does this person have any claim upon that person? Since God gave the Jewish people to other masters, the ties that existed between Him and us were severed. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the prophet: Go say to them: “Where is your mother’s scroll of severance, with which I sent her away? Or to which of My creditors have I sold you? For your iniquities you sold yourselves and for your transgressions was your mother sent away” (Isaiah 50:1). Learn from this that God did not sever His ties to the Jewish people.

והיינו דאמר ריש לקיש מאי דכתיב דוד עבדי (ירמיהו מג, י) נבוכדנצר עבדי גלוי וידוע לפני מי שאמר והיה העולם שעתידין ישראל לומר כך לפיכך הקדים הקב"ה וקראו עבדו עבד שקנה נכסים עבד למי נכסים למי And that is what Reish Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “David, My slave” (II Samuel 3:18), and: “Nebuchadnezzar, my slave” (Jeremiah 43:10)? How can the wicked Nebuchadnezzar be depicted as a slave of God in the same manner that David was depicted? Rather, it is revealed and known before the One Who spoke and the world came into being, that the Jewish people are destined to say that God sold them to the nations and they no longer have ties to Him. Therefore, the Holy One, Blessed be He, preemptively called Nebuchadnezzar His slave. With regard to the halakha concerning a slave who acquires property, the slave belongs to whom and the property belongs to whom? They both belong to the master, in this case, the Holy One, Blessed be He.

(יחזקאל כ, לב) והעולה על רוחכם היה לא תהיה אשר אתם אומרים נהיה כגוים כמשפחות הארצות לשרת עץ ואבן חי אני נאם ה' אלהים אם לא ביד חזקה ובזרוע נטויה ובחימה שפוכה אמלוך עליכם אמר רב נחמן כל כי האי ריתחא לירתח רחמנא עלן ולפרוקינן With regard to the verse: “And what comes into your mind shall never come to be, that you say: We will be like the nations, like the families of the countries, to serve wood and stone. As I live, says the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and an outstretched arm, and with wrath poured out, will I rule over you” (Ezekiel 20:32–33), Rav Naḥman says: Let the Merciful One become wrathful at us with all that wrath, and redeem us.

(ישעיהו כח, כו) ויסרו למשפט אלהיו יורנו אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר להן נביא לישראל חזרו בתשובה אמרו לו אין אנו יכולין יצר הרע שולט בנו אמר להם יסרו יצריכם אמרו לו אלהיו יורנו: With regard to the verse: “And chastise in judgment; his God will instruct him” (Isaiah 28:26), Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that the prophet said to the Jewish people: Repent. They said to him: We cannot, since the evil inclination dominates us. He said to them: Chastise your inclinations. They said to him: “His God will instruct him,” i.e., God should instruct the evil inclination to allow us to overcome him, as we are incapable of doing so on our own.

ארבעה הדיוטות בלעם ודואג ואחיתופל וגחזי: בלעם בלא עם דבר אחר בלעם שבלה עם בן בעור שבא על בעיר § The mishna teaches that four prominent commoners, Balaam, Doeg, Ahithophel, and Gehazi, have no share in the World-to-Come. The Gemara elaborates: The name Balaam is interpreted as a contraction of: Without a nation [belo am], or one who has no share in the World-to-Come with the Jewish nation. Alternatively, the name Balaam is interpreted as one who wore down the Jewish people [bila am]. He is the son of Beor, one who engaged in bestiality [be’ir].

תנא הוא בעור הוא כושן רשעתים הוא לבן הארמי בעור שבא על בעיר כושן רשעתים דעבד שתי רשעיות בישראל אחת בימי יעקב ואחת בימי שפוט השופטים ומה שמו לבן הארמי שמו It was taught in a baraita: He is Beor, father of Balaam, he is Cushan-Rishathaim, he is Laban the Aramean. He was called Beor because he engaged in bestiality. He was called Cushan-Rishathaim because he performed two evil deeds [rishiyyot] to the Jewish people, one during the time of Jacob, when he pursued him intending to kill him, and one during the time when the judges judged. And what was his actual name? His name was Laban the Aramean.

כתיב (במדבר כב, ה) בן בעור וכתיב (במדבר כד, ג) בנו בעור אמר רבי יוחנן אביו בנו הוא לו בנביאות It is written: “Son of Beor” (Numbers 22:5), and it is written elsewhere: “His son Beor” (Numbers 24:3). Rabbi Yoḥanan says in resolving the apparent contradiction: Balaam’s father was his son in terms of prophecy, as Balaam was a much greater prophet.

בלעם הוא דלא אתי לעלמא דאתי הא אחריני אתו מתניתין מני The Gemara infers from the mishna: Balaam is the one who does not come into the World-to-Come; but other gentiles come into the World-to-Come. Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna?

רבי יהושע היא דתניא ר"א אומר (תהלים ט, יח) ישובו רשעים לשאולה כל גוים שכחי אלהים ישובו רשעים לשאולה אלו פושעי ישראל כל גוים שכחי אלהים אלו פושעי עובדי כוכבים דברי ר"א אמר לו ר' יהושע וכי נאמר בכל גוים והלא לא נאמר אלא כל גוים שכחי אלהים אלא ישובו רשעים לשאולה מאן נינהו כל גוים שכחי אלהים It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is written: “The wicked shall be turned back to the netherworld, all that nations that forget God” (Psalms 9:18). “The wicked shall be turned back to the netherworld”; these are the sinners of the Jewish people, as only the sinners are sentenced to the netherworld. “All the gentiles that forget God”; these are the sinners of the gentiles. From the fact that it is written: “All the gentiles,” it is apparent that none of the gentiles have a share in the World-to-Come. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: But is it stated in the verse that the sinners of the Jewish people will be like all of the gentiles? It is stated only: “All the gentiles that forget God.” Rather, the wicked shall be turned back to the netherworld, and who are they? They are all the gentiles that forget God. Gentiles who fear God do have a share in the World-to-Come.

ואף אותו רשע נתן סימן בעצמו אמר (במדבר כג, י) תמות נפשי מות ישרים אם תמות נפשי מות ישרים תהא אחריתי כמוהו ואם לאו הנני הולך לעמי And that wicked person, Balaam, also provided a sign with regard to himself. He said: “Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my end be like his” (Numbers 23:10). If I die the death of the righteous, by natural causes, my end will be like his, i.e., I will receive a share in the World-to-Come like the Jewish people. And if I do not die by natural causes: “I will go to my people” (Numbers 24:14), i.e., my fate will be that of the rest of the wicked people in my generation, who have no share in the World-to-Come.

וילכו זקני מואב וזקני מדין תנא מדין ומואב לא היה להם שלום מעולם משל לשני כלבים שהיו בעדר והיו צהובין זה לזה בא זאב על האחד אמר האחד אם איני עוזרו היום הורג אותו ולמחר בא עלי הלכו שניהם והרגו הזאב אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי כרכושתא ושונרא עבדו הלולא מתרבא דביש גדא With regard to the verse: “And the elders of Moab and the elders of Midian set out with their divinations in their hands, and they came to Balaam” (Numbers 22:7), it was taught in a baraita: Midian and Moab had previously never had peace between them, and they were always at war with each other. What led them to make peace at that time? There is a parable of two dogs that were with the flock, and they were hostile to one another. A wolf came and attacked one. The other one said: If I do not help him, today he kills him and tomorrow he comes to attack me. They both went and killed the wolf. Moab and Midian joined together to face the potential common threat, the Jewish people. Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: A weasel [karkushta] and a cat made a wedding from the fat of the luckless. Despite their hatred of one another, they join together for their mutual benefit at the expense of a third party.

(במדבר כב, ח) וישבו שרי מואב עם בלעם ושרי מדין להיכן אזול כיון דאמר להו (במדבר כב, ח) לינו פה הלילה והשבותי אתכם דבר אמרו כלום יש אב ששונא את בנו It is written: “And the princes of Moab stayed with Balaam” (Numbers 22:8). The Gemara asks: And to where did the princes of Midian who accompanied the princes of Moab go? The Gemara answers: Once Balaam said to them: “Lodge here this night, and I will bring you word when the Lord speaks to me” (Numbers 22:8), the elders of Midian said: If he seeks permission from the Lord, he will not join us, as is there any father who hates his son? Certainly the Lord will help the Jewish people.

אמר רב נחמן חוצפא אפילו כלפי שמיא מהני מעיקרא כתיב לא תלך עמהם ולבסוף כתיב קום לך אתם אמר רב ששת חוצפא מלכותא בלא תאגא היא דכתיב (שמואל ב ג, לט) ואנכי היום רך ומשוח מלך והאנשים האלה בני צרויה קשים ממני וגו' Rav Naḥman says: Impudence is effective even toward Heaven. How so? Initially, it is written that God said to Balaam: “You shall not go with them” (Numbers 22:12), and ultimately after Balaam persisted and asked, it is written: “Rise up and go with them” (Numbers 22:20). Rav Sheshet says: Impudence is monarchy without a crown, as it is an assertion of leadership and lacks only the official coronation as king, as it is written: “And I am this day weak, though anointed king; and these men the sons of Zeruiah are too hard for me” (II Samuel 3:39). The sons of Zeruiah, due to their impudence, were as formidable as David himself.

א"ר יוחנן בלעם חיגר ברגלו אחת היה שנאמר (במדבר כג, ג) וילך שפי שמשון בשתי רגליו שנאמר (בראשית מט, יז) שפיפון עלי אורח הנושך עקבי סוס בלעם סומא באחת מעיניו היה שנאמר (במדבר כד, ג) שתום העין Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Balaam was disabled in one of his legs, as it is stated concerning him: “And he went limping [shefi]” (Numbers 23:3). Samson was disabled in both his legs, as it is stated with regard to Samson, who was from the tribe of Dan, in the prophetic blessing of Jacob: “Dan shall be a serpent by the way, an adder [shefifon] in the path that bites the horse’s heels” (Genesis 49:17). Rabbi Yoḥanan interprets shefifon as the plural of shefi, indicating disability in both legs. Balaam was blind in one of his eyes, as it is stated: “Whose eye is open” (Numbers 24:3), indicating that one eye was open and the other was blind.

קוסם באמתו היה כתיב הכא נופל וגלוי עינים וכתיב התם (אסתר ז, ח) והנה המן נופל על המטה וגו' איתמר מר זוטרא אמר קוסם באמתו היה מר בריה דרבינא אמר שבא על אתונו מ"ד קוסם באמתו היה כדאמרן ומ"ד בא על אתונו היה כתיב הכא (במדבר כד, ט) כרע שכב וכתיב התם (שופטים ה, כז) בין רגליה The Gemara relates: Balaam was a diviner by using his penis. It is written here: “Fallen, yet with opened eyes” (Numbers 24:4), and it is written there: “And Haman was fallen upon the divan whereupon Esther was” (Esther 7:8), indicating that the verb fallen has sexual connotations. It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to this matter. Mar Zutra says: Balaam was a diviner by using his penis. Mar, son of Ravina, says: He engaged in bestiality with his donkey. The one who says that he was a diviner by using his penis derives it as we stated. And the one who says that he engaged in bestiality with his donkey derives it as follows: It is written here: “He crouched, he lay down” (Numbers 24:9), and it is written there: “Between her legs

Daf 105b

כרע נפל שכב וגו' he sunk, he fell, he lay” (Judges 5:27), which is interpreted as a reference to sexual intercourse between Sisera and Jael.

(במדבר כד, טז) ויודע דעת עליון השתא דעת בהמתו לא הוה ידע דעת עליון הוה ידע מאי דעת בהמתו דאמרי ליה מאי טעמא לא רכבת סוסיא אמר להו שדאי להו ברטיבא § Balaam describes himself: “And he knows the knowledge of the Most High” (Numbers 24:16), and the Gemara asks: Now, if the knowledge of his animal he did not know, is it possible that the knowledge of the Most High he knew? The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the knowledge of his animal? The princes accompanying him said to him: What is the reason that you did not ride horses? Balaam said to them: I brought the horses to graze in the pasture and rest there.

אמרה ליה הלא אנכי אתונך לטעינא בעלמא אשר רכבת עלי אקראי בעלמא מעודך עד היום הזה The donkey said to him: “Am I not your donkey” (Numbers 22:30)? Balaam said to the donkey: Merely for burdens, not for riding. The donkey said to him: “Upon which you have ridden” (Numbers 22:30). Balaam said to the donkey: That was mere happenstance and is not a regular occurrence. The donkey said to him: “Your whole life until this day” (Numbers 22:30).

ולא עוד אלא שאני עושה [לך] מעשה אישות בלילה כתיב הכא (במדבר כב, ל) ההסכן הסכנתי וכתיב התם (מלכים א א, ב) ותהי לו סוכנת The donkey continued: Moreover, I perform a conjugal act for you and we engage in bestiality at night. From where is this derived? It is written here: “Was I ever wont [hahasken hiskanti] to do so to you” (Numbers 22:30)? And it is written there with regard to Abishag the Shunammite: “And let her be a companion [sokhenet] to him” (I Kings 1:2). Just as the root samekh, kaf, nun indicates sexual relations in the case of Abishag, the same is true with regard to the donkey. Balaam was unable to best his donkey in a debate.

אלא מאי ויודע דעת עליון שהיה יודע לכוון אותה שעה שהקב"ה כועס בה The Gemara asks: Rather, what, then, is the meaning of the phrase “And he knows knowledge of the Most High”? Is it possible that he knew the knowledge of the Most High? Rather, he would know to determine the moment during which the Holy One, Blessed be He, is angry. He would curse at that moment and the curse was effective.

והיינו דקאמר להו נביא לישראל (מיכה ו, ה) עמי זכר נא מה יעץ בלק מלך מואב ומה ענה אותו בלעם בן בעור מן השטים ועד הגלגל למען דעת צדקות ה' מאי למען דעת צדקות ה' אמר להן הקב"ה לישראל דעו נא כמה צדקות עשיתי עמכם שלא כעסתי כל אותן הימים בימי בלעם הרשע שאילמלא כעסתי כל אותן הימים לא נשתייר משונאיהן של ישראל שריד ופליט And that is what the prophet said to Israel: “My nation, remember what Balak, king of Moab, advised, and how Balaam, son of Beor, responded; from Shittim to Gilgal, so that you may know the righteous acts of the Lord” (Micah 6:5). What is the meaning of the phrase “So that you may know the righteous acts of the Lord”? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Israel: Know how many acts of kindness I performed on your behalf, that I did not become angry during all the days of Balaam the wicked, as had I become angry during all those days, no remnant or refugee would have remained among the enemies of Israel, a euphemism for Israel itself. Instead, God restrained His anger and Balaam’s curse went unfulfilled.

היינו דקאמר ליה בלעם לבלק מה אקב לא קבה אל (וגו' אותן היום [הימים] לא זעם ה') אל זועם בכל יום וכמה זעמו רגע שנאמר (תהלים ל, ו) כי רגע באפו חיים ברצונו וגו' That is what Balaam said to Balak: “How can I curse, whom God has not cursed? And how can I condemn, whom God has not condemned?” (Numbers 23:8). Since God did not become angry, Balaam was unable to curse the Jewish people. It is written: “And God is angry every day” (Psalms 7:12). And how long is the duration of His wrath? It is one moment, as it is stated: “For His anger endures but a moment; His favor is for a lifetime” (Psalms 30:6).

איבעית אימא (ישעיהו כו, כ) לך עמי בא בחדריך וסגור דלתיך בעדך חבי כמעט רגע עד יעבור זעם אימת רתח בתלת שעי קמייתא כי חוורא כרבלתא דתרנגולא כל שעתא ושעתא נמי חוורא כל שעתא ושעתא אית ביה סוריקי סומקי ההיא שעתא לית ביה סוריקי סומקי If you wish, say instead this proof from another source, as it is stated: “Come, my people, enter you into your chambers, and shut your doors about you; hide yourself for a brief moment, until the anger passes” (Isaiah 26:20), meaning that God’s anger passes in a mere moment. And when is the Holy One, Blessed be He, angry? It is during the first three hours of the day, when the crest of the rooster is white from the sun. The Gemara challenges: Each and every hour of the day the rooster’s crest is also white, as it does not always remain red. The Gemara explains: The difference is that during each and every other hour when the rooster stands that way, there are red streaks in his crest. But at that moment when God is angry, there are no red streaks in the rooster’s crest.

ההוא מינא דהוה בשיבבותיה דרבי יהושע בן לוי דהוה קא מצער ליה יומא חד נקט תרנגולתא ואסר ליה בכרעיה ואותיב אמר כי מטא ההוא שעתא אילטייה כי מטא ההוא שעתא נמנם אמר שמע מינה לאו אורח ארעא דכתיב (משלי יז, כו) גם ענוש לצדיק לא טוב אפילו במיני לא איבעי ליה למימר הכי The Gemara relates: There was a certain heretic who was in Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s neighborhood who would upset him by incessantly challenging the legitimacy of biblical verses. One day, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi took a rooster and tied it by its legs and sat and waited. He said: When that moment of God’s wrath arrives, I will curse him. When that moment of God’s wrath arrived, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi dozed off. When he awakened, he said: Conclude from the fact that I dozed off that it is not proper conduct to curse even the wicked, as it is written: “Punishment, even for the righteous, is not good” (Proverbs 17:26). Even with regard to heretics, a righteous person should not state a curse in order to punish them.

תנא משמיה דרבי מאיר בשעה שהחמה זורחת והמלכים מניחין כתריהן על ראשיהן ומשתחוים לחמה מיד כועס Explaining the cause of God’s anger, it was taught in a baraita in the name of Rabbi Meir: When the sun rises and the kings place their crowns on their heads and bow down to the sun, the Holy One, Blessed be He, immediately grows angry. Since this occurs in the early hours of every day, God becomes angry at His world at that time every day.

(במדבר כב, כא) ויקם בלעם בבקר ויחבוש את אתונו תנא משום רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אהבה מבטלת שורה של גדולה מאברהם דכתיב (בראשית כא, יד) וישכם אברהם בבקר שנאה מבטלת שורה של גדולה מבלעם שנאמר ויקם בלעם בבקר ויחבוש את אתונו § It is stated: “And Balaam rose in the morning and saddled his donkey” (Numbers 22:21). It was taught in a baraita in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: Love negates the standard conduct of those of prominence. This is derived from Abraham, as it is written: “And Abraham rose early in the morning and saddled his donkey” (Genesis 22:3). Atypically, he saddled the donkey himself and he did not wait for his servants. Likewise, hatred negates the standard conduct of those of prominence. This is derived from Balaam, as it is stated: “And Balaam rose early in the morning and saddled his donkey” (Numbers 22:21).

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצוה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה שבשכר ארבעים ושתים קרבנות שהקריב בלק זכה ויצאה ממנו רות א"ר יוסי בר הונא רות בתו של עגלון בן בנו של בלק מלך מואב היתה Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A person should always engage in Torah study and performance of a mitzva even if he does not do so for their own sake, as through engaging in them not for their own sake, he will ultimately come to engage in them for their own sake. Proof for this can be cited from the example of Balak, as in reward for the forty-two offerings that Balak sacrificed, even though he sacrificed them to facilitate the destruction of the Jewish people, he was privileged and Ruth descended from him. Rabbi Yosei bar Huna says: Ruth was the daughter of Eglon, son of the son of Balak, king of Moab.

א"ל רבא לרבה בר מרי כתיב (מלכים א א, מז) ייטב אלהים את שם שלמה משמך ויגדל [את] כסאו מכסאך אורח ארעא למימרא ליה למלכא הכי א"ל מעין קאמרה ליה Apropos Ruth, matriarch of the Davidic line, the Gemara cites that which Rava said to Rabba bar Mari: It is written that the servants of David said to David: “May God make the name of Solomon better than your name and make his throne greater than your throne [mikisekha]” (I Kings 1:47). Rava asks: Is it proper conduct to speak to a king in that manner and say that his son will be greater than he is? Rabba bar Mari said to Rava: She said to him: May the throne of Solomon be of the nature of your throne.

דאי לא תימא הכי (שופטים ה, כד) תבורך מנשים יעל אשת חבר הקיני מנשים באהל תבורך נשים באהל מאן נינהו שרה רבקה רחל ולאה אורח ארעא למימר הכי אלא מעין קאמר הכא נמי מעין קאמר He explains: As if you do not say so and do not explain it in this manner, then the verse: “Blessed above women Jael, wife of Heber the Kenite; blessed is she more than the women [minashim] in the tent” (Judges 5:24), is difficult. “The women in the tent,” who are they? They are Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah. Is it proper conduct to speak in that manner about the Matriarchs? Rather, of the nature of the Matriarchs is what the verse says, not greater. So too in the case of David’s servants: Of the nature of his throne, is what the verse says.

ופליגא דרב יוסי בר חוני דאמר רב יוסי בר חוני בכל אדם מתקנא חוץ מבנו ותלמידו בנו משלמה ותלמידו איבעית אימא (מלכים ב ב, ט) ויהי נא פי שנים ברוחך אלי ואיבעית אימא (במדבר כז, כג) ויסמוך את ידיו עליו ויצוהו The Gemara notes: This explanation disagrees with the opinion of Rav Yosei bar Ḥoni, as Rav Yosei bar Ḥoni says: A person is jealous of everyone except for his son and his student. Since their success reflects well upon him, he celebrates their success. The fact that one is not jealous of his son is derived from King David’s servants telling him: May Solomon be greater than he is. And the fact that one is not jealous of his student; if you wish, say that it is derived from that which Elisha said to Elijah: “I pray you that a double portion of your spirit be upon me” (II Kings 2:9). He asked of his mentor to be greater than him, indicating that it is not an objectionable matter. And if you wish, say instead that it is derived from Moses: “And he laid his hands upon him and commanded him” (Numbers 27:23). God commanded Moses to lay only one hand upon Joshua, and instead he laid both hands upon him with all his strength.

(במדבר כג, ה) וישם דבר בפי בלעם ר"א אומר מלאך ר' יונתן אמר חכה § With regard to the verse: “And the Lord placed a matter in Balaam’s mouth” (Numbers 23:5), Rabbi Elazar says: It was an angel that spoke from his mouth. Rabbi Yonatan says: It was a hook placed in his mouth to prevent him from saying anything else.

א"ר יוחנן מברכתו של אותו רשע אתה למד מה היה בלבו ביקש לומר שלא יהו להם בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות (במדבר כד, ה) מה טובו אהליך יעקב לא תשרה שכינה עליהם ומשכנותיך ישראל לא תהא מלכותן נמשכת כנחלים נטיו לא יהא להם זיתים וכרמים כגנות עלי נהר לא יהא ריחן נודף כאהלים נטע ה' Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From the blessing of that wicked person, Balaam, you can ascertain what was in his heart. God transformed the curses that he planned into blessings. He sought to say that they should not have synagogues and study halls, and he said instead: “How goodly are your tents, Jacob” (Numbers 24:5), a blessing on their synagogues. He sought to say that the Divine Presence [shekhina] will not rest upon them, and he said instead: “And your dwellings [mishkenot] Israel.” He sought to say that the kingdom of Israel would not continue, and he said instead that it would continue: “Like the winding brooks” (Numbers 24:6), which flow continuously. He sought to say that they would have no olive trees and vineyards, and he said instead: “Like gardens by the river’s side” (Numbers 24:6). He sought to say that their fragrance would not diffuse from their fulfillment of mitzvot, and he said instead: “Like aloes that the Lord has planted” (Numbers 24:6).

לא יהיו להם מלכים בעלי קומה כארזים עלי מים לא יהיה להם מלך בן מלך יזל מים מדליו לא תהא מלכותן שולטת באומות וזרעו במים רבים לא תהא עזה מלכותן וירם מאגג מלכו לא תהא אימת מלכותן ותנשא מלכותו He sought to say that they would not have kings of stature, and he said instead: “Like cedar trees beside the waters” (Numbers 24:6). He sought to say that they will not have a king the son of a king, and he said instead: “Water shall flow from his branches” (Numbers 24:7). He sought to say that their kingdom would not rule over the nations, and he said instead: “And his seed shall be in many waters” (Numbers 24:7). He sought to say that their kingdom would not be fierce, and he said instead: “And his king shall be higher than Agag.” He sought to say that there will be no fear of their kingdom, and he said instead: “And his kingdom shall be exalted” (Numbers 24:7).

אמר רבי אבא בר כהנא כולם חזרו לקללה חוץ מבתי כנסיות ומבתי מדרשות שנאמר (דברים כג, ו) ויהפוך ה' אלהיך לך את הקללה לברכה כי אהבך ה' אלהיך קללה ולא קללות Rabbi Abba bar Kahana says: All of the blessings ultimately reverted to be fulfilled as the curse that he originally intended, as all of those circumstances befell the Jewish people, except for the destruction of synagogues and study halls, as it is stated: “And the Lord your God transformed the curse into a blessing for you, because the Lord your God loved you” (Deuteronomy 23:6). A curse in the singular, not curses in the plural, was transformed permanently.

א"ר שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן מאי דכתיב (משלי כז, ו) נאמנים פצעי אוהב ונעתרות נשיקות שונא טובה קללה שקילל אחיה השילוני את ישראל יותר מברכה שברכם בלעם הרשע אחיה השילוני קילל את ישראל בקנה שנאמר (מלכים א יד, טו) והכה ה' את ישראל כאשר ינוד הקנה במים וגו' מה קנה זה עומד במקום מים וגיזעו Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Faithful are the wounds of a friend; but the kisses of an enemy are importunate” (Proverbs 27:6)? Better is the curse that Ahijah the Shilonite cursed the Jewish people than the blessing that Balaam the wicked blessed them. Ahijah the Shilonite cursed Israel with a reed, as it is stated: “For the Lord shall smite Israel as a reed is shaken in water” (I Kings 14:15). There is an aspect of blessing in that curse, as he was saying they will be just like a reed that stands in a place near water, as the water sustains it, and its stalk

Daf 106a

מחליף ושרשיו מרובין ואפילו כל רוחות שבעולם באות ונושבות בו אין מזיזות אותו ממקומו אלא הוא הולך ובא עמהן כיון שדוממו הרוחות עמד קנה במקומו replenishes itself, as if it is cut another grows, and its roots are numerous. And even if all the winds that are in the world come and gust against it, they do not move it from its place and uproot it. Rather, it goes and comes with the winds. And once the winds subside the reed remains in its place.

אבל בלעם הרשע ברכן בארז מה ארז זה אינו עומד במקום מים ושרשיו מועטין ואין גזעו מחליף אפילו כל הרוחות שבעולם באות ונושבות בו אין מזיזות אותו ממקומו כיון שנשבה בו רוח דרומית מיד עוקרתו והופכתו על פניו ולא עוד אלא שזכה קנה ליטול ממנו קולמוס לכתוב ממנו ס"ת נביאים וכתובים But Balaam the wicked blessed them with a cedar. There is an aspect of curse in that blessing, as he was saying they will be just like a cedar that does not stand in a place near water, and its roots are few relative to its height, and its trunk does not replenish itself, as if it is cut it does not grow back. And even if all the winds that are in the world come and gust against it, they do not move it from its place and uproot it; but once a southern wind gusts it immediately uproots the cedar and overturns it on its face. Moreover, it is the reed that was privileged to have a quill [kulmos] taken from it to write scrolls of Torah, Prophets, and Writings. Therefore, the curse of Ahijah is better than the blessing of Balaam.

(במדבר כד, כא) וירא את הקיני וישא משלו אמר לו בלעם ליתרו קיני לא היית עמנו באותה עצה מי הושיבך אצל איתני עולם § It is stated with regard to Balaam: “And he looked at the Kenite and he took up his parable and said: Though firm is your dwelling place, and though your nest be set in rock” (Numbers 24:21). Balaam said to Yitro: Kenite, were you not in Egypt with us in that counsel to drown the newborn males of Israel? Who placed you alongside the mighty of the world?

והיינו דא"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר סימאי שלשה היו באותה עצה אלו הן בלעם איוב ויתרו בלעם שיעץ נהרג איוב ששתק נידון ביסורין ויתרו שברח זכו בני בניו לישב בלשכת הגזית שנאמר (דברי הימים א ב, נה) ומשפחות סופרים יושבי יעבץ תרעתים שמעתים סוכתים המה הקינים הבאים מחמת אבי בית רכב וכתיב (שופטים א, טז) ובני קיני חותן משה עלו מעיר התמרים The Gemara comments: And that is what Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Simai says: Three were associates in that counsel, and they are: Balaam, Job, and Yitro. Balaam, who advised to drown the newborn males, was killed. Job, who was silent and was reluctant to express his opinion, was sentenced to suffer afflictions. And Yitro, who fled after he disagreed with that counsel and Pharaoh sought to kill him, his descendants were privileged to sit as scribes in session with the Sanhedrin in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, as it is stated: “And the families of the scribes who dwelt in Jabez; the Tirathites, the Shimeathites, the Sucathites. These were the Kenites who came of Hammath the father of the house of Rechab” (I Chronicles 2:55). And it is written there with regard to the identity of the Kenites: “And the children of the Kenite, Moses’ father-in-law, went up from the city of the palm trees” (Judges 1:16).

(במדבר כד, כג) וישא משלו ויאמר אוי מי יחיה משמו אל (אמר רשב"ל אוי מי שמחיה עצמו בשם אל) א"ר יוחנן אוי לה לאומה שתמצא בשעה שהקב"ה עושה פדיון לבניו מי מטיל כסותו בין לביא ללביאה בשעה שנזקקין זה עם זה With regard to the verse: “And he took up his parable, and said: Alas, he who lives from what God has appointed him” (Numbers 24:23), Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Woe unto one who sustains himself in an indulgent manner in the name of God, i.e., Balaam, whose livelihood was from speaking in the name of God. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Woe unto the nation that will be found hindering the Jewish people at the time when the Holy One, Blessed be He, redeems His children. Who places his garment between a male lion and a female lion when they are mating? One who does so will certainly die.

(במדבר כד, כד) וצים מיד כתים אמר רב ליבון אספיר (במדבר כד, כד) וענו אשור וענו עבר עד אשור קטלי מיקטל מכאן ואילך משעבדי שיעבודי With regard to the verse: “And ships come from the coast of Kittim” (Numbers 24:24), Rav says: This is the Roman legion [libbun aspir] that will attack Assyria. “And they shall afflict Assyria, and they shall afflict Eber” (Numbers 24:24). Before they reach Assyria they will kill the Jewish people; from that point forward they will enslave them and not kill them.

(במדבר כד, יד) הנני הולך לעמי לכה איעצך אשר יעשה העם הזה לעמך עמך לעם הזה מיבעי ליה א"ר אבא בר כהנא כאדם שמקלל את עצמו ותולה קללתו באחרים § Balaam said to Balak: “Behold, I go to my people; come therefore, and I shall advise you what this people shall do to your people” (Numbers 24:14). Ostensibly, he should have said: What your people shall do to this people. Rabbi Abba bar Kahana says: Balaam spoke like a person who curses himself but does not wish to utter so awful a matter and instead ascribes his curse to take effect on others.

אמר להם אלהיהם של אלו שונא זימה הוא והם מתאוים לכלי פשתן בוא ואשיאך עצה עשה להן קלעים והושיב בהן זונות זקינה מבחוץ וילדה מבפנים וימכרו להן כלי פשתן Balaam said to them: The God of these Jewish people despises lewdness, and they desire linen garments, as they have no new garments; come, and I will give you advice. Make for them enclosures using wall hangings and seat prostitutes in them, with an old woman outside the enclosure and a young woman inside, and have the women sell them linen garments.

עשה להן קלעים מהר שלג עד בית הישימות והושיב בהן זונות זקינה מבחוץ וילדה מבפנים ובשעה שישראל אוכלין ושותין ושמחין ויוצאין לטייל בשוק אומרת לו הזקינה אי אתה מבקש כלי פשתן זקינה אומרת לו בשוה וילדה אומרת לו בפחות שתים ושלש פעמים Balak made for them enclosures using wall hangings from the snow mountain, the Ḥermon, until Beit HaYeshimot, and he sat prostitutes in them, with an old woman outside and a young woman on the inside. And at the time when Jewish people were eating and drinking and were glad and going out to stroll in the marketplace, the old woman would say to a Jew: Aren’t you seeking linen garments? He would enter the enclosure and ask the price, the old woman would quote him a price equal to its value, and the young woman would quote him a price less than its value. That scenario would repeat itself two or three times.

ואח"כ אומרת לו הרי את כבן בית שב ברור לעצמך וצרצורי של יין עמוני מונח אצלה ועדיין לא נאסר (יין של עמוני ולא) יין של נכרים אמרה לו רצונך שתשתה כוס של יין כיון ששתה בער בו And thereafter she would say to him: You are like a member of our household, sit and choose for yourself the merchandise that you want. And a jug of Ammonite wine was placed near her, and neither Ammonite wine nor gentile wine had been prohibited yet for Jews. She said to him: Is it your wish to drink a cup of wine? Once he drank the wine, his evil inclination burned within him.

אמר לה השמיעי לי הוציאה יראתה מתוך חיקה אמרה לו עבוד לזה אמר לה הלא יהודי אני אמרה לו ומה איכפת לך כלום מבקשים ממך אלא פיעור [והוא אינו יודע שעבודתה בכך] ולא עוד אלא שאיני מנחתך עד שתכפור בתורת משה רבך שנא' (הושע ט, י) המה באו בעל פעור וינזרו לבשת ויהיו שקוצים באהבם He then said to her: Submit to me and engage in intercourse with me. She then removed the idol that she worshipped from her lap and said to him: Worship this. He said to her: Am I not Jewish? I am therefore forbidden from engaging in idol worship. She said to him: And what is your concern? We are asking you to do nothing more than defecate in its presence. But he does not know that its worship is conducted in that manner. Once he did so, she said to him: Moreover, I will not leave you until you deny the Torah of Moses your teacher, as it is stated: “But when they came to Ba’al-Peor they separated themselves to the shameful item; and they became detestable like that which they loved” (Hosea 9:10). They devoted themselves to the disgrace of defecation, and detested the name of God.

(במדבר כה, א) וישב ישראל בשטים ר"א אומר שטים שמה רבי יהושע אומר שנתעסקו בדברי שטות With regard to the verse: “And Israel dwelt in Shittim” (Numbers 25:1), Rabbi Eliezer says: Shittim is the name of the place. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is an allusion to the fact that they were engaged in matters of nonsense [shetut], i.e., prostitution and idol worship.

ותקראן לעם לזבחי אלהיהן רבי אלעזר אומר ערומות פגעו בהן רבי יהושע אומר שנעשו כולן בעלי קריין With regard to the verse: “And they called [vatikrena] the people to the offerings of their gods” (Numbers 25:2), Rabbi Eliezer says: Naked women encountered them. Rabbi Yehoshua says: They all became those who experienced a seminal emission [kerayin] resulting from the lust that they experienced.

מאי לשון רפידים רבי אליעזר אומר רפידים שמה רבי יהושע אומר שריפו עצמן מדברי תורה שנאמר (ירמיהו מז, ג) לא הפנו אבות אל בנים מרפיון ידים Apropos the homiletic interpretation of the names of places, the Gemara asks: What is the connotation of the term Rephidim (see Exodus 19:2)? Rabbi Eliezer says: Rephidim is the name of the place. Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is an allusion to the fact that they enfeebled [rippu] themselves with regard to engaging in matters of Torah, as it is stated: “The fathers do not look back to their children from feebleness [rifyon] of hands” (Jeremiah 47:3). There too, the connotation of the name is dereliction in the study of Torah.

אמר רבי יוחנן כל מקום שנאמר וישב אינו אלא לשון צער שנא' (במדבר כה, א) וישב ישראל בשטים ויחל העם לזנות אל בנות מואב (בראשית לז, א) וישב יעקב בארץ מגורי אביו בארץ כנען ויבא יוסף את דבתם רעה אל אביהם ונאמר (בראשית מז, כז) וישב ישראל בארץ גשן ויקרבו ימי ישראל למות (מלכים א ה, ה) וישב יהודה וישראל לבטח איש תחת גפנו ותחת תאנתו (מלכים א יא, יד) ויקם ה' שטן לשלמה את הדד האדומי מזרע המלך הוא באדום Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everywhere that it is stated: And he dwelt, it is nothing other than an expression of pain, of an impending calamity, as it is stated: “And Israel dwelt in Shittim, and the people began to commit harlotry with the daughters of Moab” (Numbers 25:1). It is stated: “And Jacob dwelt in the land where his father had sojourned in the land of Canaan” (Genesis 37:1), and it is stated thereafter: “And Joseph brought evil report of them to his father” (Genesis 37:2), which led to the sale of Joseph. And it is stated: “And Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt in the land of Goshen” (Genesis 47:27), and it is stated thereafter: “And the time drew near that Israel was to die” (Genesis 47:29). It is stated: “And Judah and Israel dwelt safely, every man under his vine and under his fig tree” (I Kings 5:5), and it is stated thereafter: “And the Lord raised up an adversary to Solomon, Hadad the Edomite; he was of the king’s seed in Edom” (I Kings 11:14).

(במדבר לא, ח) ואת מלכי מדין הרגו על חלליהם וגו' את בלעם בן בעור הרגו בחרב בלעם מאי בעי התם א"ר יוחנן שהלך ליטול שכר עשרים וארבעה אלף [שהפיל מישראל] אמר מר זוטרא בר טוביה אמר רב היינו דאמרי אינשי גמלא אזלא למיבעי קרני אודני דהוו ליה גזיזן מיניה § With regard to Balaam, it is stated: “And they slew the kings of Midian, with the rest of their slain…And Balaam, son of Beor, they slew with the sword” (Numbers 31:8). The Gemara asks: Balaam, what did he seek there; what was his role in that war? He lived in Aram. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He went to collect payment for twenty-four thousand members of the Jewish people, whom he felled with his advice. Mar Zutra bar Toviya says that Rav says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: A camel goes to seek horns and the ears that it had are severed from it. Not only was Balaam unsuccessful in collecting his fee, he also lost his life.

(יהושע יג, כב) ואת בלעם בן בעור הקוסם קוסם נביא הוא א"ר יוחנן בתחלה נביא ולבסוף קוסם אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי מסגני ושילטי הואי אייזן לגברי נגרי It is stated: “And Balaam, son of Beor, the diviner, did the children of Israel slay with the sword among the rest of their slain” (Joshua 13:22). The Gemara asks: Was he a diviner? He is a prophet. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Initially he was a prophet, but ultimately, he lost his capacity for prophecy and remained merely a diviner. Rav Pappa says that this is in accordance with the adage that people say: This woman was descended from princes and rulers, and was licentious with carpenters.

Daf 106b

(יהושע יג, כב) הרגו בני ישראל [בחרב] אל חלליהם אמר רב שקיימו בו ארבע מיתות סקילה ושריפה הרג וחנק With regard to the latter part of the verse: “And Balaam, son of Beor, the diviner, did the children of Israel slay with the sword among the rest of their slain” (Joshua 13:22), Rav says: It means that they accomplished in him all four means of court-imposed executions: Stoning, and burning, beheading, and strangulation.

א"ל ההוא מינא לר' חנינא מי שמיע לך בלעם בר כמה הוה א"ל מיכתב לא כתיב אלא מדכתיב (תהלים נה, כד) אנשי דמים ומרמה לא יחצו ימיהם בר תלתין ותלת שנין או בר תלתין וארבע א"ל שפיר קאמרת לדידי חזי לי פנקסיה דבלעם והוה כתיב ביה בר תלתין ותלת שנין בלעם חגירא כד קטיל יתיה פנחס ליסטאה A certain heretic said to Rabbi Ḥanina: Have you heard how old Balaam was when he died? Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: It is not written explicitly in the Torah. But from the fact that it is written: “Bloody and deceitful men shall not live half their days” (Psalms 55:24), this indicates that he was thirty-two or thirty-four years old, less than half the standard seventy-year lifespan. The heretic said to him: You have spoken well, I myself saw the notebook of Balaam and it was written therein: Balaam the lame was thirty-two years old when Pinehas the highwayman killed him.

א"ל מר בריה דרבינא לבריה בכולהו לא תפיש למדרש לבר מבלעם הרשע דכמה דמשכחת ביה דרוש ביה Mar, son of Ravina, said to his son: With regard to all of those enumerated as not having a share in the World-to-Come, do not extensively interpret verses homiletically in order to denigrate them, except with regard to Balaam the wicked, as any negative element that you discover in his regard, continue to interpret homiletically concerning him, as it is appropriate to attribute wickedness to one so wicked.

כתיב דואג וכתיב דוייג אמר ר' יוחנן בתחילה יושב הקב"ה ודואג שמא יצא זה לתרבות רעה לאחר שיצא אמר ווי שיצא זה § It is written in one verse: “Doeg the Edomite” (I Samuel 22:9), and it is written in another verse: “And the king said to Doyeig” (I Samuel 22:18). Rabbi Yoḥanan says in explaining the discrepancy: Initially, the Holy One, Blessed be He, sat and was concerned [doeg] that perhaps this person would emerge to undertake an evil path. After he emerged on that path, God said: Alas [vai], that person has emerged to undertake an evil path.

(סימן גבור ורשע וצדיק חיל וסופר) The Gemara cites a mnemonic for the statements of Rabbi Yitzḥak that follow: Mighty, wicked, and righteous, riches, and counter.

א"ר יצחק מאי דכתיב (תהלים נב, ג) מה תתהלל ברעה הגבור חסד אל כל היום אמר לו הקב"ה לדואג לא גבור בתורה אתה מה תתהלל ברעה לא חסד אל נטוי עליך כל היום Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Why boast of your evil mighty one? The mercy of God endures continually” (Psalms 52:3)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Doeg: Aren’t you mighty in Torah? Why do you boast of evil? Isn’t God’s mercy extended over you continually when you engage in His Torah?

וא"ר יצחק מאי דכתיב (תהלים נ, טז) ולרשע אמר אלהים מה לך לספר חוקי אמר לו הקב"ה לדואג הרשע מה לך לספר חוקי כשאתה מגיע לפרשת מרצחים ופרשת מספרי לשון הרע מה אתה דורש בהם (תהלים נ, טז) ותשא בריתי עלי פיך אמר ר' אמי אין תורתו של דואג אלא משפה ולחוץ And Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “But to the wicked, God says: What have you to do to declare My statutes, and that you have taken My covenant in your mouth” (Psalms 50:16)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Doeg the wicked: Why do you speak of My statutes and My Torah? When you reach the Torah portion of murderers and the Torah portion of slanderers, how do you teach them? You have violated both. With regard to the end of that verse: “And that you have taken My covenant in your mouth” (Psalms 50:16), Rabbi Ami says: Doeg’s Torah is only insincere lip service, as it is in his mouth but not in his heart. He does not have a profound understanding of the Torah and does not commit himself to the performance of its mitzvot.

ואמר רבי יצחק מאי דכתיב (תהלים נב, ח) ויראו צדיקים וייראו ועליו ישחקו בתחילה ייראו ולבסוף ישחקו And Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And the righteous shall see, and fear, and shall laugh at him” (Psalms 52:8)? Initially, they will fear Doeg due to his success, and ultimately they will laugh when they witness his downfall.

וא"ר יצחק מאי דכתיב (איוב כ, טו) חיל בלע ויקיאנו מבטנו יורישנו אל אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע ימות דואג אמר לו חיל בלע ויקיאנו אמר לפניו מבטנו יורישנו אל And Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “He has swallowed riches and he shall vomit them again; God shall cast them out of his belly” (Job 20:15)? David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, Doeg shall die. God said to him: “He has swallowed riches and he shall vomit them again.” He is filled with Torah and wisdom; wait until he forgets what he has learned. David said before Him: “God shall cast them out of his belly.” God can remove his Torah knowledge from him before he will forget it on his own.

וא"ר יצחק מאי דכתיב (תהלים נב, ז) גם אל יתצך לנצח אמר הקב"ה לדוד ניתי דואג לעלמא דאתי אמר לפניו גם אל יתצך לנצח מאי דכתיב (תהלים נב, ז) יחתך ויסחך מאהל ושרשך מארץ חיים סלה אמר הקב"ה לימרו שמעתא בי מדרשא משמיה אמר לפניו יחתך ויסחך מאהל ליהוי ליה בנין רבנן ושרשך מארץ חיים סלה And Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “God shall likewise destroy you forever” (Psalms 52:7)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to David: Let Doeg enter the World-to-Come. David said before Him: “God shall likewise destroy you forever,” i.e., let Doeg not have eternal life. What is the meaning of that which is written: “He shall pluck you away, and pluck you from your tent, and root you out from the land of the living. Selah” (Psalms 52:7)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to David: At least let them state a halakha in the study hall in his name. David said before Him: “He shall pluck you away, and pluck you from your tent,” i.e., let him be completely removed from the tents of Torah. God said to him: Let him have sons who are Sages. David said: “And root you out from the land of the living. Selah,” i.e., let Doeg be entirely uprooted.

וא"ר יצחק מאי דכתיב (ישעיהו לג, יח) איה סופר איה שוקל איה סופר את המגדלים איה סופר כל אותיות שבתורה איה שוקל ששוקל כל קלים וחמורים שבתורה איה סופר את המגדלים שהיה סופר שלש מאות הלכות פסוקות במגדל הפורח באויר And Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Where is he that counts; where is he that weighs; where is he that counts the towers [migdalim]” (Isaiah 33:18)? Where is he that counts all the letters of the Torah? Where is he that weighs, who considers all the elements of a fortiori inferences in the Torah? Where is he who counts the towers? This is Doeg, who would count three hundred halakhic conclusions with regard to the purity of a cupboard [migdal] that floats in the air [avir].

א"ר ארבע מאה בעיי' בעו דואג ואחיתופל במגדל הפורח באויר [ולא איפשט להו חד] אמר רבא רבותא למבעי בעיי בשני דרב יהודה כולי תנויי בנזיקין ואנן קא מתנינן טובא בעוקצין Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Doeg and Ahithophel raised four hundred dilemmas with regard to the purity of a cupboard that floats in the air, and they did not resolve even one, an indication of their great knowledge. Rava says: Is it greatness to raise dilemmas? That is not a barometer of greatness, as in the years of Rav Yehuda all of their Torah study was confined to the order of Nezikin, and we study much more than that, and are expert even in tractate Okatzin, the final tractate in the difficult order of Teharot.

וכי הוה מטי רב יהודה אשה שכובשת ירק בקדירה ואמרי לה זיתים שכבשן בטרפיהן טהורים אמר הויות דרב ושמואל קא חזינא הכא ואנן קא מתנינן בעוקצין תלת סרי מתיבתא Moreover, when Rav Yehuda would encounter the mishna in tractate Okatzin that discusses the extent to which the stems of various fruits and vegetables are considered an integral part of the produce in terms of contracting ritual impurity, where the mishna discusses the halakha concerning a woman who pickles a vegetable in a pot, and some say when he would reach the mishna (Okatzin 2:1): Olives pickled with their leaves are pure, because after pickling, it is no longer possible to lift the fruit by its leaves, so they are no longer considered part of the fruit; he would find it difficult to understand. He would say: Those are the discussions between Rav and Shmuel that we see here. And we, by contrast, teach tractate Okatzin in thirteen academies.

ורב יהודה שליף מסאני ואתא מטרא ואנן צוחינן וליכא דמשגח בן אלא הקב"ה ליבא בעי דכתיב (שמואל א טז, ז) וה' יראה ללבב But nevertheless, when Rav Yehuda would remove one of his shoes the rain would immediately fall, whereas we cry out and no one notices us. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, seeks the heart, and the barometer of greatness is devotion of the heart and not the amount of Torah that one studies, as it is written: “But the Lord looks on the heart” (I Samuel 16:7).

אמר רב משרשיא דואג ואחיתופל לא [הוו] סברי שמעתא מתקיף לה מר זוטרא מאן דכתיב ביה איה סופר איה שוקל איה סופר את המגדלים ואת אמרת לא הוו סברי שמעתא אלא דלא הוה סלקא להו שמעתא אליבא דהלכתא דכתיב (תהלים כה, יד) סוד ה' ליראיו Rav Mesharshiyya says: Doeg and Ahithophel did not comprehend halakhic discussions. Mar Zutra objects to this statement: These are people with regard to whom it is written: “Where is he that counts; where is he that weighs; where is he that counts the towers” (Isaiah 33:18), and you say that they did not comprehend halakhic discussions? Rather, Doeg and Ahithophel would not conclude halakhic discussions in accordance with halakhic rulings, as it is written: “The secret of the Lord is with those who fear Him” (Psalms 25:14). Since they did not fear God, they did not arrive at halakhic conclusions despite their keen intellect.

א"ר אמי לא מת דואג עד ששכח תלמודו שנא' (משלי ה, כג) הוא ימות באין מוסר וברוב אולתו ישגה רב (אשי) אמר נצטרע שנאמר (תהלים עג, כז) הצמתה כל זונה ממך Rabbi Ami says: Doeg died only when he forgot what he learned, as it is stated: “He shall die for want of instruction, and in his folly he shall go astray” (Proverbs 5:23). Rav Ashi says: He was afflicted with leprosy before his death, as it is stated: “Those that go far from You shall perish; You destroy [hitzmatta] all those who go astray from You” (Psalms 73:27).

כתיב התם (ויקרא כה, ל) לצמיתות ומתרגמינן לחלוטין ותנן אין בין מוסגר ומוחלט אלא פריעה ופרימה Where is the allusion to leprosy in this verse? It is written there: “And the land shall not be sold in perpetuity [litzmitut]” (Leviticus 25:23), and we translate it into Aramaic as: Laḥalutin. And we learned in a mishna with regard to lepers (Megilla 8b): The difference between a quarantined leper, i.e., one examined by a priest who found his symptoms to be inconclusive, and who must therefore remain in isolation for a period of up to two weeks to see if conclusive symptoms develop; and a confirmed [muḥlat] leper, i.e., one whose symptoms were conclusive and the priest declared him a confirmed leper, is only with regard to letting the hair on one’s head grow and rending one’s garments. The derivation is based on the etymological similarity between hitzmatta and litzmitut; the translation of litzmitut as laḥalutin, and the etymological similarity between laḥalutin and muḥlat.

(סימן שלשה ראו וחצי וקראו) The Gemara cites a mnemonic for the halakhot that follow: Three, saw, and half, and called him.

א"ר יוחנן שלשה מלאכי חבלה נזדמנו לו לדואג אחד ששכח תלמודו ואחד ששרף נשמתו ואחד שפיזר עפרו בבתי כנסיות ובבתי מדרשות Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Three angels of destruction encountered Doeg: One who caused him to forget his Torah knowledge, one who burned his soul, and one who dispersed the ashes of his soul in synagogues and in study halls to be trampled beneath the feet of the righteous.

(א"ר) יוחנן דואג ואחיתופל לא ראו זה את זה דואג בימי שאול ואחיתופל בימי דוד Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Doeg and Ahithophel did not see one another, as both died at a young age. Doeg lived in the days of Saul, and Ahithophel lived in the days of David, toward the end of David’s life.

וא"ר יוחנן דואג ואחיתופל לא חצו ימיהם תניא נמי הכי אנשי דמים ומרמה לא יחצו ימיהם כל שנותיו של דואג לא היו אלא שלשים וארבע ושל אחיתופל אינן אלא שלשים ושלש And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Doeg and Ahithophel did not reach half of their allotted days, as they died before the age of thirty-five, half of the standard lifetime mentioned in the verse: “The days of our years are seventy years” (Psalms 90:10). This is also taught in a baraita: “Bloody and deceitful men shall not live half their days” (Psalms 55:24); all the years of Doeg were only thirty-four, and the years of Ahithophel were only thirty-three.

וא"ר יוחנן בתחלה קרא דוד לאחיתופל רבו ולבסוף קראו חבירו ולבסוף קראו תלמידו בתחילה קראו רבו (תהלים נה, יד) ואתה אנוש כערכי אלופי ומיודעי ולבסוף קראו חבירו (תהלים נה, טו) אשר יחדו נמתיק סוד בבית אלהים נהלך ברגש ולבסוף קראו תלמידו (תהלים מא, י) גם איש שלומי אשר בטחתי בו And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Initially, David called Ahithophel his teacher, and eventually, he called him his colleague, and ultimately, he called him his student. Initially, David called Ahithophel his teacher, as it is stated: “But it was you, a man my equal, my master [alufi], and my familiar friend” (Psalms 55:14); a teacher is known as aluf as he trains [me’alef ] his students. And eventually, he called him his colleague, as it is stated: “We took sweet counsel together, and walked to the house of God with the throng” (Psalms 55:15); the term together indicates that they were equals. And ultimately, he called him his student, as it is stated: “Even my own familiar friend, in whom I trusted,

Daf 107a

אוכל לחמי הגדיל עלי עקב who did eat of my bread, has lifted his heel against me” (Psalms 41:10). Bread is a metaphor for Torah knowledge.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב לעולם אל יביא אדם עצמו לידי נסיון שהרי דוד מלך ישראל הביא עצמו לידי נסיון ונכשל אמר לפניו רבש"ע מפני מה אומרים אלהי אברהם אלהי יצחק ואלהי יעקב ואין אומרים אלהי דוד אמר אינהו מינסו לי ואת לא מינסית לי אמר לפניו רבש"ע בחנני ונסני שנאמר (תהלים כו, ב) בחנני ה' ונסני וגו' § Apropos Ahithophel, the Gemara relates the events that led to his death. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A person should never bring himself to undergo an ordeal, as David, king of Israel, brought himself to undergo an ordeal and failed. David said before God: Master of the Universe, for what reason does one say in prayer: God of Abraham, God of Isaac, and God of Jacob, and one does not say: God of David? God said to David: They have undergone ordeals before Me, and you have not undergone an ordeal before Me. David said before Him: Examine me and subject me to an ordeal, as it is stated: “Examine me, Lord, and subject me to an ordeal; try my kidneys and my heart” (Psalms 26:2).

אמר מינסנא לך ועבידנא מילתא בהדך דלדידהו לא הודעתינהו ואילו אנא קא מודענא לך דמנסינא לך בדבר ערוה מיד (שמואל ב יא, ב) ויהי לעת הערב ויקם דוד מעל משכבו וגו' God said to him: I will subject you to an ordeal, and I will perform a matter for you that I did not perform for the Patriarchs, as for them, I did not inform them of the nature of the ordeal, while I am informing you that I will subject you to an ordeal involving a matter of a married woman, with whom relations are forbidden. Immediately, it is written: “And it came to pass one evening that David rose from his bed” (II Samuel 11:2).

אמר רב יהודה שהפך משכבו של לילה למשכבו של יום ונתעלמה ממנו הלכה אבר קטן יש באדם משביעו רעב ומרעיבו שבע Rav Yehuda says: Once David heard the nature of his ordeal, he sought to prevent himself from experiencing lust. He transformed his nighttime bed into his daytime bed, i.e., he engaged in intercourse with his wives during the day, in an attempt to quell his lust. But a halakha, i.e., a Torah statement, escaped him: There is a small limb in man that he employs in sexual intercourse. If he starves the limb, and does not overindulge, it is satiated; but if he satiates the limb and overindulges in sexual intercourse, it is starving, and desires more. Therefore, his plan had the opposite effect.

(שמואל ב יא, ב) ויתהלך על גג בית המלך וירא אשה רוחצת מעל הגג והאשה טובת מראה מאד בת שבע הוה קא חייפא רישא תותי חלתא אתא שטן אידמי ליה כציפרתא פתק ביה גירא פתקה לחלתא איגליה וחזייה The verse states: “And he walked upon the roof of the king’s house; from the roof he saw a woman bathing, and the woman was very fair to look upon” (II Samuel 11:2). Bathsheba was shampooing her head behind a beehive, which concealed her from sight. Satan came and appeared to David as a bird. David shot an arrow at the bird, the arrow severed the beehive, Bathsheba was exposed, and David saw her.

מיד (שמואל ב יא, ג) וישלח דוד וידרוש לאשה ויאמר הלא זאת בת שבע בת אליעם אשת אוריה החתי וישלח דוד מלאכים ויקחה ותבא אליו וישכב עמה והיא מתקדשת מטומאתה ותשב אל ביתה והיינו דכתיב (תהלים יז, ג) בחנת לבי פקדת לילה צרפתני בל תמצא זמותי בל יעבר פי אמר איכו זממא נפל בפומיה דמאן דסני לי ולא אמר כי הא מילתא Immediately, it is written: “And David sent and inquired after the woman. And one said: Is not this Bathsheba, daughter of Eliam, the wife of Uriah the Hittite? And David sent messengers, and took her, and she came to him, and he lay with her, for she was purified from her impurity, and then she returned to her house” (II Samuel 11:3–4). And that is the meaning of that which is written: “You have proved my heart; You have visited me in the night: You have tried me, but You find nothing; let no presumptuous thought pass my lips” (Psalms 17:3). David said: Oh, that a muzzle would have fallen upon the mouth of the one who hates me, a euphemism for his own mouth, and I would not have said anything like that and I would have withstood the ordeal.

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (תהלים יא, א) למנצח לדוד בה' חסיתי איך תאמרו לנפשי נודי הרכם צפור אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע מחול לי על אותו עון שלא יאמרו הר שבכם צפור נדדתו Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “To the leader, of David. In the Lord I put my trust; how can you say to my soul: Flee like a bird to your mountain” (Psalms 11:1)? David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, pardon me for that sin with Bathsheba so that the wicked people will not say: The mountain that is among you, i.e., the luminary of the generation, David, was driven from the world due to a bird that led to his transgression.

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (תהלים נא, ו) לך לבדך חטאתי והרע בעיניך עשיתי למען תצדק בדברך תזכה בשפטך אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה גליא וידיעא קמך דאי בעיא למכפייה ליצרי הוה כייפינא אלא אמינא דלא לימרו עבדא זכי למריה Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Against You, only You, have I sinned, and done what is evil in Your eyes; that You are justified when You speak, and right when You judge” (Psalms 51:6)? David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: It is revealed and known before You that if I sought to suppress my evil inclination, I would have suppressed it; but I said: I will sin, so that they will not say a servant overcame his master and withstood the ordeal even though God said that he would not.

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (תהלים לח, יח) כי אני לצלע נכון ומכאובי נגדי תמיד ראויה היתה בת שבע בת אליעם לדוד מששת ימי בראשית אלא שבאה אליו במכאוב וכן תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל ראויה היתה לדוד בת שבע בת אליעם אלא שאכלה פגה Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For I am ready to stumble [letzela] and my pain is always before me” (Psalms 38:18)? Bathsheba, daughter of Eliam, was designated as fit for David from the six days of Creation. Rava interprets that the term letzela is referring to Eve, who was taken from the side [tzela] of Adam, the first man, and explains that she was destined for him, just as Eve was destined for Adam. But she came to him through pain. And likewise, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Bathsheba, daughter of Eliam, was designated as fit for David, but he partook of her unripe, before the appointed time. David would have ultimately married her in a permitted manner after the death of Uriah.

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (תהלים לה, טו) ובצלעי שמחו ונאספו נאספו עלי נכים [ולא ידעתי] קרעו ולא דמו אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע גלוי וידוע לפניך שאם היו קורעין בשרי לא היה דמי שותת Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And when I limped they rejoiced and gathered, the wretched gather themselves together against me, and those whom I know not; they tore and did not cease [dammu]” (Psalms 35:15)? David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe. It is revealed and known before you that if my enemies were to tear my flesh, my blood [dami] would not flow to the ground, due to excessive fasting (see II Samuel 12:16–17).

ולא עוד אלא בשעה שהם עוסקין בארבע מיתות ב"ד פוסקין ממשנתן ואומרים לי דוד הבא על אשת איש מיתתו במה אמרתי להם הבא על אשת איש מיתתו בחנק ויש לו חלק לעוה"ב אבל המלבין פני חבירו ברבים אין לו חלק לעולם הבא David continued: Moreover, my enemies torment me to the extent that at the time when they are engaged in the public study of the halakhot of the four court-imposed death penalties they interrupt their study and say to me: David, concerning one who engages in intercourse with a married woman, his death is effected with what form of execution? And I said to them: Concerning one who engages in intercourse with a married woman before witnesses and with forewarning, his death is by strangulation, and he has a share in the World-to-Come. But one who humiliates another before the multitudes has no share in the World-to-Come. The transgression of those who humiliated David is clearly more severe than the transgression of David himself.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אפילו בשעת חליו של דוד קיים שמנה עשרה עונות שנאמר (תהלים ו, ז) יגעתי באנחתי אשחה בכל לילה מטתי בדמעתי ערשי אמסה ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב בקש דוד לעבוד ע"ז שנאמר (שמואל ב טו, לב) ויהי דוד בא עד הראש אשר ישתחוה שם לאלהים ואין ראש אלא ע"ז שנאמר (דניאל ב, לב) והוא צלמא רישיה די דהב טב Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Even during the time of his illness he fulfilled the mitzva of conjugal rights for eighteen wives, as it is stated: “I am weary with my groaning; every night I speak in my bed; I melt away my couch with tears” (Psalms 6:7). Even when he was weary and groaning he still spoke in his bed, a euphemism for sexual intercourse. And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: David sought to engage in idol worship during Absalom’s coup, as it is stated: “And it came to pass when David was at the top [rosh] of the ascent, where he would bow to God” (II Samuel 15:32), and rosh means nothing other than idol worship, as it is stated: “As for that image, its head [reishei] was of fine gold” (Daniel 2:32).

(שמואל ב טו, לב) והנה לקראתו חושי הארכי קרוע כתנתו ואדמה על ראשו אמר לו לדוד יאמרו מלך שכמותך יעבוד ע"ז אמר לו מלך שכמותי יהרגנו בנו מוטב יעבוד ע"ז ואל יתחלל שם שמים בפרהסיא It is written: “Behold Hushai the Archite came to meet him with his coat rent and earth upon his head” (II Samuel 15:32). Hushai said to David: Shall they say a king like you will engage in idol worship? David said to him: Is it preferable that they say with regard to a king like me, known to be righteous, that his son will kill him? David continued, referring to himself in third person: It is preferable that he shall engage in idol worship and the name of Heaven shall not be desecrated in public through the murder of a righteous king in this manner.

אמר מאי טעמא קנסיבת יפת תואר א"ל יפת תואר רחמנא שרייה א"ל לא דרשת סמוכין דסמיך ליה (דברים כא, יח) כי יהיה לאיש בן סורר ומורה כל הנושא יפת תואר יש לו בן סורר ומורה Hushai said to him: What is the reason that you married a beautiful woman, the mother of Absalom? David said to him: With regard to a beautiful woman, the Merciful One permitted marrying her. Hushai said to him: But you did not interpret the juxtaposed verses, as juxtaposed to the portion of the beautiful woman is the portion beginning: “If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son” (Deuteronomy 21:18). From that juxtaposition it is derived: Anyone who marries a beautiful woman has a stubborn and rebellious son. Therefore, even if Absalom kills you, there will be no desecration of God’s name, as the people will attribute his actions to his mother.

דרש ר' דוסתאי דמן בירי למה דוד דומה לסוחר כותי אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע (תהלים יט, יג) שגיאות מי יבין [א"ל] שביקי לך ומנסתרות נקני שביקי לך גם מזדים חשוך עבדך שביקי לך אל ימשלו בי אז איתם דלא לישתעו בי רבנן שביקי לך Rabbi Dostai from Biri taught: To what is David comparable? He is comparable to a Samaritan merchant, who incrementally lowers the price until the buyer agrees to purchase the merchandise. David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe: “Who can discern his errors” (Psalms 19:13), i.e., forgive me for the unwitting sins that I committed. God said to him: They are forgiven for you. David asked more: “Cleanse me from hidden faults” (Psalms 19:13), i.e., pardon me for transgressions that I committed in private, even if I performed them intentionally. God said to him: They are forgiven for you. David requested: “Keep back your servant also from intentional sins” (Psalms 19:14). God said to him: They are forgiven for you. David requested: “Let them not have dominion over me, then I shall be faultless” (Psalms 19:14), and I further request that the Sages will not speak of me and condemn me. God said to him: They are forgiven for you.

ונקיתי מפשע רב שלא יכתב סרחוני אמר לו א"א ומה יו"ד שנטלתי משרי עומד וצווח כמה שנים עד שבא יהושע והוספתי לו שנאמר (במדבר יג, טז) ויקרא משה להושע בן נון יהושע כל הפרשה כולה עאכ"ו David requested: “And I shall be clear from great transgression” (Psalms 19:14), meaning that my transgression with Bathsheba and Uriah will not be written in the Bible. God said to him: That is impossible. And just as the letter yod that I removed from the name of Sarai, wife of Abraham, when I changed her name to Sarah, was standing and screaming several years over its omission from the Bible until Joshua came and I added the yod to his name, as it is stated: “And Moses called Hosea, son of Nun, Joshua [Yehoshua]” (Numbers 13:16); the entire portion of your transgression, which is fit to be included in the Bible, all the more so it cannot be omitted.

ונקיתי מפשע רב אמר לפניו רבש"ע מחול לי על אותו עון כולו אמר כבר עתיד שלמה בנך לומר בחכמתו (משלי ו, כז) היחתה איש אש בחיקו ובגדיו לא תשרפנה אם יהלך איש על הגחלים ורגליו לא תכוינה כן הבא על אשת רעהו לא ינקה כל הנוגע בה א"ל כל הכי נטרד ההוא גברא א"ל קבל עליך יסורין קבל עליו The verse states: “And I shall be clear from great transgression” (Psalms 19:14). David said before God: Master of the Universe, pardon me for that entire sin. God said to him: Your son Solomon is already destined to say with his wisdom: “Can a man take fire in his lap and his garments not be burned? Can one walk on hot coals and his feet not be scorched? So too one who lies with his neighbor’s wife; anyone who touches her shall not go unpunished” (Proverbs 6:27–29). David said to Him: Will that man, David, be expelled for that entire transgression, with no remedy? God said to David: Accept upon yourself afflictions, and that will atone for your sins. He accepted afflictions upon himself.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב ששה חדשים נצטרע דוד ונסתלקה הימנו שכינה ופירשו ממנו סנהדרין נצטרע דכתיב (תהלים נא, ט) תחטאני באזוב ואטהר תכבסני ומשלג אלבין נסתלקה הימנו שכינה דכתיב (תהלים נא, יד) השיבה לי ששון ישעך ורוח נדיבה תסמכני ופרשו ממנו סנהדרין דכתי' (תהלים קיט, עט) ישובו לי יראיך וגו' ששה חדשים מנלן דכתי' (מלכים א ב, יא) והימים אשר מלך דוד על ישראל ארבעים שנה Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: For six months David was afflicted with leprosy and the Divine Presence abandoned him and the members of the Sanhedrin dissociated themselves from him. He was afflicted with leprosy, as it is stated: “Purge me with hyssop and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow” (Psalms 51:9), indicating that he required purification like a leper. The Divine Presence abandoned him, as it is stated: “Restore me to joy of Your salvation; and uphold me with a willing spirit” (Psalms 51:14). And the members of the Sanhedrin dissociated themselves from him, as it is stated: “Let those who fear You turn to me, and those who have known Your testimonies” (Psalms 119:79). From where do we derive that this lasted for six months? It is derived as it is written: “And the days that David reigned over Israel were forty years;

Daf 107b

בחברון מלך שבע שנים ובירושלים מלך שלשים ושלש שנים וכתיב (שמואל ב ה, ה) בחברון מלך על יהודה שבע שנים וששה חדשים וגו' והני ששה חדשים לא קחשיב ש"מ נצטרע in Hebron he reigned seven years, and in Jerusalem he reigned thirty-three years” (I Kings 2:11). And it is written: “In Hebron he reigned over Judah seven years and six months and in Jerusalem he reigned for thirty-three years over all Israel and Judah” (II Samuel 5:5). And those six months, the prophet did not tally them as part of the forty years of King David’s reign. Conclude from it that there were six months that he was not considered king because he was afflicted with leprosy.

אמר לפניו רבש"ע מחול לי על אותו עון מחול לך (תהלים פו, יז) עשה עמי אות לטובה ויראו שונאי ויבושו כי אתה ה' עזרתני ונחמתני א"ל בחייך איני מודיע אבל אני מודיע בחיי שלמה בנך David said before Him after this: Master of the Universe, pardon me for this sin. God said to him: It is forgiven for you. David requested: “Perform on my behalf a sign for good, that they that hate me may see it and be put to shame” (Psalms 86:17); show me a sign in my lifetime so that everyone will know that You have forgiven me. God said to him: In your lifetime I will not make it known that you were forgiven, but I will make it known in the lifetime of your son, Solomon.

בשעה שבנה שלמה את בית המקדש ביקש להכניס ארון לבית קדשי הקדשים דבקו שערים זה בזה אמר עשרים וארבעה רננות ולא נענה אמר (תהלים כד, ז) שאו שערים ראשיכם והנשאו פתחי עולם ויבא מלך הכבוד מי זה מלך הכבוד ה' עזוז וגבור ה' גבור מלחמה ונאמר (תהלים כד, ט) שאו שערים ראשיכם ושאו פתחי עולם ויבא מלך הכבוד וגו' ולא נענה The Gemara explains: When Solomon built the Temple and sought to bring the Ark into the Holy of Holies, the gates clung together and could not be opened. Solomon uttered twenty-four songs of praise, and his prayer was not answered. He said: “Lift up your heads, you gates, and be you lifted up, you everlasting doors, that the King of glory may come in. Who is the King of glory? The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle” (Psalms 24:7-8). And it is stated: “Lift up your heads, you gates, yea, lift them up, you everlasting doors, that the King of glory may come in. Who then is the King of glory? The Lord of hosts; He is the King of glory. Selah” (Psalms 24:9-10), and he was not answered.

כיון שאמר (דברי הימים ב ו, מב) ה' אלהים אל תשב פני משיחך זכרה לחסדי דויד עבדך מיד נענה באותה שעה נהפכו פני שונאי דוד כשולי קדירה וידעו כל ישראל שמחל לו הקב"ה על אותו העון Once he said: “O Lord God, turn not away the face of Your anointed; remember the good deeds of David Your servant” (II Chronicles 6:42), he was immediately answered, and the gates opened (II Chronicles 7:1). At that moment, the faces of all of David’s enemies turned dark like the charred bottom of a pot. And all of the Jewish people knew that the Holy One, Blessed be He, had forgiven him for that sin, as it was only by David’s merit that Solomon’s prayer was answered.

גחזי דכתיב וילך אלישע דמשק להיכא אזל א"ר יוחנן שהלך להחזיר גחזי בתשובה ולא חזר אמר לו חזור בך אמר לו כך מקובלני ממך החוטא ומחטיא את הרבים אין מספיקין בידו לעשות תשובה § The mishna states that Gehazi, the attendant of Elisha, has no share in the World-to-Come. The Gemara explains that this is as it is written: And Elisha went to Damascus (see II Kings 8:7). Where did he go, and for what purpose? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He went to cause Gehazi to repent, but he did not repent. Elisha said to him: Repent. Gehazi said to him: This is the tradition that I received from you: Whoever sins and causes the masses to sin is not given the opportunity to repent.

מאי עבד איכא דאמרי אבן שואבת תלה לחטאת ירבעם והעמידה בין שמים לארץ ואיכא דאמרי שם חקק בפיה והיתה מכרזת ואומרת אנכי ולא יהיה לך What did he do that caused the masses to sin? There are those who say that he hung a magnetic rock on Jeroboam’s sin, i.e., on the golden calf that Jeroboam established as an idol, so that he suspended it between heaven and earth, i.e., he caused it to hover above the ground. This seemingly miraculous occurrence caused the people to worship it even more devoutly than before. And there are those who say: He engraved the sacred name of God on its mouth, and it would declare and say: “I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2), and: “You shall not have other gods” (Exodus 20:3). The idol would quote the two prohibitions from the Ten Commandments that prohibit idol worship, causing the people to worship it even more devoutly than before.

וא"ד רבנן דחה מקמיה שנאמר (מלכים ב ו, א) ויאמרו בני הנביאים אל אלישע הנה [נא] המקום אשר אנחנו יושבים שם לפניך צר ממנו מכלל דעד השתא לא הוו (פיישי) [צר] And there are those who say: Gehazi pushed the Sages away from coming before him, i.e., he prevented them from learning from Elisha, as it is stated: “And the sons of the prophets said to Elisha, behold this place where we are staying before you is too cramped for us” (II Kings 6:1). It may be derived by inference that until now they were not numerous and the place was not cramped for them, as Gehazi would turn people away.

תנו רבנן לעולם תהא שמאל דוחה וימין מקרבת לא כאלישע שדחפו לגחזי בשתי ידים [ולא כרבי יהושע בן פרחיה שדחפו ליש"ו בשתי ידים] The Sages taught: Always have the left hand drive sinners away and the right draw them near, so that the sinner will not totally despair of atonement. This is unlike Elisha, who pushed away Gehazi with his two hands and caused him to lose his share in the World-to-Come, and unlike Yehoshua ben Peraḥya, who pushed away Jesus the Nazarene with his two hands.

גחזי דכתיב (מלכים ב ה, כג) ויאמר נעמן הואל וקח ככרים (ויפצר) [ויפרץ] בו ויצר ככרים כסף וגו' ויאמר אליו אלישע מאין גחזי ויאמר לא הלך עבדך אנה ואנה ויאמר אליו לא לבי הלך כאשר הפך איש מעל מרכבתו לקראתך העת לקחת את הכסף ולקחת בגדים וזיתים וכרמים וצאן ובקר ועבדים ושפחות ומי שקל כולי האי כסף ובגדים הוא דשקל Elisha drove Gehazi away, as it is written: “And Naaman said: Be content, take two talents. And he urged him, and bound two talents of silver in two bags, with two changes of garments” (II Kings 5:23). Naaman offered Gehazi payment for the help Elisha had given him. The verse states: “And Elisha said to him: Where from, Gehazi? And he said: Your servant went nowhere at all. And he said to him: Went not my heart with you, when the man turned back from his chariot to meet you? Is it the time to receive silver and to receive garments, and olive groves, and vineyards, and sheep and cattle, and menservants and maidservants?” (II Kings 5:25-26). The Gemara asks: And did Gehazi take all that? It is merely silver and garments that he took.

אמר רבי יצחק באותה שעה היה אלישע יושב ודורש בשמונה שרצים נעמן שר צבא מלך ארם היה מצורע אמרה ליה ההיא רביתא דאישתבאי מארעא ישראל אי אזלת לגבי אלישע מסי לך כי אתא א"ל זיל טבול בירדן א"ל אחוכי קא מחייכת בי אמרי ליה הנהו דהוו בהדיה מאי נפקא לך מינה זיל נסי אזל וטבל בירדנא ואיתסי אתא אייתי ליה כל הני דנקיט לא צבי לקבולי מיניה גחזי איפטר מקמיה אלישע אזל שקל מאי דשקל ואפקיד Rabbi Yitzḥak says: This was the incident involving Gehazi: At that moment, Elisha was sitting and teaching the halakhot of the eight impure creeping animals. Now Naaman, the general of the army of Aram, was a leper. A certain young Jewish woman who had been taken captive from Eretz Yisrael said to him: If you go to Elisha, he will heal you. When Naaman came to him, Elisha said to him: Go immerse in the Jordan. Naaman said to him: Are you mocking me by suggesting that this will cure me? Those companions who were with Naaman said to him: What is the difference to you? Go, try it. Naaman went and immersed in the Jordan and was healed. Naaman came and brought to Elisha all those items that he had taken with him from Aram, and Elisha did not agree to receive them from him. Gehazi took leave from before Elisha and went and took from Naaman what he took, and he deposited them.

כי אתא חזייה אלישע לצרעת דהוה פרחא עילויה רישיה א"ל רשע הגיע עת ליטול שכר שמנה שרצים וצרעת נעמן תדבק בך ובזרעך עד עולם ויצא מלפניו מצורע כשלג: (מלכים ב ז, ג) וארבעה אנשים היו מצורעים פתח השער אמר ר' יוחנן גחזי ושלשה בניו When Gehazi came, Elisha saw the leprosy that had grown on Gehazi’s head. Elisha said to him: Wicked one! The time has arrived to take your reward for studying the matter of the eight creeping animals. Since the silver Gehazi received was his reward for studying the matter of the eight creeping animals, Elisha enumerated eight items that Gehazi sought to purchase with the silver that he took. Then Elisha said to Gehazi: “The leprosy of Naaman shall cleave to you and to your seed forever. And he went out of his presence a leper as white as snow” (II Kings 5:27). With regard to the verse: “And there were four men afflicted with leprosy at the entrance of the gate” (II Kings 7:3), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: These were Gehazi and his three sons, as he and his descendants were cursed.

[הוספה מחסרונות הש"ס: רבי יהושע בן פרחיה מאי הוא כדקטלינהו ינאי מלכא לרבנן אזל רבי יהושע בן פרחיה ויש"ו לאלכסנדריא של מצרים כי הוה שלמא שלח לי' שמעון בן שטח מני ירושלים עיר הקודש ליכי אלכסנדרי' של מצרים אחותי בעלי שרוי בתוכך ואנכי יושבת שוממה § What is the incident involving Yehoshua ben Peraḥya? The Gemara relates: When King Yannai was killing the Sages, Yehoshua ben Peraḥya and Jesus, his student, went to Alexandria of Egypt. When there was peace between King Yannai and the Sages, Shimon ben Shataḥ sent a message to Yehoshua ben Peraḥya: From me, Jerusalem, the holy city, to you, Alexandria of Egypt: My sister, my husband is located among you and I sit desolate. The head of the Sages of Israel is out of the country and Jerusalem requires his return.

קם אתא ואתרמי ליה ההוא אושפיזא עבדו ליה יקרא טובא אמר כמה יפה אכסניא זו אמר ליה רבי עיניה טרוטות אמר ליה רשע בכך אתה עוסק אפיק ארבע מאה שיפורי ושמתיה Yehoshua ben Peraḥya understood the message, arose, came, and happened to arrive at a certain inn on the way to Jerusalem. They treated him with great honor. Yehoshua ben Peraḥya said: How beautiful is this inn. Jesus, his student, said to him: But my teacher, the eyes of the innkeeper’s wife are narrow [terutot]. Yehoshua ben Peraḥya said to him: Wicked one! Do you involve yourself with regard to that matter, the appearance of a married woman? He produced four hundred shofarot and ostracized him.

אתא לקמיה כמה זמנין אמר ליה קבלן לא הוי קא משגח ביה יומא חד הוה קא קרי קריאת שמע אתא לקמיה סבר לקבולי אחוי ליה בידיה הוא סבר מידחא דחי ליה אזל זקף לבינתא והשתחוה לה אמר ליה הדר בך אמר ליה כך מקובלני ממך כל החוטא ומחטיא את הרבים אין מספיקין בידו לעשות תשובה ואמר מר יש"ו כישף והסית והדיח את ישראל:] Jesus came before Yehoshua ben Peraḥya several times and said to him: Accept our, i.e., my, repentance. Yehoshua ben Peraḥya took no notice of him. One day Yehoshua ben Peraḥya was reciting Shema and Jesus came before him with the same request. Yehoshua ben Peraḥya intended to accept his request, and signaled him with his hand to wait until he completed his prayer. Jesus did not understand the signal and thought: He is driving me away. He went and stood a brick upright to serve as an idol and he bowed to it. Yehoshua ben Peraḥya then said to Jesus: Repent. Jesus said to him: This is the tradition that I received from you: Whoever sins and causes the masses to sin is not given the opportunity to repent. And the Master says: Jesus performed sorcery, incited Jews to engage in idolatry, and led Israel astray. Had Yehoshua ben Peraḥya not caused him to despair of atonement, he would not have taken the path of evil.

תניא א"ר שמעון בן אלעזר יצר תינוק ואשה תהא שמאל דוחה וימין מקרבת It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to the evil inclination, to a child, and to a woman, have the left hand drive them away and the right draw them near. Total rejection of the evil inclination will lead to inaction, unlike channeling its power in a positive direction. One should not draw them too near, lest they lead him to sin, but one should not drive his wife or his child away completely, lest he cause them to abandon the path of righteousness.

ת"ר ג' חלאים חלה אלישע אחד שגירה דובים בתינוקות ואחד שדחפו לגחזי בשתי ידים ואחד שמת בו [שנא' (מלכים ב יג, יד) ואלישע חלה את חליו וגו'] The Sages taught: Elisha fell ill with three illnesses: One illness was due to the fact that he incited bears to attack and eat children (see II Kings 2:24-25); and one was due to the fact that he pushed Gehazi away with two hands and caused him to despair of atonement; and one was the illness from which he died, as it is stated: “And Elisha was fallen ill of his illness from which he was to die” (II Kings 13:14), indicating that he had previously suffered other illnesses.

עד אברהם לא היה זקנה כל דחזי לאברהם אמר האי יצחק כל דחזי ליצחק אמר האי אברהם בעא אברהם רחמי דליהוי ליה זקנה שנאמר (בראשית כד, א) ואברהם זקן בא בימים עד יעקב לא הוה חולשא בעא רחמי והוה חולשא שנאמר (בראשית מח, א) ויאמר ליוסף הנה אביך חולה עד אלישע לא הוה איניש חליש דמיתפח ואתא אלישע ובעא רחמי ואיתפח שנא' (מלכים ב יג, יד) ואלישע חלה את חליו אשר ימות בו: Apropos the death of Elisha, the Gemara says: Until the time of Abraham there was no aging, and the old and the young looked the same. Anyone who saw Abraham said: That is Isaac, and anyone who saw Isaac said: That is Abraham. Abraham prayed for mercy, that he would undergo aging, as it is stated: “And Abraham was old, well stricken in age” (Genesis 24:1). There is no mention of aging before that verse. Until the time of Jacob there was no weakness, i.e., illness. Jacob prayed for mercy and there was weakness, as it is stated: “And one said to Joseph: Behold, your father is ill” (Genesis 48:1). Until the time of Elisha, there was no ill person who recovered, and Elisha came and prayed for mercy and recovered, as it is stated: “And Elisha was fallen ill of his illness from which he was to die” (II Kings 13:14). That is the first mention of a person who was ill and who did not die from that illness.

מתני׳ דור המבול אין להם חלק לעוה"ב ואין עומדין בדין שנא' (בראשית ו, ג) לא ידון רוחי באדם לעולם לא דין ולא רוח דור הפלגה אין להם חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (בראשית יא, ח) ויפץ ה' אותם משם על פני כל הארץ (וכתיב ומשם הפיצם) ויפץ ה' אותם בעוה"ז ומשם הפיצם ה' לעולם הבא אנשי סדום אין להם חלק לעולם הבא שנא' (בראשית יג, יג) ואנשי סדום רעים וחטאים לה' מאד רעים בעולם הזה וחטאים לעולם הבא אבל עומדין בדין MISHNA: The members of the generation of the flood have no share in the World-to-Come and will not stand in judgment at the end of days, as it is stated: “My soul shall not abide [yadon] in man forever” (Genesis 6:3); neither will they stand in judgment [din] nor shall their souls be restored to them. The members of the generation of the dispersion have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the Lord scattered them from there upon the face of all the earth” (Genesis 11:8), and it is written: “And from there did the Lord scatter them upon the face of all the earth” (Genesis 11:9). “And the Lord scattered them” indicates in this world; “and from there did the Lord scatter them” indicates for the World-to-Come. The people of Sodom have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners before the Lord exceedingly” (Genesis 13:13). “Wicked” indicates in this world; “and sinners” indicates for the World-to-Come. But they will stand in judgment and they will be sentenced to eternal contempt.

ר' נחמיה אומר אלו ואלו אין עומדין בדין שנאמר (תהלים א, ה) על כן לא יקומו Rabbi Neḥemya says: Both these, the people of Sodom, and those, the members of the generation of the flood, will not stand in judgment, as it is stated: “Therefore the wicked shall not stand

Daf 108a

רשעים במשפט וחטאים בעדת צדיקים על כן לא יקומו רשעים במשפט זה דור המבול וחטאים בעדת צדיקים אלו אנשי סדום אמרו לו אינם עומדין בעדת צדיקים אבל עומדין בעדת רשעים in judgment, nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous” (Psalms 1:5). “Therefore the wicked shall not stand in judgment”; this is referring to the generation of the flood, about whom it is written: “The wickedness of man was great upon the earth” (Genesis 6:5). “Nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous”; these are the people of Sodom, about whom it is written: “And the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners” (Genesis 13:13). The Sages said to Rabbi Neḥemya: They will not stand in judgment for resurrection in the congregation of the righteous, but they will stand in judgment in the congregation of the wicked.

(מרגלים אין להם חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (במדבר יד, לז) וימותו האנשים מוציאי דבת הארץ רעה במגפה לפני ה' וימותו בעולם הזה במגפה לעולם הבא) The spies who spread an evil report of their visit to Canaan have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And those men who spread the evil report about the land died by plague before the Lord” (Numbers 14:37). “And…died” indicates in this world; “by plague” indicates for the World-to-Come.

דור המדבר אין להם חלק לעולם הבא ואין עומדין בדין שנאמר (במדבר יד, לה) במדבר הזה יתמו ושם ימותו דברי רבי עקיבא ר' אליעזר אומר עליהם הוא אומר (תהלים נ, ה) אספו לי חסידי כורתי בריתי עלי זבח The members of the generation of the wilderness have no share in the World-to-Come and will not stand in judgment, as it is stated: “In this wilderness they shall be consumed, and there they shall die” (Numbers 14:35). “They shall be consumed” indicates in this world; “and there they shall die” indicates for the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: The members of the generation of the wilderness were essentially righteous, and about them the verse says: “Gather My pious together to Me, those that have entered into My covenant by offering” (Psalms 50:5). It is they who entered into the covenant with God and they will certainly be rewarded in the future.

עדת קרח אינה עתידה לעלות שנאמר (במדבר טז, לג) ותכס עליהם הארץ בעולם הזה ויאבדו מתוך הקהל לעולם הבא דברי ר"ע ר"א אומר עליהם הוא אומר (שמואל א ב, ו) ה' ממית ומחיה מוריד שאול ויעל: The assembly of Korah is not destined to arise for resurrection, as it is stated: “And the earth closed upon them” (Numbers 16:33), meaning in this world, and also: “And they perished from among the assembly” (Numbers 16:33), meaning in the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: About them the verse says: “The Lord kills and makes alive; He lowers to the grave, and raises” (I Samuel 2:6), indicating that the assembly of Korah has a share in the World-to-Come.

גמ׳ ת"ר דור המבול אין להם חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (בראשית ז, כג) וימח את כל היקום אשר על פני האדמה וימח את כל היקום בעולם הזה וימחו מן הארץ לעולם הבא דברי ר"ע ר"י בן בתירא אומר לא חיין ולא נדונין שנאמר (בראשית ו, ג) לא ידון רוחי באדם לעולם לא דין ולא רוח דבר אחר לא ידון רוחי שלא תהא נשמתן חוזרת לנדנה GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The members of the generation of the flood have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And He obliterated every living thing that was upon the face of the ground, from man to cattle to creeping animal to the birds of the heaven; and they were obliterated from the earth” (Genesis 7:23). “And He obliterated every living thing” indicates in this world, whereas “and they were obliterated from the earth” indicates for the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: The members of the generation of the flood will neither live nor be judged, as it is stated: “My soul shall not abide [yadon] in man forever” (Genesis 6:3), meaning neither will they stand in judgment [din], nor shall their souls be restored to them. Alternatively, “My soul shall not abide” means their souls will not return to their sheaths [nadan], i.e., to their bodies.

ר' מנחם בר יוסף אומר אפילו בשעה שהקב"ה מחזיר נשמות לפגרים מתים נשמתן קשה להם בגיהנם שנאמר (ישעיהו לג, יא) תהרו חשש תלדו קש רוחכם אש תאכלכם Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosef, says: Even at a time when the Holy One, Blessed be He, restores souls to lifeless corpses, the souls of the generation of the flood will afflict them harshly as if they were in Gehenna, as it is stated: “You shall conceive chaff; you shall bring forth straw; your soul is a fire that shall devour you” (Isaiah 33:11).

ת"ר דור המבול לא נתגאו אלא בשביל טובה שהשפיע להם הקב"ה ומה כתיב בהם (איוב כא, ט) בתיהם שלום מפחד ולא שבט אלוה עליהם וכתיב (איוב כא, י) שורו עבר ולא יגעיל תפלט פרתו ולא תשכל וכתיב (איוב כא, יא) ישלחו כצאן עויליהם וילדיהם ירקדון וכתיב (איוב כא, יב) ישאו בתוף וכנור וישמחו לקול עוגב וכתיב יבלו ימיהם בטוב ושנותם בנעימים וכתיב וברגע שאול יחתו The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Sota 3:10): The generation of the flood became haughty and sinned due only to the excessive goodness that the Holy One, Blessed be He, bestowed upon them. And what is written concerning them, indicating that goodness? “Their houses are safe without fear, nor is the rod of God upon them” (Job 21:9). And it is written: “Their bull sires, and will not fall; their cow calves, and does not cast her calf” (Job 21:10). And it is written: “They send forth their little ones like a flock, and their children dance” (Job 21:11). And it is written: “They sing to the timbrel and harp, and rejoice at the sound of the pipe” (Job 21:12). And it is written: “They shall spend their days in prosperity, and their years in pleasures” (Job 36:11). And it is written: “And peacefully they go down to the grave” (Job 21:13).

והיא גרמה שאמרו לאל (איוב כא, יד) סור ממנו ודעת דרכיך לא חפצנו מה שדי כי נעבדנו ומה נועיל כי נפגע בו אמרו כלום צריכין אנו לו אלא לטיפה של גשמים יש לנו נהרות ומעינות שאנו מסתפקין מהן אמר הקב"ה בטובה שהשפעתי להן בה מכעיסין אותי ובה אני דן אותם שנאמר (בראשית ו, יז) ואני הנני מביא את המבול מים And that success caused them to say to God: “Depart from us; for we desire not the knowledge of Your ways. What is the Almighty, that we should serve Him, and what profit should we have if we pray unto Him” (Job 21:14-15). The members of the generation of the flood said: Do we need Him for anything, even for the drop of rain that He causes to fall? We have rivers and springs from which we take our supply of water; we do not fear Him. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: With the goodness that I bestowed upon them, with that they infuriate Me and with it I will sentence them, as it is stated: “And behold I will bring the flood of water” (Genesis 6:17).

ר' יוסי אמר דור המבול לא נתגאו אלא בשביל גלגל העין שדומה למים [שנאמר (בראשית ו, ב) ויקחו להם נשים מכל אשר בחרו] לפיכך דן אותן במים שדומה לגלגל העין שנאמר (בראשית ז, יא) נבקעו כל מעינות תהום רבה וארבות השמים נפתחו Rabbi Yosei says: The generation of the flood became haughty due only to the covetousness of the eyeball, which is similar to water, as it is stated: “And the sons of the prominent men saw that the daughters of men were fair; and they took for themselves wives from anyone they chose” (Genesis 6:2). Consequently, God punished them with water, which is similar to an eyeball [legalgal ha’ayin], as it is stated: “All the fountains [mayenot] of the great deep were breached, and the flues of heaven were opened” (Genesis 7:11).

א"ר יוחנן דור המבול ברבה קלקלו וברבה נידונו ברבה קלקלו שנאמר (בראשית ו, ה) וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם וברבה נידונו שנאמר (בראשית ז, יא) כל מעינות תהום רבה א"ר יוחנן שלשה נשתיירו מהם בלועה דגדר וחמי טבריא ועיניא רבתי דבירם Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The members of the generation of the flood sinned with “great” and were punished with “great.” They sinned with “great,” as it is stated: “And the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great” (Genesis 6:5). And they were punished with great, as it is stated: “All the fountains of the great deep were breached” (Genesis 7:11). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Three fountains of the great deep that were breached in the flood remained, and boiling water continues to flow in them as it did during the flood. They are: Beloa of Gader, and the hot springs of Tiberias, and the great spring of Beiram.

(בראשית ו, יב) כי השחית כל בשר את דרכו על הארץ א"ר יוחנן מלמד שהרביעו בהמה על חיה וחיה על בהמה והכל על אדם ואדם על הכל א"ר אבא בר כהנא וכולם חזרו חוץ מתושלמי With regard to the verse: “For all flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth” (Genesis 6:12), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This teaches that the people of the generation of the flood mated male domesticated animals with female undomesticated animals, and male undomesticated animals with female domesticated animals, and all male animals with human females, and human males with all female animals. Rabbi Abba bar Kahana says: And after the flood all of the creatures returned to mate with their own species, except for the bird called tushlami, which continued to mate with other species.

(בראשית ו, ג) ויאמר ה' לנח קץ כל בשר בא לפני א"ר יוחנן בא וראה כמה גדול כחה של חמס שהרי דור המבול עברו על הכל ולא נחתם עליהם גזר דינם עד שפשטו ידיהם בגזל שנאמר (בראשית ו, יג) כי מלאה הארץ חמס מפניהם והנני משחיתם את הארץ וכתיב (יחזקאל ז, יא) החמס קם למטה רשע לא מהם ולא מהמונם ולא מהמהם ולא נה בהם With regard to the verse: “And God said to Noah: The end of all flesh is come before Me, for the earth is filled with robbery through them, and behold, I will destroy them with the earth” (Genesis 6:13), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Come and see how great is the power of robbery, as the generation of the flood violated every precept, but their sentence to be destroyed was not sealed until they extended their hands and engaged in robbery, as it is stated: “For the earth is filled with robbery through them, and behold, I will destroy them with the earth” (Genesis 6:13). And it is written: “Robbery is risen up into a rod of wickedness; nothing comes from them, nor from their multitude, nor from any of them, nor shall there be wailing [no’ah] for them” (Ezekiel 7:11).

א"ר אלעזר מלמד שזקף עצמו כמקל ועמד לפני הקב"ה ואמר לפניו רבש"ע לא מהם ולא מהמונם ולא מהמהם ולא נה בהם Rabbi Elazar says: This teaches that robbery straightened itself like a rod and stood before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and said before Him: Master of the Universe: “Nothing comes from them, nor from their multitude, nor from any of them, nor shall there be wailing for them,” i.e., none of the robbers are fit to exist.

(ואף על נח נחתם גזר דין שנא' ולא נח בהם) תנא דבי ר' ישמעאל אף על נח נחתך גזר דין אלא שמצא חן בעיני ה' שנאמר (בראשית ו, ז) נחמתי כי עשיתם ונח מצא חן בעיני ה' And the sentence of Noah was also sealed; he was going to die with the rest of the generation of the flood, as it is stated: Nor shall there be No’aḥ for them. The Gemara interprets the term spelled nun, heh, in the aforementioned verse, as if it were spelled nun, ḥet. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The sentence of Noah was also decided; but he was spared through the kindness of God due to the fact that he found favor in the eyes of God, as it is stated: “For I regret that I have made them. And Noah found favor in the eyes of the Lord” (Genesis 6:7-8). The juxtaposition of the term “and Noah” to the phrase “for I regret that I have made them” indicates that Noah should have been killed as well.

(בראשית ו, ו) וינחם ה' כי עשה את האדם בארץ כי אתא רב דימי אמר אמר הקב"ה יפה עשיתי שתקנתי להם קברות בארץ מאי משמע כתיב הכא וינחם ה' וכתיב התם (בראשית נ, כא) וינחם אותם וידבר על לבם It is written: “Vayyinaḥem the Lord that He made man on the earth [ba’aretz]” (Genesis 6:6). The meaning of the term “vayyinaḥem” is subject to a dispute. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said in explanation: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I did well that I prepared graves for people in the earth [ba’aretz]. The Gemara asks: From where is it inferred that the term “vayyinaḥem” has a positive connotation? The Gemara answers: It is written here: “Vayyinaḥem,” and it is written there: “And he comforted them [vayenaḥem otam] and spoke to their heart” (Genesis 50:21).

ואיכא דאמרי לא יפה עשיתי שתקנתי להם קברות בארץ כתיב הכא וינחם וכתיב התם (שמות לב, יד) וינחם ה' על הרעה אשר דבר לעשות לעמו And there are those who say that the term “vayyinaḥem” has a different meaning: I did not do well that I prepared graves for people in the earth, as I should not have created them in order to destroy them. From where is it inferred that the term “vayyinaḥem” has a negative connotation? It is written here: “Vayyinaḥem,” and it is written there: “And the Lord regretted [vayyinaḥem] the evil that He thought to do to His people” (Exodus 32:14).

(בראשית ו, ט) אלה תולדות נח [נח איש צדיק תמים היה בדורותיו] א"ר יוחנן בדורותיו ולא בדורות אחרים וריש לקיש אמר בדורותיו כ"ש בדורות אחרים § With regard to the verse: “These are the generations of Noah; Noah was a righteous man, and wholehearted in his generations” (Genesis 6:9), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Relative to the other people of his generation he was righteous and wholehearted, but not relative to those of other generations. And Reish Lakish says: In his generation he was righteous and wholehearted despite being surrounded by bad influences; all the more so would he have been considered righteous and wholehearted in other generations.

א"ר חנינא משל דרבי יוחנן למה הדבר דומה לחבית של יין שהיתה מונחת במרתף של חומץ במקומה ריחה נודף שלא במקומה אין ריחה נודף א"ר אושעיא משל דריש לקיש למה הדבר דומה לצלוחית של פלייטון שהיתה מונחת במקום הטנופת במקומה ריחה נודף וכ"ש במקום הבוסם Rabbi Ḥanina says: There is a parable for the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan; to what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a barrel of wine that was placed in a cellar where vinegar is stored; in its place, its fragrance diffuses, i.e., is noticeable, relative to the odor of the vinegar. When it is not in its place surrounded by vinegar, its fragrance does not diffuse, and its pleasant odor is not sensed. Rabbi Oshaya says: There is a parable for the statement of Reish Lakish; to what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a flask of perfume [palyaton] that was placed in a location of filth. In its place its fragrance diffuses despite the ambient odor, and all the more so is its fragrance noticeable if it is placed in a location where there is perfume.

(בראשית ז, כג) וימח את כל היקום אשר על פני האדמה אם אדם חטא בהמה מה חטאה With regard to the verse: “And He obliterated every living thing that was upon the face of the ground, from man to cattle to creeping animal to the birds of the heaven” (Genesis 7:23), the Gemara asks: If man sinned, in what way did the animal kingdom sin that it, too, warranted destruction?

תנא משום רבי יהושע בן קרחה משל לאדם שעשה חופה לבנו והתקין מכל מיני סעודה לימים מת בנו עמד (ובלבל) [ופזר] את חופתו אמר כלום עשיתי אלא בשביל בני עכשיו שמת חופה למה לי אף הקב"ה אמר כלום בראתי בהמה וחיה אלא בשביל אדם עכשיו שאדם חוטא בהמה וחיה למה לי The Gemara answers: It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa: There is a parable for this matter, to a man who fashioned a wedding canopy for his son and prepared all sorts of food for the wedding feast. Sometime later, before the wedding, his son died. What did the man do? He arose and dismantled his son’s wedding canopy. He said: Did I do this for any reason other than for my son? Now that my son has died, why do I need a wedding canopy? So too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Did I create domesticated animals and non-domesticated animals for any reason other than for man? Now that man sins and is sentenced to destruction, why do I need domesticated animals and non-domesticated animals?

(בראשית ז, כב) מכל אשר בחרבה מתו ולא דגים שבים It is written: “Of all that was on dry land died” (Genesis 7:22), from which it is inferred: But not the fish that are in the sea, which are not on dry land.

דרש ר' יוסי דמן קסרי מאי דכתיב (איוב כד, יח) קל הוא על פני מים תקולל חלקתם בארץ מלמד שהיה נח הצדיק מוכיח בהם ואומר להם עשו תשובה ואם לאו הקב"ה מביא עליכם את המבול ומקפה נבלתכם על המים כזיקין שנאמר קל הוא על פני מים ולא עוד אלא שלוקחין מהם קללה לכל באי עולם שנאמר (איוב כד, יח) תקולל חלקתם בארץ Rabbi Yosei from Caesarea taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “He is swift upon the face of the waters; their portion is cursed in the earth; he turns not by way of the vineyards” (Job 24:18)? This teaches that Noah the righteous would rebuke the people of his generation and say to them: Repent. And if you do not, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will bring a flood upon you and float your corpses on the water like wineskins filled with air that float on water, as it is stated: “He is swift upon the face of the waters.” Moreover, a curse is taken from them to all who enter the world, as people will curse others, saying: They shall be like the generation of the flood. As it is stated: “Their portion is cursed in the earth.”

לא יפנה דרך כרמים מלמד שהיו מפנים דרך כרמים אמר לו ומי מעכב אמר להם פרידה אחת יש לי להוציא מכם The conclusion of that verse: “He turns not by way of the vineyards,” teaches that they would clear a path through vineyards. They said to Noah: And who is preventing the flood from coming? Noah said to them: I have one pigeon, Methuselah, who will die at his appointed time, which I must remove from among you before the flood.

Daf 108b

א"כ לא נפנה דרך כרמים They said to him: If so we will not clear a path through vineyards, i.e., we will continue to sin.

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (איוב יב, ה) לפיד בוז לעשתות שאנן נכון למועדי רגל מלמד שהיה נח הצדיק מוכיח אותם ואמר להם דברים שהם קשים כלפידים והיו (בוזים) [מבזין] אותו אמרו לו זקן תיבה זו למה אמר להם הקב"ה מביא עליכם את המבול אמרו מבול של מה אם מבול של אש יש לנו דבר אחר ועליתה שמה ואם של מים הוא מביא אם מן הארץ הוא מביא יש לנו עששיות של ברזל שאנו מחפין בהם את הארץ ואם מן השמים הוא מביא יש לנו דבר ועקב שמו ואמרי לה עקש שמו Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “A contemptible torch [lapid] in the thought of him that is at ease, a thing ready for them whose foot slips” (Job 12:5)? This teaches that Noah the righteous would rebuke the people of his generation, and he said to them statements that are harsh as torches [kelapidim], and they would treat him with contempt. They said to him: Old man, why are you building this ark? Noah said to them: The Holy One, Blessed be He, is bringing a flood upon you. They said to him: A flood of what? If it is a flood of fire, we have another item and it is called alita, and it is fireproof. And if it is a flood of water that He brings, if He brings the water from the earth, we have iron plates with which we can plate the earth to prevent the water from rising. And if He brings the water from the heavens, we have an item and it is called ekev, and some say it is called ikkesh, which will absorb the water.

אמר להם הוא מביא מבין עקבי רגליכם שנאמר (איוב יב, ה) נכון למועדי רגל תניא מימי המבול קשים כשכבת זרע שנאמר נכון למועדי רגל אמר רב חסדא ברותחין קלקלו בעבירה וברותחין נידונו כתיב הכא (בראשית ח, א) וישכו המים וכתיב התם (אסתר ז, י) וחמת המלך שככה Noah said to them: If He wishes He will bring the water from between your feet and you can do nothing to prevent it, as it is stated: “For them whose foot slips.” It is taught in a baraita: The waters of the flood were as hard and thick as semen, as it is stated: “For them whose foot slips”; foot is a euphemism. Rav Ḥisda says: With hot semen they sinned, and with hot water they were punished. As it is written here, at the conclusion of the flood: “And the waters assuaged” (Genesis 8:1), and it is written there: “Then the king’s wrath was assuaged” (Esther 7:10). Just as the term “assuaged” there is referring to the heat of Ahasuerus’s wrath, so too, “assuaged” with regard to the flood is referring to the heat of the waters.

(בראשית ז, י) ויהי לשבעת הימים ומי המבול היו על הארץ מה טיבם של שבעת הימים With regard to the verse: “And it came to pass that after seven days the waters of the flood were upon the earth” (Genesis 7:10), the Gemara asks: What is the nature of these seven additional days?

אמר רב אלו ימי אבילות של מתושלח ללמדך שהספדן של צדיקים מעכבין את הפורענות לבא דבר אחר לשבעת ששינה עליהם הקב"ה סדר בראשית שהיתה חמה יוצאת ממערב ושוקעת במזרח דבר אחר שקבע להם הקב"ה זמן גדול ואח"כ זמן קטן ד"א לשבעת הימים שהטעימם מעין העולם הבא כדי שידעו מה טובה מנעו מהן Rav says: These were the days of mourning for the death of Methuselah; and this is to teach you that eulogies for the righteous prevent calamities from ensuing. Alternatively, “after seven days” means that the Holy One, Blessed be He, altered the order of Creation for that generation, i.e., in seven days He reversed the process of Creation, so that the sun would emerge in the west and set in the east. Alternatively, it means that the Holy One, Blessed be He, designated a substantial period for them, one hundred and twenty years, to repent, and thereafter designated a brief period for them, an additional seven days, as a final opportunity for them to repent. Alternatively, “after seven days” means that during those seven days, God gave them a foretaste of the delights of the World-to-Come, which will be actualized during the seventh millennium, so that they would know what munificence their sins prevented them from receiving.

(בראשית ז, ב) מכל הבהמה הטהורה תקח לך שבעה שבעה איש ואשתו אישות לבהמה מי אית לה א"ר שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן מאותם שלא נעבדה בהם עבירה § With regard to the verse: “Of every kosher animal you shall take to you by sevens, husband and wife” (Genesis 7:2), the Gemara asks: Is there marriage for animals? Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: The reference is to those animals with which the transgression of relations with another species was not performed. Therefore, the Torah underscores that the animals that entered the ark were husband and wife.

מנא ידע אמר רב חסדא שהעבירן לפני התיבה כל שהתיבה קולטתו בידוע שלא נעבדה בהם עבירה וכל שאין התיבה קולטתו בידוע שנעבדה בה עבירה רבי אבהו אמר מאותן הבאין מאיליהן The Gemara asks: From where did Noah know which animals were not involved in that transgression? Rav Ḥisda says: He passed them before the ark. All animals that the ark accepted, it was known that a transgression had not been performed with them. And any animal that the ark did not accept, it was known that a transgression had been performed with it. Rabbi Abbahu says: Noah took onto the ark only from those animals that came on their own, as it appeared that they were sent from Heaven, and they were certainly fit for this purpose.

(בראשית ו, יד) עשה לך תיבת עצי גופר מאי גופר אמר רב אדא אמרי דבי ר' שילא זו מבליגה ואמרי לה גולמיש With regard to the verse: “Make you an ark of gopher wood” (Genesis 6:14), the Gemara asks: What is gopher wood? Rav Adda says that they say in the school of Rabbi Sheila: This is wood from the mavliga tree; and some say that it is wood from the willow [gulamish] tree.

צוהר תעשה לתיבה א"ר יוחנן אמר לו הקב"ה לנח קבע בה אבנים טובות ומרגליות כדי שיהיו מאירות לכם כצהרים With regard to the verse: “A tzohar you shall make for the ark” (Genesis 6:16), Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Noah: Set precious stones and jewels in the ark so that they will shine for you as the afternoon [tzohorayim] sun.

(בראשית ו, טז) ואל אמה תכלנה מלמעלה דבהכי [הוא] דקיימא With regard to the verse: “And to a cubit you shall finish it above” (Genesis 6:16), the Gemara explains that in that manner, having been built wide at its base and narrow at its top, the ark would stand upright and would not capsize.

(בראשית ו, טז) תחתיים שנים ושלישים תעשה תנא תחתיים לזבל אמצעיים לבהמה עליונים לאדם With regard to the verse: “With lower, second and third stories shall you make it” (Genesis 6:16), it was taught in a baraita: The bottom story was for manure, the middle story was for animals, and the top story was for people.

(בראשית ח, ז) וישלח את העורב אמר ר"ל תשובה ניצחת השיבו עורב לנח אמר לו רבך שונאני ואתה שנאתני רבך שונאני מן הטהורין שבעה מן הטמאים שנים ואתה שנאתני שאתה מניח ממין שבעה ושולח ממין שנים אם פוגע בי שר חמה או שר צנה לא נמצא עולם חסר בריה אחת או שמא לאשתי אתה צריך With regard to the verse: “And he sent forth the raven, which went forth to and fro, until the waters were dried up from the earth” (Genesis 8:7), Reish Lakish says: The raven provided a convincing response to Noah; when it did not wish to leave the ark the raven said to him: Your Master, God, hates me, and you hate me. Your Master hates me, as He commanded to take from the kosher species seven and from the non-kosher species two. And you hate me, as you disregard those from the species of seven, i.e., the kosher birds, and instead dispatch one from the species of two, i.e., the non-kosher birds. If the angel of heat or the angel of cold harms me and kills me, will the world not be lacking one species of creature, as there was only one pair of ravens? Or perhaps you are sending me because it is my wife that you need, in order to engage in intercourse with her.

אמר לו רשע במותר לי נאסר לי בנאסר לי לא כ"ש Noah said to the raven: Wicked one! If with the woman who is generally permitted to me, my wife, intercourse is forbidden to me, then with regard to domesticated and undomesticated animals, which are generally forbidden to me, is it not all the more so the case that they are forbidden to me?

ומנלן דנאסרו דכתיב (בראשית ו, יח) ובאת אל התיבה אתה ובניך ואשתך ונשי בניך אתך וכתיב (בראשית ח, טז) צא מן התיבה אתה ואשתך ובניך ונשי בניך אתך וא"ר יוחנן מיכן אמרו שנאסרו בתשמיש המטה The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that it was prohibited for them to engage in intercourse while in the ark? The Gemara answers: It is derived from that which is written: “And you shall come into the ark, you, and your sons, and your wife, and your sons’ wives with you” (Genesis 6:18); and it is written: “Emerge from the ark, you and your wife, and your sons and your sons’ wives with you” (Genesis 8:16). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From here, the Sages derived and said that it was prohibited to engage in intercourse while in the ark, as when Noah and his family entered, the husbands and wives were listed separately, and when they emerged, the husbands were listed with their wives.

ת"ר שלשה שמשו בתיבה וכולם לקו כלב ועורב וחם כלב נקשר עורב רק חם לקה בעורו The Sages taught: Three violated that directive and engaged in intercourse while in the ark, and all of them were punished for doing so. They are: The dog, and the raven, and Ham, son of Noah. The dog was punished in that it is bound; the raven was punished in that it spits, and Ham was afflicted in that his skin turned black.

(בראשית ח, ח) וישלח את היונה מאתו לראות הקלו המים א"ר ירמיה מכאן שדירתן של עופות טהורים עם הצדיקים With regard to the verse: “And he sent forth the dove from him, to see if the waters abated” (Genesis 8:8), Rabbi Yirmeya says: From here it is derived that the dwelling place of kosher birds in the ark was with the righteous people, as the verse emphasizes that Noah dispatched the dove from his place.

(בראשית ח, יא) והנה עלה זית טרף בפיה א"ר אלעזר אמרה יונה לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע יהיו מזונותי מרורים כזית ומסורים בידך ואל יהיו מתוקים כדבש ומסורים ביד בשר ודם מאי משמע דהאי טרף לישנא דמזוני הוא דכתיב (משלי ל, ח) הטריפני לחם חוקי With regard to the verse: “And in her mouth was an olive branch plucked off [taraf ]” (Genesis 8:11), Rabbi Elazar says: The dove said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, may my sustenance be bitter as the olive and dependent on Your hands, and not sweet as honey and dependent on the hands of flesh and blood. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that taraf is a term that indicates sustenance? The Gemara answers: It is inferred from that which is written: “Feed me [hatrifeni] with my allotted portion” (Proverbs 30:8).

(בראשית ח, יט) למשפחותיהם יצאו מן התיבה א"ר יוחנן למשפחותם ולא הם With regard to the verse: “After their kinds [lemishpeḥoteihem], they emerged from the ark” (Genesis 8:19), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: After their kinds [lemishpeḥotam] the animals emerged, but not them [hem] themselves, as some of the animals that entered the ark died during that year and it was their descendants who emerged.

אמר רב חנא בר ביזנא אמר ליה אליעזר לשם רבא כתיב למשפחותיהם יצאו מן התיבה אתון היכן הויתון א"ל צער גדול היה לנו בתיבה בריה שדרכה להאכילה ביום האכלנוה ביום שדרכה להאכילה בלילה האכלנוה בלילה האי זקיתא לא הוה ידע אבא מה אכלה יומא חד הוה יתיב וקא פאלי רמונא נפל תולעתא מינה אכלה מיכן ואילך הוה גביל לה חיזרא כי מתלע אכלה Rav Ḥana bar Bizna says: Eliezer, servant of Abraham, said to Shem the Great, son of Noah: It is written: “After their kinds, they emerged from the ark,” indicating that the different types of animals were not intermingled while in the ark. Where were you and what did you do to care for them while they were in the ark? Shem said to him: We experienced great suffering in the ark caring for the animals. Where there was a creature that one typically feeds during the day, we fed it during the day, and where there was a creature that one typically feeds at night, we fed it at night. With regard to that chameleon, my father did not know what it eats. One day, my father was sitting and peeling a pomegranate. A worm fell from it and the chameleon ate it. From that point forward my father would knead bran with water, and when it became overrun with worms, the chameleon would eat it.

אריא אישתא זינתיה דאמר רב לא בציר משיתא ולא טפי מתריסר זינא אישתא אורשינה אשכחיניה אבא דגני בספנא דתיבותא א"ל לא בעית מזוני א"ל חזיתיך דהות טרידא אמינא לא אצערך א"ל יהא רעוא דלא תמות שנאמר (איוב כט, יח) ואומר עם קני אגוע וכחול ארבה ימים With regard to the lion, a fever sustained it, since when it suffered from a fever, it did not need to eat; as Rav said: For no fewer than six days and no more than twelve days, fever sustains a person; he need not eat and is sustained from his own fats. Shem continued: With regard to the phoenix [avarshina], my father found it lying in its compartment on the side of the ark. He said to the bird: Do you not want food? The bird said to him: I saw that you were busy, and I said I would not trouble you by requesting food. Noah said to the bird: May it be God’s will that you shall not die, and through that bird the verse was fulfilled, as it is stated: “And I said, I shall die in my nest, and I shall multiply my days as the phoenix” (Job 29:18).

אמר רב חנה בר לואי אמר שם רבא לאליעזר כי אתו עלייכו מלכי מזרח ומערב אתון היכי עבידיתו אמר ליה אייתי הקב"ה לאברהם ואותביה מימיניה והוה שדינן עפרא והוו חרבי גילי והוי גירי שנאמר (תהלים קי, א) מזמור לדוד נאם ה' לאדוני שב לימיני עד אשית אויביך הדום לרגליך וכתיב (ישעיהו מא, ב) מי העיר ממזרח צדק יקראהו לרגלו יתן לפניו גוים ומלכים ירד יתן כעפר חרבו כקש נדף קשתו § Rav Ḥana bar Leva’ei says that Shem the Great said to Eliezer, servant of Abraham: When the four great kings of the east and the west came upon you to wage war with Abraham, what did you do? Eliezer said to him: The Holy One, Blessed be He, brought Abraham and placed him to His right, and we would throw dust and it became swords, and we threw straw and it became arrows, as it is stated: “A Psalm of David. The Lord says to my master: Sit to My right, until I make your enemies your footstool” (Psalms 110:1), and it is written: “Who has raised up one from the east at whose steps victory attends? He gives nations before him, and makes him rule over kings; his sword makes them as the dust, his bow as driven straw” (Isaiah 41:2).

נחום איש גם זו הוה רגיל דכל דהוה סלקא ליה אמר גם זו לטובה יומא חד בעו [ישראל] לשדורי דורון לקיסר אמרי בהדי Apropos Abraham’s miraculous weapons, the Gemara relates: Naḥum of Gam Zo was accustomed that in response to any circumstance that arose in his regard, he would say: This too [gam zo] is for the best. One day the Jewish people sought to send a gift [doron] to the emperor. They said: With

Daf 109a

מאן נשדר נשדר בהדי נחום איש גם זו דמלומד בנסים הוא whom shall we send the gift? They decided: We will send it with Naḥum of Gam Zo, as he is experienced in miracles.

כי מטא לההוא דיורא בעא למיבת אמרי ליה מאי איכא בהדך אמר להו קא מובילנא כרגא לקיסר קמו בליליא שרינהו לסיפטיה ושקלו כל דהוה גביה ומלנהו עפרא כי מטא להתם אישתכח עפרא אמר אחוכי קא מחייכי בי יהודאי אפקוהו למקטליה אמר גם זו לטובה אתא אליהו ואידמי להו כחד מינייהו אמר להו דילמא האי עפרא מעפרא דאברהם אבינו הוא דהוה שדי עפרא הוו חרבי גילי הוו גירי בדוק ואשכחו הכי When he reached a certain lodging, he sought to sleep there. The residents of that lodging said to him: What do you have with you? Naḥum said to them: I am taking the head tax to the emperor. They rose in the night, opened his chest and took everything that was in it, and then filled the chest with dirt. When he arrived there, in Rome, earth was discovered in the chest. The emperor said: The Jews are mocking me by giving me this gift. They took Naḥum out to kill him. Naḥum said: This too is for the best. Elijah the prophet came and appeared to them as one of Naḥum’s traveling party. Elijah said to them: Perhaps this earth is from the earth of Abraham our forefather, who would throw dust and it became swords, and who would throw straw and it became arrows. They examined the dust and discovered that it was indeed the dust of Abraham.

הוה מחוזא דלא הוו קא יכלי ליה למיכבשיה שדו מההוא עפרא עליה וכבשוה עיילוהו לבי גנזא אמרי שקול דניחא לך מלייה לסיפטא דהבא כי הדר אתא אמרו ליה הנך דיורי מאי אמטית לבי מלכא אמר להו מאי דשקלי מהכא אמטאי להתם שקלי אינהו אמטו להתם קטלינהו להנך דיורי: There was a province that the Romans were unable to conquer. They threw some of this earth upon that province and they conquered it. In appreciation for the gift that Naḥum of Gam Zo had brought on behalf of the Jewish people, they brought him into the treasury and said: Take that which is preferable to you. He filled his chest with gold. When he returned to that lodging, those residents said to him: What did you bring to the king’s palace? Naḥum said to them: What I took from here, I brought to there. The residents concluded that the earth with which they had filled the chest had miraculous properties. They took earth and brought it to the emperor. Once the Romans discovered that the earth was ineffective in battle, they executed those residents.

דור הפלגה אין להם חלק לעולם הבא וכו': מאי עבוד אמרי דבי רבי שילא נבנה מגדל ונעלה לרקיע ונכה אותו בקרדומות כדי שיזובו מימיו מחכו עלה במערבא א"כ ליבנו אחד בטורא § The mishna teaches that the members of the generation of the dispersion have no share in the World-to-Come. The Gemara asks: What sin did they perform? Their sin is not explicitly delineated in the Torah. The school of Rabbi Sheila say that the builders of the Tower of Babel said: We will build a tower and ascend to heaven, and we will strike it with axes so that its waters will flow. They laughed at this explanation in the West, Eretz Yisrael, and asked: If that was their objective, let them build a tower on a mountain; why did they build it specifically in a valley (see Genesis 11:2)?

(אלא) א"ר ירמיה בר אלעזר נחלקו לג' כיתות אחת אומרת נעלה ונשב שם ואחת אומרת נעלה ונעבוד עבודת כוכבים ואחת אומרת נעלה ונעשה מלחמה זו שאומרת נעלה ונשב שם הפיצם ה' וזו שאומרת נעלה ונעשה מלחמה נעשו קופים ורוחות ושידים ולילין וזו שאומרת נעלה ונעבוד עבודת כוכבים (בראשית יא, ט) כי שם בלל ה' שפת כל הארץ Rather, Rabbi Yirmeya bar Elazar says: They divided into three factions; one said: Let us ascend to the top of the tower and dwell there. And one said: Let us ascend to the top of the tower and engage in idol worship. And one said: Let us ascend to the top of the tower and wage war. With regard to that faction that said: Let us ascend to the top of the tower and dwell there, God dispersed them. And that faction that said: Let us ascend to the top of the tower and wage war, became apes, and spirits, and demons, and female demons. And with regard to that faction that said: Let us ascend to the top of the tower and engage in idol wor-ship, it is written: “Because there the Lord confounded the language of all the earth” (Genesis 11:9).

תניא רבי נתן אומר כולם לשם עבודת כוכבים נתכוונו כתיב הכא (בראשית יא, ד) נעשה לנו שם וכתיב התם (שמות כג, יג) ושם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו מה להלן עבודת כוכבים אף כאן עבודת כוכבים It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: All of those factions intended to build the tower for the sake of idol worship. It is written here: “And let us make a name for us” (Genesis 11:4), and it is written there: “And make no mention of the name of the other gods” (Exodus 23:13). Just as there, the connotation of “name” is idol worship, so too here, the connotation of “name” is idol worship.

אמר רבי יוחנן מגדל שליש נשרף שליש נבלע שליש קיים אמר רב אויר מגדל משכח אמר רב יוסף בבל ובורסיף סימן רע לתורה מאי בורסיף אמר ר' אסי בור שאפי: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The uppermost third of the tower was burned, the lowermost third of the tower was swallowed into the earth, and the middle third remained intact. Rav says: The atmosphere of the tower causes forgetfulness; anyone who goes there forgets what he has learned. As a result of the building of the tower, forgetting was introduced into the world. Rav Yosef says: Babylonia and the adjacent place, Bursif, are each a bad omen for Torah, i.e., they cause one to forget his knowledge. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of Bursif? Rabbi Asi says: It is an abbreviation of empty pit [bor shafi].

אנשי סדום אין להם חלק לעולם הבא וכו': ת"ר אנשי סדום אין להן חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (בראשית יג, יג) ואנשי סדום רעים וחטאים לה' מאד רעים בעוה"ז וחטאים לעולם הבא § The mishna teaches: The people of Sodom have no share in the World-to-Come. The Sages taught: The people of Sodom have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners before the Lord exceedingly” (Genesis 13:13). “Wicked” indicates in this world; “and sinners” indicates for the World-to-Come.

אמר רב יהודה רעים בגופן וחטאים בממונם רעים בגופן דכתיב (בראשית לט, ט) ואיך אעשה הרעה הגדולה הזאת וחטאתי לאלהים וחטאים בממונם דכתיב (דברים טו, ט) והיה בך חטא לה' זו ברכת השם מאד שמתכוונים וחוטאים Rav Yehuda says: “Wicked” is referring to sins they committed with their bodies; “and sinners” is referring to sins they committed with their money. “Wicked” is referring to sins they committed with their bodies, as it is written with regard to Joseph and the wife of Potiphar: “And how can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God” (Genesis 39:9). “And sinners” is referring to sins they committed with their money, as it is written: “And your eye is wicked against your poor brother, and you give him nothing…for it shall be reckoned to you as a sin” (Deuteronomy 15:9). “Before the Lord”; this is referring to blessing, a euphemism for cursing, God. “Exceedingly” means that they had intent and sinned and did not sin unwittingly or driven by lust.

במתניתא תנא רעים בממונם וחטאים בגופן רעים בממונם דכתיב (דברים טו, ט) ורעה עינך באחיך האביון וחטאים בגופן דכתיב (בראשית לט, ט) וחטאתי לאלהים לה' זו ברכת השם מאד זו שפיכות דמים שנאמר (מלכים ב כא, טז) גם דם נקי שפך מנשה (בירושלים) הרבה מאד [וגו'] It was taught in a baraita: “Wicked” is referring to sins they committed with their money; “and sinners” is referring to sins they committed with their bodies. “Wicked” is referring to sins they committed with their money, as it is written: “And your eye is wicked against your poor brother and you give him nothing” (Deuteronomy 15:9). “And sinners” is referring to sins they committed with their bodies, as it is written with regard to Joseph and the wife of Potiphar: “And sin against God” (Genesis 39:9). “Before the Lord”; this is referring to blessing, a euphemism for cursing, God. “Exceedingly [meod ]” is referring to bloodshed, as it is stated: “Moreover Manasseh shed very [meod ] much blood” (II Kings 21:16).

ת"ר אנשי סדום לא נתגאו אלא בשביל טובה שהשפיע להם הקב"ה ומה כתיב בהם (איוב כח, ה) ארץ ממנה יצא לחם ותחתיה נהפך כמו אש מקום ספיר אבניה ועפרות זהב לו נתיב לא ידעו עיט ולא שזפתו עין איה לא הדריכוהו בני שחץ לא עדה עליו שחל The Sages taught: The people of Sodom became haughty and sinned due only to the excessive goodness that the Holy One, Blessed be He, bestowed upon them. And what is written concerning them, indicating that goodness? “As for the earth, out of it comes bread, and underneath it is turned up as it were by fire. Its stones are the place of sapphires, and it has dust of gold. That path no bird of prey knows, neither has the falcon’s eye seen it. The proud beasts have not trodden it, nor has the lion passed thereby” (Job 28:5–8). The reference is to the city of Sodom, which was later overturned, as it is stated thereafter: “He puts forth His hand upon the flinty rock; He overturns the mountains by the roots” (Job 28:9).

אמרו וכי מאחר שארץ ממנה יצא לחם ועפרות זהב לו למה לנו עוברי דרכים שאין באים אלינו אלא לחסרינו [מממוננו] בואו ונשכח תורת רגל מארצנו שנאמר (איוב כח, ד) פרץ נחל מעם גר הנשכחים מני רגל דלו מאנוש נעו The people of Sodom said: Since we live in a land from which bread comes and has the dust of gold, we have everything that we need. Why do we need travelers, as they come only to divest us of our property? Come, let us cause the proper treatment of travelers to be forgotten from our land, as it is stated: “He breaks open a watercourse in a place far from inhabitants, forgotten by pedestrians, they are dried up, they have moved away from men” (Job 28:4).

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (תהלים סב, ד) עד אנה תהותתו על איש תרצחו כולכם כקיר נטוי גדר הדחויה מלמד שהיו נותנין עיניהן בבעלי ממון ומושיבין אותו אצל קיר נטוי ודוחין אותו עליו ובאים ונוטלין את ממונו Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “How long will you seek to overwhelm a man? You will all be murdered like a leaning wall or a tottering fence” (Psalms 62:4)? This teaches that the people of Sodom set their sights on property owners. They would take one and place him alongside an inclined, flimsy wall that was about to fall, and push it upon him to kill him, and then they would come and take his property.

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (איוב כד, טז) חתר בחשך בתים יומם חתמו למו לא (ראו) [ידעו] אור מלמד שהיו נותנים עיניהם בבעלי ממון ומפקידים אצלו אפרסמון ומניחים אותו בבית גנזיהם לערב באים ומריחין אותו ככלב שנא' (תהלים נט, ז) ישובו לערב יהמו ככלב ויסובבו עיר ובאים וחותרים שם ונוטלין אותו ממון Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “In the dark they dig through houses; by day they shut themselves up; they know not the light” (Job 24:16)? This teaches that they would set their sights on property owners. They would take one and they would give him balsam, whose smell diffuses, and the property owner would place it in his treasury. In the evening, the people of Sodom would come and sniff it out like a dog and discover the location of the property owner’s treasury, as it is stated: “They return at evening; they howl like a dog, and go round about the city” (Psalms 59:7). And after discovering the location they would come and dig there, and they would take that property.

(איוב כד, י) ערום הלכו מבלי לבוש ואין כסות בקרה חמור יתומים ינהגו יחבלו שור אלמנה גבולות ישיגו עדר גזלו וירעו (איוב כא, לב) והוא לקברות יובל ועל גדיש ישקוד The Gemara cites verses that allude to the practices of the people of Sodom: “They lie at night naked without clothing, and they have no covering in the cold” (Job 24:7). And likewise: “They drive away the donkey of the fatherless; they take the widow’s ox as a pledge” (Job 24:3). And likewise: “They trespass; they violently steal flocks and graze them” (Job 24:2). And likewise: “For he is brought to the grave, and watch is kept over his tomb” (Job 21:32).

דרש ר' יוסי בציפורי אחתרין ההיא ליליא תלת מאה מחתרתא בציפורי אתו וקא מצערי ליה אמרו ליה יהבית אורחיה לגנבי אמר להו מי הוה ידענא דאתו גנבי כי קא נח נפשיה דרבי יוסי שפעי מרזבי דציפורי דמא Rabbi Yosei taught in Tzippori the methods of theft employed in Sodom. That night three hundred tunnels were excavated in Tzippori in order to employ those methods. Homeowners came and harassed him; they said to him: You have given a way for thieves to steal. Rabbi Yosei said to them: Did I know that thieves would come as a result of my lecture? The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Yosei died, the gutters of Tzippori miraculously overflowed with blood as a sign of his death.

אמרי דאית ליה חד תורא מרעי חד יומא דלית ליה לירעי תרי יומי ההוא יתמא בר ארמלתא הבו ליה תורי למרעיה אזל שקלינהו וקטלינהו אמר להו The people of Sodom would say: Anyone who has one ox shall herd the city’s oxen for one day. Anyone who does not have any oxen shall herd the city’s oxen for two days. The Gemara relates: They gave oxen to a certain orphan, son of a widow, to herd. He went and took them and killed them. The orphan said to the people of Sodom:

Daf 109b

דאית ליה תורא נשקול חד משכא דלית ליה תורא נשקול תרי משכי אמרו ליה מאי האי אמר להו סוף דינא כתחילת דינא מה תחילת דינא דאית ליה תורא מרעי חד יומא דלית ליה תורי מרעי תרי יומי אף סוף דינא דאית ליה חד תורא לשקול חד דלית ליה תורא לשקול תרי Let anyone who has one ox take one hide and let anyone who does not have an ox take two hides. The people of Sodom said to the orphan: What is the reason for this? The orphan said to them: The ultimate rule is parallel to the initial rule; just as the initial rule is that anyone who has one ox shall herd the city’s animals for one day and anyone who does not have any oxen shall herd the city’s animals for two days, so too, the ultimate rule is: Let anyone who has one ox take one hide and let anyone who does not have an ox take two hides.

דעבר במברא ניתיב חד זוזא דלא עבר במברא ניתיב תרי דהוה ליה (תורא) [דרא] דלבני אתי כל חד וחד שקל' חדא א"ל אנא חדא דשקלי דהוה שדי תומי או שמכי אתו כל חד וחד שקיל חדא א"ל אנא חדא דשקלי Furthermore, they declared in Sodom: Let one who crosses on a ferry give one dinar as payment; let one who does not cross on a ferry, but walks in the river, give two dinars. In addition, when there was anyone who had a row of bricks, each and every one of the people of Sodom would come and take one brick and say to him: I am taking only one, and you are certainly not particular about so inconsequential an item, and they would do this until none remained. And when there was anyone who would cast garlic or onions to dry, each and every one of the people of Sodom would come and take one and say to him: I took only one garlic or onion, and they would do this until none remained.

ארבע דייני היו בסדום שקראי ושקרוראי זייפי ומצלי דינא דמחי ליה לאיתתא דחברי' ומפלא ליה אמרי ליה יהבה ניהליה דניעברה ניהליך דפסיק ליה לאודנא דחמרא דחבריה אמרו ליה הבה ניהליה עד דקדחא דפדע ליה לחבריה אמרי ליה הב ליה אגרא דשקל לך דמא There were four judges in Sodom and they were named for their actions: Shakrai, meaning liar, and Shakrurai, habitual liar, Zayfai, forger, and Matzlei Dina, perverter of justice. These were the judgments that they rendered: In a case of one who strikes the wife of another and causes her to miscarry, they would say to the woman’s husband: Give the woman to the one who struck her, so that she will be impregnated for you again. In a case of one who severed the ear of another’s donkey, they would say to the owner of the donkey: Give the donkey to the one who caused the damage, until the ear grows back. In a case of one who wounds another, they would say to the injured party: Give the one who wounded you a fee, as he let your blood.

דעבר במברא יהיב ארבעה זוזי דעבר במיא יהיב תמני זוזי זימנא חדא אתא ההוא כובס איקלע להתם אמרו ליה הב ד' זוזי אמר להו אנא במיא עברי אמרו ליה א"כ הב תמניא דעברת במיא לא יהיב פדיוהו אתא לקמיה דדיינא א"ל הב ליה אגרא דשקיל לך דמא ותמניא זוזי דעברת במיא And they instituted an ordinance: One who crossed the river on a ferry gives four dinars, and one who crossed the river in the water gives eight dinars. One time a certain launderer came and arrived there. The people of Sodom said to him: Give four dinars as payment for the ferry. He said to them: I crossed in the water. They said to him: If so, give eight dinars, as you crossed in the water. He did not give the payment, and they struck him and wounded him. He came before the judge to seek compensation. The judge said to him: Give your assailant a fee, as he let your blood, and eight dinars, as you crossed the river in the water.

אליעזר עבד אברהם איתרמי התם פדיוהי אתא לקמיה דיינא א"ל הב ליה אגרא דשקל לך דמא שקל גללא פדיוהי איהו לדיינא אמר מאי האי א"ל אגרא דנפק לי מינך הב ניהליה להאי וזוזי דידי כדקיימי קיימי Eliezer, servant of Abraham, happened to come there, and they wounded him. He came before the judge to seek compensation. The judge said to him: Give your assailant a fee, as he let your blood. He took a stone and he wounded the judge. The judge said: What is this? Eliezer said to him: The fee that is to be paid to me by you, give it to that person who wounded me, and my money will remain where it remains.

הויא להו פורייתא דהוו מגני עלה אורחין כי מאריך גייזי ליה כי גוץ מתחין ליה אליעזר עבד אברהם אקלע להתם אמרו ליה קום גני אפוריא אמר להון נדרא נדרי מן יומא דמיתת אמא לא גנינא אפוריא The Gemara continues to discuss the sins of the people of Sodom: They had beds on which they would lay their guests; when a guest was longer than the bed they would cut him, and when a guest was shorter than the bed they would stretch him. Eliezer, servant of Abraham, happened to come there. They said to him: Come lie on the bed. He said to them: I took a vow that since the day my mother died I do not lie on a bed.

כי הוה מתרמי להו עניא יהבו ליה כל חד וחד דינרא וכתיב שמיה עליה וריפתא לא הוו ממטי ליה כי הוה מית אתי כל חד וחד שקיל דידיה When a poor person would happen to come to Sodom, each and every person would give him a dinar, and the name of the giver was written on each dinar. And they would not give or sell him bread, so that he could not spend the money and would die of hunger. When he would die, each and every person would come and take his dinar.

הכי אתני בינייהו כל מאן דמזמין גברא לבי הילולא לשלח גלימא הוי האי הילולא אקלע אליעזר להתם ולא יהבו ליה נהמא כי בעי למסעד אתא אליעזר ויתיב לסיפא דכולהו אמרו ליה מאן אזמנך להכא א"ל לההוא [דיתיב] אתה זמנתן [אמר דילמא שמעי בי דאנא אזמינתיה ומשלחי ליה מאניה דהאי גברא] שקל גלימיה ההוא דיתיב גביה ורהט לברא וכן עבד לכולהו עד דנפקי כולהו ואכלא איהו לסעודתא This is what the people of Sodom stipulated among themselves: Whoever invites a man to a wedding, his cloak will be removed. There was this wedding, and Eliezer, servant of Abraham, arrived there and they did not give him bread. When he sought to dine, Eliezer came and sat at the end, behind everyone. They said to him: Who invited you to here? He said to the one sitting next to him: You invited me. That man said to himself: Perhaps they will hear that I invited him and they will remove the garment of that man, referring to himself. The one who sat next to him took his cloak and ran outside. And likewise, Eliezer did the same for all of them until they all left, and he ate the meal.

הויא ההיא רביתא דהות קא מפקא ריפתא לעניא בחצבא איגלאי מלתא שפיוה דובשא ואוקמוה על איגר שורא אתא זיבורי ואכלוה והיינו דכתיב (בראשית יח, כ) ויאמר ה' זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב על עיסקי ריבה: There was a young woman who would take bread out to the poor people in a pitcher so the people of Sodom would not see it. The matter was revealed, and they smeared her with honey and positioned her on the wall of the city, and the hornets came and consumed her. And that is the meaning of that which is written: “And the Lord said: Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great [rabba]” (Genesis 18:20). And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabba is an allusion to the matter of the young woman [riva] who was killed for her act of kindness. It is due to that sin that the fate of the people of Sodom was sealed.

מרגלים אין להם חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (במדבר יד, לז) וימותו האנשים מוציאי דבת הארץ רעה במגפה וימותו בעולם הזה במגפה לעולם הבא: § The mishna teaches: The spies who spread an evil report of their visit to Canaan have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And those men who spread the evil report about the land died by plague before the Lord” (Numbers 14:37). “And…died” indicates in this world, and “by plague” indicates for the World-to-Come.

עדת קרח אין להם חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (במדבר טז, לג) ותכס עליהם הארץ בעולם הזה ויאבדו מתוך הקהל לעולם הבא דברי ר"ע רבי אליעזר אומר עליהם אמר הכתוב (שמואל א ב, ו) ה' ממית ומחיה מוריד שאול ויעל: The members of the assembly of Korah have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the earth closed upon them” (Numbers 16:33), meaning in this world, and also: “And they perished from among the assembly” (Numbers 16:33), meaning in the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: About the assembly of Korah, the verse states: “The Lord kills and makes alive; He lowers to the grave, and raises” (I Samuel 2:6), indicating that the assembly of Korah has a share in the World-to-Come.

ת"ר עדת קרח אין להם חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר ותכס עליהם הארץ בעולם הזה ויאבדו מתוך הקהל לעולם הבא דברי רבי עקיבא רבי יהודה בן בתירא אומר הרי הן כאבידה המתבקשת שנאמר (תהלים קיט, קעו) תעיתי כשה אובד בקש עבדך כי מצותיך לא שכחתי: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 13:9): The members of the assembly of Korah have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the earth closed upon them” (Numbers 16:33), meaning in this world, and also: “And they perished from among the assembly” (Numbers 16:33), meaning in the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Although it says that they perished, they are like a lost item that is sought, ultimately found, and rehabilitated, as it is stated: “I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek out your servant, for I do not forget your mitzvot” (Psalms 119:176).

ויקח [קרח] אמר ריש לקיש שלקח מקח רע לעצמו קרח שנעשה קרחה בישראל בן יצהר בן שהרתיח עליו את כל העולם כצהרים בן קהת בן שהקהה שיני מולידיו בן לוי בן שנעשה לויה בגיהנם Apropos Korah, the Gemara proceeds to interpret the verses written concerning him. “And Korah, son of Izhar, son of Kohath, son of Levi, took [vayikkaḥ]” (Numbers 16:1), Reish Lakish says: He purchased [lakaḥ] a bad acquisition for himself, as through his actions he drove himself from the world. “Korah” alludes to the fact that because of him a void [korḥa] was created in the children of Israel. “Son of Izhar,” is referring to a son who incited the wrath of the entire world upon him like the heat of the afternoon [tzohorayim]. “Son of Kohath,” is referring to a son who blunted [hik’ha] the teeth of his parents, i.e., he shamed them with his conduct. “Son of Levi,” is referring to a son who became an escort [levaya] in Gehenna.

וליחשוב נמי בן יעקב בן שעקב עצמו לגיהנם אמר רב שמואל בר רב יצחק יעקב ביקש רחמים על עצמו שנאמר (בראשית מט, ו) בסודם אל תבא נפשי ובקהלם אל תחד כבודי בסודם אל תבא נפשי אלו מרגלים ובקהלם אל תחד כבודי זה עדת קרח The Gemara asks: But if Korah’s lineage is being interpreted disparagingly, why not let the Torah also include: Son of Jacob [Ya’akov], and interpret it: A son who contorted [she’akav] himself until he reached Gehenna? Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: Jacob prayed for mercy for himself that his name would not be included in the lineage of Korah, as it is stated: “Let my soul not come into their council; to their assembly let my honor not be united” (Genesis 49:6). “Let my soul not come into their council”; these are the spies. Jacob prayed that his name would not be mentioned in their regard. “To their assembly let my honor not be united”; this is referring to the assembly of Korah.

דתן שעבר על דת אל אבירם שאיבר עצמו מעשות תשובה ואון שישב באנינות פלת שנעשו לו פלאות בן ראובן בן שראה והבין The Gemara proceeds to interpret the names of Korah’s cohorts: “Dathan and Abiram, the sons of Eliab, and On, the son of Peleth, sons of Reuben” (Numbers 16:1). “Dathan” is one who violated the precepts [dat] of God. “Abiram” is one who braced [iber] himself from repenting. “And On” indicates one who sat in acute mourning [aninut] over the sin that he committed, and he repented and was spared. “Peleth” is one for whom wonders [pelaot] were performed. Son of Reuben [Reuven], is a son who saw and understood [ra’a vehevin] the nature of what was transpiring and repented.

אמר רב און בן פלת אשתו הצילתו אמרה ליה מאי נפקא לך מינה אי מר רבה אנת תלמידא ואי מר רבה אנת תלמידא אמר לה מאי אעביד הואי בעצה ואשתבעי לי בהדייהו אמרה ליה ידענא דכולה כנישתא קדישתא נינהו דכתיב (במדבר טז, ג) כי כל העדה כולם קדושים אמרה ליה תוב דאנא מצילנא לך אשקיתיה חמרא וארויתיה ואגניתיה גואי אותבה על בבא Rav says: On, son of Peleth, did not repent on his own; rather, his wife saved him. She said to him: What is the difference to you? If this Master, Moses, is the great one, you are the student. And if this Master, Korah, is the great one, you are the student. Why are you involving yourself in this matter? On said to her: What shall I do? I was one of those who took counsel and I took an oath with them that I would be with them. She said to him: I know that the entire assembly is holy, as it is written: “For all the assembly is holy” (Numbers 16:3), and they observe the restrictions of modesty. She said to him: Sit, for I will save you. She gave him wine to drink and caused him to become drunk and laid him on a bed inside their tent. She sat at the entrance of the tent

Daf 110a

וסתרתה למזיה כל דאתא חזיה הדר אדהכי והכי אבלעו להו and exposed her hair as though she were bathing. Anyone who came and saw her stepped back. In the meantime the assembly of Korah was swallowed into the ground, and On, son of Peleth, was spared.

איתתיה דקרח אמרה ליה חזי מאי קעביד משה איהו הוה מלכא לאחוה שוויה כהנא רבא לבני אחוהי שוינהו סגני דכהנא אי אתיא תרומה אמר תיהוי לכהן אי אתו מעשר דשקילתו אתון אמר הבו חד מי' לכהן ועוד דגייז ליה למזייכו ומיטלל לכו כי כופתא עינא יהב במזייכו אמר לה הא איהו נמי קא עביד אמרה ליה כיון דכולהו רבותא דידיה אמר איהו נמי (שופטים טז, ל) תמות נפשי עם פלשתים Korah’s wife said to him: See what Moses is doing. He is the king, he appointed his brother High Priest, and he appointed his brother’s sons deputy priests. If teruma comes, he says: Let it be for the priest; if the first tithe comes, which you as Levites take, he says: Give one tenth to the priest. And furthermore, he shears your hair and waves you as if you are as insignificant as excrement (see Numbers 8:5–11), as though he set his sights on your hair and wishes you to be shaven and unsightly. Korah said to her: But didn’t he also do so; he shaved his hair like the rest of the Levites? She said to him: Since it is all done for his own prominence, he also said metaphorically: “Let me die with the Philistines” (Judges 16:30); he was willing to humiliate himself in order to humiliate you.

ועוד דקאמר לכו עבדיתו תכלתא אי ס"ד תכלתא חשיבא [מצוה] אפיק גלימי דתכלתא וכסינהו לכולהו מתיבתך היינו דכתיב (משלי יד, א) חכמות נשים בנתה ביתה זו אשתו של און בן פלת ואולת בידה תהרסנה זו אשתו של קרח She said to him: And furthermore, with regard to that which he said to you, to prepare sky-blue dye for your ritual fringes, one could respond to him: If it enters your mind, Moses, that using sky-blue dye is considered a mitzva, take out robes that are made entirely of material colored with sky-blue dye, and dress all the students of your academy in sky-blue robes without ritual fringes; why could one not fulfill the mitzva in that manner? Clearly, Moses is fabricating all this. This is the meaning of that which is written: “The wisdom of women builds her house” (Proverbs 14:1); this is referring to the wife of On, son of Peleth. And: “Folly plucks it down with her hands” (Proverbs 14:1); this is referring to the wife of Korah.

(במדבר טז, ב) ויקומו לפני משה ואנשים מבני ישראל חמשים ומאתים מיוחדים שבעדה קריאי מועד שהיו יודעים לעבר שנים ולקבוע חדשים אנשי שם שהיה להם שם בכל העולם It is written: “And they arose before Moses, with men from the children of Israel, two hundred and fifty princes of the congregation, the elect men of the assembly, men of renown” (Numbers 16:2). These men were the distinctive people of the assembly. “The elect men of the assembly [keri’ei moed]” is referring to those who knew how to intercalate the years and establish the months in order to determine the time for each Festival [moed]. “Men of renown [shem],” is referring to those who had a reputation [shem] throughout the world.

(במדבר טז, ד) וישמע משה ויפול על פניו מה שמועה שמע אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן שחשדוהו מאשת איש שנאמר (תהלים קו, טז) ויקנאו למשה במחנה א"ר שמואל בר יצחק מלמד שכל אחד ואחד קנא את אשתו ממשה שנאמר (שמות לג, ז) ומשה יקח את האהל ונטה לו מחוץ למחנה With regard to the verse: “And Moses heard and he fell on his face” (Numbers 16:4), the Gemara asks: What report did he hear that elicited that reaction? Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: He heard that they suspected him of adultery with a married woman, as it is stated: “And they were jealous of Moses in the camp” (Psalms 106:16). Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says: This teaches that each and every man warned his wife to distance herself from Moses and not enter into seclusion with him, as it is stated: “And Moses would take the tent and pitch it outside the camp” (Exodus 33:7). It was due to this slander that he withdrew from the camp.

(במדבר טז, כה) ויקם משה וילך אל דתן ואבירם אמר ר"ל מכאן שאין מחזיקין במחלוקת דאמר רב כל המחזיק במחלוקת עובר בלאו שנאמר (במדבר יז, ה) ולא יהיה כקרח וכעדתו § With regard to the verse: “And Moses arose and went to Dathan and Abiram” (Numbers 16:25), Reish Lakish says: From here we derive that one may not perpetuate a dispute, as Rav says: Anyone who perpetuates a dispute violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “And he will not be like Korah and his assembly, as the Lord spoke by the hand of Moses to him” (Numbers 17:5). Even the aggrieved party must seek to end the dispute. Dathan and Abiram accused Moses and by right should have initiated the reconciliation. Nevertheless, Moses was not insistent on this; he went to them.

רב אשי אמר ראוי ליצטרע כתיב הכא ביד משה לו וכתיב התם (שמות ד, ו) ויאמר ה' לו עוד הבא נא ידך בחיקך Rav Ashi says: One who perpetuates a dispute is fit to be afflicted with leprosy. It is written here: “By the hand of Moses to him,” and it is written there: “And the Lord said furthermore to him: Put now your hand into your bosom. And he put his hand into his bosom; and when he took it out, behold, his hand was leprous, as white as snow” (Exodus 4:6). Based on the verbal analogy based on the term “to him” written in both verses, it is derived that the punishment for perpetuating a dispute is leprosy.

אמר ר' יוסי כל החולק על מלכות בית דוד ראוי להכישו נחש כתיב הכא (מלכים א א, ט) ויזבח אדוניהו צאן ובקר ומריא עם אבן הזוחלת וכתיב התם (דברים לב, כד) עם חמת זוחלי עפר Apropos the prohibition of perpetuating a dispute, Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to anyone who disputes the reign of the house of David, it is fitting for a snake to bite him. As it is written here: “And Adonijah slaughtered sheep and cattle and fatlings by the stone of Zoheleth” (I Kings 1:9); and it is written there: “With the poison of crawling things [zoḥalei] of the dust” (Deuteronomy 32:24). Adonijah, who rebelled against his father, King David, was fit to be bitten by a snake.

אמר רב חסדא כל החולק על רבו כחולק על השכינה שנאמר (במדבר כו, ט) בהצותם על ה' א"ר חמא ברבי חנינא כל העושה מריבה עם רבו כעושה עם שכינה שנאמר (במדבר כ, יג) המה מי מריבה אשר רבו בני ישראל (על) [את] ה' Rav Ḥisda says: Anyone who disagrees with his teacher is like one who disagrees with the Divine Presence, as it is stated with regard to Dathan and Abiram: “When they strove against the Lord” (Numbers 26:9), although their dispute was with Moses. Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Anyone who initiates a quarrel [meriva] with his teacher is like one who initiates a quarrel with the Divine Presence, as it is stated: “These are the waters of Meribah, where the children of Israel quarreled with the Lord” (Numbers 20:13), although their quarrel was with Moses.

א"ר חנינא בר פפא כל המתרעם על רבו כאילו מתרעם על השכינה שנאמר (שמות טז, ח) לא עלינו תלונותיכם כי (אם) על ה' א"ר אבהו כל המהרהר אחר רבו כאילו מהרהר אחר שכינה שנאמר (במדבר כא, ה) וידבר העם באלהים ובמשה Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa says: Anyone who expresses resentment against his teacher for wronging him, it is as though he is expressing resentment against the Divine Presence, as it is stated: “Your murmurings are not against us, but against the Lord” (Exodus 16:8). Rabbi Abbahu says: Anyone who suspects his teacher of wrongdoing, it is as though he suspects the Divine Presence, as it is stated: “And the people spoke against God, and against Moses” (Numbers 21:5). The verse likens God and Moses with regard to this matter.

(קהלת ה, יב) עושר שמור לבעליו לרעתו אמר ר"ל זה עושרו של קרח (דברים יא, ו) ואת כל היקום אשר ברגליהם א"ר אלעזר זה ממונו של אדם שמעמידו על רגליו ואמר רבי לוי משוי ג' מאות פרדות לבנות היו מפתחות של בית גנזיו של קרח וכולהו אקלידי וקילפי דגילדא § With regard to the verse: “Wealth is kept for the owner to his detriment” (Ecclesiastes 5:12), Reish Lakish says: This is referring to the wealth of Korah, which was of no use to him. The fact that Korah was wealthy is derived from the verse: “And all the substance that was at their feet” (Deuteronomy 11:6), as Rabbi Elazar says: This is referring to a person’s property, which stands him on his feet. And Rabbi Levi says: The keys alone to Korah’s treasury were a burden requiring three hundred white mules to transport them, and moreover, all the keys [aklidei] and locks were of leather. This conveys the vastness of his wealth.

א"ר חמא ברבי חנינא ג' מטמוניות הטמין יוסף במצרים אחת נתגלתה לקרח ואחת נתגלתה לאנטונינוס בן אסוירוס ואחת גנוזה לצדיקים לעתיד לבא Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Joseph concealed three buried treasures in Egypt that he accumulated from the sale of grain during the years of famine. The location of one was revealed to Korah, and the location of one was revealed to Antoninus, son of Asveirus, emperor of Rome, and one remains hidden for the righteous in the future, i.e., in the messianic era.

וא"ר יוחנן קרח לא מן הבלועים ולא מן השרופין לא מן הבלועין דכתיב (במדבר טז, לב) ואת כל האדם אשר לקרח ולא קרח ולא מן השרופים דכתיב (במדבר כו, י) באכול האש את חמשים ומאתים איש ולא קרח And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Korah was neither among the swallowed nor among the burned; he died in a plague. He was neither among the swallowed, as it is written: “And the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and their houses and all the men who were with Korah” (Numbers 16:32), from which it is inferred: But not Korah himself. Nor was he among the burned, as it is written: “When the fire consumed two hundred and fifty men” (Numbers 26:10), but not Korah.

במתניתא תנא קרח מן השרופין ומן הבלועין מן הבלועים דכתיב (במדבר כו, י) ותבלע אותם ואת קרח מן השרופין דכתיב (במדבר טז, לה) (ותצא אש מלפני ה') [ואש יצאה מאת ה'] ותאכל את חמשים ומאתים איש וקרח בהדייהו It was taught in a baraita: Korah was both among the burned and among the swallowed. He was among the swallowed, as it is written: “And the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them with Korah” (Numbers 26:10). He was among the burned, as it is written: “And fire came forth from the Lord, and devoured the two hundred and fifty men that burned the incense” (Numbers 16:35), and Korah was with them.

אמר רבא מאי דכתיב (חבקוק ג, יא) שמש ירח עמד זבולה לאור חציך יהלכו מלמד שעלו שמש וירח לזבול אמרו לפניו רבש"ע אם אתה עושה דין לבן עמרם נצא ואם לאו לא נצא עד שזרק בהם חצים אמר להן בכבודי לא מחיתם בכבוד בשר ודם מחיתם והאידנא לא נפקי עד דמחו להו Rava says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The sun and moon stand still in their habitation [zevula], at the light of Your arrows as they go” (Habakkuk 3:11)? This teaches that the sun and moon ascended to zevul, one of the seven firmaments, in which the upper Temple stands. They said before God: Master of the Universe, if You perform justice for Moses, the son of Amram, and prove his righteousness, we will emerge and illuminate the world. And if not, we will not emerge. They did not emerge until God fired arrows at them and said to them: You did not protest with regard to My honor, as people would see the sun and the moon each day and worship them, but you protested for the honor of flesh and blood? And today, the sun and the moon do not emerge until they are struck, as in deference to God they hesitate to emerge.

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (במדבר טז, ל) ואם בריאה יברא ה' ופצתה האדמה את פיה אמר משה לפני הקב"ה אם בריאה גיהנם מוטב ואם לאו יברא ה' למאי אילימא למבריה ממש והא (קהלת א, ט) אין כל חדש תחת השמש אלא לקרובי פיתחא Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “But if the Lord creates a new creation and the earth opens its mouth” (Numbers 16:30)? Moses said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: If Gehenna is already created, good, but if not, God should create it now. The Gemara asks: For what was Moses asking? If we say that his request was for God to actually create Gehenna, but isn’t it written: “There is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1:9)? There are no new creations after the six days of Creation. Rather, Moses asked God to bring the opening of Gehenna close to there, so that the assembly of Korah would be buried alive.

(במדבר כו, יא) ובני קרח לא מתו תנא משום רבינו אמרו מקום נתבצר להם בגיהנם וישבו עליו ואמרו שירה אמר רבה בר בר חנה זימנא חדא הוה קאזלינא באורחא אמר לי ההוא טייעא תא ואחוי לך בלועי דקרח אזיל חזא תרי בזעי דהוה קא נפק קיטרא מנייהו שקל גבבא דעמרא אמשיי' מיא ואותביה בריש רומחיה ואחלפי' התם איחרך א"ל אצית מה שמעת ושמעית דהוו קאמרי הכי משה ותורתו אמת והן בדאים With regard to the verse: “And the sons of Korah did not die” (Numbers 26:11), it is taught in a baraita that in the name of our teacher, the Sages said: A place was fortified for them in Gehenna and they sat upon it and recited songs of praise. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: One time I was walking on the path, and a certain Arab said to me: Come and I will show you those from the assembly of Korah who were swallowed. I went and I saw two fissures in the ground from which smoke was emerging. That Arab took a woolen fleece and dampened it with water and placed it on the tip of his spear and passed it over the fissures there. The fleece was singed, indicating the level of heat there. He said to me: Listen; what do you hear? And I heard that this is what they were saying: Moses and his Torah are truth, and they, referring to themselves, are liars.

Daf 110b

א"ל כל תלתין יומין מהדרא להו גיהנם כבשר בתוך קלחת ואמרי הכי משה ותורתו אמת והן בדאים: The Arab said to him: Every thirty days Gehenna returns them to this place like meat cooking in a cauldron, and they say this: Moses and his Torah are truth, and they are liars.

דור המדבר אין להם חלק לעולם הבא וכו': ת"ר דור המדבר אין להם חלק לעולם הבא שנאמר (במדבר יד, לה) במדבר הזה יתמו ושם ימותו יתמו בעולם הזה ושם ימותו בעולם הבא ואמר (תהלים צה, יא) אשר נשבעתי באפי אם יבואון אל מנוחתי דברי ר"ע § The mishna teaches: The members of the generation of the wilderness have no share in the World-to-Come. The Sages taught: The members of the generation of the wilderness have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “In this wilderness they shall be consumed, and there they shall die” (Numbers 14:35). “They shall be consumed” indicates in this world; “and there they shall die” indicates for the World-to-Come. And the verse states with regard to the generation of the wilderness: “Wherefore I took an oath in My anger that they should not enter into My rest” (Psalms 95:11), indicating that they will not be privileged to gain eternal rest; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

ר"א אומר (הן באין) לעולם הבא שנאמר (תהלים נ, ה) אספו לי חסידי כורתי בריתי עלי זבח אלא מה אני מקיים אשר נשבעתי באפי באפי נשבעתי וחוזרני בי Rabbi Eliezer says: They come to the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Gather My pious together to Me, those that have entered into My covenant by offering” (Psalms 50:5). Those who left Egypt entered into an eternal covenant with God at Mount Sinai. But how do I realize the meaning of the phrase “Wherefore I took an oath in My anger”? It must be understood: In My anger I took an oath, and I reconsidered and dissolved the oath when My anger subsided.

רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר לא נאמר פסוק זה אלא כנגד דורות הבאים אספו לי חסידי אלו צדיקים שבכל דור ודור כורתי בריתי (עלי זבח) אלו חנניה מישאל ועזריה שמסרו עצמן לתוך כבש האש עלי זבח [אלו] ר"ע וחביריו שמסרו עצמן לשחיטה על דברי תורה Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: This verse was stated to the generation of the wilderness only with regard to future generations, and should be understood in this manner: “Gather My pious together to Me”; these are the righteous that are in each and every generation. “Those that have entered into My covenant by offering”; these are Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, who submitted themselves to the fiery furnace to sanctify God’s name. “By offering”; this is a reference to Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues, who gave themselves up to slaughter over matters of Torah.

ר"ש בן מנסיא אומר באים הן לעולם הבא שנא' (ישעיהו לה, י) ופדויי ה' ישובון ובאו ציון ברנה אמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן שבקה ר"ע לחסידותיה שנאמר (ירמיהו ב, ב) הלוך וקראת באזני ירושלים לאמר זכרתי לך חסד נעוריך אהבת כלולותיך לכתך אחרי במדבר בארץ לא זרועה ומה אחרים באים בזכותם הם עצמן לא כל שכן: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: The generation of the wilderness comes to the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the redeemed of the Lord shall return and come singing into Zion” (Isaiah 35:10), meaning that those whom God redeemed will yet come to Zion. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Akiva abandoned his piety and uncharacteristically interpreted the verses harshly, as it is stated with regard to the generation of the wilderness: “Go and cry in the ears of Jerusalem saying, so says the Lord: I remember for you the affection of your youth, the love of your espousals, how you went after Me in the wilderness, in a land that was not sown” (Jeremiah 2:2). Now, if others come into the World-to-Come in the merit of the generation that left Egypt and followed God in the wilderness, is it not all the more so that the generation of the wilderness themselves have a share in the World-to-Come?

מתני׳ עשרת השבטים אינן עתידין לחזור שנא' (דברים כט, כז) וישליכם אל ארץ אחרת כיום הזה מה היום הולך ואינו חוזר אף הם הולכים ואינן חוזרים דברי ר"ע ר"א אומר כיום הזה מה יום מאפיל ומאיר אף עשרת השבטים שאפילה להן כך עתידה להאיר להם: MISHNA: The ten tribes are not destined to return to Eretz Yisrael, even during the messianic era, as it is stated: “And He cast them into another land, as it is this day” (Deuteronomy 29:27). Just as the day passes never to return, so too, the ten tribes go into exile and do not return; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: “As it is this day,” meaning just as the day darkens and then the sky brightens the next day, with regard to the ten tribes as well, although it is dark for them now, so it is destined to brighten for them.

גמ׳ ת"ר עשרת השבטים אין להם חלק לעוה"ב שנאמר (דברים כט, כז) ויתשם ה' מעל אדמתם באף ובחמה ובקצף גדול ויתשם ה' מעל אדמתם בעוה"ז וישליכם אל ארץ אחרת לעוה"ב דברי ר"ע ר"ש בן יהודה איש כפר עכו אומר משום ר"ש אם מעשיהם כיום הזה אינן חוזרין ואם לאו חוזרין GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 13:12): The ten tribes have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the Lord rooted them out of their land in anger, and in wrath, and in great indignation; and He cast them into another land, as it is this day” (Deuteronomy 29:27). “And the Lord rooted them out of their land” indicates in this world; “and cast them into another land” indicates for the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda of the village of Akko says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If their actions continue to be “as it is this day” and they continue to sin, they do not return to Eretz Yisrael. And if not, and they repent, they return to Eretz Yisrael.

רבי אומר באים הם לעוה"ב שנאמר (ישעיהו כז, יג) ביום ההוא יתקע בשופר גדול וגו' אמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן שבקה ר"ע לחסידותיה שנא' (ירמיהו ג, יב) הלוך וקראת את הדברים האלה צפונה ואמרת שובה משובה ישראל נאם ה' ולא אפיל פני בכם כי חסיד אני נאם ה' לא אטור לעולם Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The members of the ten tribes come to the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And it shall come to pass on that day, that a great shofar will be sounded, and they shall come who were lost in the land of Assyria and who were dispersed in the land of Egypt, and they shall worship the Lord at the holy mountain in Jerusalem” (Isaiah 27:13). Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Here too, Rabbi Akiva abandoned his piety and uncharacteristically interpreted the verses harshly, as it is stated with regard to the ten tribes: “Go and proclaim these words toward the north, and say: Return you faithless Israel, says the Lord; I will not frown upon you; for I am merciful, says the Lord, and I will not bear a grudge forever” (Jeremiah 3:12). The prophet prophesies about the return of the ten tribes to Eretz Yisrael.

מאי חסידותיה דתניא קטני בני רשעי ישראל אין באין לעוה"ב שנא' (מלאכי ג, יט) כי הנה היום בא בוער כתנור והיה כל זדים וכל עושי רשעה קש ולהט אותם היום הבא אמר ה' צבאות אשר לא יעזוב להם שורש וענף שורש בעוה"ז וענף לעוה"ב דברי רבן גמליאל § The Gemara asks: What is the characteristic piety of Rabbi Akiva mentioned above? The Gemara answers: It is as it is taught in a baraita: The minor children of the wicked of the Jewish people, who died with neither their own virtue nor the virtue of their parents, do not come into the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “For behold the day is coming; it burns like a furnace, and all the arrogant and all who do wickedly shall be straw; and the day that is coming shall burn them up, says the Lord of hosts, so that it will leave them neither root nor branch” (Malachi 3:19). “Root” and “branch” are referring to descendants; they will have neither a root in this world nor a branch in the World-to-Come; this is the statement of Rabban Gamliel.

ר"ע אומר באים הם לעוה"ב שנא' (תהלים קטז, ו) שומר פתאים ה' שכן קורין בכרכי הים לינוקא פתיא ואומר (דניאל ד, כ) גודו אילנא וחבלוהי ברם עיקר שרשוהי בארעא שבוקו ואלא מה אני מקיים לא יעזוב להם שורש וענף שלא יניח להם לא מצוה ולא שיורי מצוה ד"א שורש זו נשמה וענף זה הגוף Rabbi Akiva says: They come into the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “The Lord preserves the simple [peta’im]” (Psalms 116:6), as in the cities overseas the residents call a child patya. And the verse states with regard to Nebuchadnezzar: “Hew down the tree and destroy it; yet leave the stump of its roots in the earth” (Daniel 4:20). If that is the case with regard to Nebuchadnezzar, all the more so it is the case with regard to the wicked people of Israel. But how do I realize the meaning of the phrase: “So that it will leave them neither root nor branch”? It means that God will not leave for the wicked a mitzva nor the remnants of a mitzva for which they will be rewarded. Rabbi Akiva dug deep to find a way into the World-to-Come for these children. Alternatively, “root”; this is referring to the soul. “Nor branch”; this is referring to the body.

אבל קטני בני רשעי עובדי כוכבים ד"ה אין באין לעוה"ב ור"ג נפקא ליה (ישעיהו כו, יד) מותאבד כל זכר למו But everyone agrees that the minor children of the wicked of the nations of the world will not come into the World-to-Come, as they have no virtue at all. And Rabban Gamliel derives this matter concerning those children from the verse: “And you have caused all their memory to perish” (Isaiah 26:14).

אתמר קטן מאימתי בא לעוה"ב ר' חייא ור"ש בר ר' חד אמר משעה שנולד וחד אמר משעה שסיפר מ"ד משעה שנולד שנא' (תהלים כב, לב) יבואו ויגידו צדקתו לעם נולד כי עשה ומ"ד משעה שסיפר דכתיב (תהלים כב, לא) זרע יעבדנו יסופר לה' לדור It was stated: With regard to a minor who dies, from when, i.e., from what stage, does he come into the World-to-Come? There is a dispute between Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. One of them says: From the moment that he is born, and the other one says: From the moment that he begins to talk. The Gemara elaborates: The one who says: From the moment that he is born, derives it from that which is stated: “They shall come and shall declare His righteousness to a people that shall be born, that He has done this” (Psalms 22:32). And the one who says: From the moment that he begins to talk, derives it from that which is written: “Their seed shall serve Him; it shall be told of the Lord to the coming generation” (Psalms 22:31), as from the moment he talks, he belongs to God.

אתמר רבינא אמר משעה שנזרע דכתיב זרע יעבדנו ר"נ בר יצחק אמר משעה שנימול דכתיב (תהלים פח, טז) עני אני וגוע מנוער נשאתי אימיך אפונה It was stated that additional amora’im expressed opinions about the same matter. Ravina says: From the moment that the child is conceived, even before his birth, he can enter the World-to-Come, as it is written: “Their seed shall serve Him” (Psalms 22:31); even as seed the child merits to enter the World-to-Come. Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: From the moment that he is circumcised, as it is written: “I am poor and close to death from youth; I suffered your terrors [emekha], I am numb” (Psalms 88:16). From the moment that one bears the mark that the Jewish people have due to fear of God [eima], he turns to God and he belongs to Him.

תנא משום ר"מ משעה שיאמר אמן שנא' (ישעיהו כו, ב) פתחו שערים ויבא גוי צדיק שומר אמוני' אל תקרי שומר אמונים אלא שאומר אמן It is taught in the name of Rabbi Meir: From the moment that the child will say amen, as it is stated: “Open the gates, so that the righteous nation that keeps faithfulness may enter” (Isaiah 26:2). Do not read the verse as “that keeps faithfulness [shomer emunim]”; rather, read it as: That says amen [she’omer amen]. From the moment he says amen, the gates to the World-to-Come open.

Daf 111a

מאי אמן א"ר חנינא אל מלך נאמן What is the meaning of the term amen? Rabbi Ḥanina says: It is an acronym of the words: God, faithful King [El Melekh ne’eman].

(ישעיהו ה, יד) לכן הרחיבה שאול נפשה ופערה פיה לבלי חוק אמר ר"ל למי שמשייר אפי' חוק אחד א"ר יוחנן לא ניחא למרייהו דאמרת להו הכי אלא אפי' לא למד אלא חוק אחד § With regard to the verse: “Therefore, the netherworld has enlarged itself and opened its mouth without measure [livli ḥok]” (Isaiah 5:14), Reish Lakish says: It is referring to one who leaves even one statute [ḥok] unfulfilled; the netherworld expands for him. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is not satisfactory to God, their Master, that you said this about them, as according to Reish Lakish’s opinion most of the Jewish people would be doomed to Gehenna. Rather, even if one learned only one statute, he has a share in the World-to-Come, and “livli ḥok” means one who has learned no statutes at all.

(שנאמר) (זכריה יג, ח) והיה בכל הארץ נאם ה' פי שנים בה יכרתו ויגועו והשלישית יותר בה אמר ר"ל שלישי של שם א"ל רבי יוחנן לא ניחא למרייהו דאמרת להו הכי אלא אפי' שלישי של נח With regard to that which is stated: “And it shall come to pass that in all the land, says the Lord, two parts shall be excised and die, but the third shall remain in it” (Zechariah 13:8), Reish Lakish says: “The third” means that only one-third of the descendants of Shem, son of Noah, will remain, and everyone else will die. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: It is not satisfactory to God, their Master, that you said this about them, that the overwhelming majority of the world will be destroyed. Rather, even as many as one-third of the descendants of Noah, one-third of the population of the world, will remain.

(ירמיהו ג, יד) כי אנכי בעלתי בכם ולקחתי אתכם אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה אמר ר"ל דברים ככתבן א"ל ר' יוחנן לא ניחא ליה למרייהו דאמרת להו הכי אלא אחד מעיר מזכה כל העיר כולה ושנים ממשפחה מזכין כל המשפחה כולה יתיב רב כהנא קמיה דרב ויתיב וקאמר דברים ככתבן א"ל רב לא ניחא ליה למרייהו דאמרת להו הכי אלא אחד מעיר מזכה כל העיר ושנים ממשפחה מזכין כל המשפחה With regard to the verse: “For I have taken you to Myself: And I will take out one of a city, and two of a family” (Jeremiah 3:14), Reish Lakish says: The meaning of this statement is as it is written, that only individuals will be spared and the rest will be destroyed. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: It is not satisfactory to God, their Master, that you said this about them. Rather, the merit of one from the city causes the entire city to benefit, and the merit of two from a family causes the entire family to benefit and be redeemed. Likewise, the Gemara relates that Rav Kahana sat before Rav, and sat and said: The meaning of this statement is as it is written. Rav said to him: It is not satisfactory to God, their Master, that you said this about them. Rather, the merit of one from the city causes the entire city to benefit, and the merit of two from a family causes the entire family to benefit and be redeemed.

חזייה דהוה קא חייף רישיה וסליק ויתיב קמיה דרב א"ל (איוב כח, יג) ולא תמצא בארץ החיים א"ל מילט קא לייטת לי א"ל קרא קאמינא לא תמצא תורה במי שמחיה עצמו עליה The Gemara relates that Rav saw that Rav Kahana was washing the hair on his head and then arose and sat before Rav. Rav said to Rav Kahana: “Nor shall it be found in the land of the living [haḥayyim]” (Job 28:13). Rav Kahana thought that Rav addressed that verse to him and he said to Rav: Are you cursing me? Rav said to him: It is a verse that I am saying to remind you that Torah will not be found in one who sustains [meḥayye] himself in an indulgent manner in its study; rather, Torah is acquired through suffering and difficulty.

תניא רבי סימאי אומר נאמר (שמות ו, ז) ולקחתי אתכם לי לעם ונאמר והבאתי אתכם מקיש יציאתן ממצרים לביאתן לארץ מה ביאתן לארץ שנים מס' ריבוא אף יציאתן ממצרים שנים מס' ריבוא אמר רבא וכן לימות המשיח שנא' (הושע ב, יז) וענתה שמה כימי נעוריה וכיום עלותה מארץ מצרים It is taught in a baraita with regard to the few that are destined to be redeemed: Rav Simai says that it is stated: “And I will take you to Me as a people” (Exodus 6:7), and juxtaposed to that verse it is stated: “And I will bring you into the land” (Exodus 6:8). The Torah compares their exodus from Egypt to their entry into the land; just as during their entry into the land only two of six hundred thousand entered the land, as they all died in the wilderness except for Caleb and Joshua, so too, during their exodus from Egypt, in terms of the ratio, only two of six hundred thousand left Egypt and the rest died there. Rava says: And likewise, that will be situation in the messianic era, as it is stated: “And she shall respond there, as in the days of her youth, and as in the day when she came up out of the land of Egypt” (Hosea 2:17). The ultimate redemption and the exodus from Egypt are juxtaposed, indicating that in the messianic era too, only few will survive.

תניא אמר ר' אלעזר ברבי יוסי פעם אחת נכנסתי לאלכסנדריא של מצרים מצאתי זקן אחד ואמר לי בא ואראך מה עשו אבותי לאבותיך מהם טבעו בים מהם הרגו בחרב מהם מעכו בבנין ועל דבר זה נענש משה רבינו שנא' (שמות ה, כג) ומאז באתי אל פרעה לדבר בשמך הרע לעם הזה § It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: One time I entered Alexandria of Egypt. I found one old man and he said to me: Come and I will show you what my ancestors, the Egyptians, did to your ancestors, the Jewish people. Some of them they drowned in the sea, some of them they killed with the sword, and some of them they crushed in the buildings. And it is over this matter, Moses’ protest of the afflictions suffered by the Jewish people, that Moses, our teacher, was punished, as it is stated: “For since I came to Pharaoh to speak in Your name, he has done evil to this people, neither have You delivered Your people at all” (Exodus 5:23).

אמר לו הקב"ה חבל על דאבדין ולא משתכחין הרי כמה פעמים נגליתי על אברהם יצחק ויעקב באל שדי ולא הרהרו על מדותי ולא אמרו לי מה שמך אמרתי לאברהם (בראשית יג, יז) קום התהלך בארץ לארכה ולרחבה כי לך אתננה בקש מקום לקבור את שרה ולא מצא עד שקנה בד' מאות שקל כסף ולא הרהר על מדותי The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Woe over those who are gone and are no longer found; as several times I revealed Myself to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as God Almighty [El Shaddai] and they did not question My attributes, and did not say to Me: What is Your name? I said to Abraham: “Arise, walk through the land in the length of it and in the breadth of it; for unto you I will give it” (Genesis 13:17). Ultimately, he sought a place to bury Sarah and did not find one until he purchased it for four hundred silver shekels, and he did not question My attributes and did not protest that I failed to fulfill My promise to give him the land.

אמרתי ליצחק (בראשית כו, ג) גור בארץ הזאת ואהיה עמך ואברכך בקשו עבדיו מים לשתות ולא מצאו עד שעשו מריבה שנאמר (בראשית כו, כ) ויריבו רועי גרר עם רועי יצחק לאמר לנו המים ולא הרהר אחר מדותי I said to Isaac: “Sojourn in this land, and I will be with you and will bless you” (Genesis 26:3). His servants sought water to drink and they did not find it until they started a quarrel, as it is stated: “And the herdsmen of Gerar quarreled with Isaac’s herdsmen saying: The water is ours” (Genesis 26:20), and he did not question My attributes.

אמרתי ליעקב (בראשית כח, יג) הארץ אשר אתה שוכב עליה לך אתננה ביקש מקום לנטוע אהלו ולא מצא עד שקנה במאה קשיטה ולא הרהר אחר מדותי ולא אמרו לי מה שמך ואתה אמרת לי מה שמך בתחלה ועכשיו אתה אומר לי (שמות ה, כג) והצל לא הצלת את עמך (שמות ו, א) עתה תראה (את) אשר אעשה לפרעה במלחמת פרעה אתה רואה ואי אתה רואה במלחמת שלשים ואחד מלכים I said to Jacob: “The land upon which you lie, to you I will give it” (Genesis 28:13). He sought a place to pitch his tent and he did not find one until he purchased it for one hundred coins, and he did not question My attributes, and did not say to Me: What is Your name? And you, Moses, ask Me: What is Your name, initially, after witnessing My greatness more than they ever did. And now you say to Me: “Neither have You delivered Your people” (Exodus 5:23). The verse then states: “Now shall you see what I will do to Pharaoh” (Exodus 6:1). One can infer: The war with Pharaoh and his downfall you shall see, but you will not see the war with the thirty-one kings in Eretz Yisrael, as you will not be privileged to conquer Eretz Yisrael for the Jewish people.

(שמות לד, ח) וימהר משה ויקוד ארצה וישתחו מה ראה משה § With regard to the verse: “And the Lord passed before him and proclaimed: The Lord, the Lord, compassionate and gracious God, slow to anger, abounding in loving-kindness and truth, extending loving-kindness to thousands of generations…and Moses made haste and bowed his head toward the earth and prostrated himself” (Exodus 34:6–8), the Gemara asks: What did Moses see in these attributes that caused him to hastily prostrate himself?

ר' חנינא בן גמלא אמר ארך אפים ראה ורבנן אמרי אמת ראה: תניא כמ"ד ארך אפים ראה דתניא כשעלה משה למרום מצאו להקב"ה שיושב וכותב ארך אפים אמר לפניו רבונו של עולם ארך אפים לצדיקים אמר לו אף לרשעים א"ל רשעים יאבדו א"ל השתא חזית מאי דמבעי לך Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamla says: He saw the attribute of slow to anger; and the Rabbis say: He saw the attribute of truth. It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of the one who said: He saw the attribute of slow to anger, as it is taught in a baraita: When Moses ascended on high, he discovered the Holy One, Blessed be He, sitting and writing: Slow to anger. Moses said before Him: Master of the Universe, is Your attribute of slow to anger only to be used for the righteous? God said to him: It is an attribute even for the wicked. Moses said to Him: Let the wicked be doomed. God said to him: Now, you will see that you will need this, as ultimately you will reconsider that statement.

כשחטאו ישראל אמר לו לא כך אמרת לי ארך אפים לצדיקים When the Jewish people sinned in the sin of the spies and Moses asked God to forgive them, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Didn’t you say to Me that the attribute of slow to anger is for the righteous alone? They are not worthy of atonement.

Daf 111b

אמר לפניו רבש"ע ולא כך אמרת לי אף לרשעים והיינו דכתיב (במדבר יד, יז) ועתה יגדל נא כח ה' כאשר דברת לאמר Moses said before Him: Master of the Universe, and isn’t this what You said to me: It is an attribute even for the wicked? And that is the meaning of that which is written: “And now, I pray You, let the power of my Lord be great, as You have spoken, saying” (Numbers 14:17). Moses was repeating God’s promise with regard to His employment of the attribute of slow to anger.

ר' חגא הוה סליק ואזיל בדרגא דבי רבה בר שילא שמעיה לההוא ינוקא דאמר (תהלים צג, ה) עדותיך נאמנו מאד לביתך נאוה קדש ה' לאורך ימים וסמיך ליה (תהלים צ, א) תפלה למשה וגו' אמר ש"מ ארך אפים ראה The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥagga was walking up the stairs in the school of Rabba bar Sheila. He heard a certain child who said: “Your testimonies are very sure; sanctity becomes Your house, Lord, for the length of days” (Psalms 93:5). The phrase “length of days” is a reference to the attribute of slow to anger. And juxtaposed to it is the phrase: “A prayer of Moses” (Psalms 90:1), indicating that this chapter was also stated by Moses our teacher. Upon hearing those verses, Rabbi Ḥagga said: Conclude from it that it was the attribute of slow to anger that Moses saw.

א"ר אלעזר א"ר חנינא עתיד הקב"ה להיות עטרה בראש כל צדיק וצדיק שנאמר (ישעיהו כח, ה) ביום ההוא יהיה ה' צבאות לעטרת צבי ולצפירת תפארה לשאר עמו וגו' מאי לעטרת צבי ולצפירת תפארה לעושים רצונו ומצפים לישועתו יכול לכל ת"ל לשאר עמו למי שמשים עצמו כשירים § Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, is destined to be a crown on the head of each and every righteous person, as it is stated: “In that day shall the Lord of hosts be for a crown of glory, and for a diadem of beauty, unto the remnant of His people” (Isaiah 28:5). What is the meaning of the phrase: “For a crown of glory, and for a diadem of beauty”? It means: A crown for those who perform His will and a diadem for those who await His salvation. One might have thought that this extends to everyone in those categories. Therefore, the verse states: “Unto the remnant of His people,” meaning that God will be a crown and a diadem to one who humbly establishes himself like a remnant, and does not conduct himself with self-importance.

(ישעיהו כח, ו) ולרוח משפט ליושב על המשפט ולגבורה משיבי מלחמה שערה ולרוח משפט זה הרודה את יצרו וליושב על המשפט זה הדן דין אמת לאמיתו ולגבורה זה המתגבר ביצרו משיבי מלחמה זה שנושא ונותן במלחמתה של תורה שערה אלו שמשכימין ומעריבין בבתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות The Gemara interprets a verse in Isaiah. “And for a spirit of justice to him that sits in judgment and for strength to them who retaliate in battle to the gate” (Isaiah 28:6). “And for a spirit of justice”; this is referring to one who subdues his evil inclination and prevents himself from sinning. “To him that sits in judgment”; this is referring to one who judges a true judgment truthfully. “And for strength”; this is referring to one who overcomes his evil inclination. “Them who retaliate in battle”; this is referring to one who gives and takes and engages in the battle, i.e., in the discourse of Torah. “To the gate” is referring to those Torah scholars who arrive early and remain late within the gates of synagogues and study halls.

אמרה מדת הדין לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע מה נשתנו אלו מאלו אמר לה (ישעיהו כח, ז) וגם אלה ביין שגו ובשכר תעו [וגו'] פקו פליליה ואין פוקה אלא גיהנם שנאמר (שמואל א כה, לא) לא תהיה זאת לך לפוקה ואין פלילה אלא דיינין שנאמר (שמות כא, כב) ונתן בפלילים: The attribute of justice said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, how do these people, who possess these qualities, differ from those who engage in Torah study but lack these qualities? God said to the attribute of justice that those others do not receive the crown and diadem because: “These also reel through wine, and stagger through strong drink…they stumble [paku] in judgment [peliliyya]” (Isaiah 28:7). And puka in this context is referring to nothing other than Gehenna, as it is stated: “That this shall not be a cause of stumbling [puka] for you” (I Samuel 25:31). And the term of pelila in the verse in Isaiah is referring to nothing other than judges, as it is stated: “And he shall pay as the judges [biflilim] determine” (Exodus 21:22). Those who lack the qualities listed in the previous verses are not worthy of the aforementioned reward.

מתני׳ אנשי עיר הנדחת אין להם חלק לעוה"ב שנאמר (דברים יג, יד) יצאו אנשים בני בליעל מקרבך וידיחו את (אנשי) [יושבי] עירם ואינן נהרגים עד שיהיו מדיחיה מאותה העיר ומאותו השבט ועד שיודח רובה ועד שידיחוה אנשים הדיחוה נשים וקטנים או שהודח מיעוטה או שהיה מדיחיה חוצה לה הרי אלו כיחידים וצריכין ב' עדים והתראה לכל אחד ואחד MISHNA: The residents of an idolatrous city have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Certain men, wicked persons, are gone out from your midst, and have subverted the inhabitants of their city, saying: Let us go and let us worship other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:14). And idol worshippers are not executed as residents of an idolatrous city unless its subverters are from that city and from that tribe, and unless most of the inhabitants of the city are subverted, and unless men subvert the inhabitants of the city. If it occurs that women or children subvert the inhabitants of the city, or that a minority of the inhabitants of the city were subverted, or that its subverters were from outside the city and were neither residents of that city nor members of that tribe, these idol worshippers are judged as individuals. And to judge the inhabitants of a city one requires two witnesses and forewarning for each and every one who engaged in idol worship.

זה חומר ביחידים מבמרובים שהיחידים בסקילה לפיכך ממונם פלט והמרובין בסייף לפיכך ממונם אבד This is a stringency with regard to individuals who worship idols that is more stringent than the halakha with regard to multitudes who worship idols: As the individuals who worship idols are executed by stoning; therefore, since there is a stringency with regard to their mode of execution, their property is spared and is inherited by their heirs. And the multitudes are executed by the sword; therefore, since there is a leniency with regard to their mode of execution, their property is eliminated.

(דברים יג, טז) הכה תכה את יושבי העיר הזאת לפי חרב החמרת והגמלת העוברת ממקום למקום הרי אלו מצילין אותה From the verse: “You shall smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword” (Deuteronomy 13:16), it is derived that the caravan of donkeys and the caravan of camels that move from place to place, these donkey or camel drivers save the city. If they were residing in the city for a period, they could join the minority of permanent residents who were not subverted to idol worship in order to create a majority and prevent the destruction of the city and its contents.

שנא' (דברים יג, טז) החרם אותה ואת כל אשר בה ואת בהמתה לפי חרב מכאן אמרו נכסי צדיקים שבתוכה אובדין שבחוצה לה פליטין ושל רשעים בין שבתוכה בין שבחוצה לה הרי אלו אובדין It is stated: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it and its animals, with the edge of the sword” (Deuteronomy 13:16). From here, the Sages stated: The property of the righteous, who did not engage in idol worship, that is inside the city is destroyed with the rest of the city and its contents; but the property of the righteous that is outside the city is spared. And the property of the wicked, whether it is inside the city or whether it is outside the city, these items are destroyed.

שנאמר (דברים יג, יז) ואת כל שללה תקבוץ אל תוך רחבה וגו' אם אין לה רחוב עושין לה רחוב היתה רחבה חוצה לה כונסין אותה לתוכה It is stated: “And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square” (Deuteronomy 13:17). If the city has no square, one creates a square for the city in order to fulfill the mitzva as it is written. If there was a square outside of the city, they bring it inside the city by expanding the city wall to include the square.

שנאמר (דברים יג, יז) ושרפת באש את העיר ואת כל שללה כליל לה' אלהיך שללה ולא שלל שמים מכאן אמרו ההקדשות שבה יפדו ותרומות ירקבו מעשר שני וכתבי הקדש יגנזו It is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And you shall burn it with fire, both the city and all its spoils, entirely for the Lord your God.” The mishna infers: “Its spoils,” but not the spoils of Heaven. From here the Sages stated: The consecrated property in it, which was no longer the property of its inhabitants, must be redeemed, and terumot are neither eaten nor burned; rather they must be left to decay. And second tithe and sacred scrolls that were in the city must be interred.

כליל לה' אלהיך אמר ר"ש אמר הקב"ה אם אתם עושין דין בעיר הנדחת מעלה אני עליכם כאילו אתם מעלים עולה כליל לפני With regard to the phrase: “Entirely [kalil] for the Lord your God,” Rabbi Shimon says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, says: If you implement judgment on an idolatrous city, I ascribe you credit as though you have sacrificed an entirely [kalil] burnt offering before Me.

(דברים יג, יז) והיתה תל עולם לא תעשה גנות ופרדסים דברי ר' יוסי הגלילי ר"ע אומר לא תבנה עוד לכמות שהיתה אינה נבנית אבל נעשית היא גנות ופרדסים ולא ידבק בידך מאומה מן החרם שכל זמן שהרשעים בעולם חרון אף בעולם אבדו רשעים מן העולם נסתלק חרון אף מן העולם: It is written: “And it shall be a heap forever” (Deuteronomy 13:17), meaning: The idolatrous city shall not be converted even into gardens and orchards; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: From the end of that verse: “It shall not be built again,” it is derived: To restore it to the way it was before destruction, it may not be built; but it may be converted into gardens and orchards. The next verse states: “And there shall cleave nothing of that which was devoted to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). This teaches that as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is wrath in the world; once the wicked are eliminated from the world, wrath leaves the world.

גמ׳ ת"ר יצאו הן ולא שלוחין אנשים אין אנשים פחות מב' דבר אחר אנשים ולא נשים אנשים ולא קטנים GEMARA: The Sages taught an interpretation of the verse: “Certain men, wicked persons, are gone out from your midst, and have subverted the inhabitants of their city saying: Let us go and let us worship other gods that you have not known” (Deuteronomy 13:14). From the term “are gone out” it is derived that these halakhot apply only if they, the subverters themselves, subverted the residents, but not agents whom they designated to subvert. From the term “men” it is derived that men in the plural means no less than two. Alternatively, it is derived: Men, but not women; men, but not children.

בני בליעל בנים שפרקו עול שמים מצואריהם מקרבך ולא מן הספר יושבי עירם ולא יושבי עיר אחרת לאמר שצריכין עדים והתראה לכל אחד ואחד The phrase “wicked persons [benei veliyya’al]” is an abbreviation of banim beli ol, meaning: Sons who have cast off the yoke of Heaven from their necks. From the term “from your midst” it is derived that these halakhot apply only to a city located in the center of the country, but not to a city located on the border. From the phrase “inhabitants of their city” it is inferred: But not inhabitants of another city. The term “saying” alludes to the halakha that in order to convict them one requires witnesses and forewarning for each and every one who worshipped idols.

איתמר ר' יוחנן אמר חולקין עיר אחת לשני שבטים ור"ל אמר אין חולקין עיר אחת לב' שבטים איתיביה ר' יוחנן לר"ל עד שיהו מדיחיה מאותה העיר ומאותו שבט מאי לאו אע"ג דמדיחיה מאותה העיר אי איכא מאותו שבט אין אי לא לא ש"מ חולקין עיר אחת לב' שבטים It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One divides one city into the tribal territory of two tribes; and Reish Lakish says: One does not divide one city into the tribal territory of two tribes. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from the mishna, which states: Unless its subverters are from that city and from that tribe; what, is it not that although its subverters are from that city, if they are from that tribe, yes, they render the city an idolatrous city, and if not, no, they do not render the city an idolatrous city? Conclude from it: One divides one city into the tribal territory of two tribes, as otherwise, by definition, a resident of that city is a member of that tribe.

לא דנפלה ליה בירושה א"נ דיהבוה ניהליה במתנה The Gemara rejects that proof: No, even if a city is not divided between two tribes, the scenario in the mishna is possible in a case where the property in the city fell to him as an inheritance from the family of his mother, who was from a different tribe. Alternatively, it is possible in a case where they gave him that property as a gift.

איתיביה (יהושע כא, טז) ערים תשע מאת שני השבטים האלה מאי לאו ארבע ופלגא מהאי וארבע ופלגא מהאי וש"מ חולקין עיר אחת לב' שבטים לא ארבעה מהאי וחמש מהאי Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a verse written with regard to the cities designated for the Levites: “Nine cities from those two tribes” (Joshua 21:16). What, is it not that those nine cities were equally divided; four-and-a-half from this tribe, and four-and-a-half from that tribe, and conclude from it that one divides one city into the tribal territory of two tribes? The Gemara rejects that proof: No, those nine cities were divided in this manner: Four cities from this tribe and five cities from that tribe.

אי הכי לפרוש פרושי The Gemara asks: If so, let the verse state explicitly from which tribe the additional city was taken.

Daf 112a

קשיא The Gemara comments: The matter presents a difficulty with the opinion of Reish Lakish.

איבעיא להו הודחו מאליהן מהו וידיחו אמר רחמנא ולא שהודחו מאליהן או דילמא אפילו הודחו מאליהן A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the inhabitants of an idolatrous city subverted themselves to idol worship and were not subverted by others, what is the halakha? Since the Merciful One states: “And have subverted,” perhaps it may be inferred: But not if they subvert themselves; or perhaps even if they subverted themselves to idol worship, the city can be deemed an idolatrous city.

ת"ש הדיחוה נשים וקטנים אמאי ליהוי כהודחו מאליהן הנך בתר נפשייהו גרידי הני בתר נשים וקטנים גרידי: The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from the mishna: If women or children subvert the inhabitants of the city, these idol worshippers are judged as individuals. Why is that so? Let their status be considered as though they subverted themselves. Apparently, if the inhabitants subverted themselves the city is not deemed an idolatrous city. The Gemara rejects this proof: These cases are not comparable, as these, who subverted themselves, are drawn after their own initiative and worship idols wholeheartedly, and therefore perhaps the city is rendered an idolatrous city. Those, who are subverted by women and children, are drawn after women and children and are not committed to idol worship, and therefore, perhaps the city is not rendered an idolatrous city.

עד שיודח רובה: היכי עבדינן אמר רב יהודה דנין וחובשין דנין וחובשין א"ל עולא נמצא אתה מענה את דינן של אלו אלא אמר עולא דנין וסוקלין דנין וסוקלין § The mishna teaches that a city is not deemed an idolatrous city unless most of the inhabitants of the city are subverted. The Gemara asks: How do we act in order to determine if most of the inhabitants have been subverted? Rav Yehuda says: The court judges each inhabitant suspected of idol worship, and if he is found liable imprisons him in a jail, and it judges and imprisons each succeeding idolater until a majority of the city has been convicted. Ulla said to him: That will result in you delaying justice for those already sentenced and awaiting execution, and it is prohibited to delay justice. Rather, Ulla says: The court judges each inhabitant and stones him if he is found liable, then judges and stones each succeeding idolater until half of the city is found guilty, and all future convicted idolaters are executed by the sword.

איתמר רבי יוחנן אמר דנין וסוקלין דנין וסוקלין ור"ל אמר מרבין להן בתי דינין It was stated that there is a parallel amoraic dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The court judges and stones the idolater, then judges and stones each succeeding idolater. And Reish Lakish says: One increases the number of courts for them so that all the inhabitants of the city can stand trial at the same time and the means of their execution will be determined with no delay of justice.

איני והאמר ר' חמא בר יוסי א"ר אושעיא (דברים יז, ה) והוצאת את האיש ההוא או את האשה ההיא איש ואשה אתה מוציא לשעריך ואי אתה מוציא כל העיר כולה לשעריך אלא מרבין להן בתי דינין ומעיינין בדיניהן ומסקינן להו לבית דין הגדול וגמרי להו לדינייהו וקטלי להו: The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥama bar Yosei say that Rabbi Oshaya says that it is written: “And you shall take that man or that woman out…to your gates” (Deuteronomy 17:5), from which it is derived: You take a man and a woman out to your gates and they are judged by the local court, but you do not take the entire city out to your gates; instead, they stand trial before the Great Sanhedrin. Rather, the procedure is that one increases the number of courts for them and those courts analyze their cases, and when they conclude that a majority of the inhabitants are guilty of idolatry they are not sentenced; instead, we take them to the High Court [Sanhedrin] and the court issues the verdict of the idolaters and executes them.

הכה תכה את יושבי העיר וכו': תנו רבנן החמרת והגמלת העוברת ממקום למקום לנו בתוכה והודחו עמה אם נשתהו שם ל' יום הן בסייף וממונן אבד פחות מיכן הן בסקילה וממונן פלט § It is written: “You shall smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword, destroy it utterly, and all that is in it and its animals, with the edge of the sword” (Deuteronomy 13:16). The Sages taught in a baraita: The caravan of donkeys and the caravan of camels that move from place to place, that lodged in the city and were subverted with it, if they had stayed there thirty days they are executed by the sword and their property is destroyed. If they had stayed there less than that, they are executed by stoning, as individual idolaters, and their property is spared.

ורמינהי כמה יהיה בעיר ויהיה כאנשי העיר י"ב חדש אמר רבא לא קשיא הא למיהוי מבני מתא הא למיהוי מיתבי מתא And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: How long shall one be in the city and as a result, his status will be like that of the residents of the city with regard to giving charity and paying taxes? He is obligated if he remained there twelve months, and not thirty days. Rava says: This contradiction is not difficult, and it may be resolved: This period of twelve months is the period required to become one of the citizens of the city; this period of thirty days is the period required to become one of the inhabitants of the city.

והתניא המודר הנאה מבני העיר אם יש אדם שנשתהא שם י"ב חדש אסור ליהנות ממנו פחות מיכן מותר ליהנות ממנו ביושבי העיר אם נשתהא ל' יום אסור ליהנות ממנו פחות מיכן מותר ליהנות ממנו: And so it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the citizens of the city, if there is a person who had stayed there twelve months, it is prohibited for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. If a person had stayed there less than that, it is permitted for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the inhabitants of the city, if there is a person who had stayed there thirty days, it is prohibited for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. If a person had stayed there less than that, it is permitted for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. In the context of an idolatrous city, the reference is to the inhabitants of the city, which includes anyone who had stayed there for thirty days.

החרם אותה ואת כל אשר בה כו': ת"ר (דברים יג, טז) החרם אותה ואת כל אשר בה פרט לנכסי צדיקים שבחוצה לה ואת כל אשר בה לרבות נכסי צדיקים שבתוכה שללה ולא שלל שמים ואת כל שללה לרבות נכסי רשעים שחוצה לה It is written: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it” (Deuteronomy 13:16). The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to that which is written: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it”; this serves to exclude the property of the righteous that is located outside the city, which is not destroyed. “And all that is in it”; this serves to include the property of the righteous that is located inside the city; it is also destroyed. It is stated: “And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square” (Deuteronomy 13:17). From the term “its spoils” it is derived: But not the spoils of Heaven; all consecrated property is excluded. The phrase “and you shall gather all of its spoils” serves to include the property of the wicked that is located outside the city; it is also destroyed.

אמר ר"ש מפני מה אמרה תורה נכסי צדיקים שבתוכה יאבדו מי גרם להם שידורו בתוכה ממונם לפיכך ממונם אבד אמר מר (דברים יג, יז) ואת כל שללה תקבץ לרבות נכסי רשעים שבחוצה לה אמר רב חסדא ובנקבצים לתוכה Rabbi Shimon said: For what reason does the Torah say that the property of the righteous that is in it shall be destroyed? Why must they suffer for the sins of others? The reason is: Who caused the righteous to live in this city inhabited by wicked people? It is their property that tied them to this city; therefore, their property is destroyed. The Master said that the phrase “and you shall gather all of its spoils” serves to include the property of the wicked that is located outside the city; it is also destroyed. Rav Ḥisda says: And this is the halakha only with regard to property that can be gathered into the city.

אמר רב חסדא פקדונות של אנשי עיר הנדחת מותרין ה"ד אי לימא דעיר אחרת ואיתנהו בגוה פשיטא דמותרין לאו שללה הוא ואלא דידהו ואיתנהו בעיר אחרת אי דנקבצין לתוכה אמאי מותרין ואי אין נקבצין לתוכה הא אמרה חדא זימנא Rav Ḥisda says: Deposits of the inhabitants of an idolatrous city are permitted, i.e., they are not destroyed. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that Rav Ḥisda is referring to property belonging to inhabitants of another city and that property is deposited within the idolatrous city, it is obvious that the deposits are permitted, as the deposits are not “its spoils”; they are the property of others. But rather, say that Rav Ḥisda is referring to property belonging to the inhabitants of the idolatrous city, and it is deposited within another city. If so, the status of that property should be like any other property belonging to the inhabitants of the idolatrous city; if it is property that can be gathered into the city, why are the deposits permitted? It was already established that the property of the wicked is destroyed. And if it is property that cannot be gathered into the city, didn’t Rav Ḥisda already say once that this property is not burned?

לא לעולם דעיר אחרת דמפקדי בתוכה והכא במאי עסקינן כגון דקביל עליה אחריות מהו דתימא כיון דקביל עליה אחריות כדידיה דמי קא משמע לן The Gemara answers: No, Rav Ḥisda is actually referring to property belonging to inhabitants of another city that is deposited within the idolatrous city; and what are we dealing with here? It is a case where an inhabitant of the idolatrous city assumes financial responsibility for the deposit in his possession. Lest you say: Once he assumes financial responsibility for the deposit in his possession, the status of the deposit is like that of his own property and it should be destroyed, therefore Rav Ḥisda teaches us that deposits are permitted and not destroyed.

אמר רב חסדא בהמה חציה של עיר הנדחת וחציה של עיר אחרת אסורה עיסה חציה של עיר הנדחת וחציה של עיר אחרת מותרת מאי טעמא בהמה כמאן דלא פליגא דמיא עיסה כמאן דפליגא דמיא Rav Ḥisda says: An animal that is half the property of an idolatrous city and half the property of another city is forbidden. By contrast, with regard to dough that is half the property of an idolatrous city and half the property of another city, the half that belongs to the other city is permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the difference between them? The Gemara explains: An animal is like an entity that is not divided, as it is possible to eat part of an animal only through the slaughter of the entire animal. Therefore, if any portion of the animal is forbidden, the entire animal is forbidden. Dough is like an entity that is divided. Therefore, the fact that one portion of the dough is forbidden does not render the entire dough forbidden.

בעי רב חסדא בהמת עיר הנדחת מהו דתיתהני בה שחיטה לטהרה מידי נבילה לפי חרב אמר רחמנא לא שנא שחטה משחט לא שנא קטלא מקטל או דלמא כיון דשחטה מהניא לה שחיטה מאי תיקו Rav Ḥisda raises a dilemma: With regard to the animal of an idolatrous city, what is the halakha; is ritual slaughter effective at least in purifying it from the ritual impurity of an unslaughtered animal carcass? If the animals of the city are killed but not ritually slaughtered, they are impure with the impurity of a carcass and transmit impurity by means of contact as well as if they are lifted. Will the ritual slaughter of those animals prevent the transmission of that impurity? Is it so that since the Merciful One states: “And its animals, with the edge of the sword,” indicating that it is no different if one ritually slaughtered the animal, and it is no different if one killed the animal in another way, its status is that of a carcass and it transmits impurity? Or perhaps, since one ritually slaughtered the animal, ritual slaughter is effective. What is the halakha? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רב יוסף שיער נשים צדקניות מהו אמר רבא הא דרשעיות אסור (דברים יג, יז) תקבץ ושרפת כתיב מי שאינו מחוסר אלא קביצה ושריפה יצא זה שמחוסר תלישה וקביצה ושריפה Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: What is the status of the hair of pious women in the idolatrous city; must it be destroyed? Rava says: Is that to say that the hair of wicked women is forbidden and must be destroyed? “And you shall gather…and you shall burn” (Deuteronomy 13:17), is written, and it is derived: An item that is lacking, i.e., that requires, only gathering and burning must be destroyed, excluding this hair, which is lacking detaching, gathering, and burning. Therefore, even the hair of a wicked woman is not forbidden.

אלא אמר רבא בפיאה נכרית היכי דמי אי דמחובר בגופה כגופה דמיא לא צריכא דתלי בסיבטא כנכסי צדיקים שבתוכה דמי ואבד או דלמא כיון דעיילא ונפקא כלבושה דמי תיקו: Rather, Rava says: This dilemma is raised with regard to a wig. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the wig is attached to her body, its status is like that of her body. The Gemara answers: No, this dilemma is necessary only in a case where the wig is hanging on a peg. Is its status like that of the property of the righteous inside the city and therefore it is destroyed, or perhaps, since she enters and exits with the wig, its status is like that of a garment, and it is not destroyed? This dilemma shall stand unresolved.

ואת כל שללה תקבוץ אל תוך רחובה וכו': ת"ר אין לה רחוב אינה נעשית עיר הנדחת דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר אין לה רחוב עושין לה רחוב במאי קמיפלגי מר סבר רחובה מעיקרא משמע ומר סבר רחובה השתא נמי משמע: With regard to the verse: “And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square” (Deuteronomy 13:17), the Sages taught: If the city has no square, it does not become an idolatrous city, as it does not fulfill the criterion mandated by the verse; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: If the city has no square, one creates a square for the city. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, holds “its square” indicates a square that existed from the outset. And one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that “its square” can also indicate a square that was created now.

Daf 112b

וההקדשות שבה יפדו כו': ת"ר היו בה (קדשי) קדשים קדשי מזבח ימותו קדשי בדק הבית יפדו ותרומות ירקבו ומעשר שני וכתבי הקדש יגנזו ר"ש אומר בהמתה ולא בהמת בכור ומעשר שללה פרט לכסף הקדש וכסף מעשר § The mishna teaches: And the consecrated property in it must be redeemed. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 14:5): If there were offerings of the most sacred order in it, if they were animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar, they shall die; one causes their death. Items consecrated for Temple maintenance must be redeemed, and terumot must be left to decay, and second tithe and sacred scrolls must be interred. Rabbi Shimon says: That is not so; rather, the term: “Its animals” (Deuteronomy 13:16), serves to exclude a firstborn animal and animal tithe, as they never belonged to the idolatrous city. The term: “Its spoils” (Deuteronomy 13:17), serves to exclude consecrated money and tithe money.

אמר מר היו בה (קדשי) קדשים קדשי מזבח ימותו ואמאי ימותו ירעו עד שיסתאבו וימכרו ויפלו דמיהן לנדבה The Gemara proceeds to analyze the baraita. The Master said: If there were offerings of the most sacred order in it, if they were animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar, they shall die. The Gemara asks: But why shall they die? They should graze until they become unfit, and then they should be sold and their value should be allocated for communal gift offerings.

ר' יוחנן אמר (משלי כא, כז) זבח רשעים תועבה ר"ל אמר ממון בעלים הוא והכא בקדשים שחייב באחריותן ור"ש היא דאמר ממון בעלים הוא Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They shall die, as it is written: “The offering of the wicked is an abomination” (Proverbs 21:27), and it is unacceptable for sacrifice on the altar. Reish Lakish says: They shall die because the animal is the property of its owner and is not exclusively consecrated property. And the reason it is considered the property of the owner is that here, the tanna is referring to offerings with regard to which one bears financial responsibility for their replacement. That responsibility renders the status of these consecrated animals like that of his property. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: An offering with regard to which one bears financial responsibility for its replacement is the property of its owner.

הא מדסיפא ר"ש היא רישא לאו ר"ש בקדשים קלים ואליבא דרבי יוסי הגלילי דאמר קדשים קלים ממון בעלים אבל קדשי קדשים מאי יפדו The Gemara challenges: From the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, one may infer that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara suggests a new explanation: Rather, the animals that shall die are offerings of lesser sanctity, and the ruling of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: Offerings of lesser sanctity are the property of their owner. The Gemara infers: But offerings of the most sacred order, what shall be done with them? They shall be redeemed.

אדתני סיפא קדשי בדק הבית יפדו ליפלוג וליתני בדידה בד"א בקדשים קלים אבל קדשי קדשים יפדו כיון דאיכא חטאת שמתו בעליה דלמיתה אזלא לא פסיקא ליה The Gemara asks: If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the baraita: Items consecrated for Temple maintenance must be redeemed, let the tanna distinguish and teach a distinction within the category of animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar itself, as follows: In what case is this statement, that animals shall die, said? It is stated with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity; but with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, they shall be redeemed. The Gemara answers: Since there is among offerings of the most sacred order the case of the sin-offering whose owners were killed in the idolatrous city, rendering the animal a sin-offering whose owners have died, which is left to die, that distinction is not clear-cut for the tanna, as offerings of the most sacred order are not always redeemed. Therefore, the tanna preferred to cite a distinction without exceptions.

בשלמא ר' יוחנן לא אמר כר"ל דכתיב זבח רשעים תועבה אלא ר"ל מ"ט לא אמר כר' יוחנן אמר לך כי אמרינן זבח רשעים תועבה הני מילי היכא דאתנהו בעינייהו אבל הכא כיון דאישתני אישתני: The Gemara comments: Granted, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not say his explanation of the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, due to the fact that it is written: “The offering of the wicked is an abomination,” and he bases his explanation on that verse. But Reish Lakish, what is the reason he does not say his explanation of the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that when we say: “The offering of the wicked is an abomination,” this statement applies in a case where the offering is in its unadulterated form. But here, since if they were to redeem it, it would have changed and would no longer be the animal of the wicked itself, but rather an animal purchased with the proceeds of the redemption of the original, it would have changed, and it would no longer be an abomination.

ר"ש אומר בהמתך ולא בהמת בכור ומעשר: במאי עסקינן אילימא בתמימין שלל שמים הוא אלא בבעלי מומין שללה נינהו § The baraita continues. Rabbi Shimon says that the term “its animals” serves to exclude a firstborn animal and animal tithe. The Gemara asks: What animals are we dealing with? If we say that Rabbi Shimon is speaking with regard to unblemished animals, like all other offerings they are the spoils of Heaven and not the spoils of the inhabitants of the city. Rather, Rabbi Shimon is speaking with regard to blemished animals, which belong to their owners. If so, they are the spoils of the city, and what is the reason that Rabbi Shimon says that there is no obligation to destroy these animals?

אמר רבינא לעולם בבעלי מומין ומי שנאכל בתורת בהמתך יצאו אלו שאין נאכלין בתורת בהמתך אלא בתורת בכור ומעשר דשלל שמים נינהו Ravina says: Actually, Rabbi Shimon is speaking with regard to blemished animals, and his statement should be understood as follows: The mitzva is to destroy that which is eaten as its animals, i.e., as the property of an inhabitant of an idolatrous city. Excluded are those firstborn and tithe animals, which, even when blemished, are not eaten as its animals; rather, they are eaten as firstborn and tithe animals. They are given as gifts to priests, and are considered the spoils of Heaven.

ופליגא דשמואל דאמר שמואל הכל קרב והכל נפדה מאי קאמר ה"ק כל שקרב כשהוא תם ונפדה כשהוא בעל מום משלל אימעיט וכל שקרב כשהוא תם ואינו נפדה כשהוא בעל מום כגון בכור ומעשר מבהמה נפקא: And this halakha disputes the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel says: Everything is sacrificed and everything is redeemed. The Gemara asks: What is he saying? The Gemara explains that this is what he is saying: Any offering that is sacrificed on the altar when it is unblemished and is redeemed when it is blemished is excluded from the term “its spoils,” since it is considered the spoils of Heaven. And the halakha concerning any offering that is sacrificed on the altar when it is unblemished and is not redeemed when it is blemished, e.g., a firstborn animal and animal tithe, is derived from the term “its animals,” as they are not the city’s animals and they are not included in the city’s property.

תרומות ירקבו: אמר רב חסדא ל"ש אלא תרומה ביד ישראל אבל תרומה ביד כהן כיון דממוניה הוא תשרף § The baraita continues: Terumot must be left to decay. Rav Ḥisda says: The Sages taught this only with regard to teruma that is still in the possession of an Israelite, who has not yet given it to a priest. But concerning teruma that is already in the possession of a priest who lives in the idolatrous city, since it is his property, it shall be burned.

מתיב רב יוסף מעשר שני וכתבי הקדש יגנזו והא מעשר שני ביד ישראל כתרומה ביד כהן דמי וקתני יגנזו אלא אי אתמר הכי אתמר אמר רב חסדא ל"ש אלא תרומה ביד כהן אבל תרומה ביד ישראל תנתן לכהן שבעיר אחרת Rav Yosef raises an objection from the mishna: Second tithe and sacred scrolls must be interred. But isn’t the status of second tithe in the possession of an Israelite like that of teruma in the possession of a priest, as he may partake of it and benefit from it in Jerusalem; and nevertheless, it is taught: They must be interred? Rather, if the statement of Rav Ḥisda was stated, this is what was stated: Rav Ḥisda says: The Sages taught this only with regard to teruma that is already in the possession of a priest who lives in the idolatrous city, as even though it is his property, it maintains the sanctity of teruma. But teruma that is still in the possession of an Israelite, which is not his property at all, shall be given to a priest who is in another city, and should not be left to decay.

תנן התם עיסה של מעשר שני פטורה מן החלה דברי ר"מ וחכמים מחייבין אמר רב חסדא מחלוקת במעשר שני בירושלים דר"מ סבר מעשר שני ממון גבוה הוא ורבנן סברי ממון הדיוט הוא אבל בגבולין דברי הכל פטור We learned in a baraita there: Second-tithe dough is exempt from having ḥalla separated since it is property belonging to the Most High; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem one liable to separate ḥalla from second-tithe dough. Rav Ḥisda says: This dispute is with regard to second tithe in Jerusalem; as Rabbi Meir holds: Second-tithe produce is property belonging to the Most High, but the Torah permitted its owners to partake of it in Jerusalem. Since it is the property of Heaven, one is exempt from separating priestly gifts. And the Rabbis hold: It is non-sacred property from which one is liable to separate ḥalla. But with regard to second-tithe dough in the outlying areas, everyone agrees that one is exempt from separating ḥalla, as outside of Jerusalem it is prohibited to partake of it.

מתיב רב יוסף מעשר שני וכתבי הקדש יגנזו במאי עסקינן אילימא בירושלים מי הויא עיר הנדחת והתניא עשרה דברים נאמרו בירושלים וזו אחת מהן אינה נעשית עיר הנדחת ואלא בעיר אחרת ואסקוהו לגוה הא קלטוהו מחיצות Rav Yosef raises an objection from the mishna: Second tithe and sacred scrolls must be interred. What are we dealing with? If we say that the reference is to second tithe in Jerusalem, can Jerusalem be an idolatrous city? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Ten matters were stated with regard to Jerusalem, and this is one of them: It does not become an idolatrous city. Rather, apparently the reference is to second tithe in a different city that was rendered an idolatrous city, and before it was so rendered one took the second-tithe produce up into Jerusalem. The Gemara asks: In that case, wasn’t the produce admitted by the walls of Jerusalem, making it no longer associated with the idolatrous city, and it should therefore be permitted to partake of it?

אלא לאו בגבולין וקתני יגנזו לא לעולם דעיר אחרת ואסקוהו לגוה והכא במאי עסקינן שנטמא Rather, is the reference in the mishna not to second-tithe produce in an outlying area? And it is taught: They must be interred. Apparently, second-tithe produce is not the property of Heaven; it belongs to an inhabitant of the idolatrous city. The Gemara rejects this: No, actually, the reference in the mishna is to second-tithe produce in a different city, and before it was rendered an idolatrous city one took the second-tithe produce up into Jerusalem. And what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where that second-tithe produce became ritually impure. Since it is prohibited to partake of it, there is no alternative to interment.

ולפרקיה דא"ר אלעזר מניין למעשר שני שנטמא שפודין אותו אפילו בירושלים ת"ל (דברים יד, כד) לא תוכל שאתו ואין שאת אלא אכילה שנאמר (בראשית מג, לד) וישא משאת מאת פניו הכא במאי עסקינן בלקוח The Gemara challenges: And let him redeem it in Jerusalem, as Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived with regard to second-tithe produce that became impure, that one may redeem it even in Jerusalem? As the verse states: “And if the way is too long for you so that you are unable to carry it [se’eto]…and you shall turn it into money” (Deuteronomy 14:24–25). And se’et means nothing other than eating, as it is stated: “And he took portions [masot] from before him” (Genesis 43:34), indicating that second-tithe produce that cannot be eaten, whether due to the distance from Jerusalem or due to its impurity, may be redeemed. The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? It is not a case where the second-tithe produce became impure; rather, it is a case where an item purchased with second-tithe money became impure.

Daf 113a

וליפרקיה דתנן הלקוח בכסף מעשר שנטמא יפדה כר"י דאמר יקבר אי הכי מאי איריא עיר הנדחת אפילו דעלמא נמי The Gemara challenges: And let him redeem that which was purchased with second-tithe money and became ritually impure, as we learned in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 3:10): An item that is purchased with second-tithe money and that became ritually impure shall be redeemed. The Gemara answers: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: An item that is purchased with second-tithe money and that became ritually impure shall be buried, and it may no longer be redeemed. The Gemara asks: If so, and the mishna is referring to an item purchased with second-tithe money that became ritually impure, why did the mishna cite this halakha specifically in the case of an idolatrous city? The same would hold true even in cities in general as well, as in Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, the halakha there too is that the item is buried.

אלא לעולם בטהור וכגון דנפול מחיצות וכדרבא דאמר רבא מחיצה לאכול דאורייתא לקלוט דרבנן וכי גזור רבנן כי אתנהו למחיצה כי ליתנהו למחיצה לא: Rather, actually, the case in the mishna is with regard to pure second-tithe produce of an idolatrous city that was taken into Jerusalem, and it is a case where the walls of Jerusalem then fell. And this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava says: The capacity of the wall of Jerusalem to enable one to partake of second-tithe produce is by Torah law. By contrast, the capacity of the wall of Jerusalem to admit second-tithe produce, in the sense that once it enters Jerusalem the produce assumes the status of the property of the Most High and may no longer be redeemed, is by rabbinic law. And the case where the Sages issue the decree that entry into Jerusalem admits the produce is where the wall is intact; however, in a case where the wall is not intact, no, the Sages did not issue a decree, and the second tithe remains the spoils of the idolatrous city.

כתבי הקדש יגנזו: מתניתין דלא כר"א דתניא ר"א אומר כל עיר שיש בה אפי' מזוזה אחת אינה נעשית עיר הנדחת שנא' (דברים יג, יז) ושרפת באש את העיר ואת כל שללה כליל והיכא דאיכא מזוזה לא אפשר דכתיב (דברים יב, ד) לא תעשון כן לה' אלהיכם: § The mishna teaches: Sacred scrolls must be interred. The Gemara comments: The halakha cited in the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: Any city in which there is even one mezuza is not rendered an idolatrous city, as it is stated: “And you shall burn it with fire, both the city and all its spoils, entirely for the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 13:17). And in a city where there is a mezuza it is not possible to burn all its spoils, as it is written: “You shall not do so to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:4), from which it is derived that it is prohibited to destroy any item upon which the name of God appears.

ר"ש אומר אמר הקב"ה וכו': לימא בדר' אבין א"ר אילעא קמיפלגי דא"ר אבין א"ר אילעא כל מקום שאתה מוצא כלל בעשה ופרט בלא תעשה אין דנין אותו בכלל ופרט The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, says: If you implement judgment on an idolatrous city, I ascribe you credit as though you have sacrificed an entirely burnt offering before Me, and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree as to whether one may convert the ruins of the idolatrous city into gardens and orchards. The Gemara posits: Let us say that it is with regard to the statement that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says that these tanna’im disagree, as Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Anywhere that you find a generalization formulated as a positive mitzva followed by a detail formulated as a prohibition, one does not deduce from it that the generalization includes only the detail based on the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail; rather, one interprets them as two independent halakhot.

דמר אית ליה דרבי אבין ומר לית ליה דרבי אבין On that basis, say that the dispute is that one Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Avin, and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Avin. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that the positive mitzva: “And it shall be a heap forever,” and the succeeding prohibition: “It shall not be built again” (Deuteronomy 13:17), are independent mitzvot. The result is that the city must remain a heap and may not be converted into gardens and orchards. Rabbi Akiva employs the hermeneutical principle and deduces that the generalization “and it shall be a heap forever” means only that “it shall not be built again,” but converting the ruins of the idolatrous city into gardens and orchards is permitted.

לא דכ"ע אית להו דר' אבין והכא בהא קמיפלגי מר סבר עוד לגמרי משמע ומר סבר עוד לכמה שהיתה אינה נבנית אבל נעשית היא גנות ופרדסים: The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Avin, and here, they disagree about this: One Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, holds that the term “again” indicates that it is entirely prohibited to rebuild it at all. And one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that the term “again” indicates that it is not built to be as it was, but it may be converted into gardens and orchards.

ת"ר היו בה אילנות תלושין אסורין מחוברין מותרין של עיר אחרת בין תלושין בין מחוברין אסור מאי עיר אחרת אמר רב חסדא יריחו דכתיב (יהושע ו, יז) והיתה העיר חרם לה' וישבע יהושע בעת ההיא לאמר ארור האיש לפני ה' אשר יקום ובנה את העיר הזאת את יריחו בבכורו ייסדנה ובצעירו יציב דלתיה § The Sages taught in a baraita: In a case where there were trees in the city, if they are detached from the ground, they are forbidden and must be burned as the spoils of an idolatrous city; if they are attached to the ground they are permitted, i.e., they are not destroyed. By contrast, trees of another city, whether detached or attached, are forbidden. The Gemara asks: To what is the baraita referring with the phrase: Another city? Rav Ḥisda says: The reference is to Jericho, as it is written: “And the city shall be devoted, it and all that is in it, to the Lord…And Joshua charged them at that time by oath, saying: Cursed be the man before the Lord, that rises up to build this city Jericho; he shall lay its foundation with his firstborn, and with his youngest son shall he set up the gates of it” (Joshua 6:17, 26).

תניא לא יריחו על שם עיר אחרת ולא עיר אחרת על שם יריחו דכתיב (מלכים א טז, לד) בנה חיאל בית האלי את יריחו באבירם בכורו יסדה ובשגוב צעירו הציב דלתיה It is taught in a baraita that this includes a prohibition not to build Jericho even after changing its name to the name of another city, and not to build another city after giving it the name of Jericho, as it is written: “Hiel the Bethelite built Jericho; with Abiram, his firstborn, he laid its foundation, and with his young son Segub set up its gates” (I Kings 16:34).

תניא באבירם בכורו רשע לא היה לו ללמוד בשגוב צעירו היה לו ללמוד It is taught in a baraita: From the death of Abiram, his firstborn, the wicked, it was not incumbent upon him to learn not to build Jericho, as Abiram’s death could be attributed to chance. But with the death of Segub his young son, it was incumbent upon him to learn that it was due to Joshua’s curse that they died.

אבירם ושגוב מאי עבוד (מאי קאמר) ה"ק באבירם בכורו היה לו ללמוד לאותו רשע בשגוב צעירו ממשמע שנאמר באבירם בכורו איני יודע ששגוב צעירו מה ת"ל שגוב צעירו מלמד שהיה מקבר והולך מאבירם עד שגוב The Gemara asks: What did Abiram and Segub do that they are characterized as wicked, and what is the baraita saying? The Gemara answers that this is what the baraita is saying: From the death of Abiram, his firstborn, that wicked man Hiel should have learned about the cause of the death of Segub his young son. By inference from that which is stated: “With Abiram, his firstborn,” do I not know that Segub was his young son? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “His young son Segub”? It teaches that he gradually buried all his sons from Abiram through Segub, and he should have suspected that Joshua’s curse caused the deaths.

אחאב שושביניה הוה אתא איהו ואליהו למשאל בשלמא בי טמיא יתיב וקאמר דילמא כי מילט יהושע הכי לט לא יריחו על שם עיר אחרת ולא עיר אחרת על שם יריחו א"ל אליהו אין אמר ליה השתא לווטתא דמשה לא קא מקיימא דכתיב (דברים יא, טז) וסרתם ועבדתם וגו' וכתיב וחרה אף ה' בכם ועצר את השמים וגו' וההוא גברא אוקים ליה עבודת כוכבים על כל תלם ותלם ולא שביק ליה מיטרא דמיזל מיסגד ליה לווטתא דיהושע תלמידיה מקיימא Ahab was Hiel’s close friend and groomsman. He and Elijah came to inquire about Hiel’s welfare in the house of mourning [bei tamya]. Hiel sat and said: Perhaps when Joshua cursed, this is what he cursed: Not to build Jericho even after changing its name to the name of another city, and not to build another city after giving it the name of Jericho. Elijah said to him: Yes, that is the curse. Ahab said to Elijah: Now the curse of Moses is not fulfilled, as it is written: “And you go astray and worship other gods,” and it is written: “Then the Lord’s anger will flare against you, and He will close the heavens, and there will be no rain” (Deuteronomy 11:16–17). And that man, referring to himself, established an object of idol worship on each and every furrow in the kingdom of Israel, and the rain is so plentiful that it does not allow him to go and worship it; will the curse of his student, Joshua, be fulfilled?

מיד (מלכים א יז, יג) ויאמר אליהו התשבי מתושבי גלעד חי ה' אלהי ישראל אם יהיה טל ומטר וגו' בעי רחמי והבו ליה אקלידא דמטרא וקם ואזל The verse relates Elijah’s reaction: Immediately: “And Elijah the Tishbite, who was of the inhabitants of Gilead, said to Ahab: As the Lord God of Israel lives, before whom I stand, there shall not be dew or rain these years, but according to my word” (I Kings 17:1). Elijah prayed for mercy and they gave him the key to rainfall enabling him to dictate when it would rain, and he arose and went.

(מלכים א יז, ב) ויהי דבר ה' אליו לאמר לך מזה ופנית לך קדמה ונסתרת בנחל כרית (מלכים א יז, ו) והעורבים מביאים לו לחם ובשר בבקר וגו' מהיכא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מבי טבחי דאחאב (מלכים א יז, ז) ויהי מקץ ימים וייבש הנחל כי לא היה גשם בארץ כיון דחזא דאיכא צערא בעלמא כתיב (מלכים א יז, ב) ויהי דבר ה' אליו לאמר קום לך צרפתה It is written about Elijah: “And the word of the Lord came to him, saying: Go from here, and turn eastward, and hide yourself by Wadi Cherith…And the ravens brought him bread and meat in the morning” (I Kings 17:2–3, 6). The Gemara asks: From where did they bring him bread and meat? Rabbi Yehuda says that Rav says: They brought it from the slaughterhouse of Ahab. And it is written: “And it came to pass after some days, that the wadi dried up, because there was no rain in the land” (I Kings 17:7). Since God saw that there is suffering in the world and Elijah was insensitive to it, it is written: “And the word of the Lord came to him, saying: Arise, go to Zarephath” (I Kings 17:8–9), to initiate a chain of events that would lead Elijah to return the key to rainfall to God.

וכתיב (מלכים א יז, יז) ויהי אחר הדברים האלה חלה בן האשה בעלת הבית בעא רחמי למיתן ליה אקלידא דתחיית המתים אמרי ליה שלש מפתחות לא נמסרו לשליח של חיה ושל גשמים ושל תחיית המתים יאמרו שתים ביד תלמיד ואחת ביד הרב אייתי הא ושקיל האי דכתיב (מלכים א יח, א) לך הראה אל אחאב [ואתנה] מטר And it is written: “And it came to pass after these matters, that the son of the woman, the mistress of the house, became sick” (I Kings 17:17). Elijah prayed for mercy, for God to give him the key to the resurrection of the dead. They said to him from Heaven: Three keys were not typically passed to an agent: The key to a woman in childbirth, the key to rainfall, and the key to the resurrection of the dead. You already have the key to rainfall; do you also request the key to the resurrection of the dead? People will say: Two keys are in the possession of the student and one key is in the possession of the Master. Bring Me this key to rainfall, and take this key to the resurrection of the dead. Due to Elijah’s request, he was forced to revoke his oath, as it is written: “Go, appear before Ahab; and I will give rain” (I Kings 18:1).

דרש ההוא גלילאה קמיה דרב חסדא משל דאליהו למה הדבר דומה לגברא דטרקיה לגליה ואבדיה למפתחיה A certain Galilean taught before Rav Ḥisda: There is a parable for the actions of Elijah; to what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a man who slammed his door and lost his key. Elijah first prevented the rain from falling, and then no longer had possession of the key to enable it to fall again.

דרש ר' יוסי בצפורי אבא אליהו Rabbi Yosei of Tzippori taught: Father Elijah, a deferential and affectionate characterization for Elijah the prophet,

Daf 113b

קפדן הוה רגיל למיתי גביה איכסי' מיניה תלתא יומי ולא אתא כי אתא א"ל אמאי לא אתא מר א"ל קפדן קרית לי א"ל הא דקמן דקא קפיד מר: was difficult. Elijah was accustomed to coming and revealing himself before Rabbi Yosei each day. He was obscured from him for three days and did not come. When he came again, Rabbi Yosei said to him: Why did the Master not come? Elijah said to him: You denigrated me when you called me difficult. Rabbi Yosei said to Elijah: This example that is before us illustrates the point, as my Master was being difficult by not coming during those days.

(דברים יג, יח) ולא ידבק בידך מאומה מן החרם כל זמן שרשעים בעולם חרון אף בעולם וכו': מאן רשעים אמר רב יוסף גנבי § The mishna teaches with regard to the verse: “And there shall cleave nothing of that which was devoted to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18), as long as the wicked exist in the world, there is wrath in the world. The Gemara asks: Who are these wicked people mentioned in the mishna? Rav Yosef said: They are thieves.

ת"ר רשע בא לעולם חרון בא לעולם שנא' (משלי יח, ג) בבא רשע בא גם בוז ועם קלון חרפה רשע אבד מן העולם טובה באה לעולם שנא' (משלי יא, י) ובאבוד רשעים רנה צדיק נפטר מן העולם רעה באה לעולם שנאמר (ישעיהו נז, א) הצדיק אבד ואין איש שם על לב ואנשי חסד נאספים באין מבין כי מפני הרעה נאסף הצדיק צדיק בא לעולם טובה באה לעולם שנאמר (בראשית ה, כט) זה ינחמנו ממעשינו ומעצבון ידינו: The Sages taught in a baraita: When a wicked person comes into the world, wrath comes into the world, as it is stated: “When the wicked comes into the world, contempt also comes, and with ignominy, reproach” (Proverbs 18:3). When a wicked person is eliminated from the world, good comes into the world, as it is stated: “And when the wicked perish there is jubilation” (Proverbs 11:10). When a righteous person passes from the world, evil comes into the world, as it is stated: “The righteous perishes and no man lays it to heart; and merciful men are taken, none understand that due to the evil the righteous is taken” (Isaiah 57:1) When a righteous person comes into the world, good comes into the world with him, as it is stated with regard to Noah: “This is one who shall comfort us for our work and the toil of our hands” (Genesis 5:29).

הדרן עלך כל ישראל יש להם חלק וסליקא לה מסכת סנהדרין

Daf 2a

מתני׳ שבועות שתים שהן ארבע MISHNA: With regard to oaths on an utterance of the lips, there are two types that are actually four types. The Torah specifies only two types of oaths whose violation renders one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering to atone for his transgression (see Leviticus 5:4): Where a person takes an oath to perform some action, and where he takes an oath to refrain from performing some action. With regard to both types, the Torah explicitly mentions liability only for an oath pertaining to one’s future behavior. Nevertheless, the Sages derive that one is also liable for a violation of both types of oaths when they pertain to one’s past behavior. Accordingly, although only two types are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, the Sages derive that there are actually four types.

ידיעות הטומאה שתים שהן ארבע The mishna lists similar groups of halakhot. With regard to cases of awareness of the defiling of the Temple by entering it while one is ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods by partaking of them while one is ritually impure, there are two types that are actually four. It is prohibited for an impure person to enter the Temple (see Numbers 19:20) or to partake of its sacrificial foods (see Leviticus 7:19–20). If one transgressed either prohibition during a lapse of awareness, then upon becoming aware of his transgression, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2). The Torah specifies that one is liable to bring the offering only in the case in which he had a lapse of awareness of the fact that he was impure. The Sages derive that one is liable not only in these two cases, but also where he was aware of his personal status but had a lapse of awareness concerning the identity of the place he was entering or the status of the foods he ate.

יציאות השבת שתים שהן ארבע With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are actually four. On Shabbat, it is prohibited to transfer an item from domain to domain. The Torah explicitly refers to only two cases, both of which involve an item being transferred from a private domain to a public domain: Where the transfer is made by a person who remains in the public domain, and where the transfer is made by a person who remains in the private domain. The Sages derive that liability is incurred in these cases also if the item is transferred from the public domain to the private domain. Although only two types are mentioned by the Torah, the Sages derive that there are actually four types.

מראות נגעים שנים שהן ארבעה With regard to shades of leprous marks on a person’s skin, there are two types that are actually four. The Torah specifies that if a leprous mark appears on a person’s skin, the afflicted person must undergo a process of purification and then bring various offerings. Part of the classification of these types of leprosy is based on their shade of white. Two types of marks are explicitly mentioned in the Torah, and the Sages derive that each of these two types has a secondary mark.

את שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה וידיעה בסוף והעלם בינתים הרי זה בעולה ויורד The mishna returns to the subject of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods. It elaborates on which offerings atone for different cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods: In cases in which one had awareness, i.e., he knew he was ritually impure and was aware of the sanctity of the Temple or foods involved at the beginning, i.e., before he transgressed, and had awareness at the end, i.e., after the transgression, but had a lapse of awareness of one of those two components in between, while he actually transgressed, this person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

יש בה ידיעה בתחלה ואין בה ידיעה בסוף שעיר הנעשה בפנים ויום הכפורים תולה עד שיודע לו ויביא בעולה ויורד For cases in which one had awareness at the beginning, transgressed during a lapse of awareness, and still had no awareness at the end, the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, suspend any punishment that he deserves until he becomes aware of his transgression; and then to achieve atonement he brings a sliding-scale offering.

אין בה ידיעה בתחלה אבל יש בה ידיעה בסוף שעיר הנעשה בחוץ ויום הכפורים מכפר שנאמר (במדבר כט, יא) מלבד חטאת הכפורים על מה שזה מכפר זה מכפר מה הפנימי אין מכפר אלא על דבר שיש בה ידיעה אף החיצון אין מכפר אלא על דבר שיש בה ידיעה For cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but had awareness at the end, the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary, i.e., the goat of the additional offerings of Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, atone, as it is stated with regard to the offerings brought on Yom Kippur: “One goat for a sin-offering aside from the sin-offering of the atonements” (Numbers 29:11). The verse juxtaposes the internal and external goats together to teach that for that which this one atones, that one atones. Just as the internal goat, i.e., the one whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, atones only for a case in which there was awareness of the components of the transgression at some point, i.e., at the beginning, so too, the external goat, i.e., the goat of the additional offerings of Yom Kippur, atones only for a case in which there was awareness at some point, i.e., at the end.

ועל שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף שעירי הרגלים ושעירי ראשי חדשים מכפרין דברי ר' יהודה ר"ש אומר שעירי הרגלים מכפרין אבל לא שעירי ראשי חדשים ועל מה שעירי ראשי חדשים מכפרין And for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, the goats brought as sin-offerings for the additional offerings of the Festivals and the goats brought as sin-offerings for the additional offerings of the New Moons atone. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The goats of the Festivals atone for cases in which one never had awareness of the transgression, but the goats of the New Moons do not. But if so, for what do the goats of the New Moons atone?

Daf 2b

על הטהור שאכל את הטמא They atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food.

ר' מאיר אומר כל השעירין כפרתן שוה על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו Rabbi Meir says: With regard to all the goats offered as additional offerings, those of the New Moons, Festivals, and Yom Kippur, their atonement, i.e., the atonement that they effect, is the same; they all atone for the defiling of the Temple by entering it while impure, or for the defiling of its sacrificial foods by partaking of them while impure.

היה ר"ש אומר שעירי ראשי חדשים מכפרים על הטהור שאכל את הטמא ושל רגלים מכפרין על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף ושל יום הכפורים מכפר על שאין בה ידיעה בתחלה אבל יש בה ידיעה בסוף Rabbi Shimon would say, delineating his opinion as the mishna expresses it above: The goats of the New Moons atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food. And with regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, the goats of the Festivals atone for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, and the goats of the additional offerings of Yom Kippur atone for cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end.

אמרו לו מהו שיקרבו זה בזה אמר להן יקרבו אמרו לו הואיל ואין כפרתן שוה היאך קרבין זה בזה אמר להם כולן באין לכפר על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו The Rabbis said to him: What is the halakha with regard to whether goats consecrated for different days may be sacrificed, this one in place of that one? For example, if a goat was initially consecrated to be sacrificed as part of the Yom Kippur additional offerings, may it be sacrificed as part of the Festival additional offerings instead? Rabbi Shimon said to them: They may be sacrificed. They said to him: Since, according to you, their atonement is not the same, how could they possibly be sacrificed, this one in place of that one? Rabbi Shimon said to them: They can be interchanged, since ultimately all of them come to atone for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

ר"ש בן יהודה אומר משמו שעירי ראשי חדשים מכפרין על הטהור שאכל את הטמא מוסיף עליהן של רגלים שמכפרין על טהור שאכל את הטמא ועל שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon a tradition of his opinion that differs from the way the mishna expresses it above: The goats of the New Moons atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food. The goats of the Festivals exceed them, as they atone both for a pure person who partook of impure sacrificial food and also for cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end.

מוסיף עליהן של יום הכפורים שהן מכפרין על הטהור שאכל את הטמא ועל שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף ועל שאין בה ידיעה בתחלה אבל יש בה ידיעה בסוף The goats of Yom Kippur further exceed them, as they atone both for a ritually pure person who partook of ritually impure sacrificial food and for cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end; and they also atone for cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end.

אמרו לו מהו שיקרבו זה בזה אמר להם הן אמרו לו אם כן יהיו של יום הכפורים קרבין בראשי חדשים אבל היאך של ראשי חדשים קרבין ביום הכפורים לכפר כפרה שאינה שלה אמר להם כולן באין לכפר על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו The Rabbis said to him: What is the halakha with regard to whether goats consecrated for different days may be sacrificed, this one in place of that one? Rabbi Shimon said to them: Yes, they can be interchanged. They said to him: If what you say is so, granted that the goats of Yom Kippur may be sacrificed on the New Moons, but how could the goats of the New Moons be sacrificed on Yom Kippur when they will need to effect atonement for that which they were not consecrated for? Rabbi Shimon said to them: They can all be interchanged, since ultimately all of them come to atone for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, even if each one atones for a different case.

ועל זדון טומאת מקדש וקדשיו שעיר הנעשה בפנים ויום הכפורים מכפרין § And for the intentional defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, both the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, atone.

על שאר עבירות שבתורה הקלות והחמורות הזדונות והשגגות הודע ולא הודע עשה ולא תעשה כריתות ומיתות בית דין שעיר המשתלח מכפר The mishna delineates how atonement is effected for other transgressions: For all other transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether they are the minor ones or the major ones, whether they were intentional or unwitting, whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them until after Yom Kippur, whether they involve a positive mitzva or a prohibition, whether the transgressors are subject to excision from the World-to-Come [karet] or to one of the court-imposed death penalties, the scapegoat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur atones.

אחד ישראלים ואחד כהנים ואחד כהן משוח מה בין ישראלים לכהנים ולכהן משוח אלא שהפר מכפר על הכהנים על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו Israelites and priests and the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, achieve atonement from the scapegoat equally. What is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed priest? The difference is only that the priests achieve atonement for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods through the bull that the High Priest offers on Yom Kippur, whereas the Israelites achieve atonement for defiling caused by them through the goats that are sacrificed on Yom Kippur.

ר"ש אומר כשם שדם השעיר הנעשה בפנים מכפר על ישראל כך דם הפר מכפר על הכהנים כשם שוידויו של שעיר המשתלח מכפר על ישראל כך וידויו של פר מכפר על הכהנים: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, just as the blood of the goat, whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, atones for Israelites, so too, the blood of the bull of the High Priest, whose blood presentation is also performed inside the Sanctuary, atones for the priests. And for all other transgressions, just as the confession made over the scapegoat atones for Israelites, so too, the confession made over the bull atones for the priests.

גמ׳ מכדי תנא ממכות סליק מאי שנא דתני שבועות משום דתני חייב על הראש שתים אחת מיכן ואחת מיכן GEMARA: The Gemara inquires: Now, the tanna is leaving tractate Makkot, the tractate that precedes tractate Shevuot in the mishnaic order. What is distinctive about tractate Shevuot that he teaches tractate Shevuot after tractate Makkot? The Gemara answers: It is due to the fact that he teaches in a mishna at the end of tractate Makkot (20a): For rounding the edges of his head one is liable to receive two sets of lashes: One from here, the hair adjacent to one ear, and one from there, the hair adjacent to the other ear.

Daf 3a

ועל הזקן שתים מיכן ושתים מיכן ואחת מלמטה And for marring the edges of his beard there are two edges from here, on one side of his face, and two from there, on the other side, and one from below.

חדא דמיחייב עלה תרתי תנא שבועות שתים שהן ארבע The Gemara explains: As apparent from the mishna in Makkot, this is a case where there is one prohibition for which one is liable to receive two punishments. Continuing on this theme, the tanna taught in the beginning of tractate Shevuot examples of other sets of halakhot that can be formulated similarly, beginning with: With regard to oaths on an utterance, there are two types that are actually four types.

מאי שנא הכא דתני להו לכולהו ומאי שנא גבי יציאות שבת ומראות נגעים דלא קתני להו לכולהו The Gemara inquires: What is different here, in tractate Shevuot, that the mishna teaches all the sets of halakhot that can be formulated as: Two that are four, and what is different with regard to the chapter beginning: The acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, i.e., the first chapter of tractate Shabbat, and the chapter beginning: And the shades of leprous marks, i.e., the first chapter of tractate Nega’im, where the mishna does not teach all of them, rather only the specific set of halakhot relevant to that tractate?

אמרי שבועות וידיעות הטומאה דגבי הדדי כתיבין ודמיין אהדדי בקרבן עולה ויורד תני להו גבי הדדי ואיידי דתנא תרתי תנא כולהו The Sages say in explanation: Since the passages of oaths and of liability based on one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods are written together in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:2–4), and they are also similar to each other in that they can both incur liability to bring a sliding-scale offering, the mishna therefore taught both of them together here. And once it already taught two sets, it continued and taught all of them.

פתח בשבועות ומפרש ידיעות הטומאה איידי דזוטרין מילייהו פסיק שרי להו והדר תני שבועות דנפישן מילייהו The Gemara inquires further: Tractate Shevuot opens with a reference to oaths, but then proceeds to explain the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, returning to discuss oaths only in the third chapter. Why? The Gemara explains: Since the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods are relatively few, the tanna addressed them directly and dispensed with them, and then afterward returned to teach the halakhot of oaths, which have numerous details.

שבועות שתים שהן ארבע שתים שאוכל ושלא אוכל שהן ארבע אכלתי ושלא אכלתי § The mishna teaches: With regard to oaths on an utterance, there are two types that are actually four types. The Gemara explains: The two types are where one states: On my oath I will eat, and where he states: On my oath I will not eat. If he violates either oath he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. These two types are actually four types because they also include the cases where a person falsely states: On my oath I ate, and where he falsely states: On my oath I did not eat.

ידיעות הטומאה שתים שהן ארבע שתים ידיעת טומאת קדש וידיעת טומאת מקדש שהן ארבע קדש ומקדש: The mishna continues: With regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, there are two cases that are actually four. The Gemara explains: The two cases are where one’s lack of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure led him to eat sacrificial food, and where one’s lack of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure led him to enter the Temple. These two types are actually four types, because one is also liable where he was aware that he was impure, but had a lapse of awareness about the status of the sacrificial food or the identity of the Temple.

יציאות שבת שתים שהן ארבע שתים הוצאה דעני והוצאה דבעל הבית שהן ארבע הכנסה דעני והכנסה דבעל הבית The mishna continues: With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are four. The Gemara explains the cases by using the analogy of a poor person who remains in the public domain and a homeowner who remains in the private domain and one passes an item to the other: The two types are the carrying out by a poor person of an item from the private domain to the public domain and the carrying out by a homeowner of an item from the private domain to the public domain. These two types are actually four types because they also include the bringing in by a poor person of an item from the public domain to the private domain and the bringing in by a homeowner of an item from the public domain to the private domain.

מראות נגעים שנים שהן ארבעה שנים שאת ובהרת שהן ארבעה שאת ותולדתה בהרת ותולדתה The mishna’s final example: With regard to shades of leprous marks, there are two shades that are actually four. The Gemara explains: The two shades are of a wool-white leprous mark [se’et] and of a snow-white leprous mark [baheret]. These two are actually four because they also include a se’et and its secondary mark, i.e., one similar to it, and a baheret and its secondary mark, i.e., one similar to it.

מני מתניתין לא רבי ישמעאל ולא ר' עקיבא אי רבי ישמעאל האמר אינו חייב אלא על העתיד לבוא אי ר' עקיבא האמר על העלם טומאה הוא חייב ואינו חייב על העלם מקדש § The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael nor the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara elaborates: If one suggests that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that suggestion can be refuted, as doesn’t he say with regard to oaths: One is liable only for oaths pertaining to the future, but not for those pertaining to the past? The mishna states that one is liable also for oaths pertaining to the past. And if one suggests it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that suggestion can be refuted, as doesn’t he say: For having defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods during a lapse of awareness of the fact that one is ritually impure one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, but one is not liable for having done so during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple? The mishna states that one is liable also in such a case.

איבעית אימא רבי ישמעאל איבעית אימא ר' עקיבא איבעית אימא רבי ישמעאל מהן לחיוב ומהן לפטור ואיבעית אימא רבי עקיבא מהן לחיוב ומהן לפטור The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and if you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the intent of the mishna is that while there are four types of oaths, among them are types for which there is liability to bring an offering for one who violates them and among them are types for which there is exemption from liability for one who violates them. And if you wish, say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the intent of the mishna is that while there are four cases defined by one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, among them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering and among them are cases for which there is exemption from liability.

לפטור The Gemara asks: How can one say that the mishna teaches types for which there is exemption from liability?

Daf 3b

הא דומיא דמראות נגעים קתני מה התם כולהו לחיובא אף הכא נמי כולהו לחיובא But the mishna teaches these cases similar to the different shades of leprous marks, which indicates that just as there, all four of them are shades for which there is liability to bring an offering, so too here, with regard to oaths and the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, all four of them are cases for which there is liability to bring an offering.

לעולם ר' ישמעאל וכי לא מחייב רבי ישמעאל לשעבר קרבן אבל מלקות חיובי מחייב The Gemara suggests a different resolution: Actually, the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. And while Rabbi Yishmael does not deem one liable for oaths pertaining to the past, that is only with regard to liability to bring an offering; but he does deem one liable to be administered lashes.

וכדרבא דאמר רבא בפירוש ריבתה תורה שבועת שקר דומיא דשבועת שוא מה שוא לשעבר אף שקר נמי לשעבר And this is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: The Torah explicitly amplifies the prohibition of taking a false oath to be similar to the prohibition of an oath taken in vain, to teach that one is flogged for its violation. It follows that just as an oath taken in vain pertains to the past and renders one liable to receive lashes, so too, taking a false oath that pertains to the past renders one liable to receive lashes.

בשלמא אכלתי ולא אכלתי כדרבא שלא אוכל ואכל נמי לאו שיש בו מעשה הוא אלא אוכל ולא אכל אמאי לאו שאין בו מעשה הוא The Gemara asks: Granted that one who stated: On my oath I ate, but in fact he did not eat, or one who stated: On my oath I did not eat, but in fact he ate, is liable to receive lashes, as this is in accordance with the statement of Rava. And also if one stated: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate in violation of his oath, he is liable to receive lashes, as it is a prohibition that involves an action, and, in general, such prohibitions are punishable by flogging. But if one stated: On my oath I will eat, and in violation of his oath he did not eat, why should he be liable to receive lashes? It is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The generally accepted principle is that one is not liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition without performing an action.

קסבר רבי ישמעאל לאו שאין בו מעשה לוקין עליו The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with the generally accepted principle and holds that one is flogged for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action.

אי הכי קשיא דר' יוחנן אדרבי יוחנן The Gemara challenges: If so, then a difficulty arises between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

דאמר רבי יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is always in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna. Since the mishna here is unattributed and assumes that one is flogged for taking a false oath, Rabbi Yoḥanan should rule that this is the halakha.

ואתמר שבועה שאוכל ככר זו היום ועבר היום ולא אכלה ר' יוחנן וריש לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו אינו לוקה ר' יוחנן אמר אינו לוקה משום דהוה לאו שאין בו מעשה וכל לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו וריש לקיש אמר אינו לוקה התראת ספק היא והתראת ספק לא שמה התראה And an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who said: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not flogged for taking a false oath. They disagree with regard to the reason that he is not flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, as he violates the oath by failing to perform an action rather than by performing an action, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for its violation. And Reish Lakish says: He is not flogged because it is an uncertain forewarning, as one cannot forewarn him before he fails to fulfill the oath because as long as time remains in the day he can still later eat the loaf and fulfill the oath; and an uncertain forewarning is not characterized as forewarning. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not rule in accordance with the mishna here.

רבי יוחנן סתמא אחרינא אשכח The Gemara resolves the difficulty: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna which holds that one is not flogged for a prohibition that does not involve an action, and he rules in accordance with that mishna.

הי סתמא אילימא האי סתמא דתנן אבל המותיר בטהור והשובר בטמא אינו לוקה את הארבעים The Gemara asks: Which other unattributed mishna did he find? If we say he found this unattributed mishna, as we learned (Pesaḥim 84a): But one who leaves over some of the meat of a ritually pure Paschal offering until the morning of the fifteenth of Nisan and one who breaks a bone of a ritually impure Paschal offering are not flogged with the forty lashes, that is difficult.

בשלמא שובר בטמא דכתיב (שמות יב, מו) ועצם לא תשברו בו בכשר ולא בפסול אבל המותיר בטהור מאי טעמא לאו משום דהוי לאו שאין בו מעשה וכל לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו First, the Gemara explains how this mishna demonstrates Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Granted that breaking a bone of a impure Paschal offering does not incur lashes, as it is written: “Nor shall you break a bone in it” (Exodus 12:46). The term “in it” indicates that the verse refers only to a valid Paschal offering, but not to a disqualified one, such as one that is impure. But in the case of one who leaves over some of the meat of a pure Paschal offering, what is the reason he is not flogged? Is it not because it is a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged?

וממאי דר' יעקב היא דאמר לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו דלמא ר' יהודה היא ומשום דבא הכתוב ליתן עשה אחר לא תעשה הא לאו הכי לקי The Gemara now questions this explanation of the mishna: But from where is it apparent that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who says that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and he holds that the reason the mishna rules that one is not flogged is due to the fact that the verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition of leaving over the meat, and one is not flogged for a prohibition whose violation obligates one in a positive mitzva. But were it not for this, one would be flogged, despite the fact it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. Since the unattributed mishna is not necessarily in accordance with Rabbi Yaakov’s opinion, it cannot be the basis of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling.

דתניא (שמות יב, י) לא תותירו ממנו עד בקר והנותר ממנו עד בקר באש תשרפו בא הכתוב ליתן עשה אחר לא תעשה לומר שאין לוקין עליו דברי ר' יהודה רבי יעקב אומר לא מן השם הוא זה אלא משום דהוה לאו שאין בו מעשה ולאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו The Gemara cites the source of Rabbi Yaakov’s and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinions: As it is taught in a baraita: “And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn in fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving over the meat, to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Ya’akov says: This is not for that reason; rather, it is due to the fact that it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged.

אלא האי סתמא אשכח שבועה שלא אוכל ככר זו שבועה שלא אוכלנה ואכלה Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan found this unattributed mishna, which teaches (27b): If one states: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and immediately states: On my oath I will not eat it, and then he ate it,

Daf 4a

אינו חייב אלא אחת זו היא שבועת ביטוי שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה קרבן עולה ויורד he is liable for only one violation. Since the second oath did not prohibit any act in addition to the first oath, he is not liable for violating it. The mishna concludes: This is an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation, and to bring a sliding-scale offering for its unwitting violation.

זו היא דחייבין על זדונה מכות אבל אוכל ולא אכל לא לקי The Gemara infers from the formulation of the mishna: It is specifically this case of an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation. But if a person stated: On my oath I will eat, and then he did not eat, he is not flogged. Presumably this is because the violation does not involve any action. This mishna, then, can provide a basis for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling.

מכדי האי סתמא והאי סתמא מאי חזי דעביד כי האי סתמא לעביד כי האי סתמא The Gemara asks: Now, this mishna (27b) is unattributed and that mishna (2a) is unattributed. What did Rabbi Yoḥanan see that he practiced in accordance with this unattributed mishna? Let him instead practice in accordance with that unattributed mishna.

ולטעמיך רבי גופיה היכי סתם לן הכא הכי והכא הכי The Gemara adds another question: And according to your reasoning that both mishnayot carry equal weight, then with regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi himself, when he redacted the Mishna, how could he teach us as unattributed both this opinion in the mishna here and that opinion in the mishna there? This would result in a contradiction.

אלא מעיקרא סבר לאו שאין בו מעשה לוקין עליו וסתמה והדר סבר אין לוקין עליו וסתמה ומשנה לא זזה ממקומה Rather, it is apparent that initially Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi held that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged, and so he taught it as an unattributed mishna, and later he retracted his opinion and held that one is not flogged for a violation of such a prohibition, and so he taught that opinion as an unattributed mishna. And he left the first mishna (2a) as it was because a mishna does not move from its place, i.e., since the students had already learned that mishna it was deemed inappropriate to remove it. Based on this logic, Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled in accordance with the later mishna (27b).

במאי אוקימתא כר' ישמעאל ולמלקות מראות נגעים מאי מלקות איכא בקוצץ בהרתו וכרבי אבין א"ר אילעא דא"ר אבין א"ר אילעא כל מקום שנאמר השמר פן ואל אינו אלא לא תעשה The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and it is referring to liability to receive lashes. The Gemara questions this: But in the parallel case of shades of leprous marks, what punishment of lashes is there? The Gemara answers: There is a punishment of lashes in a case where one cuts off his snow-white leprous mark [baheret], and in accordance with the principle that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says, as Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Wherever it is stated: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. So too, with regard to leprosy, the verse states: “Observe the leprous mark” (Deuteronomy 24:8), which according to Rabbi Ile’a’s principle teaches a prohibition, namely that it is prohibited to remove the mark. Accordingly, one who violates this prohibition is liable to receive lashes.

יציאות שבת מאי מלקות איכא לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד הוא וכל לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד אין לוקין עליו משום הכי קא מוקמינא כר' ישמעאל דאמר לאו שניתן לאזהרת מיתת ב"ד לוקין עליו The Gemara asks further: But in the parallel clause of acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, what punishment of lashes is there? The prohibition against doing so is a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, and the generally accepted principle is that with regard to a violation of any prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is not flogged for its violation even if no death penalty is imposed, as that prohibition is punishable only by death. The Gemara answers: It is due to that reason that we interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as he says that with regard to a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is flogged for its violation in a case where there is no actual death penalty.

הא לאו הכי קיימא כר"ע קשיא ידיעות לאו אמרת רבי ישמעאל היא ולמלקות ר"ע נמי ולמלקות The Gemara asks: Is that to say that were it not for this reason, the mishna could be interpreted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that one is not flogged for violating such prohibitions? But then the question raised above with regard to the mishna’s detailing of the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods poses a difficulty, as Rabbi Akiva holds that one is not liable if he entered the Temple during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple, whereas the mishna indicates one is liable in such a case. The Gemara answers: Didn’t you say above that it is possible to conclude that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes? Similarly, it is also possible to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes.

אי הכי ידיעות התראות מיבעי ליה הא לא קשיא תני ידיעות דהתראות The Gemara asks: If so, why did the tanna use the term: Cases of awareness, which is generally used for cases in which the transgression was performed during a lack of awareness and then subsequent awareness is necessary in order for the person to be liable to bring an offering? The tanna should have instead said: Forewarnings, as the forewarning is a necessary condition to be able to give lashes for an intentional transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; emend and teach the mishna as saying: Cases of awareness of forewarnings.

אי הכי שתים שהן ארבע תרתי הוא דהויין ותו את שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה וידיעה בסוף והעלם בינתים העלמה למלקות מאי עבידתיה ותו הרי זה בעולה ויורד The Gemara rejects the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes: If so, if the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes, why does it state that there are two types that are four? There are only two types. Since the person was forewarned he is certainly fully aware of all aspects of his transgression. Accordingly, there are only two cases of liability: For a ritually impure person who enters the Temple and for a ritually impure person who partakes of sacrificial foods. And furthermore, the continuation of the mishna states the case: In which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between, when he actually transgressed. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of lapses of awareness to one’s liability to receive lashes? And furthermore, that clause explicitly concludes: This person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Clearly then, the mishna is not referring to liability to receive lashes.

אלא אמר רב יוסף רבי היא ונסיב לה אליבא דתנאי בידיעות נסיב לה כרבי ישמעאל בשבועות נסיב לה כר"ע Having rejected the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to be punished with lashes, it addresses the difficulty raised above that the mishna’s ruling with regard to oaths does not accord with Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion and its ruling with regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods does not accord with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? Rather, Rav Yosef said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and he formulates the mishna according to different tanna’im, as follows: With regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and with regard to oaths, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

אמר רב אשי אמריתא לשמעתא קמיה דרב כהנא ואמר לי לא תימא רבי נסיב לה אליבא דתנאי וליה לא ס"ל Rav Ashi said: I said this statement of Rav Yosef before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: Do not say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi formulates the mishna according to different tanna’im but he himself does not hold accordingly.

אלא רבי טעמיה דנפשיה מפרש דתניא מנין שאינו חייב אלא על שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה וידיעה בסוף והעלם בינתים ת"ל (ויקרא ה, ב) ונעלם ונעלם שני פעמים דברי ר"ע Rav Kahana continued: Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is explicating his own reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering only for cases in which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end and had a lapse of awareness only in between, when he actually transgressed? The verses state with regard to a person’s awareness of the fact that he was impure: “And it was concealed,” “and it was concealed” (Leviticus 5:2–3), mentioning concealment twice. The first mention is necessary to teach that one is liable to bring an offering only where he was unaware of his status at the time of the transgression. The second mention is superfluous and serves to teach an additional condition for liability, that one must have had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

רבי אומר אינו צריך הרי הוא אומר The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This proof is not necessary, as it says in the verse:

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Daf 5a

ריבויי ומיעוטי using the method of amplifications and restrictions.

אין בעלמא כללי ופרטי דריש והכא היינו טעמא כדתנא דבי ר' ישמעאל Ameimar answers: Yes, generally Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ex-pounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, but here, with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, this is the reason that he expounds the verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions: He holds in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught.

דתנא דבי ר' ישמעאל (ויקרא יא, לב) במים במים שני פעמים אין זה כלל ופרט אלא ריבה ומיעט As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: When defining which fish it is permitted to eat, the verse states: “This you may eat, from whatever is in the water, anything that has fins and scales in the water, in the seas and in the streams” (Leviticus 11:9). The verse first states the general term: “In the water,” “in the water,” mentioning it twice, and only afterward mentions the details, i.e., “in the seas and in the streams.” When the general and detailed phrases are ordered in this way, they are not expounded as a generalization and a detail, but rather as an amplification and a restriction. Similarly, although Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi generally expounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, since the verse mentions the two general terms first and mentions the specific detail only afterward, he expounds it using the method of amplifications and restrictions.

ורבנן אמר רבינא כדאמרי במערבא כל מקום שאתה מוצא שתי כללות הסמוכות זה לזה הטל פרט ביניהן ודונם בכלל ופרט The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, why do they expound the verse about the redemption of a firstborn as a generalization and a detail? Ravina said: Like they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: Wherever you find two generalizations juxtaposed to each other, followed by a specific detail, place the detail between the two generalizations and thereby expound them as a generalization and a detail followed by another generalization.

השתא דאמרת רבי כללי ופרטי דריש בעל כורחיך קשיא שבועות אלא בשבועות נסיב אליבא דר' עקיבא וליה לא סבירא ליה: The Gemara concludes the question it asked earlier: Now that you said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi expounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, perforce the mishna’s ruling in the case of oaths is difficult, as it is derived by expounding the verse as an amplification and a restriction, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not generally expound verses in that manner. This contradicts Rav Kahana’s explanation that the mishna expresses Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s own opinion. Rather, one must say that with regard to oaths, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi formulated the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, but he himself does not hold accordingly.

גופא מנין שאינו חייב אלא על שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה וידיעה בסוף והעלם בינתים ת"ל (ויקרא ה, ב) ונעלם ונעלם שני פעמים דברי ר"ע § Above (4a), the Gemara cited a baraita. Now the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. The baraita states: From where is it derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering only for cases in which he had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between, when he actually transgressed? The verse states with regard to a person’s awareness of the fact that he was impure: “And it was concealed,” “and it was concealed,” mentioning it twice (Leviticus 5:2–3). The first mention teaches that one is liable only if during the transgression he was unaware of his status, and the second mention teaches that one is liable only if he had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

רבי אומר אינו צריך הרי הוא אומר ונעלם מכלל שידע והוא ידע הרי כאן שתי ידיעות א"כ מה ת"ל ונעלם לחייב על העלם טומאה ועל העלם מקדש: The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This proof is not necessary, as it states in the same verse: “And it was concealed,” which indicates, by inference, that initially he had been aware; and nevertheless the verse continues to state: “And he was aware.” It emerges, then, that the verse refers here to two different periods of awareness, one before the transgression and one afterward. But if so, why must the verse state: “And it was concealed,” a second time? It is in order to render one liable both for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure and for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple.

אמר מר ונעלם מכלל שידע מאי משמע אמר רבא מדלא כתיב והיא עלומה ממנו The Master said in that baraita: The verse states: “And it was concealed,” which indicates, by inference, that initially he had been aware. The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? Rava said: From the fact that it is not written: And it is concealed from him, which would have been the appropriate formulation had he never been aware of the matter at all. Accordingly, the phrase “and it was concealed” is to be understood as referring to a case in which he had been initially aware.

א"ל אביי אלא מעתה גבי סוטה דכתיב (במדבר ה, יג) ונעלם מעיני אישה מכלל דהוי ידע מעיקרא אי הוה ידע מי בדקו לה מיא Abaye said to him: If that is so, then you should also make a similar inference with regard to a suspected adulteress [sota], as it is written that she is liable to undergo the ordeal of drinking the bitter waters when “a man lay with her carnally, and it was concealed from the eyes of her husband” (Numbers 5:13). This would indicate, by inference, that initially he had been aware of the fact that his wife committed adultery. Abaye explains the difficulty: If he was actually aware that his wife had committed adultery, would the bitter waters have the power to examine her?

והא תניא (במדבר ה, לא) ונקה האיש מעון והאשה ההיא תשא את עונה בזמן שהאיש מנוקה מעון המים בודקין את אשתו אין האיש מנוקה מעון אין המים בודקין את אשתו But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to a case in which she is found guilty: “And the husband will be free of sin and the wife shall bear her sin” (Numbers 5:31). This verse teaches that only when the husband is free of sin, the water examines his wife, but if the husband is not free of sin, the water does not examine his wife. If the husband had been aware that his wife had committed adultery, then she is forbidden to him and he is required to divorce her. The fact he did not divorce her is considered a sin; consequently, the waters cannot examine his wife.

ותו גבי תורה דכתיב (איוב כח, כא) ונעלמה מעיני כל חי ומעוף השמים נסתרה מכלל דאיכא דהוה ידע ביה והכתיב (איוב כח, יג) לא ידע אנוש ערכה Abaye presents another difficulty to Rava: And furthermore, according to your understanding, you should also make a similar inference with regard to Torah, as it is written: “And it was concealed from the eyes of all living creatures, and from those that soar in the heavens it was hidden” (Job 28:21), which would indicate, by inference, that initially there was someone who was aware of the Torah. But isn’t it written: “No man knew its value, and it is not known in the land of the living” (Job 28:13)?

אלא אמר אביי קסבר רבי ידיעת בית רבו שמה ידיעה Rather, Abaye said: The formulation of the verse does not indicate that he actually realized he was impure; it indicates only that he was initially aware of the fact that he had come into contact with a source of impurity, but he failed to reach the obvious conclusion that he was thereby rendered impure. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the elementary knowledge of the halakhot of ritual impurity that a person gained in his childhood from his school is sufficient, in light of his awareness of the fact he came into contact with a source of impurity, to be considered awareness of the fact that he was impure, and thereby render him liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

א"ל רב פפא לאביי אלא דקתני אין בה ידיעה בתחלה ויש בה ידיעה בסוף מי איכא דלית ליה ידיעת בית רבו א"ל אין משכחת לה בתינוק שנשבה לבין הנכרים: Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But how can you explain the halakha that is taught in the mishna: For cases in which he did not have awareness at the beginning but had awareness at the end? According to your explanation, is there anyone who does not have the elementary knowledge of the halakhot of ritual impurity that he gained from his school? Abaye said to him: Yes, you find it in the case of a child who was taken captive among gentiles, who never received even the most elementary level of knowledge.

יציאות שבת שתים שהן ארבע: תנן התם יציאות שבת שתים שהן ארבע בפנים ושתים שהן ארבע בחוץ מאי שנא הכא דתנא שתים שהן ד' ותו לא ומאי שנא התם דתני שתים שהן ארבע בפנים ושתים שהן ארבע בחוץ § The mishna states (2a): With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are four. We learned in a mishna there (Shabbat 2a): With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are primarily two basic actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item inside, to a private domain; and two basic actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item outside, to a public domain. The Gemara asks: What is different here that the mishna teaches: There are two types that are four, and nothing more; and what is different there, in tractate Shabbat, that the mishna teaches: There are two actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item inside, to a private domain, and two actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item outside, to a public domain?

התם דעיקר שבת הוא תני אבות ותולדות הכא דלאו עיקר שבת הוא אבות תני ותולדות לא תני The Gemara answers: There, in tractate Shabbat, which is where the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat is found, the mishna teaches both the primary categories and the subcategories of labor prohibited on Shabbat. But here, in tractate Shevuot, which does not contain the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat but does not teach the subcategories of labor.

אבות מאי נינהו יציאות יציאות תרתי הויין The Gemara asks: What are the primary categories of transferring an item on Shabbat? They are acts of carrying out from the private domain to the public domain. The Gemara objects: But the acts of carrying out are only two in number, i.e., where the carrying out is done by someone standing in the private domain and when it is done by someone in the public domain. Why then does the mishna state that there are four cases?

וכ"ת מהן לחיוב ומהן לפטור והא דומיא דמראות נגעים קתני מה התם כולהו לחיובא אף הכא כולהו לחיובא And if you would say that the mishna enumerates four types of carrying out, among them those for which there is liability and among them those for which there is exemption, that is not feasible, as doesn’t the mishna teach this case as similar to the different shades of leprous marks? This would indicate that just as there, all four of them are types for which there is liability, so too here, with regard to carrying out on Shabbat, all four of them are types for which there is liability.

אלא אמר רב פפא התם דעיקר שבת תני חיובי ופטורי הכא חיובי תני ופטורי לא תני Rather, Rav Pappa said that the difference between the manner in which the halakha is cited in tractates Shevuot and Shabbat must be understood as follows: There, in tractate Shabbat, which contains the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches both cases of liability and cases of exemption. But here, in tractate Shevuot, which does not contain the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches only cases of liability but does not teach cases of exemption.

חיובי מאי נינהו יציאות יציאות תרתי הוא דהויין שתים דהוצאה ושתים דהכנסה The Gemara asks: What are the cases of liability? They are acts of carrying out from the private domain to the public domain. The Gemara objects: But the acts of carrying out are only two in number. Why then does the mishna state that there are four cases? The Gemara explains: There are two cases of carrying out an item from a private domain to a public domain and two more cases of bringing in an item from a public domain to a private domain.

והא יציאות קתני אמר רב אשי תנא הכנסה נמי הוצאה קרי לה ממאי The Gemara objects: But the mishna teaches: Acts of carrying out. It does not appear to mention acts of bringing in at all. Rav Ashi said: The tanna also refers to an act of bringing in an item as an act of carrying out an item. The Gemara asks: From where do we know this?

Daf 5b

דתנן המוציא מרשות לרשות חייב מי לא עסקינן דקא מעייל עיולי וקא קרי ליה הוצאה It is as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 73a): One who carries out an item from one domain to another domain is liable. The Gemara claims: Are we not also dealing with a case where he is bringing it in from a public domain to a private domain, and nevertheless the mishna refers to it as carrying out?

ודלמא קא מפיק מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים אם כן ניתני המוציא מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים מאי מרשות לרשות דאפילו מרשות הרבים לרשות היחיד The Gemara questions this assertion: But perhaps the mishna is dealing with a case of carrying out an item from a private domain to a public domain. The Gemara defends its claim: If so, let it instead teach: One who carries out an item from a private domain to a public domain is liable. What is the reason it used the more generalized formulation: From one domain to another domain? To teach that one is liable even if one transfers an item from a public domain to a private domain.

וקא קרי לה הוצאה וטעמא מאי תנא כל עקירת חפץ ממקומו הוצאה קרי לה The Gemara explains further: Even though the mishna addresses carrying an item in from a public domain to a private domain, it refers to it as carrying out. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? The tanna refers to any act that involves removal of an item from its place as carrying out. Accordingly, the term can appropriately be used even when an item is brought in to a private domain from a public domain.

אמר רבינא מתניתין נמי דיקא דקתני יציאות שבת שתים שהן ארבע בפנים ושתים שהן ארבע בחוץ וקא מפרש הכנסה שמע מינה Ravina said: The language of the mishna in tractate Shabbat is also precise in indicating this, as it teaches: With regard to acts of carrying out [yetziyyot] that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are primarily two basic actions that are four cases from the perspective of a person inside a private domain, and two basic actions that are four cases from the perspective of a person outside, in a public domain. And then, immediately, in the continuation of that mishna, it explicates the cases of bringing in an item. Conclude from it that the term: Carrying out, is also used to refer to bringing in an item.

רבא אמר רשויות קתני רשויות שבת שתים: Rava said: One cannot make any inference from the language of the mishna, as it is not referring to acts of carrying out. Rather, it teaches domains. In other words, it means: With regard to the domains of Shabbat there are two types, the existence of which leads to four types of prohibited transfers, two with regard to carrying out and two with regard to bringing in.

מראות נגעים שנים שהן ארבעה: תנן התם מראות נגעים שנים שהן ארבעה בהרת עזה כשלג שניה לה כסיד ההיכל § The mishna teaches: With regard to different shades of leprous marks, there are two types that are actually four. We learned in a mishna there (Nega’im 1:1): With regard to different shades of leprous marks, there are two types that are actually four: The baheret, mentioned in the Torah (see Leviticus 13:2), is considered a primary mark; it is an intense white, like snow. Secondary to it, i.e., a sub-category of it, is a mark that is white like the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls.

שאת כצמר לבן שניה לה כקרום ביצה That mishna continues: The se’et mentioned in the Torah is considered a primary mark; it is like white wool. Secondary to it is a mark that is white like the membrane of an egg. The ordering of different shades is relevant in determining which shades can be combined together. In order for a leprous mark to be halakhically significant, it must at least be the size of a split Cilician bean [geris]. If a mark is that size, but it is composed of different shades of white, none of which is alone the size of a geris, then if the different shades are compatible they can combine together and will thereby render the person ritually impure.

א"ר חנינא מאן תנא מראות נגעים דלא כר' עקיבא דאי ר"ע כיון דאמר זו למעלה מזו וזו למעלה מזו א"כ טיהרת סיד היכל מלצרף Rabbi Ḥanina said: Who is the tanna who taught this mishna, which delineates the different shades of leprous marks into two groups? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. As if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva one would be presented with a difficulty: Since with regard to which shades can combine together, Rabbi Akiva says: The different shades should be ordered this one above this one, and that one above that one, i.e., according to their degrees of brightness, from the most bright to the darkest shade, as follows: Snow white, i.e., baheret; wool white, i.e., se’et; lime; and egg membrane; and only two adjacent shades can combine together. But if so, you have rendered pure a mark that is white like the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls and is smaller than a geris, as it cannot be combined with any other shade of white.

בהדי מאן ליצרפי' ליצרפיה בהדי בהרת איכא שאת דעדיפא מיניה ליצרפיה בהדי שאת לאו תולדה דידיה הוא The Gemara explains: With which other shade could we combine the lime-colored mark? We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a snow-white baheret, which is the primary mark relative to a lime-colored mark, as there is a wool-white se’et, which is a more bright white than a lime-colored mark but less bright than snow white. Since baheret is not adjacent to lime it cannot combine with it. We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a se’et, as a lime-colored mark is not its secondary mark and a primary mark can combine only with its secondary mark. This is difficult because the mishna’s categorization of a lime-colored mark as a secondary mark indicates that it can be combined with another shade of white. Perforce, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

אי הכי קרום ביצה נמי בהדי מאן ליצרפי' ליצרפיה בהדי שאת איכא סיד דעדיף מיניה ליצרפיה בהדי סיד לאו בר מיניה הוא The Gemara asks: If that is so, that Rabbi Akiva holds that only adjacent shades of white can combine together, why didn’t Rabbi Ḥanina also bring proof from a mark that is white like the membrane of an egg, as with which other shade could we combine it? We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a wool-white se’et, which is the primary mark relative to an egg membrane–colored mark, as there is a lime-colored mark, which is a more bright white than an egg membrane–colored mark but less bright that wool white. Since se’et is not adjacent to egg membrane it cannot combine with it. We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a lime-colored mark, as it is not its type, i.e., they are not of the same category, and so they cannot combine.

Daf 6a

האי מאי בשלמא בלא סיד היכל קרום ביצה לא קשיא דאע"ג דקרום ביצה מתתאי דשאת רחמנא אמר (ויקרא יד, נו) ולשאת ולספחת ספחת טפילה לשאת אע"ג דמנחתא מיניה טובא אלא סיד היכל קשיא אלא מחוורתא מתניתין דלא כרבי עקיבא The Gemara answers: What is this comparison? Granted, it would all be well were it not for the difficulty with regard to a mark the color of the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls, as the difficulty raised with regard to an egg membrane–colored mark is not difficult. As even though the shade of an egg membrane is two stages below that of a se’et, the Merciful One states: “And for a se’et and for a sappaḥat” (Leviticus 14:56), which indicates that a sappaḥat is secondary to a se’et and can combine with it even though a sappaḥat is of a much lower degree of brightness than it. Rabbi Akiva holds that both of the additional shades not explicitly mentioned in the Torah are derived from the word: Sappaḥat, and so both of them can combine with a se’et. But the difficulty raised with regard to a mark the color of the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls is indeed difficult. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

והיכא שמעינן לרבי עקיבא זו למעלה מזו § The Gemara elaborates on Rabbi Akiva’s opinion: And where have we learned that according to Rabbi Akiva the different shades should be ordered this one above that one, i.e., according to their degrees of brightness, and only two adjacent shades can combine together?

אילימא מהא דתניא אמר רבי יוסי שאל יהושע בנו של רבי עקיבא מרבי עקיבא מפני מה אמרו מראות נגעים שנים שהן ארבעה אמר לו ואם לאו מה יאמרו יאמרו מקרום ביצה ולמעלה טמא If we say we learned it from that which is taught in the following baraita, it is difficult. The baraita teaches: Rabbi Yosei said that Yehoshua, son of Rabbi Akiva, asked of Rabbi Akiva: For what reason did the Sages say that the different shades of leprous marks are two types that are four, and proceed to specify their names? Rabbi Akiva said to him: But if not that, what else could they say? Rabbi Yehoshua answered him: Let them say that any mark of a degree of brightness from that of an egg membrane and above is ritually impure.

אמר לו לומר שמצטרפים זה עם זה אמר לו ויאמרו מקרום ביצה ולמעלה טמא ומצטרפין זה עם זה אמר לו לומר לך כל כהן שאינו בקי בהן ובשמותיהן אינו רואה את הנגעים Rabbi Akiva said to him: They specified the four different shades in order to say that they combine with each other in that order, i.e., each one with its adjacent shade. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: If so, let them simply say: Any mark of a degree of brightness from that of an egg membrane and above is ritually impure, and they combine with each other. Rabbi Akiva said to him: They specified their names in order to tell you: Any priest who is not an expert in distinguishing between them and in identifying their names is not authorized to inspect the leprous marks and make a decision regarding them.

ואילו מסיד היכל ולמעלה לא קאמר The Gemara explains the difficulty: Rabbi Yehoshua suggested that according to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion it should be sufficient to say that any mark of a degree of brightness from that of an egg membrane and upward is impure, but he did not say that it would also be necessary to add: And any mark of a degree of brightness from that of the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls and above is impure. If Rabbi Akiva agrees to the categorization of the mishna, then it would be necessary to state separately each category of marks, in a dual formulation, in order to indicate that only shades that are categorized together can combine.

מדלא אמר ליה ש"מ דשמיע ליה לר' עקיבא דאמר כולהו לבהדי שאת מצטרפין The Gemara suggests: Conclude from the fact that he did not say this to Rabbi Akiva that Rabbi Yehoshua heard of Rabbi Akiva that he says: All the different shades combine with a se’et. Accordingly, both a snow-white baheret and a lime-colored mark will each combine with a se’et, as they are adjacent to it when listed in order of their degrees of brightness. An egg membrane–colored mark will also combine with a se’et, as it is derived from the word: Sappaḥat, and the Torah indicates that a sappaḥat is secondary to a se’et.

ודלמא שאת ותולדתה בהרת ותולדתה The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps Rabbi Akiva does hold that the only combinations possible are a se’et and its secondary mark, i.e., an egg membrane–colored mark; and a baheret and its secondary mark, i.e., a lime-colored mark. And perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua in fact proposed that the Sages should use a dual formulation, but the baraita cites only the first half of his suggestion.

אלא מדרבי חנינא דאמר ר' חנינא משל דרבי עקיבא למה הדבר דומה לארבעה כוסות של חלב אחד נפלו לתוכו שתי טיפין של דם ואחד נפלו לתוכו ארבע טיפין של דם ואחד נפלו לתוכו שמונה ואחד נפלו לתוכו שתים עשרה טיפין ואמרי לה שש עשרה טיפין שכולן מראות לובן הן אלא שזה למעלה מזה וזה למעלה מזה Rather, Rabbi Akiva’s opinion can be inferred from that which Rabbi Ḥanina says, as Rabbi Ḥanina says: The following is an analogy to illustrate the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to four cups of milk, and two drops of blood fell into one of them, and four drops of blood fell into another one of them, and eight drops of blood fell into another one, and twelve drops of blood fell into the last one. And some say that sixteen drops fell into the last cup. This is a suitable analogy, as the milk in all of the cups still has a similar shade of white, but the cups can be ordered according to their degrees of brightness, as this one is above this one, and that one is above that one. Rabbi Ḥanina’s analogy would appear to portray Rabbi Akiva’s opinion in the same way it was cited earlier.

אימור דשמעת ליה לרבי עקיבא בפתוך בחלוק מי שמעת ליה The Gemara rejects this. The Torah states that a “reddish-white affliction” (Leviticus 13:42), not just a flawless white one, renders a person ritually impure. Therefore, the Gemara suggests: Say that you heard Rabbi Akiva express this opinion with regard to combining different shades of a mark that is mixed [befatukh] with red, which is the case most similar to the analogy offered by Rabbi Ḥanina, but with regard to different shades of flawless white, have you heard Rabbi Akiva express this opinion?

וכי תימא כי היכי דשמעת ליה בפתוך הכי שמעת ליה בחלוק ובפתוך גופיה מי שמעת ליה והתניא רבי עקיבא אומר אדמדם שבזה ושבזה כיין המזוג במים אלא של בהרת עזה כשלג ושל סיד דיהה הימנה And if you would say that just as you heard Rabbi Akiva express this opinion with regard to a mark that is mixed with red, so too, by logical extension, you have effectively heard Rabbi Akiva express this opinion with regard to different shades of flawless white, as what possible reason is there to differentiate between them, this is difficult. And this suggestion is problematic, as in the case of a mixed reddish-white mark itself, did you ever hear him express this opinion? But isn’t it taught otherwise in a mishna (Nega’im 1:2): With regard to the various shades of white that are mixed with red, Rabbi Akiva says the reddish variation of this one, i.e., of a baheret, and of that one, i.e., of a lime-colored mark, are like wine diluted in water, except for the following distinction: That the reddish variation of a baheret is still an intense white, like snow, albeit with a somewhat pinkish hue, but the reddish variation of lime is darker than it.

Daf 6b

ואם איתא של צמר דיהה הימנה מיבעי ליה And if it is so that Rabbi Akiva lists the different shades in decreasing order of their degree of brightness, then after mentioning the reddish variation of baheret he should have next said: The reddish variation of a wool-white mark is darker than it, not that the reddish variation of lime is darker than it.

אמרי אין הכי נמי והתניא רבי נתן אומר לא שאמר ר' עקיבא של סיד דיהה הימנה אלא של צמר דיהה הימנה They said in response to this: Yes, it is indeed so that Rabbi Akiva continues by referring to the reddish variations of a wool-white mark, and it is taught likewise in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says, referring to that mishna: It is not correct that Rabbi Akiva said: The reddish variation of lime is darker than it; rather, he said that the reddish variation of a wool-white mark is darker than it.

ומנלן דבהרת עזה היא אמר אביי אמר קרא (ויקרא יג, ד) ואם בהרת לבנה היא היא לבנה ואין אחרת לבנה § The Gemara considers the source from which the different shades of marks are derived: And from where do we derive that baheret is an intense white color? Abaye said: The verse states: “And if it is a white baheret” (Leviticus 13:4), which indicates that it alone is a bright white and there is no other as white as it.

תנו רבנן בהרת עמוקה וכן הוא אומר (ויקרא יג, כה) ומראה עמוק מן העור כמראה חמה העמוקה מן הצל שאת אין שאת אלא גבוה וכן הוא אומר (ישעיהו ב, יד) על כל ההרים הרמים ועל כל הגבעות הנשאות ספחת אין ספחת אלא טפילה וכן הוא אומר (שמואל א ב, לו) ואמר ספחני נא The Sages taught in a baraita: The bright shade of a baheret makes it appear deeper than the surrounding skin, and so the verse states: “And its appearance is deeper than the skin” (Leviticus 13:25). This is like the appearance of an area illuminated by the sun, which appears deeper than the area in the shade. The darker shade of a se’et makes it appear as though it is raised above the surrounding skin; this is indicated by the fact that the word se’et means nothing other than raised, and so the verse states: “Upon all the high mountains and upon all the raised up [hanissaot] hills” (Isaiah 2:14). The words hanissaot and se’et share the same Hebrew root and both refer to something raised up. In the verse: “For a se’et and for a sappaḥat” (Leviticus 14:56), the word sappaḥat means nothing other than secondary, and so the verse states: “And he will say: Append me [sefaḥeni] please to one of the priestly classes to eat a piece of bread” (I Samuel 2:36). This teaches that there is a leprous mark that is secondary and appended to a se’et. This is a mark that is the color of an egg membrane.

אשכחן טפילה לשאת טפילה לבהרת מנלן אמר רבי זירא נאמרה לבנה בשאת ונאמרה לבנה בבהרת מה לבנה האמורה בשאת יש לה טפילה אף לבנה האמורה בבהרת יש לה טפילה We found a source for a mark that is secondary to a se’et; from where do we derive that there is also a mark that is secondary to a baheret? Rabbi Zeira said: “White” (Leviticus 13:10) is stated with regard to a se’et and “white” (Leviticus 13:4) is stated with regard to a baheret. This teaches that just as the shade of white stated with regard to a se’et has a secondary mark, i.e., the mark that is the color of an egg membrane, so too, the shade of white stated with regard to a baheret has a secondary mark, i.e., the lime-colored mark.

במתניתא תנא הטיל הכתוב לספחת בין שאת לבהרת לומר לך כשם שטפילה לשאת כך טפילה לבהרת: A different source for this was taught in a baraita: The verse (see Leviticus 13:2) placed the word sappaḥat between se’et and baheret, to say to you: Just as there is a shade that is secondary to a se’et, so too, there is a shade that is secondary to a baheret.

שאת כצמר לבן: מאי צמר לבן אמר רב ביבי אמר רב אסי צמר נקי בן יומו שמכבנין בו למילת The mishna in Nega’im cited above states: A se’et is like white wool. The Gemara asks: What is meant by white wool? Rav Beivai says that Rav Asi says: It is the color of clean wool from a lamb that is wrapped up [mekhabnin] in a cover when it is one day old in order to protect it from being sullied, so that the wool will be suitable for producing a fine wool garment.

אמר רבי חנינא משל דרבנן למה הדבר דומה לתרי מלכי ולתרי איפרכי מלכו של זה למעלה ממלכו של זה ואיפרכו של זה למעלה מאיפרכו של זה § In continuation of his statement cited above Rabbi Ḥanina says: The following is an analogy to illustrate the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., the opinion expressed in the mishna in Nega’im (1:1) that both a baheret and a se’et have marks that are secondary to them. To what is this matter comparable? To two kings and to two governors [iparkhei] where, with regard to their supremacy, the king of this governor is above the king of that governor, and the governor of this king is above the governor of that king. The two kings are analogous to a baheret and a se’et and their two governors are, respectively, a lime-colored mark and an egg membrane–colored mark. Accordingly, the order of supremacy is: Baheret, se’et, lime-colored mark, egg membrane–colored mark.

האי זה למעלה מזה וזה למעלה מזה הוא The Gemara questions whether this is a suitable analogy for the opinion of the Rabbis: But this analogy suggests that the shades are ordered, this one above this one and that one above that one, i.e., according to their degrees of brightness. That is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, not the opinion of the Rabbis.

אלא מלכו של זה למעלה מאיפרכיה דנפשיה ומלכו של זה למעלה מאיפרכיה דנפשיה Rather, a suitable analogy is where the king of this governor is above his own governor, and the king of that governor is above his own governor. So too, each secondary mark is subordinate only to its primary mark.

רב אדא בר אבא אמר כגון מלכא ואלקפטא רופילא וריש גלותא האי זה למעלה מזה הוא אלא כגון מלכא ורופילא ואלקפטא וריש גלותא The Gemara presents a different analogy. Rav Adda bar Abba said: For example: A king, and a chief officer [alkafta], the vizier [rofila], and the Exilarch; each person in the list is more powerful than the subsequent one. The Gemara asks: But this analogy suggests that the shades are ordered, this one above that one, which is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion. Rather, a suitable analogy is, for example: A king and the vizier; and a chief officer and the Exilarch. This list splits the four into two groups, each group containing one person who is subordinate to the other.

רבא אמר כגון שבור מלכא וקיסר The Gemara presents a different analogy. Rava said: The previous suggestion is not precise because all these positions, apart from the king, are subordinate to the king. A more precise analogy would be, for example: King Shapur, the king of Persia, with his subordinate; and the Roman emperor with his subordinate.

א"ל רב פפא לרבא הי מינייהו עדיף אמר ליה בחורשיא קא אכיל ליה פוק חזי טיבעא דמאן סגי בעלמא דכתיב (דניאל ז, כג) ותאכל כל ארעא ותדושנה ותדקנה א"ר יוחנן זו רומי חייבת שטיבעה יצא בכל העולם כולו Rav Pappa said to Rava: Which of them is greater, King Shapur or the Roman emperor? Rava said to him: Does he eat in the forest, i.e., do you live disconnected and unaware of events in the world at large? Go out and see whose coin circulates throughout the world, which is an indicator of a government’s influence, as it is written with regard to the fourth empire described in Daniel’s dream of the future powers of the world: “It shall devour the whole earth and tread upon it and break it into pieces” (Daniel 7:23), and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is the guilty empire of Rome whose coin circulates throughout the entire world.

רבינא אמר כגון גלימא דעמר ושחקיה סדינא דכיתנא ושחקיה: The Gemara presents a different analogy. Ravina said: For example, a new white woolen garment and a frayed one; a new linen sheet and a frayed one.

את שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה וכו': ת"ר מנין שאין הכתוב מדבר אלא בטומאת מקדש וקדשיו § The mishna (2a) states: In cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between while he actually transgressed, this person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that the verse that describes the liability for a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2–4) speaks of nothing other than the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods? While the verse mentions that a violation was committed due to a lapse of awareness of one’s state of impurity, it does not mention which transgression was violated.

ודין הוא הואיל והזהיר וענש על הטומאה וחייב קרבן על הטומאה מה כשהזהיר וענש על הטומאה לא הזהיר וענש אלא על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו אף כשחייב קרבן על הטומאה לא חייב אלא על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו The Gemara explains: And it is a logical inference: Since the Torah has explicitly prohibited and also prescribed punishment for the intentional defiling of something sacred and has rendered one liable to bring an offering for the unwitting defiling of something sacred, it follows that just as when it prohibited and also prescribed punishment for the defiling of something sacred it prohibited and also prescribed punishment only for the intentional defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods; so too, when it rendered one liable to bring an offering for the defiling of something sacred it rendered one liable to do so only for the unwitting defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

ואימא תרומה שהזהיר וענש לא אשכחן עון מיתה דחייב עליה קרבן The Gemara asks: But say instead that the obligation to bring a sliding-scale offering is referring to a ritually impure person who partook of the sacred portion of produce grown in Eretz Yisrael that is designated to be given to a priest [teruma], as the Torah also has explicitly prohibited and prescribed punishment for this. One who partakes of teruma while ritually impure is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven (see Leviticus 22:9). The Gemara answers: It cannot be referring to teruma, because we do not find a sin whose punishment for an intentional violation is death, with regard to which one is liable to bring an offering for its unwitting violation. Sin-offerings, of which the sliding-scale offering is one type, are brought only for transgressions whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

אימא ה"מ קרבן קבוע אבל The Gemara asks: But say that this statement applies only to a fixed sin-offering, but

Daf 7a

עולה ויורד ניתי מידי דהוה אשמיעת קול ואביטוי שפתים one can bring a sliding-scale offering for the unwitting violation of a transgression whose intentional violation is not punishable by karet; just as is the case of a violation for “hearing the voice” (Leviticus 5:1), which is where a litigant asks a witness to testify about an event and he takes a false oath that he did not witness the event, and for taking a false oath with the “utterance of lips” (Leviticus 5:4). In both of these cases, an intentional violation is not punishable by karet, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for an unwitting violation.

אמר קרא (ויקרא ה, ג) בה בה למעוטי תרומה The Gemara answers: It cannot be referring to one who partakes of teruma while ritually impure, as the verse concerning a sliding-scale offering states: “Or if he will touch impurity of a man in any manner of his impurity through which he can become impure” (Leviticus 5:3). The verse states “through which” to exclude an impure person who partakes of teruma from liability to bring a sliding-scale offering.

אימא בה למעוטי מקדש דלא סגי ליה בקרבן עולה ויורד עד דמייתי קרבן קבוע The Gemara asks: But say the verse states “through which” to exclude one who defiles the Temple, and teaches that due to the severity of that transgression it is not sufficient for him to achieve atonement with a sliding-scale offering; rather, he will not achieve atonement until he brings a fixed sin-offering. Accordingly, no proof can be drawn from here.

קרי רבא עליה דרבי דולה מים מבורות עמוקים Rava read the following verse about Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: “One who draws water from deep wells” (see Proverbs 20:5); this verse describes Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, because by delving deeply into the Bible he found a source that a sliding-scale offering atones for the unwitting defiling of sacrificial foods by partaking of them while ritually impure.

דתניא רבי אומר אקרא אני חיה בהמה למה נאמרה נאמר כאן (ויקרא ה, ב) בהמה טמאה ונאמר להלן (ויקרא ז, כא) בהמה טמאה מה להלן טומאת קודש אף כאן טומאת קודש This is as it is taught in a baraita concerning the verse: “Or if a person will have touched any impure object, whether the carcass of an impure animal [ḥayya] or the carcass of an impure domesticated animal [behema]” (Leviticus 5:2). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Since a domesticated animal is also referred to a ḥayya, it would be sufficient if I would read only the verse’s clause about a ḥayya. Why then is an explicit clause about a behema stated? It is in order to derive a verbal analogy. It is stated in the verse here: “An impure domesticated animal,” and it is stated in the verse below with regard to one who intentionally defiles an offering by partaking of it while he is impure: “An impure domesticated animal” (Leviticus 7:21). Just as below the reference is to the defiling of sacrificial foods, so too here, the reference is to the defiling of sacrificial foods.

אשכחן טומאת קודש טומאת מקדש מנלן אמר קרא (ויקרא יב, ד) בכל קדש לא תגע ואל המקדש לא תבא איתקש מקדש לקודש The Gemara continues: We found a source for the halakha that the sliding-scale offering atones for the defiling of sacrificial foods; from where do we derive that it also atones for the defiling of the Temple by entering it while ritually impure? The verse states with regard to a woman after childbirth, who is impure due to having given birth: “She may not touch any sacred item and she may not enter the Temple” (Leviticus 12:4). The verse juxtaposes the Temple to sacred items to teach that the halakhot that apply to one apply to the other. Accordingly, the sliding-scale offering atones for both.

אי הכי תרומה נמי דאמר מר בכל קדש לא תגע לרבות את התרומה The Gemara asks: If so, that the liability to bring a sliding-scale offering is derived from this verse, then one should also be liable to bring the offering if he partakes of teruma while impure, as the Master said that the general term “sacred item,” in the verse: “She may not touch any sacred item,” serves to include teruma in the prohibition. Accordingly, it should also be included in the obligation to bring a sliding-scale offering.

הא מיעט רחמנא בה אימא בה למעוטי מקדש מסתברא מקדש לא ממעטינן שכן בכרת כמותה The Gemara explains: The Merciful One excludes something with the term “through which” (Leviticus 5:3). Should we say that the term “through which” serves to exclude the defiling of the Temple? No, it is reasonable that we should not exclude the defiling of the Temple, as its intentional violation is punishable by karet, just like one who defiles sacrificial foods by partaking of them while he is impure. Rather, the term must serve to exclude one who partakes of teruma while impure.

אדרבה תרומה לא ממעטינן שכן אכילה כמותה The Gemara offers a counterargument: On the contrary, we should not exclude one who partakes of teruma while impure, as it is a violation done through eating, similar to one who eats sacrificial food while impure. Therefore, there is still no proof that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for defiling the Temple.

אלא אמר רבא שלש כריתות בשלמים למה אחת לכלל ואחת לפרט ואחת לטומאה הכתובה בתורה סתם ואיני יודע מה היא Rather, Rava said it can be derived from the following: Why does the Torah mention three times the punishment of karet with regard to one who partakes of peace-offerings while he is impure? The three times are Leviticus 22:3, 7:20, and 7:21. One time is to apply the punishment to the general case of a ritually impure person who partakes of any type of offering, and one time is to apply it to the specific instance of a peace-offering, and one time is to apply it to another case of defiling something sacred that is written in the Torah without specifying what it is referring to, and I do not know from that passage what that case is.

הוי אומר טומאת קודש ואם אינו ענין לטומאת קודש דנפקא ליה מדרבי תנהו ענין לטומאת מקדש Rava continues: The only passage that describes the defiling of something sacred without specifying the situation is the passage in the Torah that discusses a sliding-scale offering brought for the defiling of sacrificial foods. Therefore, you must say that the third mention of karet is referring to the defiling of sacrificial foods. But if it is not needed to teach the matter of defiling sacrificial foods, as that has been derived through the verbal analogy of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, apply it to the matter of defiling the Temple. Accordingly, one who intentionally defiles the Temple by entering it while impure is liable to receive karet, and it is reasonable that he should be liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for doing so unwittingly.

והאי מיבעי ליה לכדרבי אבהו דאמר רבי אבהו שלש כריתות בשלמים למה אחת לכלל ואחת לפרט ואחת לדברים שאינן נאכלין The Gemara asks: But that third mention is necessary in order to expound it in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu says: Why does the Torah mention three times the punishment of karet with regard to one who partakes of peace-offerings while he is ritually impure? One time is to apply the punishment to the general case of an impure person who partakes of any type of offering, and one time is to apply it to the specific instance of a peace-offering, and one time is to apply it to an impure person who eats items that are not generally eaten, such as frankincense.

ולר"ש דאמר דברים שאינן נאכלין אין חייבין עליהן כרת משום טומאה לאיתויי חטאת הפנימית דס"ד אמינא הואיל ואמר ר"ש כל שאינו קרב על מזבח החיצון כשלמים אין חייבין עליו משום פיגול משום טומאה נמי לא קמ"ל דמיחייב The Gemara adds: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that for items that are not generally eaten one is not liable to be punished with karet for partaking of them while he is ritually impure, the third mention is necessary in order to include the case of an impure person who eats an internal sin-offering, as it could enter your mind to say that since Rabbi Shimon says: For any type of offering that is not sacrificed on and its blood applied to the external altar in the manner that peace-offerings are, one cannot be liable to be punished with karet for eating it if it is piggul, i.e., for eating such an offering if it was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time. One might have thought that similarly, for such an offering, one is also not liable to be punished with karet for intentionally partaking of it while ritually impure; the third mention teaches us that one is indeed liable. Therefore, there is still no proof that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for unwittingly entering the Temple while impure.

אלא אמרי נהרדעי משמי' דרבא שלש טומאות בשלמים למה אחת לכלל ואחת לפרט ואחת לטומאה הכתובה בתורה סתם ואיני יודע מה היא Rather, the Sages of Neharde’a said in the name of Rava that it can be derived from the following: Why does the Torah mention three times the ritually impure status with regard to one who partakes of peace-offerings while he is impure? That is, each of the three times that the Torah mentions the punishment of karet, it also mentions the fact that the person was impure at the time. One time is for the general case of a impure person who partakes of any type of offering, and one time is for the specific instance of one who partakes of a peace-offering, and one time is to apply it to another case of defiling something sacred that is written in the Torah without specifying what it is referring to, and I do not know from that passage what the case is.

הוי אומר טומאת קודש ואם אינו ענין לטומאת קודש דנפקא ליה מדרבי תנהו ענין לטומאת מקדש Now, the only passage that describes the defiling of something sacred without specifying the situation is the passage in the Torah that discusses a sliding-scale offering that is brought for the defiling of sacrificial foods. Therefore, you must say that the third mention of karet is referring to the defiling of sacrificial foods. But if it is not needed to teach the matter of defiling sacrificial foods, as that has been derived through the verbal analogy of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, apply it to the matter of defiling the Temple.

והאי נמי מיבעי ליה איידי דבעי למכתב כרת לכדר' אבהו כתב נמי טמאות דלא סגי לה בלאו הכי The Gemara asks: But that third mention is also necessary, because since it is necessary for the Torah to write the karet punishment three times in order to expound it in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abbahu, it also has to write that the person was ritually impure, as it is not sufficient to mention the punishment without mentioning for what the punishment is given. Accordingly, there is still no proof that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for unwittingly defiling the Temple.

אלא אמר רבא אתיא טומאתו טומאתו כתיב הכא (ויקרא ה, ג) לכל טומאתו Rather, Rava said: It is derived from a verbal analogy between the terms “his impurity” and “his impurity,” as follows: It is written here, with regard to a sliding-scale offering: “Or if he will touch impurity of a man in any manner of his impurity through which he can become impure” (Leviticus 5:3),

Daf 7b

וכתיב התם (במדבר יט, יג) טמא יהיה עוד טומאתו בו מה להלן טומאת מקדש אף כאן טומאת מקדש and it is written there with regard to the red heifer: “Whoever touches the corpse of a man who died and is not sprinkled, he will have contaminated the Tabernacle of God…he will be impure, his impurity is still upon him” (Numbers 19:13). This verbal analogy teaches that just as there the verse is referring to the defiling of the Temple, so too here, the sliding-scale offering is brought to atone for the defiling of the Temple.

ואלא בה למה לי The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “through which” (Leviticus 5:3)? The Gemara earlier derived from this term that one who is impure and unwittingly eats teruma is not liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. The Gemara has now derived that the sliding-scale offering atones specifically for the unwitting defiling of the Temple. If so, it is obvious that one is not liable for unwittingly eating teruma, and the phrase is superfluous.

לרבות נבלת עוף טהור The Gemara answers: The term “through which” serves to include one who was rendered impure by eating the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird. Unlike other impure items, which render impure any person who touches them, the carcass of a kosher bird renders a person impure only if he eats it. Therefore, one might have thought he would not be liable for entering the Temple if he was rendered impure by having eating the carcass of a kosher bird. The extra term is therefore necessary to teach that one is liable.

הא אמרת בה מיעוטא הוא משום דמיעוטא הוא אייתר כתיב (ויקרא ה, ג) או כי יגע דבר נגיעה אין דלאו בר נגיעה לא וכתיב בה מיעוטא הוה מיעוט אחר מיעוט ואין מיעוט אחר מיעוט אלא לרבו': The Gemara challenges: But didn’t you say above that the term “through which” is a restriction? How can you now use it to include additional cases? The Gemara explains: It is precisely because it is a restriction that it includes additional cases. As it is written at the beginning of that verse: “Or if he will touch an impurity of a man” (Leviticus 5:3), which indicates that one who is impure with a form of impurity that can impart impurity through touching, yes, he is liable for defiling the Temple by entering it in his impure state. But if one is impure with a form of impurity that cannot impart impurity through touching, then one would not be liable. Therefore, the verse opens with a restriction, and when the verse continues, and it is written “through which,” which is also a restriction, this constitutes a restriction after a restriction, and a restriction after a restriction serves only to amplify the halakha, applying it to additional cases.

יש בה ידיעה בתחלה ואין בה ידיעה בסוף שעיר הנעשה בפנים וכו': ת"ר (ויקרא טז, טז) וכפר על הקדש מטומאות בני ישראל וגו' § The mishna continues: For cases in which one had awareness at the beginning, but then transgressed during a lapse of awareness and still had no awareness at the end, the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, suspend any punishment that he deserves until he becomes aware of his transgression, at which point he must bring a sliding-scale offering. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the internal goat offering: “And he shall effect atonement upon the Sanctuary from the impurities of the children of Israel and from their acts of rebellion, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:16).

יש לי בענין זה להביא שלש טומאות טומאת ע"ז וטומאת גילוי עריות וטומאת שפיכות דמים With regard to this matter, i.e., the atonement effected by the sacrifice of the goat, I can state that this verse serves to amplify the atonement by teaching that the goat offering atones for the following three sins, which the Torah is referring to as impurities: The impurity of the sin of idol worship, and the impurity of engaging in forbidden sexual relations, and the impurity of perpetrating bloodshed.

בע"ז הוא אומר (ויקרא כ, ג) למען טמא את מקדשי בגילוי עריות הוא אומר (ויקרא יח, ל) ושמרתם את משמרתי לבלתי עשות מחקות התועבות וגו' ולא תטמאו בהם בשפיכות דמים הוא אומר (במדבר לה, לד) ולא תטמא את הארץ יכול על ג' טומאות הללו יהא שעיר מכפר ת"ל (ויקרא טז, טז) מטומאות בני ישראל ולא כל טומאות The baraita demonstrates that each of these sins is referred to as impurity: With regard to idol worship the verse states: “For he had given his offspring to Molekh in order to render impure My Sanctuary” (Leviticus 20:3). With regard to forbidden sexual relations the verse states: “You shall safeguard My charge not to do any of the abominable traditions that were done before you and not to render yourself impure through them” (Leviticus 18:30). With regard to bloodshed the verse states: “The land will not atone for the blood that was spilled on it except through the blood of the one who spilled it; you shall not render the land impure” (Numbers 35:34). One might have thought that the goat offering would atone for these three types of impurities. To counter this, the verse states: “From the impurities of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 16:16). The restrictive term “from” indicates that it atones for some impurities but not for all impurities.

מה מצינו שחלק הכתוב מכלל כל טומאות הוי אומר טומאת מקדש וקדשיו אף כאן בטומאת מקדש וקדשיו דברי ר' יהוד' The baraita derives the type of impurity for which the goat offering does atone: What do we find is the impurity that the verse differentiates from all other impurities? You must say that the verse is referring to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. It is specifically for this transgression that the Torah provides one with the means of achieving atonement, i.e., by bringing a sliding-scale offering. So too here, since the verse limits the atonement of the goat offering to transgressions involving impurity, it is logical that it can also atone only for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

ר"ש אומר ממקומו הוא מוכרע הרי הוא אומר (ויקרא טז, טז) וכפר על הקדש מטומאות מטומאות של קודש Rabbi Shimon says: It is not necessary to derive which transgressions the goat offering atones for by comparing the verse written concerning it to a different verse. Rather, from its own place, i.e., from the verse about the atonement effected by the goat itself, it can be determined, as it states: “And he shall effect atonement upon the Sanctuary [hakodesh] from the impurities of the children of Israel,” which should be interpreted as saying that it atones for the defiling of anything sacred [kodesh], i.e., the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

יכול על כל טומאה שבקודש יהא שעיר זה מכפר תלמוד לומר (ויקרא טז, טז) ומפשעיהם לכל חטאתם חטאים דומיא דפשעים מה פשעים שאינם בני קרבן אף חטאים שאינם בני קרבן The baraita continues: One might have thought that this goat offering would atone for all cases of the defiling of the Temple, even where there was awareness at the beginning and at the end. To counter this, the verse states: “And from their acts of rebellion, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:16), which indicates that the goat offering atones only for sins that are similar to acts of rebellion. Just as it atones for acts of rebellion that are not subject to atonement through an offering, as sin-offerings brought by an individual are brought only for unwitting sins, so too, it atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering. As long as one does not become aware of his sin, it cannot be atoned for through the sliding-scale offering. Accordingly, the goat will atone for it.

ומנין ליש בה ידיעה בתחלה ואין בה ידיעה בסוף ששעיר זה תולה ת"ל לכל חטאתם חייבי חטאות במשמע The baraita continues. And from where is it derived for a case in which one had awareness at the beginning but did not have awareness at the end, that this goat suspends the punishment that he deserved until he becomes aware of his transgression? The verse states “for all their sins,” from which it is indicated that the goat offering atones only for those who are potentially liable to bring a sin-offering, i.e., the sliding-scale offering, should they become aware of their sin.

אמר מר יש לי בענין זה להביא ג' טומאות טומאת ע"ז וטומאת גילוי עריות וטומאת שפיכות דמים The Gemara clarifies some of the details of the baraita. The Master said: With regard to this matter, I can state that this verse serves to amplify the atonement by teaching that the goat offering atones for the following three sins, which the Torah is referring to as impurities: The impurity of the sin of idol worship, and the impurity of engaging in forbidden sexual relations, and the impurity of perpetrating bloodshed.

האי ע"ז היכי דמי אי במזיד בר קטלא הוא אי בשוגג בר קרבן הוא The Gemara asks: Concerning this sin of idol worship, for which one might have thought the goat would atone, what are the circumstances? If you say the reference is to a case where he transgressed intentionally, then one can counter that he is subject to the death penalty and no offering will atone for his sin. And if you say the reference is to a case where he transgressed unwittingly, then one can counter that he is liable to bring his own sin-offering for his transgression, and the goat will not atone for him.

במזיד ולא אתרו ביה בשוגג ולא אתיידע ליה The Gemara answers: The goat offering atones in a case where he transgressed intentionally but witnesses did not forewarn him about his transgression, and therefore he is not liable to receive the death penalty. It also atones in a case where he transgressed unwittingly, but by the time Yom Kippur arrived he had still not become aware of his transgression and therefore he was not liable to bring an offering.

Daf 8a

גילוי עריות נמי היכי דמי אי במזיד בר קטלא הוא אי בשוגג בר קרבן הוא The Gemara asks further: With regard to forbidden sexual relations, for which one might have thought the goat offering would atone as well, what are the circumstances? If you say the reference is to a case where he transgressed intentionally, then one can counter that he is subject to the death penalty and so no offering will atone for his sin. And if you say the reference is to a case where he transgressed unwittingly, then one can counter that he is liable to bring his own sin-offering for his transgression, and so the goat will not atone for him.

במזיד ולא אתרו ביה בשוגג ולא אתידע ליה The Gemara answers: The goat offering atones in a case where he transgressed intentionally but witnesses did not forewarn him about his transgression, so he is not liable to receive the death penalty. It also atones in a case where he transgressed unwittingly, but by the time Yom Kippur arrived he had still not become aware of his transgression, so he was not liable to bring an offering.

שפיכות דמים נמי ה"ד במזיד בר קטלא הוא אי בשוגג בר גלות הוא The Gemara asks further: Concerning the bloodshed for which one might have thought that the goat would atone as well, what are the circumstances? If you say the reference is to a case where he transgressed intentionally, then one can counter that he is subject to the death penalty, so no offering will atone for his sin. And if you say the reference is to a case where he transgressed unwittingly, then one can counter that he is subject to go into exile, so the goat offering will not atone for him.

במזיד ולא אתרו ביה בשוגג ולא אתידע ליה אי נמי בהנך דלאו בני גלות נינהו The Gemara answers: The goat offering atones in a case where he transgressed intentionally but witnesses did not forewarn him about his transgression, and so he is not liable to receive the death penalty. It also atones in a case where he transgressed unwittingly, but by the time Yom Kippur arrived he had still not become aware of his transgression, so he was not liable to bring an offering. Alternatively, it is referring to those cases for which the perpetrator is not subject to exile, e.g., where the death was caused in a way that was almost unavoidable, or where it was very close to being considered intentional.

אמר מר יכול על שלש טומאות הללו יהא שעיר מכפר ת"ל (ויקרא טז, טז) מטומאות ולא כל טומאות מה מצינו שחלק הכתוב מכלל כל הטומאות בטומאת מקדש וקדשיו אף כאן בטומאת מקדש וקדשיו דברי רבי יהודה § The Gemara continues to analyze the next part of the baraita: The Master said: One might have thought that the goat offering would atone for these three types of impurities. To counter this, the verse states: “From the impurities of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 16:16). The restrictive term “from” indicates that it atones for some impurities but not for all impurities. What do we find is the impurity that the verse differentiates from all other impurities? We find it with regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. It is specifically for this transgression that the Torah provides one with the means of achieving atonement, i.e., by bringing a sliding-scale offering. So too here, since the verse limits the atonement of the goat offering to transgressions involving impurity, it is logical that it can also atone only for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

מאי חלק דמייתי בעולה ויורד אימא ע"ז ומאי חלק The Gemara asks: In what way does the Torah differentiate the impurity of this transgression from other types of transgressions? It is differentiated in that one brings a sliding-scale offering to atone for it. But if that is a sufficient distinction, then say instead that the goat offering atones for idol worship, and in what way does the Torah differentiate it from other types of transgressions?

(סימן ע"ז יולדת מצורע נזיר (וכו')) Before answering, the Gemara interjects with a mnemonic that summarizes which cases it will suggest the goat offering should atone for: Idol worship, a woman after childbirth, a leper, a nazirite, etc.

דמייתי שעירה ולא כשבה The Gemara returns to answer its question: It is differentiated in that he brings a she-goat as a sin-offering and not an ewe, which is the animal brought as a sin-offering for other transgressions.

אמר רב כהנא אנן חלק להקל קאמרינן והאי חלק להחמיר הוא Rav Kahana said: We said that the goat offering should atone for a transgression that the Torah differentiates in order to be lenient relative to other transgressions, but this case of idol worship is one that the Torah differentiates in order to be stringent relative to other transgressions. Accordingly, the verse cannot be referring to idol worship.

אימא יולדת דחלק דמייתא עולה ויורד אמר רב הושעיא (ויקרא טז, טז) לכל חטאתם ולא לכל טומאתם The Gemara asks: Why not say instead that the goat offering atones for a woman after childbirth, as the Torah differentiates her from other people who must bring a sin-offering following a period of impurity in that she brings a sliding-scale offering, whereas others bring a fixed sin-offering? Rav Hoshaya said: The verse states: “For all their sins” (Leviticus 16:16), and not: For all their impurities. Accordingly, since the offering brought by a woman after childbirth is not to atone for a sin, but due to the fact that she went through a period of ritual impurity, the goat offering will not atone for her.

ולר' שמעון בן יוחאי דאמר יולדת נמי חוטאת היא מאי איכא למימר רבי שמעון לטעמיה דאמר ממקומו הוא מוכרע The Gemara asks: But if so, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says: A woman after childbirth brings an offering because she is also a sinner, what is there to say? Under the intense pain of childbirth a woman is apt to take an oath not to engage in intercourse in order to avoid becoming pregnant again. This is regarded as a sin because she will certainly violate that oath. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon conforms to his line of reasoning, as he said in the baraita: From its own place, i.e., from the verse about the atonement of the goat offering itself, it can be determined what the goat offering atones for.

אימא מצורע אמר רב הושעיא לכל חטאתם ולא לכל טומאתם The Gemara asks: Why not say that the goat offering atones for a leper, as the Torah differentiates him from other people who must bring a fixed offering following a period of impurity in that he brings a sliding-scale offering? Rav Hoshaya said: The verse states: “For all their sins” and not: For all their impurities. Accordingly, since the offering brought by a leper is not to atone for a sin, the goat offering will not atone for him.

ולר' שמואל בר נחמני דאמר על שבעה דברים נגעים באין מאי איכא למימר התם נגעיה דאכפר ליה וקרבן לאישתרויי בקהל The Gemara asks: But if so, according to Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, who says: Leprous marks come upon a person for seven matters, i.e., seven different sins, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: There, it is his leprous mark that atones for his sin, and the offering is brought in order to permit him to reenter the congregation, after having been ostracized while he was a leper.

ואימא נזיר טמא דחלק דמייתי תורים ובני יונה אמר רב הושעיא לכל חטאתם ולא לכל טומאתם The Gemara asks: But why not say that the goat offering atones for a nazirite who became ritually impure, as the Torah differentiates him from other people who must bring an offering following a period of impurity in that he brings doves or young pigeons? Rav Hoshaya said: The verse states: “For all their sins” and not: For all their impurities. Accordingly, since the offering brought by a nazirite is not to atone for a sin, the goat offering will not atone for him.

ולר' אלעזר הקפר דאמר נזיר נמי חוטא הוא מאי איכא למימר סבר לה כר' שמעון דאמר ממקומו הוא מוכרע The Gemara asks: But if so, according to Rabbi Elazar HaKappar, who says: A nazirite is also a sinner because he unnecessarily ab-stained from wine, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the baraita: From its own place, i.e., from the verse about the atonement of the goat itself, it can be determined what the goat offering atones for.

אמר מר ר' שמעון אומר ממקומו הוא מוכרע הרי הוא אומר (ויקרא טז, טז) וכפר על הקדש מטומאות מטומאתו של קודש כו' שפיר קאמר רבי שמעון ורבי יהודה אמר לך ההוא מיבעי ליה כי היכי דעביד לפני ולפנים הכי נעביד בהיכל § The Gemara continues to clarify the next part of the baraita: The Master said: Rabbi Shimon says: It is not necessary to derive which transgressions the goat offering atones for by comparing the verse written concerning it to a different verse. Rather, from its own place, i.e., from the verse about the atonement effected by the goat itself, it can be determined, as it states: “And he shall effect atonement upon the Sanctuary [hakodesh] from the impurities of the children of Israel,” which should be interpreted as saying that it atones for the defiling of anything sacred [kodesh], i.e., the Temple or its sacrificial foods. The Gemara explains Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, asking: Rabbi Shimon is saying well; why does Rabbi Yehuda disagree? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda could have said to you: That verse is necessary to teach that in the same manner that he performs the blood presentation in the innermost sanctum, i.e., in the Holy of Holies, that is how he shall later perform them in the Sanctuary.

ורבי שמעון ההוא (ויקרא טז, טז) מוכן יעשה נפקא ורבי יהודה אי מההיא הוה אמינא ניתי פר ושעיר אחריני ונעביד קמ"ל ור' שמעון וכן יעשה לאהל מועד מיניה משמע The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Shimon derive that halakha? That halakha is derived from the continuation of the verse: “And so shall he do to the Tent of Meeting,” i.e., the Sanctuary. The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda derive from that part of the verse? The Gemara explains: He holds that if this halakha would be derived only from that part of the verse, I would say that he should bring another bull and goat, slaughter them, and perform the blood presentations in the Sanctuary with their blood. Therefore, the first part of verse: “And he shall effect atonement upon the Sanctuary,” teaches us that all the presentations are made with blood from the same bull and goat. The Gemara asks: And why does Rabbi Shimon not need the first part of the verse to derive this? The Gemara explains that the verse: “And so shall he do to the Tent of Meeting,” itself indicates that the blood used in the Tent of Meeting, i.e., in the Sanctuary, is from the same bull and goat.

אמר מר יכול על כל טומאות שבקודש יהא שעיר זה מכפר ת"ל מפשעיהם לכל חטאתם וגו' מאי ניהו יש בה ידיעה בתחלה ויש בה ידיעה בסוף האי בר קרבן הוא § The Gemara cites the next part of the baraita: The Master said: One might have thought that this goat offering would atone for all cases of the defiling of the Temple, even where there was awareness at the beginning and at the end. To counter this, the verse states: “And from their acts of rebellion, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:16), which indicates that the goat offering atones only for transgressions with regard to which the perpetrator is not subject to bring an offering brought by an individual to atone for himself. The Gemara asks: What is the case for which the goat offering does not atone? Where one had awareness at the beginning and had awareness at the end. The Gemara objects: But the person in that case is subject to atonement through an offering. If so, even without this verse it would be obvious that the goat offering would not atone for him and absolve him from his obligation to bring an offering.

לא צריכא דאתידע ליה סמוך לשקיעת החמה ס"ד אמינא אדמייתי The Gemara explains: No, the verse is necessary to teach that the goat does not atone for him in a case in which he became aware of his transgression close to sunset before the onset of Yom Kippur and was unable to bring his offering before Yom Kippur. In such a case it might enter your mind to say that until he brings his sliding-scale offering the day after Yom Kippur,

Daf 8b

ניתלי ליה קמ"ל the goat would suspend any punishment that he deserved. Therefore, the verse teaches us that since the transgression is of a type that is subject to an offering brought by an individual, the goat does not effect any atonement for it.

אמר מר מנין שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה ואין בה ידיעה בסוף ששעיר זה תולה מנין מאי קא קשיא ליה § The Gemara cites the next part of the baraita: The Master said: From where is it derived that if a person had awareness at the beginning but did not have awareness at the end, that this goat suspends the punishment that he deserved until he becomes aware of his transgression? The Gemara challenges: Why does the baraita ask: From where is it derived? What is it that the baraita finds difficult about this that it searches for a proof for it?

הכי קא קשיא ליה השתא דאמרת חטאים דומיא דפשעים מה פשעים דלאו בני קרבן אף חטאים נמי דלאו בני קרבן אימא מה פשעים דלאו בני קרבן לעולם אף חטאים דלאו בני קרבן לעולם ומאי נינהו אין בה ידיעה בתחלה ויש בה ידיעה בסוף אבל יש בה ידיעה בתחלה ואין בה ידיעה בסוף כיון דכי מתידע ליה בר קרבן הוא אימא לא ליתלי The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita finds difficult: Now that you have said that the goat atones only for sins that are similar to acts of rebellion, such that just as it atones for acts of rebellion that are not subject to atonement through an offering, so too, it atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, why not compare them in a more restrictive manner and say: Just as it atones only for acts of rebellion that are never subject to atonement through an offering, so too, it atones, or suspends punishment, only for sins that are never and will never be subject to atonement through an offering? And what types of transgressions are they? They are in cases where one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end. But where he had awareness at the beginning but did not have awareness at the end, since when he becomes aware, he is subject to an offering, one could say that the goat will not even suspend his punishment.

וכי תימא אין בה ידיעה בתחלה ויש בה ידיעה בסוף שעיר הנעשה בחוץ ויוה"כ מכפר And if you would say that the comparison should not be understood in this way, because for one who did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end, the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary and Yom Kippur itself atone, that is difficult. If atonement is achieved through them, it is unnecessary for the verse to teach that atonement is not effected by the internal goat. Perforce, the comparison must be understood as the baraita presents it. What then is the difficulty of the baraita?

ס"ד אמינא ניפוך מיפך אמר קרא (ויקרא טז, טז) לכל חטאתם מכלל דבני חטאות נינהו The Gemara explains: It could enter your mind to say that we should reverse our conclusions about which offering atones for which type of transgression. In other words, one could say that the internal goat atones for the sin of one who did not have awareness at the beginning and the external goat atones for the sin of one who did have awareness at the beginning. If so, the comparison could be fully extended, as the Gemara suggested, and accordingly one could have thought that the internal goat would not atone for one who had awareness at the beginning. To counter this, the verse states: “For all their sins,” which indicates by inference that the internal goat atones only for those who are potentially liable to bring a sin-offering, i.e., the sliding-scale offering, should they become aware of their sin.

ונתכפר כפרה גמורה אי כתיב מחטאתם כדקא אמרת השתא דכתיב לכל חטאתם להנך דאתו לכלל חטאת The Gemara challenges: But let one who is still not aware of his transgression achieve complete atonement, so that even should he later become aware of his transgression, he will not have to bring an offering. Why does the baraita say that the goat only suspends the punishment? The Gemara answers: If it were written: From their sins, it would be interpreted as you say, but now that it is written: “For all their sins,” this indicates that it is referring to those sins whose commission will potentially cause the transgressor to become subject to an obligation to bring a sin-offering.

וכי מאחר שאינו מכפר למה תולה אמר ר' זירא לומר שאם מת מת בלא עון א"ל רבא אם מת מיתה ממרקת אלא אמר רבא להגן עליו מן היסורין: The Gemara asks: But once it has been determined that the goat does not effect complete atonement, to what end does it suspend punishment? Rabbi Zeira said: The baraita means to say that if he dies before he brings his offering, he dies without liability for sin. Rava said to him: If he dies, he does not need the offering to atone for him, since death itself cleanses him of all his sins. Rather, Rava said there is a different explanation: The baraita means to say that the goat serves to protect him from being punished with suffering before he has brought his offering.

אין בה ידיעה בתחלה ויש בה ידיעה בסוף שעיר הנעשה בחוץ ויוה"כ מכפר כו': § The mishna teaches: For cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but had awareness at the end, the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary, i.e., the goat of the additional offerings of Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, atone. This is derived from the fact that the Torah juxtaposes the internal and external goats to teach that both atone only for cases in which one had awareness of his transgression at some point, although each offering atones in a different case.

מכדי איתקושי איתקוש להדדי ונכפר פנימי אדידיה ואדחיצון ונפקא מינה להיכא דלא עבד חיצון אמר קרא (שמות ל, י) אחת כפרה אחת מכפר ואינו מכפר שתי כפרות The Gemara comments: Now, the verse juxtaposes the two goats with each other to teach that they effect atonement for similar cases. But then let the internal goat atone both for itself, i.e., for the cases that it normally atones for, and for that which the external goat normally atones for, and the practical difference will be in a case where, for some reason, the service of the external goat was not performed. The Gemara explains: The verse states: “Aaron shall bring atonement upon its corners once a year; with the blood of the sin-offering of atonement once in the year shall he make atonement for it throughout your generations” (Exodus 30:10). The emphasis of the repeated term “once” teaches that the goat effects one atonement for only one case but cannot effect two atonements for two different cases.

ונכפר חיצון אדידיה ואמאי דעביד פנימי נפקא מינה לטומאה דאירעה בין זה לזה אמר קרא (שמות ל, י) אחת בשנה כפרה זו לא תהא The Gemara challenges: But then let the external goat atone both for itself, i.e., for the cases that it normally atones for, and for that which the internal goat normally does atone for, and the practical difference will be in a case of the defiling of the Temple or sacrificial foods that occurred between the offering of this goat and that goat. If it occurs after the internal goat’s blood presentation, then the external goat will effect atonement for it. The Gemara explains: The verse states: “Aaron shall bring atonement upon its corners once a year” (Exodus 30:10). The emphasis on the term “once a year” teaches that this atonement, for the specific case that it atones for, should be

Daf 9a

אלא אחת בשנה: only once a year.

ולר' ישמעאל דאמר אין בה ידיעה בתחלה ויש בה ידיעה בסוף בר קרבן הוא שעיר הנעשה בחוץ אמאי מכפר על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף According to the mishna, the internal goat atones for a case in which there was no awareness at the beginning but there was awareness at the end. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yishmael, who says: For a case in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end, that person is liable to bring an offering, for what does the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary atone? The Gemara answers: It atones for a case in which one did not have awareness, neither in the beginning, nor in the end.

האי שעירי הרגלים ושעירי ראשי חדשים מכפרין סבר לה כר"מ דאמר כל השעירים כפרתן שוה על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו The Gemara challenges this answer: But for that case, the goats of the Festivals and the goats of the New Moons atone. The Gemara explains: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: The atonement effected by all the goats offered as part the additional offerings, i.e., those of the New Moons, the Festivals, and Yom Kippur, is the same: They all atone for various cases of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

אלא למאי הלכתא איתקש חיצון לפנימי מה פנימי אינו מכפר בשאר עבירות אף חיצון אינו מכפר בשאר עבירות: The Gemara asks: But if Rabbi Yishmael holds that the internal goat atones for a situation in which there was no awareness at all, with regard to what halakha does the Torah juxtapose the internal goat with the external goat? The Gemara explains: The juxtaposition teaches that just as the internal goat does not atone for other transgressions, so too, the external goat does not atone for other transgressions. Rather, they both atone only for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

על שאין בה ידיעה בתחלה ולא בסוף שעירי רגלים ושעירי ראשי חדשים מכפרין דברי ר' יהודה: § The mishna teaches: For the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, the goats brought as sin-offerings as part of the additional offerings of the Festivals and the goats brought as sin-offerings as part of the additional offerings of the New Moons atone. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

א"ר יהודה אמר שמואל מ"ט דר' יהודה אמר קרא (במדבר כח, טו) ושעיר עזים אחד לחטאת לה' חטא שאין מכיר בו אלא ה' יהא שעיר זה מכפר The Gemara elaborates: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The verse states with regard to additional offerings of the New Moons: “And one goat for a sin-offering to the Lord” (Numbers 28:15). The final phrase, which literally means: A sin to the Lord, alludes to the fact that this goat atones for a sin of which only the Lord is aware, i.e., where there was no awareness either at the beginning or at the end.

והאי מיבעי ליה לכדר"ל דאמר ר"ל מה נשתנה שעיר של ר"ח שנאמר בו לה' אמר הקב"ה שעיר זה יהא כפרה על שמיעטתי את הירח The Gemara objects: But this phrase is necessary in order to expound it in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish says: What is different about the goat brought as a sin-offering of the New Moon that it is stated with regard to it: “To the Lord,” a term not written with regard to other sin-offerings? The Holy One, Blessed be He, says, as it were: This goat shall be an atonement for the fact that I diminished the size of the moon.

א"כ לימא קרא על ה' מאי לה' לכדאמרן The Gemara resolves the problem: If so, i.e., if the phrase was needed only for that statement, let the verse state only: A sin-offering for the Lord. For what reason does it state: “To the Lord”? In order to expound it in accordance with that which we have said, that it atones only for a sin that the Lord alone is aware of.

ואימא כוליה להכי הוא דאתא א"כ נימא קרא חטאת ה' מאי לה' שמעת מינה תרתי The Gemara asks: But why not say that the whole of the phrase comes exclusively to teach this halakha, and not to expound it in accordance with Reish Lakish’s statement at all? The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse state: A sin-offering of the Lord. For what reason does it state: “To the Lord”? You can conclude two conclusions from it.

ונכפר נמי אפי' בשאר עבירות תנא דבי ר' ישמעאל הואיל וזה בא בזמן קבוע וזה בא בזמן קבוע מה זה אינו מכפר אלא על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו אף זה אינו מכפר אלא על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו The Gemara asks: But let the goat atone even for other transgressions that a person never became aware of. Why does Rabbi Yehuda limit the scope of its atonement? The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Since this goat of the New Moon is brought at a fixed time, and that goat of Yom Kippur is brought at a fixed time, they must atone for similar transgressions. Just as that goat of Yom Kippur atones only for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, so too, this goat of the New Moon atones only for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

אשכחן שעירי ראשי חדשים שעירי הרגלים מנלן וכי תימא הא נמי כדתנא דבי ר' ישמעאל איכא למיפרך אי מדראש חדש שכן תדיר אי מדיום הכפורים שכן מרובה כפרתו וכי תימא The Gemara says: We found a source teaching that the goats of the New Moons atone for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. From where do we derive that the goats of the Festivals also atone for such cases? And if you would say that this can also be derived in accordance with that which the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, that suggestion can be refuted as follows: If you try to derive it through a comparison to the goats of the New Moon, the comparison is flawed, as those goats are more frequent than those of the Festivals. And if you try to derive it through a comparison to the goat of Yom Kippur, that comparison is also flawed, as that goat has a more extensive atonement, since it atones for all sins. And if you would say:

Daf 9b

הא גמרינן ר"ח מדיוה"כ ולא פרכינן התם כפרה מיכתב כתיבא גלויי מילתא בעלמא הוא אבל הכא איכא למימר כולה מילתא לא גמרינן Don’t we derive the atonement of the goat of the New Moon through a comparison to the goat of Yom Kippur and we did not refute it by saying that the atonement of the goat of Yom Kippur is more extensive, that is not relevant: There, with regard to the goat of the New Moon, the basic fact that it provides atonement is written in the verse, as Rav Yehuda explains above, and the comparison to the goat of Yom Kippur is merely revealing a matter, i.e., it teaches in what way its atonement is limited. But here, with regard to the goats of the Festivals, the verse does not mention any details about atonement, so it is valid to say that we do not derive the entire matter from the comparison to the goat of Yom Kippur, as it provides a more extensive atonement.

אלא כדא"ר חמא בר' חנינא שעיר ושעיר ה"נ שעיר ושעיר ואיתקוש שעירי רגלים לשעירי ראשי חדשים מה שעירי ראשי חדשים אינן מכפרין אלא על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף אף שעירי הרגלים אינן מכפרין אלא על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף: Rather, the atonement of the goats of the Festivals is derived just as Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says in explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Meir (10a): The matter is derived from the fact that with regard to the goat of the Festivals (see Numbers, chapters 28–29) the verses that mention the goat could have simply stated: A goat, but instead state: “And a goat.” Here too, the fact that the verse could have simply stated: A goat, but instead states: “And a goat,” indicates that the goats of the Festivals are juxtaposed with the goat of the New Moon, which are mentioned at the beginning of that passage, and teaches that they all effect a similar atonement. Just as the goats of the New Moon atone only for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, so too, the goats of the Festivals atone only for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end.

איבעיא להו כי אמר ר' יהודה על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף הני מילי בחטא שאין סופו ליודע אבל חטא שסופו ליודע כמי שיש ידיעה בסוף דמי ושעיר הנעשה בחוץ ויוה"כ מכפר או דלמא אפילו חטא שסופו ליודע השתא מיהא חטא שאין מכיר בו אלא ה' קרינא ביה A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Rabbi Yehuda says that the goats of the New Moons and the Festivals atone for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, does that statement apply only to a sin that will never eventually become known, e.g., where no one was present when the person became ritually impure, but with regard to a sin that will eventually become known, it is considered to be like a case of one who has awareness of his sin at the end, and therefore only the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary and Yom Kippur itself atone for it? Or perhaps, even with regard to a sin that will eventually become known, right now, at least, before it becomes known, I can call it a sin of which only God is aware, and therefore the goats of the New Moons and the Festivals atone for it.

ת"ש דתניא על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף וחטא שסופו ליודע שעירי הרגלים ושעירי ר"ח מכפרים דברי ר"י: The Gemara concludes: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma, as it is taught in a baraita: For a case in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, and it is a sin that will eventually become known, the goats of the Festivals and the goats of the New Moons atone. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

ר"ש אומר שעירי הרגלים מכפרין אבל לא שעירי ר"ח וכו': § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon says: The goats of the Festivals atone for a case in which one never had awareness of his transgression, but the goats of the New Moons do not. Rather, the latter atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food.

א"ר אלעזר א"ר אושעיא מאי טעמיה דר"ש אמר קרא (ויקרא י, יז) ואותה נתן לכם לשאת את עון העדה והאי קרא בשעיר דר"ח כתיב ויליף עון עון מציץ נאמר כאן עון ונאמר להלן (שמות כח, מג) עון מה להלן טומאת בשר אף כאן טומאת בשר The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states: “And He gave it to you to bear the sin of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17), and this verse is written with regard to the goat of the New Moon. And its capacity to atone is derived from the frontplate through a verbal analogy between the words “sin” in this verse, and the word “sin” stated with regard to the frontplate. The verse there states: “And it shall be on Aaron’s forehead and Aaron will bear the sin of the sacred offerings” (Exodus 28:38). The verbal analogy teaches as follows: It is stated here, with regard to the goat of the New Moon: “Sin,” and it is stated there, with regard to the frontplate: “Sin.” Just as there, in the verse in Exodus, the atonement is for a sin involving the ritual impurity of sacrificial meat, i.e., where such meat is placed on the altar, so too here, in the verse in Leviticus, the atonement is for a sin involving the ritual impurity of sacrificial meat, i.e., where a ritually pure person partakes of it.

אי מה להלן עולין אף כאן עולין עון העדה כתיב The Gemara asks: If the two cases are to be compared, then one could take the comparison further: Just as there, in the verse in Exodus, the atonement is only for meat that ascends upon the altar, so too here, in the verse in Leviticus, the atonement is only for meat that ascends upon the altar. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It is written with regard to the goat of the New Moon: “To bear the sin of the congregation.” This indicates that it atones for the personal sin of partaking of sacrificial meat that was to be consumed by an individual, which became ritually impure.

מכדי מיגמר גמרי מהדדי נכפר דר"ח אדידיה ואדציץ נפקא מינה להיכא דנשבר הציץ אמר קרא עון עון אחד הוא נושא ואין נושא ב' עונות The Gemara suggests: Now, the atonement of the goats of the New Moon and that of the frontplate are derived from one another by a verbal analogy. If so, let the goat of the New Moon atone for itself, i.e., for the cases that it normally atones for, and for that which the frontplate normally atones for, and the practical difference will be in a case where the frontplate was broken. The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to the goat of the New Moon: “To bear the sin of the congregation,” which indicates that it bears, i.e., atones for, only one sin, but it does not bear two sins.

ונכפר ציץ אדידיה ואדר"ח נפקא מינה לטומאה דאירעה בין זה לזה אמר קרא אותה אותה נושא עון ואין אחרת נושא עון The Gemara suggests: But let the frontplate atone for itself, i.e., for those cases that it normally atones for, and for that which the goats of the New Moon normally atone for, and the practical difference will be in a case of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods that occurred between the goat offering of this New Moon and that New Moon which follows. The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to the goat of the New Moon: “And He gave it to you to bear the sin of the congregation,” which indicates that it bears, i.e., atones for, that sin, but another does not bear that sin.

רב אשי אמר כתיב הכא עון העדה עדה ולא קדשים והתם כתיב עון הקדשים קדשים ולא עדה Rav Ashi states another proof for the opinion that each atones in a different case: It is stated here with regard to the goat of the New Moon: “The sin of the congregation,” which indicates that it atones for the sin of the congregation, but not for the sin involving sacred offerings. And there, with regard to the frontplate, it is written: “The sin of the sacred offerings,” which indicates that it atones for the sin involving sacred offerings, but not for the sin of the congregation.

אשכחן שעירי ראשי חדשים דמכפרי על טהור שאכל את הטמא שעירי רגלים דמכפרי על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף מנלן The Gemara says: We found a source for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion about the goats of the New Moons, that they atone for a ritually pure person who partook of ritually impure sacrificial food. From where do we derive his opinion about the goats of the Festivals, that they atone for cases of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end?

כדאמר ר' חמא ברבי חנינא שעיר ושעיר ה"נ שעיר ושעיר The Gemara answers: It is derived just as Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says, in explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Meir (10a): The fact that with regard to the goat of the Festivals the verses that mention the goats could have simply stated: A goat, but instead state: “And a goat,” teaches that the goats of the Festivals effect an atonement similar to that of the goat of the New Moon that is mentioned at the beginning of that passage. Here too, the fact that the verse could have simply stated: A goat, but instead states: “And a goat,” teaches that the goats of the Festivals effect an atonement similar to that of the goat of the New Moon, which is mentioned at the beginning of that passage.

Daf 10a

ואיתקוש שעירי הרגלים לשעירי ראשי חדשים מה שעיר דראש חודש במילתא דקודש מכפרי אף שעירי רגלים במילתא דקודש מכפרי And through this additional “and,” the goats of the Festivals are juxtaposed with the goats of the New Moons, indicating that just as the goats of the New Moons atone for a case involving sacrificial food, i.e., where a ritually pure person partook of ritually impure sacrificial food, so too, the goats of the Festivals atone for a similar case involving sacrificial food, i.e., where a ritually impure person partook of ritually pure sacrificial food.

וכי תימא ניכפרו אדראש חדש הא אמרינן אותה אותה נושא עון ואין אחר נושא עון And if you would say: Let the goats of the Festivals atone for that which the goats of the New Moon are sacrificed, that is not possible. Didn’t we say above that the verse states with regard to the goat of the New Moon: “And He gave it to you to bear the sin of the congregation,” which indicates that it bears, i.e., atones for, that sin but another does not bear that sin?

וכי תימא ניכפרו אדיום הכפורים הא אמרי' (ויקרא טז, לד) אחת בשנה כפרה זו לא תהא אלא אחת בשנה And if you would say: Let the goats of the Festivals atone for that which the goat of Yom Kippur is brought, that is not possible. Didn’t we say above that the verse states with regard to the goat of Yom Kippur: “Aaron shall bring atonement upon its corners once a year” (Exodus 30:10)? The emphasis on “once a year” teaches that this atonement for this case should be only once a year.

אמאי מכפרי The Gemara explains: It must be that the goats of the Festivals atone for cases of defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, because if not, for what other matter involving sacrificial foods could they atone?

אי על שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה ויש בה ידיעה בסוף האי בר קרבן הוא אי על שיש בה ידיעה בתחלה ואין בה ידיעה בסוף האי שעיר הנעשה בפנים ויום הכפורים תולה אי על שאין בה ידיעה בתחלה אבל יש בה ידיעה בסוף האי שעיר הנעשה בחוץ ויום הכפורים מכפר If you say they atone for cases in which one had awareness at the beginning and had awareness at the end, then one can counter that he is liable to bring an offering to atone for his transgression, and therefore the goats of the Festivals will not atone for him. If you say they atone for cases in which one had awareness at the beginning but did not have awareness at the end, then one can counter that the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary and Yom Kippur itself suspend any punishment that he deserves until he becomes aware of his transgression. If you say they atone for cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end, then one can counter that the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary atones.

על כרחך אינו מכפר אלא על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף: Perforce, they atone only for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end.

ר' מאיר אומר כל השעירים כפרתן שוה כו': § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir says: The atonement effected by all the goats offered as part of the additional offerings, i.e., those of the New Moons, Festivals, and Yom Kippur, is the same. They all atone for various cases of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

אמר ר' חמא בר ר' חנינא מאי טעמא דר' מאיר אמר קרא שעיר ושעיר הוקשו כל השעירים זה לזה וי"ו מוסיף על ענין ראשון Rabbi Ḥama bar Rabbi Ḥanina said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? With regard to the goat of the Festivals (Numbers, chapters 28–29) the verse could have simply stated: A goat, but instead it states: “And a goat,” which teaches that all the goats are juxtaposed, this one with that one, as the use of the term “and” teaches that the second matter adds to the first matter, and that all the goats effect a similar atonement as the first one listed, that of the New Moon.

קסלקא דעתך כל חד וחד מחבריה גמר והאמר ר' יוחנן כל התורה כולה למידין למד מלמד חוץ מקדשים שאין למידין למד מלמד The Gemara questions this interpretation: Initially it enters your mind to explain that the atonement effected by each and every one of the goats of the Festivals is derived from the atonement effected by the goat adjacent to it, i.e., the one mentioned in the passage immediately preceding it: The atonement effected by the Passover goat from the atonement effected by the goat of the New Moon and the atonement effected by the Shavuot goat from the atonement effected by the Passover goat and so forth. But this is difficult, as doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: With regard to the entire Torah, one derives a halakha derived via a juxtaposition from a halakha derived via a juxtaposition, except for halakhot concerning consecrated matters, where one does not derive a halakha derived via a juxtaposition from a halakha derived via a juxtaposition?

הא לא קשיא כולהו מקמא גמרי The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, because actually the atonement effected by all of the goats is derived directly from the atonement effected by the first goat, i.e., the goat of the New Moon.

תינח כל דכתב ביה ושעיר עצרת ויוה"כ דלא כתב ביה ושעיר מנלן The Gemara asks: Rabbi Ḥama bar Rabbi Ḥanina’s explanation works out well for all the goats with regard to which it is written: “And a goat,” but from where do we derive what the goats of Shavuot and Yom Kippur atone for, as with regard to them it is not written: And a goat, but simply: “A goat”?

אלא אמר ר' יונה אמר קרא (במדבר כט, לט) אלה תעשו לה' במועדיכ' הוקשו כל המועדי' כולן זה לזה: והא ר"ח לאו מועד הוא Rather, Rabbi Yona says: The verse states at the end of the passage detailing the goats of the Festivals: “These shall you offer to the Lord on your Festivals” (Numbers 29:39); with this verse all the goats of the Festivals are juxtaposed, this one with that one, which indicates that they all atone for the same sins. The Gemara challenges: But the New Moon is not regarded as a Festival.

איברא ר"ח נמי איקרי מועד כדאמר אביי דאמר אביי תמוז דההיא שתא מלויי מליוהו דכתיב (איכה א, טו) קרא עלי מועד לשבור בחורי The Gemara refutes this: In truth, the New Moon is also called a Festival, in accordance with what Abaye says with regard to a different issue, as Abaye says: With regard to the month of Tammuz in that year during which the Jewish people sinned by accepting the slanderous report of the spies about Eretz Yisrael, the court made it a full month of thirty days, as it is written: “He proclaimed a festival to crush my young men” (Lamentations 1:15). Abaye understands the verse to mean that by extending the month of Tammuz by an extra day, by proclaiming that the thirtieth day should be celebrated as a New Moon in addition to the first day of the following month, it emerged that the acceptance of the spies’ report occurred on the ninth of Av, and not the eighth, thereby defining the ninth of Av as an ominous day for the Jewish people. From Abaye’s explanation it is apparent that the New Moon is also called a Festival.

אמר רבי יוחנן ומודה ר"מ בשעיר הנעשה בפנים שהוא אינו מכפר כפרתן והן אינן מכפרין כפרתו The Gemara continues to analyze Rabbi Meir’s opinion: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And even though he holds that all the goats offered as part of the additional offerings effect atonement for the same sin, Rabbi Meir concedes with regard to the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur that it does not atone their atonement, i.e., does not atone for the sins that they atone for, and they do not atone its atonement.

הוא אינו מכפר כפרתן כפרה אחת מכפר ואינו מכפר שתי כפרות הן אינן מכפרין כפרתו אמר קרא אחת בשנה כפרה זו לא תהא אלא אחת בשנה He elaborates: It does not atone their atonement, because, as the Gemara derived from the verse: “Aaron shall bring atonement upon its corners once a year” (Exodus 30:10), the internal goat effects one atonement for only one case but cannot effect two atonements for two different cases. And they do not atone its atonement, because, as the Gemara explained, the verse states: “Aaron shall bring atonement upon its corners once a year.” The emphasis on the phrase “once a year” teaches that this atonement for the specific case that it atones for should be only once a year.

תניא נמי הכי על שאין בה ידיעה לא בתחלה ולא בסוף ועל שאין בה ידיעה בתחלה אבל יש בה ידיעה בסוף ועל טהור שאכל את הטמא שעירי הרגלים ושעירי ראשי חדשים ושעיר הנעשה בחוץ מכפרין דברי ר' מאיר The Gemara adds: This qualification of Rabbi Meir’s opinion is also indicated by that which is taught in a baraita: For cases of the defiling of the Temple in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, and for cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end, and for a ritually pure person who partook of ritually impure sacrificial food, the goats of the Festivals and the goats of the New Moons and the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary atone. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

ואילו שעיר הנעשה בפנים שיירה וכפרתן נמי שיירה: The Gemara notes: But in delineating which offerings atone, Rabbi Meir omitted the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, and furthermore, when delineating their atonement, i.e., what cases they atone for, he also omitted it, i.e., he did not mention the cases that the internal goat atones for, which are the cases in which one had awareness at the beginning but did not have awareness at the end. Evidently, the atonement of the internal goat is substantively different from the atonement of the other goats.

היה ר' שמעון אומר שעירי ראשי חדשים מכפרין על טהור שאכל את הטמא כו': § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon would say: The goats of the New Moons atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food. And for defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods, the goats of the Festivals atone for cases in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end, and the goats of the additional offerings of Yom Kippur atone for cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end.

בשלמא דראשי חדשים לא מכפרי אדרגלים דאמר קרא עון עון אחד הוא נושא ואינו נושא שני עונות אלא דרגלים ניכפרו אדראשי חדשים אמר קרא אותה אותה נושא עון ואין אחר נושא עון The Gemara challenges: Granted, the goats of the New Moons do not atone for that which the goats of Festivals atone, as the verse states with regard to the goat of the New Moon: “And he gave it to you to bear the sin of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17), which indicates that it bears, i.e., atones for, one sin but does not bear two sins. But nevertheless, let the goats of the Festivals atone for that which the goats of New Moons atone. The Gemara responds: The verse states: “He gave it to you.” The emphasis on “it” teaches that it bears this sin, but no other offering bears this sin.

בשלמא דרגלים לא מכפרין אדיום הכפורים דאמר קרא אחת בשנה כפרה זו לא תהא אלא אחת בשנה אלא דיום הכפורים ניכפרו אדרגלים אמר קרא אחת כפרה אחת מכפר ואינו מכפר שתי כפרות The Gemara challenges: Granted, the goats of the Festivals do not atone for that which the goats of Yom Kippur atone, as the verse states with regard to the goat of Yom Kippur: “Aaron shall bring atonement upon its corners once a year” (Exodus 30:10). The emphasis on the phrase “once a year” teaches that this atonement, i.e., the specific case it atones for, should be only once a year. But nevertheless, let the goats of Yom Kippur atone for that which the goats of the Festivals atone. The Gemara responds: The verse states: “Once a year,” which indicates that it effects one atonement for only one case but cannot effect two atonements for two different cases.

והא כי כתיב אחת בשעיר הנעשה בפנים הוא דכתיב אמר קרא (במדבר כט, יא) מלבד The Gemara challenges the use of these derivations: But when it states “once” in this verse, it is with regard to the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary that it is written, so the derivations from it should have no bearing on the discussion concerning the external goat. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “One goat for a sin-offering aside from

Daf 10b

חטאת הכפורים ואיתקוש חיצון לפנימי: the sin-offering of the atonements” (Numbers 29:11). “One goat for a sin-offering” is referring to the external goat, and “the sin-offering of the atonements” is referring to the internal goat. With this verse, the external goat is juxtaposed with the internal goat, and therefore the limitations imposed on the atonement of the internal goat are also to be applied to the external goat.

רבי שמעון בן יהודה אומר משמו כו': § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon a version of his opinion that differs from that of the mishna above: The goats of the New Moons atone for a ritually pure person who unwittingly partook of ritually impure sacrificial food. The goats of the Festivals exceed them, as they atone both for a ritually pure person who partook of ritually impure sacrificial food and also atone for cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods where one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end. The goats of Yom Kippur further exceed them, as they atone both for a ritually pure person who partook of ritually impure sacrificial food and for cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one did not have awareness, neither at the beginning nor at the end; and they also atone for cases in which one did not have awareness at the beginning but did have awareness at the end.

מאי שנא דראשי חדשים דלא מכפרי אדרגלים דאמר קרא (ויקרא י, יז) עון עון אחד הוא נושא ואינו נושא שני עונות דרגלים נמי לא ניכפרו אדראשי חדשים דאמר קרא (ויקרא י, יז) אותה אותה הוא נושא עון ואין אחר נושא עון אותה לא משמע ליה The Gemara asks: What is different about the goats of the New Moons that they do not atone for that which the goats of the Festivals atone? The Gemara answers: As the verse states with regard to any one of the goats of the New Moons: “And He gave it to you to bear the sin of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17), which teaches that it bears, i.e., atones for, one sin but does not bear two sins. The Gemara asks: If so, the goats of the Festivals should also not atone for that which the goats of the New Moons atone, as that same verse states: “And He gave it to you,” which indicates that it bears, i.e., atones for, that sin, but nothing else bears that sin. Why then does Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda cite Rabbi Shimon as holding that the goats of the Festivals do atone for that which the goats of the New Moons atone? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon does not learn anything from the word “it.” Accordingly, he holds that any one of the goats of the Festivals can atone for two different sins.

מ"ש דרגלים דלא מכפרי אדיום הכפורים דאמר קרא (שמות ל, י) אחת בשנה כפרה זו לא תהא אלא אחת בשנה אי הכי דיום הכפורים נמי לא ניכפרו אדרגלים אחת כתיב כפרה אחת מכפר ואינו מכפר שתי כפרות אחת לא משמע ליה The Gemara asks further: What is different about the goats of the Festivals that they do not atone for that which the goats of Yom Kippur atone? As the verse states with regard to the goat of Yom Kippur: “Once a year” (Exodus 30:10), which teaches that this atonement for the specific case that it atones for should be only once a year, and therefore no other offering can atone for it. The Gemara challenges: If so, the goats of Yom Kippur should also not atone for that which the goats of the Festivals atone, as it is written: “Once a year,” which teaches that the goats effect one atonement for only one case but cannot effect two atonements for two cases. Why then does Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda cite Rabbi Shimon as holding that the goats of Yom Kippur atone for everything that the goats of the Festivals atone for? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon does not learn anything from the word “once.” Accordingly, he holds that the goats of Yom Kippur can atone for three different cases.

אמאי דכי כתיב אחת בשעיר הנעשה בפנים כתיב אי הכי דרגלים נמי נכפרו אדיום הכפורים דכי כתיב אחת בשעיר הנעשה בפנים כתיב The Gemara asks: Why doesn’t he expound the word “once”? He does not expound it because when the word “once” is written, it is written with regard to the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, and so the halakha derived from that verse has no bearing on the capacity of the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary to atone. The Gemara asks: If so, the goats of the Festivals also should atone for that which the goats of Yom Kippur atone, as when the phrase “once a year” is written, it is written with regard to the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, so the halakha derived from that verse has no bearing on whether another offering can atone for that which the external goat atones.

לעולם אחת משמע ליה ושאני הכא דאמר קרא (שמות ל, י) וכפר אהרן על קרנותיו אחת בשנה קרנותיו דמזבח הפנימי הוא דכפרה אחת מכפר ואינו מכפר שתי כפרות הא דחיצון אפילו שתי כפרות The Gemara answers: Actually, he does learn a halakha from the word “once,” and he holds that it also teaches about the capacity of the external goat to atone, as the Gemara explained above. But it is different here, with regard to the derivation that the goat cannot effect two atonements, as the verse states: “And Aaron shall bring atonement upon its corners once a year” (Exodus 30:10). The emphasis on “upon its corners” teaches that it is only with regard to the internal goat, whose blood presentation is performed upon the corners of the internal altar, that it effects one atonement for only one case but cannot effect two atonements for two different cases, but the external goat, whose blood presentation is performed upon the corners of the external altar, can effect even two different atonements.

אמר עולא אמר רבי יוחנן תמידין שלא הוצרכו לצבור נפדין תמימים § Animals purchased with funds collected for public offerings may be sacrificed only during the fiscal year in which those funds were given. For this purpose, the fiscal year begins on the first of Nisan. Generally, once an animal has been consecrated as an offering, then even if for some reason it may no longer be sacrificed, it still cannot be redeemed unless it develops a blemish. Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches an exception to this halakha: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Lambs consecrated for the daily offerings that were not needed by the public during the fiscal year in which they were purchased are redeemed, even if they are unblemished, and they may then be used for non-sacred purposes.

יתיב רבה וקאמר לה להא שמעתא א"ל רב חסדא מאן ציית לך ולר' יוחנן רבך וכי קדושה שבהן להיכן הלכה Rabba was sitting and reciting this halakha. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Who will listen to you and Rabbi Yoḥanan, your teacher, with regard to this halakha? Rav Ḥisda clarified: But the sanctity that was inherent in them, to where has it gone? Since these animals were consecrated as offerings, they should have been endowed with inherent sanctity. Only sanctity that inheres in an item’s value, i.e., an item consecrated to the Temple treasury, can be desacralized through redemption, but an item with inherent sanctity can never be desacralized.

אמר ליה את לא תסברא דלא אמרינן קדושה שבהן להיכן הלכה והתנן מותר הקטורת מה היו עושין בה מפרישין ממנה שכר האומנין ומחללין אותה על מעות האומנין ונותנין אותה לאומנין בשכרן וחוזרין ולוקחין אותה מתרומה חדשה Rabba said to him: Don’t you also hold that we do not say that the question: The sanctity that was inherent in them, to where has it gone, poses a difficulty? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shekalim 4:5): In any fiscal year, one may use only incense that was purchased with funds collected for that year. Accordingly, the mishna asks: With regard to the surplus incense that remained unused at the end of the fiscal year, what would the Temple treasurers do with it in order to render it usable for the following year? They would separate from the Temple treasury the wages for the artisans who worked for the Temple, and those funds would thereby be desacralized. And then they would desacralize the surplus incense by transferring its sanctity to that money that had been set aside for the artisans. Then, they would give the now-desacralized incense to the artisans as their wages, and finally, they would repurchase it with funds from the new collection carried out for the coming year.

ואמאי נימא קדושה שבהן להיכן הלכה Rabba explains the proof from the mishna: One could ask: But why should the method described work? Let us say: The sanctity that was inherent in the incense, to where has it gone? It cannot be removed by redeeming it. Perforce, even you must concede that this question does not pose a difficulty.

א"ל קטורת קאמרת שאני קטורת Rav Ḥisda said to him: Did you say that there is a proof from the halakhot of incense? One cannot compare incense to animals consecrated for the daily offerings, since incense is different,

Daf 11a

דקדושת דמים הוא as it has only sanctity that inheres in its value. By contrast, animal offerings have inherent sanctity, which cannot be removed.

אלא מעתה לא תפסל בטבול יום אלמה תניא נתנה במכתשת נפסלת בטבול יום Rabba challenges Rav Ḥisda’s claim about incense: If that is so, it should not become disqualified through contact with one who was ritually impure who immersed that day but is still not regarded as fully pure until nightfall, as only items with inherent sanctity are disqualified in such a way. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita with regard to the incense: Once the priest has placed it in a mortar to grind it, it can be disqualified through contact with one who immersed that day?

וכי תימא כל קדושת דמים מיפסלי בטבול יום והתנן המנחות מועלין בהן משהוקדשו קדשו בכלי הוכשרו ליפסל בטבול יום ובמחוסר כפורים ובלינה Rabba deflects a possible challenge: And if you would say to defend your opinion that all items that have sanctity that inheres in their value are also disqualified through contact with one who immersed that day, that is not so. He explains: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Me’ila 9a): With regard to the ingredients of the meal-offerings, one is liable for misusing them from when they are consecrated with sanctity that inheres in their value by the owner verbally dedicating them to the Temple? Once they are further consecrated with inherent sanctity by being placed in a service vessel, they become fit to be disqualified both through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, and through being left overnight.

קדשו בכלי אין לא קדשו בכלי לא Rabba explains the proof: From this mishna it is apparent that if the ingredients of the meal-offerings were consecrated with inherent sanctity by being placed in a service vessel, then, yes, they can been disqualified through contact with one who immersed that day, but if they were not consecrated by being placed in a service vessel, then they will not be disqualified through contact with one who immersed that day, as they have only sanctity that inheres in their value.

אלא מאי קדושת הגוף היא אלא מעתה תיפסל בלינה אלמה תנן הקומץ והלבונה והקטורת ומנחת כהנים ומנחת כהן משוח ומנחת נסכים מועלים בהן משהוקדשו קדשו בכלי הוכשרו ליפסל בטבול יום ובמחוסר כפורים ובלינה Rav Ḥisda responds: Rather, what do you say? Do you say that the surplus incense, which was only placed in a mortar but never in a service vessel, has inherent sanctity? But if that is so, it should be disqualified by being left overnight. Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (Me’ila 10a): With regard to the handful of the meal-offering that the priest takes to burn on the altar, the frankincense, the incense, the meal-offering of priests, the meal-offering of the anointed priest, i.e., High Priest, and the meal-offering of libations, one is liable for misusing them from when they are consecrated by verbally dedicating them for their purposes. Once they are further consecrated with inherent sanctity by being placed in a service vessel, they become fit to be disqualified both through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, and through being left overnight.

קדשו בכלי אין לא קדשו בכלי לא Rav Ḥisda explains the proof: From this mishna it is apparent that if these items were consecrated with inherent sanctity by being placed in a service vessel, then yes, they can been disqualified by being left overnight, but if they were not consecrated by being placed in a service vessel, then they will not be disqualified by being left overnight, as they have only sanctity that inheres in their value. Apparently, even after the incense has been placed in the mortar, it still does not have inherent sanctity.

אמר ליה לינה קאמרת שאני קטורת הואיל וצורתה בכל השנה כולה Rabba said to him: Did you say that you can provide a proof from the disqualification that occurs as a result of an item’s being left overnight? One cannot do so, as incense is different, because even though it has inherent sanctity, it is not disqualified by being left overnight, since its form remains unchanged throughout the entire year, and the disqualification brought about by being left overnight applies only to a substance that spoils over time.

מ"מ קשיא וכי קדושה שבהן להיכן הלכה אמר רבה לב בית דין מתנה עליהן אם הוצרכו הוצרכו ואם לאו יהיו לדמיהן The Gemara notes: In any case, Rav Ḥisda’s initial question is still difficult: But the sanctity that was inherent in them, to where has it gone? Rabba said: With regard to the consecration of items for public offerings such as the daily offerings and incense, the court tacitly stipulates concerning them as follows: If they are ultimately required to be used as offerings that year, then they are required for that, and they should be consecrated as offerings. But if they are not required that year, then they are only to be consecrated for their value, i.e., for them to be sold and then for their proceeds to be used toward the purchase of offerings.

א"ל אביי והא מר הוא דאמר הקדיש זכר לדמיו קדוש קדושת הגוף לא קשיא הא דאמר לדמי עולה הא דאמר לדמי נסכים Abaye said to Rabba: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said: If one consecrated a male ram for its value, since that ram is itself fit to be brought as an offering, it is automatically consecrated with inherent sanctity? Accordingly, to what avail is the court’s stipulation? Since the items are fit to be used as offerings, they will automatically become consecrated with inherent sanctity, even if they are consecrated only for their value. Rabba answers: This is not difficult. This case, where the ram is automatically consecrated with inherent sanctity, is referring to a situation where the donor says that it should be consecrated for the value of a burnt-offering, for which the ram is itself suitable, whereas that case, of the court’s stipulation, is analogous to a situation where he says that a ram should be consecrated for the value of libations, for which the ram itself is not suitable and therefore is not automatically consecrated with inherent sanctity.

איתיביה אביי פר ושעיר של יום הכפורים שאבדו והפריש אחרים תחתיהם Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s suggestion from that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur that were lost, and one separated and sacrificed others in their stead,

Daf 11b

וכן שעירי ע"ז שאבדו והפריש אחרים תחתיהן כולן ימותו דברי ר' יהודה ר' אלעזר ור' שמעון אומרים ירעו עד שיסתאבו וימכרו ויפלו דמיהן לנדבה שאין חטאת צבור מתה and likewise, goats that were designated to atone for an act of unwitting public idol worship that were lost, and one separated and sacrificed others in their stead, in such cases, all of the lost animals, should they subsequently be found, shall be left to die. This is in accordance with the halakha that a sin-offering whose owner has already achieved atonement is left to die. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: They should graze until they become unfit by developing a blemish, and then they are sold and their proceeds are allocated for communal gift offerings. They are not left to die, because the halakha is that a communal sin-offering is not left to die.

ואמאי לימא לב בית דין מתנה עליהן Abaye explains his challenge: But why should it even be necessary to wait until the offerings develop a blemish? Let us say here also that the court tacitly stipulates concerning them, so that if it ultimately emerges that they were not needed, then they should have only sanctity that inheres in their value, and therefore it should be possible to redeem them even if they do not develop a blemish.

אבודין קאמרת שאני אבודין דלא שכיחי Rabba deflects the challenge: Did you say that there is a proof from the case of lost animals? Cases of lost animals are different, because they are not common. Therefore, the court does not stipulate concerning such an eventuality.

הרי פרה דלא שכיחא ותניא פרה נפדית על כל פסול שבה מתה תפדה נשחטה תפדה מצא אחרת נאה הימנה תפדה שחטה על גבי מערכתה אין לה פדייה עולמית שאני פרה דקדשי בדק הבית היא Abaye persists: But consider the case of a red heifer, which is not common, and yet it is taught in a baraita: A red heifer may be redeemed for any disqualification that occurs to it. If it died, it shall be redeemed; if it was slaughtered in an improper place, it shall be redeemed; if another was found that is choicer than it, it shall be redeemed. But once the priest has slaughtered it properly on its arrangement of wood on the Mount of Olives, it can no longer be redeemed. Presumably, the reason it may be redeemed if a choicer one is found is that the court tacitly stipulates that in such a case it should be consecrated with sanctity that inheres in its value. It is apparent that even in uncommon cases, the court makes such stipulations. Rabba rejects the proof: The red heifer is different, as in all cases it has only the sanctity of items consecrated for Temple maintenance, which inheres only in the item’s value, and so it can always be redeemed, even if still unblemished.

אי הכי מתה או נשחטה תפדה הא בעינן העמדה והערכה הא מני ר"ש היא דאמר קדשי מזבח היו בכלל העמדה והערכה קדשי בדק הבית לא היו בכלל העמדה והערכה Abaye asks: If so, if it died or was slaughtered, how can it be redeemed? In order for an item to be redeemed, don’t we require that it first undergo the process of standing and valuation? The animal must be stood before a priest who then evaluates how much it should be redeemed for (see Leviticus 27:11–12), and a dead animal cannot stand. Rabba answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Items consecrated to be offered on the altar were included in the requirement of standing and appraising, but items with the sanctity of items consecrated for Temple maintenance, such as the red heifer, were not included in the requirement of standing and appraising.

אי רבי שמעון אימא סיפא שחטה על גבי מערכתה אין לה פדייה עולמית Abaye asks: If, as you claim, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, then say and try to justify the latter clause, which states: Once the priest has slaughtered it properly on its arrangement of wood on the Mount of Olives, it can no longer be redeemed.

והתניא ר"ש אומר פרה מטמאה טומאת אוכלין הואיל והיתה לה שעת הכושר ואמר ר"ל אומר היה ר' שמעון פרה נפדית על גב מערכתה And this statement is not consistent with Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, as isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the meat of a red heifer that was slaughtered properly is susceptible to becoming ritually impure with the ritual impurity of food, even though it is prohibited to partake of it in its current state, since it had a time when it was fit to be eaten. And in explanation of when it was fit to be eaten, Reish Lakish says: Rabbi Shimon would say that a red heifer may be redeemed even while it is upon its arrangement of wood. It is considered fit to be eaten due to the potential to redeem it, which would allow one to then partake of it. It is apparent from Reish Lakish’s comment that the latter clause, and by logical extension, the rest of the baraita, is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon’s opinion.

אלא שאני פרה הואיל ודמיה יקרין Rabba concedes therefore that the red heifer can be redeemed due to the fact that the court makes a stipulation with regard to it, but, nevertheless, he defends his opinion that they do not normally make a stipulation for uncommon cases: Rather, the case of a red heifer is different, since it is of great monetary value. Therefore, to avoid a great loss, the court makes a stipulation despite its being an uncommon case.

אמר מר מתה תפדה וכי פודין את הקדשים להאכילן לכלבים אמר רב משרשיא משום עורה וקיימי ב"ד ומתנו אדעתא דעורה אמר רב כהנא אמרי אינשי מגמלא אונה The Gemara interjects with a question concerning the baraita: The Master said in the baraita: If a red heifer died, it shall be redeemed. The Gemara asks: But may one redeem consecrated items in order to feed the meat from them to dogs? Certainly one may not. Nevertheless, the meat of a red heifer that died without being slaughtered is not suitable for any other purpose. Rav Mesharshiyya said: It is redeemed for the sake of its hide. The Gemara asks: But does the court stand and stipulate with its mind on the hide of the heifer, which is presumably of little value? Rav Kahana said: As people say in a popular adage: From a camel, even just its ear. Since a camel is so valuable, even the flesh of its ear is valuable and should be saved if possible. Similarly, the hide of a red heifer will also be valuable.

איתיביה אמרו לו לר' שמעון מהו שיקרבו זה בזה אמר להו יקרבו אמרו לו הואיל ואין כפרתן שוה היאך הן קריבין אמר להן כולן באין לכפר על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו § Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s claim that the court tacitly stipulates concerning items consecrated for public offerings from the mishna (2b): The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: What is the halakha with regard to whether goats consecrated for different days may be sacrificed, this one in place of that one? For example, if a goat was initially consecrated to be sacrificed as part of the Yom Kippur additional offerings, may it be sacrificed instead as part of the Festival additional offerings? Rabbi Shimon said to them: Such a goat may be sacrificed. They said to Rabbi Shimon: Since, according to you, their atonement is not the same, how could they possibly be sacrificed? Rabbi Shimon said to them: They can be interchanged, since ultimately all of them come to atone for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

ואמאי לימא לב ב"ד מתנה עליהן ר' שמעון קאמרת ר"ש לית ליה לב ב"ד מתנה עליהן דאמר רב אידי בר אבין אמר רב עמרם א"ר יוחנן תמידין שלא הוצרכו לצבור לדברי רבי שמעון אין נפדין תמימים לדברי חכמים נפדין תמימים Abaye explains the objection brought from the mishna: But according to Rabba, why did Rabbi Shimon give the reason he gave? Let Rabbi Shimon say instead that the court tacitly stipulates concerning them that they should be consecrated for the day on which they are ultimately brought. Rabba answers: Did you say a proof from a statement of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle that the court tacitly stipulates concerning them, as is apparent from that which Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Amram says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Concerning lambs consecrated for the daily offerings that were not needed by the public, according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon they are not redeemed if they are unblemished; according to the statement of the Rabbis they are redeemed, even if they are unblemished.

ורבנן דפליגי עליה דרבי שמעון מאן נינהו אי נימא רבנן דקטורת The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that the court does make such stipulations, who are they? Where is their opinion recorded? If we say that they are the Sages who ruled, in the mishna cited above (Shekalim 4:5), with regard to surplus incense that it may be redeemed,

Daf 12a

שאני קטורת דלא בר רעיה היא no proof can be drawn from there, as incense is different, as it is not an entity that can be left to graze. The option that exists for animals to leave them to graze until they develop a blemish and then redeem them obviously cannot apply to incense. Therefore, it is reasonable that with regard to incense, since there is no other way to rectify it, all will concede that the court makes a stipulation.

אלא רבנן דפרה דלמא שאני פרה דדמיה יקרין Rather, say it is the opinion of the Sages who ruled, in the baraita cited above, with regard to the red heifer that it may be redeemed if a choicer one is found. The Gemara rejects this claim: Perhaps the case of a red heifer is different, since it is of great monetary value. To avoid a considerable loss, the court makes a stipulation despite it being an uncommon case.

ואלא רבנן דאמרו לו Rather, say it is the opinion of the Sages that is introduced with the phrase: They said to him, in the mishna on 2b.

ממאי דר' יהודה היא והכי קאמר ליה בשלמא לדידי דאמינא לב ב"ד מתנה עליהן אמטו להכי יקרבו אלא לדידך דאמרת לא אמאי יקרבו The Gemara asks: From where do you know that the tanna referred to as the Rabbis is Rabbi Yehuda and that this is what he is saying to Rabbi Shimon: Granted, according to my opinion, that I say that the court tacitly stipulates concerning offerings that their consecration is contingent upon their eventual use, it is due to this reason that they can be sacrificed on an occasion different from the one they were initially intended for; but according to your opinion, that you say that the court does not make such stipulations, why can they be sacrificed on an occasion different from the one they were initially intended for?

דלמא ר"מ היא והכי קאמר ליה בשלמא לדידי דאמינא כל השעירים כפרתן שוה מש"ה יקרבו אלא לדידך אמאי יקרבו But perhaps the tanna referred to as the Rabbis is Rabbi Meir, and this is what he is saying to Rabbi Shimon: Granted, according to my opinion, that I say that the atonement effected by the goats of the additional offerings of all three occasions, i.e., those of the New Moons, Festivals, and Yom Kippur, is the same, it is due to this reason that they can be sacrificed on an occasion different from the one they were initially intended for. But according to your opinion, that they effect atonement for different cases of sin, why can they be sacrificed on an occasion different from the one they were initially intended for? Since it cannot be demonstrated that the Rabbis’ opinion is based on the assumption that the court makes stipulations with regard to communal offerings, no proof can be drawn from the mishna.

אלא ר' יוחנן גמרא גמיר לה לדברי ר"ש אין נפדין לדברי חכמים נפדין Rather, the opinion of the Rabbis cited by Rabbi Yoḥanan is not necessarily recorded elsewhere, but Rabbi Yoḥanan learned it through a tradition that lambs consecrated for the daily offerings that were not needed by the public, according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, cannot be redeemed if they are unblemished, while according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed, even if they are unblemished.

ולר"ש דלית ליה לב ב"ד מתנה עליהן מאי עבדין להו א"ר יצחק א"ר יוחנן מקיצין בהן את המזבח The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold that the court tacitly stipulates concerning those lambs that were consecrated for the daily offerings that remain unused at the end of the fiscal year, what is done with them? Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One supplements the offerings brought on the altar with them. Whenever there were no obligatory offerings to be brought upon the altar, supplementary offerings would be offered upon it in order that it should not remain idle.

א"ר שמואל בר רב יצחק ומודה ר"ש בשעירי חטאת שאין מקיצין בגופן אלא בדמיהן Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to goats of communal sin-offerings that were lost and for which replacements were offered in their stead, that even should they later be found, one does not supplement the offerings of the altar with those animals themselves. Rather, supplementary offerings are purchased with their value, i.e., the sin-offerings should be left to graze until they develop a blemish, at which point they can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase supplementary offerings.

הכא הוא דמעיקרא עולה והשתא עולה אבל התם דמעיקרא חטאת והשתא עולה גזירה לאחר כפרה אטו לפני כפרה By Torah law, both communal burnt-offerings and sin-offerings that may no longer be offered for their intended purposes may be offered as supplementary burnt-offerings. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon draws a distinction between the two cases: Here, where from the outset the animal was intended to be used as a burnt-offering, i.e., for the daily-offering, and now the intention is to use it as a burnt-offering, i.e., for the supplementary offerings, the animal itself may be used. But there, where from the outset the animal was intended to be used as a sin-offering, and now the intention is to use it as a burnt-offering, there is a rabbinic decree rendering prohibited the use of the animal itself even after its atonement has already been effected by a replacement sin-offering, due to the concern that people will confuse it with a sin-offering before its atonement has been effected by a replacement sin-offering. Such a sin-offering may be brought only for its originally intended purpose.

אמר אביי אף אנן נמי תנינא פר ושעיר של יוה"כ שאבדו והפריש אחרים תחתיהם וכן שעירי ע"ז שאבדו והפריש אחרים תחתיהן כולן ימותו דברי ר' יהודה ר' אלעזר ור"ש אומרים ירעו עד שיסתאבו וימכרו ויפלו דמיהן לנדבה שאין חטאת צבור מתה Abaye said: We learn this in a baraita as well: With regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur that were lost, and one separated and sacrificed others in their stead, and likewise, goats that were designated to atone for an act of unwitting public idol worship that were lost, and one separated and sacrificed others in their stead, in such cases, all of the original animals, if they are subsequently found, should be left to die. This is in accordance with the halakha that a sin-offering whose owner has already achieved atonement is left to die. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: They should graze until they become unfit, and then they are sold and their proceeds are allocated for communal gift offerings. They do not need to be left to die because the halakha is that a communal sin-offering is not left to die.

ואמאי נקרבו אינהו גופייהו עולה אלא לאו ש"מ גזירה לאחר כפרה אטו לפני כפרה Abaye explains how this baraita supports Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak’s claim: But why do Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say that the animal should be left to develop a blemish? Let these animals themselves be sacrificed as a supplementary burnt-offering. Rather, must one not conclude from the fact they did not offer this suggestion that there is a rabbinic decree rendering prohibited the use of the animal itself, even after its atonement has already been effected, due to the concern that people will confuse it with a sin-offering before its atonement has been effected?

אמר רבא אף אנן נמי תנינא והשני ירעה עד שיסתאב וימכר ויפלו דמיו לנדבה Rava said: We learn this halakha in a mishna (Yoma 62a) as well: If after the lottery for the two Yom Kippur goats one of them dies, another pair is brought and a second lottery is performed. One becomes the counterpart of the remaining goat from the first pair, and the second, now-superfluous goat is left to graze until it becomes unfit; and then it is sold and the proceeds are allocated for communal gift offerings.

ואמאי יקרב איהו גופיה עולה אלא לאו ש"מ גזרה אחר כפרה אטו לפני כפרה Rava explains how this mishna supports Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak’s claim: But why should the superfluous goat be left to develop a blemish? Let the animal itself be sacrificed as a supplementary burnt-offering. Rather, must one not conclude from the fact that the mishna does not offer this suggestion that there is a rabbinic decree rendering prohibited the use of the animal itself even after its atonement has already been effected, due to the concern that people will confuse it with a sin-offering before its atonement has been effected?

אמר רבינא אף אנן נמי תנינא אשם שמתו בעליו או שנתכפרו בעליו ירעה עד שיסתאב וימכר ויפלו דמיו לנדבה רבי אליעזר אומר ימות רבי יהושע אומר יביא בדמיו עולה Ravina said: We learn this halakha in a mishna (Temura 20b) as well: A guilt-offering whose owner died, or that was lost and before it was subsequently found its owner achieved atonement through a replacement guilt-offering, should graze until it becomes unfit, and then it is sold and the proceeds are allocated for communal gift offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: It should be left to die. Rabbi Yehoshua says: The owner of the guilt-offering should bring a burnt-offering with the proceeds of its sale.

וליקרב הא גופא עולה אלא לאו גזירה לאחר כפרה אטו לפני כפרה שמע מינה Ravina explains how this mishna supports Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak’s claim: But why should it be left to develop a blemish? Let this animal itself be sacrificed as a supplementary burnt-offering. Rather, must one not conclude from the fact that the mishna does not offer this suggestion that there is a rabbinic decree rendering prohibited the use of the animal itself, even after its atonement has already been effected, due to the concern that people will confuse it with a sin-offering before its atonement has been effected? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that there is such a rabbinic decree.

תניא נמי הכי מה הן מביאין מן המותרות Rabbi Yoḥanan explained that Rabbi Shimon holds that lambs that were consecrated for the daily offerings that remain unused at the end of the fiscal year are offered as supplementary offerings. The Gemara notes: This is also taught in a baraita: What type of offerings would they bring from the surplus lambs that were consecrated for the daily offerings?

Daf 12b

קיץ כבנות שוח למזבח והכתיב (ויקרא ב, יא) כי כל שאור וכל דבש וגו' תני רב חנינא כבנות שוח לאדם They would bring from them dessert, like white figs, for the altar. The Gemara asks: Are white figs ever offered on the altar? But isn’t it written: “For any leavening or fruit honey you shall not cause to go up in smoke as a fire-offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11)? The term “fruit honey” includes all tree fruits. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥanina teaches: The supplementary offerings are to the altar like white figs for a person.

דרש ר"נ בר רב חסדא אין מקיצין בעולת העוף אמר רבא הא בורכא א"ל ר"נ בר יצחק לרבא מאי בורכתא אנא אמריתה ניהליה ומשמיה דרב שימי מנהרדעא אמריתה ניהליה דאמר רב שימי מנהרדעא מותרות לנדבת צבור אזלי ואין עולת עוף בצבור The Gemara discusses what may be used for the supplementary offerings: Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda taught: One does not supplement the offerings of the altar with a bird burnt-offering. Rava said: This ruling is an absurdity [burkha]. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: What is the absurdity? The ruling has a basis. I said this ruling to Rav Naḥman, and said it to him in the name of Rav Shimi of Neharde’a, as Rav Shimi of Neharde’a says: The surplus lambs that were consecrated for the daily offerings are allocated for communal gift offerings, and there is not a bird burnt-offering that is offered by the community.

ואף שמואל סבר להא דר' יוחנן דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל קרבנות צבור סכין מושכתן למה שהן The Gemara notes: And also Shmuel holds in accordance with this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who taught that Rabbi Shimon holds that lambs consecrated for the daily offering that were not used are brought as supplementary offerings, even though they were not originally consecrated for that purpose, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: With regard to communal offerings, their consecration serves only to define which general category of offering they are included in, e.g., whether they are a sin-offering or burnt-offering, but it is the purpose for which they are ultimately slaughtered with a knife that defines what their precise nature is.

תניא נמי הכי ומודה ר"ש בשעיר שאם לא קרב ברגל יקרב בר"ה ואם לא קרב בר"ח יקרב ביוה"כ ואם לא קרב ביוה"כ יקרב ברגל ואם לא קרב ברגל זה יקרב ברגל אחר שמתחלתו לא בא אלא לכפר על מזבח החיצון The Gemara notes: This is also taught in a baraita with regard to sin-offerings: And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to a goat consecrated to be used as part of the additional offerings on the pilgrimage Festivals that if it was not sacrificed on a pilgrimage Festival it can be sacrificed on a New Moon, and if was not sacrificed on a New Moon it can be sacrificed on Yom Kippur, and if it was not sacrificed on Yom Kippur it can be sacrificed on a pilgrimage Festival, and if was not sacrificed on this pilgrimage Festival, it can be sacrificed on another pilgrimage Festival. This is because from the outset, by virtue of its consecration, it came only to atone by having its blood presented upon the external altar, but its precise nature is defined only by the purpose for which it is ultimately slaughtered.

(תנא לא הוקדש אלא לכפר על מזבח החיצון): Another baraita teaches the same ruling: It is taught: The sin-offering was consecrated only to atone by having its blood presented upon the external altar.

"ועל זדון טומאת מקדש וקדשיו שעיר הנעשה בפנים כו'" מנהני מילי § The mishna teaches: And for cases in which the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods was carried out intentionally, the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur, and Yom Kippur itself, atone. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived?

דת"ר (ויקרא טז, טז) וכפר על הקדש מטומאות בני ישראל וגו' פשעים אלו המרדים וכן הוא אומר (מלכים ב ג, ז) מלך מואב פשע בי ואומר (מלכים ב ח, כב) אז תפשע לבנה בעת ההיא חטאות אלו השגגות וכן הוא אומר (ויקרא ד, ב) נפש כי תחטא בשגגה: The Gemara answers: They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the High Priest sacrificing the internal goat of Yom Kippur: “And he shall effect atonement upon the Sanctuary from the impurities of the children of Israel and from their acts of rebellion, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:16). The verse is referring to two categories of sin. The first category is acts of rebellion [pesha’im]; these are the rebellious sins, and so the verse states that King Jehoram of Israel said to King Jehoshaphat of Judah: “The king of Moab rebelled [pasha] against me” (II Kings 3:7). And the verse states with regard to a rebellion against Judah: “Then Libnah rebelled [tifsha] at that time” (II Kings 8:22). The second category is sins [ḥataot]; these are unwitting sins, and so the verse states: “If an individual person shall transgress [teḥeta] unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:2).

"על שאר עבירות שבתורה הקלות והחמורות הזדונות והשגגות כו'" § The mishna teaches: For all other transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether they are the minor ones or the major ones, whether they were intentional or unwitting, whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them until after Yom Kippur, whether they involve a positive mitzva or a prohibition, whether the transgressors are subject to excision from the World-to-Come [karet], or to one of the court-imposed death penalties, the scapegoat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur atones.

היינו קלות היינו עשה ולא תעשה חמורות היינו כריתות ומיתות ב"ד הודע היינו מזיד לא הודע היינו שוגג The Gemara notes that the mishna appears repetitious: Minor ones are the same as a standard positive mitzva and prohibition, major ones are the same as transgressions that are subject to karet and to court-imposed death penalties, transgressions that one became aware of are the same as intentional transgressions, and transgressions that one did not become aware of are the same as unwitting transgressions.

אמר רב יהודה ה"ק על שאר עבירות שבתורה בין קלות בין חמורות בין שעשאן בשוגג בין שעשאן במזיד אותן שעשאן בשוגג בין נודע לו ספיקן בין לא נודע לו ספיקן ואלו הן קלות עשה ולא תעשה ואלו הן חמורות כריתות ומיתות ב"ד Rav Yehuda said that this is what the mishna is saying: For all other transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether they are the minor ones or the major ones, whether they were performed unwittingly or whether they were performed intentionally, they each have their own halakhot. For those that were performed unwittingly, in cases where there was an uncertainty whether the act was forbidden at all, atonement is effected whether the uncertainty with regard to the transgressions became known to him before Yom Kippur or whether the uncertainty with regard to them did not become known to him until after Yom Kippur. And these are the minor ones the mishna is referring to: A standard positive mitzva and a prohibition. And these are the major ones it is referring to: Transgressions that are subject to karet and to court-imposed death penalties.

האי עשה ה"ד אי דלא עבד תשובה (משלי כא, כז) זבח רשעים תועבה אי דעבד תשובה כל יומא נמי דתניא עבר על מצות עשה ועשה תשובה לא זז משם עד שמוחלין לו The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this positive mitzva in the mishna? If it is a case where he did not repent, the offering cannot atone for him, as the verse states: “The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination” (Proverbs 21:27). If he did repent, then why is the mishna referring to Yom Kippur? He will achieve atonement on any other day as well, as it is taught in a baraita: If one transgressed a positive mitzva and repented, he does not move from there until he is forgiven.

אמר רבי זירא Rabbi Zeira said:

Daf 13a

בעומד במרדו ורבי היא דתניא רבי אומר על כל עבירות שבתורה בין עשה תשובה בין לא עשה תשובה יום הכפורים מכפר חוץ מפורק עול ומגלה פנים בתורה ומפר ברית בבשר שאם עשה תשובה יום הכפורים מכפר ואם לאו אין יום הכפורים מכפר The mishna is referring to a case where the person did not repent and persists in his rebellion, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that even for such a case Yom Kippur and the scapegoat will atone. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For all transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether one repented, or whether one did not repent, Yom Kippur atones, except for one who divests himself of the yoke of Heaven, by denying God’s existence, and one who reveals facets of the Torah that differ from its true meaning, and one who nullifies the covenant of circumcision of the flesh. For these, if one repented, Yom Kippur atones, and if not, Yom Kippur does not atone.

מאי טעמא דרבי דתניא (במדבר טו, לא) כי דבר ה' בזה זה הפורק עול ומגלה פנים בתורה ואת מצותו הפר זה המפר ברית בבשר (במדבר טו, לא) הכרת תכרת הכרת לפני יוה"כ תכרת לאחר יוה"כ The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is as it is taught in a baraita in interpretation of the verse: “For he scorned the word of the Lord and nullified His commandment; that person will be cut off [hikkaret tikkaret], his sin is upon him” (Numbers 15:31): “For he scorned the word of the Lord”; this is referring to one who divests himself of the yoke of Heaven and one who reveals facets of the Torah that differ from its true meaning. “And nullified His commandment”; this is referring to one who nullified the covenant of circumcision of the flesh. The use of the double verb form hikkaret tikkaret teaches that he will be cut off, i.e., he is liable to receive karet, before Yom Kippur, and he will still be cut off after Yom Kippur, as Yom Kippur does not atone for him.

יכול אפילו עשה תשובה ת"ל (במדבר טו, לא) עונה בה לא אמרתי אלא בזמן שעונה בה One might have thought that this applies even if he repented. To counter this, the verse states: “His sin is upon him,” by which God indicates: I said that Yom Kippur does not atone for these sins only when his sin is still upon him, as he did not repent. It is apparent from this baraita that it is only for the three sins mentioned that Yom Kippur does not atone without repentance, but Yom Kippur atones for other sins even if one did not repent.

ורבנן הכרת בעולם הזה תכרת לעולם הבא עונה בה שאם עשה תשובה ומת מיתה ממרקת And with regard to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, how do they interpret the verse? If someone commits one of the three sins mentioned, then he is cut off [hikkaret] from life in this world, and he will be cut off [tikkaret] in the World-to-Come. The phrase “His sin is upon him” teaches that if he repented and died, his death cleanses him of his sin.

ומי מצית מוקמת לה כרבי והא מדסיפא רבי יהודה היא רישא נמי ר' יהודה היא דקתני סיפא אחד ישראל ואחד כהנים ואחד כהן משוח ומאן אית ליה האי סברא רבי יהודה מכלל דרישא ר' יהודה The Gemara asks: And can you interpret the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? But from the fact that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, by inference, the first clause is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but not of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as the latter clause of the mishna teaches: Israelites and priests and the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, all equally achieve atonement from the scapegoat. And who accepts this reasoning? Rabbi Yehuda, as the Gemara will demonstrate. By inference, the first clause is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, not of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

אמר רב יוסף רבי היא וסבר לה כר' יהודה Rav Yosef said: It is possible that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and the latter clause does not pose a difficulty, because with regard to whether priests achieve atonement through the scapegoat, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

א"ל אביי דוקא קאמר מר רבי סבר לה כר' יהודה אבל רבי יהודה לא סבר לה כרבי או דלמא מדרבי סבר לה כרבי יהודה אף רבי יהודה סבר לה נמי כרבי מיהו אורחא דמילתא קתני למימר דתלמיד סבר לה כרביה Abaye said to him: Does the Master mean specifically what he is saying, i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to whether the scapegoat atones for both Israelites and priest, but Rabbi Yehuda does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi with regard to atonement for one who did not repent? Or perhaps from the fact that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it follows that Rabbi Yehuda also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but the reason that Rav Yosef did not make this clear is that he teaches the matter in the manner in which it typically occurs, which is to say that a disciple, in this case, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds in accordance with the opinion of his teacher, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda.

א"ל אין דוקא קאמינא רבי סבר לה כרבי יהודה אבל ר' יהודה לא סבר לה כרבי Rav Yosef said to him: Yes, I mean specifically what I was saying: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but Rabbi Yehuda does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

דתניא יכול יהא יוה"כ מכפר על שבים ועל שאינן שבים ודין הוא הואיל וחטאת ואשם מכפרין ויום הכפורים מכפר מה חטאת ואשם אין מכפרין אלא על השבים אף יוה"כ אין מכפר אלא על השבים מה לחטאת ואשם שאין מכפרין על המזיד כשוגג תאמר ליוה"כ שמכפר על המזיד כשוגג As it is taught in a baraita recorded in the Sifra: One might have thought that Yom Kippur would atone for those who repent and for those who do not repent, and this assertion is supported by the following logical inference: Although it would appear that since a sin-offering and a guilt-offering atone and Yom Kippur atones, it should follow that just as a sin-offering and a guilt-offering atone only for those who repent, so too, Yom Kippur atones only for those who repent, this comparison is flawed. One can claim: What is notable about a sin-offering and a guilt-offering? They are notable in that they do not atone for intentional sins like they do for unwitting sins. Can you say the same about Yom Kippur, which does atone for intentional sins as it does for unwitting sins?

הואיל ומכפר על המזיד כשוגג יכפר על שבים ועל שאינן שבים תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כג, כז) אך חלק The baraita continues: Since it is the case that the atonement of Yom Kippur is more far-reaching in that it atones for intentional sins as it does for unwitting sins, it follows that it should atone both for those who repent and for those who do not repent. To counter this, the verse states: “Yet on the tenth day of this seventh month it is Yom Kippur” (Leviticus 23:27). The word “yet” serves to divide and limit the atonement of Yom Kippur in that it atones only for those who repent.

סתם סיפרא מני ר' יהודה וקאמר שבים אין לא שבים לא Rav Yosef attributes the baraita to Rabbi Yehuda: Whose opinion is expressed by the unattributed baraitot in the Sifra? Rabbi Yehuda. And he says: For those who repent, yes, Yom Kippur atones, but for those who do not repent, Yom Kippur does not atone.

ורמי סתם סיפרא אסתם סיפרא דתניא יכול לא יהא יוה"כ מכפר אא"כ התענה בו וקראו מקרא קדש ולא עשה בו מלאכה לא התענה בו ולא קראו מקרא קדש ועשה בו מלאכה מנין ת"ל (ויקרא כג, כח) יום כפורים הוא מ"מ The Gemara asks: But raise a contradiction, setting one unattributed baraita in the Sifra, i.e., the one just cited, against another unattributed baraita in the Sifra, as in another baraita there it is taught: One might have thought that Yom Kippur would atone only if one fasted on it and declared it a holy convocation and did not perform labor on it. From where is it derived that even if one did not fast on it and did not declare it a holy convocation and performed labor on it, that it still atones? The verse states: “Yet on the tenth day of this seventh month it is Yom Kippur” (Leviticus 23:27). The additional emphasis on “it is” serves to teach that the day atones in any case. This baraita contradicts the one cited above that states clearly that Yom Kippur atones only for those who repent.

אמר אביי לא קשיא הא רבי והא רבי יהודה Abaye said: This is not difficult: This second baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and that first baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

רבא אמר הא והא רבי ומודה רבי בכרת דיומא דאי לא תימא הכי כרת דיום הכפורים לרבי לית ליה Rava said: Both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that Yom Kippur atones for those who do not repent, but even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that with regard to avoiding the punishment of karet incurred for violating the day of Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur atones and one is not liable to be punished with karet only if one repented for the sin of violating the day of Yom Kippur. Perforce he must concede this point, as if you do not say so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, there would be no instance in which one would be liable to be punished with karet for violating Yom Kippur.

אלמה לא משכחת לה כגון דעבד בליליא ומית דלא אתא יממא לכפורי ליה The Gemara questions this proof: Why not? You could find it in a case where he performed labor on the night of Yom Kippur and died that night, as in such a case, the daytime of Yom Kippur, which is the part of Yom Kippur that effects atonement, never came to atone for him.

אלא אימא Rather, say that Rava’s proof is as follows:

Daf 13b

כרת דיממא לרבי לית ליה It must be that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that Yom Kippur does not atone for one who violates the day itself and does not repent, as if you do not say so, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, there would be no instance in which a person would be liable to receive karet for violating Yom Kippur in the daytime.

אלמה לא משכחת לה דאכל אומצא וחנקיה ומית אי נמי דאכל סמוך לשקיעת החמה דלא הוה שהות לכפורי ליה: The Gemara questions this proof: Why not? You could find it in a case where he ate a piece of meat, and while he was eating it choked him and he died, or in a case where he ate immediately before sunset at the end of the day. Even if one holds that Yom Kippur does atone for violations of the day itself, in these cases it could not, as there was no time after the violation for the day to atone for him, in the first case because he was already dead, and in the second case because it was no longer Yom Kippur.

אחד ישראל ואחד כהנים ואחד כהן משוח: § The mishna (2b) states: Israelites and priests and the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, equally achieve atone-ment. What is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed priest? The difference is only that the priests achieve atonement for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods through the bull that the High Priest offers on Yom Kippur, whereas the Israelites achieve atonement for their transgressions through the goats that are sacrificed on Yom Kippur.

הא גופא קשיא קתני אחד ישראל ואחד כהנים ואחד כהן משוח והדר תני מה בין ישראל לכהנים ולכהן משוח אמר רב יהודה הכי קאמר אחד ישראל ואחד כהנים ואחד כהן משוח מתכפרין בשעיר המשתלח בשאר עבירות ואין חילוק ביניהן ומה בין ישראל לכהנים ולכהן משוח אלא שהפר מכפר על הכהנים על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו וכו' The Gemara asks: This mishna itself is difficult, as it teaches: Both Israelites and priests and the anointed priest equally achieve atonement. But then it teaches: What is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed priest? Rav Yehuda said that this is what the mishna is saying: Both Israelites and priests and the anointed priest equally achieve atonement through the scapegoat for transgressions other than the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and in this regard there is no distinction between them. But what is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed priest? The difference is only that the bull of the High Priest that he offers on Yom Kippur atones for the priests for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, whereas the Israelites achieve atonement for their transgressions through the goats that are sacrificed on Yom Kippur.

ומני רבי יהודה היא דתניא (ויקרא טז, לג) וכפר את מקדש הקדש זה לפני ולפנים את אהל מועד זה היכל מזבח כמשמעו יכפר אלו עזרות כהנים כמשמעו עם הקהל אלו ישראל יכפר אלו הלוים And whose opinion is expressed by the mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita in exposition of the verse: “He shall bring atonement upon the sanctum of the sacred, and he shall effect atonement upon the Tent of Meeting and the altar, and upon the priests and upon all the people of the congregation shall he bring atonement” (Leviticus 16:33): “He shall bring atonement upon the sanctum of the sacred”; this is referring to the innermost sanctum, i.e., the Holy of Holies. “Upon the Tent of Meeting”; this is referring to the Sanctuary. “And the altar”; this is understood in accordance with its plain meaning. “He shall effect atonement”; this is referring to the Temple courtyards. “And upon the priests”; this is understood in accordance with its plain meaning. “And upon all the people”; these are the Israelites. “Shall he bring atonement”; this is referring to the Levites.

הושוו כולן לכפרה אחת שמתכפרין בשעיר המשתלח בשאר עבירות דברי ר' יהודה All of them are equated with regard to the fact that they are all atoned for through one atonement, i.e., that they are atoned for by the scapegoat for all transgressions other than the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

רבי שמעון אומר כשם שדם שעיר הנעשה בפנים מכפר על ישראל על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו כך דם הפר מכפר על הכהנים על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו וכשם שוידויו של שעיר המשתלח מכפר על ישראל בשאר עבירות כך וידויו של פר מכפר על הכהנים בשאר עבירות The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon says: Just as the blood of the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary atones for Israelites for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, so too, the blood of the bull of the High Priest, whose blood presentation is also performed inside the Sanctuary, atones for the priests for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. And just as the confession made over the scapegoat atones for Israelites for other transgressions, so too, the confession made over the bull atones for the priests for other transgressions. It is apparent from the baraita that it is only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that the scapegoat atones for both Israelites and priests.

ולרבי שמעון הא ודאי הושוו מאי הושוו דבני כפרה נינהו מיהו כל חד וחד מכפר בדנפשיה The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: And according to Rabbi Shimon, one can ask: Weren’t both Israelites and priests certainly equated in the verse in Leviticus? The Gemara explains: According to his opinion, in what way are they equated in the verse? They are equated in that they are all subject to atonement on Yom Kippur; but each one of the groups achieves atonement in its own way.

מאי טעמיה דרבי שמעון דכתיב (ויקרא טז, ז) ולקח את שני השעירים איתקש שעיר המשתלח לשעיר הנעשה בפנים מה שעיר הנעשה בפנים אינו מכפר על הכהנים על טומאת מקדש וקדשיו דכתיב ביה אשר לעם אף שעיר המשתלח אינו מכפר על הכהנים בשאר עבירות The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that priests are not atoned for by the scapegoat? As it is written: “He shall take the two goats” (Leviticus 16:7); one is used for the scapegoat and the other for the internal goat. With this verse, the scapegoat is juxtaposed with the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary. It teaches that just as the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside does not atone for the priests for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, as it is written with regard to that goat: “The goat sin-offering of the people” (Leviticus 16:15), which indicates that it atones for Israelites and not for the priests, so too, the scapegoat does not atone for the priests for their other transgressions.

ורבי יהודה אמר לך להכי איתקוש שיהו שוים במראה ובקומה ובדמים הוא דאתא And as for Rabbi Yehuda, how does he understand the juxtaposition? He could have said to you: It is only for this reason that the goats are juxtaposed: The juxtaposition comes to teach that they should be similar in appearance and in height and in value. They are not similar in the atonement that they effect.

מאן תנא להא דתנו רבנן ושחט את שעיר החטאת אשר לעם שאין הכהנים מתכפרין בו ובמה מתכפרין בפרו של אהרן The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that which the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the internal goat: “He shall slaughter the goat sin-offering of the people” (Leviticus 16:15); the term “of the people” excludes Aaron and the priests, and therefore indicates that the priests do not achieve atonement through that goat. But then, through what do they achieve atonement? Presumably, through the bull of Aaron, i.e., the bull of the High Priest.

יכול לא יתכפרו בפרו של אהרן שהרי כבר נאמר אשר לו מעתה אין להן כפרה כשהוא אומר יכפר על הכהנים מצינו להן כפרה One might have thought that they would also not achieve atonement through the bull of Aaron, as it is already stated: “Aaron shall bring near his own bull sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:6), which indicates that it atones only for Aaron’s transgressions, not for the transgressions of others. And if that is so, then they do not have any means through which to achieve atonement. But when the verse states: “And he shall effect atonement…upon the priests” (Leviticus 16:33), we have clearly found that they do have a means of achieving atonement.

במה הן מתכפרין מוטב שיתכפרו בפרו של אהרן שהרי הותר מכללו אצל ביתו ואל יתכפרו בשעיר הנעשה בפנים שלא הותר מכללו אצל ביתו The baraita continues: Through which means then do they achieve atonement? Do they achieve it through the internal goat or the bull of Aaron? It is better to say that they achieve atonement through the bull of Aaron, as in any event, with regard to his household, an exception was made to its rule that it atones only for Aaron, and his household also achieves atonement from his bull. It is therefore not unreasonable to say that the priesthood should also achieve atonement from his bull. And one should not say that they achieve atonement through the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, as it is not found with regard to Aaron’s household that an exception was made to its rule that it atones for the people, as his household does not achieve atonement from the scapegoat.

ואם נפשך לומר הרי הוא אומר (תהלים קלה, יט) בית אהרן ברכו את ה' בית הלוי ברכו את ה' יראי ה' ברכו את ה' And if it is your wish to say that this reasoning can be refuted, one can cite another proof, as the verse states: “House of Israel, bless the Lord; house of Aaron, bless the Lord; house of Levi, bless the Lord; those who fear the Lord, bless the Lord” (Psalms 135:19–20). It is apparent from this verse that “house of Aaron” is referring to all priests and not just to Aaron’s immediate household, and so it is reasonable that Aaron’s bull should atone for them.

מאן תנא אמר ר' ירמיה דלא כר' יהודה דאי ר' יהודה האמר כהנים יש להן כפרה בשעיר המשתלח ומני רבא אמר ר' שמעון היא דאמר כהנים אין להם כפרה בשעיר המשתלח The Gemara repeats its question about this baraita: Who is the tanna who taught this baraita? Rabbi Yirmeya says: It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as, if one suggests that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, one can counter: Doesn’t he say that the priests have a means of atonement through the scapegoat, whereas the baraita indicates that they do not, as it states that if they do not achieve atonement through the bull of Aaron, then they do not have any means through which to achieve atonement? But then, whose opinion is expressed? Rava says: It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that the priests do not have a means of achieving atonement through the scapegoat.

אביי אמר אפי' תימא ר' יהודה הכי קאמר מעתה אין להם כפרה בטומאת מקדש וקדשיו כשהוא אומר יכפר על הכהנים מצינו שיש להן כפרה בשאר עבירות וכמו דמצינו שיש להן כפרה בשאר עבירות כך יש להן כפרה Abaye said: You may even say that the baraita is accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and this is what it is saying: If that is so, that the priests do not achieve atonement through the bull of Aaron, then they do not have any means through which to achieve atonement for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. When the verse states: “And he shall effect atonement…upon the priests,” we have clearly found that they do have a means of atonement for other transgressions. And it follows that just as we have found that they have a means of atonement for other transgressions, as Israelites do, so too, they must also have a means of atonement

Daf 14a

בטומאת מקדש וקדשיו במה הם מתכפרין מוטב שיתכפרו בפרו של אהרן שהרי הותר מכללו אצל ביתו ואל יתכפרו בשעיר הנעשה בפנים שהרי לא הותר מכללו for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. Through which means, then, do they achieve atonement for this? Is it through the internal goat or the bull of Aaron? It is better to say that they achieve atonement through the bull of Aaron, as in any event with regard to his household an exception was made to its rule that it atones only for Aaron. And one should not say that they achieve atonement through the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, as it is not found that with regard to Aaron’s household an exception was made to its rule.

ואם נפשך לומר הרי הוא אומר (תהלים קלה, יט) בית אהרן ברכו את ה' וגו' And if it is your wish to say that this reasoning can be refuted, one can bring another proof, as it states: “House of Aaron, bless the Lord,” which is referring to all priests and not just to Aaron’s immediate household, and so it is reasonable that Aaron’s bull should atone for them.

ומאי אם נפשך לומר וכ"ת ביתו כתיב כולן קרויין ביתו שנא' בית אהרן ברכו את ה' יראי ה' ברכו את ה' The Gemara clarifies the last part of the baraita: And what possible refutation is the baraita referring to when it says: If it is your wish to say that this reasoning can be refuted? The Gemara explains: And if you would say of the preceding proof that it is incorrect to suggest that all priests achieve atonement from the bull of Aaron, as with regard to it the term: “His household” (Leviticus 16:6), is written, which suggests that it atones only for his immediate family, then this can be refuted, as all of the priests are collectively referred to as his household, as is evident from that which is stated: “House of Aaron, bless the Lord; house of Levi, bless the Lord, those who fear the Lord, bless the Lord.”

והאי אשר לעם להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה דקאמר רחמנא מדעם ליהוי ההוא (ויקרא טז, ה) מומאת עדת בני ישראל נפקא The Gemara questions some of the expositions of the baraita: And with regard to this phrase: “Goat of the people” (Leviticus 16:15), does it come to teach that which the baraita teaches, i.e., that the priests do not achieve atonement through it? But that phrase is necessary to teach that the Merciful One states that the goat must be purchased with funds collected from the people. The Gemara refutes this: That requirement is derived from the verse: “And from the assembly of the children of Israel he shall take two goats” (Leviticus 16:5).

והאי אשר לו להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא משלו הוא מביא ואינו מביא משל צבור The Gemara asks further: And with regard to this phrase: “His own bull sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:6), does it come to teach that which the baraita teaches, i.e., that it atones only for Aaron’s transgressions, not for the transgressions of others? But that phrase is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The High Priest brings, i.e., purchases, the bull from his own funds, but he does not bring it from funds collected from the public.

יכול לא יביא משל צבור שאין הצבור מתכפרין בו אבל יביא משל אחיו הכהנים שאחיו הכהנים מתכפרין בו ת"ל (ויקרא טז, ו) אשר לו יכול לא יביא ואם הביא כשר ת"ל שוב אשר לו הכתוב שנה עליו לעכב One might have thought that he does not bring it from funds collected from the public because the public does not achieve atonement through it, but he may bring it from funds belonging to his brethren the priests because his brethren the priests achieve atonement through it. To counter this, the verse states: “His own bull sin-offering,” to indicate that he must purchase it using only his own funds. One might have thought that he should not bring it from others’ funds, but nevertheless, if he did it would still be valid. To counter this, the verse again states “his own.” The verse repeats the phrase to render the requirement essential.

תנא הכי קא קשיא ליה מאי שנא בדעם דלא מכפר דלא קא חסרי ביה ממונא דכתיב אשר לעם בדאהרן נמי לא קא חסרי ביה ממונא וקאמר כולן קרויין ביתו If both mentions of the phrase “his own” are necessary to teach about the ownership of the bull, how can the above baraita suggest that the phrase indicates that the bull atones only for the High Priest’s transgressions? The Gemara explains: This is what is difficult for the tanna of the baraita: What is different about the goat of the people that explains why it does not atone for the priests? The difference is that the priests did not forfeit any money over the purchase of it. Therefore, it does not atone for the priests, but only for the Israelites, as it is written with regard to the internal goat: “Of the people.” With regard to the bull of Aaron as well, the priests do not forfeit any money over the purchase of it, so it follows that they should not achieve atonement through it. And therefore, to explain why they do achieve atonement, the baraita states that all of the priests are collectively referred to as: His household.

בשלמא לר"ש היינו דכתיב תרי וידוין ודם הפר חד כנגד שעיר הנעשה בפנים וחד כנגד שעיר הנעשה בחוץ וחד כנגד שעיר המשתלח § The Gemara returns to its discussion of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the priests do not achieve atonement through the scapegoat, that is why it is written in the Torah that two confessions are to be recited over the bull and that the blood of the bull is to be presented inside the Sanctuary: Of these three forms of atonement, one corresponds to the atonement provided by the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, one corresponds to the atonement provided by the goat whose blood presentation is performed outside the Sanctuary, and one corresponds to the atonement provided by the scapegoat.

אלא לר' יהודה תרי וידוין ודם הפר ל"ל בחד וידוי ודמו סגיא But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the priests do achieve atonement through the scapegoat, why do I need the two confessions recited over the bull and the blood of the bull to be presented inside the Sanctuary? One confession over the bull and its blood being presented inside the Sanctuary would be sufficient.

אחד לו ואחד לביתו כדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל כך היא מדת הדין נוהגת מוטב יבוא זכאי ויכפר על החייב ואל יבוא חייב ויכפר על החייב: The Gemara answers: Two confessions are necessary, one for the High Priest himself, and one for his household, i.e., the priests, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The High Priest must first confess his own transgressions and only afterward those of the priests, because that is how the attribute of justice functions: It is better that the innocent come and atone for the guilty, than that the guilty come and atone for the guilty. When the High Priest confesses the transgressions of those in his house, it is better that he already be considered innocent, having confessed and been absolved of his own transgressions.

הדרן עלך שבועות שתים:

מתני׳ ידיעות הטומאה שתים שהן ארבע נטמא וידע ונעלמה ממנו הטומאה וזכור את הקדש MISHNA: With regard to cases of awareness of the defiling of the Temple by entering it while one is ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods by partaking of them while one is ritually impure, there are two types that are actually four. How so? If one became ritually impure and he was aware that he was impure, but afterward his impurity was hidden from him, though he remembered that he was partaking of sacrificial food, which is forbidden to one who is in a state of ritual impurity; this is one of the four types of awareness of impurity.

נעלם ממנו הקדש וזכור את הטומאה נעלמו ממנו זה וזה ואכל את הקדש ולא ידע ומשאכל ידע הרי זה בעולה ויורד If the fact that he was partaking of sacrificial food was hidden from him, though he remembered the ritual impurity that he had contracted; this is the second of the four types of awareness of impurity. And the same halakha applies if both this and that were hidden from him, both the fact that he was impure and the fact that he was partaking of sacrificial food. In all these cases, if he partook of the sacrificial food and was unaware either that he was impure, or that the food was sacrificial food, or both, and after he partook of it he became aware of that which he had forgotten, he is required to bring a sliding-scale offering. In this type of offering, the sinner sacrifices an animal, bird, or meal-offering, depending on his financial status.

נטמא וידע ונעלמה ממנו טומאה וזכור את המקדש נעלם ממנו מקדש וזכור את הטומאה נעלם ממנו זה וזה ונכנס למקדש ולא ידע ומשיצא ידע הרי זה בעולה ויורד: And similarly with regard to entering the Temple: If one became ritually impure and he was aware that he was impure, but afterward his impurity was hidden from him, though he remembered that he was entering the Temple, which is prohibited for one who is in a state of ritual impurity; this is the third of the four types of awareness of impurity. If the fact that he was entering the Temple was hidden from him, though he remembered the ritual impurity that he had contracted; this is the fourth type of awareness of impurity. And the same halakha applies if both this and that were hidden from him, both the fact that he was impure and the fact that he was entering the Temple. In all these cases, if he entered the Temple and was unaware either that he was impure, or that he was entering the Temple, or both, and after he left he became aware of what was hidden from him, he is required to bring a sliding-scale offering.

אחד הנכנס לעזרה ואחד הנכנס לתוספת העזרה שאין מוסיפין על העיר ועל העזרות אלא במלך ונביא ואורים ותומים וסנהדרין של שבעים ואחד ובשתי תודות ובשיר As for the boundaries of the Temple with regard to the halakhot of impurity, the same halakha applies to one who enters the area that was part of the original Temple courtyard and to one who enters the later addition to the Temple courtyard, because the additional section is sanctified with the full sanctity of the Temple courtyard. The mishna notes: As, additions can be made to the city of Jerusalem or to the Temple courtyards only by a special body comprising the king, a prophet, the Urim VeTummim, and the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges, and with two thanks-offerings and with a special song. Once the addition to the courtyard is made by this body and this process, it is given the full sanctity of the original courtyard area.

ובית דין מהלכין ושתי תודות אחריהן וכל ישראל אחריהם The mishna provides certain details of the consecration ceremony. And the court would move forward, and two thanks-offerings would be brought after them, and all of the Jewish people would follow behind them.

Daf 14a

הדרן עלך שבועות שתים:

Daf 14b

הפנימית נאכלת והחיצונה נשרפת וכל שלא נעשית בכל אלו הנכנס לשם אין חייב עליה: When they would reach the end of the place that they desired to consecrate, the inner thanks-offering would be eaten and the outer one would be burned. The details of this ceremony will be described in the Gemara. And with regard to any addition to the Temple that was not made with all these ceremonial procedures, one who enters there while ritually impure is not liable to bring an offering if his entry was unwitting, nor to be punished with karet, excision from the World-to-Come, if his entry was intentional.

נטמא בעזרה ונעלמה ממנו טומאה וזכור את המקדש נעלם הימנו מקדש וזכור הטומאה נעלם ממנו זה וזה והשתחוה או ששהה בכדי השתחואה או בא לו בארוכה חייב בקצרה פטור The first part of the mishna discussed one who became ritually impure before entering the Temple. The mishna proceeds to consider a case involving one who was ritually pure when he entered the Temple but who became impure while in the Temple courtyard, and afterward, his impurity was hidden from him but he remembered that he was standing in the Temple, or the fact that he was standing in the Temple was hidden from him but he remembered his impurity, or both this fact and that fact were hidden from him. In all these cases, if he bowed down, or he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down even though he did not actually bow, or he went out by way of a longer route when he could have taken a shorter route, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. But if he left the Temple via the shortest way, he is exempt.

זו היא מצות עשה שבמקדש שאין חייבין עליה This mitzva that the ritually impure must be sent out of the Temple is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which, as is taught elsewhere in the Mishna (Horayot 8b), the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring an offering for an erroneous ruling. A communal bull sin-offering is brought because of the unwitting transgression of a prohibition involving an action by the Jewish people resulting from an erroneous halakhic decision handed down by the Sanhedrin. But if the Sanhedrin mistakenly ruled that one who became impure while in the Temple may leave by way of a longer route, they do not bring this offering, as it is brought only for an erroneous ruling on a matter that requires the bringing of a fixed sin-offering, and not a sliding-scale offering, for its unwitting violation.

ואיזו היא מצות עשה שבנדה שחייבין עליה היה משמש עם הטהורה ואמרה לו נטמאתי ופירש מיד חייב מפני שיציאתו הנאה לו כביאתו: And which is the positive mitzva with regard to a menstruating woman for which, as is taught in Horayot there, the Sanhedrin is liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling? If a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her and did not wait until his penis became flaccid, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman, because his withdrawal from her is as pleasant to him as his entry. If the Sanhedrin mistakenly ruled that one may withdraw immediately, they bring a bull offering for their erroneous ruling.

רבי אליעזר אומר השרץ ונעלם ממנו על העלם שרץ חייב ואינו חייב על העלם מקדש Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to the sliding-scale offering the verse states: “Or if a person touches any impure thing, whether it is the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal, and it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:2). A precise reading of this verse indicates that in a case where one has a lapse of awareness that he had contracted ritual impurity by touching a creeping animal, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for having defiled the Temple or the sacrificial food, but he is not liable to bring such an offering in a case where he has a lapse of awareness that he is entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food.

רבי עקיבא אומר ונעלם ממנו והוא טמא על העלם טומאה חייב ואינו חייב על העלם מקדש Similarly, Rabbi Akiva says: The verse states: “And it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2), thereby teaching that in a case when one has a lapse of awareness that he had contracted ritual impurity, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, but one is not liable to bring such an offering in a case when he has a lapse of awareness that he is entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food.

ר' ישמעאל אומר ונעלם ונעלם שתי פעמים לחייב על העלם טומאה ועל העלם מקדש: Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse states: “And it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:2), and it states: “And it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:3), twice, in order to render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering both in a case where one has a lapse of awareness that he had contracted ritual impurity and in a case where one has a lapse of awareness that he is entering the Temple.

גמ׳ אמר רב פפא לאביי שתים שהן ארבע שתים שהן שש הויין ידיעות הטומאה תחלה וסוף ידיעות הקודש תחלה וסוף ידיעות מקדש תחלה וסוף GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the halakhot concerning awareness of ritual impurity are two that are further subdivided into four. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Are these actually two states of awareness that are subdivided into four? As the mishna lists them, they seem to be two that are subdivided into six: Awareness of the impurity at the beginning and at the end, awareness of the sacrificial food at the beginning and at the end, and awareness of the Temple at the beginning and at the end.

ולטעמיך תמני הויין דהא איכא טומאה דקודש וטומאה דמקדש תחלה וסוף Abaye answered him: According to your reasoning, that you count all the various cases listed in the mishna, there are eight states of awareness, as there is also awareness of the impurity in connection with eating the sacrificial food, at the beginning and at the end, and awareness of the impurity in connection with entering the Temple, at the beginning and at the end. The mishna mentions awareness of the impurity both in the first clause, which discusses partaking of sacrificial food, and in the second clause, which discusses entering the Temple.

הא לא קשיא שם טומאה אחת היא מכל מקום שית הויין Rav Pappa refutes this: This is not difficult, as the status of ritual impurity carries one name in both cases: The person was aware that he had contracted ritual impurity and then it became hidden from him, and there is no reason to distinguish between impurity in connection with partaking of sacrificial food and impurity in connection with entering the Temple. Accordingly, Rav Pappa’s first question remains: In any case there are six states of awareness.

אמר רב פפא לעולם תמני הויין ארבעי קמייתא דלא מייתן ליה לידי קרבן לא קא חשיב ארבעה בתרייתא דמייתן ליה לידי קרבן קא חשיב Rav Pappa said in answer to his own question: Actually, there are eight states of awareness, two of the impurity in connection with partaking of sacrificial food, two of the impurity in connection with entering the Temple, two of awareness of the sacrificial food, and two of awareness of the Temple, each pair having one awareness at the beginning and one at the end. But the first four states of awareness at the beginning do not in themselves bring the unwitting transgressor to liability to bring an offering, as if he does not reach awareness at the end, he will not have known that he transgressed. Therefore, the tanna does not count them. But the tanna does count the last four states of awareness, which bring the unwitting transgressor to the liability to bring an offering.

ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב פפא לעולם תמני הויין וארבעי קמייתא דליתנהו בכל התורה כולה קא חשיב ארבעי בתרייתא דאיתנהו בכל התורה כולה לא קא חשיב And there are those who say that Rav Pappa said as follows: Actually, there are eight states of awareness, and it is the first four states of awareness at the beginning, which are not found in the entire Torah, that the tanna counts. In all the other instances where one is liable to bring an offering for an unwitting transgression, it is not necessary that there be any awareness at the beginning. Since this is a novel requirement, the tanna counts these states of awareness. But the tanna does not count the last four states of awareness at the end, which are found also in the entire Torah, as a standard sin-offering is brought when one is made aware after the fact that he had transgressed.

בעי רב פפא נעלמו ממנו הלכות טומאה מהו היכי דמי אילימא דלא ידע אי שרץ טמא אי צפרדע טמא זיל קרי בי רב הוא The amora’im try to define the awareness of the impurity mentioned in the mishna. Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If the halakhot of impurity became hidden from him, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring a sliding-scale offering in such a situation? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case under discussion? If we say that he did not know whether a creeping animal is impure or pure or whether a frog is impure or pure, this is a topic that you could go learn in a children’s school. As these matters are explicitly recorded in the Torah, they can never be considered hidden.

לעולם דידע בטומאת שרץ וכגון דנגע בכעדשה ולא ידע כעדשה אי מטמא אי לא מטמא מאי כיון דידע דמטמא שרץ בעולם ידיעה היא או דלמא כיון דכעדשה לא ידע אי מטמא אי לא מטמא העלמה היא תיקו Actually, Rav Pappa must have been asking about a case where he knew the essential halakha with regard to the ritual impurity of a creeping animal, and it is a case where he touched a portion of the animal that was of a lentil-bulk and he did not know the halakha concerning whether a portion that was of a lentil-bulk renders a person impure or does not render him impure. What is the halakha in such a case? The Gemara explains the two possibilities: Does one say that since he knows generally that a creeping animal renders a person impure, it is awareness? Or perhaps one says that since he does not know whether a portion that was of a lentil-bulk renders a person impure or does not render a person impure, it is considered hidden from him. The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רבי ירמיה בן בבל שעלה לארץ ישראל ונעלם ממנו מקום מקדש מהו Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma concerning the awareness of the Temple: If a Babylonian or a resident of another country ascended to Eretz Yisrael, and the site of the Temple was hidden from him, so that he unwittingly entered into the Temple in a state of ritual impurity, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring a sliding-scale offering to atone for his offense, or not?

אליבא דמאן אי אליבא דרבי עקיבא דבעי ידיעה בתחלה הא לא מחייב על העלם מקדש אי אליבא דרבי ישמעאל דמחייב על העלם מקדש הא לא בעי ידיעה בתחלה The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion was this dilemma raised? If it was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who requires that there be awareness at the beginning in order for one to become liable to bring an offering, that is difficult, as Rabbi Akiva does not deem one liable when he had a lapse of awareness that he was entering the Temple. And if the dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who deems one liable when he had a lapse of awareness that he was entering the Temple, that is difficult, as Rabbi Yishmael does not require that there be awareness at the beginning. According to both tanna’im, the dilemma is not relevant.

לא צריכא אליבא דרבי דבעי ידיעה בתחלה ומחייב על העלם מקדש ואמר ידיעת בית רבו שמה ידיעה מאי כיון דידע דאיכא מקדש בעולם ידיעה היא או דלמא כיון דמקומו לא ידע ליה העלמה היא תיקו: The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma only in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who requires awareness at the beginning and also deems one liable when he had a lapse of awareness that he was entering the Temple, and he also says that awareness that one gains in the house of his teacher is called awareness (see 5a). What is the halakha in such a case? The Gemara explains the two possibilities: Does one say that since he knows that there is a Temple someplace in the world, it is awareness? Or perhaps one says that since he does not know the precise location of the Temple, it is considered hidden from him. The Gemara comments: This dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אחד הנכנס לעזרה וכו': מנא הני מילי אמר רב שימי בר חייא דאמר קרא (שמות כה, ט) ככל אשר אני מראה אותך את תבנית המשכן ואת תבנית כל כליו § The mishna teaches: The same halakha applies to one who enters the area that was part of the original Temple courtyard and to one who enters the later addition to the Temple courtyard, as additions can be made to the city of Jerusalem or to the Temple courtyards only by a special body comprising the king, a prophet, the Urim VeTummim, and the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges, and with two thanks-offerings and with a special song. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya said: As the verse states: “According to all that I show you, the form of the Tabernacle, and the form of all its vessels,

Daf 15a

וכן תעשו לדורות and so shall you do” (Exodus 25:9). The final words: “And so shall you do,” are superfluous and serve to teach: As was done in the Tabernacle, so shall you do in future generations.

מתיב רבא כל הכלים שעשה משה משיחתן מקדשתן מכאן ואילך עבודתן מחנכתן ואמאי ונימא וכן תעשו לדורות Rava raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to all the sacred vessels that Moses fashioned, their anointment with oil consecrates them. From that point forward, in the generations after Moses, new vessels do not require anointment to be consecrated; rather, their use in the Temple service initiates them and renders them fit for use. Rava clarifies the objection: But why is this so? Let us say here as well that the phrase “and so shall you do” teaches that the same must be done in future generations.

שאני התם דאמר קרא (במדבר ז, א) וימשחם ויקדש אותם אותם במשיחה ולא לדורות במשיחה The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse states with regard to the Tabernacle and its vessels: “And he anointed them and consecrated them” (Numbers 7:1). This teaches that it is only “them,” the vessels fashioned by Moses, that are consecrated through anointment, but vessels fashioned in later generations are not consecrated through anointment.

אימא אותם במשיחה לדורות או במשיחה או בעבודה אמר רב פפא אמר קרא (במדבר ד, יב) אשר ישרתו בם בקדש תלאן הכתוב בשירות The Gemara asks: Why not say: “Them,” the vessels made by Moses, he consecrated specifically through anointment, but vessels made in future generations are consecrated either through anointment or through their initial service? Rav Pappa said: The verse states: “And they shall take all the service vessels, with which they will serve in the Sanctuary” (Numbers 4:12). The future tense “they will serve,” indicates that the verse is referring to future vessels, and the verse makes them dependent upon service, teaching that in future generations vessels will be consecrated through their initial service.

השתא דכתב רחמנא אשר ישרתו אותם למה לי אי לא כתב רחמנא אותם הוה אמינא הני הוא דבמשיחה לדורות במשיחה ובעבודה דהא כתב וכן תעשו מיעט רחמנא אותם אותם במשיחה ולא לדורות במשיחה: The Gemara asks: Now that the Merciful One has written “with which they will serve,” why do I need the restrictive term “them”? The Gemara answers: Had the Merciful One not written “them,” I would say that they, the vessels made by Moses, were consecrated through anointment alone, but vessels made in later generations must be consecrated both through anointment and through service, as the Torah wrote: “And so shall you do,” referring to future generations. Therefore, the Merciful One excluded future vessels from anointment by stating “them,” teaching that it is only them that were consecrated through anointment, but in later generations they are not consecrated through anointment.

ובשתי תודות: תנא שתי תודות שאמרו בלחמן ולא בבשרן מנהני מילי אמר רב חסדא דאמר קרא (נחמיה יב, לא) ואעמידה שתי תודות גדולות ותהלוכות לימין מעל לחומה § The mishna teaches: And with two thanks-offerings. A tanna taught in a baraita: And with regard to the two thanks-offerings that are mentioned here, the reference is to their loaves, but not to their flesh. An animal thanks-offering is accompanied by forty loaves of bread that are brought as a meal-offering. Ten loaves are leavened, and the remainder is comprised of ten each of three types of unleavened bread. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Ḥisda said: As the verse states with regard to the consecration of the wall of Jerusalem in the days of Ezra: “And I placed two large thanks-offerings, and we went in procession to the right upon the wall” (Nehemiah 12:31).

מאי גדולות אילימא ממין גדול ממש נימא פרים אלא גדולות במינן The Gemara clarifies the meaning of this verse: What is meant by “large”? If we say that the animals of the thanks-offering were literally from a large species, i.e., oxen, rather than from a small species, i.e., sheep, let the verse state that they were oxen. Rather, let us say that he took animals from among the largest and the finest quality of their species.

מי איכא חשיבותא קמי שמיא והתניא נאמר בעולת בהמה (ויקרא א, ט) אשה ריח ניחח בעולת העוף (ויקרא א, ט) אשה ריח ניחח במנחה (ויקרא ב, ב) אשה ריח ניחח מלמד שאחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שיכוין את לבו לאביו שבשמים The Gemara challenges this: Is the size of the offering of any importance before Heaven? But isn’t it taught in a mishna (Menaḥot 110a): It is stated with regard to an animal burnt-offering: “A fire offering, a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 1:9), and it is also stated with regard to a bird burnt-offering: “A fire offering, a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 1:17), and it is also stated with regard to a meal-offering: “A fire offering, a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 2:2). The same term is used in all three cases even though the three offerings are of different value. This teaches that one who brings a substantial sacrifice and one who brings a modest sacrifice have equal merit, and both offerings are accepted as having a pleasing aroma, provided that one directs his heart to his Father in Heaven.

אלא גדולה שבתודה ומאי ניהו חמץ דתנן התודה היתה באה מן חמש סאין ירושלמיו' שהן שש מדבריות שהן שתי איפות והאיפה שלש סאין עשרים עשרון עשרה לחמץ ועשרה למצה ובמצה שלשה מינין חלות רקיקין ורבוכה Rather, let us say that “large thanks-offerings” means the larger element in the thanks-offering loaves. And what is that? The leavened loaves, as we learned in a mishna (Menaḥot 76b): The meal part of the thanks-offering came from five Jerusalem se’a of flour, which are equivalent to six wilderness se’a. The se’a referred to in the Bible when the Jewish people were in the wilderness is smaller than the se’a used later in Jerusalem. This is equivalent to two ephahs, each ephah being three wilderness se’a. These two ephahs are twenty measures of a tenth of an ephah. Ten of these tenths were used to make leavened loaves and ten of these tenths were used to make unleavened loaves. And the unleavened loaves were of three types: Loaves of matza, wafers, and measures of flour mixed with water and oil. Accordingly, the leavened loaves were three times the size of the unleavened ones, and it was the leavened loaves that were used to consecrate additions to the city.

אמר רמי בר חמא אין העזרה מתקדשת אלא בשירי מנחה מאי טעמא כירושלים מה ירושלים דבר הנאכל בה מקדשה אף עזרה דבר הנאכל בה מקדשה Rami bar Ḥama says: One can infer from this baraita that the Temple courtyard is consecrated only with the remainder of the meal-offering, and not by the loaves of a thanks-offering. The remainder of the meal-offering is the part left over after a handful of it and its frankincense have been sacrificed on the altar; this remainder is eaten by a priest. What is the reason for this? The consecration of the Temple courtyard is like the consecration of Jerusalem. Just as with regard to Jerusalem, an item that is eaten specifically in it, i.e., the loaves of a thanks-offering, which are eaten anywhere in the city, consecrates the city, so too, with regard to the Temple courtyard, an item that is eaten specifically in it, i.e., the remainder of the meal-offering, consecrates the courtyard.

אטו לחמי תודה בעזרה מי לא מתאכלי אלא כירושלים מה ירושלים דבר הנאכל בה ויוצא ממנה נפסל אף עזרה דבר הנאכל בה והיוצא ממנה נפסל The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the loaves of a thanks-offering are not eaten in the Temple courtyard? Rather, the comparison should be drawn as follows: The consecration of the Temple courtyard is like the consecration of Jerusalem. Just as Jerusalem is consecrated with the loaves of a thanks-offering, which is an item that is eaten inside the city, and which, if it emerges from there, is disqualified, so too, the Temple courtyard is consecrated with an item that is eaten inside the courtyard, and which, if it emerges from there, is disqualified. This item is the remainder of a meal-offering, which can be eaten only by a priest and only in the Temple courtyard.

אי מה להלן חמץ אף כאן חמץ ותסברא מנחת חמץ מי איכא The Gemara asks: If the consecration of the Temple courtyard is derived from the consecration of Jerusalem, let us say as follows: Just as there, with regard to the consecration of an addition made to Jerusalem, the loaves used in the ceremony are leavened, so too here, with regard to the consecration of an addition made to the Temple courtyard, the remainder of the meal-offering should be leavened. The Gemara expresses surprise at this suggestion: And how can you understand this? Is there a leavened meal-offering? A meal-offering is always unleavened.

Daf 15b

וכי תימא דמחמיץ להו לשירים ומקדש בהו והכתיב (ויקרא ו, י) לא תאפה חמץ חלקם ואמר ריש לקיש אפילו חלקם לא תאפה חמץ And if you would say that one leavens the remainder of the meal-offering, which the priests partake of, and he consecrates the Temple courtyard with it, that too is difficult, as isn’t it written: “It shall not be baked leavened, for their portion I have given it to them” (Leviticus 6:10)? And Reish Lakish says in explanation of this verse: Even the priests’ portion shall not be baked leavened, as it is prohibited to bake even a portion of the meal-offering leavened.

אלמה לא אפשר דמקדש בשתי הלחם בעצרת משום דלא אפשר The Gemara asks: Still, why not consecrate the Temple courtyard with a leavened meal-offering? It is possible to consecrate it with the two loaves of bread that are brought as a communal offering on the festival of Shavuot, which is a meal-offering that is leavened. The Gemara answers: Because actually it is not possible to do so.

היכי ניעביד נבנייה מאתמול וניקדשיה מאתמול שתי הלחם בשחיטת כבשים הוא דקדשי The Gemara explains why not. How could we do it? If we build the addition to the Temple courtyard on the eve of Shavuot and also consecrate it on the eve of the Festival, there is a difficulty, as the two loaves become consecrated as a meal-offering with the slaughter of the two lambs that are sacrificed together with them as peace-offerings, and this occurs on the Festival itself, not on the eve of the Festival.

נבנייה מאתמול וניקדשיה האידנא בעינן קידוש בשעת הבנין If we build the addition to the Temple courtyard on the eve of the Shavuot festival, but consecrate it only now, on the Festival, this too is difficult, as we require consecration at the time of the completion of the building.

נבנייה ביום טוב ונקדשיה ביום טוב אין בנין מקדש דוחה יום טוב If we build it on the Festival and consecrate it on the Festival, this also cannot be, as the building of the Temple does not override the Festival.

נשבקה לבתר הכי ונבנייה וניקדשיה איפסילא ליה בלינה If we leave the two loaves until after the Festival and build the addition to the Temple courtyard on the day after the Festival, and consecrate it by eating the two loaves on that day, this is difficult as well, as the two loaves were already disqualified by virtue of being left overnight after the Festival.

נבנייה ממעלי יומא ונשייר ביה פורתא דעד דקדיש יומא לאלתר נגמריה וניקדשיה אין בנין בית המקדש בלילה דאמר אביי מנין שאין בנין בית המקדש בלילה שנאמר (במדבר ט, טו) וביום הקים את המשכן ביום מקימו בלילה אין מקימו הלכך לא אפשר: If we build the addition to the Temple courtyard on the eve of the Festival and leave a little unbuilt until after the Festival, and as soon as the day is over and the Festival is finished, we immediately finish building the addition and consecrate it with the two loaves before they become disqualified, this too is impossible, as the building of the Temple cannot take place at night. This is as Abaye says: From where is it derived that the building of the Temple cannot take place at night? As it is stated: “And on the day that the Tabernacle was erected” (Numbers 9:15), from which it can be derived: One may erect it during the day, but one may not erect it at night. Therefore, it is impossible to consecrate the Temple courtyard with the two loaves; it must be done with the remainder of an unleavened meal-offering.

ובשיר: ת"ר שיר של תודה בכנורות ובנבלים ובצלצלים על כל פינה ופינה ועל כל אבן גדולה שבירושלים ואומר (תהלים ל, ב) ארוממך ה' כי דליתני וגו' ושיר של פגעים ויש אומרין שיר של נגעים § The mishna teaches concerning the consecration of an addition to the city of Jerusalem or the Temple courtyard: And with a song. The Sages taught in a baraita: They sang the song of thanksgiving, i.e., Psalms, chapter 100, which begins: “A psalm of thanksgiving,” accompanied by harps, lyres, and cymbals, at every corner and upon every large stone in Jerusalem. And they also recited Psalms, chapter 30, which begins: “I will extol You, O Lord, for You have lifted me up,” and the song of evil spirits, i.e., Psalms, chapter 91, which begins: “He that dwells in the secret place of the Most High.” And some say that this psalm is called the song of plagues.

מאן דאמר דנגעים דכתיב (תהלים צא, י) ונגע לא יקרב באהלך ומאן דאמר פגעים דכתיב (תהלים צא, ז) יפול מצדך אלף The reason of the one who says that it is called the song of plagues is that it is written: “Nor shall any plague come near your dwelling” (Psalms 91:10). And the reason of the one who says that it is called the song of evil spirits is that it is written: “A thousand shall fall at your side and ten thousand at your right hand; but it shall not come near you” (Psalms 91:7).

ואומר (תהלים צא, א) יושב בסתר עליון בצל שדי יתלונן עד (תהלים צא, ט) כי אתה ה' מחסי עליון שמת מעונך וחוזר ואומר (תהלים ג, א) מזמור לדוד בברחו מפני אבשלום בנו ה' מה רבו צרי עד לה' הישועה על עמך ברכתך סלה: And they recited the psalm from the verse: “He that dwells in the secret place of the Most High shall abide in the shadow of the Almighty” (Psalms 91:1), until they completed the verse: “Because You, O Lord, are my refuge; You have made the most High Your habitation” (Psalms 91:9). And they would then recite Psalms, chapter 3, which begins: “A psalm of David, when he fled from Absalom his son. Lord, how many are my enemies become,” until they reached the verse: “Salvation belongs to the Lord; Your blessing be upon Your people. Sela” (Psalms 3:9), which is the end of that psalm.

רבי יהושע בן לוי אמר להו להני קראי וגאני היכי עביד הכי והאמר ר' יהושע בן לוי אסור להתרפאות בדברי תורה להגן שאני It is related that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi would recite these verses to protect him from evil spirits during the night and fall asleep while saying them. The Gemara asks: How could he do that? But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi himself say: One is prohibited from healing himself with words of Torah? The Gemara answers: To protect oneself is different, as he recited these verses only to protect himself from evil spirits, and not to heal himself.

ואלא כי אמר אסור דאיכא מכה אי דאיכא מכה אסור ותו לא והתנן הלוחש על המכה אין לו חלק לעולם הבא הא איתמר עלה א"ר יוחנן ברוקק שנו לפי שאין מזכירין שם שמים על הרקיקה: The Gemara challenges: But rather, when Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that this is prohibited, he was referring to a situation where there is already a wound and one recites these verses in order to heal himself. But if there is already a wound and he recites these verses over it, is only this prohibited, and nothing more? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sanhedrin 90a), that one who whispers an incantation over a wound has no share in the World-to-Come? The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna was taught with regard to one who spits into the wound and then whispers these verses. And the reason for the severity of this action is that the name of Heaven must not be mentioned in connection with spitting, as doing so is a show of contempt for God.

ב"ד מהלכין ושתי תודות אחריהן וכו': למימרא דבית דין קמי תודה אזלי והכתיב (נחמיה יב, לב) וילך אחריהם הושעיה וחצי שרי יהודה הכי קאמר בית דין מהלכין ושתי תודות מהלכות ובית דין אחריהם § The mishna teaches that as part of the consecration ceremony, the court would move forward, and two thanks-offerings would be brought after them, and all of the Jewish people would follow behind them. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the members of the court walk in front of the thanks-offering? But isn’t it written in the verse from which this ceremony is derived: “And I placed two large thanks-offerings, and we went in procession to the right upon the wall, toward the dung gate; and after them went Hoshaiah, and half of the princes of Judah” (Nehemiah 12:31–32)? The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: The court moves forward. And how is this done? The two thanks-offerings move forward, and the court follows after them.

כיצד מהלכות רבי חייא ורבי שמעון ברבי חד אמר זו כנגד זו וחד אמר זו אחר זו מאן דאמר זו כנגד זו הפנימית הך דמקרבא לחומה מאן דאמר זו אחר זו הפנימית הך דמקרבא לב"ד The Gemara clarifies this point: How exactly did the two thanks-offerings move forward? Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, disagree about this. One Sage says: One thanks-offering alongside the other. And one Sage says: One behind the other. According to the one who says that the two offerings moved one alongside the other, the thanks-offering that the mishna refers to as the inner one is that which is closest to the wall. According to the one who says that the two offerings moved one behind the other, the thanks-offering that is called the inner one is that which is closest to the members of the court advancing behind the thanks-offerings.

תנן הפנימית נאכלת והחיצונה נשרפת בשלמא למאן דאמר זו אחר זו אמטו להכי פנימית נאכלת משום דאתיא חיצונה קמה וקדשה לה אלא למאן דאמר זו כנגד זו תרוייהו בהדי הדדי קא מיקדשי The Gemara analyzes these two opinions: We learned in the mishna: When they would reach the end of the place that they desired to consecrate, the inner thanks-offering would be eaten and the outer one would be burned. Granted, according to the one who says that the two thanks-offerings moved forward one behind the other, and that the inner one is the one that was in the rear, it is due to this that the inner one is eaten, because the outer one came before it and consecrated the additional area, so that it is now a sanctified place fit for the eating of the thanks-offering loaves. But according to the one who says that the two thanks-offerings moved forward one alongside the other, the two of them together consecrated the additional area. Why, then, is the inner one eaten and the outer one burned?

וליטעמיך למאן דאמר זו אחר זו חדא מי מיקדשא הא כל שלא נעשית בכל אלו תנן ואפי' למ"ד באחת מכל אלו הני תרוייהו חדא מצוה היא The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning, according to the one who says that the two offerings moved forward one behind the other, does one offering by itself consecrate the area? Didn’t we learn in the mishna that with regard to any addition that was not made with all these ceremonial procedures, the addition is not consecrated? And even according to the one who says (see 16a) that the correct reading of the mishna is: With regard to any addition that was not made with any one of all these ceremonial procedures, the addition is not consecrated, nevertheless, these two thanks-offerings are one mitzva, and one without the other would not consecrate the area.

אלא א"ר יוחנן Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Daf 16a

על פי נביא נאכלת ועל פי נביא נשרפת: Based on a ruling of a prophet the loaves of one thanks-offering were eaten, and based on a ruling of a prophet the loaves of the other thanks-offering were burned. The prophets Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, who lived at the time of Ezra and Nehemiah’s reconsecration of Jerusalem, instructed the people concerning how the ceremony should be conducted, without providing reasons for the procedures.

כל שלא נעשית בכל אלו כו': איתמר רב הונא אמר בכל אלו תנן רב נחמן אמר באחת מכל אלו תנן § The mishna teaches: And with regard to any addition to the Temple that was not made with all these ceremonial procedures, one who enters there while ritually impure is not liable. It was stated that amora’im disagreed about the text of the mishna. Rav Huna says: We learned in the mishna: With all these, which means that all of these procedures are indispensable, and if even one is missing, the consecration does not take effect. Rav Naḥman says: We learned in the mishna: With one of all these; i.e., any one of these procedures suffices for the consecration to take effect.

רב הונא אמר בכל אלו תנן קסבר קדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה וקידשה לעתיד לבא ועזרא זכר בעלמא הוא דעבד The Gemara further clarifies this disagreement. Rav Huna says: We learned in the mishna: With all these. The Gemara explains: He maintains that the initial consecration of the Temple in the days of David and Solomon sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever. Therefore, the site of the Temple retained its original sanctity even during the days of the Second Temple. And Ezra, who reconsecrated the area, did so merely as a commemoration of the initial consecration. Accordingly, even though there was no king or Urim VeTummim, the entire area was fully consecrated. By contrast, in order to consecrate an area that had not been part of the initial consecration, all of these procedures are necessary and none can be omitted.

רב נחמן אמר באחת מכל אלו תנן קסבר קדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה ולא קידשה לעתיד לבא ועזרא קדושי קדיש אע"ג דלא הוו אורים ותומים Rav Naḥman says: We learned in the mishna: With one of all these. The Gemara explains: He maintains that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time only, and did not sanctify it forever. And Ezra consecrated the Temple and its courtyards, even though there was no king or Urim VeTummim. Consequently, it follows that there is no need for all of these procedures in order for the consecration to take effect.

איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן כל שלא נעשית בכל אלו תני באחת מכל אלו Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman: The mishna explicitly states: Any addition that was not made with all these procedures. Rav Naḥman said to him: Emend the mishna and teach it as stating: With one of all these procedures.

תא שמע אבא שאול אומר שני ביצעין היו בהר המשחה תחתונה ועליונה תחתונה נתקדשה בכל אלו עליונה לא נתקדשה בכל אלו אלא בעולי גולה שלא במלך ושלא באורים ותומים The Gemara cites a proof against the opinion of Rav Naḥman: Come and hear a baraita: Abba Shaul says: There were two ponds [bitzin] on the Mount of Olives [Har HaMishḥa], a lower pond and an upper pond. The lower pond was consecrated during the time of the First Temple with all the procedures mentioned in the mishna, and it has the sanctity of Jerusalem for all purposes. By contrast, the upper pond was not consecrated with all these procedures, but rather it was consecrated by those who returned from the exile in Babylonia, without a king and without the Urim VeTummim.

תחתונה שהיתה קדושתה גמורה עמי הארץ נכנסין לשם ואוכלין שם קדשים קלים אבל לא מעשר שני וחברים אוכלין שם קדשים קלים ומעשר שני The baraita continues: With regard to the lower pond, whose consecration was complete, amei ha’aretz, uneducated people who were not scrupulous in their observance of the mitzvot relating to tithes and to ritual purity, would enter into there and would partake of offerings of lesser sanctity that may be eaten in all of Jerusalem there, but they would not partake of second tithe there because they conducted themselves stringently concerning this matter. And ḥaverim, who were meticulous in their observance of those mitzvot, would partake of both offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe there.

עליונה שלא היתה קדושתה גמורה עמי הארץ היו נכנסין שם ואוכלין שם קדשים קלים אבל לא מעשר שני וחברים אין אוכלין שם לא קדשים קלים ולא מעשר שני ומפני מה לא קידשוה שאין מוסיפין על העיר ועל העזרות אלא במלך ונביא ואורים ותומים ובסנהדרין של ע"א ובשתי תודות ובשיר The baraita continues: As for the upper pond, whose consecration was incomplete, amei ha’aretz would enter into there and partake of offerings of lesser sanctity there, but they would not partake of second tithe there. And ḥaverim would partake of neither offerings of lesser sanctity nor second tithe there. And for what reason did they not consecrate the upper pond? It was because additions can be made to the city of Jerusalem or to the Temple courtyards only by a special body comprising the king, a prophet, the Urim VeTummim, and the Sanhedrin of seventy-one, and with two thanks-offerings and with a special song.

ולמה קידשוה למה קידשוה הא אמרת לא קידשוה אלא למה הכניסוה מפני שתורפה של ירושלים היתה ונוחה היא ליכבש משם The Gemara asks: But why did they consecrate the upper pond if they could not do so properly? This Gemara responds: Why did they consecrate it? Didn’t you say that they did not consecrate it? Rather, the question should be asked as follows: Given that they could not consecrate the upper pond, why did they bring it within the walls of the city? The Gemara answers: Because it was a weak point [turpa] of Jerusalem and it would have been easy to conquer the city from there, it became necessary to include it within the wall. This baraita seems to present explicit proof against the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who holds that there is no need for all of the procedures listed in the mishna in order for the consecration to be complete.

תנאי היא דתניא א"ר אליעזר שמעתי כשהיו בונין בהיכל עשו קלעים להיכל וקלעים לעזרות אלא שבהיכל בונין מבחוץ ובעזרות בונין מבפנים The Gemara rejects this proof: This is a dispute between tanna’im as to whether the initial consecration of Jerusalem and the Temple sanctified them only for their time or forever. Abba Shaul maintains that the initial consecration lapsed, and therefore the reconsecration required all of the procedures mentioned in the mishna. Where is this dispute taught? As it is taught in a mishna (Eduyyot 8:6): Rabbi Eliezer says: I heard that when they were building the Sanctuary in the Second Temple, they fashioned temporary curtains for the Sanctuary and temporary curtains for the courtyards to serve as partitions until the construction of the stone walls was completed. The difference was only that in the Sanctuary, the workers built the walls outside the curtains, without entering, and in the courtyards, the workers built the walls within the curtains.

אמר רבי יהושע שמעתי שמקריבין אף על פי שאין בית אוכלין קדשי קדשים אע"פ שאין קלעים קדשים קלים ומעשר שני אע"פ שאין חומה מפני שקדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה וקידשה לעתיד לבא לאו מכלל דר' אליעזר סבר לא קידשה לעתיד לבא The mishna continues: Rabbi Yehoshua says: I heard that one sacrifices offerings on the altar even if there is no Temple, and one partakes of offerings of the most sacred order in the Temple courtyard even if there are no curtains, and one partakes of offerings of lesser sanctity and second-tithe produce in Jerusalem even if there is no wall surrounding the city. This is due to the fact that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever. The Gemara concludes: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua based his opinion on the principle that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem forever, can one not learn by inference that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it did not sanctify them forever? Apparently, this issue is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im.

א"ל רבינא לרב אשי ממאי דלמא דכולי עלמא קדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה וקידשה לעתיד לבא ומר מאי דשמיע ליה קאמר ומר מאי דשמיע ליה קאמר וכי תימא קלעים לר' אליעזר למה לי לצניעותא בעלמא Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where do you draw this inference? Perhaps everyone maintains that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and there is no dispute between them. And if you would say: Why do I need curtains at all according to Rabbi Eliezer? The original sanctity remained when Jerusalem was not surrounded by walls, and similarly, the presence or absence of curtains is irrelevant to the sanctity of the Temple area. The Gemara answers: The curtains were established merely for seclusion, as it would have been unbecoming for the activity in this most sacred venue to be visible to all.

אלא הני תנאי דתניא א"ר ישמעאל ברבי יוסי למה מנו חכמים את אלו שכשעלו בני הגולה מצאו אלו וקידשום אבל ראשונות בטלו משבטלה הארץ אלמא קסבר קדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה ולא קידשה לעתיד לבא Rather, this matter is subject to a dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the walled cities listed in the mishna in tractate Arakhin (32a): Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: Why did the Sages enumerate specifically these nine cities as cities that were walled since the days of Joshua, son of Nun? In fact, there were many more. The reason is that when the exiles ascended to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia in the time of Ezra, they found these cities and consecrated them as walled cities; but the sanctity of the first walled cities, enumerated in the book of Joshua, was nullified when settlement in Eretz Yisrael was negated and the Jewish people were exiled. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, maintains: The initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time only and did not sanctify them forever.

ורמינהי אמר ר' ישמעאל בר' יוסי וכי אלו בלבד היו והלא כבר נאמר (דברים ג, ד) ששים עיר כל חבל ארגוב ממלכת עוג בבשן כל אלה ערים בצורות חומה גבוהה אלא למה מנו חכמים את אלו שכשעלו בני הגולה מצאו אלו וקידשום And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a different baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: Were these cities that are enumerated in tractate Arakhin the only walled cities? But isn’t it already stated: “Sixty cities, all the region of Argob, the kingdom of Og, king of Bashan, all these were cities fortified with high walls, gates and bars” (Deuteronomy 3:4–5), indicating that there were many walled cities in the time of Joshua? Rather, why then did the Sages enumerate specifically these cities? It is due to the fact that when the exiles ascended from Babylonia they found these and consecrated them as walled cities.

קידשום השתא הא אמרינן לקמן דלא צריכא לקדושי אלא מצאו אלו ומנאום The Gemara asks: They consecrated them? If their sanctity remained, it should not have been necessary to consecrate them. Now, don’t we say later in the same baraita that it is not necessary to consecrate them? The Gemara clarifies: Rather, this is what the baraita means to say: When the exiles ascended from Babylonia they found these and enumerated them.

ולא אלו בלבד אלא כל שתעלה בידך מסורת מאבותיך שמוקפת חומה מימות יהושע בן נון כל מצות אלו נוהגות בה מפני שקדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה וקידשה לעתיד לבא קשיא דר' ישמעאל בר יוסי אדרבי ישמעאל בר יוסי The baraita continues: And not only these, but in any city with regard to which you receive a tradition from your ancestors that it was surrounded by a wall from the days of Joshua, son of Nun, all these mitzvot with regard to walled cities are observed in it, due to the fact that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and sanctified them forever. The Gemara comments: This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yishmael bar Yosei and another statement of Rabbi Yishmael bar Yosei.

איבעית אימא תרי תנאי אליבא דר' ישמעאל בר יוסי איבעית אימא חדא מינייהו ר' אלעזר בר יוסי אמרה דתניא ר' אלעזר בר יוסי אומר (ויקרא כה, ל) אשר לוא חומה אע"פ שאין לו עכשיו והיה לו קודם לכן: The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that there are two tanna’im who disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael bar Yosei. Each transmitted Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion in a different manner. And if you wish, say instead that one of the traditions is mistaken, as one of the baraitot was stated by Rabbi Elazar bar Yosei, and not his brother, Rabbi Yishmael. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar bar Yosei says that the verse with regard to walled cities states: “Which has [lo] a wall” (Leviticus 25:30). The word lo is written with an alef, meaning no, and accordingly the verse would be stating to the contrary, that the city does not have a wall, but its vocalization is in the sense of its homonym, lo with a vav, meaning that it has a wall. This indicates that even if it does not presently have a wall but it had a wall previously, it retains its status as a walled city. It is Rabbi Elazar bar Yosei who maintains that the first consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem forever.

Daf 16b

נטמא בעזרה ונעלמה ממנו טומאה וכו': טומאה בעזרה מנלן א"ר אלעזר כתוב אחד אומר (במדבר יט, יג) את משכן ה' טמא וכתוב אחד אומר (במדבר יט, כ) כי את מקדש ה' טמא (אם אינו ענין לטומאה שבחוץ תנהו ענין לטומאה שבפנים) § The mishna teaches about one who was ritually pure when he entered the Temple but who became impure while in the Temple courtyard, and afterward his impurity was hidden from him. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one is liable even if he contracted impurity in the Temple courtyard and failed to leave immediately by way of the shortest route, and not only if he entered the Temple courtyard when he was already impure? Rabbi Elazar says: One verse states: “He has defiled the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Numbers 19:13), and one verse states: “For he has defiled the Temple of the Lord” (Numbers 19:20). If this second verse is not needed for the matter of one who contracted impurity outside before he entered the Temple courtyard, as this situation is already referred to in the previous verse, apply it to the matter of one who contracted impurity inside the Temple courtyard.

וקראי מיתרי הא מיצרך צריכי דתניא ר' אלעזר אומר אם נאמר משכן למה נאמר מקדש ואם נאמר מקדש למה נאמר משכן אילו נאמר משכן ולא נאמר מקדש הייתי אומר על משכן יהא חייב שהרי משוח בשמן המשחה ועל מקדש לא יהא חייב ואם נאמר מקדש ולא נאמר משכן הייתי אומר על מקדש יהא חייב שהרי קדושתו קדושת עולם ועל משכן לא יהא חייב לכך נאמר משכן לכך נאמר מקדש The Gemara asks: But is it really superfluous to have both of these verses, one having been sufficient? Aren’t they each necessary to teach a novel ruling? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar says: If it is stated: “Tabernacle,” why does it state: “Temple”? And if it is stated: “Temple,” why does it state: “Tabernacle”? He explains: Had the verse stated only: “Tabernacle,” and not stated: “Temple,” I would have said that one is liable for entering the Tabernacle in a state of impurity, since it was anointed with the anointing oil, and therefore it carries greater sanctity, but he is not liable for entering the Temple, which was not anointed with the anointing oil. And had the verse stated only: “Temple,” and not stated: “Tabernacle,” I would have said that one is liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity, since its sanctity is an eternal sanctity, but he is not liable for entering the Tabernacle, whose sanctity was only for its time. For this reason, it is stated: “Tabernacle,” and for this reason, it is stated: “Temple.”

רבי אלעזר הכי קא קשיא ליה מכדי משכן איקרי מקדש ומקדש איקרי משכן נכתוב או אידי ואידי מקדש או אידי ואידי משכן משכן ומקדש למה לי שמע מינה תרתי The Gemara answers: Rabbi Elazar did not base his derivation on a superfluous verse, but on the change in wording between the two verses. This is what is difficult for him: Since the Tabernacle is also called Temple and the Temple is also called Tabernacle, then let the verse write either in both verses: Temple, or in both verses: Tabernacle; why do I need both “Tabernacle” and “Temple”? Conclude two conclusions from it, i.e., that one is liable even for impurity contracted inside the grounds, and that the halakha applies both in the Tabernacle and in the Temple.

בשלמא מקדש איקרי משכן דכתיב (ויקרא כו, יא) ונתתי משכני בתוככם אלא משכן דאיקרי מקדש מנלן אילימא מדכתיב (במדבר י, כא) ונסעו הקהתים נושאי המקדש ההוא בארון כתיב אלא מהכא (שמות כה, ח) ועשו לי מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם וכתיב (שמות כה, ט) ככל אשר אני מראה אותך את תבנית המשכן: The Gemara questions its previous assumption: Granted, the Temple is also called Tabernacle, as it is written: “And I will set My Tabernacle among you” (Leviticus 26:11), where the reference is to the Temple, as the verse is referring to that which will transpire after the Jewish people have settled in their land. But from where do we derive that the Tabernacle is also called Temple? If we say that it is derived from that which is written: “And the Kehatites, the bearers of the Temple, set forward” (Numbers 10:21), that instance of the term Temple is not written with regard to the Tabernacle; rather, it is written with regard to the Ark and the other sacred vessels. Rather, it is derived from here: “And let them make Me a Temple, that I may dwell among them” (Exodus 25:8), where the reference is to the Tabernacle, as immediately afterward it is written: “According to all that I show you, the pattern of the Tabernacle” (Exodus 25:9).

והשתחוה או ששהה כדי השתחואה: אמר רבא לא שנו אלא שהשתחוה כלפי פנים אבל השתחוה כלפי חוץ שהה אין לא שהה לא § The mishna teaches: If he bowed down, or he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, or he went out by way of a longer route when he could have taken a shorter route, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Rava says: They taught this only when he bowed down in the Temple courtyard facing inward, toward the Holy of Holies, as that alone is proper bowing. But if he bowed down facing outward, that is not considered bowing. When he bows facing outward, if he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, yes, he is liable, but if he did not tarry long enough to bow down, he is not liable.

איכא דמתני לה אסיפא או ששהה בכדי השתחואה מכלל דהשתחואה גופה בעיא שהייה אמר רבא לא שנו אלא שהשתחוה כלפי חוץ אבל כלפי פנים אע"ג דלא שהה והכי קאמר השתחוה כלפי פנים או ששהה כדי השתחואה בהך השתחואה דכלפי חוץ חייב There are those who teach the statement of Rava with regard to the latter clause: Or if he tarried in the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. It may be said by inference that bowing down itself entails tarrying, and the mere act of bowing does not render one liable. With regard to this Rava says: They taught this only when he bowed down facing outward. In such a case, he is liable only if he tarried long enough to bow down. But if he bowed down facing inward toward the Holy of Holies, he is liable even if he did not tarry for that length of time. And this is what the mishna is saying: If he bowed down facing inward, or if he tarried long enough to bow down while he was bowing down facing outward, he is liable.

היכי דמי השתחואה דאית בה שהייה והיכי דמי השתחואה דלית בה שהייה דלית בה שהייה זו כריעה בעלמא היא דאית בה שהייה פישוט ידים ורגלים The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of bowing in which there is tarrying, and what are the circumstances of bowing in which there is no tarrying? The Gemara answers: With regard to bowing in which there is no tarrying, that is merely kneeling. As for bowing in which there is tarrying, that is prostrating oneself while spreading one’s arms and legs in total submission.

וכמה שיעור שהייה פליגי בה ר' יצחק בר נחמני וחד דעימיה ומנו רבי שמעון בן פזי ואמרי לה ר"ש בן פזי וחד דעימיה ומנו ר' יצחק בר נחמני ואמרי לה ר"ש בר נחמני חד אמר כמימריה דהאי פסוקא וחד אמר כמויכרעו לסיפא (דברי הימים ב ז, ג) וכל בני ישראל רואים ברדת האש וכבוד ה' על הבית ויכרעו אפים ארצה על הרצפה וישתחוו והודות לה' כי טוב כי לעולם חסדו The Gemara asks: And what is the measure of that tarrying? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani and one other Sage who was with him disagree about this. And who is that other scholar? Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi. And some say that it was Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi and one other Sage who was with him. And who is that other scholar? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani. And some say it was Rabbi Shimon bar Naḥmani. One Sage says: It is as long as the time it takes to recite this following verse in its entirety, and one Sage says: It is as long as the time it takes to recite from the term “and they bowed” in the middle of that verse until the end. What is the verse? “And when all the children of Israel saw how the fire came down, and the glory of the Lord upon the House, and they bowed with their faces to the ground upon the pavement, and prostrated themselves, and praised the Lord, saying: For He is good, for His steadfast love endures forever” (II Chronicles 7:3).

ת"ר קידה על אפים וכן הוא אומר (מלכים א א, לא) ותקד בת שבע אפים ארץ כריעה על ברכים וכן הוא אומר (מלכים א ח, נד) מכרוע על ברכיו השתחואה זו פישוט ידים ורגלים וכן אומר (בראשית לז, י) הבוא נבוא אני ואמך ואחיך להשתחות לך ארצה: The Gemara discusses the different forms of bowing in greater detail. The Sages taught: The term kidda indicates falling upon one’s face, and so the verse states: “Then Bathsheba bowed [vatikkod] with her face to the ground” (I Kings 1:31). Keria means descending upon one’s knees, and so the verse states with regard to Solomon: “He rose from before the altar of the Lord, from kneeling [mikero’a] upon his knees” (I Kings 8:54). Hishtaḥava’a, this is prostrating oneself while spreading one’s arms and legs in total submission, and so the verse states that Jacob asked, in response to Joseph’s relating of his dream: “Shall I and your mother and your brothers indeed come to bow down [lehishtaḥavot] to you to the ground” (Genesis 37:10), i.e., spread out completely on the ground.

בעי רבא צריך שהייה למלקות או אין צריך שהייה למלקות לקרבן גמירי שהייה למלקות לא גמירי שהייה § Rava raises a dilemma: Is tarrying long enough to bow down necessary to incur lashes? If one was warned not to remain in the Temple courtyard in a state of impurity, is he liable to receive lashes only if he remains there long enough to bow down, completely spread out on the ground? Or is tarrying not necessary to incur lashes, and he is immediately liable to receive lashes? The Gemara clarifies the two possibilities: Is it learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary in order to incur liability to bring an offering, but not learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary to become liable to receive lashes?

Daf 17a

או דלמא בפנים גמירי שהייה לא שנא לקרבן ולא שנא למלקות תיקו Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary to incur any liability for impurity within the Temple, and it is no different whether the liability is to bring an offering, and it is no different whether it is to receive lashes? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רבא תלה עצמו באויר עזרה מהו כי גמירי שהייה שהייה דבת השתחואה דלאו בת השתחואה לא גמירי או דלמא בפנים שהייה גמירי ל"ש דבת השתחואה ול"ש דלאו בת השתחואה תיקו Rava raises another dilemma: If an impure person suspended himself in the airspace of the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, what is the halakha? When it is learned as a tradition that an impure person is liable for tarrying in the Temple, is this only with regard to tarrying that is suited for bowing; but with regard to tarrying that is not suited for bowing, as in this case, where the person cannot bow down as long as he is suspended in the air, it is not learned as a tradition that one is liable? Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition that there is liability for tarrying within the Temple, and it is no different whether the tarrying is suited for bowing, and it is no different whether the tarrying is not suited for bowing. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רב אשי טימא עצמו במזיד מהו באונס גמירי שהייה במזיד לא גמירי שהייה או דלמא בפנים גמירי שהייה ל"ש באונס ול"ש במזיד תיקו Rav Ashi also raises a dilemma relating to this matter: If one intentionally rendered himself ritually impure while he was in the Temple courtyard, what is the halakha with regard to tarrying? Is it learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary when one contracts impurity while in the Temple in circumstances beyond his control, but not learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary when he renders himself impure intentionally? Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary for any liability for impurity within the Temple, and it is no different whether the impurity was contracted in circumstances beyond his control, and it is no different whether it was contracted intentionally. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רב אשי נזיר בקבר בעי שהייה למלקות או אינו צריך בפנים גמירי שהייה בחוץ לא גמירי שהייה או דלמא באונס גמירי שהייה לא שנא בפנים ול"ש בחוץ תיקו: Rav Ashi raises another dilemma: If a nazirite, who is prohibited from contracting impurity imparted by a corpse, found himself alongside a grave, is tarrying there a necessary condition for him to incur lashes, or is tarrying not necessary, and he is liable immediately? Is it learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary within the Temple, but not learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary outside the Temple, and the nazirite is liable immediately? Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary for liability for impurity contracted in circumstances beyond one’s control, and it is no different whether the impurity was contracted within the Temple, and it is no different whether it was contracted outside the Temple. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בא לו בארוכה חייב בקצרה פטור וכו': אמר רבא קצרה שאמרו אפי' עקב בצד גודל ואפי' כל היום כולו § The mishna teaches: If, at the time that one was unaware either that he was impure, or that he was in the Temple, he went out by way of a longer route when he could have taken a shorter route, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. But if he left the Temple via the shortest way, he is exempt. Rava says: With regard to the short route, which the Sages said here that he is exempt for, this does not necessarily mean that he left the Temple as quickly as possible, as if he took the most direct route he is exempt even if he walked with exceedingly small steps, heel to toe, and even if it took him all day long.

בעי רבא שהיות מהו שיצטרפו ותיפשוט ליה מדידיה התם בדלא שהה Rava raised a dilemma: What is the halakha with regard to combining periods of tarrying, each of which is less than the amount of time necessary to recite the second portion of the verse mentioned above (II Chronicles 7:3)? If an impure person tarried in the Temple for less than the amount of time needed to bow down, and then started to leave, and then tarried again for less than the amount of time needed to bow down, do those two periods of tarrying combine together, so that if he tarried in total long enough to bow down, he is liable? The Gemara challenges: Let Rava resolve his dilemma from his own statement with regard to one who left the Temple with small steps, heel to toe, as such a person tarries intermittently between steps. The Gemara answers: There Rava is referring to one who did not tarry at all, walking continuously without interruption, albeit slowly. When Rava raised his dilemma here, it was with regard to one who stopped walking altogether and tarried.

בעא מיניה אביי מרבה בא לו בארוכה שיעור קצרה מהו שיעור גמירי וכי בא לו בארוכה שיעור קצרה פטור או דלמא דוקא גמירי בארוכה חייב בקצרה פטור א"ל לא נתנה ארוכה להדחות אצלו Abaye raised a dilemma to Rabba that is the very opposite of the dilemma raised by Rava: If the impure person quickly went out the longer way in the measure of time ordinarily needed to go out the shortest way, what is the halakha? Is it learned as a tradition that he is liable for tarrying for a certain measure of time, and if he went out the longer way in the measure of time ordinarily needed to go out the shortest way, he is exempt? Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition specifically that if he left the longer way, he is liable, whereas if he left the shortest way, he is exempt. Rabba said to Abaye: The liability for leaving using the longer way was not given so that it would be overridden for him; i.e., he is liable if he exits via the longer way, even if he runs.

מתקיף לה ר' זירא אלא דקיימא לן טמא ששימש במיתה היכי משכחת לה אי דלא שהה היכי עביד עבודה אי דשהה בר כרת הוא Rabbi Zeira objects to this: But as for this halakha that we maintain, that an impure priest who intentionally served in the Temple is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, how can you find these circumstances? If he did not tarry in the Temple long enough to bow down, how could he have performed any service in such a short period of time? And if he tarried long enough to bow down, he is liable to be punished with karet, which is a more severe punishment than death at the hand of Heaven.

אי אמרת בשלמא שיעורא גמירי משכחת לה דאניס נפשיה בקצרה ועבד עבודה Rabbi Zeira explains his objection: Granted, if you say that it is learned as a tradition that one is liable for tarrying for a certain measure of time, and if he did not tarry for the time it takes to bow down and leave the Temple via the shortest way, he is exempt, then you can find a case where the priest could have served in a state of impurity without becoming liable to be punished with karet. The case is where he exerted himself and ran out very quickly via the shortest way after having performed a service in a state of impurity, so that the total time that he was in the Temple was less time than it would ordinarily take him to bow and leave the shortest way. In such a case he is exempt from being punished with karet, and liable only to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for having performed the Temple service while impure.

Daf 17b

אלא אי אמרת דוקא גמירי היכי משכחת לה But if you say that it is learned as a tradition specifically that if an impure person tarries long enough to bow down, he is liable even if he does not exceed the time required to go out the shortest way, then how can you find these circumstances?

אמר אביי מאי קושיא משכחת לה כגון שבא בקצרה והפך בצינורא וכדרב הונא דאמר רב הונא זר שהפך בצינורא חייב מיתה Abaye said: What is the difficulty? You find it in a case such as where he went out from the Temple via the shortest way, but as he was leaving he turned over one of the limbs of an offering on the altar with a fork [betzinnora]. This is an action that takes only a brief moment to perform, and yet it is considered priestly service, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna. As Rav Huna says: A non-priest who turns over part of an offering on the altar with a fork is liable to receive the death penalty, because he engaged in Temple service restricted to priests.

גופא אמר רב הונא זר שהפך בצינורא חייב מיתה ה"ד אי דלא הפך לה לא מיעכלי פשיטא ואי דלא הפך בהו נמי מיעכלי מאי קא עביד The Gemara proceeds to analyze the matter itself: Rav Huna says: A non-priest who turns over part of an offering on the altar with a fork is liable to receive the death penalty. What are the circumstances of such a case? If in the event that he had not turned it over, the offering would not have been consumed by the fire, then it is obvious that the non-priest is liable, as he performed the service of burning the offering on the altar. And if in the event that he had not turned it over, it would also have been consumed by the fire, then what service did he perform? Even without his action, the offering would have been burned.

לא צריכא דאי לא הפך בהו מיעכלי בתרתי שעי והשתא מיעכלי בחד שעתא והא קמ"ל דכל קרובי עבודה עבודה היא The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for Rav Huna to state this halakha with regard to a case where, had the non-priest not turned it over, it would have been consumed by the fire in two hours, but now that he turned it over, it is consumed by the fire in one hour. And he teaches us this: That any act that accelerates the service, causing it to be performed more quickly, is itself considered a service.

א"ר אושעיא בעינא דאימא מילתא ומסתפינא מחבריא הנכנס לבית המנוגע דרך אחוריו ואפילו כולו חוץ מחוטמו טהור דכתיב (ויקרא יד, מו) והבא אל הבית דרך ביאה אסרה תורה The Gemara returns to the general topic of one who enters the Temple while in a state of ritual impurity, citing Rabbi Oshaya, who said: I wish to say something, but I am afraid of my colleagues, i.e., I am afraid that they will raise an objection against me. What did he want to say? With regard to one who enters a house afflicted with leprosy, if he enters the house backward, then even if his entire body entered except for his nose, which remained outside the house, he remains pure, as it is written: “He that enters into the house all the time that it is shut up shall be impure until evening” (Leviticus 14:46), teaching that the Torah prohibited, i.e., conferred impurity, only with regard to the normal manner of entering into a house, i.e., face-first.

ומסתפינא מחבריא אי הכי כולו נמי אמר רבא כולו לא גרע מכלים שבבית דכתיב (ויקרא יד, לו) ולא יטמא כל אשר בבית But I am afraid of my colleagues, as they might raise the following objection: If so, that the impurity depends on the person entering the house in the normal manner, then even if his entire body entered the house, he would also be pure, as he did not go into the house in the normal fashion. Rava said: This is not difficult, as if his entire body entered in this manner, he is impure, because he is no worse now, i.e., his halakha should be no more lenient, than vessels that are in the house, which become impure, as it is written: “And they shall empty the house…so that all that is in the house shall not be made impure” (Leviticus 14:36).

תניא נמי הכי גגין הללו אין אוכלין שם קדשי קדשים ואין שוחטין שם קדשים קלים וטמא שנכנס דרך גגין להיכל פטור שנאמר (ויקרא יב, ד) ואל המקדש לא תבא דרך ביאה אסרה תורה: The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya, that wherever entering is mentioned in the Torah, the reference is to the normal manner of entering: With regard to those roofs that covered the various chambers found in the Temple courtyard, offerings of the most sacred order may not be eaten there, on them, and offerings of lesser sanctity may not be slaughtered there, because those roofs do not have the sanctity of the Temple courtyard. And a ritually impure person who enters the Sanctuary via those roofs is exempt, as it is stated with regard to a woman who became ritually impure: “And she shall not enter into the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 12:4), teaching that the Torah prohibited only the normal manner of entering the Temple. So too, in the case of a house afflicted with leprosy, where mention is made of entering, only one who enters into the house in the normal manner becomes impure, as stated by Rabbi Oshaya.

זו היא מצות עשה שבמקדש שאין חייבין עליה וכו': היכא קאי דקאמר זו היא התם קאי אין חייבין על עשה ועל לא תעשה שבמקדש § The mishna teaches: This mitzva that the ritually impure must be sent out of the Temple is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling. The Gemara asks: To what does the tanna of the mishna refer when he says: This is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling? Where was it taught that there is such a mitzva for which they are not liable? The Gemara answers: He is referring to a mishna found there in tractate Horayot (8b), which teaches: The Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning ritual impurity in the Temple, as this offering is brought only for an erroneous ruling on a matter whose unwitting violation requires the bringing of a fixed sin-offering, and not a sliding-scale offering.

ואין מביאין אשם תלוי על עשה ועל לא תעשה שבמקדש The mishna there continues: And one who is uncertain whether or not he unwittingly transgressed a prohibition that requires a sin-offering does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning ritual impurity in the Temple, as this offering is brought only when certainty about the unwitting transgression would require a fixed sin-offering, not a sliding-scale offering. Unwitting transgression of a mitzva concerning ritual impurity in the Temple results in an obligation to bring a sliding-scale offering.

אבל חייבין על עשה ועל לא תעשה שבנדה ומביאין אשם תלוי על עשה ועל לא תעשה שבנדה The mishna there continues: But the Sanhedrin is liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning a menstruating woman. And one who is uncertain whether or not he unwittingly transgressed a prohibition that requires a sin-offering brings a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning a menstruating woman.

וקאמר זו היא מצות עשה שבמקדש שאין חייבין עליה ואיזו היא מצות עשה שבנדה שחייבין עליה היה משמש עם הטהורה ואמרה לו נטמאתי ופירש מיד חייב מפני שיציאתו הנאה לו כביאתו And it is in reference to that mishna that the tanna in the mishna here says: This mitzva, that the ritually impure must be sent out of the Temple, is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling. And which is the positive mitzva with regard to a menstruating woman for which the Sanhedrin is liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling? If a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her and did not wait until his penis became flaccid, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman, because his withdrawal from her is as pleasant to him as his entry. If the Sanhedrin mistakenly ruled that one may withdraw immediately, they bring a bull offering for their erroneous ruling.

איתמר אביי אמר משמיה דר' חייא בר רב חייב שתים וכן אמר רבא אמר רב שמואל בר שבא אמר רב הונא חייב שתים חדא אכניסה וחדא אפרישה § The Gemara further clarifies the matter of a man who immediately withdrew from the woman after she told him that she had experienced menstrual bleeding. It was stated that Abaye says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings for this unwitting transgression. And so Rava says that Rav Shmuel bar Shaba says that Rav Huna says: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings, one for his initial entry and one for his immediate withdrawal.

הוי בה רבה במאי אילימא סמוך לוסתה ובמאן אילימא בתלמיד חכם בשלמא אכניסה ליחייב קסבר יכולני לבעול אלא אפרישה אמאי ליחייב מזיד הוא Rabba discusses this matter, raising a question: About what case are we speaking? If we say that it was near her expected date of menstruation, when sexual intercourse is prohibited due to a concern that the woman might already be menstruating or that she might begin to menstruate during the act of intercourse, and nevertheless they engaged in intercourse, there is a difficulty: With whom are we dealing? If we say that we are dealing with a Torah scholar, granted that he will be liable to bring a sin-offering for his initial entry. That was an unwitting transgression, as he thought to himself: I can engage in intercourse with her before she begins to menstruate. But why will he be liable to bring a sin-offering for his immediate withdrawal? That transgression was intentional, since he is a Torah scholar and he knows that in such a case he must not withdraw immediately, and a sin-offering is not brought for an intentional transgression.

Daf 18a

ואי בעם הארץ אידי ואידי אכל שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחד הוא And if we say that we are dealing with an am ha’aretz, an ignoramus, who does not know that it is prohibited for him to engage in intercourse with a woman near the expected onset of her menstruation, and who also does not know that it is prohibited for him to immediately withdraw from her if she experiences menstrual bleeding during intercourse, then for both this and that, his entry and his withdrawal, he should be liable to bring only a single sin-offering, since he had no awareness of his transgression between his two actions. This is like one who ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in the course of one lapse of awareness and is therefore liable to bring only one sin-offering. Here too, although he performed two actions for which one could be liable to bring sin-offerings, entry and withdrawal, there was only one lapse of awareness.

ואלא בשאין סמוך לוסתה ובמאן אילימא בתלמיד חכם ולא חדא לא מיחייב אכניסה אנוס אפרישה מזיד אי בעם הארץ חדא הוא דמיחייב אפרישה Rather, it must be a case where it was not near her expected date of menstruation, and there was no reason for the man to think that the woman would experience menstrual bleeding. And with whom are we dealing? If we say that we are dealing with a Torah scholar, then he should not be liable to bring even one sin-offering, because with regard to his initial entry, he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and with regard to his withdrawal, after he knew that she was a menstruating woman, his transgression was intentional, and he would be liable to receive karet. And if we are dealing with an am ha’aretz, he should be liable to bring only one sin-offering, for his immediate withdrawal.

הדר אמר רבא לעולם בסמוך לוסתה ובתלמיד חכם ותלמיד חכם לזו ואין תלמיד חכם לזו Rava reconsidered and then said: Actually, it is a case where it was near the expected date of the woman’s menstruation, and we are dealing with a Torah scholar. But he is a Torah scholar only with regard to this halakha, that it is prohibited to engage in intercourse with a woman near the expected onset of her menstruation, and he erred in thinking that he could complete the act of intercourse before she experienced menstrual bleeding. Therefore, once he learns that she has experienced menstrual bleeding, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression at the time of his entry. But he is not a Torah scholar with regard to that halakha, that it is prohibited for one to immediately withdraw from a woman if she experiences menstrual bleeding during intercourse. Since he had awareness of his transgression between his two actions, this is not an instance of one lapse of awareness, and therefore he is liable to bring a second sin-offering for his unwitting transgression at the time of his withdrawal.

אמר רבא ותרוייהו תנינהו כניסה תנינא פרישה תנינא פרישה תנינא דקתני היה משמש עם הטהורה ואמרה לו נטמאתי ופירש מיד חייב Rava said: And we learn both of these matters for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering; we learn about entry, and we learn about withdrawal. Rava now clarifies the matter: We learn about withdrawal, as the mishna teaches: If a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman.

כניסה תנינא נמצא על שלו טמאין וחייבין בקרבן מאי לאו בסמוך לוסתה ואכניסה Rava continues: We learn about entry in a mishna (Nidda 14a): If a spot of blood is found on his rag, i.e., the rag that he uses to wipe his penis after intercourse, then it is clear that this blood came from the woman during their act of intercourse. Consequently, both the man and the woman are impure and are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression. Rava explains: What, is it not the case that the mishna speaks here of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, and it teaches that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his initial entry at that time?

א"ל רב אדא בר מתנא לרבא לעולם אימא לך בשלא סמוך לווסתה ואפרישה וכי תימא פרישה למה לי הא תנא ליה הא איצטריך לאשמועינן נמצא על שלה טמאים בספק ופטורין מן הקרבן ואיידי דבעי מיתנא נמצא על שלה תנא נמי נמצא על שלו Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: Actually, I could say to you that the mishna speaks here of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman not near the expected date of her menstruation, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his immediate withdrawal upon learning that she had experienced menstrual bleeding. And if you would say: Why do I need to be taught once again about withdrawal? Didn’t the tanna already teach this in the mishna here? One can respond: It was necessary to teach us this, i.e., the continuation of the mishna in tractate Nidda, which states: If a spot of blood is found on her rag, i.e., the rag that she uses to wipe herself after intercourse, they are impure only because of an uncertainty, as perhaps the bleeding commenced only after they completed their act of intercourse, and therefore they are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. And since the mishna had to teach the case where the blood was found on her rag, it also taught the case where it was found on his rag, even though there is no novel element in this ruling.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אדא מי מצית לאוקמה לההיא בשלא סמוך לוסתה ואפרישה והא נמצא קתני ונמצא לבתר הכי משמע ואי אפרישה מעיקרא כי פריש ליה מעיקרא הויא ליה ידיעה Ravina said to Rav Adda: Can you really interpret that mishna as referring to a case where it was not near the expected date of the woman’s menstruation, and that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his withdrawal? But isn’t it taught in that mishna: If blood is found on his rag? And these words indicate that the blood was found only afterward, after the man had already withdrawn from the woman. That is to say, only after he withdrew from the woman he learned that she had experienced menstrual bleeding. Ravina clarifies the difficulty: And if the mishna is referring to a case where he is liable for his withdrawal, at the outset, when he withdrew from the woman, it was from then that he had knowledge of her menstrual status, as he withdrew because she had informed him that she had experienced bleeding. Of what significance is his finding blood on his rag?

א"ל רבא ציית מאי דקאמר רבך היכי מצית דתניא עלה זו היא מצות עשה שבנדה שחייבין עליה ואם איתא מצות לא תעשה היא Rava said to Rav Adda: Listen to what your teacher, Ravina, is saying, as he has explained the matter. Rav Adda said to Rava: How can I listen to his words and accept his explanation? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to this mishna concerning blood found on a rag: This is the positive mitzva with regard to a menstruating woman for which one is liable. Rav Adda explains: And if it is so that the mishna is referring to a case where the man is liable for his initial entry, this wording is difficult, as engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman is not the violation of a positive mitzva, but a prohibition.

אמר ליה אי תניתא חסר ותני הכי זו היא מצות לא תעשה שבנדה שחייבין עליה היה משמש עם הטהורה ואמרה לו נטמאתי ופירש מיד חייב זו היא מצות עשה שבנדה כו' Rava said to him: If you learned this baraita in this manner, its wording is imprecise, as it is missing words, and you should teach it like this: When blood is found on the man’s rag, this is the prohibition with regard to a menstruating woman for which one is liable. And additionally, if a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for that act, and this is the positive mitzva for which one is liable with regard to a menstruating woman.

אמר מר פירש מיד חייב היכי עביד אמר רב הונא משמיה דרבא נועץ עשר צפרניו בקרקע עד שימות וטוביה § The Gemara resumes its discussion of the mishna: The Master said above in the mishna: If he immediately withdrew from the woman after having been informed that she had experienced menstrual bleeding, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman. The Gemara asks: What should one do in such a situation? Rav Huna said in the name of Rava: He should press his ten fingernails into the ground, i.e., the bed, and restrain himself and do nothing until his penis becomes flaccid, and only then should he withdraw from her, and it is good for him to do so.

אמר רבא זאת אומרת המשמש מת בעריות פטור דאי סלקא דעתך חייב הכא מאי טעמא פטור משום דאנוס הוא אי אנוס הוא כי פירש מיד נמי ניפטר אנוס הוא Rava said: That is to say, one who engages in intercourse, with a flaccid penis, with those with whom relations are forbidden is exempt. As if it enters your mind to say that he is liable, here, in the mishna, what is the reason that he is exempt if he waits and withdraws only later, after he has lost his erection? You might say that it is because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control in that the woman experienced menstrual bleeding while he was in the middle of the act of intercourse, and not because he withdrew with a flaccid penis, as one who engages in intercourse with a flaccid penis is liable. But if he is exempt from liability because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, then even if he withdraws immediately, before losing his erection, he should also be exempt, for the same reason, that he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control.

אמר ליה אביי לעולם אימא לך המשמש מת בעריות חייב והכא מאי טעמא פטור משום דאנוס הוא והא דאמרת כי פריש מיד אמאי חייב שהיה לו לפרוש בהנאה מועטת ופירש בהנאה מרובה Abaye said to Rava: Actually, I could say to you that one who engages in intercourse, with a flaccid penis, with those with whom relations are forbidden is liable. And here, what is the reason that one who waits and withdraws only later, after he has lost his erection, is exempt? It is because he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control. And concerning that which you said: Why, then, is he liable if he withdrew immediately, i.e., when you said: He should also be exempt, it is because he should have withdrawn with a flaccid penis and experienced little pleasure, but instead he withdrew with an erect organ and experienced great pleasure.

אמר ליה רבה בר חנן לאביי אם כן מצינו ארוכה וקצרה בנדה Rabba bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: If so, according to your opinion, we find a difference in halakha between a long way and a short way with regard to a menstruating woman. If he withdrew the short way, i.e., without waiting, he has committed a transgression, and if he withdrew the long way, i.e., after waiting, he has not committed a transgression.

Daf 18b

ואנן במקדש תנן אלא משום דלא דמי ארוכה דהכא קצרה דהתם וארוכה דהתם קצרה דהכא And we learned this difference in the mishna specifically with regard to ritual impurity in the Temple. If such a distinction were also in effect with regard to a menstruating woman, the mishna would mention it. Rather, one can explain: No parallel distinction is made, because the two cases are not similar in their details. The long way here, with regard to a menstruating woman, namely, that the man must wait, is like the shortest way there, with regard to impurity in the Temple, namely, that the impure person must leave the Temple by way of the most direct route. And the long way there, with regard to the Temple, is like the shortest way here, with regard to a menstruating woman.

מתקיף לה רב הונא בריה דרב נתן ומי אמר אביי אנוס הוא אלמא בשלא סמוך לוסתה קאמרינן והא אביי דאמר חייב שתים אלמא בסמוך לוסתה עסקינן Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, objects to what Abaye said: Did Abaye really say with regard to the mishna that if the man withdraws with a flaccid penis he is exempt because he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control? Apparently, then, we are speaking of a man who engaged in intercourse with a woman not near the expected date of her menstruation, and therefore the situation is considered beyond his control. But is it not Abaye who says that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings for this transgression, one for his initial entry and one for his withdrawal? Apparently, we are dealing with a man who engaged in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, so he is considered an unwitting transgressor, who is liable to bring a sin-offering, and is not the victim of circumstances beyond his control. Consequently, Abaye’s two statements contradict each other.

כי איתמר דאביי בעלמא איתמר The Gemara answers: When this statement of Abaye was stated, that the man is liable to bring two sin-offerings, it was stated in general. It was not relating to the case in the mishna, but was an independent ruling concerning one who engages in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation.

בעא מיניה רבי יונתן בן יוסי בן לקוניא מרבי שמעון בן יוסי בן לקוניא אזהרה לבועל נדה מנין מן התורה שקל קלא פתק ביה אזהרה לבועל נדה (ויקרא יח, יט) ואל אשה בנדת טומאתה לא תקרב § Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya asked Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya: From where in the Torah is the prohibition concerning one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman [nidda] derived? Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya took a clod [kala] of earth and threw it at him in reproach and said to him: Is there a need to search the Torah for a derivation for the prohibition concerning one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman? The verse states: “And a woman who is impure by her uncleanness [nidda] you shall not approach, to uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:19)?

אלא אזהרה למשמש עם הטהורה ואמרה לו נטמאתי דלא ניפריש מיד מנלן אמר חזקיה אמר קרא (ויקרא טו, כד) ותהי נדתה עליו אפי' בשעת נדתה תהא עליו The Gemara explains the intent of the question of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya: Rather, from where do we derive the prohibition with regard to the case in the mishna concerning one who was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, that he must not withdraw immediately? In response to this question Ḥizkiyya said: The verse states: “And if any man lies with her, and her menstrual flow shall be upon him” (Leviticus 15:24), teaching that even at any time when she is menstruating, the prohibition shall be upon him; therefore, he must not withdraw from her immediately.

אשכחן עשה לא תעשה מנלן אמר רב פפא אמר קרא לא תקרב לא תקרב נמי לא תפרוש הוא דכתיב (ישעיהו סה, ה) האומרים קרב אליך אל תגש בי כי קדשתיך The Gemara asks: We found a source for a positive mitzva with regard to the manner in which one must withdraw from a menstruating woman; from where do we derive that immediate withdrawal is also subject to a prohibition? Rav Pappa said: The verse states: “And a woman who is impure by her uncleanness you shall not approach, to uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:19). The Gemara explains: “You shall not approach [tikrav]” means also the opposite: You shall not withdraw, as it is written: “Those who say: Withdraw [kerav] to yourself, come not near to me, for I am holier than you” (Isaiah 65:5), where “kerav” means remove or withdraw.

ת"ר (ויקרא טו, לא) והזרתם את בני ישראל מטומאתם אמר רבי יאשיה מיכן אזהרה לבני ישראל שיפרשו מנשותיהן סמוך לוסתן וכמה אמר רבה עונה § Having mentioned that it is prohibited for a man to engage in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, the Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: The verse with regard to a menstruating woman states: “And shall you separate the children of Israel from their uncleanness” (Leviticus 15:31), Rabbi Yoshiya says: From here we derive a prohibition to the children of Israel that they must separate from their wives near the expected date of their menstruation. And how long before must they separate? Rabba says: A set interval of time for the ritual impurity of a menstruating woman, which is half of a twenty-four hour day, either the daytime or the nighttime.

א"ר יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יוחאי כל שאינו פורש מאשתו סמוך לוסתה אפילו הויין לו בנים כבני אהרן מתים דכתיב והזרתם את בני ישראל מטומאתם והדוה בנדתה וסמיך ליה אחרי מות Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to anyone who does not separate from his wife near the expected date of her menstruation, even if he has sons who are fit to be great and holy like the sons of Aaron, these sons will die due to his sin, as it is written: “And shall you separate the children of Israel from their uncleanness…this is the law…of her that is sick with her menstrual flow” (Leviticus 15:31–33), and it is stated near it: “After the death of the two sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 16:1).

אמר ר' חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן כל הפורש מאשתו סמוך לוסתה הויין לו בנים זכרים דכתיב (ויקרא יא, מז) להבדיל בין הטמא ובין הטהור וסמיך ליה אשה כי תזריע וילדה זכר רבי יהושע בן לוי אמר הויין לו בנים ראויין להוראה דכתיב (ויקרא י, י) להבדיל ולהורות Concerning this matter, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who separates himself from his wife near the expected date of her menstruation will have male children, as it is written: “To distinguish between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 11:47), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: He will have sons who are worthy of teaching halakha, as it is written: “To distinguish…between the impure and the pure, and to teach the children of Israel all the statutes” (Leviticus 10:10–11).

אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן כל המבדיל על היין במוצאי שבתות הויין לו בנים זכרים דכתיב להבדיל בין הקדש ובין החול וכתיב התם להבדיל בין הטמא ובין הטהור וסמיך ליה אשה כי תזריע רבי יהושע בן לוי אמר בנים ראוין להוראה דכתיב להבדיל ולהורות The Gemara continues to expound these verses: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who recites havdala over wine at the conclusion of Shabbatot, and not over some other beverage, will have male children, as it is written: “To distinguish between the holy and the unholy, and between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 10:10), and it is written there once again: “To distinguish between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 11:47), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Anyone who recites havdala over wine at the conclusion of Shabbatot will have sons who are worthy of teaching halakha, as it is written: “To distinguish between the holy and the unholy…and to teach” (Leviticus 10:10–11).

אמר רבי בנימין בר יפת אמר רבי אלעזר כל המקדש את עצמו בשעת תשמיש הויין לו בנים זכרים שנאמר (ויקרא יא, מד) והתקדשתם והייתם קדושים וסמיך ליה אשה כי תזריע: Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet says that Rabbi Elazar says: Anyone who sanctifies himself with modest conduct while engaging in sexual intercourse will have male children, as it is stated: “You shall sanctify yourselves, and you shall be holy” (Leviticus 11:44), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2).

רבי אליעזר אומר השרץ ונעלם ממנו כו': מאי בינייהו § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to the sliding-scale offering the verse states: “Or if a person touches any impure thing, whether it is the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal, and it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2). The juxtaposition of the words “and it is hidden” to the words “a creeping animal” teaches that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering when it was hidden from him that he had contracted ritual impurity from a creeping animal, but not when it was hidden from him that he was entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food. Rabbi Akiva says that it is from the words “and it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” that it is derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for a lapse of awareness about his impurity, but not for a lapse of awareness about the Temple or the sacrificial food. The Gemara asks: Since Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva agree about the halakha, what is the practical difference between them?

אמר חזקיה שרץ ונבלה איכא בינייהו ר' אליעזר סבר בעינן עד דידע אי בשרץ איטמי אי בנבלה איטמי ורבי עקיבא סבר לא בעינן עד דידע דכיון דידע דאיטמא בעולם לא צריך אי בשרץ איטמי אי בנבלה איטמי Ḥizkiyya says: There is a practical difference between them in a case where one initially knew that he had contracted ritual impurity, but he did not know whether the impurity was contracted from a creeping animal or from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal. Rabbi Eliezer holds that for him to be liable to bring an offering, we require that he initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass, and if he never knew this, he does not bring an offering. And Rabbi Akiva holds that for him to be liable to bring an offering, we do not require that he know this detail; since he knows in general terms that he contracted impurity, it is not necessary that one know whether he contracted the impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted the impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass.

וכן אמר עולא שרץ ונבלה איכא בינייהו דעולא רמי דרבי אליעזר אדרבי אליעזר ומשני מי א"ר אליעזר בעינן עד דידע אי בשרץ איטמי אי בנבלה איטמי And Ulla also says: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the person did not know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal. Ulla did not say this explicitly, but rather he raises a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Eliezer and another statement of Rabbi Eliezer, and then resolves it. He asked: Does Rabbi Eliezer actually say that in order to be liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, we require that one initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass?

ורמינהי אמר רבי אליעזר מה נפשך חלב אכל חייב נותר אכל חייב שבת חילל חייב יום הכפורים חילל חייב אשתו נדה בעל חייב אחותו בעל חייב And he raises a contradiction from a baraita with regard to one who ate a forbidden food but did not know whether it was forbidden fat or it was notar, part of a sacrifice left over after the time allotted for its consumption; or one who performed labor but did not know whether it was Shabbat or Yom Kippur; or one who engaged in intercourse but did not know whether it was with his menstruating wife or with his sister. In all these cases Rabbi Eliezer holds that he must bring a sin-offering, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Eliezer says: Whichever way you look at it, he is liable. If he ate forbidden fat he is liable; if he ate notar he is liable. If he desecrated Shabbat he is liable; if he desecrated Yom Kippur he is liable. If he engaged in intercourse with his menstruating wife, he is liable; if he engaged in intercourse with his sister, he is liable. In all these cases, he knows that he transgressed, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

אמר לו רבי יהושע הרי הוא אומר (ויקרא ד, כג) או הודע אליו חטאתו אשר חטא בה עד שיודע לך במה חטא Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: The verse states with regard to a sin-offering: “Or if his sin, in which he sinned, became known to him” (Leviticus 4:23), teaching that there is no liability for an offering until it becomes known to the sinner the manner in which he sinned. According to this baraita, Rabbi Eliezer himself holds that in order to become liable to bring a sin-offering, it is not necessary that one know precisely which prohibition he violated.

ומשני התם אשר חטא והביא אמר רחמנא חטא כל שהוא הכא מכדי כתיב (ויקרא ה, ב) בכל דבר טמא או בנבלת שרץ טמא למה לי שמע מינה בעינן עד דידע אי בשרץ איטמי אי בנבלה איטמי And Ulla resolves the contradiction: There, with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering, the Merciful One states: “Or if his sin, in which he sinned, became known to him, he shall bring his offering” (Leviticus 4:23), teaching that it suffices that he knows that he committed some type of sin. Here, with regard to ritual impurity in the Temple, since it is written at the beginning of the verse: “Or if a person touches any impure thing” (Leviticus 5:2), why do I need that which is stated immediately afterward: “Or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal”? Conclude from it that we require that he initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass, and if he never knew this, he does not bring an offering.

ורבי עקיבא איידי The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, who does not expound the verses in this way, what does he say to this? The Gemara answers: He maintains that since

Daf 19a

דבעי למיכתב בהמה וחיה לכדרבי כתיב נמי שרץ כדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל כל פרשה שנאמרה ונשנית לא נשנית אלא בשביל דבר שנתחדש בה the Torah needs to write both “domesticated animal” and “undomesticated animal” in the verse “or the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal” to teach that halakha that the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught (see 7a), “creeping animal” is also written, even though there is no novel element taught by the addition of that term. This is in accordance with what was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Every passage in the Torah that was stated and repeated was repeated only for the novel element introduced therein. It is the style of the Torah to repeat an entire passage to teach even one additional halakha, in this case, that which was taught by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

ורבי אליעזר האי בה מאי עביד ליה פרט למתעסק The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that in general it is not necessary that the unwitting transgressor know precisely which prohibition he violated, what does he do with the words “in which he sinned,” the words from which Rabbi Yehoshua learned that there is no liability to bring an offering unless he knows precisely which sin he committed? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Eliezer, these words emphasize the fact that one is liable only when he intends to do the prohibited act, to the exclusion of one who acts unawares and has no intention to perform the action. That is to say, if one was preoccupied with another matter and, acting unawares, he transgressed a prohibition, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

ורבי יוחנן אמר משמעות דורשין איכא בינייהו וכן אמר רב ששת משמעות דורשין איכא בינייהו דרב ששת מחליף דרבי אליעזר לרבי עקיבא ודרבי עקיבא לרבי אליעזר Until now the Gemara has discussed Ḥizkiyya’s understanding of the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is no halakhic difference between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, as they both agree that one must know the exact source of his ritual impurity. The difference between them is limited to the interpretation of the meaning of the verses, i.e., they disagree about the source in the Torah for this halakha. And similarly, it can be reasoned that Rav Sheshet says: The difference between them is limited to the interpretation of the meaning of the verses, as Rav Sheshet would switch the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer for that of Rabbi Akiva and that of Rabbi Akiva for that of Rabbi Eliezer. He was not meticulous in his attributions of the respective opinions, as he held that there is no halakhic difference between them.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן העלם זה וזה בידו מהו אמר ליה הרי העלם טומאה בידו וחייב אדרבה הרי העלם מקדש בידו ופטור Rava asked Rav Naḥman: According to both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, if one had a lapse of awareness of both this and that, his having contracted ritual impurity and his having entered the Temple, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: He has a lapse of awareness about his impurity, and therefore he is liable. The Gemara disputes this: On the contrary, he has a lapse of awareness about the Temple, and he should therefore be exempt.

אמר רב אשי חזינן אי מטומאה קא פריש הרי העלם טומאה בידו וחייב אי ממקדש קא פריש הרי העלם מקדש בידו ופטור אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי כלום פריש ממקדש אלא משום טומאה כלום פריש מטומאה אלא משום מקדש אלא לא שנא Rav Ashi said: We observe his behavior. If he leaves the Temple because of the impurity, i.e., when he is told that he is impure, it is clear that the lapse of awareness that he had is about the impurity, and he is liable. And if he leaves because of the Temple, i.e., when he is told that he is in the Temple, then the lapse of awareness that he had is about the Temple, and he is exempt. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: There is no indication from here; didn’t he leave because he became aware of the Temple only because he became aware also of the impurity? Otherwise, why would he leave the Temple? And didn’t he leave because he became aware of the impurity only because he became aware also of the Temple? Otherwise, why would he leave the Temple? Rather, there is no difference, so there is no indication from here.

תנו רבנן שני שבילין אחד טמא ואחד טהור והלך בראשון ולא נכנס בשני ונכנס חייב § The Gemara begins a discussion about another topic related to awareness of impurity. The Sages taught in a baraita: If there were two paths in a certain place, one of them impure, as a corpse was buried there, and the other one pure, but it was not clear which of the two paths was impure, and someone walked on the first path and did not then enter the Temple, and then afterward he walked on the second path, forgot that he was ritually impure, and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since he certainly contracted impurity on one of the paths and entered the Temple in a state of impurity.

הלך בראשון ונכנס הזה ושנה וטבל ואח"כ הלך בשני ונכנס חייב ר"ש פוטר ורבי שמעון בן יהודה פוטר בכולן משום ר' שמעון: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and on the third day he was sprinkled with waters of purification to purify him from the uncertain impurity imparted by a corpse, and on the seventh day he was sprinkled upon again, and he immersed himself in a ritual bath, thereby completing his purification, and then afterward he walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since one of the paths was certainly impure and he entered the Temple after having walked on it. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt in this latter case, because neither time that he entered the Temple was it certain that he was impure, the first time because he might not yet have become impure, and the second time because he might already have purified himself. And Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, in the name of Rabbi Shimon, deems him exempt in all of these cases.

בכולן The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda really exempt him in all of these cases,

Daf 19b

ואפילו בקמייתא ממה נפשך טמא הוא אמר רבא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהלך בראשון ובשעה שהלך בשני שכח שהלך בראשון דהויא ליה מקצת ידיעה even in the first case, where he walked on both of the paths and did not purify himself in between? This is difficult, as whichever way you look at it, he is impure, since he certainly contracted impurity on one of the two paths. Rava said: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he walked on the first path, and then afterward when he was walking on the second path he forgot that he had already walked on the first path, so that his lapse of awareness when he entered the Temple was only a lapse of partial awareness. That is, when he entered the Temple he forgot only that he had walked on the first path, and for this lapse of knowledge by itself he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as it is not certain that he contracted impurity there.

ובהא קא מיפלגי תנא קמא סבר אמרינן מקצת ידיעה ככל ידיעה ורבי שמעון סבר לא אמרינן מקצת ידיעה ככל ידיעה Rava continues: And the tanna’im disagree with regard to this issue: The first tanna, who teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems the person exempt only where there was purification between the two entries, but not in the first case, maintains that we say that partial awareness of definite impurity is counted as complete awareness. And Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, who teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems the person exempt even in the first case, where there was no purification between the two entries, maintains that we do not say that partial awareness of definite impurity is counted as complete awareness.

הלך בראשון ונכנס הזה ושנה וטבל חזר והלך בשני ונכנס חייב ורבי שמעון פוטר ואמאי חייב ספק ידיעה הוא § The baraita teaches: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and on the third day he was sprinkled with waters of purification, and on the seventh day he was sprinkled upon again, and he immersed himself in a ritual bath, and then he walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering; and Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara asks: But why is he liable according to the first tanna? Each time he entered the Temple it was only with a lapse of awareness of uncertain impurity, the first time because he might not yet have become impure, and the second time because he might already have purified himself.

אמר רבי יוחנן כאן עשו ספק ידיעה כידיעה וריש לקיש אמר הא מני רבי ישמעאל היא דאמר לא בעינן ידיעה בתחלה: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Here, since he certainly contracted impurity on one of the paths and entered the Temple in a state of impurity, they made awareness of uncertain impurity like awareness of definite impurity. And Reish Lakish says: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: We do not require any awareness of impurity whatsoever at the beginning, before he enters the Temple, and it suffices if it becomes known to him at the end that he had been impure at the time of his entry.

ורמי דרבי יוחנן אדרבי יוחנן ורמי דריש לקיש אדריש לקיש דתניא אכל ספק חלב ונודע ספק חלב ונודע רבי אומר כשם שמביא חטאת על כל אחד ואחד כך מביא אשם תלוי על כל אחד ואחד And the Gemara raises a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan; and the Gemara raises a contradiction between this statement of Reish Lakish and another statement of Reish Lakish. As it is taught in a baraita: If one ate an item concerning which there was uncertainty as to whether or not it was forbidden fat, and he later became aware of it, and then he ate some other item concerning which there was uncertainty as to whether or not it was forbidden fat, and he later became aware of it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Just as he would bring a sin-offering for each and every one of his instances of consumption were he to learn that what he ate was actually forbidden fat, so too, he brings a provisional guilt-offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a transgression that requires a sin-offering, for each and every one of his instances of consumption if after each instance he became aware that he might have eaten forbidden fat.

ר"ש בן יהודה ורבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון אמרו משום רבי שמעון אינו מביא אלא אשם תלוי אחד שנאמר (ויקרא ה, יח) על שגגתו אשר שגג התורה ריבתה שגגות הרבה ואשם תלוי אחד Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said in the name of Rabbi Shimon: He brings only one provisional guilt-offering, as it is stated with regard to a provisional guilt-offering: “He shall bring an unblemished ram…for a guilt-offering…to the priest; and the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his unwitting transgression wherein he unwittingly transgressed and knew it not” (Leviticus 5:18). This wording teaches that the Torah included many instances of unwitting transgressions in one provisional guilt-offering. One brings one provisional guilt-offering even if he had committed many unwitting transgressions.

ואמר ריש לקיש כאן שנה רבי ידיעות ספיקות מתחלקות לחטאות Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree about how to understand the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: With regard to which case did he say that one brings a separate sin-offering for each and every one of his instances of consumption? And Reish Lakish says: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that awareness of the uncertain status separates the acts with regard to sin-offerings. If it later became known with certainty that he had actually eaten forbidden fat both times, he would be liable to bring two sin-offerings for the two instances of consumption, despite the fact that the two actions were separated only by awareness of the uncertain status, because such awareness is sufficient to separate the two acts.

ורבי יוחנן אמר כשם שידיעות ודאי בעלמא מתחלקות לחטאות כך ידיעות ספק מתחלקות לאשמות And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not mean to say that awareness of the uncertain status separates the acts with regard to sin-offerings. He merely established the principle: Just as definite awareness in general separates the acts with regard to sin-offerings, e.g., where one ate forbidden fat and then became aware that it was definitely forbidden fat that he had eaten, and then he forgot and once again ate forbidden fat, so too, awareness of the uncertain status separates the acts with regard to provisional guilt-offerings. But awareness of the uncertain status does not separate the acts with regard to sin-offerings. If the awareness between the acts was only awareness of the uncertain status, he does not bring a sin-offering for each act when he later learns with certainty that it was forbidden fat that he had eaten. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that awareness of the uncertain status is not like definite awareness, and Reish Lakish maintains that it is like definite awareness. This contradicts what they said above.

בשלמא דרבי יוחנן אדרבי יוחנן לא קשיא כאן עשו ולא בכל התורה כולה עשו הכא הוא דלא כתיבא ידיעה בהדיא מונעלם הוא דקא אתי ולא בכל התורה כולה עשו דכתיב (ויקרא ד, כג) או הודע אליו ידיעה מעלייתא בעינן The Gemara comments: Granted, the apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and the other statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is not difficult, as one can explain that Rabbi Yoḥanan is precise in his wording, as he says: Here, with regard to impurity in the Temple, they made awareness of the uncertain status like definite awareness; but they did not do so everywhere in the entire Torah. There is a basis for this distinction, as here, with regard to impurity in the Temple, awareness at the beginning is not written explicitly in the Torah, but rather it is derived from: “And it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:2), which indicates that there must be some awareness that became hidden from him, and for this, awareness of the uncertain status suffices. But by contrast, they did not make awareness of the uncertain status like definite awareness everywhere in the entire Torah, as it is written: “Or if his sin, which he has sinned, becomes known to him” (Leviticus 4:28), which indicates that in general we require full-fledged awareness at the beginning.

אלא לריש לקיש אדמוקים ליה כר' ישמעאל נוקמה כרבי הא קא משמע לן דרבי ישמעאל לא בעי ידיעה בתחלה But as for Reish Lakish, rather than interpreting this baraita concerning the two paths in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who does not require any awareness whatsoever at the beginning, let him interpret it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that awareness of the uncertain status is like definite awareness. The Gemara explains: Reish Lakish teaches us this: That with regard to impurity in the Temple, Rabbi Yishmael does not require any awareness at the beginning.

פשיטא דלא בעי מדלא מייתרי ליה קראי (ויקרא ה, ב) ונעלם דמיחייב על העלם מקדש מהו דתימא כי לית ליה מקראי אבל מגמרא אית ליה קמ"ל: The Gemara challenges: It is obvious that Rabbi Yishmael does not require awareness at the beginning, since he has no superfluous verses from which to derive such a requirement. Rabbi Akiva learns from the superfluous phrase: “And it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:4), that awareness at the beginning is necessary, but Rabbi Yishmael says the verse serves to teach another halakha, that one is liable to bring an offering for a lapse of awareness that he was entering the Temple. The Gemara rejects this challenge: Lest you say: When Rabbi Yishmael does not accept this halakha requiring awareness at the beginning, it means that he does not derive it from a verse, but he accepts it as a tradition; to counter this, Reish Lakish teaches us that according to Rabbi Yishmael there is no requirement whatsoever for awareness at the beginning.

הדרן עלך ידיעות הטומאה

מתני׳ שבועות שתים שהן ארבע שבועה שאוכל ושלא אוכל שאכלתי ושלא אכלתי MISHNA: With regard to oaths attesting to the truth about an utterance, which, when violated, render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, there are two types that are actually four types. The initial two oaths, which relate to utterances about the future and are explicitly prohibited in the Torah, are: On my oath I will eat, or: On my oath I will not eat. These are expanded to four, to include oaths concerning utterances about the past: On my oath I ate, or: On my oath I did not eat.

שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל כל שהוא חייב דברי רבי עקיבא אמרו לו לר"ע היכן מצינו באוכל כל שהוא שהוא חייב שזה חייב אמר להם ר' עקיבא וכי היכן מצינו במדבר ומביא קרבן שזה מדבר ומביא קרבן: If one says: On my oath I will not eat, and he then ate any amount, even less than an olive-bulk, he is liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, leading you to say that this person is liable? Rabbi Akiva said to them: And where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it, as this oath taker merely speaks, i.e., takes an oath, and brings an offering for it?

גמ׳ למימרא דשאוכל דאכילנא משמע ורמינהי שבועה לא אוכל לך שבועה שאוכל לך לא שבועה שלא אוכל לך אסור GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Is this to say that phrasing an oath as: On my oath I will eat, always means that I take an oath that I will eat? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Nedarim 16a): If one says: On my oath I will not eat of yours, or: On my oath I will eat of yours, or: Not on my oath I will not eat of yours, the food of the other person is forbidden.

אמר אביי לעולם דאכילנא משמע לא קשיא כאן במסרבין בו לאכול כאן בשאין Abaye said: Actually, saying: On my oath I will eat, means that I take an oath that I will eat. It is not difficult, because there is a difference between the contexts of the mishnayot: Here, it is referring to an oath taken in a context where others are importuning him to eat, so when he says: On my oath I will eat of yours, his intention is to indicate his refusal to eat. There, it is a context where others are not

Daf 19b

הדרן עלך ידיעות הטומאה

Daf 20a

מסרבין בו לאכול importuning [mesarevin] him to eat.

מתניתין בשאין מסרבין בו לאכול ברייתא במסרבין בו לאכול וקאמר לא אכילנא ולא אכילנא דכי קא משתבע הכי קאמר שבועה שלא אוכל The Gemara explains: The mishna here is referring to a case where others are not importuning him to eat; therefore, his oath should be understood literally, as obligating himself to eat. The external mishna, in tractate Nedarim, is referring to a case where others are importuning him to eat and he is saying: I will not eat, I will not eat. Under those circumstances, when he takes an oath, this is what he is saying: On my oath I will not eat.

רב אשי אמר תני שבועה שאי אוכל לך אי הכי מאי למימרא מהו דתימא לישניה דאיתקילא ליה קמ"ל: Rav Ashi, offering a different resolution of the contradiction, says: Teach, i.e., revise the mishna in tractate Nedarim to say in the middle oath: On my oath I will not [she’i] eat of yours, i.e., using a different formulation for: On my oath I will not eat of yours. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating what is effectively the same oath twice? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that there is a concern that the oath was a slip of his tongue and he meant to take an oath that he will eat and instead said: I will not eat, the mishna teaches us that one need not be concerned that this is what occurred.

ת"ר מבטא שבועה איסר שבועה איסור איסר אם אתה אומר איסר שבועה חייב ואם לאו פטור אם אתה אומר איסר שבועה והא אמרת איסר שבועה הוא § The Sages taught: “The clear utterance of her lips, with which she has bound her soul” (Numbers 30:7), is referring to an oath, and: “A bond with which she has bound her soul” (Numbers 30:5), is also referring to an oath. With regard to the prohibition invoked by the word “bond,” if you say a bond is an oath, he is liable, but if not, he is exempt. The Gemara seeks to explicate this baraita: If you say a bond is an oath? But you already said that a bond is an oath.

אמר אביי ה"ק מבטא שבועה איסר מיתפיס בשבועה איסור איסר אם אתה אומר מיתפיס בשבועה כמוציא שבועה מפיו דמי חייב ואם לאו פטור Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: “Clear utterance” is an oath, whereas “bond” is the association of some object or action with a matter that has already been prohibited by an oath. What is the prohibition invoked by the word “bond”? If you say that creating an association with an oath is like explicitly expressing an oath with his own mouth then he is liable to bring an offering for unwittingly violating the oath and to receive lashes for doing so intentionally. But if it is not like stating an oath explicitly, he is exempt.

וממאי דמבטא שבועה דכתיב (ויקרא ה, ד) או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים איסר נמי דכתיב (במדבר ל, יד) כל נדר וכל שבועת איסר The Gemara analyzes Abaye’s explanation: From where may one derive that “clear utterance” is an oath? One derives it from the verse written with regard to an oath on an utterance, as it is written: “Or if anyone take an oath to clearly utter with his lips” (Leviticus 5:4). The Gemara asks: Isn’t “bond” also referring to an oath, as it is written: “Every vow, and every oath of a bond to afflict the soul, her husband may let it stand, or her husband may make it void” (Numbers 30:14)?

אלא ממאי דאיסר מיתפס בשבועה הוא דכתיב (במדבר ל, יא) או אסרה אסר על נפשה בשבועה Rather, from where may one derive that a bond is the association of some object or action with another matter that has been prohibited by an oath? One may derive it from the verse, as it is written: “Or bound her soul by a bond with an oath” (Numbers 30:11), which indicates that the bond is associated with a preexisting oath.

מבטא נמי הכתיב (ויקרא ה, ד) לכל אשר יבטא האדם בשבועה The Gemara asks: Isn’t the term “clear utterance” also associated with an oath in a verse, as it is written: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4)?

אלא אמר אביי מבטא שבועה מהכא (במדבר ל, ז) ואם היו תהיה לאיש ונדריה עליה או מבטא שפתיה אשר אסרה על נפשה ואילו שבועה לא קאמר במאי אסרה עצמה במבטא Rather, Abaye said: The fact that “clear utterance” means an oath is derived from here: “And if she be married to a husband, while her vows are upon her, or the clear utterance of her lips, with which she has bound her soul” (Numbers 30:7). While in that verse, it does not state: Oath. With what does she impose a prohibition upon herself? She does so with “clear utterance,” indicating that “clear utterance” is referring to an oath.

רבא אמר לעולם אימא לך מיתפיס בשבועה לאו כמוציא שבועה מפיו דמי והכי קאמר מבטא שבועה איסר נמי שבועה אסריה דאיסר הטילו הכתוב בין נדר לשבועה הוציאו בלשון נדר נדר בלשון שבועה שבועה Rava said: Actually, I will say to you that association with an oath is not like expressing an oath with one’s own mouth, and this is what the baraita is saying: “Clear utterance” is an oath. “Bond” can also be an oath, but it is ambiguous. The verse placed the wording of the prohibition of a bond between that of a vow and that of an oath. Therefore, if one expressed a bond with the language of a vow, it is a vow. If one expressed it with the language of an oath, it is an oath.

היכן הטילו (במדבר ל, יא) ואם בית אישה נדרה או אסרה אסר על נפשה בשבועה וגו' The Gemara asks: Where did the verse place the word for “bond” between a vow and an oath? The verse says: “And if she vowed in her husband’s house or bound her soul by a bond with an oath” (Numbers 30:11).

ואזדו לטעמייהו דאיתמר מתפיס בשבועה אביי אמר כמוציא שבועה מפיו דמי ורבא אמר לאו כמוציא שבועה מפיו דמי The Gemara comments: Abaye and Rava both follow their own lines of reasoning, as it was stated: With regard to one who associates some object or action with another matter that has been prohibited by an oath, Abaye says: It is like explicitly expressing an oath with his mouth, and Rava says: It is not like explicitly expressing an oath with his mouth.

מיתיבי איזה איסר האמור בתורה האומר הרי עלי שלא אוכל בשר ושלא אשתה יין כיום שמת בו אביו כיום שמת בו פלוני כיום שנהרג בו גדליה בן אחיקם כיום שראה ירושלים בחורבנה אסור ואמר שמואל והוא שנדור ובא מאותו היום The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: What is the bond mentioned in the Torah? A bond applies to one who says: It is incumbent upon me that I will not eat meat and that I will not drink wine like on the day that his, i.e., my, father died, or: Like on the day that so-and-so died, or: Like on the day that Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed, or: Like on the day on which he saw Jerusalem in its destruction. One who makes one of these pronouncements is prohibited from eating meat and drinking wine. And Shmuel says: This is the case only when he is prohibited from eating meat and drinking wine by vow since that day, e.g., the day his father died.

בשלמא לאביי מדמתפיס בנדר נדר מתפיס בשבועה שבועה The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, according to the opinion of Abaye, from the fact that a vow that one associates with another vow is considered a vow, as Shmuel’s ruling demonstrates, one may conclude that an oath that one associates with another oath is considered an oath.

Daf 20b

אלא לרבא קשיא But according to Rava’s opinion, that association with an oath is not considered an oath, the baraita poses a difficulty, as it indicates that association with a vow is considered a vow; a corresponding rule should apply to an oath.

אמר לך רבא תריץ ואימא הכי איזהו איסר נדר האמור בתורה האומר הרי עלי שלא אוכל בשר ושלא אשתה יין כיום שמת בו אביו כיום שנהרג בו פלוני ואמר שמואל והוא שנדור ובא מאותו היום The Gemara answers: Rava could say to you: Resolve the difficulty posed by the baraita and say that the baraita teaches this: Which is the bond of a vow mentioned in the Torah? When is a bond, i.e., the acceptance of a prohibition on oneself, considered a vow? According to Rava, “bond” in the verse is not referring to association. Rather, it is referring to one who says: It is incumbent upon me that I will not eat meat and that I will not drink wine like on the day that his, i.e., my, father died, or: Like on the day that so-and-so was killed. And Shmuel says: This is the halakha only when he is prohibited from eating meat and drinking wine by vow since that day, e.g., the day his father died.

מאי טעמא אמר קרא (במדבר ל, ג) איש כי ידור נדר לה' עד שידור בדבר הנדור What is the reason for Shmuel’s caveat? The verse states: “When a man vows a vow to the Lord” (Numbers 30:3). The redundancy in the phrase “vows a vow” teaches that when one associates a vow with another prohibition, it does not take effect unless he vows by associating it with an item forbidden by means of a vow. Association is derived from this verse and is limited to vows.

כיום שמת בו אביו פשיטא כיום שנהרג בו גדליה בן אחיקם איצטריך ליה סלקא דעתך אמינא כיון דכי לא נדר נמי אסור כי נדר נמי לא הויא עליה איסור והאי לאו מיתפיס בנדר הוא קמ"ל The Gemara discusses the baraita: One who says: It is incumbent upon me that I will not eat meat and that I will not drink wine like on the day that his father died. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he is prohibited from eating meat and drinking wine? Why does the baraita need to mention the specific example of a vow concerning the day his father died? The Gemara answers: It was necessary that the baraita state that the vow takes effect for the sake of the other example: Like on the day that Gedaliah ben Ahikam was killed. Otherwise, it may enter your mind to say: Since, even if he did not vow to refrain from eating meat or drinking wine on that day they would be prohibited to him anyway, as it is a public fast day, when he did vow to refrain from eating and drinking on that day, the prohibition of the vow would not take effect on him, and that subsequent vow would then not be associated with a vow, but with an ordinary prohibition. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the vow made on the fast day takes effect and the second vow can be associated with it.

ואף ר' יוחנן סבר לה להא דרבא דכי אתא רבין א"ר יוחנן מבטא לא אוכל לך איסר לא אוכל לך שבועה The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan also holds in accordance with this opinion of Rava that a bond is not an association with an oath, but an oath itself, as when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one says: By my clear utterance I will not eat of yours, or: On my bond I will not eat of yours, it is an oath.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי יוחנן אוכל ולא אוכל שקר ואזהרתיה מהכא (ויקרא יט, יב) לא תשבעו בשמי לשקר אכלתי ולא אכלתי שוא ואזהרתיה מהכא (שמות כ, ו) לא תשא את שם ה' אלהיך לשוא § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one takes an oath, saying: I will eat, or: I will not eat, relating to the future, and does not fulfill it, it is a false oath. And its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “And you shall not take an oath by My name falsely, so that you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). If one takes an oath, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, relating to past actions, and it is a lie, it is an oath taken in vain, and its prohibition in the Torah is from here: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain; for the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7).

קונמות עובר (במדבר ל, ג) בלא יחל דברו Rav Dimi continued: With regard to vows where one states that an item is forbidden like an offering [konamot], if he subsequently derives benefit from that item, one violates the prohibition: “When a man vows a vow to the Lord, or takes an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth” (Numbers 30:3).

מיתיבי שוא ושקר אחד הן מאי לאו מדשוא לשעבר אף שקר נמי לשעבר אלמא אכלתי ולא אכלתי שקר הוא The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The prohibitions against taking an oath in vain and taking a false oath are one. The Gemara suggests: What, is the baraita not teaching that if an oath taken in vain refers to the past, a false oath also refers to the past? Apparently, the statements: I ate, and: I did not eat, are both false oaths, contrary to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that a false oath is one that relates to the future.

מידי איריא הא כדאיתא והא כדאיתא ומאי דבר אחד הן דבדיבור אחד נאמרו כדתניא (שמות כ, ח) זכור (דברים ה, יא) ושמור בדיבור אחד נאמרו מה שאין יכול הפה לדבר ומה שאין האוזן יכול לשמוע The Gemara answers: Are the cases comparable? This case, of a false oath, is as it is and that case, of an oath taken in vain, is as it is. What, then, is the meaning of the assertion of the baraita that they are one? It is that both were spoken in a single utterance at the giving of the Torah, like that which is taught in a baraita: “Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8), and: “Observe the Sabbath day, to keep it holy” (Deuteronomy 5:12), were spoken in one utterance, in a manner that the human mouth cannot say and that the human ear cannot hear.

בשלמא התם בדיבור אחד נאמרו כדרב אדא בר אהבה דאמר רב אדא בר אהבה נשים חייבות בקידוש היום דבר תורה דאמר קרא זכור ושמור כל שישנו בשמירה ישנו בזכירה והני נשי הואיל ואיתנהו בשמירה איתנהו נמי בזכירה אלא הכא למאי הלכתא מיבעי ליה The Gemara asks: Granted, there, “remember” and “observe” were spoken in a single utterance in order to teach the halakha that Rav Adda bar Ahava says; as Rav Adda bar Ahava says: Women are obligated to recite kiddush sanctifying the seventh day, by Torah law, even though it is a positive, time-bound mitzva, since the verses state: “Remember,” and: “Observe,” indicating that anyone who is obligated to observe, i.e., is prohibited from performing labor on Shabbat, is obligated to remember, by reciting kiddush. And these women, since they are obligated to observe, they also are obligated to remember. But here, with regard to the prohibitions against taking a false oath and taking an oath in vain, for what halakha is it necessary for them to have been spoken in a single utterance?

אלא כשם שלוקה על שוא כך לוקה נמי על שקר The Gemara explains: Rather, the two prohibitions were spoken together to teach that just as one is flogged for taking an oath in vain, so is one also flogged for taking a false oath.

כלפי לייא אלא אימא כשם שלוקה על שקר כך לוקה נמי על שוא The Gemara asks: Isn’t it the opposite [kelapei layya]? It is clear that one receives lashes for taking a false oath about the future, which one violates with an action, but an oath taken in vain about the past is merely a verbal pronouncement. Rather, say like this: Just as one is flogged for taking a false oath, i.e., violating one’s oath about the future, so is one also flogged for taking an oath in vain.

פשיטא האי לאו והאי לאו מהו דתימא כדאמר ליה רב פפא לאביי לא ינקה כלל The Gemara asks: Why must the baraita state that one is flogged for either type of oath? Isn’t it obvious? This is a prohibition and that is a prohibition, and for both one is liable to receive lashes. The Gemara answers: Lest you say as Rav Pappa said to Abaye, that the verse: “For the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7), might indicate that God will not absolve him at all, and even if he is punished he cannot atone for his sin,

Daf 21a

קמ"ל כדשני ליה it teaches us as Abaye answers him below.

ואיבעית אימא כשם שמביא קרבן על שקר כך מביא קרבן על שוא ור"ע היא דמחייב לשעבר כלהבא The Gemara offers an alternative resolution of the difficulty posed by the baraita: And if you wish, say that the assertion of the baraita that the prohibitions against taking an oath in vain and taking a false oath are one means: Just as one brings an offering for taking a false oath, so one brings an offering for taking an oath in vain. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who deems one liable to bring an offering for taking an oath in vain that refers to the past, just as for taking a false oath that refers to the future.

מיתיבי אי זו היא שבועת שוא נשבע לשנות את הידוע לאדם שבועת שקר נשבע להחליף אימא נשבע ומחליף The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s distinction between a false oath and an oath taken in vain from a baraita: Which oath is an oath taken in vain? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true. And a false oath is when one takes an oath that contradicts the past. The Gemara answers: Say, i.e., emend the baraita to say, that a false oath is when one takes an oath and subsequently contradicts it by acting otherwise.

כי אתא רבין א"ר ירמיה א"ר אבהו א"ר יוחנן אכלתי ולא אכלתי שקר ואזהרתיה (ויקרא יט, יב) מלא תשבעו בשמי לשקר אוכל ולא אוכל עובר (במדבר ל, ג) בלא יחל דברו ואי זו היא שבועת שוא נשבע לשנות את הידוע לאדם § When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he reported that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one takes an oath, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, it is a false oath if it is not true. And its prohibition in the Torah is from: “And you shall not take an oath by My name falsely, so that you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). If one takes an oath, saying: I will eat, or: I will not eat, and breaks his oath, he violates the prohibition: “When a man vows a vow to the Lord, or takes an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:3). And which oath is an oath taken in vain? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true.

אמר רב פפא הא דרבי אבהו לאו בפירוש איתמר אלא מכללא איתמר דאמר רב אידי בר אבין אמר רב עמרם אמר רב יצחק א"ר יוחנן ר' יהודה אומר משום ר' יוסי הגלילי כל לא תעשה שבתורה לאו שיש בו מעשה לוקין עליו ושאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו חוץ מנשבע ומימר ומקלל את חבירו בשם Rav Pappa said: This statement of Rabbi Abbahu, i.e., conveying the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, was not stated explicitly by Rabbi Abbahu; rather, it was stated by inference. It was inferred from that which Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Amram says that Rav Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: With regard to any prohibition in the Torah, if it is a prohibition that involves an action, one is flogged for violating it. But with regard to a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for violating it, except in the cases of one who takes an oath, and one who substitutes a different animal for one that is consecrated to be sacrificed (see Leviticus 27:10), and one who curses another using the Divine Name (see Leviticus 19:14).

נשבע מנלן א"ר יוחנן משום רשב"י אמר קרא (שמות כ, ו) לא תשא את שם ה' אלהיך לשוא כי לא ינקה ב"ד של מעלה אין מנקין אותו אבל ב"ד של מטה מלקין אותו ומנקין אותו The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one who takes an oath that is not true is flogged? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: The verse states: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain; for the Lord will not absolve of guilt he that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7). It is the heavenly court that does not absolve him; but the earthly court flogs him, and in doing so, absolves him of guilt.

א"ל רב פפא לאביי דלמא הכי קאמר רחמנא לא ינקה כלל אי כתיב כי לא ינקה כדקאמרת השתא דכתיב כי לא ינקה ה' ה' הוא דאינו מנקה אבל ב"ד של מטה מלקין אותו ומנקין אותו Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Perhaps this is what the Merciful One is saying: He will not be absolved of guilt at all. Abaye answered: If it were written: For he will not be absolved of guilt, it would be as you say. Now that it is written: “For the Lord will not absolve of guilt,” the verse teaches that it is the Lord Who will not absolve one who takes His name in vain; but the earthly court flogs him, and in doing so absolves him of guilt.

אשכחן שבועת שוא שבועת שקר מנלן ר' יוחנן דידיה אמר לשוא לשוא שתי פעמים אם אינו ענין לשבועת שוא תנהו ענין לשבועת שקר The Gemara asks: We found a source for receiving lashes for an oath taken in vain, despite the fact that no physical action was performed. From where do we derive that this is also the halakha with regard to a false oath? Rabbi Yoḥanan himself said: The verse states: “In vain…in vain,” twice. If the second mention is not necessary for the matter of an oath taken in vain, since it was already stated, apply it to the matter of a false oath.

והוי בה ר' אבהו האי שבועת שקר ה"ד אילימא שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל לאו שיש בו מעשה הוא ואלא דאמר שבועה שאוכל ולא אכל האי מי לוקה והא איתמר שבועה שאוכל ככר זו היום ועבר היום ולא אכלה רבי יוחנן ור"ל דאמרי תרוייהו אינו לוקה And Rabbi Abbahu discusses this: With regard to this false oath referred to by Rabbi Yoḥanan, what are the circumstances under which one who takes it is flogged? If we say it is when he says: On my oath I will not eat, and he then ate, that is a prohibition that involves an action. And if one would rather say that he says: On my oath I will eat, and he does not eat, is one who breaks his oath like that flogged? But wasn’t it stated that with regard to one who says: On my oath I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say he is not flogged?

ר' יוחנן אמר אינו לוקה משום דהוה לאו שאין בו מעשה וכל לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו ור"ל אמר אינו לוקה משום דהוה התראת ספק והתראת ספק לא שמה התראה Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is not flogged because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and concerning any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for violating it. And Reish Lakish says he is not flogged because his violation of the prohibition necessarily involves an uncertain forewarning, and an uncertain forewarning is not considered a forewarning at all. Only if one is forewarned immediately prior to violating a prohibition does he receive lashes. Since not fulfilling his oath is a sin of omission, whenever the forewarning is offered, it remains uncertain whether one will fulfill the oath or not.

וא"ר אבהו תהא באכלתי ולא אכלתי ומאי שנא אמר רבא בפירוש ריבתה תורה שבועת שקר דומה לשוא מה שוא לשעבר אף שקר נמי לשעבר In response to his own question, Rabbi Abbahu says: The case where one who takes a false oath is flogged will be where he takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat. The Gemara asks: What is different about oaths relating to the past, for which one is liable to receive lashes even though he did not perform an action, and oaths relating to the future that one violates by omission, and for which one is therefore exempt from lashes according to Rabbi Yoḥanan because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action? Rava said: The Torah explicitly extended the liability to receive lashes to one who takes a false oath that is similar to an oath taken in vain. Just as an oath taken in vain refers to the past, so too, one is liable for a false oath that refers to the past. This discussion of Rabbi Abbahu’s is the source of his inference as to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan mentioned by Rav Pappa.

איתיביה רבי ירמיה לרבי אבהו שבועה שלא אוכל ככר זו שבועה שלא אוכלנה שבועה שלא אוכלנה ואכלה אינו חייב אלא אחת זו היא שבועת בטוי שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה קרבן עולה ויורד Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu from a mishna (27b): If one says: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and then says: On my oath I will not eat it, and then again: On my oath I will not eat it, and he subsequently ate it, he is liable only once. This is the oath on an utterance for which one who violates the prohibition intentionally is liable to receive lashes and one who violates it unwittingly is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

זו היא למעוטי מאי לאו למעוטי אכלתי ולא אכלתי דלא לקי Rabbi Yirmeya asks: When the mishna says: This is the oath on an utterance, it is to exclude what? Is it not to exclude the case of one who takes an oath relating to the past, saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, thereby indicating that he is not flogged?

לא למעוטי אכלתי ולא אכלתי מקרבן זו היא דעל שגגתה קרבן עולה ויורד אבל אכלתי ולא אכלתי לא ור' ישמעאל היא דאמר אינו חייב אלא על העתיד לבא אבל מילקא לקי The Gemara responds: No. It serves to exclude one who takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, from liability to bring an offering. The Gemara explains: This is the oath on an utterance for which one who violates it unwittingly is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. But if one takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, then no, one does not bring an offering. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: One is liable to bring an offering only for breaking oaths relating to the future, but one is flogged even for false oaths relating to the past.

Daf 21b

אימא סיפא זו היא שבועת שוא שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה פטור זו היא למעוטי מאי מאי לאו למעוטי אכלתי ולא אכלתי דלא לקי The Gemara asks: Say the latter clause of the mishna (29a): Which oath is an oath taken in vain? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true, like one says with regard to a stone column that it is made of gold. This is an oath taken in vain, for which one is liable to receive lashes if he takes the oath intentionally, and for which he is exempt if he takes it unwittingly. When the mishna says: This is an oath taken in vain, it is to exclude what? What, isn’t that phrase added to the mishna to exclude one who takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, teaching that he is not flogged?

לא זו היא דעל שגגתה פטור מקרבן אבל אכלתי ולא אכלתי על שגגתה חייב קרבן ור"ע היא דמחייב לשעבר כלהבא The Gemara responds: No, the mishna adds: This is an oath, to teach that for violating the prohibition against taking an oath in vain unwittingly, one is exempt from bringing an offering; but one who takes an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, is liable to bring an offering for an unwitting violation. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who deems one liable to bring an offering for oaths referring to the past just like one is liable for oaths referring to the future.

הא אמרת רישא ר' ישמעאל היא רישא רבי ישמעאל וסיפא רבי עקיבא כולה ר"ע ורישא לאו למעוטי אכלתי ולא אכלתי מקרבן אלא למעוטי אוכל ולא אכל ממלקות אבל קרבן מיחייב The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say that the first clause of that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? How can the first clause follow Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion and the latter clause follow Rabbi Akiva’s conflicting opinion? The Gemara answers: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the first clause does not serve to exclude one who took an oath saying: I ate, or: I did not eat, from the liability to bring an offering. Rather, it serves to exclude one who took an oath saying: I will eat, and who subsequently did not eat, from the liability to receive lashes. But he is still liable to bring an offering.

ומאי שנא מסתברא קאי בלהבא ממעט להבא קאי בלהבא ממעט לשעבר: The Gemara asks: And what is different about this way of understanding the mishna that it is to be preferred? The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that when the mishna is addressing an oath referring to the future, it excludes an oath referring to the future, in accordance with the reading that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Does it makes sense that when addressing an oath referring to the future, it excludes an oath referring to the past, as the reading of the first clause in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael would have it? Therefore, the added sentence: This is an oath on an utterance, in the first clause, serves to exclude one who took an oath saying: I will eat, and who subsequently did not eat, from the liability to receive lashes; and the whole mishna can be understood as being in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that one is liable to bring an offering even for oaths relating to the past.

שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל כל שהוא חייב כו': איבעיא להו ר"ע בכל התורה כולה כר"ש ס"ל דמחייב במשהו דתניא ר"ש אומר כל שהוא למכות ולא אמרו כזית אלא לענין קרבן § The mishna teaches that if one says: On my oath I will not eat, and he then ate any amount, even less than an olive-bulk, he is liable according to Rabbi Akiva. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does Rabbi Akiva in the entire Torah, i.e., in general, hold that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who deems one liable for eating any amount of forbidden food? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats any amount of forbidden food is liable to receive lashes, and the Sages stated the measure of an olive-bulk only in the matter of determining liability to bring an offering.

ובדין הוא דבעי איפלוגי בעלמא והאי דקא מיפלגי הכא להודיעך כוחן דרבנן דאף ע"ג דאיכא למימר הואיל ומפרש חייב סתם נמי חייב קא משמע לן דפטרי And if in fact Rabbi Akiva agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, then by right, the mishna should have taught that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree in general. And the reason that it states only here that they disagree is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis hold that even though it is possible to say that since one who eats less than an olive-bulk after taking an oath in which he specifically forbids himself any amount is liable, one who eats less than an olive-bulk without so specifying in his oath will also be liable, as that is included in his oath not to eat, that reasoning is not accepted. The mishna therefore states the dispute in the context of an oath that he will not eat in order to teach us that, according to the Rabbis, as long as he did not specify that his oath includes any amount, he is exempt from receiving lashes.

או דלמא בעלמא כרבנן סבירא ליה והכא היינו טעמא הואיל ומפרש חייב סתם נמי חייב The Gemara presents the other side of the dilemma: Or perhaps, in general, Rabbi Akiva holds like the Rabbis that one must consume at least an olive-bulk in order to be liable for a prohibition that involves eating. And here, with regard to an oath that one will not eat, this is the reason he disagrees: Since one who specifically forbids himself any amount is liable, one who eats less than an olive-bulk without so specifying in his oath will also be liable.

ת"ש דאמרו לו לר"ע היכן מצינו באוכל כל שהוא חייב שזה חייב ואם איתא לימא להו אנא בכל התורה כולה כר"ש סבירא לי Come and hear that which the Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, leading you to say that this person is liable? The Gemara explains why this is relevant: If it is so that according to Rabbi Akiva one is always liable for eating any amount, let him say to them: In the entire Torah I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

לדבריהם דרבנן קאמר להו לדידי בכל התורה כולה כר"ש סבירא לי לדידכו אודו לי מיהא הואיל ומפרש חייב סתם נמי חייב ואמרו ליה רבנן לא The Gemara answers: The fact that Rabbi Akiva did not answer the Rabbis in that way does not necessarily indicate that he does not agree with Rabbi Shimon in general. Perhaps he is speaking to the Rabbis in accordance with their own statement, and this is how he would respond to their question: As far as my opinion is concerned, in the entire Torah I hold that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that one is liable for all prohibitions involving eating when one eats any amount. According to you, admit to me at least that since one who specifically forbids himself any amount is liable, one who eats less than an olive-bulk without so specifying in his oath will also be liable. And the Rabbis said to him: No, we will not admit that.

תא שמע ר"ע אומר נזיר ששרה פתו ביין ויש בה כדי לצרף כזית חייב ואי סלקא דעתך בעלמא כר"ש סבירא ליה למה לי לצרף The Gemara presents another attempt to resolve the dilemma. Come and hear a mishna (Nazir 34b): Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate it, and the two together contain enough to combine to an olive-bulk, is liable, even though there is less than the minimal measure of wine. And if it should enter your mind that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in general, then why do I need the wine and bread to combine to the measure of an olive-bulk? Consumption of any amount of wine should be sufficient for him to be liable.

ועוד תנן שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים חייב ור' שמעון פוטר והוינן בה אמאי חייב מושבע מהר סיני הוא רב ושמואל ור' יוחנן דאמרי תרוייהו בכולל דברים המותרין עם דברים האסורין And additionally, we learned in a mishna (22b): If one says: On my oath I will not eat, and then ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses, or animals with a wound that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot], or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, he is liable; and Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. And we discussed it: Why is he liable for breaking his oath when he eats non-kosher food? He is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat forbidden food, and an oath cannot take effect to render a matter forbidden that is already forbidden. Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan both, i.e., all, say that this is a case where he incorporates into the oath that he will not eat some permitted items, along with the statement concerning the forbidden items. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted items, it extends also to the forbidden ones.

ור"ל אמר אי אתה מוצא אלא אי במפרש חצי שיעור ואליבא דרבנן אי בסתם ואליבא דר' עקיבא דאמר אדם אוסר עצמו בכל שהוא And Reish Lakish says: You find that one is liable for eating forbidden food as the result of an oath only if it is both an oath where he specifies that it includes a half-measure, in this case, less than an olive-bulk, and in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that one is not liable for eating a half-measure unless it is specified in the oath. Since eating a half-measure is not prohibited by the Torah, the oath takes effect. Alternatively, you find that one is liable if he took the oath without specifying that the oath prohibits less than the usual measure and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that a person renders himself prohibited from eating any amount by taking an oath not to eat.

ואי ס"ד בעלמא כר' שמעון סבירא ליה כל שהוא נמי מושבע ועומד מהר סיני הוא אלא לאו שמע מינה בעלמא כרבנן סבירא ליה שמע מינה: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in general, this is difficult, as one who consumes any amount is also already under oath from Mount Sinai. Why should the oath take effect according to Reish Lakish? Rather, must one not conclude from it: In general, Rabbi Akiva holds like the Rabbis, and it is only with regard to unspecified oaths that he deems one liable for eating any amount? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that Rabbi Akiva holds like the Rabbis.

אמרו לו לרבי עקיבא היכן מצינו כו': ולא והרי נמלה בריה שאני § The mishna teaches: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, leading you to say that this person is liable? The Gemara asks: And do we not? But isn’t one who eats an ant liable, despite the fact that it is smaller than an olive-bulk? The Gemara answers: A whole entity is different, since it has significance.

והרי הקדש הא בעינן שוה פרוטה The Gemara asks: But isn’t one who eats less than an olive-bulk of consecrated food liable? The Gemara answers: In order to be liable for eating consecrated food, we require a different measure, an amount worth one peruta. One is not liable for eating an amount worth less than that.

והרי מפרש מפרש נמי כבריה דמי The Gemara asks: But isn’t one who specifies in his oath that he is prohibited from eating any amount liable for doing so? The Gemara answers: One who specifies that eating any amount is prohibited is indeed comparable to one who eats a whole entity, since he has granted it significance.

והרי עפר אלא The Gemara asks: But isn’t there an unresolved question with regard to one who took an oath not to eat and then ate dirt? If, as the Rabbis claim, one is not liable for eating less than a full measure, you could rather

Daf 22a

תיפשוט דבעי רבא שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל עפר בכמה תפשוט עד דאיכא כזית כי קאמרינן במידי דבר אכילה קאמרינן answer that which Rava asks with regard to one who says: On my oath I will not eat, and who then ate dirt. Rava’s question is: How much must he eat in order to be liable? Based on the Rabbis’ statement, you could answer that he is not liable unless there is an olive-bulk that he has eaten. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: When we say in the mishna that there are no cases where a person who eats less than a full measure is liable, we say it with regard to items that are edible.

והרי קונמות קונמות נמי כמפרש דמי: The Gemara asks: But aren’t konamot an example of a case where one is liable for eating even less than an olive-bulk? The Gemara answers: Konamot are also like a case where he specifies that any amount is forbidden for consumption.

אמר להן היכן מצינו במדבר ומביא קרבן שזה מדבר ומביא קרבן: ולא והרי מגדף מדבר ואוסר קאמרינן והאי מדבר וחוטא הוא § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva said to the Rabbis: Where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it, as this oath taker merely speaks, i.e., takes an oath, and brings an offering for it? The Gemara asks: And do we not? But isn’t a blasphemer liable to bring an offering according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva (see Karetot 7a)? The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who speaks and in doing so generates a prohibition. And this one, the blasphemer, is merely one who speaks and sins but does not bring an offering.

והרי נזיר מביא קרבנו על דבורו קאמרינן והאי מביא קרבן לאשתרויי ליה חמרא הוא דקא מייתי The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t a nazirite render wine forbidden to himself through speech, by making a vow? And he does bring an offering. The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who brings an offering specifically for his speaking, and this one, the nazirite, brings an offering at the end of his naziriteship in order to permit wine to himself.

והרי הקדש אוסר לעצמו קאמרינן והאי אוסר על כל העולם כולו הוא The Gemara challenges: But isn’t consecrated property a case where one renders an item forbidden via speech alone and brings an offering for its misuse? The Gemara answers: We are speaking of one who, by speaking, generates a prohibition for himself, and nevertheless brings an offering. And this one, who consecrates an item, generates a prohibition for the whole world.

הרי קונמות קסבר אין מעילה בקונמות The Gemara challenges: Aren’t konamot an example of a case where one renders an item forbidden to himself by speech alone and brings an offering for using it? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds that there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot.

אמר רבא מחלוקת בסתם אבל במפרש דברי הכל בכל שהוא מאי טעמא מפרש נמי כבריה דמי § Rava says: The dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis is with regard to where one took the oath without specifying that he is liable for eating any amount. But in a case where he specifies that his oath applies to any amount, everyone agrees that he is liable for eating any amount. What is the reason for this? One who specifies this renders any amount significant like a whole entity.

ואמר רבא מחלוקת בשלא אוכל אבל בשלא אטעום דברי הכל בכל שהוא פשיטא מהו דתימא ליטעום נמי כדאמרי אינשי קמ"ל And Rava says: The dispute is with regard to a case where one takes an oath saying: On my oath I will not eat, but in a case where one says: On my oath I will not taste, all agree that he is liable for tasting any amount. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he is liable in that case? Tasting has no defined measure. The Gemara answers: Rava nevertheless taught it, lest you say that even if one takes an oath saying: I will not taste, he is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk, as people say: To taste, as a way of saying: To eat. Therefore, Rava teaches us that this is not the case.

אמר רב פפא מחלוקת בשבועות אבל בקונמות דברי הכל בכל שהוא מאי טעמא קונמות נמי כיון דלא קא מדכר שמא דאכילה כדמפרש דמי § Rav Pappa says: The dispute in the mishna is with regard to oaths, but with regard to konamot, all agree that one is liable for eating any amount. What is the reason for this? Indeed, with regard to konamot, since in the vow he did not explicitly mention eating, which has a defined measure, but only that the item is forbidden to him like an offering, it is as if he specified that he is liable for eating any amount.

מיתיבי שני קונמות מצטרפין שתי שבועות אין מצטרפות ר' מאיר אומר קונמות כשבועות ואי סלקא דעתך חייב בכל שהוא למה לי לצרף The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in a baraita: Items that are forbidden by two konamot combine to produce a full measure for which one is liable; items forbidden by two oaths do not so combine. Rabbi Meir says: Items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths. The Gemara explains the objection: And if it enters your mind that with regard to items forbidden by konamot, one is liable for eating any amount, why do I need them to combine?

דאמר אכילה מזו עלי קונם אכילה מזו עלי קונם אי הכי אמאי מצטרפות סוף סוף זיל להכא ליכא שיעורא וזיל להכא ליכא שיעורא דאמר אכילה משתיהן עלי קונם The Gemara answers: They combine in a case where he said: Eating from this one is konam for me; eating from that one is konam for me. Since he explicitly mentions eating, he is not liable unless he eats an olive-bulk. The Gemara asks: If so, why do they combine to produce a full measure? Ultimately, since he took two separate vows, go to this item and there is not a full measure, and go to that item and there is not a full measure. The Gemara answers: They combined to produce one full measure when he said: Eating from both of them is konam for me.

דכוותה גבי שבועות דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל משתיהן אמאי אין מצטרפין אמר רב פנחס שאני שבועות מתוך שחלוקות לחטאות אין מצטרפות The Gemara asks: In the corresponding situation with regard to oaths, where he said: On my oath I will not eat from both of them, why do they not combine? Rav Pineḥas said: Oaths are different. Since two items that are forbidden by a single oath are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, in that one is liable to bring a sin-offering for eating each one, so too eating a small amount from each does not combine in order to produce a full measure.

אי הכי ר' מאיר אומר קונמות כשבועות בשלמא שבועות הואיל וחלוקות לחטאות אלא קונמות אמאי לא איפוך רבי מאיר אומר שבועות כקונמות ולית ליה לדרב פנחס The Gemara asks: If so, how did Rabbi Meir say that items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths and do not combine to produce a full measure? Granted that items forbidden by oaths do not combine, since they are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, but why do items forbidden by konamot not combine? The Gemara answers: Reverse the language so that the baraita has Rabbi Meir say: Items forbidden by oaths are like items forbidden by konamot. Neither combines to produce a full measure, and Rabbi Meir does not accept the statement of Rav Pineḥas that items forbidden by oaths are different.

רבינא אמר כי קאמר רב פפא לענין מלקות כי תניא ההיא לענין קרבן דבעינן שוה פרוטה Ravina said: When Rav Pappa says that one is liable for eating any amount of an item forbidden by konamot, that is with regard to the matter of lashes. When it is taught in the baraita that items forbidden by konamot combine to produce a full measure, that is with regard to the matter of an offering for misuse of consecrated property, where we require that one derive benefit equal to the value of one peruta from the forbidden item.

למימרא דסברי רבנן יש מעילה בקונמות והתניא ככר זו הקדש ואכלה בין הוא בין חבירו מעל לפיכך יש לה פדיון ככר זו עלי הקדש (הרי) הוא מעל חבירו לא מעל לפיכך אין לה פדיון דברי ר"מ The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the Sages hold that the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property extend to items forbidden by konamot? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one said: This loaf is consecrated, and subsequently ate it, then either he or another who ate it is liable for misusing consecrated property; consequently, since the loaf is consecrated, it is subject to redemption. If one said: This loaf is forbidden to me as if it were consecrated, i.e., it is konam for me, and then he ate it, he is liable for misusing consecrated property, but another is not liable for misusing consecrated property; consequently, since the loaf is not fully consecrated, it is not subject to redemption. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Daf 22b

וחכמים אומרים בין הוא ובין חבירו לא מעל לפי שאין מעילה בקונמות And the Rabbis say: Both he and the other are not liable for misusing consecrated property, because there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot.

איפוך אחד זה ואחד זה לא מעל לפי שאין מעילה בקונמות דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים הוא מעל וחבירו לא מעל The Gemara responds: Reverse the opinions and say as follows: Both this one and that one are not liable for misusing consecrated property, because there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property with regard to konamot. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He is liable for misuse of consecrated property and the other is not liable for misuse of consecrated property.

אי הכי רבי מאיר אומר קונמות כשבועות אלא קונמות אצטרופי הוא דלא מצטרפי הא מעילה אית בהו והאמר ר' מאיר אין מעילה בקונמות כלל The Gemara asks: If so, how is it that Rabbi Meir says in the previous baraita: Items forbidden by konamot are like those forbidden by oaths? Items forbidden by konamot do not combine to produce a full measure that renders one liable for misuse of consecrated property, but this indicates that misuse of consecrated property nevertheless applies to them. But doesn’t Rabbi Meir say, according to the reversal of the opinions, that with regard to konamot, there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property at all?

לדבריהן דרבנן קאמר להו לדידי אין מעילה בקונמות כלל לדידכו אודו לי מיהת דקונמות כשבועות The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Meir says that items forbidden by konamot do not combine to produce a full measure, he is saying this to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, as follows: According to my opinion with regard to konamot, there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property at all. According to your opinion, at least admit to me that items forbidden by konamot are like items forbidden by oaths and do not combine to produce a full measure.

ורבנן שבועות איכא דרב פנחס קונמות ליכא דרב פנחס And the Rabbis? They explain that with regard to items forbidden by oaths one should apply the reasoning of Rav Pineḥas that since two items that are forbidden by a single oath are distinct with regard to sin-offerings, they do not combine in order to produce a full measure. With regard to konamot the reasoning of Rav Pineḥas does not apply.

אמר רבא שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל עפר פטור בעי רבא שבועה שלא אוכל עפר בכמה כיון דאמר שלא אוכל דעתיה אכזית או דלמא כיון דלאו מידי דאכלי אינשי הוא בכל שהוא תיקו: § Rava says that if one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate dirt, he is exempt, because eating dirt is not considered to be eating. Rava raises a dilemma: If one says: On my oath I will not eat dirt, how much dirt must he eat in order to be liable? Is the halakha that since he said: I will not eat dirt, his intention is that the prohibition applies to an olive-bulk? That is the standard measure for prohibitions with regard to eating. Or perhaps, since dirt is not something that people eat, he is liable for eating any amount. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רבא שבועה שלא אוכל חרצן בכמה כיון דמתאכיל על ידי תערובת דעתיה אכזית או דלמא כיון דלא בעיניה אכלי ליה אינשי דעתיה אמשהו תיקו Rava raises a dilemma: If one says: On my oath I will not eat a grape seed, how much must he eat in order to be liable? Is the halakha that since it is ordinarily eaten in a mixture, i.e., as part of a grape, his intention is that the prohibition applies to a complete olive-bulk measure of grape seeds? Or perhaps, since people do not eat it by itself but always in a mixture, his intention is to be liable for eating any amount. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רב אשי נזיר שאמר שבועה שלא אוכל חרצן בכמה דכיון דכזית איסורא דאורייתא הוא כי קא משתבע אהתירא קא משתבע ודעתיה אמשהו או דלמא כיון דאמר שלא אוכל דעתיה אכזית § Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: In the case of a nazirite who says: On my oath I will not eat a grape seed, how much must he eat in order to be liable? A nazirite is prohibited from eating grape seeds (see Numbers 6:4). Is the halakha that since eating an olive-bulk is a prohibition by Torah law, when he takes an oath of this sort, he is taking the oath to prohibit that which is permitted to him and his intention in taking the oath is to prohibit eating any amount? Or perhaps, since he said: I will not eat a grape seed, his intention is that the prohibition applies to an olive-bulk, which is the standard measure for what is considered eating.

תא שמע שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים חייב ור' שמעון פוטר והוינן בה אמאי חייב מושבע ועומד מהר סיני הוא רב ושמואל ור' יוחנן דאמרי בכולל דברים המותרין עם דברים האסורין The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a mishna (22b): With regard to one who said: On my oath I will not eat, and then ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. And we discussed it: Why is he liable for violating his oath when he eats non-kosher food? He is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat forbidden food, and an oath cannot take effect to prohibit that which is already forbidden. Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan all say that this is a case where he incorporates into the oath that he will not eat some permitted items, along with the statement concerning the forbidden items. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted items, it extends also to the forbidden ones.

וריש לקיש אמר אי אתה מוצא אלא אי במפרש חצי שיעור ואליבא דרבנן אי בסתם ואליבא דרבי עקיבא דאמר אדם אוסר עצמו בכל שהוא And Reish Lakish says: You find that one is liable for eating non-kosher food after taking an oath not to eat only if it is both a case where he specifies in the oath that his oath includes a half-measure and in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that one is not liable for eating a half-measure unless it is specified in the oath. Since eating a half-measure is not prohibited by the Torah, the oath takes effect. Alternatively, you find that one is liable if he took the oath without specifying that the oath prohibits less than the usual measure and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that a person renders himself prohibited from eating any amount by taking an oath not to eat.

והא נבילה דמושבע ועומד מהר סיני הוא דכי חרצן לגבי נזיר דמיא וטעמא דפריש הא לא פריש דעתיה אכזית שמע מינה The Gemara comments: But isn’t a carcass an item for which one is already under oath from Mount Sinai? In that respect it resembles a grape seed for a nazirite, and yet the reason that Reish Lakish says he is liable according to the Rabbis is that he specified that the oath prohibits him from eating even a half-measure, indicating that if he did not specify, his intention is that the oath refer to an olive-bulk. Conclude from it that a nazirite who takes an oath not to eat a grape seed is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk.

אלא תפשוט דבעי רבא שבועה שלא אוכל עפר בכמה תפשוט דעד דאיכא כזית דהא נבילה כעפר דמיא וטעמא דפריש הא לא פריש דעתיה אכזית The Gemara asks: But according to this, resolve the dilemma that Rava raises with regard to one who says: On my oath I will not eat dirt, asking how much he must eat in order to be liable? Resolve the dilemma by saying that he is not liable unless he eats an olive-bulk, since a carcass resembles dirt, and the reason he is liable is that he specified that the oath prohibits him from eating even a half-measure, indicating that if he did not specify, his intention is that the oath refers to an olive-bulk.

לא עפר לאו בר אכילה הוא כלל נבילה בת אכילה ואריא הוא דרביע עילווה: The Gemara answers: No, the dilemma cannot be resolved based on this comparison. Dirt is entirely inedible. A carcass, by contrast, is edible, but a lion crouches on it, i.e., eating it is prohibited by the Torah. Therefore, one cannot derive the halakha concerning dirt from the halakha concerning a carcass.

מתני׳ שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל ושתה אינו חייב אלא אחת שבועה שלא אוכל ושלא אשתה ואכל ושתה חייב שתים שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל פת חטין ופת שעורין ופת כוסמין אינו חייב אלא אחת שבועה שלא אוכל פת חטין ופת שעורין ופת כוסמין ואכל חייב על כל אחת ואחת שבועה שלא אשתה ושתה משקין הרבה אינו חייב אלא אחת שבועה שלא אשתה יין ושמן ודבש ושתה חייב על כל אחת ואחת MISHNA: If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring only one offering, because an oath to refrain from eating includes refraining from drinking. If he said: On my oath I will not eat and I will not drink, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring two offerings. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate wheat bread and barley bread and spelt bread, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread or barley bread or spelt bread, and then he ate all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one. If he said: On my oath I will not drink, and then he drank several kinds of liquids, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not drink wine or oil or honey, and then he drank all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one.

שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל אוכלין שאינן ראוין לאכילה ושתה משקין שאינן ראוין לשתיה פטור שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים חייב ור' שמעון פוטר אמר קונם אשתי נהנית לי אם אכלתי היום והוא אכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים הרי אשתו אסורה: If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since he is already under oath from Mount Sinai not to eat them and an oath cannot take effect where another oath is in force. But if he said: It is konam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.

גמ׳ אמר רבי חייא בר אבין אמר שמואל שבועה שלא אוכל ושתה חייב איבעית אימא סברא ואיבעית אימא קרא GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Shmuel says: If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he drank, he is liable. If you wish, you may propose a logical argument for this ruling, and if you wish, you may cite a verse to explain it.

איבעית אימא סברא דאמר ליה אינש לחבריה נטעום מידי ועיילי ואכלי ושתו ואיבעית אימא קרא שתיה בכלל אכילה דאמר ריש לקיש מנין לשתיה שהיא בכלל אכילה שנאמר (דברים יד, כג) ואכלת לפני ה' אלהיך במקום אשר יבחר לשכן שמו שם מעשר דגנך ותירושך The Gemara explains: If you wish, you may propose a logical argument for this ruling: It is clear that drinking is included in eating from the fact that a person will say to another: Let’s have a taste of something, and they go in and eat and drink. And if you wish, cite a verse as the source for this ruling, as Reish Lakish says: From where is it derived that drinking is included in eating? It is derived from that which is stated: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, the tithe of your grain, of your tirosh, and of your oil” (Deuteronomy 14:23).

Daf 23a

ותירוש חמרא הוא וכתיב ואכלת And since the Hebrew word tirosh mentioned in the verse is wine, and it is written with regard to it: “And you shall eat,” this indicates that drinking is an activity included in eating.

ודלמא על ידי אניגרון דאמר רבה בר שמואל אניגרון מיא דסילקי אכסיגרון מיא דכולהו סילקי The Gemara challenges: But perhaps the verse is referring to consuming wine by means of an anigeron, as Rabba bar Shmuel says: Anigeron is a stew of beet greens and wine, and aksigeron is a stew of all types of cooked vegetables. If so, the wine in the verse is not drunk but eaten.

אלא אמר רב אחא בר יעקב מהכא (דברים יד, כו) ונתתה הכסף בכל אשר תאוה נפשך בבקר ובצאן וביין ובשכר יין חמרא הוא וכתיב ואכלת Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Cite from here, a verse written with regard to money with which one has redeemed second tithe: “And you shall bestow the money for whatsoever your soul desires, for oxen, or for sheep, or for wine [uvayyayin], or for strong drink, or for whatsoever your soul asks of you; and you shall eat there before the Lord your God, and you shall rejoice, you and your household” (Deuteronomy 14:26). The Hebrew word yayin mentioned in the verse is wine, and it is written: “And you shall eat.”

ודלמא ה"נ על ידי אניגרון The Gemara challenges: But perhaps here this verse is also referring to consuming wine by means of an anigeron.

שכר כתיב מידי דמשכר The Gemara rejects this: “Strong drink” is written in the verse, referring to something intoxicating, and wine mixed into a stew is not intoxicating.

ודלמא דבילה קעילית דתניא אכל דבילה קעילית ושתה דבש וחלב ונכנס למקדש ועבד חייב The Gemara challenges: But perhaps the intoxicating substance referred to in the verse is pressed figs from Ke’ila, as it is taught in a baraita: A priest who ate pressed figs from Ke’ila or drank honey or milk and then entered the Temple and performed the sacrificial rites is liable for violating the prohibition against conducting the Temple service while intoxicated.

אלא גמר שכר שכר מנזיר מה להלן יין אף כאן יין Rather, one derives the meaning of “strong drink” in this verse by means of a verbal analogy from the verse about a nazirite: “He shall abstain from wine and strong drink: He shall drink no vinegar of wine, or vinegar of strong drink, neither shall he drink any liquor of grapes, nor eat fresh grapes or dried” (Numbers 6:3). Just as there, the strong drink that is forbidden to the nazirite is referring to a type of wine, so too here, the verse is referring to wine.

אמר רבא אף אנן נמי תנינא שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל ושתה אינו חייב אלא אחת אי אמרת בשלמא שתיה בכלל אכילה איצטריך ליה לתנא לאשמועינן דאינו חייב אלא אחת אלא אי אמרת שתיה לאו בכלל אכילה שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל ועשה מלאכה מי איצטריך לאשמועינן דאינו חייב אלא אחת § Rava said: We learn in the mishna as well that drinking is included in eating. The mishna teaches: If one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring only one offering. Granted, if you say that drinking is included in eating, that is why it was necessary for the tanna to teach us that he is liable to bring only one offering. But if you say that drinking is not included in eating, there is no reason for the tanna to teach that it is only one violation. If one says: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate and performed some kind of labor, would it be necessary to teach us that the person is liable to bring only one offering? He never took an oath prohibiting labor.

א"ל אביי אלא מאי שתיה בכלל אכילה אימא סיפא שבועה שלא אוכל ושלא אשתה ואכל ושתה חייב שתים כיון דאמר שלא אוכל איתסר ליה בשתיה כי אמר שלא אשתה אמאי חייב אילו אמר שלא אשתה תרי זימני מי מיחייב תרתי Abaye said to him: What, rather, is your conclusion; that drinking is included in eating? Say the latter clause of the mishna: If he said: On my oath I will not eat and I will not drink, and then he ate and drank, he is liable to bring two offerings. According to you, Rava, once he said: I will not eat, drinking became forbidden to him, so when he said: I will not drink, why is he rendered liable to bring a separate offering? If he had said: I will not drink, two times, would he be liable to bring two offerings?

אמר ליה התם דאמר שלא אשתה והדר אמר שלא אוכל דשתיה בכלל אכילה איתא אכילה בכלל שתיה ליתא Rava said to him: There, in the mishna, it is actually a case where he said: I will not drink, and then said: I will not eat. Although it is so that drinking is included in eating, it is not so that eating is included in drinking, and the oath not to drink went into effect independently of the oath not to eat. Therefore, he is liable to bring two offerings.

אבל אמר שבועה שלא אוכל ושלא אשתה ואכל ושתה מאי אינו חייב אלא אחת אי הכי אדתני רישא שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל ושתה אינו חייב אלא אחת ליתני שבועה שלא אוכל ושלא אשתה אינו חייב אלא אחת וכל שכן שלא אוכל לחודיה The Gemara asks: But according to this, if he said: On my oath I will not eat and I will not drink, and he then ate and drank, what is the halakha? Is it that he is liable to bring only one offering? If that is so, rather than teaching in the first clause of the mishna that one who said: On my oath I will not eat, and then ate and drank, is liable to bring only one offering, let the tanna teach the following: If one says: On my oath I will not eat and I will not drink, and he ate and drank, he is liable to bring only one offering. From that ruling it could be concluded that when one takes an oath: I will not eat, alone, all the more so is he liable to bring only one offering.

אלא לעולם כדקתני ושאני הכא כיון דאמר שלא אוכל והדר אמר שלא אשתה גלי אדעתיה דהך אכילה דאמר אכילה גרידתא היא Rather, the mishna actually is as it is taught, that one who took an oath not to eat and drink, and then ate and drank, is liable to bring two offerings, even though drinking is included in eating. And here it is different. Since he said: I will not eat, and then said: I will not drink, he revealed his intention that the eating that he stated first is eating alone and does not include drinking.

אמר רב אשי מתני' נמי דיקא שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל אוכלין שאין ראוין לאכילה ושתה משקין שאין ראוין לשתיה פטור הא ראוין חייב ואמאי הא שבועה שלא אוכל קאמר Rav Ashi said: The mishna is also precisely formulated in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel that drinking is included in eating. It teaches: If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. But if those liquids were fit for consumption, he would be liable. And why? The mishna teaches that he took an oath saying: On my oath I will not eat, without mentioning drinking, which indicates that drinking is included in eating.

דלמא דאמר תרתי שבועה שלא אוכל שבועה שלא אשתה: The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the mishna is referring to a case where he said both: On my oath I will not eat and: On my oath I will not drink. The mishna did not spell out the second oath because its primary interest was in teaching that eating or drinking that which is inedible or not potable is not considered eating or drinking.

שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל פת חטין כו': ודלמא למיפטר נפשיה מאחרנייתא קאתי § The mishna teaches that if one said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate wheat bread and barley bread and spelt bread, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread or barley bread or spelt bread, and then he ate all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each one. The Gemara challenges: But perhaps when he details each type of bread it comes to ensure that he exempts himself from having other foods included in the oath, not to indicate that each type of bread is a separate oath.

הוה ליה למימר חטין ושעורין וכוסמין ודלמא לכוס The Gemara answers: If that was his intention, then he could have just said: Wheat, barley, and spelt, without mentioning bread each time. From the fact that he mentioned bread each time, it can be understood that his intention was that each be considered a separate oath. The Gemara rejects this: But if he did not mention bread, perhaps his oath could be interpreted to prohibit chewing [lakhos] whole kernels of these grains, and he consequently mentioned bread to limit the oath to bread.

דהוה ליה למימר פת חטין ושעורין וכוסמין ודלמא פת חטין לאכול שעורין וכוסמין לכוס The Gemara suggests: If his intention was to ensure that his oath does not extend to other foods, he could have just said: Bread made from wheat, or barley, or spelt, and in that way his oath would be limited to just bread. The Gemara rejects this: If he had said it that way, perhaps his oath could be interpreted to prohibit him from eating wheat bread and from chewing whole kernels of barley or spelt.

דהוה ליה למימר פת חטין ושל שעורין ושל כוסמין The Gemara suggests: If his intention was to ensure that his oath does not extend to other foods, he could have just said: Bread made from wheat, and from barley, and from spelt, thereby limiting his oath to types of bread.

Daf 23b

ודלמא ע"י תערובת The Gemara rejects this: But if he had said it that way, perhaps his oath could be interpreted to prohibit only bread made from a mixture of all these grains.

אימא וכן של שעורים וכן של כוסמין פת פת למה לי שמע מיניה לחלק: The Gemara suggests: If the specification in the mishna serves merely to ensure that his oath does not extend to other foods, have him say: Bread made from wheat and so from barley and so from spelt. Why do I need to repeat: Bread, bread, each time? Conclude from it that the point of repeating the word bread each time is to individuate each statement as a separate oath.

שבועה שלא אשתה ושתה משקין הרבה אינו חייב אלא אחת כו': בשלמא התם דאמרת מייתרא ליה פת פת לחיובא אלא הכא מאי הוה למימר דלמא למיפטר נפשיה ממשקין אחריני קאתי § The mishna teaches: If he said: On my oath I will not drink, and then he drank several kinds of liquids, he is liable to bring only one offering. If he says: On my oath I will not drink wine, or oil, or honey, and he drank all of them, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one. The Gemara asks: Granted, there, in the case of the bread, the ruling of the mishna is understood, as you said that the word bread before barley, and the word bread before spelt are superfluous and serve to extend his liability so that each is considered an independent oath. But here, where there is no superfluous language, what was there to say? Perhaps the oath comes to ensure that he exempts himself so that the oath does not extend to other liquids. Since that is a possibility, he should not be liable for breaking three separate oaths when he drank all three liquids.

אמר רב פפא הכא במונחין לפניו עסקינן שהיה לו לומר שבועה שלא אשתה אלו ודלמא אלו הוא דלא שתינא אחריני שתינא Rav Pappa said: We are dealing here with a situation where all three liquids are placed before him. Under the circumstances, if he merely wished to indicate that his oath is limited to these liquids, he could have said: On my oath I will not drink these. Since he instead specified the liquids in the oath, it was in order to indicate that each should be considered as a separate oath. The Gemara challenges: But had he said: I will not drink these, perhaps his oath would be interpreted as meaning: It is these liquids, which are before me right now, that I will not drink, but I will drink other wine, oil, and honey.

אלא דאמר שבועה דלא שתינא כגון אלו דלמא כגון אלו דלא שתינא בציר מהכי וטפי מהכי שתינא The Gemara answers: Rather, if he merely wished to indicate that his oath is limited to these types of liquids, it would be a case where he said: On my oath I will not drink liquids such as these. The Gemara challenges: Had he said it that way, perhaps it could be interpreted as referring to the volume of the liquids: I will not drink liquids such as these, but I will drink less than this or more than this.

אלא כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אשתה ממין אלו ודלמא מין אלו הוא דלא שתינא הא אינהו גופייהו שתינא The Gemara answers: Rather, if he merely wished to indicate that his oath is limited to these types of liquids, it is a case where he said: On my oath I will not drink from these types of liquids. The Gemara challenges: But had he said it that way, perhaps his oath would be interpreted to mean: I will not drink these types of liquids in general, but I will drink these particular liquids in front of me.

אימא שלא אשתה אלו ומינייהו The Gemara suggests: If the point of the specification of the liquids in the mishna was merely to ensure that his oath does not extend to other liquids, have him say: On my oath I will not drink these and liquids of their types. Since he instead specified: Wine, oil, and honey, one may conclude that his intention was to individuate each liquid as a separate oath.

רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר במסרהב בו חבירו עסקינן דאמר לו בוא ושתה עמי יין ושמן ודבש דהיה לו לומר שבועה שלא אשתה עמך יין ושמן ודבש למה לי לחייב על כל אחת ואחת Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: We are dealing with a case in which another is importuning him to drink, as he said to him: Come, drink wine, and oil, and honey with me; if he wanted him to desist, he should have said: On my oath I will not drink with you. Under these circumstances, why do I need him to specify: Wine, and oil, and honey? The specification of the liquids serves to indicate his intention to render himself liable for each and every one.

תנן התם תן לי חטין ושעורין וכוסמין שיש לי בידך שבועה שאין לך בידי כלום אינו חייב אלא אחת שבועה שאין לך בידי חטין ושעורין וכוסמין חייב על כל אחת ואחת § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (36b) with regard to an oath concerning a deposit, that if one says to his bailee: Give me my wheat, barley, and spelt that are in your possession, and the bailee lies and says: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable to bring only one guilt-offering. But if the bailee says: On my oath I do not have in my possession any wheat, barley, or spelt that belong to you, he is liable to bring a separate offering for each and every one.

וא"ר יוחנן אפי' פרוטה מכולם מצטרפת And Rabbi Yoḥanan says with regard to that mishna that he is liable even if the value of all three species combines to amount to as little as one peruta.

פליגי בה רב אחא ורבינא חד אמר אפרטי מיחייב אכללי לא מיחייב וחד אמר אכללי נמי מיחייב Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this. One said: When the bailee says: On my oath I do not have in my possession any wheat, barley, or spelt that belong to you, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering only for violating the specific oaths for individual types of grain, and he is not liable for violating a general oath that he does not have anything in his possession. Consequently, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that the different types of grains can be combined to amount to one peruta is referring only to the oath in the first clause of the mishna where he did not specify the grains. And one said: He is also liable for violating a general oath, and in the latter clause of the mishna he is liable for violating four oaths: One general oath that he does not have anything in his possession and three specific oaths, one for each type of grain. Consequently, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement applies also to where he specifies the grains, and he is liable to bring one offering even when all three species combine to amount to only one peruta.

הכא מאי The Gemara asks: Here, in the case of one who takes an oath that he will not eat wheat bread, barley bread, or spelt bread, what is the halakha? Is there a dispute as to whether he is considered to have taken a general oath alongside the specific oaths?

אמר רבא הכי השתא התם מיחייב אכללא ומיחייב אפרטא דהא אי משתבע והדר משתבע מיחייב תרתי הכא אי סלקא דעתך איתא בכללא אפרטי אמאי מיחייב מושבע ועומד הוא: Rava said: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of an oath of a deposit, he is liable for the general oath and for the specific oath, since if a bailee takes an oath denying that he is in possession of a deposit and then takes another oath to the same effect, he is liable for taking two false oaths on a deposit. Here, with regard to an oath to prohibit oneself from eating, if it enters your mind that he is bound by a general oath, why would he be liable for the specific oaths? He is already under an oath due to the general oath, and an oath cannot take effect when the matter it prohibits is already forbidden by another oath.

שבועה שלא אוכל וכו': הא גופא קשיא אמרת שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל אוכלין שאין ראוין לאכילה ושתה משקין שאין ראוין לשתיה פטור והדר תני שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים חייב מאי שנא רישא דפטור ומאי שנא סיפא דחייב § The mishna teaches that if one said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible, he is exempt. If he said: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses, he is liable. The Gemara asks: This mishna itself is difficult. You said that if one said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate foods that are inedible, or drank liquids that are not potable, he is exempt. And then the mishna teaches that if one says: On my oath I will not eat, and then he ate the meat of unslaughtered carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is liable. What is different about the first clause that he is exempt and what is different about the latter clause that he is liable? Non-kosher animals are also unfit to be eaten.

הא לא קשיא רישא בסתם וסיפא במפרש The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. The first clause is where he took an oath not to eat without specifying what is included in it. Presumably, his oath did not include items that are not ordinarily eaten. And the latter clause is a case where he specifies what it is he will not eat, e.g., unslaughtered carcasses, and nevertheless eats them.

מפרש נמי גופיה תיקשי אמאי מושבע מהר סיני הוא The Gemara asks: You may also raise a difficulty with regard to the case where he specifies that he will not eat non-kosher items: Why? He is under oath from Mount Sinai, and an oath does not take effect to prohibit that which is already forbidden.

רב ושמואל ורבי יוחנן דאמרי בכולל דברים המותרין עם דברים האסורין Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan all say that this is a case where he incorporates into the oath that he will not eat some permitted items, along with the statement concerning the forbidden items. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the permitted items, it extends also to the forbidden ones.

וריש לקיש אמר אי אתה מוצא אלא אי במפרש חצי שיעור ואליבא דרבנן אי בסתם אליבא דרבי עקיבא דאמר אדם אוסר עצמו בכל שהוא And Reish Lakish says: You find that one is liable for eating non-kosher food as the result of an oath only if it is an oath where he specifies that it includes a half-measure, and in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that one is not liable for eating a half-measure unless it is specified in the oath. Since eating a half-measure is not prohibited by Torah law, the oath takes effect. Alternatively, you find that one is liable if he took the oath without specifying that the oath prohibits less than the usual measure, and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that a person renders himself prohibited from eating any amount by taking an oath not to eat.

בשלמא רבי יוחנן לא אמר כריש לקיש דמוקים לה למתניתין כדברי הכל אלא ר"ל מאי טעמא לא אמר כר' יוחנן The Gemara asks: Granted, it is understood why Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say like Reish Lakish, as he interprets the mishna so that it is in accordance with the opinion of everyone; but what is the reason that Reish Lakish does not say like the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan?

אמר לך כי אמרינן איסור כולל The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could say to you: When we say that a more inclusive prohibition, which adds additional aspects to the prohibition for the same individual, can take effect where there already is a prohibition in place,

Daf 24a

באיסור הבא מאליו באיסור הבא על ידי עצמו לא אמרינן it is with regard to a prohibition that occurs on its own, like the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur, which is more inclusive than the prohibition against eating non-kosher food and therefore takes effect. But with regard to a prohibition that occurs by the act of a person himself, i.e., an oath or a vow, we do not say that because it is more inclusive it can take effect also with regard to items that are already forbidden by Torah law.

בשלמא לריש לקיש משום הכי קא פטר רבי שמעון דתניא רבי שמעון אומר כל שהוא למכות ולא אמרו כזית אלא לקרבן אלא לרבי יוחנן מאי טעמא דרבי שמעון דפטר The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Reish Lakish, who understands the mishna to be dealing with the case of one who took an oath about less than a full measure, it is due to this reason that Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who takes an oath prohibiting himself from eating non-kosher food, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: Any amount is sufficient to render one liable to receive lashes, and the Sages stated the measure of an olive-bulk to determine only liability to bring an offering. According to Reish Lakish, Rabbi Shimon holds that one is already under oath from Mount Sinai even with regard to less than a full measure, and for that reason the oath does not take effect. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who understands the mishna to be referring to an oath that includes erstwhile permitted items, what is the reason that Rabbi Shimon deems one exempt from bringing an offering for breaking his oath not to eat non-kosher food?

מידי הוא טעמא אלא משום איסור כולל רבי שמעון לטעמיה דלית ליה איסור כולל דתניא רבי שמעון אומר האוכל נבילה ביוה"כ פטור The Gemara answers: Isn’t the reason that the first tanna holds that the individual is liable for violating his oath only due to the fact that the oath generates a more inclusive prohibition? In this matter Rabbi Shimon conforms to his standard line of reasoning in that he does not hold that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect where a preexisting prohibition is in place. This is in accordance with that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats non-kosher meat on Yom Kippur is exempt from bringing an offering for eating on Yom Kippur, despite the fact that the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur is a more inclusive prohibition than that of eating non-kosher meat, as on that day one may not eat anything.

בשלמא לריש לקיש משכחת לה בלאו והן אלא לר' יוחנן בשלמא לאו משכחת לה אלא הן היכי משכחת לה From the verse: “Or if any one take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), the Sages derived that one is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance only when the oath is such that it could be inverted from the positive to the negative or vice versa. For example, one is liable for violating an oath to eat because one can also take an oath not to eat. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, you find a case where the oath can be negative or positive. Therefore, one is liable according to the Rabbis when he takes an oath that he will eat any amount, since he could also take an oath that he will not eat any amount. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, granted, that you can find a case of a negative oath, as the oath not to eat non-kosher animals takes effect when it includes other erstwhile permitted items. But how can you find a positive version of this oath? An oath to eat non-kosher animals cannot take effect, as eating non-kosher animals is prohibited by Torah law.

אלא כדרבא דאמר רבא שבועה שלא אוכל ואכל עפר פטור Rather, do not distinguish between the former and the latter clauses of the mishna based on whether he specifies what he is eating. In both cases he takes an oath not to eat, without specifying. In the case where he eats something inedible, he is exempt, in accordance with that which Rava says, as Rava says that if one said: On my oath I will not eat, and he ate dirt, he is exempt, since eating an inedible substance is not considered to be eating. Eating non-kosher meat is considered to be eating; for that reason, the latter clause of the mishna states that one is liable for doing so if he took an oath not to eat. The oath takes effect with regard to the non-kosher items because, as Rabbi Yoḥanan noted, it includes items that would otherwise be permitted.

אמר רב מרי אף אנן נמי תנינא קונם אשתי נהנית לי אם אכלתי היום ואכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים הרי אשתו אסורה לו Rav Mari said: We learn in the mishna (22b) as well that eating non-kosher food is considered eating, as if one said: It is konam for my wife to derive benefit from me if I ate today, and he had eaten carcasses or tereifot, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, his wife is prohibited from deriving benefit from him.

הכי השתא התם כיון דמעיקרא אכל והדר אשתבע ליה The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? There, since he initially ate the forbidden item and only then took an oath saying that he did not eat,

Daf 24b

חשובי אחשביה אלא הכא מי אחשביה in taking the oath, he granted significance to the non-kosher food, and that is why his eating forbidden items is considered to be eating. But here, where he took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher food, did he thereby give significance to it? For this reason, no conclusive proof can be cited from the last case in the mishna.

אמר רבא מאי טעמא דמאן דאית ליה איסור כולל Rabbi Yoḥanan understands the mishna as referring to a case in which the oath takes effect because it is a more inclusive prohibition than the prohibition against eating non-kosher food, in that it adds additional prohibitions for the same individual. In this context, Rava says: What is the reasoning of the one who holds that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect where there already is a prohibition in place?

מידי דהוה אאיסור מוסיף Rava answers his own question: It is just as it is in the case of an expanded prohibition, which incorporates additional people into the list of those for whom the original item is forbidden. An expanded prohibition also takes effect despite the fact that there is already a prohibition in place.

ומאן דפטר דלית ליה כי אמר איסור מוסיף בחדא חתיכה בשתי חתיכות לא אמרי' And with regard to the one who exempts another from liability in the case of a more inclusive prohibition, as he does not hold that it takes effect, why does he hold that an expanded prohibition does take effect? When he says that an expanded prohibition takes effect, that is with regard to a single piece, i.e., that the number of people who are prohibited from eating the same piece of meat is expanded. With regard to two distinct pieces, i.e., a case where the new prohibition expands the scope of prohibited items, as in an inclusive prohibition, we do not say that it takes effect.

ואמר רבא למאן דאית ליה איסור כולל אמר שבועה שלא אוכל תאנים וחזר ואמר שבועה שלא אוכל תאנים וענבים מיגו דחייל אענבים חייל נמי אתאנים § And Rava says: According to the one who holds that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect where another prohibition is already in place, the halakha should be as follows: When a person says: On my oath I will not eat figs, and then says: On my oath I will not eat figs and grapes, since the last oath takes effect with regard to the grapes, it also takes effect with regard to the figs, even though they were already forbidden by his previous oath.

פשיטא The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious?

מהו דתימא איסור הבא מאליו אמרינן איסור הבא מעצמו לא אמרינן קמ"ל: The Gemara answers: Lest you say that we say that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect only with regard to a prohibition that occurs on its own, like the prohibition against eating non-kosher food, but with regard to a prohibition that occurs by the act of a person himself we do not say that the more inclusive prohibition takes effect, Rava teaches us that there is no difference.

מתיב רבא בריה דרבה יש אוכל אכילה אחת וחייב עליה ארבע חטאות ואשם אחד ואלו הן טמא שאכל חלב והוא נותר מן המוקדשין ביוה"כ Rava, son of Rabba, raises an objection from a mishna (Karetot 13b): It is possible for a person to perform one act of eating for which he is liable to bring four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering. And these are the prohibitions one can violate in this manner: A ritually impure person who ate forbidden fat that is the leftover from one of the sacrificial animals on Yom Kippur. If he did this and was unaware of the relevant prohibitions he is liable to bring four sin-offerings, as well as a guilt-offering for deriving benefit from the misuse of consecrated property.

ר' מאיר אומר אף אם היתה שבת והוציאו חייב אמרו לו אינו מן השם Rabbi Meir says: Also, if it was Shabbat and he transferred the item from one domain to another in his mouth, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing labor on Shabbat as well. The Rabbis said to him: This is not a prohibition of the same type, since in the case of Rabbi Meir’s additional prohibition he does not violate it by eating.

ואם איתא משכחת לה חמש כגון שאמר שבועה שלא אוכל תמרים וחלב מיגו דחייל אתמרים חיילא נמי אחלב Rava, son of Rabba, explains the objection that arises from the mishna: And if it is so that a more inclusive prohibition takes effect, then you find a case where one is liable for the violation of five prohibitions in one act of eating, such as where one says in the aforementioned situation: On my oath I will not eat dates and forbidden fat. Since the oath takes effect with regard to the dates, it also takes effect with regard to the forbidden fat. The fact that the mishna fails to mention such an oath indicates that a more inclusive prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition is already in place.

כי קתני איסור הבא מאליו איסור הבא מעצמו לא קתני The Gemara answers: The absence of an oath with a more inclusive prohibition in the mishna does not indicate anything. When the tanna teaches the scenario above, he lists only the potential prohibitions that occur on their own in one act of eating, but he does not teach prohibitions that occur by the act of the person himself.

והרי הקדש The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from consecrated property, which does not occur on its own but only when an item is consecrated?

בבכור דקדושתו מרחם The Gemara answers: The case in the mishna is that of a first-born animal, whose sanctity is from the womb, i.e., begins automatically at birth.

איבעית אימא כי קתני מידי דלית ליה שאלה שבועה דאית ליה שאלה לא קתני If you wish, say instead, in response to the question, that when the tanna of the mishna teaches it, he includes only matters to which presenting a request for dissolution do not apply. An oath, to which a request for dissolution applies, is not taught.

הרי הקדש The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from consecrated property? Consecration can be dissolved by a Sage.

הא אוקמינן בבכור The Gemara answers: Didn’t we already establish that the case in the mishna is that of a firstborn animal, whose sanctity cannot be dissolved?

איבעית אימא כי קתני קרבן קבוע קרבן עולה ויורד לא קתני If you wish, say instead that when he teaches that case, he lists only those prohibitions for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering. If one breaks his oath he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, and the tanna of the mishna does not teach about the liability to bring other offerings.

הרי טמא שאכל את הקדש דקרבן עולה ויורד הוא The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna list the transgression of an impure person who ate consecrated items, i.e., the sacrificial animals mentioned in the mishna, which is a prohibition for which one brings a sliding-scale offering?

בנשיא ורבי אליעזר היא דאמר נשיא מביא שעיר The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a king who eats the leftover of a sacrificial animal while impure, and the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: A ritually impure king who ate consecrated items brings a male goat as a sin-offering, rather than the sliding-scale offering brought by a commoner.

רב אשי אמר כי קתני מידי דחיילא כשיעור שבועה דחיילא אפחות מכשיעור לא קתני Rav Ashi said there is a different answer: When the tanna teaches this case, he lists only matters that apply when one eats the measure of an olive-bulk, whereas the case of an oath, which applies to eating even less than the standard measure, is not taught in the mishna.

הרי הקדש The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from the misuse of consecrated property, which applies to eating even less than an olive-bulk?

הא בעינן שוה פרוטה The Gemara answers: We require that one derive the value of one peruta of benefit in order to be liable, so that is also a prohibition to which standard measures apply.

ורב אשי מאויריא אמר ר' זירא כי קתני זדונו כרת זדונו לאו לא קתני And Rav Ashi of Avireya said that Rabbi Zeira said: When the tanna teaches this case, he lists only prohibitions for which intentional violation of them renders one liable to receive karet, and he does not teach prohibitions for which intentional violation of them renders one liable to receive lashes.

והרי אשם דזדונו לאו וקתני The Gemara asks: But isn’t the guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property, which is listed in the mishna, a prohibition for which intentional violation of it renders one liable to receive only lashes, not karet? And nevertheless the tanna of the mishna teaches it.

Daf 25a

בחטאת קאמרינן The Gemara answers: We are speaking of sin-offerings when we assert that that mishna lists only prohibitions for which one is liable to receive karet for their intentional violation.

רבינא אמר כי קתני מידי דחייל אמידי דבר אכילה הוא שבועה דחיילא אמידי דלאו בר אכילה הוא לא קתני Ravina offered a different answer. He said: When the tanna teaches this case, he lists only those prohibitions that apply specifically to items that are edible. With regard to an oath, it is a matter that applies also to items that are not edible, and he does not teach it in that mishna.

והרי הקדש דחייל נמי אעצים ואבנים The Gemara asks: But doesn’t that mishna include in its list the prohibition against deriving benefit from the misuse of consecrated property, which applies even to consecrated wood and stones?

אלא כי קתני (מידי) דחייל אמידי דאית בה מששא שבועה דחיילא אמידי דלית ביה מששא כגון שאישן ושלא אישן לא קתני: The Gemara answers: Rather, when the tanna teaches this case, he lists those prohibitions that apply to tangible matters. With regard to an oath, it is something that also applies to intangible matters, such as: I will sleep, or: I will not sleep, and the tanna does not teach it in that mishna.

מתני׳ אחד דברים של עצמו ואחד דברים של אחרים ואחד דברים שיש בהן ממש ואחד דברים שאין בהן ממש MISHNA: If one unwittingly takes a false oath about the past or breaks an oath he made about the future, both if it is an oath that addresses matters that concern oneself and if it is an oath that addresses matters that concern others, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for an oath on an utterance. And likewise, an oath on an utterance may address both tangible matters and intangible matters.

כיצד אמר שבועה שאתן לאיש פלוני ושלא אתן שנתתי ושלא נתתי How so? Examples of oaths about future actions that concern others are if one said: On my oath I will give so-and-so a particular item, or: On my oath I will not give it to him. Examples of such oaths about the past are if one said: On my oath I gave another a particular item, or: On my oath I did not give it to him.

שאישן ושלא אישן שישנתי ושלא ישנתי שאזרוק צרור לים ושלא אזרוק שזרקתי ושלא זרקתי Examples of oaths about the future that address intangible matters are where one said: On my oath I will sleep, or: On my oath I will not sleep. Examples of such oaths about the past are where one said: On my oath I slept, or: On my oath I did not sleep. Other examples of oaths about intangible matters are when one takes an oath, saying: I will throw a stone into the sea, or: I will not throw it, or: I threw it, or: I did not throw it.

ר' ישמעאל אומר אינו חייב אלא על העתיד לבא שנאמר (ויקרא ה, ד) להרע או להיטיב Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future, as it is stated: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4). The Torah refers explicitly only to oaths about what one will do in the future.

אמר לו ר"ע א"כ אין לי אלא דברים שיש בהן הרעה והטבה דברים שאין בהן הרעה והטבה מנין Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, and one is liable only for oaths explicitly mentioned in the verse, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply?

אמר לו מריבוי הכתוב אמר לו אם ריבה הכתוב לכך ריבה הכתוב לכך: Rabbi Yishmael said to him: The halakha in these cases is derived by amplification of the meaning of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.

גמ׳ ת"ר חומר בנדרים מבשבועות חומר בשבועות מבנדרים חומר בנדרים שהנדרים חלים על דבר מצוה כדבר הרשות מה שאין כן בשבועות GEMARA: With regard to oaths about intangible matters, the Sages taught: There is a stringency that applies to vows and not to oaths, and there is a stringency that applies to oaths and not to vows. The stringency that applies to vows is that vows take effect with regard to a matter involving a mitzva, like they take effect with regard to an optional matter, which is not the case with regard to oaths. An oath not to perform a mitzva does not take effect at all.

חומר בשבועות שהשבועות חלות על דבר שאין בו ממש כדבר שיש בו ממש מה שאין כן בנדרים: The stringency that applies to oaths is that oaths take effect with regard to an intangible matter like they do with regard to a tangible matter, which is not the case with regard to vows.

כיצד אמר שבועה שאתן לפלוני ושלא אתן: מאי אתן אילימא צדקה לעני מושבע ועומד מהר סיני הוא שנאמר (דברים טו, י) נתון תתן לו § The mishna teaches: How so? Examples are if one said: On my oath I will give so-and-so some item, or: On my oath I will not give it to him. What is the case of an oath in which he says: I will give? If we say that he takes an oath that he will give charity to a poor person, that is not an oath that takes effect, since he is under oath from Mount Sinai to give charity, as it is stated with regard to a poor person: “You shall give him” (Deuteronomy 15:10).

אלא מתנה לעשיר: Rather, the case is where he said he would give a gift to a rich person. The oath takes effect, as there is no mitzva to do so.

שאישן ושלא אישן: איני והא"ר יוחנן האומר שבועה שלא אישן ג' ימים מלקין אותו וישן לאלתר § The mishna teaches that if one takes an oath, saying: I will sleep, or: I will not sleep, the oath takes effect and he is liable to bring an offering if he fails to fulfill the terms of his oath. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that in the case of one who says: On my oath I will not sleep for three days, the court flogs him immediately and he may sleep. Since it is impossible for one not to sleep for three days, his oath is regarded as an oath taken in vain from the outset. How could someone who took an oath never to sleep be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance if he slept unwittingly?

התם דאמר ג' הכא דלא אמר ג': The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to a case where he said explicitly that he will not sleep for three days. Here, the mishna is referring to a case where he did not say three days, and his oath extends only for the amount of time it is possible not to sleep.

שאזרוק צרור לים ושלא אזרוק: איתמר שבועה שזרק פלוני צרור לים ושלא זרק רב אמר חייב ושמואל אמר פטור § The mishna teaches that an example of an oath on an utterance is where one took an oath, saying: I will throw a stone into the sea, or: I will not throw it. It was stated: With regard to one who says: On my oath so-and-so threw a stone into the sea, or: On my oath he did not throw it, Rav says: If it was later discovered that what he said was false, he is liable to bring an offering for his oath. And Shmuel says: He is exempt.

רב אמר חייב איתיה בלאו והן ושמואל אמר פטור ליתיה בלהבא The Gemara explains the opinions: Rav says that he is liable, as the oath can be positive or negative. The Sages derived from the verse: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), that one is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance only when the oath is such that it could be inverted from the positive to the negative and vice versa. Since he can take an oath either that he threw the stone or that he did not, he is liable. And Shmuel says he is exempt, because the oath cannot be stated with regard to the future; he cannot control what so-and-so will do in the future. Consequently, it is an oath taken in vain, rather than an oath on an utterance.

לימא בפלוגתא דר' ישמעאל ור"ע קא מיפלגי דתנן ר' ישמעאל אומר אינו חייב אלא על העתיד לבא שנאמר להרע או להיטיב אמר לו ר"ע א"כ אין לי אלא דברים שיש בהן הרעה והטבה דברים שאין בהן הרעה והטבה מנין The Gemara asks: Shall we say that they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva? As we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future, as it is stated: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4). Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, and one is liable only for oaths explicitly mentioned in the verse, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply?

אמר לו מריבוי הכתוב אמר לו אם ריבה הכתוב לכך ריבה הכתוב לכך Rabbi Yishmael said to him: The halakha in these cases is derived by amplification of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.

רב דאמר כר"ע ושמואל דאמר כר' ישמעאל Say that Rav, who ruled that one who took an oath that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea is liable, states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that one can be liable for oaths about the past. And say that Shmuel states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that one is exempt from liability for taking an oath about the past.

אליבא דר' ישמעאל כולי עלמא לא פליגי השתא מילתא דאיתא בלהבא לא מחייב עלה רבי ישמעאל לשעבר מילתא דליתא בלהבא מיבעיא The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Everyone agrees that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael one is exempt from liability for taking an oath that so-and-so threw an item. Now, with regard to a statement, i.e., an oath, that could be a valid oath referring to the future, e.g., I will throw an item, Rabbi Yishmael does not deem one liable for it when it refers to the past. Is it necessary to say that one is not liable for a statement, i.e., an oath, that so-and-so threw a particular item, that cannot be a valid oath when adjusted to be referring to someone else’s actions in the future, since it is not under the oath taker’s control?

כי פליגי אליבא דר"ע רב כר"ע ושמואל אמר עד כאן לא מחייב ר"ע התם לשעבר אלא מלתא דאיתא בלהבא מחייב ר"ע לשעבר אבל מידי דליתיה בלהבא לא When they disagree, it is with regard to how to understand the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The opinion of Rav is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva without any qualification of it. And Shmuel says: Rabbi Akiva deems one liable only there, in the case of an oath that refers to the past, when it is a statement, i.e., an oath, that could be a valid oath referring to the future; in such a case Rabbi Akiva deems one liable also if the oath was taken referring to the past, like an oath where one says: I threw a stone. But with regard to statements that cannot be valid oaths if adjusted to the future, like an oath about another’s action, he does not deem one liable when they are made about the past.

לימא בפלוגתא The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the dispute

Daf 25b

דרבי יהודה בן בתירא ורבנן קמיפלגי דתנן נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל פטור לקיים את המצוה ולא קיים פטור שהיה בדין שיהא חייב כדברי ר' יהודה בן בתירא דאמר רבי יהודה בן בתירא ומה אם הרשות שאינו מושבע עליה מהר סיני הרי הוא חייב עליה מצוה שמושבע עליה מהר סיני אינו דין שיהא חייב עליה between these amora’im parallels the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the Rabbis? As we learned in a mishna (27a): If one took an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he did not refrain, he is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. If one took an oath to perform a mitzva and he did not perform it, he is also exempt, though it would have been fitting to argue that he is liable to bring the offering, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. As Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said: What? If, with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, for which one is not under oath from Mount Sinai, he is liable for breaking it, then with regard to an oath about a mitzva, for which he is under oath from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he would be liable for it?

אמרו לו לא אם אמרת בשבועת הרשות שכן עשה בה לאו כהן תאמר בשבועת מצוה שכן לא עשה בה לאו כהן The Rabbis said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for breaking an oath concerning an optional action, where the Torah rendered one liable for a negative oath not to perform it like for a positive oath to perform it, shall you also say one is liable for breaking an oath concerning a mitzva, where the Torah did not render one liable for a negative oath like for a positive oath? If one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he did not refrain, he is exempt.

נימא רב דאמר כר' יהודה בן בתירא ושמואל דאמר כרבנן The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rav states his opinion in accordance with that of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who holds that one can be liable for an oath that cannot be inverted, and Shmuel states his opinion in accordance with that of the Rabbis, who hold that one can be liable only if the oath can be inverted?

אליבא דרבי יהודה בן בתירא כולי עלמא לא פליגי השתא לאו והן לא בעי להבא ולשעבר בעי The Gemara rejects this: Everyone, i.e., both Rav and Shmuel, agrees with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira that one is liable if he took an oath that so-and-so performed an action that he did not in fact perform. The Gemara explains: Now, given that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira does not require that it be possible to invert a negative oath to a positive oath, does he require that it be possible for an oath to refer to the future as well as to the past? Shmuel explained that the reason one is not liable for an oath that so-and-so threw a stone into the sea is that it cannot be inverted to address the future, in other words: So-and-so will throw a stone into the sea, as that is not under the oath taker’s control.

כי פליגי אליבא דרבנן שמואל כרבנן ורב כי לא מחייבי רבנן בלאו והן דכתיב (ויקרא ה, ד) להרע או להיטיב בהדיא אבל להבא ולשעבר דמריבויא דקראי אתו מחייבי When they disagree it is with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis: Shmuel holds like the Rabbis, that one is exempt in the case of an oath that cannot be inverted. Accordingly, Shmuel ruled that one who takes an oath that so-and-so threw an item is exempt from bringing an offering if it is found that the statement was false. And Rav holds that the Rabbis do not deem one liable in the case of an oath that cannot be inverted from negative to positive or vice versa, as it is written explicitly: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). But with regard to the requirement that it be possible to invert an oath referring to the future to refer to the past or vice versa, which is derived from an amplification of the meaning of the verses, the Rabbis deem one liable, as they do not accept the derivation.

מתיב רב המנונא לא אכלתי היום ולא הנחתי תפילין היום משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב בשלמא לא אכלתי איתיה בלא אוכל אלא לא הנחתי מי איתיה בלא אניח Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to Shmuel’s opinion from a mishna (29b): If one said: I did not eat today, or: I did not don phylacteries today, and another said to him: I administer an oath to you that your statement is true, and the original speaker said: Amen, he is liable for breaking an oath on an utterance if his statement was false, as responding amen to an oath administered to oneself is equivalent to stating the oath explicitly. Granted, he is liable in the case where he said: I did not eat, since it also would have been possible for him to take an oath saying: I will not eat, but in the case where he said: I did not don phylacteries, would it have been possible for him to take an oath saying: I will not don phylacteries, and in doing so abrogate a positive mitzva?

הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה לצדדין קתני לא אכלתי לקרבן לא הנחתי למלקות He, Rav Hamnuna, raises the objection and he resolves it: The tanna teaches this mishna disjunctively, referring to two different cases. When he teaches that one is liable for taking the oath: I did not eat, it refers to one’s liability to bring an offering. When he teaches liability for the oath: I did not don phylacteries, it refers to one’s liability to receive lashes for taking a false oath. This liability does not require that it be possible to invert the oath to refer to the future.

מתיב רבא איזו היא שבועת שוא נשבע לשנות את הידוע לאדם ואמר על עמוד של אבן (שהוא במקום פלוני) שהוא של זהב ואמר עולא והוא שניכר לג' בני אדם טעמא דניכר הא לא ניכר עובר משום שבועת ביטוי ואמאי הא אינו ביהא של זהב Rava also raises an objection to Shmuel’s opinion from a mishna (see 29a): Which oath is an oath taken in vain? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true, and, for example, says about a stone column that is in such and such a place that it is made of gold. And Ulla says that the phrase: Known to people, in the mishna is referring to when it is a fact that is known to three people. The Gemara explains the objection to Shmuel’s opinion: The reason he is liable for taking an oath in vain is due to the fact that his oath contradicted a fact known to three people. But if it is not known, he violates the prohibition of taking a false oath on an utterance. Given Shmuel’s opinion, why should he be liable? Isn’t it impossible to invert the oath to make it about the future, saying: That column will be of gold?

הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה ניכר עובר משום שבועת שוא לא ניכר עובר משום שבועת שקר He raises the objection and he resolves it. When the fact is known to three people, the one who takes an oath denying it violates the prohibition of taking an oath in vain. If it is not known, then he violates the prohibition of taking a false oath, for which he receives lashes if he did so intentionally. Nevertheless, he is not liable to bring an offering for falsely taking an oath on an utterance, since this oath cannot be inverted to be about the future.

אמר אביי ומודה רב באומר לחבירו שבועה שאני יודע לך עדות ואשתכח דלא ידע ליה דפטור הואיל וליתיה בכלל שאיני יודע לך עדות § Abaye said: And Rav, who holds one liable for an oath on an utterance even if it cannot be inverted to refer to the future, concedes in a case where one says to another: On my oath I know testimony that is relevant to you, and it is found afterward that he did not know testimony that was relevant to him, that in that case he is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. The reason is that it is not in the category of an oath that could be inverted to the negative oath of: I do not know testimony that is relevant to you, as that oath would be an oath of testimony, rather than an oath on an utterance. The Torah states: “And if anyone sin, in that he hears the voice of adjuration, he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1). One is liable to bring an offering for an oath of testimony if he takes an oath falsely denying that he has knowledge of testimony in a monetary matter.

ידעתי ולא ידעתי מחלוקת העדתי ולא העדתי מחלוקת But if he takes an oath saying: I knew testimony that is relevant to you, or: I did not know testimony that is relevant to you, the halakha is subject to the dispute between Rav and Shmuel. Similarly, if he took an oath saying: I testified, or: I did not testify, whether or not he is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance depends on the dispute between Rav and Shmuel. In these cases, the oaths cannot be inverted from the past to the future and are also not oaths of testimony, since they do not involve the refusal to testify.

בשלמא לשמואל דאמר מילתא דליתיה בלהבא לא מחייב עליה לשעבר להכי אפקה רחמנא לשבועת עדות מכלל שבועת ביטוי אלא לרב למאי הלכתא אפקה רחמנא The Gemara says: Granted, according to the opinion of Shmuel, who says that an oath about a matter that cannot be inverted to refer to the future is one for which one is not liable when it refers to the past, it is for that reason the Merciful One removed an oath of testimony, which cannot be inverted, from the category of an oath on an utterance and legislated it in a separate verse (see Leviticus 5:1). But according to the opinion of Rav, for what halakha did the Merciful One remove it from the category of an oath on an utterance and relate to it as a distinct category? Every oath of testimony is a case of an oath on an utterance and there is no need to relate to it as a special case.

אמרוה רבנן קמיה דאביי לאיחיובי עליה תרתי The Sages said before Abaye: An oath of testimony is singled out, according to Rav, in order to render one who takes it falsely liable to bring two sliding-scale offerings for it, one for a false oath on an utterance and one for a false oath of testimony.

אמר להו תרתי לא מציתו אמריתו דתניא (ויקרא ה, ד) לאחת מאלה לאחת אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו שתים Abaye said to them: You cannot say that one who takes a false oath of testimony is liable to bring two offerings, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the sliding-scale offering that is brought for both an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance: The verse states: “And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things” (Leviticus 5:5). By inference, for one of the sins that render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering you may deem him liable, but you may not deem him liable for two.

ולאביי למאי הלכתא אפקיה רחמנא The Gemara asks: And if this is so, then according to Abaye’s understanding of the opinion of Rav, for what halakha did the Merciful One remove an oath of testimony from the category of an oath on an utterance and relate to it as a distinct category?

לכדתניא בכולן נאמר ונעלם וכאן לא נאמר ונעלם לחייב על המזיד כשוגג The Gemara answers: An oath of testimony is singled out, as it is taught in a baraita: For every other one of the prohibitions for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, it is stated in the verse: “And it is hidden from him” (see Leviticus 5:2–4), and here, with regard to the oath of testimony, the phrase: And it is hidden from him, is not stated. This serves to render one liable to bring an offering for taking a false oath of testimony intentionally like one who is liable for doing so unwittingly.

אמרו ליה רבנן לאביי אימא במזיד מיחייב חדא בשוגג מיחייב תרתי The Sages said to Abaye: Say that the oath of testimony was singled out for a different reason: When he takes a false oath of testimony intentionally he is liable to bring only one offering but when he does so unwittingly, he is liable to bring two, one for an oath of testimony and one for an oath on an utterance.

אמר להו לאו היינו דאמרי לאחת אחת אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו שתים ואי במזיד מי איכא תרתי Abaye said to them in response: Is this not what they said in a baraita with regard to the verse about the sliding-scale offering: “When he shall be guilty in one of these things” (Leviticus 5:5)? By inference, for one of the sins that render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering you may deem him liable, but you may not deem him liable for two? And since one does not bring an offering for an intentional false oath on an utterance, if the verse is referring to a case where he intentionally took a false oath of testimony, how could there be a case where one is liable to bring two offerings such that this case needs to be excluded? Consequently, the verse must be referring to a case where he took the oath unwittingly, and it teaches that nevertheless, one brings only one offering for each violation.

רבא אמר משום דהוה דבר שבכלל ויצא לידון בדבר החדש אין לך בו אלא חידושו בלבד Rava said in response to the question posed by the Sages: There is no need to derive from a verse that one is liable to bring only one offering for a false oath of testimony. Since an oath of testimony is a matter that was included in a generalization, i.e., the general principle of an oath on an utterance, and it was singled out to teach a new matter with regard to it, you have only the new matter alone to consider. Since an oath of testimony is singled out in that it applies only to potential witnesses in the context of a court, a case of an oath of testimony ceases to be included under the rubric of an oath on an utterance.

מכלל דאביי סבר איתה לשבועה בעולם The Gemara asks: Should one understand by inference that Abaye holds that in cases of an oath of testimony, the oath on an utterance still exists in principle? One does not bring two offerings because of the halakha derived from the verse, but if for some reason the oath of testimony does not take effect, one may still be liable for an oath on an utterance.

והאמר אביי מודה רב באומר לחבירו שבועה שאני יודע לך עדות ואשתכח דלא ידע ליה דפטור הואיל וליתיה באיני יודע לך עדות But didn’t Abaye say that Rav concedes that one is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance in a case where one says to another: On my oath I know testimony that is relevant to you, and it was found that he did not know testimony that was relevant to him? In that case he is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on utterance, since it is not an oath that could be inverted to the negative oath: I do not know testimony that is relevant to you, as that oath would be an oath of testimony rather than an oath on an utterance.

הדר ביה אביי מההיא ואיבעית אימא The Gemara answers: Abaye retracted that opinion. And if you wish, say instead that

Daf 26a

חדא מינייהו רב פפא אמרה: Rav Pappa said one of those statements, not Abaye.

ר' ישמעאל אומר אינו חייב אלא על העתיד לבא: ת"ר (ויקרא ה, ד) להרע או להיטיב אין לי אלא דברים שיש בהן הרעה והטבה שאין בהן הרעה והטבה מנין תלמוד לומר (ויקרא ה, ד) או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future. The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to an oath on an utterance: From the verse: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips,” which includes other matters.

אין לי אלא להבא לשעבר מנין תלמוד לומר (ויקרא ה, ד) לכל אשר יבטא האדם בשבועה דברי רבי עקיבא רבי ישמעאל אומר להרע או להיטיב להבא I have derived only that one is liable for oaths referring to the future. From where do I derive that one is liable for oaths referring to the past? The verse subsequently states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4); this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse states: “To do evil, or to do good,” referring exclusively to oaths about the future.

אמר לו רבי עקיבא אם כן אין לי אלא דברים שיש בהן הטבה והרעה דברים שאין בהן הרעה והטבה מנין אמר לו מרבוי הכתוב אמר לו אם ריבה הכתוב לכך ריבה הכתוב לכך The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? Rabbi Yishmael said to Rabbi Akiva in response: It is derived from an amplification of the meaning of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.

שפיר קא"ל רבי עקיבא לר' ישמעאל The Gemara questions: Rabbi Akiva said well his critique of the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Why does Rabbi Yishmael disagree?

א"ר יוחנן ר' ישמעאל ששימש את רבי נחוניא בן הקנה שהיה דורש את כל התורה כולה בכלל ופרט איהו נמי דורש בכלל ופרט רבי עקיבא ששימש את נחום איש גם זו שהיה דורש את כל התורה כולה בריבה ומיעט איהו נמי דורש ריבה ומיעט Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is because Rabbi Yishmael was the one who served as a disciple of Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, who would interpret the entire Torah with the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail. Therefore, Rabbi Yishmael also interprets the Torah with the method of a generalization and a detail. Rabbi Akiva was one who served as a disciple of Naḥum of Gam Zo, who would interpret the entire Torah with the hermeneutical principle of amplification and restriction. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva also interprets the Torah by amplification and restriction.

מאי ר' עקיבא דדריש ריבויי ומיעוטי דתניא או נפש כי תשבע ריבה להרע או להיטיב מיעט לכל אשר יבטא האדם חזר וריבה ריבה ומיעט וריבה ריבה הכל What is the specific instance in this context where one finds that Rabbi Akiva interprets with amplifications and restrictions? It is as it is taught in a baraita that when the verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips” (Leviticus 5:4), it amplifies the range of possible oaths for which one could be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance. When the verse continues: “To do evil, or to do good,” it restricts that range. When it further continues: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,” it then amplifies again. According to the hermeneutical principle that when a verse amplified, and then restricted, and then amplified, it amplified the relevant category to include everything except for the specific matter that was excluded by the restriction.

מאי ריבה ריבה כל מילי ומאי מיעט מיעט דבר מצוה What was included when the verse amplified the range of liability? It amplified it to include all matters about which one might take an oath. And in what way did it restrict it when it continued: “To do evil, or to do good”? It restricted the range of liability for an oath on an utterance to exclude an oath that is a matter involving a mitzva, i.e., an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva.

ור' ישמעאל דריש כלל ופרט או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים כלל להרע או להיטיב פרט לכל אשר יבטא האדם חזר וכלל כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט מה הפרט מפורש להבא אף כל להבא And Rabbi Yishmael interprets the verse following the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips” (Leviticus 5:4), is a generalization; “to do evil, or to do good,” is a detail; “whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,” the verse then further generalized. There is a hermeneutical principle that when a verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and another generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the detail in the verse is explicitly an oath referring to the future, so too, all the oaths for which one is liable must be referring to the future.

אהני כללא לאתויי אפי' דברים שאין בהן הרעה והטבה להבא אהני פרטא למעוטי אפילו דברים שיש בהן הרעה והטבה לשעבר The generalization serves to include even those matters that do not concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the future; the detail serves to exclude even matters that concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the past.

איפוך אנא The Gemara challenges: I will reverse it and say that the generalization serves to include oaths concerning the past, and the detail serves to exclude matters that do not involve doing evil or doing good. Why is that not an equally legitimate interpretation of the verse?

א"ר יצחק דומיא דלהרע או להיטיב מי שאיסורו משום (במדבר ל, ג) בל יחל דברו יצאתה זו שאין איסורו משום בל יחל דברו אלא משום בל תשקרו Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yishmael understands that liability is extended to one whose oath is similar to an oath “to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). He whose prohibition is due to the verse: “He shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:3), is liable, as liability for an oath about the future entails breaking one’s word. Excluded is that oath whose prohibition is not due to the verse: “He shall not break his word”; rather, it is due to the verse: “You shall not lie” (Leviticus 19:11), since liability for an oath about the past applies when the oath itself was a lie.

רב יצחק בר אבין אמר אמר קרא או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים מי שהשבועה קודמת לביטוי ולא שהביטוי קודמת לשבועה יצא זה אכלתי ולא אכלתי שהמעשה קודם לשבועה Rav Yitzḥak bar Avin says that there is a different explanation of Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion: The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good,” referring to one whose oath precedes its clarification, i.e., the action that breaks it, and not to one who takes an oath where the clarification, i.e., the action prohibited in the oath, precedes the oath. Excluded is that oath where one said, for example: I ate, or: I did not eat, where the action precedes the oath.

ת"ר (ויקרא ה, ד) האדם בשבועה פרט לאנוס ונעלם פרט למזיד § The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath, and it is hidden from him; and, when he knows of it, be guilty in one of these things” (Leviticus 5:4). The phrase “a man…with an oath” serves to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control from liability to bring an offering. The term “and it is hidden” serves to exclude from liability one who broke his oath intentionally, as he does not deserve to be able to achieve atonement through bringing an offering.

ממנו שנתעלמה ממנו שבועה יכול שנתעלמה ממנו חפץ ת"ל בשבועה ונעלם על העלם שבועה הוא חייב ואינו חייב על העלם חפץ: The baraita continues: The term “from him” teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that an oath taker is also liable when he broke an oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: “With an oath, and it is hidden from him.” He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

אמר מר האדם בשבועה פרט לאנוס היכי דמי The Master says above in the baraita: The phrase “a man…with an oath” serves to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara asks: What are such circumstances?

כדרב כהנא ורב אסי כי הוו קיימי מקמי דרב מר אמר שבועתא דהכי אמר רב ומר אמר שבועתא דהכי אמר רב כי אתו לקמיה דרב אמר כחד מינייהו אמר ליה אידך ואנא בשיקרא אישתבעי The Gemara answers: It is as it was with Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who, when they were standing up in the presence of Rav, their teacher, at the conclusion of a lesson, disagreed with regard to exactly what he said. One Sage said: On my oath Rav said like this, and the other Sage said: On my oath Rav said like that. When they came before Rav to clarify what he had said, he stated his opinion in accordance with what one of them had said. The other said to Rav: Did I then take a false oath?

אמר ליה לבך אנסך Rav said to him: Your heart compelled you. It is not regarded as a false oath, since at the time that you took the oath you were certain that you were telling the truth.

ונעלם ממנו שנתעלם ממנו שבועה יכול שנתעלם ממנו חפץ תלמוד לומר בשבועה ונעלם ממנו על העלם שבועה הוא חייב ואינו חייב על העלם חפץ: § The baraita teaches: The phrase “and it is hidden from him” teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that the oath taker is also liable when he broke the oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: “With an oath, and it is hidden from him.” He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath, but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

מחכו עלי' במערבא בשלמא שבועה משכחת לה בלא חפץ כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל פת חטין וכסבור שאוכל קאמר דשבועתיה אינשי חפצא דכיר אלא חפץ בלא שבועה ה"ד They laughed at this in the West, Eretz Yisrael, and said: Granted, you find lack of awareness of one’s oath without there being lack of awareness of the object of the oath, as in a case where one said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: I will eat wheat bread, as in that case his oath is forgotten and the object of it is remembered. But under what circumstances is there a case of lack of awareness of the object of the oath without lack of awareness of the oath itself?

כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל פת חטין וכסבור של שעורים קאמר דשבועתיה דכיר ליה חפצא אינשי כיון דחפצא אינשי להו היינו העלם שבועה The Gemara suggests: It can be found in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: On my oath I will not eat barley bread, as in that case his oath is remembered by him and the object of it is forgotten. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Once the object of the oath is forgotten by him, that is a case of lack of awareness of his oath.

אלא אמר רבי אלעזר דא ודא אחת היא Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: The distinction made in the baraita between lack of awareness of one’s oath and lack of awareness of the object of one’s oath is not valid, and both this and that are one and the same.

מתקיף לה רב יוסף אלמא חפץ בלא שבועה לא משכחת לה והא משכחת לה כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל פת חטין והושיט ידו לסל ליטול פת שעורין ועלתה בידו של חטין וכסבור שעורים היא ואכלה דשבועתיה דכיר ליה חפצא הוא דלא ידע ליה Rav Yosef objects to this. Is it really the case that you do not find a case of lack of awareness of the object of an oath without lack of awareness of the oath? But you find it in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he extended his hand to the basket to take barley bread, and wheat bread came up in his hand, and he thought it was barley bread and ate it. That is a case where his oath is remembered by him, and it is the object of the oath of which he is unaware.

אמר ליה אביי כלום מחייבת ליה קרבן אלא אמאי דתפיס בידיה העלם שבועה הוא Abaye said to him: Don’t you deem him liable to bring an offering for breaking his oath only for that which he holds in his hand and eats? When he eats the bread, that is lack of awareness of the oath, since he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.

לישנא אחרינא אמר ליה אביי לרב יוסף סוף סוף קרבן דקא מייתי עלה דהאי פת מיהת העלם שבועה הוא The Gemara presents another formulation of this statement. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Ultimately, the offering he brings for this bread is in any event due to lack of awareness of the oath, as he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.

ורב יוסף אמר לך כיון דכי ידע ליה דחטין הוא פריש מיניה העלם חפץ הוא And Rav Yosef could say to you: Since were he to know of it that it is wheat bread he would refrain from eating it, this should be regarded as a case of lack of awareness of the object.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן העלם זה וזה בידו מהו אמר ליה הרי העלם שבועה בידו וחייב אדרבה הרי העלם חפץ בידו ופטור Rava asked of Rav Naḥman: In a case where one has a lack of awareness of this, the oath, and that, its object, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: He breaks the oath while having a lack of awareness of the oath and is therefore liable. Rava replied: On the contrary, he has a lack of awareness of the object of the oath and should therefore be exempt.

אמר רב אשי חזינן אי מחמת שבועה קא פריש הרי העלם שבועה בידו וחייב אי מחמת חפץ קא פריש הרי העלם חפץ בידו ופטור Rav Ashi said: We see: If he refrains from eating due to the oath, i.e., when he is reminded that he took an oath, he had a lack of awareness of the oath and is liable. If he refrains due to the object of the oath, i.e., when he is reminded what it is he is about to eat, he had a lack of awareness due to the object, and is exempt.

א"ל רבינא לרב אשי כלום פריש משבועה אלא משום חפץ כלום פריש מחפץ אלא משום שבועה אלא לא שנא Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Doesn’t he refrain only from breaking the oath due to his recognition of the object? Doesn’t he refrain from the object due only to the oath? In either case, he needs to remember both the oath and its object, and the manner in which he was reminded does not serve to indicate anything. Rather, there is no difference between the two.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן Rava asked of Rav Naḥman:

Daf 26b

איזו היא שגגת שבועת ביטוי לשעבר אי דידע מזיד הוא אי דלא ידע אנוס הוא What is the case of an unwitting oath on an utterance referring to the past, for which one is liable to bring an offering? If it is a case where he knows when he takes the oath that it is not true, then he is an intentional taker of a false oath and may not bring an offering. If it is a case where he did not know at the time of taking the oath that what he was saying is not true, then he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and is exempt from bringing an offering.

א"ל באומר יודע אני ששבועה זו אסורה אבל איני יודע אם חייבין עליה קרבן או לאו Rav Naḥman said to him in answer to his question: It is a case where the one taking the oath says: I know that taking this oath is prohibited, but I do not know if one is liable to bring an offering for it or not. Since he does not know the full implications of his action, it is regarded as unwitting, and he may still bring an offering to atone for it.

כמאן כמונבז דאמר שגגת קרבן שמה שגגה Rava asked Rav Naḥman further: In accordance with whose opinion do you answer in this way? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, who says: Lack of intention with regard to the offering, i.e., ignorance as to whether one’s action renders one liable to bring an offering, is regarded as lack of intention? There is a dispute between Munbaz and the Rabbis in tractate Shabbat (69a–b) with regard to one who knows that a particular action desecrates Shabbat but does not know that it renders one liable to bring a sin-offering. Munbaz holds that even one who is merely ignorant of the liability to bring an offering is deemed an unwitting sinner who brings a sin-offering to atone. The Rabbis disagree and deem him unwitting only if he is unaware that the action is prohibited.

אפילו תימא רבנן עד כאן לא פליגי רבנן עליה דמונבז אלא בכל התורה כולה דלאו חידוש הוא אבל הכא דחידוש הוא דבכל התורה כולה לא אשכחן לאו דמייתי קרבן Rav Naḥman explains: You may even say that this explanation accords with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis disagree with the opinion of Munbaz only with regard to all typical cases in the entire Torah for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, where that liability is not a novelty. But here, with regard to oaths, it could be said that bringing a sin-offering is a novelty, since there is a principle that we do not find in the entire Torah another example of a simple prohibition for which one brings an offering for its unwitting violation.

דילפינן מע"ז והכא מייתי אפילו רבנן מודו Rav Naḥman continues: The reason for this principle is that we derive for which prohibitions one brings a sin-offering from the prohibition of idol worship, where one is liable to receive karet for an intentional violation and one is liable to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting violation. And yet here, in the case of the oath, one brings a sin-offering even though intentional violation of the prohibition is not punishable by karet. Given the novelty of the offering for an oath on an utterance, even the Rabbis would agree that ignorance of the fact that one is performing an action for which the Torah legislates an offering is sufficient for one to be regarded as unwitting and liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

בעא מיניה רבינא מרבא נשבע על ככר ומסתכן עליה מהו Ravina asked Rava: If one took an oath concerning a certain loaf, rendering himself prohibited from eating it, and later his life is in danger due to his not eating it, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring an offering in atonement for eating it?

מסתכן לישרי ליה מר אלא מצטער ואכלה בשגגת שבועה מאי Rava responded: If his life is in danger, let the Master permit him to eat, as saving his life overrides the prohibition; he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control and does not need to atone at all. Ravina said: Rather, the question is this: With regard to one who is suffering from hunger and who ate it unwittingly, i.e., he forgot the prohibition generated by the oath, although had he known, he would still have eaten this loaf of bread intentionally due to his hunger, what is the halakha?

א"ל תנינא שב מידיעתו מביא קרבן על שגגתו לא שב מידיעתו אין מביא קרבן על שגגתו Rava said to him: We learn in a baraita: One who, had he known that his action was prohibited, would have withdrawn from sinning due to his knowledge, brings an offering for his unwitting sin; but one who would not have withdrawn from sinning due to his knowledge does not bring an offering for his unwitting sin. Since he would have eaten anyway, he does not bring an offering.

אמר שמואל גמר בלבו צריך שיוציא בשפתיו שנאמר (ויקרא ה, ד) לבטא בשפתים § Shmuel says: Even after one decided to take an oath, he needs to express it with his lips for it to take effect, as it is stated in the verse: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4).

מיתיבי בשפתים ולא בלב גמר בלבו מנין ת"ל (ויקרא ה, ד) לכל אשר יבטא האדם בשבועה The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states that one takes an oath “with his lips,” but not with his heart. From where is it derived that one who decided in his heart to take an oath is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance? The verse states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4).

הא גופה קשיא אמרת בשפתים ולא בלב והדר אמרת גמר בלבו מנין The Gemara points out: This baraita is difficult in itself. You said: “With his lips,” but not with his heart, and then you said: From where is it derived that one who decided in his heart to take an oath is liable? There seems to be a contradiction within the baraita concerning the halakha where one did not express the oath.

אמר רב ששת הא לא קשיא הכי קאמר בשפתים ולא שגמר בלבו להוציא בשפתיו ולא הוציא גמר בלבו סתם מנין ת"ל לכל אשר יבטא Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult; this is what the baraita is saying: One takes an oath “with his lips” and does not take an oath when he merely decided in his heart to express with his lips but has not yet actually expressed the oath verbally. From where is it derived that one who simply decided in his heart to take an oath without the intention of stating it with his lips is liable? The verse states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4).

אלא לשמואל קשיא The Gemara challenges: But according to the opinion of Shmuel, this baraita nevertheless poses a difficulty, as it indicates that an oath that was not expressed verbally takes effect.

אמר רב ששת תריץ ואימא הכי בשפתים ולא שגמר בלבו להוציא פת חטין והוציא פת שעורין גמר בלבו להוציא פת חטין והוציא פת סתם מנין ת"ל לכל אשר יבטא האדם Rav Sheshet said: Resolve the difficulty and say the baraita like this: One takes an oath “with his lips,” but does not take an oath where he decided in his heart to express an oath prohibiting wheat bread and he instead expressed an oath about barley bread. From where is it derived that he is liable where he decided in his heart to express an oath about wheat bread and expressed his oath about bread without specifying? The verse states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath.”

מיתיבי (דברים כג, כד) מוצא שפתיך תשמור ועשית אין לי אלא שהוציא בשפתיו גמר בלבו מנין ת"ל (שמות לה, ה) כל נדיב לב The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel from a baraita: The verse states: “That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according as you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). From here I have derived only a case in which he expresses with his lips. From where do I derive a case where he decided only in his heart? The verse states in the context of the contributions to the building of the Tabernacle: “And they came, both men and women, as many as were willinghearted, and brought nose rings, and earrings, and signet rings, and girdles, all jewels of gold” (Exodus 35:22). The fact that the verse describes those who contributed as willinghearted indicates that one becomes liable via a non-verbal decision.

שאני התם דכתיב כל נדיב לב The Gemara answers: The case there, of contributions to the Tabernacle, is different, as it is written: “As many as were willinghearted.” This halakha is stated only in the context of contributions to the Tabernacle, not in the context of oaths.

וניגמר מינה The Gemara suggests: And let us learn from it that in general, oaths can be taken via a non-verbal decision.

משום דהוו תרומה וקדשים שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובין הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין The Gemara rejects this: One cannot extrapolate from the fact that the non-verbal consecrations to the Tabernacle were effective, because teruma, which can be separated non-verbally, and donating consecrated items are two verses that come as one, i.e., they are both instances where a non-verbal commitment is sufficient, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

הניחא למ"ד אין מלמדין אלא למ"ד מלמדין מאי איכא למימר The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element, but according to the one who says that they do teach their common element, what can be said?

הוו חולין וקדשים וחולין מקדשים לא גמרינן: The Gemara answers: The two contexts here are non-sacred items, i.e., oaths, and consecrated items, donations to the Tabernacle and teruma, and we do not derive halakhot concerning non-sacred items from halakhot concerning consecrated items.

Daf 27a

מתני׳ נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל פטור לקיים ולא קיים פטור שהיה בדין שיהא חייב כדברי ר' יהודה בן בתירא MISHNA: If one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he does not refrain, he is exempt from bringing an offering for an oath on an utterance. If he takes an oath to perform a mitzva and he does not perform it, he is also exempt, though it would have been fitting to claim that he is liable to bring the offering, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.

א"ר יהודה בן בתירא מה אם הרשות שאינו מושבע עליו מהר סיני הרי הוא חייב עליו מצוה שהוא מושבע עליה מהר סיני אינו דין שיהא חייב עליה The mishna explains: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said: What? If, with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, for which one is not under oath from Mount Sinai, he is liable for breaking it, then with regard to an oath about a mitzva, for which he is under oath from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he would be liable for breaking it?

אמרו לו לא אם אמרת בשבועת הרשות שכן עשה בה לאו כהן תאמר בשבועת מצוה שלא עשה בה לאו כהן שאם נשבע לבטל ולא ביטל פטור: The Rabbis said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for breaking an oath concerning an optional action, where the Torah rendered one liable for a negative oath not to perform it like for a positive oath to perform it, shall you also say one is liable with regard to breaking an oath concerning a mitzva, where the Torah did not render one liable for a negative oath like for a positive oath, since if one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and did not refrain, he is exempt.

גמ׳ ת"ר יכול נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל יהא חייב ת"ל (ויקרא ה, ד) להרע או להיטיב מה הטבה רשות אף הרעה רשות אוציא נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל שהוא פטור GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: One might have thought that when one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and he does not refrain, he would be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance. To counter this, the verse states: “To do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Just as doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action. I will therefore exclude from liability one who takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva and does not refrain, so that he is exempt from bringing the offering.

יכול נשבע לקיים את המצוה ולא קיים שיהא חייב ת"ל להרע או להיטיב מה הרעה רשות אף הטבה רשות אוציא נשבע לקיים את המצוה ולא קיים שהוא פטור The baraita continues: One might have thought that when one takes an oath to perform a mitzva and does not perform it, that he would be liable. To counter this, the verse states: “To do evil, or to do good.” Just as doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action. I will therefore exclude from liability one who takes an oath to perform a mitzva and does not perform it, so that he is exempt from bringing the offering.

יכול נשבע להרע לעצמו ולא הרע יכול יהא פטור ת"ל להרע או להיטיב מה הטבה רשות אף הרעה רשות אביא נשבע להרע לעצמו ולא הרע שהרשות בידו One might have thought that when one takes an oath to harm himself and he does not harm himself, that he could be exempt from liability. The verse states: “To do evil, or to do good.” Just as doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action. I include as liable one who takes an oath to harm himself and does not harm himself, since it is his prerogative to harm himself or not.

יכול נשבע להרע לאחרים ולא הרע שיהא חייב ת"ל להרע או להיטיב מה הטבה רשות אף הרעה רשות אוציא נשבע להרע לאחרים ולא הרע שאין הרשות בידו מנין לרבות הטבת אחרים ת"ל או להיטיב ואיזו היא הרעת אחרים אכה את פלוני ואפצע את מוחו One might have thought that when one takes an oath to harm others and does not harm them, that he would be liable. To counter this, the verse states: “To do evil, or to do good.” Just as doing good is referring to an oath about an optional action, so too, doing evil is referring to an oath about an optional action. I will therefore exclude from liability one who takes an oath to harm others and he does not harm them, since it is not his prerogative to do so. From where is it derived that taking an oath that concerns doing good to others is included among the oaths for which one may be liable? The verse states: “Or to do good.” And what is harming others? An example is when one takes an oath saying: I will strike so-and-so and injure his brain.

וממאי דקראי בדבר הרשות כתיבי דלמא בדבר מצוה כתיבי The baraita assumes throughout that “to do evil, or to do good” is referring to optional actions. The Gemara asks: But from where do we know that these verses are written referring to optional matters? Perhaps they are written referring to matters involving a mitzva.

לא ס"ד דבעינן הטבה דומיא דהרעה והרעה דומיא דהטבה דאקיש הרעה להטבה מה הטבה אינה בביטול מצוה אף הרעה אינה בביטול מצוה הרעה גופה הטבה היא The Gemara rejects this: This should not enter your mind, since we require that doing good be similar to doing evil, and doing evil be similar to doing good, as doing evil is juxtaposed to doing good in the verse. If one stipulates that the verse is referring to matters involving a mitzva, then just as doing good does not involve refraining from performing a mitzva, but must involve performing a mitzva, e.g., an oath to eat matza on Passover, so too, doing evil does not involve refraining from performing a mitzva, e.g., an oath not to eat leavened bread on Passover. The result of this reasoning is that doing evil in the verse is itself doing good, in that it will always involve taking oaths to keep mitzvot.

ואקיש הטבה להרעה מה הרעה אינה בקיום מצוה אף הטבה אינה בקיום מצוה הטבה גופה הרעה היא And likewise, doing good is juxtaposed to doing evil; just as doing evil does not involve performing a mitzva, as it would then not be doing evil, so too, doing good does not involve performing a mitzva. Doing good in the verse is itself doing evil, in that it does not involve the fulfillment of mitzvot.

אי הכי בדבר הרשות נמי לא משכחת לה The Gemara asks: If that is so, that doing evil and doing good are compared in this manner, you do not find that the verse can be interpreted even with regard to optional matters, as the same sort of contradiction could be generated.

אלא מדאיצטריך או לרבות הטבת אחרים ש"מ בדבר הרשות כתיבי דאי ס"ד בדבר מצוה כתיבי השתא הרעת אחרים איתרבי הטבת אחרים מיבעיא Rather, one may derive that the verse is referring to optional matters from the fact that it was necessary for the verse to write “or to do good,” in order to include liability for oaths that involve doing good to others. Conclude from it that these verses are written referring to optional matters. As, if it should enter your mind that the verses are written referring to matters involving a mitzva, there is a difficulty: Now that doing evil to others has been included, i.e., when one takes an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva, is it necessary to mention doing good to others?

והאי או מיבעי ליה לחלק לחלק לא צריך קרא The Gemara challenges: But this “or” is necessary in order to separate them, i.e., to indicate that one can be liable for either type of oath. Had the verse said: To do evil and to do good, one might assume that one is liable only for oaths that involve both. The Gemara answers: A verse is unnecessary in order to separate, as it is clear that either sort of oath is included.

הניחא לר' יונתן אלא לר' יאשיה מאי איכא למימר The Gemara asks: This works out well according to Rabbi Yonatan’s opinion concerning the interpretation of conjunctions, but according to Rabbi Yoshiya’s opinion, what can be said?

דתניא (ויקרא כ, ט) איש אשר יקלל את אביו ואת אמו אין לי אלא אביו ואמו אביו ולא אמו אמו ולא אביו מנין ת"ל (ויקרא כ, ט) אביו ואמו קלל אביו קלל אמו קלל דברי ר' יאשי' The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “A man who curses his father and his mother shall die” (Leviticus 20:9), I have derived only that one is liable if he curses both his father and his mother. From where do I derive that if one curses his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, he is liable? The continuation of the verse states: “His father and his mother he has cursed; his blood is upon him.” In the first part of the verse, the word “curses” is in proximity to “his father,” and in the last part of the verse, “cursed” is in proximity to “his mother.” This teaches that the verse is referring to both a case where he cursed only his father and a case where he cursed only his mother; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yoshiya maintains that conjunctions are interpreted strictly unless the verse indicates otherwise.

ר' יונתן אומר משמע שניהם כאחד ומשמע אחד בפני עצמו Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation, because the phrase “his father and his mother” indicates that one is liable if he curses both of them together, and it also indicates that he is liable if he curses either one of them on their own,

Daf 27b

עד שיפרוט לך הכתוב יחדיו unless the verse specifies that one is liable only if he curses both together. An example of a verse where the Torah specifies that the halakha applies only to the two elements in conjunction is: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10).

אפי' תימא ר' יאשיה וסבר לה כר"ע דדריש רבויי ומיעוטי (ואייתר ליה או לחלק) The Gemara continues: You may even say that the verse is referring to optional matters according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya. He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who interprets the Torah using the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions (see 26a), and the word “or” is superfluous and is used to separate “to do evil” from “to do good.”

אי אמרת בשלמא בדבר הרשות כתיב ממעט דבר מצוה אלא אי אמרת בדבר מצוה כתיב ממאי קא ממעט: The Gemara explains how one derives that the oaths referred to in the verse are oaths about optional matters in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiya, who interprets the verse in accordance with the principle of amplifications and restrictions: Granted, if you say that the verse about an oath on an utterance is written with regard to optional matters, the words “to do evil, or to do good” serve to restrict the meaning of the verse and exclude the application of an oath on an utterance to a matter involving a mitzva. The Gemara asks rhetorically: But if you say that the verse is written referring to a matter involving a mitzva, what do the words “to do evil, or to do good” serve to restrict?

א"ר יהודה בן בתירא מה אם הרשות כו': ורבנן שפיר קאמרי ליה לר' יהודה בן בתירא § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said: What? If, with regard to an oath concerning an optional matter, for which one is not under oath from Mount Sinai, he is liable for breaking it, then with regard to an oath about a mitzva, for which he is under oath from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he would be liable for breaking it? The Rabbis then asked him why he thinks one should be liable for an oath about a mitzva, since one would be exempt if it were inverted from positive to negative, rendering it an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva, which does not take effect. The Gemara comments: The Rabbis’ objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira is well stated.

ור"י בן בתירא אמר לך אטו הטבת אחרים לאו אע"ג דליתא בכלל הרעת אחרים ורבי רחמנא הכא נמי בקיום מצוה אע"ג דליתיה בביטול מצוה רבייה רחמנא The Gemara responds: And Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira could say to you: Isn’t there the case of an oath involving doing good to others, even though it does not include the possibility of being inverted to include liability for an oath concerning harming others, but nevertheless the Merciful One has amplified the halakha to include it? Here also, with regard to an oath to perform a mitzva, even though it does not include the possibility of being inverted to include liability for an oath concerning refraining from performing a mitzva, the Merciful One has amplified the halakha to include it.

ורבנן התם איתיה בלא איטיב הכא מי איתיה בלא אקיים: And how could the Rabbis respond? They could say that there, with regard to an oath to do good to others, there is the possibility of inverting the oath to: I will not do good. Here, with regard to an oath to perform a mitzva, is there any possibility of a valid oath: I will not perform a mitzva?

מתני׳ שבועה שלא אוכל ככר זו שבועה שלא אוכלנה שבועה שלא אוכלנה ואכלה אינו חייב אלא אחת MISHNA: If one says: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and he then says again: On my oath I will not eat it, and again: On my oath I will not eat it, and he then ate it, he is liable only once. Once the first oath had taken effect, the subsequent oaths could not, as a prohibition cannot take effect where another prohibition is already in place.

זו היא שבועת בטוי שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה קרבן עולה ויורד This is an oath on an utterance, for which one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally breaking it, and for unwittingly breaking it one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

שבועת שוא חייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה פטור: For an oath taken in vain, one is liable to receive lashes when it is taken intentionally, and one is exempt when it is taken unwittingly.

גמ׳ למה לי למיתני שבועה שלא אוכל שבועה שלא אוכלנה GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need to teach the mishna such that the wording of the first oath is: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and then the wording of the second oath is: On my oath I will not eat it?

הא קמ"ל טעמא דאמר שלא אוכל והדר אמר שלא אוכלנה דלא מיחייב אלא חדא אבל אמר שלא אוכלנה והדר אמר שלא אוכל מיחייב תרתי The Gemara answers: This teaches us that the reason that he is liable only once is that he said: I will not eat this loaf, and then said: I will not eat it. But if he had said: I will not eat it, and then had said: I will not eat this loaf, he would be liable twice.

כדרבא דאמר רבא שבועה שלא אוכל ככר זו כיון שאכל ממנה כזית חייב שלא אוכלנה אינו חייב עד שיאכל את כולה: This is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava says: If one says: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, once he has eaten an olive-bulk of it he is liable, as this oath is understood to mean that it is prohibited for him to eat any of the loaf. If he says: On my oath I will not eat it, he is not liable unless he eats the whole loaf. The words: I will not eat it, indicate that his oath applies only to eating the entire loaf. Accordingly, when the first oath is: I will not eat it, and the second oath is: I will not eat this loaf, the second oath can take effect, as it generates a new prohibition that applies to each and every olive-bulk of the loaf.

שבועה שלא אוכלנה ואכלה אינו חייב אלא אחת כו': הא תו למה לי § The mishna teaches: If one says: On my oath I will not eat this loaf, and he then says again: On my oath I will not eat it, and again: On my oath I will not eat it, and he then ate it, he is liable only once. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to mention this additional, third, oath: I will not eat it?

הא קמ"ל חיובא הוא דליכא הא שבועה איכא דאי משכחת רווחא חיילא The Gemara answers: This teaches us that there is no liability where one states redundant oaths, but there is an oath; the final oath is not completely discounted, so that if you find room, i.e., an application, for the additional oath, it goes into effect.

למאי הלכתא לכדרבא דאמר רבא שאם נשאל על הראשונה עלתה לו שניה תחתיה For what matter is this halakha relevant? It is relevant for the statement of Rava, as Rava says that if one requested of a halakhic authority to dissolve the first oath, and he did so, the second one counts for him in its place unless it, too, was dissolved.

לימא מסייעא ליה מי שנדר ב' נזירות ומנה ראשונה והפריש עליה קרבן ואח"כ נשאל על הראשונה עלתה לו שניה בראשונה The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports his opinion: With regard to one who took two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first term of naziriteship and separated an offering for it, and afterward requested and received dissolution of the first vow from a halakhic authority, the second term was counted for him in the observance of the first term, and he is not required to be a nazirite further. This indicates that the second vow went into effect retroactively once the first was dissolved, and the same would be true in the case of two oaths.

הכי השתא התם נזירות מיהא איתא דכי מני לראשונה בעי מיהדר מימנא לשניה בלא שאלה הכא שבועה שניה מי איתא כלל The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, the second naziriteship is there in any event, as once he counts the first term, he needs to return and count the second if there is no request for dissolution. Here, if he does not request dissolution of the first oath, is there a second oath at all? Therefore one cannot find support for Rava’s opinion from the baraita.

אמר רבא נשבע על ככר ואכלה אם שייר ממנה כזית נשאל עליה אכלה כולה אין נשאל עליה § Rava says: If one took an oath about a loaf and then ate it, if he left an olive-bulk of it, he may request that his oath about the loaf be dissolved. If he ate the whole loaf, he may no longer request that his oath about it be dissolved.

א"ל רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי ה"ד אי דאמר שלא אוכל מכזית קמא עבדיה לאיסוריה אי דאמר שלא אוכלנה מאי איריא כזית Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: What are the circumstances? If one took an oath where he said: I will not eat this loaf, which Rava, as cited above, understands as rendering it prohibited for him to eat any part of the loaf, then with the first olive-bulk that he ate he already committed his transgression. If he took an oath where he said: I will not eat it, which Rava understands as rendering it prohibited for him to eat only the whole loaf, why does Rava mention specifically that he left over an olive-bulk?

Daf 28a

אפי' כל שהוא נמי Even if he had left any amount it would also be possible for him to dissolve the oath, as he had not yet broken his oath.

אי בעית אימא שלא אוכל אי בעית אימא שלא אוכלנה איבעית אימא שלא אוכל מיגו דמהניא ליה שאלה אכזית בתרא מהניא ליה שאלה נמי אכזית קמא Rav Ashi answers: If you wish, say that the halakha stated by Rava is referring to a case where he took an oath, saying: I will not eat this loaf, and if you wish, say that it is referring to a case where he took an oath , saying: I will not eat it. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the halakha stated by Rava is referring to a case where he took an oath , saying: I will not eat this loaf. Since a request for dissolution is still effective even for the last olive-bulk of the loaf, it is effective also for the first olive-bulk.

ואיבעית אימא שלא אוכלנה אי שייר כזית חשיב לאיתשולי עליה ואי לא לא חשיב לאיתשולי עליה And if you wish, say that the halakha stated by Rava is referring to a case where he took an oath, saying: I will not eat it. If he left an olive-bulk, that is a sufficiently significant quantity for which to request dissolution of the oath. But if he did not leave that much, it is not a sufficiently significant quantity for which to request dissolution of the oath.

מיתיבי מי שנדר שתי נזירות ומנה ראשונה והפריש עליה קרבן ואח"כ נשאל על הראשונה עלתה לו שניה בראשונה Rava assumes that once one has eaten the entire loaf, it is no longer possible to dissolve the oath. The Gemara raises an objection to this from a baraita: With regard to one who took two vows of naziriteship, and counted the first term and separated an offering for it, and afterward requested and received dissolution of the first vow from a halakhic authority, the second term was counted for him in the observance of the first term and he is not required to be a nazirite further. Although the first term of naziriteship was entirely finished, a halakhic authority could still dissolve the vow.

הכא במאי עסקינן בשלא כיפר The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he has not yet atoned, i.e., he has not yet brought the offerings that one brings at the conclusion of naziriteship.

והתניא כיפר בשלא גלח ור"א היא דאמר תגלחת מעכבא The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that one can still dissolve his vow of naziriteship after he has atoned? The Gemara answers: It is a case where he has brought the offerings but has not yet shaved his hair, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Shaving is indispensable to the completion of naziriteship.

והתניא גלח אמר רב אשי נזירות קא רמית מי גרם לשניה שלא תחול ראשונה ואינה The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that one can still dissolve his vow of naziriteship after he has shaved? Rav Ashi said: Are you comparing naziriteship to oaths? What caused the second naziriteship to not take effect until now? It was the first naziriteship, and once it has been dissolved, it is no longer a factor. Since the observance of the naziriteship term is the same whether it is counted for the second or the first, the first term of naziriteship can be regarded as not yet having started and that is why it can be dissolved. By contrast, in the case of the oath, once he ate the loaf, his oath is no longer extant at all.

אמימר אמר אפילו אכלה כולה נשאל עליה אי בשוגג מחוסר קרבן אי במזיד מחוסר מלקות אבל כפתוהו על העמוד לא כדשמואל דאמר שמואל כפתוהו על העמוד ורץ מב"ד פטור Ameimar said, in contrast to the opinion of Rava: Even if he ate the entire loaf he may still request dissolution of the oath. If he ate it unwittingly, i.e., he forgot the oath, it is a situation where he has not yet brought the offering he is liable to bring. If he ate it intentionally, it is a situation where he has not yet received lashes. But if he was already tied to the stake in order to receive lashes, he can no longer request that his oath be dissolved, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: If one had already been tied to the stake in order to receive lashes, and he ran away from the court and escaped, he is exempt from receiving lashes, as being tied to the stake is regarded as the beginning of receiving the lashes; once he has escaped, he is treated as though he were already flogged.

ולא היא התם רץ הכא לא רץ The Gemara rejects this: And that is not so. Even if he was tied to the stake he can still have his oath dissolved. There, with regard to his exemption from receiving lashes after he ran away, the original flogging is over and there is no need to initiate a new one. Here, with regard to dissolving the oath, he did not run, and since he is still subject to lashes, he can still have his oath dissolved.

אמר רבא שבועה שלא אוכל ככר זו אם אוכל זו ואכל את הראשונה בשוגג והשניה במזיד פטור ראשונה במזיד ושניה בשוגג חייב שתיהן בשוגג פטור § Rava says: If one says: On my oath I will not eat that loaf if I eat this one, and then he ate the first one, i.e., the loaf whose consumption was the condition for the oath taking effect, unwittingly, and ate the second intentionally, he is exempt. Since he fulfilled the condition unintentionally, the oath does not take effect, as it was without full intent. But if he ate the first intentionally, knowing that if he eats it it will be prohibited for him to eat the other loaf, and he then ate the second unwittingly, he is liable to bring an offering for breaking his oath unwittingly. If he ate them both unwittingly he is exempt, as the oath does not take effect when he fulfills the condition unwittingly.

Daf 28b

שתיהן במזיד אכליה לתנאיה והדר אכליה לאיסוריה מיחייב אכליה לאיסוריה והדר אכליה לתנאיה פלוגתא דרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש למ"ד התראת ספק שמה התראה חייב למ"ד לאו שמה התראה פטור In a case where he ate both of them intentionally, if he ate the loaf whose consumption was his condition and then ate the forbidden loaf, he is liable to receive lashes. If he ate the forbidden loaf and then ate the loaf whose consumption was his condition, his liability is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. According to the one who says that an uncertain forewarning is deemed a valid forewarning, he is liable to receive lashes. According to the one who says that an uncertain forewarning is not deemed a valid forewarning, he is exempt. Since when he was forewarned for eating the forbidden loaf it was uncertain whether it would actually become forbidden, that forewarning is not sufficient for him to be liable to receive lashes.

תלאן זו בזו לא אוכל זו אם אוכל זו לא אוכל זו אם אוכל זו ואכל זו בזדון עצמה ובשגגת חבירתה וזו בזדון עצמה ובשגגת חבירתה פטור If one took an oath with regard to two loaves such that he rendered them interdependent, this one on that one, saying: I will not eat that if I eat this, and: I will not eat this if I eat that, and he ate this one intentionally with regard to itself, i.e., at the time he ate it he was aware that he had taken an oath that would render it forbidden if he ate the other, but unwittingly with regard to the other, i.e., he did not remember that in eating it he rendered the second one forbidden, and then he ate that one intentionally with regard to itself but unwittingly with regard to the other, he is exempt, as both conditions were fulfilled only unintentionally.

זו בשגגת עצמה ובזדון חבירתה וזו בשגגת עצמה ובזדון חבירתה חייב If he ate this one unwittingly with regard to itself, having forgotten that it would be forbidden if he ate the other, but intentionally with regard to the other, understanding that with his action he rendered the other forbidden, and that one unwittingly with regard to itself but intentionally with regard to the other, he is liable to bring offerings for unwittingly breaking his oaths, as the conditions were fulfilled intentionally and the oaths took effect.

שתיהן בשוגג פטור If he ate both of them unwittingly he is exempt, as both conditions were fulfilled only unintentionally.

שתיהן במזיד אשניה מיחייב אראשונה פלוגתא דרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש If he ate both of them intentionally, he is liable to receive lashes for eating the second loaf, while for the first loaf his status depends on the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish with regard to an uncertain forewarning.

אמר רב מרי אף אנן נמי תנינא (ארבעה נדרים התירו חכמים נדרי זרוזין נדרי הבאי נדרי שגגות נדרי אונסין) Rav Mari said: We learn in the mishna (Nedarim 20b) as well that if one takes an oath with a condition but then fulfills the condition only unwittingly, he is exempt: The Sages dissolved four types of vows without the requirement of a request to a halakhic authority: Vows of exhortation, vows of exaggeration, unwitting vows, and vows whose fulfillment is impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control.

נדרי שגגות כיצד קונם אם אכלתי ואם שתיתי ונזכר שאכל ושתה שאיני אוכל שאיני שותה שכח ואכל ושתה מותר ותני עלה כשם שנדרי שגגות מותרין כך שבועות שגגות מותרות The mishna elaborates (see Nedarim 25b): Unwitting vows, how so? If one says: A certain item is forbidden to me like an offering [konam] if I ate or if I drank, and he then remembers that he ate or drank, or if one says: This loaf is konam for me if I will eat or if I will drink, and he then forgets and eats or drinks, the item is permitted. And it is taught in a baraita with regard to that mishna: Just as unwitting vows are dissolved, so are unwitting oaths dissolved, since he fulfilled the condition while lacking awareness that he was doing so.

(שבועות שגגות ה"ד לאו כי האי גוונא שמע מינה) The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of unwitting oaths? Is it not a case like this, where he takes an oath with a condition and then fulfills the condition of the oath unwittingly? Conclude from that mishna that there is support for Rava’s opinion.

עיפא תני שבועות בי רבה פגע ביה אבימי אחוה אמר ליה שבועה שלא אכלתי שבועה שלא אכלתי מהו אמר ליה אינו חייב אלא אחת א"ל אישתבשת הרי יצאה שבועה לשקר § It is related that the Sage Eifa learned tractate Shevuot in the academy of Rabba. His brother Avimi met him and tested him concerning the halakhot of oaths. Avimi said to him: If one says: On my oath I did not eat, and then again: On my oath I did not eat, what is the halakha? Eifa said to him: He is liable only once if he ate. Avimi said to him: You have confused the issue. Since the oaths are about the past, it is not a question of whether the second oath takes effect. Each time, a false oath was issued, and each was a separate transgression.

שבועה שלא אוכל תשע ועשר מהו חייב על כל אחת ואחת אמר ליה אישתבשת אי תשע לא אכיל עשר לא אכיל Avimi asked him further: If one said: On my oath I will not eat nine pieces and on my oath I will not eat ten, what is the halakha? Eifa replied: He is liable for each and every one of the oaths, as the scope of the second oath is broader than that of the first. Avimi said to him: You have confused the issue: If he may not eat nine, he may not eat ten. The oath not to eat ten cannot take effect, since it is an action already prohibited by the oath not to eat nine.

שבועה שלא אוכל עשר ותשע מהו אינו חייב אלא אחת אמר ליה אישתבשת עשר הוא דלא אכיל הא תשע מיהא אכיל Avimi asked him further: If one said: On my oath I will not eat ten and on my oath I will not eat nine, what is the halakha? Eifa replied: He is liable for only one oath. Avimi said to him: You have confused the issue. According to the first oath, it is ten that he may not eat, but he may still eat nine, so the second oath takes effect, in that it prohibits him from eating nine.

אמר אביי זימנין דמשכחת לה להא דעיפא כדמר דאמר רבה שבועה שלא אוכל תאנים וענבים וחזר ואמר שבועה שלא אוכל תאנים Abaye said: There are times when you find that the ruling of Eifa with regard to an oath not to eat ten followed by an oath not to eat nine applies, as in the case mentioned by the Master. As Rabba says: In the case of one who says: On my oath I will not eat figs and grapes together, and then says: On my oath I will not eat figs,

Daf 29a

ואכל תאנים והפריש קרבן ואח"כ אכל ענבים לחודייהו הויא להו ענבים חצי שיעור ואחצי שיעור לא מיחייב קרבן הכא נמי כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל עשר וחזר ואמר שבועה שלא אוכל תשע ואכל תשע והפריש קרבן ואח"כ אכל עשירית הויא לה עשירית חצי שיעור ואחצי שיעור לא מיחייב: and he unwittingly ate figs and set aside an offering for breaking the second oath, and afterward he unwittingly ate grapes alone, he is exempt from liability for breaking the first oath. The grapes are tantamount to a half-measure of his first oath, which was not to eat figs and grapes together, and one is not liable to bring an offering for a half-measure. Here also, where he said: On my oath I will not eat ten, and then said: On my oath I will not eat nine, and he ate nine and set aside an offering for breaking his second oath, and later he ate the tenth, this tenth is tantamount to a half-measure of his first oath, and one is not liable to bring an offering for a half-measure.

מתני׳ איזו היא שבועת שוא נשבע לשנות את הידוע לאדם אמר על העמוד של אבן שהוא של זהב ועל האיש שהוא אשה ועל האשה שהיא איש MISHNA: Which oath is an oath taken in vain, mentioned in the previous mishna (27b)? It is when one takes an oath to deny that which is known to people to be true, for example, one says about a stone column that it is made of gold, or about a man that he is a woman, or about a woman that she is a man.

נשבע על דבר שאי אפשר לו אם לא ראיתי גמל שפורח באויר ואם לא ראיתי נחש כקורת בית הבד Another type of oath taken in vain is when one takes an oath about a matter that is impossible, e.g., if he says: If I did not see a camel flying through the air, or: If I did not see a snake as large as the beam of the olive press.

אמר לעדים בואו והעידוני שבועה שלא נעידך נשבע לבטל את המצוה שלא לעשות סוכה ושלא ליטול לולב ושלא להניח תפילין זו היא שבועת שוא שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה פטור In the case of one who said to witnesses: Come and testify for me, and they replied: On our oath we will not testify for you, that is an oath taken in vain, because it involves taking an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva. Other examples of this include an oath not to build a sukka, or not to take a lulav, or not to don phylacteries. This type of oath is an oath taken in vain, for which one is liable to receive lashes if he takes the oath intentionally, and for which he is exempt if he takes it unwittingly.

שבועה שאוכל ככר זו שבועה שלא אוכלנה הראשונה שבועת ביטוי והשניה שבועת שוא If one said: On my oath I will eat this loaf, and later said: On my oath I will not eat it, the first oath is an oath on an utterance, and the second is an oath taken in vain, as he took an oath to perform an action that would violate his previous oath.

אכלה עבר על שבועת שוא לא אכלה עבר על שבועת ביטוי: If he ate it, he violated the prohibition against taking an oath in vain. If he did not eat it, he violated the prohibition against breaking an oath on an utterance.

גמ׳ אמר עולא והוא שניכר לג' בני אדם: GEMARA: With regard to an oath taken in vain that denies that which is known to people, Ulla says: It is considered known to people when it is a fact that is known to three people.

נשבע על דבר שאי אפשר לו אם לא ראיתי גמל פורח באויר: שבועה שראיתי לא קאמר מאי אם לא ראיתי אביי אמר תני שבועה שראיתי רבא אמר באומר יאסרו כל פירות שבעולם עלי אם לא ראיתי גמל פורח באויר § The mishna describes an oath taken in vain where one takes an oath about a matter that is impossible, e.g., where one says: If I did not see a camel flying through the air. The Gemara points out: The tanna of the mishna did not say: On my oath I saw. What is the meaning of: If I did not see? Abaye said: Emend the language of the mishna and teach: On my oath I saw. Rava said: This is part of a larger statement where one says: Let all the produce in the world be prohibited for me if I did not see a camel flying through the air.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי ודלמא האי גברא ציפורא רבא חזי ואסיק ליה שמא גמלא וכי קא משתבע אדעתיה דידיה אישתבע With regard to the oath: If I did not see a camel flying through the air, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Perhaps this man who took this oath saw a great bird and named it for himself: Camel, and when he took the oath, he took the oath according to his own understanding.

וכי תימא בתר פומיה אזלינן ולא אזלינן בתר דעתיה והא תניא כשמשביעין אותו אומרים לו הוי יודע שלא על דעתך אנו משביעין אותך אלא על דעתנו ועל דעת ב"ד מאי טעמא לאו משום דאמרינן דלמא איסקונדרי יהיב ליה ואסיק להו זוזי דכי קא משתבע אדעתיה דידיה קא משתבע And if you would say that we follow his mouth, i.e., the generally accepted meaning of what one says, and we do not follow his understanding, i.e., his own private meaning, but isn’t it taught otherwise in a baraita: When they administer an oath to him in court, the judges say to him: Know that it is not according to your own understanding that we administer this oath to you, but according to our understanding and according to the understanding of the court? What is the reason they say this? Is it not because we say: Perhaps he gave tokens [iskunderei] to his creditor but he calls them for himself: Dinars, so that when he takes the oath, it is according to his own understanding that he takes the oath. Since, in principle, it is possible for him to take an oath according to his private meaning of the words, the court insists that the oath it administers is to be understood according to the words’ generally accepted meaning.

לא התם משום קניא דרבא Rav Ashi replies: No, the reason the court admonishes the oath taker is not that the oath can be interpreted according to a private meaning. There, when the court administers an oath, they explain that it is according to their meaning due to deceptions like that of the reed in Rava’s court. In that incident, someone handed his creditor a hollow reed, which he had secretly filled with coins, to hold for him, and proceeded to take an oath that he had given him the money owed to him, whereupon he took back the reed, as the creditor was unaware of its contents. The court admonishes oath takers so that they do not think that they have fulfilled their obligation to take an oath if they engage in such chicanery.

ת"ש וכן מצינו כשהשביע משה את ישראל אמר להן דעו שלא על דעתכם אני משביע אתכם אלא על דעת המקום ועל דעתי ואמאי לימא להו קיימו מאי דאמר אלוה לאו משום דמסקי אדעתייהו עבודת כוכבים The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita: And so we found that when Moses administered an oath to Israel that they would keep the Torah (see Deuteronomy 29:9–12), he said to them: Know that I am not administering this oath according to your understanding but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to my understanding. And why not let him simply say to them: Keep that which God said? Is it not that he insisted on admonishing them because he was concerned lest they direct the oath in their minds to idolatry, saying that they are taking an oath of loyalty to God but privately intending the oath to be for idolatry? This indicates that the content of an oath can be affected by an oath taker’s private meaning.

לא משום דעבודת כוכבים נמי איקרי אלוה דכתיב (שמות כ, כג) אלהי כסף ואלהי זהב The Gemara rejects this: No, Moses explicitly indicated that the oath was according to God’s and his own understanding because idolatry is also referred to with the word: God, as it is written: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver or gods of gold” (Exodus 20:20). Therefore, the generally accepted meaning of the oath is ambiguous.

ולימא להו קיימו תורה חדא תורה ולימא קיימו שתי תורות תורת חטאת תורת אשם קיימו כל התורה כולה עבודת כוכבים דאמר מר חמורה עבודת כוכבים שכל הכופר בה כמודה בכל התורה כולה The Gemara suggests: If private meanings do not affect the content of an oath, let Moses merely say to them: Keep the Torah. The Gemara explains: They could then have taken an oath to keep only one Torah, either the Written or the Oral Torah. The Gemara suggests: And let him say: Keep two Torahs. The Gemara explains: The word: Torah, also has a narrower meaning of a set of halakhic procedures. The Jewish people could then have limited the oath to the law of [torat] the sin-offering or the law of [torat] the guilt-offering. The Gemara suggests: Let Moses administer an oath to keep the entire Torah. The Gemara replies: That could have been understood as referring only to the prohibition of idolatry, as the Master says: The prohibition of idolatry is so severe that with regard to one who denies idol worship, it is as if he affirms the entire Torah.

ולימא להו קיימו מצוה חדא מצוה קיימו מצות תרתי כל המצות כולן מצות ציצית דאמר מר שקולה מצות ציצית כנגד כל המצות כולן The Gemara suggests: And let him say to them: Keep the mitzva, i.e., that which you are commanded. The Gemara replies: That could have been understood as referring to only one mitzva. The Gemara suggests: Let him say: Keep mitzvot, i.e., in the plural. The Gemara replies: That could be understood as referring to only two mitzvot. The Gemara suggests: Let him say: All the mitzvot in their entirety. The Gemara replies: That could be understood as referring to the mitzva of ritual fringes, as the Master says: The mitzva of ritual fringes is equivalent to all the other mitzvot.

ולימא להו קיימו שש מאות ושלש עשרה מצות ולטעמיך לימא להו על דעתי על דעת המקום למה לי The Gemara suggests: And let him say to them: Keep 613 mitzvot. The Gemara replies: And according to your reasoning, let him simply say: Take the oath according to my understanding. Why do I need for him to say: According to the understanding of the Omnipresent?

Daf 29b

אלא כי היכי דלא תהוי הפרה לשבועתייהו: Rather, Moses administered the oath in this manner so that there would not be any possibility of the nullification of their oath. An oath taken with public consent cannot be dissolved. In this case, Moses and God constitute the public that gives its consent to the oath administered to the people. This was the reason for Moses’ insistence that the oath was taken according to his and God’s awareness; it was not because there was a possibility that the people could take the oath according to a private meaning.

ואם לא ראיתי נחש כקורת בית הבד: ולא והא ההוא דהוה בשני שבור מלכא הוה חד דאחזיק תליסר אורוותא תיבנא § The mishna teaches with regard to an oath about a matter that is impossible, e.g., If I did not see a camel flying through the air, or: If I did not see a snake as large as the beam of the olive press. The Gemara asks: And are there no snakes that large? But wasn’t there a certain snake during the years of the reign of King Shapur, one snake that could contain, i.e., swallow, thirteen stables of straw?

אמר שמואל בטרוף כולהו נמי מיטרף טריפין בשגבו טרוף: Shmuel said: The size of the snake is not the subject of the analogy. The oath is referring to a snake that was flat [taruf ] like the beam of an olive press. The Gemara asks: Aren’t they all flat? The Gemara explains: Snakes’ undersides are flat. This oath is referring to a snake whose back is flat.

שבועה שאוכל ככר זו שבועה שלא אוכלנה כו': השתא משום שבועת ביטוי מיחייב משום שבועת שוא לא מיחייב הרי יצתה שבועה לשוא § The mishna teaches: If one said: On my oath I will eat this loaf, and later said: On my oath I will not eat it, the first oath is an oath on an utterance, and the second is an oath taken in vain. If he ate the loaf, he violated the prohibition against taking an oath in vain. If he did not eat it, he violated the prohibition against breaking an oath on an utterance. The Gemara asks: Now, if he did not eat it, he is liable because he violated his oath on an utterance. Is he not also liable for an oath taken in vain? An oath was issued in vain when he took the oath not to eat the loaf, as this required a violation of the oath he had taken to eat it.

אמר ר' ירמיה תני אף על שבועת ביטוי: Rabbi Yirmeya said: Teach the mishna with this emendation: If he did not eat it, he also violated the prohibition against breaking an oath on an utterance.

מתני׳ שבועת ביטוי נוהגת באנשים ובנשים בקרובים וברחוקים בכשרין ובפסולין בפני בית דין ושלא בפני בית דין מפי עצמו וחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה קרבן עולה ויורד MISHNA: As opposed to the halakhot of an oath of testimony, which will be discussed in the following chapter, the halakhot of an oath on an utterance apply to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to testify and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, i.e., when one takes an oath on his own, at his own initiative. And for violating an oath intentionally one is liable to receive lashes, and for doing so unwittingly he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

שבועת שוא נוהגת באנשים ובנשים ברחוקים ובקרובים בכשרין ובפסולין בפני ב"ד ושלא בפני ב"ד ומפי עצמו וחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה פטור Liability for an oath taken in vain applies to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to bear witness and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, and also when one takes an oath on his own. And for violating an oath intentionally one is liable to receive lashes, and for doing so unwittingly he is exempt.

אחת זו ואחת זו המושבע מפי אחרים חייב (אם) לא אכלתי היום ולא הנחתי תפלין היום משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב: With regard to both this, an oath on an utterance, and that, an oath taken in vain, even if he is administered the oath by others, he is liable. For example, if one said: If I did not eat today, or: I did not don phylacteries today, and another said to him: I administer an oath to you that your statement is true, and the former said: Amen, he is liable if the statement was false.

גמ׳ אמר שמואל כל העונה אמן אחר שבועה כמוציא שבועה בפיו דמי דכתיב (במדבר ה, כב) ואמרה האשה אמן אמן GEMARA: Shmuel says: Anyone who answers amen after being administered an oath is like one who expresses an oath with his own mouth, as it is written in the context of the oath administered to a sota, a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful: “And the woman shall say: Amen, amen” (Numbers 5:22).

אמר רב פפא משמיה דרבא מתני' וברייתא נמי דיקא דקתני שבועת העדות נוהגת באנשים ולא בנשים ברחוקים ולא בקרובים בכשרין ולא בפסולין ואינה נוהגת אלא בראוין להעיד ובפני ב"ד ושלא בפני ב"ד מפי עצמו ומפי אחרים אינן חייבין עד שיכפרו בהן בב"ד דברי רבי מאיר Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: An inference from the mishna and a baraita also support this when they are read precisely, as it is taught in the mishna (30a): The oath of testimony is practiced with regard to men but not with regard to women; with regard to non-relatives of the litigants, but not with regard to relatives; with regard to those fit to testify but not with regard to those unfit to testify due to a transgression that they performed. And the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. And this oath applies both in the presence of a court and not in the presence of a court, i.e., when the witness takes the oath on his own that he has no knowledge of the matter. But if an oath is administered to the witnesses by others, they are not liable until they deny knowledge of the matter in court and take an oath to that effect; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

ותניא בברייתא שבועת העדות כיצד אמר לעדים בואו והעידוני שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות או שאמרו אין אנו יודעין לך עדות משביע אני עליכם ואמרו (לו) אמן בין בפני ב"ד בין שלא בפני בית דין בין מפי עצמו בין מפי אחרים כיון שכפרו בהם חייבין דברי רבי מאיר Before stating the inference from the mishna, Rav Pappa cites the baraita. And it is taught in a baraita: With regard to an oath of testimony, how is one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering? A person said to witnesses: Come and testify for me. They replied: On our oath we do not know any testimony that concerns you, i.e., we have no knowledge of the matter. Alternatively, they said: We do not know any testimony that concerns you, and he said to them: I administer an oath to you, and they said to him: Amen. Whether this oath was taken in the presence of a court or whether it was not in the presence of a court, whether it was taken by each witness by himself or whether it was administered by others, once they denied knowing testimony that they in fact knew, they are liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

קשיין אהדדי אלא לאו ש"מ הא דענה אמן הא דלא ענה אמן ש"מ Rav Pappa asks: Aren’t the mishna and the baraita difficult, as they contradict each other? According to the mishna one is liable when the oath is administered by others only if it takes place in the presence of a court, while according to the baraita one is liable even not in the presence of a court. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that this statement in the baraita, where he is liable even not in the presence of a court, is referring to one who answered amen to the administered oath. That statement in the mishna is referring to one who did not answer amen and is therefore liable only in the presence of a court? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that it is so.

אמר רבינא משמיה דרבא מתניתין דהכא נמי דיקא דקא תני שבועת ביטוי נוהגת באנשים ובנשים ברחוקים ובקרובים בכשרין ובפסולין בפני בית דין ושלא בפני בית דין מפי עצמו אין מפי אחרים לא וקתני סיפא זה וזה מושבע מפי אחרים חייב Ravina said in the name of Rava: The mishna that is here (29b) also may be read precisely to support this point. As it is taught in the mishna: The halakhot of an oath on an utterance apply to men and to women, to relatives and to non-relatives, to those who are fit to testify and to those who are disqualified, whether the oath is taken in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, i.e., when one takes an oath on his own, at his own initiative. Ravina states his inference: On his own, yes, but administered by others, no. And it is taught in the last clause of the mishna: With regard to this, an oath on an utterance, and that, an oath taken in vain, even if he is administered the oath by others, he is liable.

קשיין אהדדי אלא לאו ש"מ הא דענה אמן הא דלא ענה אמן These statements in the mishna are difficult, as they contradict each other. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that this latter clause of the mishna is referring to one who answered amen to the administered oath. That former clause is referring to one who did not answer amen and is therefore liable only in the presence of a court.

ואלא שמואל מאי קא משמע לן דוקיא דמתניתין קא משמע לן: The Gemara asks: But since his statement can be derived from tannaitic sources, what is Shmuel teaching us? The Gemara answers: He is teaching us the precise reading of the mishna. Since that halakha is not stated explicitly in the mishna, Shmuel saw fit to state it.

הדרן עלך שבועת שתים

Daf 30a

מתני׳ שבועת העדות נוהגת באנשים ולא בנשים ברחוקין ולא בקרובין בכשרין ולא בפסולין ואינה נוהגת אלא בראוין להעיד MISHNA: The oath of testimony is practiced with regard to men but not with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives of the litigants but not with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify but not with regard to those unfit to testify due to a transgression that they performed. And the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify.

בפני בית דין ושלא בפני ב"ד מפי עצמו ומפי אחרים אין חייבין עד שיכפרו בהן בב"ד דברי ר' מאיר וחכמים אומרים בין מפי עצמו ובין מפי אחרים אינן חייבין עד שיכפרו בהן בב"ד The oath of testimony is practiced both in the presence of a court and not in the presence of a court, when the potential witness takes the oath on his own. But if the oath is administered by others and those denying that they witnessed the incident in question neither take an oath nor answer amen to the administered oath, they are not liable until they deny any knowledge of the incident in question in court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether one of the witnesses takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, the witnesses are not liable until they deny any knowledge of the incident in question before the litigants in court.

וחייבין על זדון השבועה ועל שגגתה עם זדון העדות ואינן חייבין על שגגתה ומה הן חייבין על זדון השבועה קרבן עולה ויורד: And one is liable for the act of taking a false oath with intent and for an unwitting act of taking a false oath, i.e., he is unaware of the liability for taking a false oath, provided that he takes the oath with intent in terms of the testimony, i.e., he takes an oath that he has no knowledge of the matter even though he knows that he witnessed the incident. But witnesses are not liable for taking the oath if they were unwitting in terms of the testimony, i.e., they believe that they have no knowledge of the matter. And what are they liable for by taking a false oath with intent? They are liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

גמ׳ מנהני מילי דת"ר (דברים יט, יז) ועמדו שני האנשים בעדים הכתוב מדבר GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the oath of testimony is not practiced with regard to women because they are unfit to testify. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter, that women do not testify, derived? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “If an unrighteous witness rises up against any man…then the two men shall stand” (Deuteronomy 19:16–17), it is with regard to witnesses that the verse is speaking. Apparently, men, not women, may testify.

אתה אומר בעדים או אינו אלא בבעלי דינין כשהוא אומר (דברים יט, יז) אשר להם הריב הרי בעלי דינין אמור הא מה אני מקיים ועמדו שני האנשים בעדים הכתוב מדבר ואם נפשך לומר נאמר כאן שני ונאמר להלן (דברים יט, יז) שני מה להלן בעדים אף כאן בעדים The baraita continues: Do you say that it is with regard to witnesses, or perhaps it is only with regard to litigants that the verse is speaking? When it states: “Between whom the controversy is” (Deuteronomy 19:17), the litigants are already stated in the verse. How do I realize the meaning of the phrase “then the two men shall stand”? Apparently, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse is speaking. And if it is your wish to say that this is not a proof, another proof may be cited. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks.

מאי אם נפשך לומר וכי תימא מדלא כתב ואשר להם הריב כוליה קרא בבעלי דינין משתעי נאמר כאן שני ונאמר להלן שני מה להלן בעדים אף כאן בעדים The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement of the baraita: And if it is your wish to say? Why is the initial proof inadequate? The Gemara answers: And if you would say that from the fact that the verse did not write: Then the two men and those between whom the controversy is shall stand, which would indicate that the verse changes its focus from the witnesses to the litigants, perhaps throughout the entire verse it is with regard to litigants that it is speaking. Therefore, the tanna cites an additional proof. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks.

תניא אידך ועמדו שני האנשים בעדים הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בעדים או אינו אלא בבעלי דינין אמרת וכי שנים באים לדין שלשה אין באין לדין ואם נפשך לומר נאמר כאן שני ונאמר להלן שני מה להלן בעדים אף כאן בעדים It is taught in another baraita: When the verse states: “Then the two men shall stand,” it is with regard to witnesses that the verse is speaking. The baraita continues: Do you say that it is with regard to witnesses, or perhaps it is only with regard to litigants that the verse is speaking? The tanna asks: Did you say that? If the reference is to litigants, why does the verse mention two? Do two people come to court for judgment but three people do not come to court for judgment? And if it is your wish to say that this is not a proof, another proof may be cited. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks.

מאי אם נפשך לומר וכי תימא בתובע ונתבע קא משתעי קרא נאמר כאן שני ונאמר להלן שני מה להלן בעדים אף כאן בעדים The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And if it is your wish to say? Why is the initial proof inadequate? The Gemara answers: And if you would say that even though there are cases where there are more than two litigants, it is with regard to a plaintiff and a defendant that the verse is speaking. Therefore, the tanna cites an additional proof. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks.

תניא אידך ועמדו שני האנשים בעדים הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בעדים או אינו אלא בבעלי דינין אמרת וכי אנשים באין לדין נשים אין באות לדין ואם נפשך לומר נאמר כאן שני ונאמר להלן שני מה להלן בעדים אף כאן בעדים It is taught in another baraita: When the verse states: “Then the two men shall stand,” it is with regard to witnesses that the verse is speaking. The baraita continues: Do you say that it is with regard to witnesses, or perhaps it is only with regard to litigants that the verse is speaking? The tanna asks: Did you say that? If the reference is to litigants, why does the verse mention men? Do men come to court for judgment but women do not come to court for judgment? And if it is your wish to say that this is not a proof, another proof may be cited. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks.

מאי אם נפשך לומר וכי תימא אשה לאו אורחה משום (תהלים מה, יד) כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה נאמר כאן שני ונאמר להלן שני מה להלן בעדים אף כאן בעדים The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And if it is your wish to say? Why is the initial proof inadequate? The Gemara answers that it means: And if you would say that with regard to a woman, it is not typical conduct for her to appear in court due to the verse that is stated with regard to women: “All the glory of the king’s daughter is within” (Psalms 45:14), and that is why the verse addressed a situation that is prevalent, i.e., a case where the litigants are men, and there is no proof that women are unfit for testimony. Therefore, the tanna cites an additional proof. It is stated here: “The two men,” and it is stated there: “On the basis of two witnesses”; just as there, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks, so too here, it is with regard to witnesses that the verse speaks.

ת"ר ועמדו שני האנשים מצוה לבעלי דינין שיעמדו אמר ר' יהודה שמעתי שאם רצו להושיב את שניהם מושיבין איזהו אסור שלא יהא אחד עומד ואחד יושב אחד מדבר כל צרכו ואחד אומר לו קצר דבריך § The Gemara cites another interpretation of the verse. The Sages taught: “Then the two men shall stand”; this indicates that there is a mitzva for the litigants to stand during the court proceedings. Rabbi Yehuda said: I heard that if the judges wished to seat both of the litigants, they may seat them. What, then, is prohibited for the judges? They must ensure that there will not be a situation where one litigant is standing and one litigant is sitting, or a situation where one litigant says everything that he needs to say to present his case and one litigant, the judge says to him: Curtail your statement.

ת"ר (ויקרא יט, טו) בצדק תשפוט עמיתך שלא יהא אחד יושב ואחד עומד אחד מדבר כל צרכו ואחד אומר לו קצר דבריך ד"א בצדק תשפוט עמיתך הוי דן את חבירך לכף זכות The Sages taught: The verse states: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague” (Leviticus 19:15), from which it is derived: The court must ensure that there will not be a situation where one litigant is sitting and one litigant is standing, or a situation where one litigant says everything that he needs to say to present his case and one litigant, the judge says to him: Curtail your statement. Alternatively, it is derived from the verse: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague,” that you should judge another favorably, and seek to find justification for his actions, even if when interpreted differently his actions could be judged unfavorably.

תני רב יוסף בצדק תשפוט עמיתך עם שאתך בתורה ובמצות השתדל לדונו יפה Rav Yosef teaches that from the verse: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague [amitekha],” it is derived: With regard to one who is with you [im she’itekha] in observance of Torah and in fulfillment of mitzvot, try to judge him favorably, in the manner that the Gemara will now explain.

רב עולא בריה דרב עילאי הוה ליה דינא קמיה דרב נחמן שלח ליה רב יוסף עולא חברנו עמית בתורה ובמצות אמר למאי שלח לי לחנופי ליה הדר אמר למישרא בתיגריה The Gemara relates: Rav Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, had a trial pending before Rav Naḥman. Rav Yosef sent a message to Rav Naḥman: Ulla our friend is a colleague in Torah and mitzvot, with regard to whom the verse states that you should judge him favorably. Rav Naḥman said: For what purpose did he send this message to me? Does he expect me to grant him preferential treatment? Every judgment must be undertaken with righteousness. Rav Naḥman then said: Rav Yosef sent me the message to ensure I would open with Rav Ulla’s dispute in the event that other cases come before me for judgment, in deference to the Torah because he is a Torah scholar.

Daf 30b

אי נמי לשודא דדייני Alternatively, Rav Yosef informed me that Rav Ulla is a Torah scholar with regard to circumstances where the ruling is not clear-cut and the decision is rendered based on the discretion of the judges, that is, when the court is unable to rule solely based on the testimony presented in court and the judges arrive at their ruling based on their sense of the matter. Rav Yosef informed Rav Naḥman that if the case is decided based on judicial discretion, Rav Ulla is worthy of having the decision ruled in his favor.

אמר עולא מחלוקת בבעלי דינין אבל בעדים דברי הכל בעמידה דכתיב (דברים יט, יז) ועמדו שני האנשים אמר רב הונא מחלוקת בשעת משא ומתן אבל בשעת גמר דין דברי הכל דיינין בישיבה ובעלי דינין בעמידה דכתיב (שמות יח, יג) וישב משה לשפוט את העם ויעמוד העם § Ulla says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the obligation to stand in court is only with regard to the litigants; but with regard to the witnesses, everyone agrees that they testify while standing, as it is written: “Then the two men shall stand” (Deuteronomy 19:17). Rav Huna says: The dispute whether the litigants are required to stand is only at the time of the deliberation, but at the time of the verdict, everyone agrees that the judges issue the verdict while sitting and the litigants receive the verdict while standing, as it is written: “And Moses sat to judge the people and the people stood” (Exodus 18:13).

ל"א מחלוקת בשעת משא ומתן אבל בשעת גמר דין דברי הכל דיינין בישיבה ובעלי דינין בעמידה דהא עדים כגמר דין דמו וכתיב בהו ועמדו שני האנשים The Gemara presents an alternative version of the statement of Rav Huna: The dispute whether the litigants are required to stand is only at the time of the deliberation, but at the time of the verdict, everyone agrees that the judges issue the verdict while sitting and the litigants receive the verdict while standing, as concerning the witnesses, the status of the stage of their testimony is like that of the stage of the verdict, and it is written concerning them: “Then the two men shall stand.”

דביתהו דרב הונא הוה לה דינא קמיה דרב נחמן אמר היכי נעביד אי איקום מקמה מסתתמן טענתיה דבעל דינא לא איקום מקמה אשת חבר הרי היא כחבר א"ל לשמעיה צא ואפרח עלי בר אווזא ושדי עלוואי ואיקום The Gemara relates: The wife of Rav Huna had a trial pending before Rav Naḥman. Rav Naḥman said: What should we do? If I will arise before her in deference to her status as the wife of a Torah scholar, the claims of the other litigant will be suppressed, as it will be mistaken as a display of preference for the wife of Rav Huna, since not everyone is aware that one is required to show deference to the wife of a Torah scholar. If I will not arise before her, that would run counter to the principle that in terms of deference, the status of the wife of a ḥaver is like that of a ḥaver, who is devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot. Rav Naḥman said to his attendant: Go outside and cause a duck to fly and cast it onto me, and in that way I will be forced to arise in a manner that will fulfill the obligation to rise, without intimidating the other litigant.

והאמר מר מחלוקת בשעת משא ומתן אבל בשעת גמר דין דברי הכל דיינים בישיבה ובעלי דינין בעמידה דיתיב כמאן דשרי מסאניה ואמר איש פלוני אתה זכאי איש פלוני אתה חייב The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the Master, Rav Huna, say: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis whether the litigants are required to stand is only at the time of the deliberation, but at the time of the verdict, everyone agrees that the judges issue the verdict while sitting and the litigants receive the verdict while standing? How, then, can Rav Naḥman rise? The Gemara responds: One may fulfill both requirements in a case where he sits like one who unties his shoe, neither completely standing nor completely sitting, and says his verdict: So-and-so, you are innocent, and so-and-so, you are guilty.

אמר רבה בר רב הונא האי צורבא מרבנן ועם הארץ דאית להו דינא בהדי הדדי מותבינן ליה לצורבא מרבנן ולעם הארץ נמי אמרינן ליה תיב ואי קאי לית לן בה § Rabba bar Rav Huna says: In this situation where a Torah scholar [letzurva merabbanan] and an am ha’aretz have a court case with one another, we seat the Torah scholar, and to the am ha’aretz we also say: Sit. And if he chooses to stand due to deference, we have no problem with it.

רב בר שרביא הוה ליה דינא קמיה דרב פפא אותביה ואותיב נמי לבעל דיניה אתא שליחא דבי דינא בטש ביה ואוקמיה לעם הארץ ולא אמר ליה רב פפא תיב היכי עביד הכי והא מסתתמן טענתיה אמר רב פפא מימר אמר איהו הא אותבן שליחא הוא דלא מפייס מינאי The Gemara relates: Rav bar Sherevya had a trial pending before Rav Pappa. Rav Pappa seated him and also seated his litigant counterpart, who was an am ha’aretz. An agent of the court came and kicked and stood the am ha’aretz on his feet to show deference to the Torah scholars there, and Rav Pappa did not say to him: Sit. The Gemara asks: How did Rav Pappa act in that manner by not instructing the am ha’aretz to sit again? But aren’t the claims of the am ha’aretz suppressed by Rav Pappa’s perceived preferential treatment of Rav bar Sherevya? The Gemara responds: Rav Pappa said to himself that the litigant will not perceive bias, as he says: The judge seated me; it is the agent of the court who is displeased with me and compelled me to stand.

ואמר רבה בר רב הונא האי צורבא מרבנן ועם הארץ דאית להו דינא בהדי הדדי לא ליקדום צורבא מרבנן וליתיב משום דמיחזי כמאן דסדר ליה לדיניה ולא אמרן אלא דלא קביע ליה עידניה אבל קביע ליה עידניה לית לן בה מימר אמר בעידניה טריד And Rabba bar Rav Huna says: In this situation where a Torah scholar and an am ha’aretz have a court case with one another, let the Torah scholar not come to court early and sit with the judge in order to learn from him, due to the fact that by doing so he appears as one who is consulting the judge to arrange his legal claims, and that is prohibited. And we said this only in a case where there is not a fixed time for the Torah scholar to study with the judge at that hour; but if there is a fixed time for him to study with the judge at that hour, we have no problem with it, as the other litigant will say: He is occupied with his fixed study time, and the fact that he sat before the judge is unrelated to the case.

ואמר רבה בר רב הונא האי צורבא מרבנן דידע בסהדותא וזילא ביה מילתא למיזל לבי דיינא דזוטר מיניה לאסהודי קמיה לא ליזיל אמר רב שישא בריה דרב אידי אף אנן נמי תנינא מצא שק או קופה ואין דרכו ליטול הרי זה לא יטול § And Rabba bar Rav Huna says: In the case of a certain Torah scholar who knows testimony relevant to a certain individual, but it is a demeaning matter for him to go to the court consisting of a judge who is less prominent than he in order to testify before him, let him not go and testify. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: We learn that halakha in a mishna (Bava Metzia 29b) as well: If one found a sack or a basket, and it is not his typical manner to take it, he shall not take it in order to return it to its owner. Evidently, a Torah scholar may refrain from performing the mitzva to return a lost item (see Deuteronomy 22:1–3) if it is not in keeping with his stature.

הני מילי בממונא אבל באיסורא (משלי כא, ל) אין חכמה ואין תבונה ואין עצה לנגד ה' כל מקום שיש בו חלול ה' אין חולקין כבוד לרב: The Gemara notes: This matter applies only with regard to cases involving monetary matters; but in cases involving ritual matters, the dignity of the Torah scholar is not a consideration, as it is written: “There is neither wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord” (Proverbs 21:30), from which it is derived: Wherever there is desecration of the name of the Lord, one does not show deference to the teacher. Rather, the Torah scholar forgoes the honor due him in order to avoid violation of any prohibition that would desecrate the name of God.

רב יימר הוה ידע ליה סהדותא למר זוטרא אתא לקמיה דאמימר אותבינהו לכולהו אמר ליה רב אשי לאמימר והאמר עולא מחלוקת בבעלי דינין אבל בעדים דברי הכל בעמידה א"ל האי עשה והאי עשה עשה דכבוד תורה עדיף The Gemara relates: Rav Yeimar knew testimony relevant to the case of Mar Zutra. He came before Ameimar, who seated all the witnesses in deference to Rav Yeimar. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But doesn’t Ulla say that the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the obligation to stand in court is only with regard to the litigants, but with regard to the witnesses, everyone agrees that they testify while standing? Ameimar said to him: This, i.e., witnesses standing during testimony, is a positive mitzva, and that, i.e., treating Torah scholars with deference and allowing Rav Yeimar to sit, is a positive mitzva, and the positive mitzva of deference to the Torah takes precedence. Ameimar seated Rav Yeimar in deference to the Torah. In order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, he seated all the witnesses.

(סימן סניגרון בור גזלת מרמה) § The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the ensuing discussion: Advocacy, ignoramus, robbery, fraud.

ת"ר מנין לדיין שלא יעשה סניגרון לדבריו תלמוד לומר (שמות כג, ז) מדבר שקר תרחק ומנין לדיין שלא ישב תלמיד בור לפניו ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק The Sages taught: From where is it derived that a judge should not engage in advocacy [saneigeron] for his own statements and devise various pretexts to justify his erroneous rulings? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7). And from where is it derived with regard to a judge that a student who is an ignoramus should not sit before him to discuss the proceedings? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” When an ignorant student engages in the proceedings, he is apt to cause the judge to err in judgment.

מנין לדיין שיודע לחבירו שהוא גזלן וכן עד שיודע בחבירו שהוא גזלן מנין שלא יצטרף עמו תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק From where is it derived that a judge who knows that another judge is a robber and is disqualified from serving as a judge; and likewise, a witness who knows that another witness is a robber and is disqualified from serving as a witness; from where is it derived that he should not join him in judgment or testimony? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מנין לדיין שיודע בדין שהוא מרומה שלא יאמר הואיל והעדים מעידין אחתכנו ויהא From where is it derived that in a case where a judge who knows that the witnesses testifying before him are lying even though he is unable to prove it through their cross-examination and with regard to the verdict the result will be that it is fraudulent, that he should not say: Since the witnesses are testifying and I cannot prove their deceit, I will decide the case based on their testimony, and let

Daf 31a

קולר תלוי בצואר עדים תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק the chain [kolar] of culpability for the miscarriage of justice be placed around the neck of the false witnesses? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

(סימן תלת"א תלמי"ד ותל"ת בעל"י חו"ב סמרטו"ט שומ"ע ומטעי"ם) The Gemara provides a mnemonic for additional halakhot derived from the verse: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” Three relating to a student; and three relating to creditors; and three relating to a judge: Rags, hears, and explain.

מנין לתלמיד שיושב לפני רבו ורואה זכות לעני וחוב לעשיר מנין שלא ישתוק תלמוד לומר (שמות כג, ז) מדבר שקר תרחק From where is it derived with regard to a student who is sitting before his teacher and sees a claim that provides advantage for a poor person and disadvantage for a wealthy person that he shall not remain silent? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מנין לתלמיד שרואה את רבו שטועה בדין שלא יאמר אמתין לו עד שיגמרנו ואסתרנו ואבננו משלי כדי שיקרא הדין על שמי ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק From where is it derived with regard to a student who sees his teacher who is erring in judgment that he shall not say: I will wait for my teacher until he concludes the trial and then I will contradict him and construct a ruling of my own so that the verdict will be attributed to my name? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מנין לתלמיד שאמר לו רבו יודע אתה בי שאם נותנין לי מאה מנה איני מבדה מנה יש לי אצל פלוני ואין לי עליו אלא עד אחד מנין שלא יצטרף עמו תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7).

האי מדבר שקר תרחק נפקא הא ודאי שקורי קא משקר ורחמנא אמר (שמות כ, יב) לא תענה ברעך עד שקר אלא כגון דאמר ליה ודאי חד סהדא אית לי ותא אתה קום התם ולא תימא ולא מידי דהא לא מפקת מפומך שקרא אפי' הכי אסור משום שנאמר מדבר שקר תרחק The Gemara asks: Is it from the verse “Distance yourself from a false matter” that this matter is derived? But isn’t he certainly lying in that case, and this is already stated, as the Merciful One states: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13)? Rather, the reference is to a case where the teacher said to him: It is certain that I have one witness, and you come and stand there beside him and do not say anything, as in that manner you do not express a lie from your mouth. Your silent presence will create the impression that I have two witnesses and lead the debtor to admit his debt. Even so, it is prohibited to do this, due to that which is stated: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מנין לנושה בחבירו מנה שלא יאמר אטעננו במאתים כדי שיודה לי במנה ויתחייב לי שבועה ואגלגל עליו שבועה ממקום אחר תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק There are three halakhot with regard to a creditor: From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars, and there are no witnesses to that effect, that he shall not say: I will claim that he owes me two hundred dinars so that he will admit that he owes me one hundred dinars, and he will become liable to take an oath to me, the oath of one who admits to part of a claim, and on that basis I will extend the oath and compel him to take an oath with regard to a debt that he owes me from another place? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מנין לנושה בחבירו מנה וטענו מאתים שלא יאמר אכפרנו בב"ד ואודה לו חוץ לבית דין כדי שלא אתחייב לו שבועה ולא יגלגל עלי שבועה ממקום אחר תלמוד לומר מדבר שקר תרחק From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars and claims that the debtor owes him two hundred dinars, that the debtor shall not say: I will completely deny his claim in court, and I will admit to him outside court so that I will not become liable to take an oath to him and he will not extend the oath and compel me to take an oath with regard to a debt that I owe him from another place? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מנין לשלשה שנושין מנה באחד שלא יהא אחד בעל דין ושנים עדים כדי שיוציאו מנה ויחלוקו ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק From where is it derived with regard to three who are seeking repayment from one individual for a total of one hundred dinars, that one of the three should not assume the role of a sole litigant and claim one hundred dinars, and the other two will assume the role of witnesses so that they will exact payment of one hundred dinars from the debtor and divide it among them? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מנין לשנים שבאו לדין אחד לבוש סמרטוטין ואחד לבוש איצטלית בת מאה מנה שאומרין לו לבוש כמותו או הלבישהו כמותך ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק כי הוו אתו לקמיה דרבא בר רב הונא אמר להו שלופו פוזמוקייכו וחותו לדינא There are three halakhot with regard to a judge: From where is it derived with regard to two individuals who came to judgment, one dressed in rags and one dressed in a garment worth one hundred times one hundred dinars, that the judges say to the wealthy person: Dress like the poor person or dress the poor person in a garment like yours? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” The Gemara relates: When individuals would come before Rava bar Rav Huna for judgment he would say to them: Remove your fine shoes [puzmukaikhu] and descend for judgment, so you will not appear more distinguished than the other litigant.

מנין לדיין שלא ישמע דברי בעל דין (חבירו) קודם שיבא בעל דין חבירו ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק From where is it derived that a judge should not hear the statement of one litigant before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

מנין לבעל דין שלא יטעים דבריו לדיין קודם שיבא בעל דין חבירו ת"ל מדבר שקר תרחק רב כהנא מתני (שמות כ, ז) מלא תשא לא תשיא From where is it derived that a litigant shall not explain the rationale behind his statements to the judge before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” Rav Kahana teaches that this halakha is derived from that which is written: “You shall not accept [lo tissa] a false report” (Exodus 23:1), which he interprets as though it is written: You shall not cause others [lo tassi] to accept a false report.

(יחזקאל יח, יח) ואשר לא טוב עשה בתוך עמיו רב אמר זה הבא בהרשאה ושמואל אמר זה הלוקח שדה שיש עליה עסיקין: The verse states: “And did that which is not good among his people” (Ezekiel 18:18). Rav says: This is referring to one who comes to court with authorization to present claims on behalf of another. And Shmuel says: This is referring to one who purchases a field concerning which there are those who contest ownership of it, as in that way, he involves himself in the disputes of others.

אינה נוהגת אלא בראוין להעיד כו': לאפוקי מאי אמר רב פפא לאפוקי מלך ורב אחא בר יעקב אמר לאפוקי משחק בקוביא § The mishna teaches that the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. The Gemara asks: This statement serves to exclude what person not allowed to testify who was not mentioned explicitly in the mishna? Rav Pappa said: It serves to exclude a king who, although he is neither a relative nor otherwise disqualified from testifying, does not testify in court. And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: It serves to exclude one who plays with dice, who is disqualified as a witness by rabbinic law.

מ"ד משחק בקוביא כל שכן מלך ומ"ד מלך אבל משחק בקוביא מדאורייתא מחזא חזי ורבנן הוא דפסלוהו: The Gemara notes: According to the one who says that the mishna excludes one who plays with dice from the oath of testimony, all the more so should a king be excluded, as he does not testify by Torah law. And according to the one who says that the mishna excludes a king from the oath of testimony, it may exclude only a king, but perhaps one who plays with dice is not excluded, as by Torah law he is fit to testify and it is the Sages who disqualified him. Therefore, he is not excluded from the oath of testimony, which is by Torah law.

בפני בית דין ושלא בפני ב"ד כו': במאי קמיפלגי § The mishna teaches: The oath of testimony is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the potential witness takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the witness takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree?

אמרוה רבנן קמיה דרב פפא בדון מינה ומינה בדון מינה ואוקי באתרה קא מיפלגי The Sages said the explanation before Rav Pappa: They disagree with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy. Is the method to infer the halakha from the source of the verbal analogy and derive the details from that source as well, or is the method to infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place?

ר' מאיר סבר דון מינה ומינה מפקדון מה פקדון מושבע מפי עצמו חייב אף עדות מושבע מפי עצמו חייב ומינה מה פקדון בין בבית דין ובין שלא בבית דין אף עדות בין בבית דין ובין שלא בבית דין The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Meir holds: Infer from it and derive the details from it. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. And derive the details from it: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court.

ורבנן סברי דון מינה ואוקי באתרה מה פקדון מושבע מפי עצמו חייב אף עדות מושבע מפי עצמו חייב ואוקי באתרה מה מושבע מפי אחרים בבית דין אין שלא בבית דין לא אף מושבע מפי עצמו בבית דין אין שלא בבית דין לא And the Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. But interpret the halakha according to its own place and derive the details of the halakha from the halakhot of the oath of testimony: Just as in the case of one who was administered an oath by others, if he denies knowledge of the matter in court, yes, he is liable, and if his denial does not take place in court, no, he is not liable; so too, one who took the oath on his own, if he did so in court, yes, he is liable, and if he did not take the oath in court, no, he is not liable.

Daf 31b

אמר להו רב פפא אי מפקדון גמרי לה רבנן דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דדון מינה ומינה Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: If the Rabbis derive liability for one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own by means of a verbal analogy from the oath on a deposit, then everyone agrees: Infer from it and derive the details from it, and even the Rabbis would concede that all of the halakhot of the oath of testimony are derived from the oath on a deposit; therefore, one is liable for an oath taken on one’s own even outside the court.

אלא היינו טעמא דרבנן דמייתו לה בקל וחומר ומה מפי אחרים חייב מפי עצמו לא כל שכן Rather, this is the reason that the Rabbis hold that there is no liability for the oath of testimony taken on one’s own outside the court: They derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakhot of the oath of testimony itself, as follows: And if one who was administered an oath by others is liable, when one takes the oath on his own, is he not all the more so liable?

ומדמייתו לה מקל וחומר דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון מה מושבע מפי אחרים בב"ד אין שלא בב"ד לא אף מושבע מפי עצמו בפני ב"ד אין שלא בפני ב"ד לא And from the fact that they derived the halakha by means of an a fortiori inference, one is bound by the limitations that restrict that derivation: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Therefore, just as one who is administered an oath by others, if the oath is administered in court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not administered in court, no, he is not liable, so too, one who took the oath on his own, before a court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not before a court, no, he is not liable.

אמרו ליה רבנן לרב פפא מי מצית אמרת דלאו בדון מינה ומינה פליגי והתנן גבי פקדון שבועת הפקדון נוהגת באנשים ובנשים ברחוקין ובקרובין בכשרין ובפסולין בפני ב"ד ושלא בפני ב"ד מפי עצמו ומפי אחרים אינו חייב עד שיכפור בו בב"ד דברי ר"מ וחכ"א בין מפי עצמו ובין מפי אחרים כיון שכפר בו חייב The Rabbis said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that it is not with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? But didn’t we learn in the mishna with regard to the oath on a deposit: The oath on a deposit is practiced with regard to men and with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives and with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify and with regard to those unfit to testify. The oath on a deposit is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the bailee takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others, he is not liable until he denies responsibility for the deposit in court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the bailee takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, once he denied the claim concerning the deposit he is liable.

מושבע מפי אחרים בפקדון מנא להו לרבנן דחייב לאו דגמרי לה מעדות ושמע מינה בדון מינה ומינה פליגי The question arises: From where do the Rabbis derive that one who is administered an oath on a deposit by others is liable, given that an oath of that kind is not mentioned in the Torah in the context of an oath on a deposit? Is it not that they derive it from the halakhot of the oath of testimony? And conclude from it that it is with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? The Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The fact that one is liable for an oath on a deposit that is administered by others is derived from the oath of testimony, but one does not derive that one is liable only if that oath is administered in the presence of a court. Rather, the oath on a deposit administered by others is derived from an oath on a deposit taken on one’s own; one is liable in both cases for an oath taken not in the presence of the court.

מההיא אין מהא ליכא למשמע מינה: Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: From that mishna, yes, it is evident that the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir disagree with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it. However, no inference is to be learned from this mishna taught with regard to the oath of testimony, as perhaps the Rabbis derived their opinion by means of an a fortiori inference.

וחייבין על זדון השבועה: מנהני מילי דתנו רבנן בכולן נאמר בהן ונעלם וכאן לא נאמר בה ונעלם לחייב על המזיד כשוגג: § The mishna teaches: And one is liable for the act of taking a false oath with intent. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony with intent? It is derived as the Sages taught: In all of the other cases where one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2–4), i.e., the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and violating an oath on an utterance, it is stated: “And it is hidden”; but here, with regard to the oath of testimony, it is not stated: And it is hidden, which serves to render one liable for taking the oath intentionally just as he is liable for taking the oath unwittingly.

ועל שגגתה עם זדון העדות: ה"ד שגגתה עם זדון העדות א"ר יהודה אמר רב באומר יודע אני ששבועה זו אסורה אבל איני יודע אם חייבין עליה קרבן אם לא: § The mishna teaches: And one is liable for an unwitting act of taking a false oath provided that he takes the oath with intent in terms of the testimony. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case of an unwitting act of taking a false oath with intent in terms of the testimony? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says that this is in the case of one who says: I know that taking this false oath that I do not know the relevant information is prohibited, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring an offering for taking that oath.

ואין חייבין על שגגתה גרידתא לימא תנינא לדרב כהנא ודרב אסי The mishna teaches: But they are not liable for taking the oath if they were unwitting in terms of the testimony alone. If one actually forgot that he knows about the matter, he is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that we learn in the mishna that which Rav said in response to the dispute of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi? The Gemara (26a) cited a dispute between Rav Kahana and Rav Asi with regard to a certain statement of Rav, and each took an oath that his version was accurate. Rav told them that although the version of one of the amora’im was not accurate, he is not liable for taking a false oath, as each amora was convinced that his oath was true. This is not an unwitting oath; rather, it is an oath taken unaware.

לא אע"ג דתנן איצטריך ס"ד אמינא הכא הוא דלא כתיב ונעלם דבעינן שוגג דומיא דמזיד אבל התם דכתיב ונעלם אפילו שגגתה כל דהו קמ"ל: The Gemara responds: No, even though we learned this halakha in the mishna, Rav’s statement that the one who did not cite Rav’s statement accurately is exempt was necessary. It may enter your mind to say: It is only here, with regard to the oath of testimony, that one is exempt for unwittingly taking a false oath, as: And it is hidden, is not written concerning it, indicating that in order to be liable, we require that the halakhic status of the unwitting oath is similar to that of an intentional oath, i.e., he knows that he is taking a false oath, but he does not know that he is liable to bring an offering for doing so. Therefore, one who is unaware that it is a false oath is exempt. But there, in the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, where each took an oath on an utterance, where it is written: “And it is hidden,” even if it is entirely unwitting, i.e., they were totally unaware that the oath was false, one might say that he is liable. Therefore, Rav teaches us that even in the case of an oath on an utterance, one who is unwitting to that extent is exempt.

מתני׳ שבועת העדות כיצד אמר לשנים בואו והעידוני שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות או שאמרו לו אין אנו יודעין לך עדות משביע אני עליכם ואמרו אמן הרי אלו חייבין MISHNA: Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony, how so? In a case where the plaintiff said to two individuals: Come and testify on my behalf, and they replied: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, i.e., we do not have any knowledge of the matter you speak of, or in a case where they said to him: We do not know any testimony on your behalf, and he said to them: I administer an oath to you, and they said: Amen; if it was determined that they lied, these two witnesses are liable.

השביע עליהם חמש פעמים חוץ לב"ד ובאו לב"ד והודו פטורין כפרו חייבין על כל אחת ואחת השביע עליהן ה' פעמים בפני ב"ד וכפרו אינן חייבין אלא אחת אר"ש מה טעם הואיל ואינם יכולין לחזור ולהודות If he administered an oath to them five times outside the court, and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident in question and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court. If he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of the incident, they are liable for taking only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason for this ruling? Since once they denied that they had any knowledge of the incident they can no longer retract that denial and admit that they have knowledge of the matter. Therefore, there was only one oath of testimony, and there is no liability for the remaining oaths.

כפרו שניהן כאחד שניהן חייבין בזה אחר זה הראשון חייב והשני פטור כפר אחד והודה אחד הכופר חייב If both of the witnesses denied knowledge of the incident together, both of them are liable. If they denied knowledge one after the other, the first who denied knowledge is liable, and the second is exempt, as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive. If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable.

היו שתי כיתי עדים כפרה הראשונה ואח"כ כפרה השניה שתיהן חייבות מפני שהעדות יכולה להתקיים בשתיהן: If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both of the sets are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them, as even after the first set denies knowledge of the incident, the second remains capable of providing decisive testimony.

גמ׳ אמר שמואל ראוהו שרץ אחריהן אמרו לו מה אתה רץ אחרינו שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות פטורין עד שישמעו מפיו מאי קא משמע לן תנינא שילח ביד עבדו או שאמר להן הנתבע משביע אני עליכם שאם אתם יודעין לו עדות שתבואו ותעידוהו הרי אלו פטורים GEMARA: Shmuel says: If the witnesses saw the plaintiff pursuing them, and they said to him: For what reason are you pursuing us? On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are exempt, until they will hear a demand to testify directly from his mouth. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? We learn this in a mishna (35a): If the plaintiff sent a request for testimony with his servant, or if the respondent said to the potential witnesses: I administer an oath to you that if you know any testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, i.e., my opponent in the litigation, you will come and testify on his behalf, and they took a false oath that they have no knowledge of the incident, they are exempt,

Daf 32a

עד שישמעו מפי התובע until they hear a demand to testify directly from the mouth of the plaintiff.

רץ אחריהן איצטריכא ליה סלקא דעתך אמינא כיון דרץ אחריהן כמאן דאמר להו דמי קמ"ל The Gemara answers: Mentioning the case of the plaintiff pursuing them was necessary for Shmuel, as otherwise it could enter your mind to say: Since the plaintiff is pursuing them, it is like the case of one who says to them directly to testify. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that although the intent of the plaintiff is for them to testify, the witnesses are liable only if he tells them so explicitly.

והא נמי תנינא שבועת העדות כיצד אמר לעדים בואו והעידוני שבועה כו' אמר אין לא אמר לא The Gemara asks: But this too, we learn in the mishna: Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony, how so? In a case where the plaintiff said to two witnesses: Come and testify on my behalf, and they replied: On our oath, etc., from which it can be inferred that if the plaintiff said this to the witnesses, yes, they are liable, and if he did not say this to the witnesses, no, they are not liable.

אמר לאו דוקא The Gemara rejects this: No proof may be cited from the mishna, as perhaps when the tanna states: In a case where the plaintiff said, he did not mean that this is the halakha only in a case where he specifically verbalized his demand that they testify; rather, the same would be true even if he conveyed his intent in a non-verbal manner.

דאי לא תימא הכי גבי פקדון דקתני שבועת הפקדון כיצד אמר לו תן לי פקדון שיש לי בידך ה"נ אמר אין לא אמר לא הא (ויקרא ה, כא) וכחש בעמיתו כל דהו As, if you do not say so and assert that the language of the mishna is precise and one is liable only if the oath was in response to a verbal demand, then as for the mishna (36b), which teaches with regard to a deposit: Liability to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath on a deposit, how so? In a case where the owner said to the bailee: Give me the deposit that belongs to me and is in your possession, would you say there, also, that if the owner said this to the bailee, yes, he is liable, and if he did not say this to the bailee, no, he is not liable? But doesn’t the verse “And deals falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit” (Leviticus 5:21) indicate that the bailee is liable for any denial of the deposit at all, unrelated to the nature of the claim raised by the owner of the item?

אלא אמר לאו דוקא הכא נמי לאו דוקא Rather, it must be that when the tanna says with regard to the oath on a deposit: In a case where the owner said to the bailee, he did not mean that this is the halakha only in a case where he specifically verbalized his demand. Here too, with regard to the oath of testimony, the tanna did not mean that this is the halakha only in a case where the plaintiff specifically verbalized his demand.

האי מאי אי אמרת בשלמא אמר דהכא דוקא תנא התם אטו הכא אלא אי אמרת לא אמר דהתם דוקא ולא אמר דהכא דוקא אמר אמר למה לי למיתנייה The Gemara asks: What is this comparison? Granted, if you say that here, when the tanna says in the mishna with regard to the oath of testimony: In a case where the plaintiff said to two individuals, it is specifically in a case where the plaintiff verbalized his demand, one could explain that the tanna taught there, with regard to the oath on a deposit: In a case where the owner said, due to the fact that he employed that formulation here in the mishna. Tanna’im frequently employ uniform language in different cases, even though there are halakhic differences between them. But if you say that neither there with regard to the oath on a deposit is it specifically in a case where the owner verbally said, nor here with regard to the oath of testimony is it specifically in a case where the plaintiff verbally said, why do I need to teach: Said, said, in both instances?

דלמא אורחא דמילתא קא משמע לן The Gemara answers: Perhaps the tanna is teaching us the matter in the manner in which it typically occurs, as both a plaintiff and the owner of a deposit typically articulate their claims verbally. It may still be that if the demand was conveyed non-verbally, the witness is liable. Since there is no proof from the mishna, the statement of Shmuel is necessary to teach that if the demand is not articulated verbally, the witness is not liable for taking a false oath.

תניא כוותיה דשמואל ראוהו שבא אחריהן אמרו לו מה אתה בא אחרינו שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות פטורין ואם בפקדון חייבים: The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: In a case where the witnesses saw that the plaintiff was pursuing them, and they said to him: For what reason are you pursuing us; on our oath we do not know testimony on your behalf, they are exempt. And if it is with regard to an oath on a deposit, in a case where the owner is pursuing the bailee and he denies that the deposit is in his possession, the bailees are liable, as they are liable for any denial of the deposit at all, irrespective of the nature of the claim raised by the owner of the item.

השביע עליהן חמשה פעמים כו': § The mishna teaches: If he administered an oath to them five times and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court.

מנלן דאכפירה בב"ד הוא דמחייבי אחוץ לב"ד לא מחייבי The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that it is specifically for denial in court that they are liable, and they are not liable for denial outside court?

אמר אביי אמר קרא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו לא אמרתי לך אלא במקום שאילו מגיד זה מתחייב זה ממון Abaye said: It is derived as the verse states with regard to the oath of testimony: “If he does not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1), from which it is derived: I said this halakha to you only in a place where, were this witness to utter his testimony, that other individual becomes liable to make a monetary payment, i.e., in court. He is not liable for denial in a place where his testimony would not render one liable to pay.

א"ל רב פפא לאביי אי הכי אימא שבועה גופא בב"ד אין ושלא בבית דין לא Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If so, say that it is not the denial but the oath itself; if it is taken in court, yes, he is liable, and if it is that which is not taken in court, no, he is not liable.

לא ס"ד דתניא (ויקרא ה, ה) לאחת לחייב על כל אחת ואחת ואי ס"ד בב"ד מי מחייב על כל אחת ואחת והתנן השביע עליהן חמשה פעמים בפני ב"ד וכפרו אין חייבין אלא אחת אמר ר' שמעון מה טעם הואיל ואינם יכולין לחזור ולהודות אלא לאו שמע מינה שבועה חוץ לב"ד כפירה בב"ד: Abaye said to Rav Pappa: That should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a baraita that the verse: “And it will be when he is guilty of any one of these” (Leviticus 5:5), serves to render one liable to bring an offering for each and every instance when one repeatedly performs the transgressions for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. And if it enters your mind that one is liable only for an oath taken in court, is one liable for each and every oath? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: If he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of any testimony relating to the incident, they are liable for taking only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason for this ruling? Since once they denied that they had any knowledge of the matter they can no longer retract that denial and admit that they have knowledge of the matter. Abaye explains: Rather, must one not conclude from it that one is liable for each and every oath taken outside court; but one is liable only if the denial is in court?

כפרו שניהן כאחת חייבין: הא אי אפשר לצמצם § The mishna teaches: If both of the witnesses denied knowledge of the incident together, both of them are liable. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it impossible for two events to coincide precisely? By necessity, one denial must have preceded the other.

אמר רב חסדא הא מני ר' יוסי הגלילי היא דאמר אפשר לצמצם Rav Ḥisda said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: It is possible for two events to coincide precisely.

רבי יוחנן אמר אפילו תימא רבנן כגון שכפרו שניהן בתוך כדי דיבור ותוך כדי דיבור כדיבור דמי Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the mishna can be interpreted in a case where both of them denied knowledge of relevant testimony within the time required for speaking a short phrase, and the halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech. Although the two statements did not coincide precisely, their halakhic status is as if they did.

א"ל רב אחא מדיפתי לרבינא מכדי תוך כדי דיבור כמה הוי כדי שאילת תלמיד לרב (איכא דאמרי כדי שאילת הרב לתלמיד) עד דאמרי שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות טובא הוי א"ל כל אחד ואחד תוך דיבורו של חבירו: Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: After all, how long is the duration of: Within the time required for speaking a short phrase? It is an interval equivalent to the duration of the three-word greeting of a student to his teacher: Shalom alekha rabbi. Some say that it is a briefer interval, equivalent to the duration of the two-word greeting of a teacher to his student: Shalom alekha. According to either opinion, in the time that elapses until the two of them say: On my oath we do not know any testimony for you, it is an interval greater than the time required to utter those words. How, then, can the mishna be interpreted as referring to a case where they stated their denials within the time required for speaking those words? Ravina said to Rav Aḥa of Difti: The case in the mishna is one where each and every potential witness will issue his denial within the time required for speaking, starting from the end of the statement of the other.

בזה אחר זה הראשון חייב והשני פטור: מתני' דלא כי האי תנא דתניא משביע עד אחד פטור ורבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון מחייב § The mishna teaches: If they denied knowledge one after the other, the first one who denied knowledge is liable, and the second one is exempt, as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive, and he is exempt from the oath of testimony. The Gemara notes: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who administers an oath to one witness, the witness is exempt from bringing an offering for taking a false oath of testimony; and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, deems the witness liable to bring an offering. In his opinion, the second witness in the case in the mishna would be liable, not exempt.

לימא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר עד אחד כי אתא לשבועה הוא דקא אתא ומר סבר עד אחד כי אתא לממונא קא אתא The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: One Sage, the first tanna, holds: When one witness comes to testify, it is to render the one against whom he is testifying liable to take an oath, and that is the reason that he is coming, as one witness cannot render him liable to make a monetary payment. And one Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds: When one witness comes to testify, it is to render the one against whom he is testifying liable to make a monetary payment, and that is the reason that he is coming. The tanna’im disagree whether denial by one witness constitutes a denial with regard to monetary matters.

ותיסברא האמר אביי הכל מודים בעד סוטה והכל מודים בעדי סוטה ומחלוקת בעדי סוטה הכל מודים בעד אחד והכל מודים בעד שכנגדו חשוד על השבועה The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand their dispute in that way? Doesn’t Abaye say: All concede with regard to a witness in the case of a sota that he is liable for taking a false oath of testimony; and all concede with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota; and there is a dispute with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota. All concede with regard to one witness that he is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony because he cannot render another liable to make a monetary payment; and all concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart, the defendant, is suspect about the oath.

אלא דכ"ע עד אחד כי אתי לשבועה קא אתי והכא בהא קמיפלגי מר סבר דבר הגורם לממון כממון דמי ומ"ס לאו כממון דמי The Gemara suggests: Rather, all concede that when one witness comes to testify, it is to render the one against whom he is testifying liable to take an oath, and that is the reason he is coming. And here they disagree about this: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds: A matter that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value. Although the testimony of one witness does not render one liable for monetary payment, occasionally the party against whom he testified will prefer to pay rather than take the oath that the witness rendered him liable to take. In those cases, the testimony of one witness does in fact cause money to be paid. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds: A matter that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value.

גופא אמר אביי הכל מודים בעד סוטה והכל מודים בעדי סוטה ומחלוקת בעדי סוטה הכל מודים בעד אחד והכל מודים בעד שכנגדו חשוד על השבועה § With regard to the matter itself, Abaye says: All concede with regard to a witness in the case of a sota that he is liable for taking a false oath of testimony; and all concede with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota; and there is a dispute with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota. All concede with regard to one witness, and all concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart is suspect about the oath.

הכל מודים בעד סוטה שחייב בעד טומאה דרחמנא הימניה דכתיב (במדבר ה, יג) ועד אין בה כל שיש בה The Gemara elaborates: All concede with regard to a witness in the case of a sota that he is liable for taking a false oath of testimony in the case of a witness of impurity. This is referring to a case where the husband issues a warning to his wife in the presence of two witnesses that she may not enter into seclusion with a certain man and witnesses testify that she entered into seclusion with him, and one witness testifies that she engaged in intercourse with that man, as in that case the Merciful One accorded credibility to the witness, as it is written with regard to a sota: “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13), that she engaged in intercourse. From that verse it is derived that any witness that there is against her is sufficient to render her forbidden to her husband and enable him to divorce her without paying the sum stipulated in the marriage contract. Therefore, the witness who testified that she engaged in intercourse with that man is for all intents and purposes a witness to a monetary matter.

והכל מודים בעדי סוטה שפטור בעדי קינוי דהוה גורם דגורם And all concede with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota that each witness is exempt from liability due to a false oath of testimony. This is referring to the case of witnesses of warning, who testify that the jealous husband warned his wife not to enter into seclusion with a certain man, as each witness is the cause of a cause of financial loss, not a direct cause of that loss. In order to lose payment of her marriage contract, in addition to the witnesses of warning, witnesses of seclusion would also be required, after which either a witness would testify that she engaged in intercourse or she would be required to drink the bitter water of a sota, either of which would confirm that she engaged in an adulterous relationship.

Daf 32b

ומחלוקת בעדי סוטה בעדי סתירה מר סבר דבר הגורם לממון כממון דמי וחייב ומר סבר לאו כממון דמי ופטור And there is a dispute with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota; this is referring to witnesses of seclusion who testify that the woman who was warned by her husband in fact entered into seclusion with the man in question. One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that a matter that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, and each witness is liable for taking a false oath of testimony, as had they testified the woman would lose her marriage contract. And one Sage, the Rabbis, hold that a matter that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, and he is exempt.

הכל מודים בשכנגדו חשוד על השבועה הכל מודים בעד אחד דר' אבא § It is stated above further: All concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart is suspect about the oath. All concede in the case of one witness, as in the incident with Rabbi Abba.

הכל מודים בשכנגדו חשוד על השבועה דחשיד מאן אילימא דחשיד לוה דאמר ליה מלוה אי אתית אסהדת לי הוה משתבענא ושקילנא ולימא ליה מי יימר דמשתבעת The Gemara elaborates: All concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart is suspect about the oath. The testimony of one witness renders the borrower liable to take an oath that he does not owe money. The Gemara asks: In a case where who is suspect? If we say that the borrower who is denying the debt is suspect, and it is a case where the lender says to the witness: If you came and testified on my behalf I would have taken an oath and taken the sum owed me from the borrower, since he is suspect with regard to oaths, why would the witness be liable for taking a false oath of testimony? Let the witness say to the lender: Who could say that you would have taken an oath? Since there is no certainty that he would have taken the oath, the witness is merely the cause of a cause of financial loss.

אלא כגון ששניהן חשודין דאמר מר חזרה שבועה למחויב לה ומתוך שאינו יכול לישבע משלם Rather, it is a case where both the borrower and the lender are suspect, as the Master says: Since both are suspect, the oath reverts to the one who is initially obligated to take it, i.e., the borrower, and since he is unable to take the oath because he is suspect, he pays the entire claim to the lender. One witness rendered the borrower liable to pay the debt.

הכל מודים בעד אחד דר' אבא דההוא גברא דחטף נסכא מחבריה אתא לקמיה דר' אמי הוה יתיב ר' אבא קמיה אזל אייתי חד סהדא דמיחטף חטפה מיניה אמר ליה אין חטפי ודידי חטפי Abaye said: All concede in the case of one witness, as in the incident with Rabbi Abba. What are the circumstances? As there was a certain man who snatched a silver ingot from another. The one from whom it was taken came before Rabbi Ami while Rabbi Abba was sitting before him, and he went and brought one witness who testified that the defendant indeed snatched it from him. The one who snatched it said to him: Yes, it is true that I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine.

א"ר אמי היכי לדייני דייני להאי דינא לישלם ליכא תרי סהדי ליפטריה הא איכא חד סהדא דמחטף חטף לישתבע כיון דאמר אין חטפי ודידי חטפי הוה ליה כגזלן א"ל ר' אבא הוה ליה מחויב שבועה ואינו יכול לישבע וכל המחויב שבועה ואינו יכול לישבע משלם Rabbi Ami said: How shall judges rule in this case? Let the judges require him to pay. But there are not two witnesses who witnessed the robbery. Let the judges rule to exempt him from payment. But there is one witness that he snatched the ingot. Based on the testimony of that witness, let the alleged robber take an oath that he did not snatch the ingot. But once he said: Yes, I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine, his halakhic status is like that of a robber, who is disqualified from taking an oath. Rabbi Abba said to him: He is one who is obligated to take an oath but is unable to take an oath, and anyone who is obligated to take an oath but is unable to take an oath is liable to pay. In that case, were that witness to take a false oath and deny knowledge of the matter, he would be liable.

אמר רב פפא הכל מודים בעד מיתה שהוא חייב והכל מודים בעד מיתה שהוא פטור § Rav Pappa says: All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is liable for taking an oath of testimony if he took a false oath and denied knowledge of the incident, and all concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is exempt in that case.

הכל מודים בעד מיתה שהוא פטור דאמר לה לדידה ולא אמר להו לבית דין דתנן האשה שאמרה מת בעלי תנשא מת בעלי תתיבם The Gemara elaborates: All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is exempt where he said to the wife herself that her husband is dead, but he did not tell it to the court, and now he denies his earlier statement, as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 1:12): The woman who said: My husband died, shall remarry on the basis of her own testimony. Likewise, if she says: My husband died, she shall enter into levirate marriage with her brother-in-law on the basis of her own testimony. The fact that the witness subsequently denied knowledge of the matter does not cause her to lose her marriage contract, since she can come to the court and testify based on the statement of the witness and collect her marriage contract.

הכל מודים בעד מיתה שהוא חייב דלא אמר לדידה ולא אמר להו לבית דין All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is liable in a case where he did not say that the husband is dead to the wife herself nor did he say it to the court. In that case, his denial of knowledge of the matter causes the wife to lose payment of her marriage contract.

שמע מינה משביע עדי קרקע חייב דלמא דתפישא מטלטלי: The Gemara asks: Shall we conclude from here that according to Rav Pappa, in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to land, the witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony, given that the marriage contract here is collected from land belonging to the husband? This matter is subject to a dispute between the Sages (37b). The Gemara answers: No proof may be cited from here, as perhaps Rav Pappa is referring to a case where she seizes her husband’s movable property as payment for her marriage contract. Therefore, this is not considered testimony with regard to land.

כפר אחד והודה אחד כו': השתא בזה אחר זה דתרוייהו קא כפרי אמרת הראשון חייב והשני פטור כפר אחד והודה אחד מיבעיא § The mishna teaches: If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable. The Gemara asks: Why was it necessary to teach this halakha in the mishna? Now that in the previous case, where the potential witnesses both denied knowledge of the matter one after the other, you said: The first is liable and the second is exempt, in a case where one denied knowledge and one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, is it necessary to mention that the one who denied knowledge is liable?

לא צריכא כגון שכפרו שניהן וחזר אחד מהן והודה בתוך כדי דיבור והא קא משמע לן דתוך כדי דיבור כדיבור דמי The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where both of them denied knowledge of the matter, and one of them retracted his denial and admitted to knowledge of the matter within the time required for speaking a short phrase. And this teaches us that the halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech.

בשלמא לרב חסדא דמוקי לה לההוא כרבי יוסי הגלילי רישא אפשר לצמצם וסיפא איצטריך לאשמועינן דתוך כדי דיבור כדיבור דמי אלא לרבי יוחנן רישא תוך כדי דיבור סיפא תוך כדי דיבור תרתי למה לי The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who interprets the previous case in the mishna in which the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident as one, and they are liable in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, a different halakha may be learned from each clause in the mishna. It is learned from the first clause that it is possible for two events to coincide precisely, and the latter clause was necessary to teach us that the halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the halakha of: Within the time required for speaking a short phrase, is learned from the first clause, and the halakha of: Within the time required for speaking a short phrase, is learned from the latter clause. Why do I need two clauses to teach the same halakha?

מהו דתימא ה"מ כפירה וכפירה אבל כפירה והודאה אימא לא קמ"ל: The Gemara answers: Even according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, both clauses are necessary. Lest you say that this statement: The halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, applies only in a case where the first statement is a denial and the second statement is a denial; but in a case where the first statement is a denial and the second statement is an admission, say that no, its halakhic status is not like that of continuous speech and one cannot admit knowledge after having denied it. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that even in a case where he retracts the denial and admits his knowledge, its halakhic status is not like that of continuous speech.

היו שתי כיתי עדים כפרה הראשונה ואח"כ כפרה השניה: בשלמא שניה תתחייב דכפרה לה ראשונה אלא ראשונה אמאי § The mishna teaches: If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and thereafter, the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both sets of witnesses are liable. The Gemara asks: Granted, the second set will be held liable, as since the first set denied knowledge of the matter, the ability of the plaintiff to collect his monetary claim is dependent exclusively on the second set, and their denial caused his loss. But why is the first set liable?

Daf 33a

הא קיימא שניה But the second set of witnesses still stands available to testify, so what loss did the first set cause the plaintiff when they denied knowledge of the matter?

אמר רבינא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהיתה שניה בשעת כפירת ראשונה קרובין בנשותיהן ונשותיהן גוססות מהו דתימא רוב גוססים למיתה קמ"ל (השתא מיהא לא שכיב): Ravina said: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where the two witnesses in the second set were relatives through their wives at the time of the denial of the first set of witnesses. The two witnesses in the second set were married to two sisters, and brothers-in-law are unfit to serve as witnesses together. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff is entirely dependent upon the testimony of the first set of witnesses. And the sisters who were wives of the witnesses in the second set were moribund. Lest you say that since, presumably, the majority of individuals who are moribund will actually die very soon, and therefore these two witnesses are fit to testify together, therefore, the tanna teaches us that since now in any event, the wives had not yet died, their husbands remain unfit to testify together.

מתני׳ משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידוני שיש לי ביד פלוני פקדון ותשומת יד וגזל ואבידה שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות אין חייבין אלא אחת MISHNA: In a case where the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf that I have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, and an outstanding loan, and a stolen item, and a lost item, and they lied in reply: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are liable for taking only one false oath of testimony.

שבועה שאין אנו יודעין שיש לך ביד פלוני פקדון ותשומת יד וגזל ואבידה חייבין על כל אחת ואחת But if they lied in reply: On our oath we do not know that you have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, and an outstanding loan, and a stolen item, and a lost item, they are liable for each and every one of the components of the claim. It is as though they took a separate oath with regard to each of the details of the claim.

משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידו שיש לי ביד פלוני פקדון חטין ושעורין וכוסמין שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות אין חייבין אלא אחת In a case where the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that I have in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt, and they lied in reply: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are liable for taking only one false oath of testimony.

שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות שיש לך ביד פלוני חטין ושעורין וכוסמין חייבין על כל אחת ואחת But if they lied in reply: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf that you have in the possession of so-and-so wheat, and barley, and spelt, they are liable for each and every one of the components of the claim.

משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידוני שיש לי ביד פלוני נזק וחצי נזק תשלומי כפל ותשלומי ארבעה וחמשה ושאנס איש פלוני את בתי ופתה את בתי ושהכני בני ושחבל בי חבירי ושהדליק את גדישי ביוה"כ הרי אלו חייבין: In a case where the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf that I have in the possession of so-and-so an outstanding payment for damage; or an outstanding payment for half the damage, which the owner pays for damage caused by his innocuous ox goring another animal; or with regard to an outstanding payment of double the principal that a thief must pay the owner of the stolen item; or with regard to an outstanding payment of four or five times the principal that a thief pays when he stole a sheep or an ox, respectively, and then slaughtered or sold it; or in a case where the plaintiff said: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that so-and-so raped my daughter; or, he seduced my daughter; or, that my son struck me; or, that another injured me; or, that he set my stack of grain on fire on Yom Kippur; if in any of these cases the witnesses took an oath falsely denying any knowledge of the matter on behalf of the plaintiff, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

גמ׳ איבעיא להו משביע עדי קנס מהו GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case where one administers an oath to witnesses concerning a fine if they do not come and testify that one performed an action that renders him liable to pay a sum fixed by the Torah as penalty for that action, what is the halakha? Is it like any other case of an oath administered to witnesses in monetary matters or not?

אליבא דר' אלעזר בר"ש לא תיבעי לך דאמר יבואו עדים ויעידו The Gemara refines the dilemma: According to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, do not raise the dilemma, as he says in a case where one performed an action in the presence of witnesses for which he is liable to pay a fine, and before the witnesses testified, he admitted his liability, even though the principle is: One who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is exempt from paying the fine, the witnesses shall come and testify and render the one who performed the action liable to pay the fine. In his opinion, payment of the fine is dependent upon their testimony, and therefore if they lie, they are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

כי תיבעי לך אליבא דרבנן דאמרי מודה בקנס ואחר כך באו עדים פטור When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as they say: One who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt, even if afterward witnesses came and testified to his liability. The case in the mishna is one where the plaintiff demanded that the witnesses testify on his behalf before the defendant admitted knowledge of the fine.

ורבנן דהתם כמאן סבירא להו אילימא כר' אלעזר בר"ש דהכא הא קאמר דבר הגורם לממון כממון דמי The Gemara seeks to clarify: And the Rabbis, who expressed their opinion there that one who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt, even if afterward witnesses come, in accordance with whose opinion do they hold? If we say that they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, cited here (32a), doesn’t he say: A matter that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value with regard to the oath of testimony? Witnesses who testify concerning a fine also cause financial loss, as, if the individual does not admit his liability, he will be liable to pay the fine based on their testimony.

אלא כרבנן דהכא דאמרי דבר הגורם לממון לאו כממון דמי מאי כיון דאילו מודה מיפטר לאו ממונא קא כפר ליה או דלמא השתא מיהא לא אודי Rather, apparently, the Rabbis there hold in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis here, who say: A matter that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value. It is according to that opinion that the dilemma is raised: What is the halakha in the case of witnesses to a fine? Does one say: Since if the one liable to pay the fine admits his liability, he is exempt from paying the fine, the witness taking the oath denying knowledge of the matter is not denying a monetary claim, and therefore, he is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony? Or perhaps since now, in any event, he has not yet admitted liability, payment of the fine is dependent upon the testimony of these witnesses and it is considered a monetary matter for which they are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

תא שמע משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידוני שיש לי ביד פלוני נזק וחצי נזק והא חצי נזק קנסא הוא כמ"ד פלגא נזקא ממונא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna to resolve the dilemma: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf that I have in the possession of so-and-so an unpaid payment for damage; and likewise, an unpaid payment for half the damage. In those cases the witnesses can be held liable for the oath of testimony. But isn’t payment for half the damage payment of a fine? The Gemara rejects this proof: This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that payment of half the damage is monetary restitution and not a fine.

הניחא למ"ד פלגא נזקא ממונא אלא למ"ד קנסא מאי איכא למימר בחצי נזק צרורות דהלכתא גמירי לה דממונא הוא The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that payment of half the damage is monetary restitution. But according to the one who says that payment of half the damage is payment of a fine, what can be said? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, the mishna is referring to a case where the plaintiff demands that the witnesses testify with regard to liability to pay for half the damage caused by pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of a walking animal, as they learned this halakha through tradition transmitted to Moses from Sinai that payment of half the damage in that case is monetary restitution, not a fine. Therefore, no proof may be cited from the mishna with regard to liability for taking a false oath of testimony concerning a fine.

ת"ש תשלומי כפל משום קרנא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna to resolve the dilemma: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that I have in the possession of so-and-so an unpaid payment of double the principal, for which the witnesses are also liable for taking a false oath of testimony. But isn’t that payment of a fine? The Gemara responds: The liability for taking a false oath of testimony in that case is not due to their denial of knowledge of the matter with regard to the fine; rather, the liability is due to their denial of knowledge of the matter with regard to the principal, which is a full-fledged monetary payment.

ותשלומי ד' וה' משום קרנא The Gemara cites another proof from the mishna: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that I have in the possession of so-and-so payment of four or five times the principal, which is a fine. The Gemara answers: There too, the liability is due to their denial of knowledge of the matter with regard to the principal, not due to the fine.

שאנס איש פלוני ופתה את בתי משום בושת ופגם The Gemara cites another proof from the continuation of the mishna: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that so-and-so raped my daughter; or, he seduced my daughter. Isn’t the payment for rape and seduction a fine of 50 sela? The Gemara rejects this: There, the liability of the witnesses is due to their denial of knowledge of the matter with regard to payment for humiliation and compensation for degradation of the value of the young woman resulting from the rape or the seduction. Those are categorized as monetary restitution, not as fines.

מאי קמ"ל כולה ממונא הוא רישא חדא קמ"ל סיפא חדא קמ"ל רישא חדא קמ"ל דחצי נזק צרורות ממונא הוא The Gemara asks: According to this understanding, what is the tanna teaching us with the multiplicity of cases in the mishna? All the cases in the mishna are of monetary restitution. The Gemara answers: In the first clause, the tanna teaches us one novel element, and in the latter clause, the tanna teaches us one novel element. In the first clause, the tanna teaches us one novel element, that liability to pay for half the damage caused by pebbles is monetary restitution, not a fine.

סיפא חדא קמ"ל ושהדליק את גדישי ביוה"כ לאפוקי מאי לאפוקי מדר' נחוניא בן הקנה דתניא ר' נחוניא בן הקנה היה עושה יוה"כ כשבת לתשלומין מה שבת כו' In the latter clause, the tanna teaches us one novel element: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that he set my stack of grain on fire on Yom Kippur. What does this halakha serve to exclude? It serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana would deem Yom Kippur like Shabbat with regard to payment of damages. Just as in the case of one who intentionally desecrates Shabbat, he is liable to receive the death penalty and is therefore exempt from liability for payment for damage that is caused while desecrating Shabbat, so too, in the case of one who intentionally desecrates Yom Kippur, he is liable to receive the death penalty and is therefore exempt from liability for payment for damage that is caused while desecrating Yom Kippur. The tanna of the mishna disagrees.

ת"ש משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידוני The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita to resolve the dilemma: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf

Daf 33b

שהוציא איש פלוני שם רע על בתי חייבין הודה מפי עצמו פטור that so-and-so slandered my daughter. In such a case, the witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony. If the accused admitted on his own that he slandered the young woman, he is exempt from paying the fine. The only payment in the case of a husband who falsely accuses his bride of adultery is payment of a fine, and yet the baraita says that the witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

הא מני ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון היא דאמר יבואו עדים ויעידו The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Even if the one who is liable to pay the fine admits his liability, the witnesses shall come and testify and render the one who performed the action liable to pay the fine.

אימא סיפא הודה מעצמו פטור אתאן לרבנן The Gemara asks: Say the latter clause of the baraita: If that man admitted on his own that he slandered the young woman, he is exempt from paying the fine. Ostensibly, in this we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that if the one who is liable admits his liability before the witnesses testify, he is exempt from paying the fine, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.

כולה ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון היא וה"ק לא משכחת לה הודה מפי עצמו דפטור אלא היכא דליכא עדים כלל והודה מעצמו: The Gemara explains: The baraita in its entirety is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and this is what the tanna is saying in the latter clause: You find a case of one who admitted liability on his own that he is exempt from paying the fine, only in a case where there are no witnesses at all and he admitted liability on his own. In a case where there are witnesses, he is liable to pay the fine on the basis of their testimony even if he admitted liability.

מתני׳ משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידו שאני כהן שאני לוי שאיני בן גרושה שאיני בן חלוצה שאיש פלוני כהן שאיש פלוני לוי שאינו בן גרושה שאינו בן חלוצה שאנס MISHNA: In a case where the plaintiff said to two witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that I am a priest, or that I am a Levite, or that I am not the son of a priest and a divorced woman, or that I am not the son of a priest and a ḥalutza, or that so-and-so is a priest, or that so-and-so is a Levite, or that he is not the son of a priest and a divorced woman, or that he is not the son of a priest and a ḥalutza; in all these cases the witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony, because these do not involve monetary claims.

איש פלוני את בתו ופתה את בתו ושחבל בי בני ושחבל בי חבירי שהדליק גדישי בשבת הרי אלו פטורין: Likewise, if the plaintiff said to them: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that so-and-so raped his daughter, or that he seduced his daughter, or that my son injured me, or that another person wounded me on Shabbat, or that he set my stack of grain on fire on Shabbat; in all these cases these witnesses are exempt, as each case is punishable with the death penalty, and therefore they are cases that do not involve monetary payment.

גמ׳ טעמא דאיש פלוני כהן דאיש פלוני לוי הא מנה לפלוני ביד פלוני חייבין הא קתני סיפא עד שישמעו מפי התובע GEMARA: The Gemara infers: The reason that the witnesses are exempt is that the plaintiff demanded that they testify that so-and-so is a priest or that so-and-so is a Levite, which are claims that do not involve monetary payment; but were the plaintiff to say: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify that one hundred dinars belonging to so-and-so are in the possession of another so-and-so, they would be liable. But isn’t it taught in the latter clause of the mishna (35a): The witnesses are exempt until they hear a demand to come and testify directly from the mouth of the plaintiff, and here the individual administering the oath is not the plaintiff.

אמר שמואל בבא בהרשאה והאמרי נהרדעי לא כתבינן אורכתא אמטלטלי ה"מ היכא דכפריה אבל לא כפריה כתבינן Shmuel says: The reference here is to a case where the individual administering the oath comes with authorization to demand that the witnesses testify on his behalf. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Sages of Neharde’a say: We do not write an authorization document concerning movable property? The Gemara answers: This statement that one does not write authorization for movable property applies only in a case where the respondent already denied the claim against him. But in a case where the respondent did not yet deny the claim against him, we write authorization even for movable property.

ת"ר מנין שאין הכתוב מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון ר' אליעזר אומר נאמר כאן (ויקרא ה, א) אואין ונאמר להלן (ויקרא ה, כא) אואין מה להלן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון אף כאן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון § The Sages taught: From where is it derived that the verse with regard to an oath of testimony is speaking only about cases involving a monetary claim? Rabbi Eliezer says: Multiple instances of the term “or” are stated here, with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he hears the voice of an oath and he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1), and multiple instances of the term “or” are stated there, with regard to an oath on a deposit: “And he deals falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of an outstanding loan, or of robbery, or he exploited his colleague, or he found a lost item” (Leviticus 5:21–22); just as there, the verse is speaking only about cases involving a monetary claim, so too here, the verse is speaking only about cases involving a monetary claim.

(במדבר לה, כא) אואין דרוצח יוכיחו שהן אואין ומדברים שלא בתביעת ממון The Gemara challenges: The multiple instances of the term “or” that are stated with regard to a murderer: “And if he shoved him with hatred or cast upon him any vessel without lying in wait or in enmity smote him with his hand” (Numbers 35:20–21), will prove that multiple instances of the term “or” are unrelated to limiting the application of the halakha to cases involving a monetary claim, as these are multiple instances of the term “or” in verses that are not speaking about cases involving a monetary claim.

דנין אואין שיש עמהן שבועה מאואין שיש עמהן שבועה ואל יוכיחו אואין דרוצח שאין עמהן שבועה The Gemara answers: One infers multiple instances of the term “or” with which there is an oath administered, i.e., an oath of testimony, from multiple instances of the term “or” with which there is an oath administered, i.e., an oath on a deposit, and the multiple instances of the term “or” that are stated with regard to a murderer will not prove anything to the contrary, as there is no oath in their context.

(במדבר ה, יד) אואין דסוטה יוכיחו שהן אואין ויש עמהן שבועה ומדברים שלא בתביעת ממון The Gemara challenges: The multiple instances of the term “or” that are stated with regard to a sota in the Torah: “Or if the spirit of jealousy came upon him…or a man upon whom a spirit of jealousy came” (Numbers 5:14, 30), will prove that multiple instances of the term are unrelated to a monetary claim, as these are multiple instances of the term “or,” and there is an oath administered by the priest to the sota in their context, and the verse is speaking about cases not involving a monetary claim.

דנין אואין שיש עמהן שבועה ואין עמהן כהן מאואין שיש עמהן שבועה ואין עמהן כהן ואל יוכיחו אואין דרוצח שאין עמהן שבועה ואל יוכיחו אואין דסוטה שאע"פ שיש עמהן שבועה יש עמהן כהן The Gemara rejects this: One infers multiple instances of the term “or” with which there is an oath administered and with which there is no priest administering it, i.e., the case of an oath of testimony, from multiple instances of the term “or” with which there is an oath administered and with which there is no priest administering it, i.e., an oath on a deposit, and the multiple instances of the term “or” that are stated with regard to a murderer will not prove anything to the contrary, as there is no oath in their context, and the multiple instances of the term “or” that are stated with regard to a sota will not prove anything to the contrary, as even though there is an oath in their context, there is a priest administering the oath in their context. This is the source from which Rabbi Eliezer proves that liability for an oath of testimony is limited to cases involving a monetary claim.

ר"ע אומר (ויקרא ה, ה) והיה כי יאשם לאחת מאלה יש מאלה שהוא חייב ויש מאלה שהוא פטור הא כיצד תבעו ממון חייב ד"א פטור Rabbi Akiva says that it is written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And it shall be when he will be guilty of one of these” (Leviticus 5:5). The term “of these” is a restrictive expression from which it is derived: There are some of these for which he is liable and there are some of these for which he is exempt. How so? If the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to a monetary claim, the witness is liable for taking a false oath; if the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to another matter, he is exempt.

ר' יוסי הגלילי אומר הרי הוא אומר (ויקרא ה, א) והוא עד או ראה או ידע בעדות המתקיימת בראיה בלא ידיעה ובידיעה בלא ראיה הכתוב מדבר Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight, i.e., direct observation, without knowledge of the matter, or by means of indirect knowledge of the matter without sight that the verse is speaking.

ראיה בלא ידיעה כיצד מנה מניתי לך בפני פלוני ופלוני יבואו פלוני ופלוני ויעידו זו היא ראיה בלא ידיעה Sight without knowledge, how so? It is a case where the creditor claims: I counted one hundred dinars for you before so-and-so and so-and-so, and the debtor responds: Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify. This is a case of sight without knowledge, as the witnesses do not know whether the money was counted as a loan, a deposit, or repayment of a loan.

ידיעה בלא ראיה כיצד מנה הודיתה לי בפני פלוני ופלוני יבואו פלוני ופלוני ויעידו זו היא ידיעה בלא ראיה Knowledge without sight, how so? It is a case where the creditor claims: You admitted to owing me one hundred dinars before so-and-so and so-and-so,and the debtor replied: Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify. This is a case of knowledge of the debt without sight of the loan taking place. Testimony based on sight without knowledge or based on knowledge without sight is possible only in cases involving a monetary claim.

ר"ש אומר חייב כאן וחייב בפקדון מה להלן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון אף כאן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון Rabbi Shimon cites a different proof and says: The Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath here with regard to testimony, and the Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath with regard to a deposit; just as there, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim, so too here, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim.

ועוד ק"ו מה פקדון שעשה בו נשים כאנשים קרובים כרחוקים פסולים ככשרים וחייב על And furthermore, one can infer this halakha by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a deposit. If in the case of a deposit, with regard to which the Torah rendered the halakhic status of women like that of men, the halakhic status of relatives like that of non-relatives, and the halakhic status of unfit witnesses like that of those fit to testify, and he is liable for

Daf 34a

כל אחת ואחת בפני ב"ד ושלא בפני ב"ד אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון עדות שלא עשה בה נשים כאנשים קרובים כרחוקים פסולין ככשרים ואינו חייב אלא אחת בפני ב"ד אינו דין שלא יהא מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון each and every oath if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he denied having the deposit in his possession, whether he took the oath before a court or not before a court, and despite the broad application of the halakha, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim, then in the case of an oath of testimony with regard to which the Torah did not render the halakhic status of women like that of men, the status of relatives like that of non-relatives, and the status of unfit witnesses like that of those fit to testify, and he is liable to bring only one sliding-scale offering if the plaintiff administered several oaths to him and he falsely denied knowledge of the matter in the presence of a court, is it not right that the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving a monetary claim?

מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע ומזיד כשוגג תאמר בעדות שכן עשה בה מושבע כנשבע ומזיד כשוגג The baraita rejects this inference: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Will you say that the same is true with regard to an oath of testimony, as in that case the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath; and it rendered the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, and one is liable to bring an offering in both instances?

ת"ל תחטא תחטא לגזירה שוה נאמר כאן (ויקרא ה, כא) תחטא ונאמר להלן תחטא מה להלן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון אף כאן אינו מדבר אלא בתביעת ממון Therefore, the verse states the term “shall sin” with regard to an oath of testimony and states “shall sin” with regard to an oath on a deposit in order to derive a verbal analogy. Here, it is stated with regard to an oath of testimony: “Shall sin” (Leviticus 5:1), and there, it is stated with regard to an oath on a deposit: “Shall sin” (Leviticus 5:21). Just as there, concerning an oath on a deposit, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim, so too here, concerning an oath of testimony, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim.

מתקיף לה רבה בר עולא (ויקרא ה, ד) או או ביטוי יוכיחו שהן אואין ויש עמהן שבועה ואין עמהן כהן ומדברים שלא בתביעת ממון § After presenting the different proofs cited in the baraita, the Gemara proceeds to analyze the opinions cited therein, beginning with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one derives that one is liable for an oath of testimony only if it involves a monetary claim from the case of an oath on a deposit based on multiple instances of the term “or” that appear in both contexts, and there is an oath with those multiple instances of the term “or” and there is no priest in their context. Rabba bar Ulla objects to this: The multiple instances of the term “or” in the verse: “Or if any one shall take an oath to clearly express with his lips to do evil or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), which is written with regard to an oath on an utterance, will prove that one is liable even without a monetary claim, as they are multiple instances of the term “or,” and there is an oath in their context, and there is no priest in their context, and they are not speaking with regard to a monetary claim.

מסתברא מפקדון הוה ליה למילף שכן תחטא מתחטא The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from an oath on a deposit and not from an oath on an utterance due to the verbal analogy between the terms “shall sin” and “shall sin.”

אדרבה מביטוי ה"ל למילף שכן חטאת מחטאת The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as it is a derivation of one case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath from another case for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for taking a false oath. This is in contrast to an oath on a deposit, for which one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath.

אלא מסתברא מפקדון ה"ל למילף שכן חטא במזיד תבעיה וכפריה ועבריה Rather, it stands to reason that he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin, intentionally, claimed from him, denied his claim, and his past. There is a verbal analogy between them, as the term “shall sin” appears in both contexts. In both cases one is liable for taking a false oath intentionally. Additionally, in both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. And both oaths relate to events that transpired in the past.

אדרבה מביטוי הוה ליה למילף שכן חטאת שירדה לחומש הנך נפישן: The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath of testimony from the halakha with regard to an oath on an utterance, as there are many elements common to both oaths, represented by the mnemonic: Sin-offering, that descended, to one-fifth. In both cases one is liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath, as opposed to a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. In each case the offering is a sliding-scale offering, as opposed to the fixed offering in the case of an oath on a deposit. In both cases there is no payment of an additional one-fifth for taking a false oath. And in the case of a false oath on a deposit, there is payment of an additional one-fifth. The Gemara answers: These elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on a deposit are more numerous than the elements common to an oath of testimony and an oath on an utterance.

ר"ע אומר (ויקרא ה, ה) והיה כי יאשם לאחת מאלה יש מאלה שהוא חייב ויש מאלה שהוא פטור הא כיצד תבעו ממון חייב תבעו ד"א פטור § Rabbi Akiva says that it is written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And it shall be when he will be guilty of one of these” (Leviticus 5:5). The term “of these” is a restrictive expression from which it is derived: There are some of these for which he is liable and there are some of these for which he is exempt. How so? If the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to a monetary claim, the witness is liable for taking a false oath; if the plaintiff demanded testimony from the witness with regard to another matter, he is exempt.

איפוך אנא The Gemara challenges: Since it is not clear from the verse for which claim one is liable and for which claim one is exempt, I will reverse it and say that one is liable only when the claim was with regard to another matter, not when it involves monetary matters.

ר"ע אאואין דר"א סמיך The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva relies on the multiple instances of the term “or,” as cited by Rabbi Eliezer, to derive from an oath on a deposit that one is liable only for a false oath that involves a monetary claim. From the term “of these” Rabbi Akiva derives that there are some cases involving monetary claims for which one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

מאי בינייהו בין ר"א ובין ר"ע The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? With regard to which cases involving monetary claims does Rabbi Akiva hold that one is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony?

איכא בינייהו משביע עדי קרקע לר"א חייבין לר"ע פטורין The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land. According to Rabbi Eliezer, they are liable if they take a false oath. According to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt in that case, as it is excluded by the term “of these.”

ולר' יוחנן דאמר התם משביע עדי קרקע אפי' לר"א פטורין הכא מאי איכא בין ר"א לר"ע The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says there with regard to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony that in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving land, the witnesses are exempt even according to Rabbi Eliezer, what difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?

איכא בינייהו עדי קנס The Gemara answers: The practical difference between their opinions is in the case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine. According to Rabbi Eliezer they are liable, and according to Rabbi Akiva they are exempt.

ר' יוסי הגלילי אומר והוא עד או ראה או ידע בעדות המתקיימת בראיה בלא ידיעה ובידיעה בלא ראיה הכתוב מדבר § Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge of the matter, or by means of knowledge without sight, that the verse is speaking. The reference is to testimony involving monetary matters, as all other testimony requires both knowledge and sight.

א"ל רב פפא לאביי לימא ר' יוסי הגלילי לית ליה דר' אחא דתניא ר' אחא אומר גמל האוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא גמל הרוג בצידו בידוע שזה הרגו דאי אית ליה דר' אחא בדיני נפשות נמי משכחת לה כר"ש בן שטח Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Shall we say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there is a rutting male camel [gamal haoḥer] that is rampaging among other camels and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage. Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law can be decided based on circumstantial evidence. As, if he is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that witnesses may testify on the basis of circumstantial evidence, in cases of capital law too, you find a case of knowledge without sight, as in the case discussed by Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ.

דתניא אר"ש בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי אחד שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתי אחריו ומצאתי סייף בידו ודם מטפטף והרוג מפרפר אמרתי לו רשע מי הרגו לזה או אני או אתה As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said in the form of an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here.

אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים או שלשה עדים יומת המת אלא המקום יפרע ממך אמרו לא זזו משם עד שנשכו נחש ומת But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: “On the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and there are no witnesses here. Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you. The Sages said: They did not move from there until a snake came and bit the pursuer and he died. Rabbi Aḥa would hold in that case that the pursuer could be executed by the court based on circumstantial evidence. Ostensibly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees, as he says that testimony based on knowledge without sight exists only in cases of monetary law.

אפי' תימא אית ליה דרבי אחא בשלמא ידיעה בלא ראיה משכחת לה אלא ראיה בלא ידיעה היכי משכחת לה מי לא בעי מידע אם עובד כוכבים הרג או ישראל הרג אם אדם טרפה הרג או שלם הרג The Gemara answers: Even if you say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa that one may rely on circumstantial evidence even in cases of capital law, one may nevertheless distinguish between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law. Granted, even in cases of capital law you find testimony based on knowledge without sight, but how can you find a case of sight without knowledge? Don’t the witnesses need to know if the one whom he witnessed killing another killed a gentile or he killed a Jew, if he killed one who has a wound that would have caused him to die within twelve months [tereifa] or he killed one whose body is intact?

ש"מ קסבר רבי יוסי הגלילי משביע עדי קנס פטור דאי ס"ד חייב נהי דידיעה בלא ראיה אשכחן לה ראיה בלא ידיעה מי לא בעי מידע נכרית בעל בת ישראל בעל בתולה בעל בעולה בעל The Gemara notes: Conclude from it that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that in a case where one administers an oath to witnesses with regard to testimony involving a fine, the witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony. As if it enters your mind to say that the witnesses are liable, although you find testimony with regard to fines based on knowledge without sight, and witnesses may testify based on circumstantial evidence, in cases of sight without knowledge, when it comes to fines, don’t the witnesses need to know if the rapist engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman or if he engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, if he engaged in intercourse with a virgin or if he engaged in intercourse with a non-virgin? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in cases where both testimony based on sight alone and testimony based on knowledge alone are accepted, which is not the case concerning testimony involving fines.

יתיב רב המנונא קמיה דרב יהודה ויתיב רב יהודה וקא מיבעיא ליה מנה מניתיך בפני פלוני ופלוני § Apropos the matter of sight without knowledge in cases of monetary law, the Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Yehuda, and Rav Yehuda was sitting and he was raising a dilemma: If one demands payment from another and claims: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,

Daf 34b

ועדים רואין אותו מבחוץ מאי and witnesses see him counting the money from outside, what is the halakha? Is their testimony accepted?

א"ל רב המנונא והלה מה טוען אי אמר לא היו דברים מעולם הוחזק כפרן אי אמר אין שקלי ודידי שקלי כי אתו עדים מאי הוי א"ל המנונא את עול תא Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Yehuda: And what does the other person claim in response to the demand for repayment? If he says: These matters never happened, he assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him. If he says: Yes, I took money from him, but it is my money that I took, then when the witnesses come and testify that they saw the claimant counting the money and giving it to him, what of it? The testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his claim, as the witnesses do not know the circumstances under which the money changed hands. Rav Yehuda said to him: Are you Hamnuna? Enter and come into the study hall, as you make your teacher wiser.

ההוא דא"ל לחבריה מנה מניתי לך בצד עמוד זה א"ל לא עברתי בצד עמוד זה אתו תרי סהדי אסהידו ביה דהשתין מים בצד עמוד זה אמר ר"ל הוחזק כפרן The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I did not pass alongside this column. Two witnesses came and testified about him that they saw that he urinated alongside this column. Reish Lakish said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the testimony of witnesses proves that he passed alongside the column.

מתקיף לה ר"נ האי דינא פרסאה הוא מי קאמר מעולם בעסק זה קא"ל Rav Naḥman objects to this: That is a ruling characteristic of a Persian court, not a reasonable ruling characteristic of a Jewish court. Did the respondent say that he never passed alongside the column? It was that he did not pass alongside the column in the context of this matter that he said to him that he did not pass the column; therefore, the testimony of the witnesses does not contradict his statement.

איכא דאמרי ההוא דא"ל לחבריה מנה מניתי לך בצד עמוד זה א"ל לא עברתי בצד עמוד זה מעולם נפקו ביה סהדי דהשתין מים בצד עמוד זה אמר ר"נ הוחזק כפרן There are those who say that the incident transpired a bit differently. There was a certain individual who said to another: I counted for you and gave you one hundred dinars as a loan alongside this column. The other person said to him in response: I never passed alongside this column. Witnesses emerged and testified concerning him that he urinated alongside this column. Rav Naḥman said: He assumes the presumptive status of a denier of the truth, as the witnesses contradicted his claim.

א"ל רבא לר"נ כל מילתא דלא רמיא עליה דאיניש עביד לה ולאו אדעתיה: Rava said to Rav Naḥman: There is no proof from here that he assumes the presumptive status of a denier, as any matter that is not incumbent upon a person to remember, he performs it and it is not on his mind. Therefore, when he denied ever passing alongside the column, it was because there was never any reason for him to remember that he had been there.

ר"ש אומר חייב כאן וחייב בפקדון כו': § The Gemara proceeds to cite the opinion cited last in the baraita explaining the source of the halakha that one is liable for taking a false oath of testimony only for a case involving monetary matters. Rabbi Shimon says: The Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath here, with regard to an oath of testimony, and the Torah rendered one liable if he takes a false oath with regard to an oath on a deposit; just as there, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims, so too here, the verse is speaking of liability only in cases involving monetary claims.

מחכו עלה במערבא מאי חוכא They mocked this proof in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asked: What is worthy of mockery in the statement of Rabbi Shimon?

דקתני מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע מזיד כשוגג The Gemara explains that they mocked that which the baraita teaches in the continuation, rejecting the a fortiori inference suggested by Rabbi Shimon: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.

מכדי מושבע מפי עצמו בעדות לר"ש מנא ליה דגמר מפקדון פקדון נמי מושבע מפי אחרים נגמר מעדות This rejection is difficult: Now, with regard to the fact that one who administered an oath to himself is liable in the case of an oath of testimony, from where is it derived according to Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon derives it by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit. If so, based on the same verbal analogy, in the case of an oath on a deposit too, let us derive from the case of an oath of testimony the fact that one is liable for a false oath that was administered by others.

ומאי חוכא דלמא ר"ש בק"ו מייתי לה מפי אחרים חייב מפי עצמו לא כל שכן The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps Rabbi Shimon does not derive that one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own is liable by means of a verbal analogy from an oath on a deposit; rather, he derives it by means of an a fortiori inference: If one is liable for a false oath of testimony administered by others, is it not all the more so that he is liable for an oath that he takes on his own?

אלא חוכא אמזיד כשוגג דקתני מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע מזיד כשוגג The Gemara answers: Rather, the mockery is with regard to the distinction between an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony in the matter of whether the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, as it teaches in the baraita: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath.

מכדי מזיד גבי עדות מנא ליה דלא כתיב ביה ונעלם ה"נ לא כתיב ביה ונעלם Now, from where does he derive that one who takes an intentional false oath of testimony is liable? He derives it as it is not written in the context of an oath of testimony: And it is hidden. Here too, it is not written in the context of an oath on a deposit: And it is hidden. Therefore, there should be no distinction between intentional and unwitting with regard to an oath on a deposit either.

אמר להו רב הונא ומאי חוכא דלמא מזיד דלאו כשוגג בפקדון ממעילה ר"ש גמר לה Rav Huna said to the Sages: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps the fact that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath in the case of a deposit, and it is from the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property that Rabbi Shimon derived it. Just as one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for the misuse of consecrated property only if he did so unwittingly, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit only if he unwittingly took the false oath.

והיינו חוכא אדגמר לה ממעילה נגמר לה מעדות The Gemara answers: And that is what is worthy of mockery. Instead of deriving the lack of liability for an intentional false oath of deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property, let him derive liability for an intentional false oath on a deposit from the case of an oath of testimony.

מסתברא ממעילה הוה ליה למילף שכן מעילה ממעילה The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that he should have derived it from the case of misuse of consecrated property, as that is a derivation of misuse written with regard to an oath on a deposit: “If any one shall sin and commits an act of misuse and dealt falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit” (Leviticus 5:21), which is derived from misuse written with regard to misuse of consecrated property: “If any one commits an act of misuse and sinned unwittingly from items consecrated to the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15).

אדרבה מעדות הוה ליה למילף שכן תחטא מתחטא The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have derived it from the case of an oath of testimony, as that is a derivation of “shall sin” written with regard to an oath on a deposit which is derived from “shall sin” written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And if any one shall sin and he hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness” (Leviticus 5:1).

מסתברא ממעילה הוה ליה למילף שכן מעילה בכל נהנה בקבוע חומש ואשם The Gemara rejects this: It stands to reason that it is from the case of misuse of consecrated property that he should have derived it, as there are many elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property represented by the mnemonic: Misuse, with regard to all, derive benefit, with fixed, one-fifth, and guilt-offering. The term misuse is employed in both cases. Both cases are relevant with regard to all individuals and not only those fit to testify. Both involve one deriving benefit from property that is not his. In both cases, one is liable to bring a fixed guilt-offering, as opposed to one who takes a false oath of testimony, who is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. In both cases, one adds one-fifth to the payment of the principal. In both cases, that is the offering with which one gains atonement.

אדרבה מעדות ה"ל למילף שכן חטא הדיוט בשבועה תבעיה וכפריה ואואין הנך נפישין The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, he should have derived the halakha with regard to an oath on a deposit from the halakha of an oath of testimony, as there are many elements common to both oaths represented by the mnemonic: Sin, ordinary [hedyot], with an oath, claimed from him, denied his claim, and multiple instances of the term “or.” The term “shall sin” is written in both contexts. Both oaths relate to the property of ordinary individuals, not to consecrated property. In both cases there is a claim presented by one of the parties and denial of that claim by the one taking the oath. Multiple instances of the term “or” appear in both passages in the Torah. The Gemara responds: These elements common to an oath on a deposit and misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony.

אלא מאי חוכא Rather, after resolving all the difficulties that were raised against the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the question remains: What did the Sages of Eretz Yisrael find that is worthy of mockery in that baraita?

כי אתא רב פפא ורב הונא בריה דרב יהושע מבי רב אמרי היינו חוכא מכדי ר"ש ג"ש גמיר למה ליה דפריך מה לפקדון שכן לא עשה בו מושבע כנשבע מזיד כשוגג When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall of their teacher, they said: This is what is worthy of mockery: Now, since ultimately Rabbi Shimon derives the halakha by means of a verbal analogy between the term “shall sin” written with regard to an oath on a deposit and the term “shall sin” written with regard to an oath of testimony, why is it that he refutes the parallel between them by saying: What is notable about the case of a deposit? It is notable in that with regard to a deposit the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others like that of one who himself took an oath, as one to whom an oath was administered by others is exempt; and the Torah did not render the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Rabbi Shimon should have derived by means of the verbal analogy that all the halakhot of an oath of testimony and all the halakhot of an oath on a deposit are identical.

ומאי חוכא דלמא כי פריך מקמי דתיקום ליה ג"ש בתר דקמא ליה ג"ש לא פריך The Gemara rejects this: And what is worthy of mockery in that statement? Perhaps when Rabbi Shimon refuted the parallel between the two oaths, it was prior to the verbal analogy being established for him, and the derivation was by means of a paradigm. After the verbal analogy was established for him, he does not refute the parallel and holds that in the case of an oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering for false oaths administered by others as well as for intentional false oaths.

ולא והאמר להו רבא בר איתי לרבנן מאן תנא שבועת הפקדון לא ניתן זדונה לכפרה ר"ש היא The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not refute the parallel between the two oaths? But didn’t Rava bar Ittai say to the Sages: Who is the tanna who taught with regard to an oath on a deposit that atonement by means of an offering is not possible for one who takes an intentional false oath? It is Rabbi Shimon. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon concludes that there remains a distinction between intentional and unwitting in the case of an oath on a deposit.

דלמא מזיד כשוגג פריך דגמר לה ממעילה דהנך נפישין אבל מושבע כנשבע לא פריך The Gemara suggests: Perhaps with regard to the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath being like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath, Rabbi Shimon refutes the parallel between the two oaths even after the verbal analogy is established for him, as he derives the halakha of an oath on a deposit from the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, where there is a distinction between intentional and unwitting, as those elements common to an oath on a deposit and the misuse of consecrated property are more numerous than the elements common to an oath on a deposit and an oath of testimony. But he does not refute the parallel between the two oaths with the claim that there is a distinction between them with regard to whether the halakhic status of one to whom an oath was administered by others is like that of one who himself took an oath. Once the verbal analogy was established for him, there is no longer a distinction between the two oaths in that regard.

ותהדר עדות ותגמר לה מפקדון מזיד דלאו כשוגג מה פקדון שוגג אין מזיד לא אף עדות שוגג אין מזיד לא כי היכי דיליף פקדון ממעילה The Gemara asks: If, according to Rabbi Shimon, based on the derivation from the misuse of consecrated property, one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit does not bring a guilt-offering like one who took the false oath unwittingly, let the discussion of the case of an oath of testimony return to the verbal analogy and derive it from the case of an oath on a deposit that the halakhic status of one who takes an intentional false oath is not like that of one who takes an unwitting false oath. Just as in the case of an oath on a deposit, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, so too, in the case of an oath of testimony, one who takes an unwitting false oath, yes, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and one who takes an intentional false oath, no, he is not liable, just as he derives the case of an oath on a deposit from the case of misuse of consecrated property.

Daf 35a

להכי כתבה רחמנא לעדות גבי שבועת ביטוי וגבי טומאת מקדש וקדשיו דבכולן נאמר בהן ונעלם וכאן לא נאמר בהן ונעלם לחייב על המזיד כשוגג: The Gemara answers: For that reason, the Merciful One writes the verse with regard to an oath of testimony near the verse with regard to an oath on an utterance and near the verse with regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, as in all of those passages it is stated concerning them: “And it is hidden,” and here, with regard to an oath of testimony, it is not stated concerning them: And it is hidden. The Torah did so to underscore the contrast between them and to deem liable one who takes an intentional false oath of testimony like one who takes an unwitting false oath of testimony.

מתני׳ משביע אני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידוני שאמר איש פלוני ליתן לי מאתים זוז ולא נתן הרי אלו פטורים שאין חייבין אלא על תביעת ממון כפקדון MISHNA: If one said to witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so said he is going to give me two hundred dinars and he did not give them to me, and they take false oaths that they have no knowledge of the matter, they are exempt from liability to bring an offering for taking a false oath of testimony, as one is liable for taking a false oath of testimony only in a case involving a monetary claim like a deposit in the sense that were the witnesses to testify, the individual would be liable to pay. In the case of a promise to give a gift he could claim that he merely reconsidered.

משביע אני עליכם כשתדעו לי עדות שתבואו ותעידוני הרי אלו פטורים מפני שקדמה שבועה לעדות If one said to witnesses: I administer an oath to you that when you will know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, these witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony even if they do not testify, due to the fact that the oath preceded their knowledge of the relevant testimony.

עמד בבית הכנסת ואמר משביע אני עליכם שאם אתם יודעין לי עדות שתבואו ותעידוני הרי אלו פטורין עד שיהא מתכוין להם If one stood in the synagogue and said for all to hear: I administer an oath to you that if you know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, these witnesses are exempt until he directs his demand to specific individuals.

אמר לשנים משביע אני עליכם איש פלוני ופלוני שאם אתם יודעין לי עדות שתבואו ותעידוני שבועה שאין אנו יודעין לך עדות והם יודעין לו עדות עד מפי עד או שהיה אחד מהן קרוב או פסול הרי אלו פטורין If one said to two people: I administer an oath to you, so-and-so and so-and-so, that if you know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, and they respond: On our oath we do not know any testimony relevant to you, and they know testimony relevant to him, not based on an incident they witnessed but based on hearsay testimony, which is not valid testimony, or if one of the witnesses is found to be a relative or disqualified, these witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony because they are unfit witnesses.

שלח ביד עבדו או שאמר להן הנתבע משביע אני עליכם שאם אתם יודעין לו עדות שתבואו ותעידוהו הרי אלו פטורין עד שישמעו מפי התובע: If the plaintiff sent the demand for their testimony by means of his slave, or in a case where the defendant said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you that if you know any testimony relevant to the plaintiff that you will come and testify on his behalf, and they took a false oath that they have no knowledge of the matter, these witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony until they will hear the demand to testify directly from the mouth of the plaintiff.

גמ׳ ת"ר משביעני עליכם אם לא תבואו ותעידוני שאמר איש פלוני ליתן לי מאתים זוז ולא נתן יכול יהו חייבין ת"ל (ויקרא ה, כא) תחטא תחטא לגזירה שוה GEMARA: The Gemara cites proof for the halakhot in the mishna from verses in the Torah. The Sages taught: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf that so-and-so said that he is going to give me two hundred dinars and he did not give them to me; in such a case one might have thought that they would be liable. Therefore, the verse states the term “shall sin” with regard to an oath of testimony and “shall sin” with regard to an oath on a deposit in order to derive a verbal analogy.

נאמר כאן תחטא ונאמר להלן תחטא מה להלן בתביעת ממון ויש לו אף כאן בתביעת ממון ויש לו: Here, it is stated with regard to an oath of testimony “shall sin” (Leviticus 5:1), and there, it is stated with regard to an oath on a deposit “shall sin” (Leviticus 5:21). Just as there, with regard to an oath on a deposit, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim and in a case where the plaintiff has a legitimate claim, so too here, with regard to an oath of testimony, the verse is speaking only with regard to a monetary claim and in a case where the plaintiff has a legitimate claim. In the case cited in the baraita and in the first clause of the mishna, the plaintiff does not have a legitimate claim.

משביע אני עליכם כשתדעו לי עדות כו': The mishna teaches: I administer an oath to you that when you will know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf.

ת"ר משביע אני עליכם כשתדעו לי עדות שתבואו ותעידוני יכול יהו חייבין ת"ל (ויקרא ה, א) ושמעה קול אלה והוא עד או ראה או ידע מי שקדמה עדות לשבועה ולא שקדמה שבועה לעדות: The Sages taught: I administer an oath to you that when you will know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf; in such a case one might have thought that they would be liable. Therefore, the verse states: “And he heard the voice of an oath and he is a witness or he saw or he knew” (Leviticus 5:1). One is liable to bring an offering for a false oath only in a case where knowledge of the testimony preceded the oath, and not in a case where the oath preceded knowledge of the testimony.

עמד בבית הכנסת ואמר משביעני עליכם: אמר שמואל אפילו עדיו ביניהן The mishna continues: If one stood in the synagogue and said for all to hear: I administer an oath to you that if you know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, these witnesses are exempt. Shmuel says: That is the halakha even if his witnesses were among the people in the synagogue.

פשיטא לא צריכא דקאי עילויהו מהו דתימא כמאן דאמר להו דמי קמ"ל The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Otherwise, there would be no novel element in this halakha of the mishna. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to cite this case only in a situation where he is standing right next to those witnesses. Lest you say he is comparable to one who spoke to them directly and those witnesses would be liable, the tanna teaches us that until he specifies to whom he is directing his demand, he does not render those witnesses obligated to take an oath of testimony.

תניא נמי הכי ראה סיעה של בני אדם עומדין ועדיו ביניהן ואמר להן משביעני עליכם אם אתם יודעין לי עדות שתבואו ותעידוני יכול יהו חייבין ת"ל והוא עד והרי לא ייחד עדיו יכול אפילו אמר כל העומדין כאן תלמוד לומר והוא עד והרי ייחד עדיו: The Gemara notes: This is also taught in a baraita: If one saw a group of people standing, and his witnesses were among them, and he said to the entire group: I administer an oath to you that if you know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, in such a case one might have thought that they would be liable. The verse states: “And he is a witness” (Leviticus 5:1), and in this case he did not specify his witnesses; therefore, they are not liable. One might have thought that the halakha is the same even if he said: I administer an oath to everyone who is standing here that you will come and testify on my behalf. The verse states: “And he is a witness” (Leviticus 5:1), and in this case, although he spoke to a group, he specified his witnesses; therefore, they are liable.

אמר לשנים משביע אני עליכם: ת"ר אמר לשנים משביע אני עליכם פלוני ופלוני אם אתם יודעין לי עדות שתבואו ותעידוני והן יודעין לו עדות עד מפי עד או שהיה אחד מהן קרוב או פסול יכול יהו חייבין ת"ל (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו בראוין להגדה הכתוב מדבר: The mishna teaches that if one said to two individuals: I administer an oath to you, and they know testimony relevant to him based on hearsay, or if one of the witnesses is found to be a relative or disqualified, they are exempt. The Gemara cites that which the Sages taught: If one said to two individuals: I administer an oath to you, so-and-so and so-and-so, that if you know testimony relevant to me you will come and testify on my behalf, and they know testimony relevant to him based on hearsay testimony, or if one of the witnesses is a relative or disqualified, in such a case one might have thought that they would be liable. The verse states: “If he does not state it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1), teaching that it is with regard to those eligible for the statement of testimony that the verse is speaking, not those who are ineligible.

שלח ביד עבדו וכו': ת"ר שלח ביד עבדו או שאמר להן הנתבע משביעני עליכם שאם אתם יודעין לו עדות שתבואו ותעידוהו יכול יהו חייבין ת"ל אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו The mishna teaches: If the plaintiff sent the demand for their testimony by means of his slave, etc. The Sages taught: If the plaintiff sent the demand for their testimony by means of his slave, or in a case where the defendant said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you that if you know any testimony relevant to the plaintiff that you will come and testify on his behalf, might one have thought that they would be liable? The verse states: “If he does not state it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1); therefore, they are not liable.

מאי תלמודא אמר ר"א אם לוא יגיד כתיב אם לו לא יגיד ונשא עונו ואם לאחר לא יגיד פטור: The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation that leads to that conclusion? Rabbi Elazar said: The derivation is based on the fact that it is written: Im lo yaggid. In the verse the word lo is spelled lamed, vav, alef and interpreted as both “not,” spelled lamed alef, and “to him,” spelled lamed vav. It is derived: If the witness who knows the testimony does not state it to the plaintiff, he shall bear his iniquity, and he is liable; but if he does not state it to another, he is exempt.

מתני׳ משביעני (אני) עליכם מצוה אני עליכם אוסרכם אני הרי אלו חייבין MISHNA: The mishna discusses the formula of an oath of testimony. If the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you concerning your refusal to testify if you do not come and testify on my behalf, or even if he said: I command you, or I bind you, although he did not employ an unequivocal formula of an oath, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

בשמים ובארץ הרי אלו פטורין באלף דלת ביוד הי בשדי בצבאות בחנון ורחום בארך אפים ברב חסד ובכל הכנויין הרי אלו חייבין If one administered the oath to the witnesses in the name of heaven and in the name of earth, these witnesses are exempt from liability for taking a false oath of testimony, as that is not an oath in the name of God. If one administered the oath to the witnesses in the name of alef dalet, i.e., Adonai; in the name of yod heh, the Tetragrammaton; in the name of the Almighty [Shaddai]; in the name of the Lord of Hosts [Tzevaot]; in the name of the Gracious and Compassionate One; in the name of He Who is Slow to Anger; in the name of He Who is Abounding in Loving-kindness; or in the name of any of the appellations of God, even though he did not mention the ineffable name of God, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

המקלל בכולן חייב דברי ר"מ וחכמים פוטרין One who curses God employing any of these names or appellations of God is liable to be executed through stoning; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem him exempt, as they hold that one is liable for cursing God only if he employs the ineffable name of God.

המקלל אביו ואמו בכולן חייב דברי ר"מ וחכמים פוטרין One who curses his father or his mother employing any of these names or appellations of God is liable to be executed through stoning; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem him exempt, as they hold that one is liable for cursing his father and his mother only if he employs the ineffable name of God.

המקלל עצמו וחבירו בכולן עובר בלא תעשה (דברים כח, כב) יככה ה' אלהים וכן יככה אלהים זו היא אלה הכתובה בתורה One who curses himself or another employing any of these names or appellations of God violates a prohibition. If one says: The Lord God shall strike you (see Deuteronomy 28:22), and likewise if one says: God shall strike you if you do not come to testify, that is a curse that is written in the Torah, and in such a case one is certainly liable if he fails to testify.

אל יכך ויברכך וייטיב לך ר"מ מחייב וחכמים פוטרין: If one says to the witnesses: God shall not strike you, or: God shall bless you, or: God shall benefit you if you come and testify, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, as one may infer from that statement that if he fails to testify God will strike him, or will not bless or benefit him. And the Rabbis deem him exempt because the curse is not explicitly stated.

גמ׳ משביעני עליכם מאי קאמר אמר רב יהודה הכי קאמר משביע אני עליכם בשבועה האמורה בתורה מצוה אני עליכם בצוואה האמורה בתורה אוסרכם אני באיסור האמור בתורה GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I administer an oath to you, I command you, or I bind you, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony. The Gemara asks: What is the plaintiff saying? He merely said that he is administering an oath, but he did not say in the name of what he is administering the oath. Rav Yehuda said: This is what the plaintiff is saying: I administer an oath to you with the oath mentioned in the Torah, I command you with the command mentioned in the Torah, I bind you with the bond mentioned in the Torah, and in the Torah all of these include mention of the name of God.

אמר ליה אביי אלא הא דתני רבי חייא כובלכם אני הרי אלו חייבין כובל באורייתא מי כתיב Abaye said to Rav Yehuda: But according to that interpretation, concerning that which Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches, that if the plaintiff said to the witnesses: I chain you, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony, is chaining written in the Torah? Apparently, the reference in the mishna and the baraita is not to similar language in the Torah.

אלא אמר אביי ה"ק משביע אני עליכם בשבועה מצוה אני עליכם בשבועה אוסרכם אני בשבועה כובלכם אני בשבועה: Rather, Abaye said that this is what the plaintiff is saying: I administer an oath to you with an oath, I command you with an oath, I bind you with an oath, I chain you with an oath. The witnesses are liable in all these cases provided that the plaintiff mentions an oath.

באלף דלת ביוד הי בשדי בצבאות בחנון ורחום בארך אפים ברב חסד: § The mishna teaches: If one administered the oath to the witnesses in the name of alef dalet, in the name of yod heh, in the name of the Almighty [Shaddai], in the name of the Lord of Hosts [Tzevaot], in the name of the Gracious and Compassionate One, in the name of He Who is Slow to Anger, or in the name of He Who is Abounding in Loving-kindness, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

למימרא דחנון ורחום שמות נינהו ורמינהי יש שמות שנמחקין ויש שמות שאין נמחקין אלו הן שמות שאין נמחקין כגון אל אלהיך אלהים אלהיכם אהיה אשר אהיה אלף דלת ויוד הי שדי צבאות הרי אלו אין נמחקין Is that to say that gracious and compassionate are sacred names? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: There are names of God that may be erased and there are names of God that may not be erased due to their inherent sanctity. These are names that may not be erased: For example, several variations of the name God [Elohim]: El, Elohekha with a second person singular suffix, Elohim, Eloheikhem with a second person plural suffix; I Shall Be As I Shall Be, alef dalet, yod heh, Almighty [Shaddai], Lord of Hosts [Tzevaot], these names may not be erased.

אבל הגדול הגבור הנורא האדיר והחזק והאמיץ העזוז חנון ורחום ארך אפים ורב חסד הרי אלו נמחקין But adjectives that describe the Holy One, Blessed be He, e.g., the Great, the Mighty, the Awesome, the Prodigious, the Powerful, the Courageous, the Strong, gracious, compassionate, slow to anger, or abounding in loving-kindness; these may be erased. Apparently, gracious and compassionate are adjectives and not actual names of God; how, then, does an oath or a curse in the name of gracious and compassionate take effect?

אמר אביי מתניתין במי שהוא חנון Abaye said: In the mishna, it is with regard to one who administers an oath or curses in the name of He Who is Gracious,

Daf 35b

במי שהוא רחום קאמר or in the name of He Who is compassionate, that the tanna is stating the halakha. Although gracious and compassionate are not names of God, the reference in the mishna is to an oath in the name of God.

א"ל רבא אי הכי בשמים ובארץ נמי במי שהשמים והארץ שלו קאמר Rava said to Abaye: If so, in the case of one who administered the oath to the witnesses in the name of heaven and in the name of earth as well, say that it is with regard to an oath in the name of He for Whom the heaven and the earth are His that the tanna is stating the halakha. Why, then, does the mishna say that for an oath in the name of heaven and in the name of earth, these witnesses are exempt from liability?

הכי השתא התם כיון דליכא מידי אחרינא דאיקרי רחום וחנון ודאי במי שהוא חנון ודאי במי שהוא רחום קאמר הכא כיון דאיכא שמים וארץ בשמים ובארץ קאמר The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, since there is no other entity that is called gracious and compassionate, certainly it is in the name of He Who is gracious, and certainly it is in the name of He Who is compassionate that the tanna is speaking. By contrast, here, since there are heaven and earth that exist as independent entities, perhaps when he administers an oath in the name of heaven and in the name of earth, it is in the name of the actual heaven and in the name of the actual earth that he is speaking, and not in the name of He for Whom the heaven and the earth are His.

ת"ר כתב אלף למד מאלהים יה מיי' ה"ז אינו נמחק שין דלת משדי אלף דלת מאדני צדי בית מצבאות ה"ז נמחק § Apropos the names of God that may be erased and those that may not be erased, the Gemara discusses the details of the matter. The Sages taught: If one wrote the letters alef lamed from the name Elohim, or yod heh from the Tetragrammaton, this pair of letters and that pair of letters may not be erased. But if one wrote the letters shin dalet from Shaddai, or alef dalet from Adonai, or tzadi beit from Tzevaot, this may be erased.

רבי יוסי אומר צבאות כולו נמחק שלא נקרא צבאות אלא על שם ישראל שנאמר (שמות ז, ד) והוצאתי את צבאותי את עמי בני ישראל מארץ מצרים אמר שמואל אין הלכה כרבי יוסי Rabbi Yosei says: The word tzevaot may be erased in its entirety, as God is called Tzevaot only in the context of the children of Israel, and it is not an independent name of God, as it is stated: “And I shall bring forth My hosts [tzivotai], My people the children of Israel, out of the land of Egypt” (Exodus 7:4). Shmuel says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

ת"ר כל הטפל לשם בין מלפניו ובין מלאחריו ה"ז נמחק לפניו כיצד ליי' ל' נמחק ביי' ב' נמחק ויי' ו' נמחק מיי' מ' נמחק (תהלים קמד, טו) שיי' ש' נמחק היי' ה' נמחק כיי' כ' נמחק The Sages taught: Any letters ancillary to the name of God, whether as a prefix preceding the name or as a suffix succeeding the name, this addition may be erased. Preceding it, how so? If one wrote the Tetragrammaton with the prefix lamed, meaning: To the Lord, the lamed may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix beit, meaning: By the Lord, the beit may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix vav, meaning: And the Lord, the vav may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix mem, meaning: From the Lord, the mem may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix shin, meaning: That the Lord, the shin may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix heh, meaning: Is the Lord, the heh may be erased; the Tetragrammaton with the prefix kaf, meaning: Like the Lord, the kaf may be erased.

לאחריו כיצד אלהינו נ"ו נמחק אלהיהם ה"ם נמחק אלהיכם כ"ם נמחק אחרים אומרים לאחריו אינו נמחק שכבר קדשו השם אמר רב הונא הלכה כאחרים Succeeding it, how so? If one wrote Eloheinu, meaning: Our God, the nun vav suffix may be erased; Eloheihem, meaning: Their God, the heh mem suffix may be erased; Eloheikhem, meaning: Your God, second person plural, the kaf mem suffix may be erased. Aḥerim say: The suffix succeeding the name of God may not be erased as the name of God to which it is appended already sanctified it and it is considered as though it is part of the name. Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Aḥerim.

(אברהם דלטיא לנבות בגבעת בנימן שלמה דניאל סימן) § Abraham; who cursed Naboth; in Gibeah of Benjamin; Solomon; Daniel; this is a mnemonic for the halakhot that follow.

כל שמות האמורים בתורה באברהם קדש חוץ מזה שהוא חול שנאמר (בראשית יח, ג) ויאמר יי' אם נא מצאתי חן בעיניך All names that could be understood as the name of God that are stated in the Torah with regard to Abraham are sacred and are referring to God, except for this name, which is non-sacred, as it is stated: “My lords, if I have found favor in your eyes” (Genesis 18:3). In that passage, Abraham is addressing the angels who appeared to him in the guise of men, not God.

חנינא בן אחי רבי יהושע ורבי אלעזר בן עזריה משום רבי אלעזר המודעי אמרו אף זה קדש כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב גדולה הכנסת אורחין יותר מהקבלת פני שכינה כמאן כאותו הזוג Ḥanina, son of the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya in the name of Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i, say: This too is sacred. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabbi Yehuda says that Rav says: Hospitality accorded to guests is greater than receiving the Divine Presence? In accordance with whose opinion is that statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of that pair of tanna’im, Ḥanina, son of the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who understood that Abraham was speaking to God.

כל שמות האמורים בלוט חול חוץ מזה שהוא קדש שנאמר (בראשית יט, יח) ויאמר לוט אליהם אל נא אדני הנה נא מצא עבדך חן בעיניך וגו' מי שיש בידו להמית ולהחיות זה הקדוש ברוך הוא All names that could be understood as the name of God that are stated in the Torah with regard to Lot are non-sacred and are referring to angels, except for this one, which is sacred, as it is stated: “And Lot said to them: Please, not so Adonai. Behold your servant has found favor in your eyes, and you have magnified Your mercy that You have performed for me by saving my life” (Genesis 19:18–19). It is apparent from the context that Lot is addressing He Who has the capacity to kill and to vivify; that is the Holy One, Blessed be He.

כל שמות האמורים בנבות קדש במיכה חול ר"א אומר בנבות קדש במיכה יש מהן חול ויש מהן קדש אלף למד חול יוד הי קדש חוץ מזה שאלף למד והוא קדש (שופטים יח, לא) כל ימי היות בית האלהים בשילה All names that are stated with regard to Naboth are sacred, e.g., in the verse: “Naboth blasphemed Elohim and the king” (I Kings 21:13), and those stated with regard to Micah are non-sacred and are referring to the graven image that he fashioned (see Judges, chapters 17–18). Rabbi Eliezer says: Indeed, all names that are stated with regard to Naboth are sacred; but those stated with regard to Micah, some of them are non-sacred and some of them are sacred. The names beginning with the letters alef lamed, i.e., Elohim, are non-sacred, as the reference is to the idol that he crafted, and all the names beginning with the letters yod heh, i.e., the Tetragrammaton, are sacred, except for this name that begins with the letters alef lamed and it is sacred: “All the time that the house of Elohim was in Shiloh” (Judges 18:31).

כל שמות האמורים בגבעת בנימין ר"א אומר חול רבי יהושע אומר קדש All names that are stated in the passage concerning Gibeah of Benjamin, where the rest of the tribes consulted God to determine whether they should go to war against the tribe of Benjamin (see Judges, chapter 20), Rabbi Eliezer says: They are non-sacred, as they were consulting an idol, not God. Rabbi Yehoshua says: They are sacred.

אמר לו ר"א וכי מבטיח ואינו עושה Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: How can you say that those names are sacred? Does God promise and not fulfill the promise? Twice the tribes received the response to go to war against Benjamin, and twice they were vanquished.

אמר לו ר' יהושע מה שהבטיח עשה והם לא ביחנו אם לנצוח אם לנצח באחרונה שביחנו הסכימו על ידן שנאמר (שופטים כ, כח) ופנחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן (הכהן) עומד לפניו בימים ההם לאמר האוסיף עוד לצאת למלחמה עם [בני] בנימין אחי אם אחדל וגו' Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: That which God promised, He fulfilled. In each case, He responded to their question. The first time they consulted God through the Urim VeTummim, but they did not seek to ascertain if they are to triumph in the war or if they are to be defeated. In the last time that they consulted God through the Urim VeTummim, where they sought to ascertain whether they would emerge triumphant, they consented in Heaven to their endeavor, as it is stated: “And Pinehas, son of Elazar, son of Aaron was standing before it in those days, saying: Shall I yet again go out to battle against the children of Benjamin my brother, or shall I cease? And the Lord said: Go up, as tomorrow I will deliver them into your hand” (Judges 20:28).

כל שלמה האמורין בשה"ש קדש שיר למי שהשלום שלו חוץ מזה (שיר השירים ח, יב) כרמי שלי לפני האלף לך שלמה שלמה לדידיה ומאתים לנוטרים את פריו רבנן וי"א אף זה חול (שיר השירים ג, ז) הנה מטתו שלשלמה ששים All mentions of the name Shlomo that are stated in the Song of Songs, such as: “The song of songs that is Shlomo’s” (Song of Songs 1:1), are not references to King Solomon; rather, they are sacred, meaning a song to the One for Whom peace [shehashalom] is His, except for this mention: “My vineyard, which is mine, is before me; you, Solomon shall have the one thousand,” i.e., one thousand are for Solomon himself; “and two hundred for those who guard its fruit” (Song of Songs 8:12), which is a reference to the Sages. And some say: This verse too is non-sacred: “Behold, the bed of Solomon; sixty mighty men are around it” (Song of Songs 3:7).

אף זה ולא מיבעי האיך אלא הא דאמר שמואל מלכותא דקטלא חד משיתא בעלמא לא מיענשא שנאמר כרמי שלי לפני האלף לך שלמה למלכותא דרקיעא ומאתים לנוטרים את פריו למלכותא דארעא שמואל לא כת"ק ולא כי"א The Gemara asks: Does this mean: This verse too is non-sacred, and it is not necessary to say that the verse cited earlier is non-sacred? But that which Shmuel says: A monarchy that kills one of every six individuals in the world is not punished for doing so, as that is the prerogative of a monarch, as it is stated: “My vineyard, which is mine, is before me; you, Shlomo shall have the one thousand,” this is a reference to the monarchy of Heaven; “and two hundred for those who guard its fruit,” this is a reference to the monarchy of earth. Of the 1,200 mentioned in the two parts of the verse, two hundred, or one-sixth, are the prerogative of the earthly monarch. Shmuel, who interprets the mention of Shlomo in this verse as referring to God, holds neither in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna nor in accordance with the opinion introduced with the term: Some say. Both tanna’im agree that the reference in the verse is to Solomon and not to the Holy One, Blessed be He.

אלא ה"ק וי"א זה קדש וזה הוא חול דמטתו ושמואל דאמר כי"א Rather, Shmuel cites a different version of the opinion introduced with the term: Some say, according to which this is what it is saying. And some say: This Shlomo that appears in the verse with regard to the one thousand is sacred, and that Shlomo that appears in the verse with regard to the bed of Solomon is non-sacred, and it is Shmuel who states his opinion in accordance with the opinion introduced with the term: Some say.

כל מלכיא האמורים בדניאל חול חוץ מזה שהוא קדש (דניאל ב, לז) אנת מלכא [מלך] מלכיא די אלה שמיא מלכותא חסנא ותקפא ויקרא יהב לך All kings that are stated with regard to Daniel are non-sacred, except for this one, which is sacred: “You, O king, king of kings, unto whom the God of heaven has given you the kingdom, the power, and the strength, and the glory” (Daniel 2:37).

וי"א אף זה קדש שנאמר (דניאל ד, טז) מרי חלמא לשנאך ופשרה לערך למאן קאמר אי סלקא דעתך לנבוכדנצר קאמר ליה שנאותיה מאי נינהו ישראל מילט קא לייט להו לישראל And some say: This too is sacred, as it is stated: “My Lord, the dream shall be for your enemy and its interpretation for your foe” (Daniel 4:16). To whom is Daniel saying this? If it enters your mind that when Daniel says: “My lord,” it is to Nebuchadnezzar that he is saying it, his enemy, who are they? They are the Jewish people. Would Daniel curse the Jewish people?

ות"ק סבר שונאי ישראל איכא שונאי עובדי כוכבים ליכא: And the first tanna, who understands that Daniel is referring to Nebuchadnezzar, holds: Are there Jewish enemies for Nebuchadnezzar and there are no gentile enemies for him? Daniel was cursing the gentile enemies, not the Jewish enemies.

ובכל כנויין הרי אלו חייבין כו': § The mishna teaches: Or if one administered the oath to the witnesses in the name of any of the appellations of God, even though he did not mention the ineffable name of God, these witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony.

ורמינהי (במדבר ה, כא) יתן ה' אותך לאלה ולשבועה מה ת"ל והלא כבר נאמר והשביע הכהן את האשה בשבועת האלה לפי שנא' (ויקרא ה, א) ושמעה קול אלה נאמר כאן אלה ונאמר להלן אלה מה להלן שבועה אף כאן שבועה מה להלן בשם אף כאן בשם And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita that cites the verse: “The Lord shall render you as a curse and as an oath” (Numbers 5:21). Why must the verse state this? Isn’t it already stated at the beginning of the verse: “And the priest shall administer to the woman with the oath of cursing”? Due to the fact that it is stated with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he heard the voice of an ala” (Leviticus 5:1), one may infer: Ala is stated here with regard to an oath of testimony and ala is stated there with regard to a sota; just as there, with regard to a sota, the reference is to an oath, so too here, with regard to an oath of testimony, the reference is to an oath. And just as there, the oath is administered in the name of God, so too here, the oath is administered in the name of God. This is contrary to the mishna, where the ruling is that an oath of testimony may be administered even in the name of appellations of God.

אמר אביי לא קשיא הא רבי חנינא בר אידי הא רבנן דתניא רבי חנינא בר אידי אומר הואיל ואמרה תורה השבע ואל תשבע קלל ואל תקלל מה השבע בשם אף לא תשבע בשם מה קלל בשם אף לא תקלל בשם Abaye said: This is not difficult. This baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Idi, and that mishna is the opinion of the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ḥanina bar Idi says: Since the Torah says in some cases: Take an oath, and in some cases: Do not take an oath; and it says in some cases: Curse, and in some cases: Do not curse, just as when the Torah says: Take an oath, it is in the name of God, so too, when the Torah states: Do not take an oath, it is in the name of God. And just as when the Torah states: Curse, it is in the name of God, so too, when the Torah says: Do not curse, it is in the name of God.

ורבנן אי גמירי גזירה שוה ניבעי שם המיוחד אי לא גמירי גזירה שוה אלה דשבועה היא מנא להו The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis say: If they derive an oath of testimony from sota by means of a verbal analogy, let us require that both an oath of testimony and the curse will be specifically in the ineffable name of God. If they do not derive an oath of testimony from sota by means of a verbal analogy, from where do they derive that the instance of the word ala that is written with regard to an oath of testimony is an oath?

נפקא להו מדתניא אלה אין אלה אלא לשון שבועה וכן הוא אומר (במדבר ה, כא) והשביע הכהן את האשה בשבועת האלה The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which is taught in a baraita: It is written with regard to an oath of testimony: “And he hears the voice of an ala” (Leviticus 5:1); ala is nothing other than an expression meaning oath. And likewise it says: “And the priest shall administer to the woman with the oath of cursing [ha’ala]” (Numbers 5:21).

התם שבועת האלה כתיב הכי קאמר אלה אין אלה אלא בשבועה וכן הוא אומר והשביע הכהן את האשה בשבועת האלה The Gemara asks: It is not merely ala that is written there; the oath of an ala is written there. Apparently, ala alone does not mean oath. The Gemara explains that this is what the tanna is saying: “And he hears the voice of an ala”; ala is used only when accompanied by an oath. And likewise it says: “And the priest shall administer to the woman with the oath of cursing.”

Daf 36a

ומנין לעשות (אלה שאין עמה שבועה כאלה שיש עמה שבועה) ושבועה שאין עמה אלה כשבועה שיש עמה אלה תלמוד לומר (ויקרא ה, א) ושמעה קול אלה ושמעה אלה ושמעה קול And from where is it derived to render an ala with which the word oath is not written like an ala with which the word oath is written and an oath with which the word ala is not written like an oath with which the word ala is written? The verse states: “And he hears the voice of an ala” (Leviticus 5:1). The phrase “the voice of an ala” is unnecessary, as it would have been sufficient to write: And he heard an ala. It is interpreted as though it were written: And he heard an ala and he heard a voice.

אמר רבי אבהו מנין לאלה שהיא שבועה שנאמר (יחזקאל יז, יג) ויבא אתו באלה וגו' וכתיב (דברי הימים ב לו, יג) וגם במלך נבוכדנצר מרד אשר השביעו באלהים Rabbi Abbahu says: From where is it derived with regard to ala that it is an oath? It is derived as it is stated: “And he took from the seed of the monarchy…and brought it into an ala” (Ezekiel 17:13); and it is stated with regard to Zedekiah, who was from the seed of the monarchy: “And he also rebelled against Nebuchadnezzar who had administered an oath to him by God” (II Chronicles 36:13). This indicates that the ala is an oath.

תנא ארור בו נידוי בו קללה בו שבועה § The Gemara proceeds to define a related term. It is taught with regard to the term arur: There is an element of ostracism within it, there is an element of curse within it, and there is an element of oath within it.

בו נידוי דכתיב (שופטים ה, כג) אורו מרוז אמר מלאך ה' אורו ארור יושביה ואמר עולא בארבע מאה שיפורי שמתיה ברק למרוז The Gemara elaborates: There is an element of ostracism within it, as it is written in the song of Deborah: “Curse [oru] Meroz, said the angel of God; cursed with a curse [oru aror] are its inhabitants” (Judges 5:23). And Ulla says: With blasts from four hundred shofarot, Barak ostracized the city of Meroz, indicating that the term arur has the connotation of ostracism.

בו קללה דכתיב (דברים כז, יג) ואלה יעמדו על הקללה וכתיב (דברים כז, טו) ארור האיש אשר יעשה פסל וגו' There is an element of curse within it, as it is written with regard to the ceremony at Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal: “And these shall stand for the curse” (Deuteronomy 27:13), and it is written: “Cursed [arur] be the man who fashions a graven image, an abomination to the Lord, the work of the hands of the craftsman, and sets it up in secret. And all the people shall answer and say: Amen” (Deuteronomy 27:15).

בו שבועה דכתיב (יהושע ו, כו) וישבע יהושע בעת ההיא לאמר ארור האיש לפני ה' וגו' ודלמא תרתי עבד להו אשבעינהו ולייטינהו There is an element of oath within it, as it is written: “And Joshua administered an oath at that time saying: Arur be the man before God who shall arise and rebuild this city, Jericho” (Joshua 6:26). The Gemara challenges: But perhaps Joshua performed two actions to the people; he administered an oath to them and he cursed them, and the term arur relates to the curse, not to the oath.

אלא מהכא (שמואל א יד, כד) ואיש ישראל נגש ביום ההוא ויואל שאול את העם לאמר ארור האיש אשר יאכל וגו' וכתיב (שמואל א יד, כז) ויהונתן לא שמע בהשביע אביו את העם ודלמא הכא נמי תרתי עבד להו אשבעינהו ולייטינהו Rather, the fact that there is an element of oath in the term arur is derived from here: “And the men of Israel were distressed on that day, and Saul administered an oath [vayyoel] to the people, saying: Arur is the man who eats bread until the evening and I will be avenged on my enemies” (I Samuel 14:24). And it is written: “But Jonathan did not hear when his father administered the oath to the people” (I Samuel 14:27). The Gemara challenges: But perhaps, here too, Saul performed two actions to the people; he administered an oath to them and he cursed them.

מי כתיב וארור השתא דאתית להכי התם נמי לא כתיב וארור The Gemara answers: Is it written in that context ve’arur, with a conjunctional prefix, which would indicate that arur is independent of the oath that was administered? Arur is written without a prefix, indicating that it is an intrinsic part of the oath. The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this insight, there too, in the context of Joshua, ve’arur with a conjunctional prefix is not written, indicating that arur is an intrinsic part of the oath.

אמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמן בו שבועה בו קבלת דברים בו האמנת דברים § Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says with regard to the term amen: There is an element of oath within it, there is an element of acceptance of the statement and agreement within it, and there is an element of confirmation of the statement, i.e., that he believes and prays that the statement will be fulfilled, within it.

בו שבועה דכתיב (במדבר ה, כב) ואמרה האשה אמן אמן The Gemara elaborates: There is an element of oath within it, as it is written: “And the priest shall administer an oath to the woman…and the woman shall say: Amen, amen” (Numbers 5:21–22). “Amen” is the oath that the woman takes.

בו קבלת דברים דכתיב (דברים כז, כו) ארור אשר לא יקים את דברי התורה הזאת לעשות אותם ואמר כל העם אמן There is an element of acceptance of the statement within it, as it is written: “Cursed is he who shall not confirm the matters of this Torah to perform them; and all the people shall say: Amen” (Deuteronomy 27:26), expressing their agreement to fulfill all the matters of the Torah.

בו האמנת דברים דכתיב (ירמיהו כח, ה) ויאמר ירמיה [הנביא] (אל חנניהו) אמן כן יעשה ה' יקם ה' את דבריך There is an element of confirmation of the statement within it, as it is written: “And Jeremiah the prophet said: Amen, may the Lord do so; may the Lord uphold your statement” (Jeremiah 28:6).

אמר רבי אלעזר לאו שבועה הן שבועה בשלמא לאו שבועה דכתיב (בראשית ט, טו) ולא יהיה עוד המים למבול וכתיב (ישעיהו נד, ט) כי מי נח זאת לי אשר נשבעתי אלא הן שבועה מנא לן סברא הוא מדלאו שבועה הן נמי שבועה § Rabbi Elazar says: No, or any negative expression, can be an oath, and yes, or any positive expression, can be an oath. The Gemara notes: Granted that no can be an oath, as it is written: “And the waters shall no more become a flood” (Genesis 9:15). And it is written with regard to that negative commitment: “As this is as the waters of Noah unto Me; as I have taken an oath that the waters of Noah shall no more pass over the earth” (Isaiah 54:9). But from where do we derive the fact that yes can be an oath? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning; from the fact that no can be an oath, yes too can be an oath.

אמר רבא והוא דאמר לאו לאו תרי זימני והוא דאמר הן הן תרי זימני דכתיב (בראשית ט, יא) ולא יכרת כל בשר עוד ממי המבול ולא יהיה עוד המים למבול ומדלאו תרי זימני הן נמי תרי זימני: Rava said: And a negative expression is an oath only in a case where one said no, no, stating the term two times, or it is in a case where one said yes, yes, stating the term two times, as it is written: “All flesh shall not be excised any more by floodwaters” (Genesis 9:11), and it is again written: “And the waters shall no more become a flood” (Genesis 9:15). And from the fact that no is an oath only when stated two times, yes, too, is an oath only when stated two times.

המקלל בכולן חייב דברי ר"מ וחכמים פוטרין: § The mishna teaches: One who curses God employing any of these names or appellations of God is liable to be executed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem him exempt.

תנו רבנן (ויקרא כד, טו) איש [איש] כי יקלל אלהיו ונשא חטאו מה ת"ל והלא כבר נאמר (ויקרא כד, טז) ונקב שם ה' מות יומת יכול לא יהא חייב אלא על שם המיוחד בלבד מנין לרבות את הכינויין תלמוד לומר איש איש כי יקלל אלהיו וגו' מכל מקום דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים על שם מיוחד במיתה ועל הכינויין באזהרה: The Sages taught that it is written: “Each and every man who shall curse his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15). Why must the verse state this? Wasn’t it already stated: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16)? One might have thought that one would be liable only for cursing the ineffable name of God alone. From where is it derived to include liability for one who curses the appellations of God? It is derived as the verse states: “Each and every man who shall curse his God,” indicating that one is liable in any case, even for cursing an appellation. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis say: For cursing the ineffable name of God, one is liable to be executed with a court-imposed death penalty, as it is stated explicitly in the verse. And for cursing one of the appellations of God, one is liable for violating a prohibition, but he is not liable to be executed.

והמקלל אביו ואמו וכו': מאן חכמים The mishna teaches: And one who curses his father and his mother employing any of these names or appellations of God is liable to be executed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis deem him exempt. The Gemara asks: Who are the Rabbis whose opinion is cited here?

רבי מנחם בר יוסי דתניא רבי מנחם בר יוסי אומר (ויקרא כד, טז) בנקבו שם יומת מה ת"ל שם לימד על המקלל אביו ואמו שאינו חייב עד שיקללם בשם: The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Menaḥem bar Yosei says: It is stated with regard to one who blasphemes God: “When he blasphemes a name, he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16). Why must the verse state “a name,” when it is stated at the beginning of the verse: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death”? This extraneous word “name” taught with regard to one who curses his father or his mother that he is not liable to be executed through stoning until he curses them in the name of God.

והמקלל עצמו וחבירו כו': אמר רבי ינאי ודברי הכל The mishna teaches: One who curses himself or another employing any of these names or appellations of God violates a prohibition. Rabbi Yannai says: And everyone agrees that this is the halakha. Even the Rabbis, who hold that one who blasphemes God or curses his parents is liable only if he employs the Tetragrammaton, agree here that one is liable to receive lashes when he curses employing an appellation.

עצמו דכתיב (דברים ד, ט) רק השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד כדרבי אבין אמר רבי אילעא דאמר כל מקום שנאמר השמר פן ואל אינו אלא לא תעשה וחבירו דכתיב (ויקרא יט, יד) לא תקלל חרש: The Gemara proceeds to cite sources for these prohibitions. The prohibition against cursing oneself is derived as it is written: “Only observe for yourself, and keep your soul diligently” (Deuteronomy 4:9). This is in accordance with that which Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Everywhere in the Torah that the terms observe, lest, or do not are stated, it is nothing other than a prohibition. One who curses himself does not keep, i.e., take care of, himself and consequently violates the prohibition. And cursing another is derived as it is written: “Do not curse the deaf” (Leviticus 19:14), which applies to others just as it does to one who is deaf.

יכך ה' אלהים וכן יככה אלהים זו היא אלה הכתובה בתורה: יתיב רב כהנא קמיה דרב יהודה ויתיב וקאמר הא מתניתין כדתנן א"ל כנה § The mishna teaches that if one says: The Lord God shall strike you (see Deuteronomy 28:22), and likewise if one says: God shall strike you if you do not come to testify, that is a curse that is written in the Torah. The Gemara relates: Rav Kahana sat before Rav Yehuda, and he sat and stated the mishna verbatim as we learned it. Rav Yehuda said to him: Employ a euphemism and formulate it in the third person rather than the second person: God shall strike him instead of you, so that it will not sound as though you are cursing your teacher.

יתיב ההוא מרבנן קמיה דרב כהנא ויתיב וקאמר (תהלים נב, ז) גם אל יתצך לנצח יחתך ויסחך מאהל ושרשך מארץ חיים סלה א"ל כנה Likewise, the Gemara relates: A certain one of the Sages sat before Rav Kahana, and he sat and said the verse: “God will likewise break you forever; He will take you up and pluck you from the tent, and uproot you from the land of the living, Selah” (Psalms 52:7). Rav Kahana said to him: Employ a euphemism and formulate it in the third person rather than the second person, so that it will not sound as though you are cursing your teacher.

תרתי למה לי מהו דתימא ה"מ מתניתין אבל בקראי אימא לא מכנינן קמ"ל: The Gemara asks: Why do I need two incidents to relate the same concept? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to relate the second incident as well. Lest you say that this statement applies only to the mishna, as in the Oral Torah, where the content, not the formulation, is significant, emending the text in the interest of euphemism is permitted; but with regard to verses in the Bible, where the formulation, i.e., each word, is significant, say that we do not employ a euphemism. Therefore, the Gemara teaches us that it is permitted to employ a euphemism even when reciting verses.

אל יכך ויברכך וייטיב לך רבי מאיר מחייב וחכמים פוטרין: § The mishna teaches that if one says to the witnesses: God shall not strike you, or: God shall bless you, or: God shall benefit you if you come and testify, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, as one may infer from that statement that if he fails to testify God will strike him, or will not bless or benefit him. And the Rabbis deem him exempt because the curse is not explicitly stated.

והא לית ליה לר"מ מכלל לאו אתה שומע הן איפוך The Gemara asks: But isn’t it so that Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement, and in an agreement, he requires the parties to explicitly state both the positive and the negative stipulations? The Gemara says: Reverse the attribution of the opinions and say that it is the Rabbis who hold that the witness is liable and it is Rabbi Meir who deems him exempt.

כי אתא רבי יצחק תנא כדתנן אמר רב יוסף השתא דאנן תנן הכי וכי אתא רבי יצחק תני הכי ש"מ דוקא תנן The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he taught the mishna as we learned it and did not reverse the attribution of the opinions. Rav Yosef said: Now that we have learned the mishna in this formulation, and when he came, Rabbi Yitzḥak taught the mishna in this formulation, conclude from it that the formulation that we learned in the mishna was taught specifically in that manner and that is the correct formulation.

אלא קשיא כי לית ליה בממונא אבל באיסורא אית ליה The Gemara challenges: But the question remains difficult, as Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Meir does not accept that principle, it is only in cases involving monetary matters; but in cases involving ritual matters, e.g., an oath of testimony discussed in the mishna, he accepts the principle, and the witness is liable even in that case.

הרי סוטה דאיסורא הוא The Gemara asks: But sota is a case involving ritual, and not monetary matters, and the verse states only what will befall the sota if she did not commit adultery: “And if you did not go astray to defilement, while under your husband, you shall be absolved [hinnaki]” (Numbers 5:19), and the verse does not state what will befall the woman if she committed adultery.

ואמר ר' תנחום בר חכינאי (במדבר ה, יט) הנקי כתיב טעמא דכתיב הנקי הא לאו הכי מכלל לאו אתה שומע הן לא אמרינן A difficulty is raised: According to Rabbi Meir, who does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement, both the positive and the negative eventualities should have been written in the verse. And Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥakhinai says to resolve the difficulty: Hinnaki is written, meaning: You shall be absolved. But since it is written without the letter yod, it is interpreted as though ḥinnaki is written, meaning: You shall be strangulated, which is the eventuality if she committed adultery. The Gemara concludes: The reason that this verse is not difficult is that hinnaki is written and ḥinnaki is interpreted; but if that were not the case, we do not say: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement. Apparently, even in ritual matters, Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle.

Daf 36b

אלא איפוך אפילו באיסורא לית ליה Rather, nevertheless, reverse the attribution of the opinions in the mishna and say that Rabbi Meir deems the witness exempt from liability for an oath of testimony, as even in ritual matters, Rabbi Meir does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement.

מתקיף ליה רבינא ובאיסורא לית ליה אלא מעתה שתויי יין. ופרועי ראש דבמיתה הכי נמי דלית ליה לר"מ והתנן אלו שבמיתה שתויי יין ופרועי ראש Ravina objects to this: And in ritual matters, does Rabbi Meir not accept the principle? But if that is so, with regard to the halakha that priests who perform the Temple service while intoxicated with wine, and priests who perform the Temple service with overgrown hair on their head, who, based on this principle, are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, so too does Rabbi Meir not accept this principle? But didn’t we learn in a baraita: And these are they who are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven: Priests who perform the Temple service while intoxicated with wine and priests who perform the Temple service with overgrown hair on their head, and Rabbi Meir does not disagree with that ruling?

אלא לעולם תיפוך כי לית ליה בממונא באיסורא אית ליה ושאני סוטה דאיסורא דאית ביה ממונא הוא: Rather, actually reverse the attribution of the opinions in the mishna and say that Rabbi Meir deems the witness exempt from liability for an oath of testimony. When Rabbi Meir does not accept that principle, it is only in cases involving monetary matters; but in cases involving ritual matters, he accepts the principle. That is the reason he does not dispute the halakha in the baraita with regard to a priest intoxicated with wine or with overgrown hair on his head. And the reason that he does not accept the principle: From a negative statement you can infer a positive statement, in the case of sota is that sota is different because it is a ritual matter in which there are ramifications involving monetary matters, i.e., payment of the marriage contract. The same is true with regard to an oath of testimony in the mishna; although it is a ritual matter, it is a ritual matter with ramifications involving monetary matters.

הדרן עלך שבועת העדות

מתני׳ שבועת הפקדון נוהגת באנשים ובנשים ברחוקים ובקרובים בכשרים ובפסולים MISHNA: One who takes a false oath denying that he is in possession of an item that another deposited with him is liable to return the item with an additional one-fifth of its value and to bring a guilt-offering (see Leviticus 5:20–26). The halakhot of an oath on a deposit apply to men and to women, to non-relatives and to relatives, i.e., even if the owner of the deposit and the purported bailee are related, to those fit to serve as witnesses and to those disqualified from doing so.

בפני בית דין ושלא בפני בית דין מפי עצמו ומפי אחרים אינו חייב עד שיכפרנו בב"ד דברי רבי מאיר These halakhot apply when the oath is taken in the presence of a court and when taken not in the presence of a court, as long as the oath is taken on his own, i.e., stated by the defendant himself. But if the oath is administered by others, he is not liable unless he denies the claim in court; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וחכמים אומרים בין מפי עצמו בין מפי אחרים כיון שכפר בו חייב And the Rabbis say: Both when the defendant takes an oath on his own and when the oath is administered by others, once he has falsely denied the claim against him, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering and to pay restitution and an additional one-fifth, even if the oath was not administered in the presence of a court.

וחייב על זדון השבועה ועל שגגתה עם זדון הפקדון ואינו חייב על שגגתה גרידתא ומה חייב על זדונה אשם בכסף שקלים And one is liable to bring an offering for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit and for unwittingly taking a false oath about the intentional misappropriation of the deposit, i.e., if one knowingly took a false oath but was unaware that he is liable to bring an offering for taking the oath. But he is not liable for unwittingly taking a false oath by itself, where he mistakenly thought that he did not owe anything. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? He must bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels.

שבועת הפקדון כיצד אמר לו תן לי פקדוני שיש לי בידך שבועה שאין לך בידי או שאמר לו אין לך בידי משביעך אני ואמר אמן הרי זה חייב The mishna continues: What is the case of an oath on a deposit? It is where the claimant said to the defendant: Give me my deposit, which is in your possession, and the defendant replied: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession; or the defendant said to him: Nothing of yours is in my possession, the claimant responded: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen. In either case this defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if he lied.

השביע עליו חמש פעמים בין בפני בית דין ובין שלא בפני ב"ד וכפר חייב על כל אחת ואחת אמר רבי שמעון מה טעם מפני שיכול לחזור ולהודות If the claimant administered an oath to him five times, whether in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court, and the defendant falsely denied each claim, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for each and every denial. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason? It is due to the fact that he is able to retract and confess after each oath and repay the claimant. Since he did not do so, each oath is considered a separate denial of a monetary claim.

היו חמשה תובעים אותו אמרו לו תן לנו פקדון שיש לנו בידך שבועה שאין לכם בידי אינו חייב אלא אחת שבועה שאין לך בידי ולא לך ולא לך חייב על כל אחת ואחת ר"א אומר עד שיאמר שבועה באחרונה ר"ש אומר עד שיאמר שבועה לכל אחד ואחד If five people were suing him and they said to him: Give us back our deposit that is in your possession, and the defendant says: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds to each claimant: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim that he denied. Rabbi Eliezer says: He is not liable for his oath concerning each claim unless he says: On my oath, at the end of the denial, i.e., he says: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, on my oath, so that it is clear that he is taking an oath to each one. Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable for his oath concerning each claim unless he says: On my oath, to each and every claimant, i.e., he says: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and on my oath nothing of yours, to each claimant separately.

תן לי פקדון ותשומת יד גזל ואבידה שיש לי בידך שבועה שאין לך בידי אינו חייב אלא אחת שבועה שאין לך בידי פקדון ותשומת יד וגזל ואבידה חייב על כל אחת ואחת In a case where the claimant said: Give me back my deposit, and pledge, stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, and the defendant responds: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your deposit, or pledge, stolen item, or lost item, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim.

תן לי חטין ושעורין וכוסמין שיש לי בידך שבועה שאין לך בידי אינו חייב אלא אחת שבועה שאין לך בידי חטין ושעורין וכוסמין חייב על כל אחת ואחת רבי מאיר אומר אפילו אמר חטה ושעורה וכוסמת חייב על כל אחת ואחת In a case where the claimant said: Give me back my wheat, and barley, and spelt that are in your possession, if the defendant responds: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your wheat, barley, or spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Rabbi Meir says: Even if the defendant says: On my oath I do not have in my possession your grain of wheat, or grain of barley, or grain of spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim.

אנסת ופיתית את בתי והוא אומר לא אנסתי ולא פיתיתי משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב רבי שמעון פוטר שאינו משלם קנס על פי עצמו אמרו לו אע"פ שאינו משלם קנס על פי עצמו משלם בשת ופגם על פי עצמו The mishna continues: If one accuses another: You raped or you seduced my daughter, and the other says: I did not rape and I did not seduce your daughter, to which the father replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, the defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if it is a false oath. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt, since one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. Had he confessed he would have been exempt from paying the fine; he is therefore not liable for his denial. The Rabbis said to him: Even though he does not pay the fine based on his own admission, he does pay compensation for humiliation and compensation for degradation resulting from her being raped or seduced, which are monetary claims and not fines, based on his own admission. He is therefore liable for a false oath, as he denied a monetary claim.

גנבת את שורי והוא אומר לא גנבתי משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב גנבתי אבל לא טבחתי ולא מכרתי משביעך אני ואמר אמן פטור Similarly, in a case where one person accuses another: You stole my ox, and the defendant says: I did not steal your ox, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, he is liable to pay for the ox due to the theft and to bring a guilt-offering if he lied, since by his oath he is denying that he owes the value of the ox that he would have to pay if he admitted to stealing it. But in a case where the claimant accuses the defendant of stealing the ox and slaughtering or selling it, and the defendant says: I stole the ox, but I did not slaughter or sell it, and this is a lie, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then the defendant is exempt from the fivefold payment for slaughtering or selling another’s ox, since it is a fine.

המית שורך את שורי והוא אומר לא המית משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב המית שורך את עבדי והוא אומר לא המית משביעך אני ואמר אמן פטור If the claimant says: Your ox killed my ox, and the defendant lies and says: It did not kill your ox, to which the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then he is liable for his false oath. But if the claimant says: Your ox killed my Canaanite slave and you are therefore liable to pay me a fine of thirty shekels, and he lies and says: It did not kill your slave, to which the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, then he is exempt, because payment for the slave is a fine.

אמר לו חבלת בי ועשית בי חבורה והוא אומר לא חבלתי ולא עשיתי בך חבורה משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב אמר לו עבדו הפלת את שיני וסימית את עיני והוא אומר לא הפלתי ולא סימיתי משביעך אני ואמר אמן פטור If the claimant said to him: You injured me and caused me a wound, and the defendant says: I did not injure you and I did not cause you a wound, to which the claimant replies: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, he is liable. But if one’s Canaanite slave said to him: You knocked out my tooth, or: You blinded my eye, and you are therefore required to emancipate me, and he says: I did not knock out your tooth, or: I did not blind your eye, to which the slave replies: I administer an oath to you, and he said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering even though he lied, since the obligation to emancipate one’s slave in these cases is a penalty.

זה הכלל כל המשלם על פי עצמו חייב ושאינו משלם על פי עצמו פטור: This is the principle: For any claim that the defendant would have to pay based on his own admission, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath concerning that claim. And for any claim that he would not pay based on his own admission but would pay only by the testimony of witnesses, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking a false oath concerning that claim.

גמ׳ רב אחא בר הונא ורב שמואל בריה דרבה בר בר חנה ורב יצחק בריה דרב יהודה תנו שבועות בי רבה פגע בהו רב כהנא אמר GEMARA: Rav Aḥa bar Huna and Rav Shmuel, son of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, and Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, studied tractate Shevuot in the study hall of Rabba. Rav Kahana encountered them and inquired with regard to a matter in the mishna. He said

Daf 36b

הדרן עלך שבועת העדות

Daf 37a

להו הזיד בשבועת הפקדון והתרו בו מהו כיון דחידוש הוא דבכל התורה לא אשכחן מזיד דמייתי קרבן והכא מייתי קרבן לא שנא אתרו ביה ולא שנא לא אתרו ביה או דלמא ה"מ היכא דלא אתרו ביה אבל היכא דאתרו ביה מילקא לקי קרבן לא מייתי או דלמא הא והא עבדינא to them: If one intentionally took a false oath on a deposit and witnesses forewarned him, what is the halakha? Is it the case that since the halakha of an oath on a deposit is a novelty, as in the entire Torah we do not find another case where one who transgressed intentionally brings an offering for atonement, but here he does bring an offering for transgressing the prohibition intentionally, there is no difference whether witnesses forewarned him and there is no difference whether they did not forewarn him, and he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, though generally, there is no offering brought when there was forewarning? Or perhaps, that matter of bringing a guilt-offering when one intentionally takes a false oath applies only when they did not forewarn him; but when they forewarned him, he is flogged, as this is the standard punishment for an intentional transgression, and he does not bring an offering. Or perhaps, we impose both lashes and a guilt-offering.

א"ל תנינא חמורה הימנה שבועת הפקדון שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה אשם בכסף שקלים מדקאמר ליה על זדונה מכות מכלל דאתרו ביה וקאמר מכות אין קרבן לא They said to Rav Kahana: We learn in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and for unwittingly taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels; whereas one who takes a false oath of testimony, whether intentionally or unwittingly, brings a sin-offering. From the fact that the baraita states that for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit one is liable to receive lashes, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one cannot receive lashes without forewarning, and it is stating: Yes, he is liable to receive lashes, but he is not liable to bring an offering. The baraita, then, resolves the question of Rav Kahana.

ומאי חומרא דניחא ליה לאיניש דמייתי קרבן ולא לילקי The Gemara elaborates: And what is the stringency in the fact that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit receives lashes? It is due to the fact that a person prefers to bring an offering rather than receive lashes.

אמר להו רבא בר איתי מאן תנא זדון שבועת הפקדון לא ניתן לכפרה ר"ש אבל לרבנן קרבן נמי מייתי Rava bar Itai said to the students of Rabba: You cannot answer the question from that baraita, as who is the tanna who taught that intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit is not subject to atonement? It is Rabbi Shimon. But according to the Rabbis, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as well as receiving lashes. Therefore, the question remains unanswered.

אמר להו רב כהנא בר מינה דההיא דאנא תנינא לה והכי תנינא לה אחד זדונה ואחד שגגתה אשם בכסף שקלים ומאי חומרא דאילו התם חטאת בת דנקא והכא אשם בכסף שקלים Rav Kahana said to the students: Apart from this, you cannot answer my question from this baraita, as I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. And what is the stringency in this halakha? It is that there, with regard to an oath of testimony, he is liable to bring a sin-offering that can be worth even one-sixth of one dinar, and here, the guilt-offering incurred for an oath on a deposit must be worth at least two silver shekels.

וליגמר מינה דלמא דלא אתרו ביה The Gemara suggests: And let him derive an answer to his question from his version of the baraita, which indicates that one who intentionally takes a false oath on a deposit brings an offering and does not receive lashes. The Gemara responds: Perhaps it is referring to a case where they did not forewarn him; had he been forewarned, he would be flogged.

ל"א ת"ש אין חייבין על שגגתה מה הן חייבין על זדונה אשם בכסף שקלים מאי לאו בדאתרו ביה ה"נ דלא אתרו ביה The Gemara presents a different version of the previous discussion: Come and hear an answer to the question of Rav Kahana from the mishna: One is not liable for taking a false oath on a deposit unwittingly. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? A guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara explains: What, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, and the mishna nevertheless rules only that he must bring an offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: Here, too, the mishna is referring to a case where the witnesses did not forewarn him.

ת"ש לא אם אמרת בנזיר טמא שכן לוקה תאמר בשבועת הפקדון שאינו לוקה מדקאמר לוקה מכלל דאתרו ביה וקאמר תאמר בשבועת הפקדון שאינו לוקה אבל קרבן מייתי The Gemara continues to seek an answer to Rav Kahana’s question: Come and hear an answer from a baraita. After comparing the case of a nazirite to one who takes an oath on a deposit, the baraita states: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara notes: Now, from the fact that the baraita states that a nazirite is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where witnesses forewarned him, as one is not liable to receive lashes without forewarning; and yet the baraita states: Shall you say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? One can infer: But he does bring a guilt-offering.

מאי אינו לוקה דאינו נפטר במלקות מכלל דנזיר טמא נפטר במלקות הא קרבן כתיב ביה התם דמייתי קרבן כי היכי דתיחול עליה נזירות בטהרה The Gemara rejects the proof: What does the baraita mean when it states that he is not flogged? It means that he is not exempted through lashes alone and he must also bring an offering. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that an impure nazirite is exempted through lashes alone? Isn’t it written in the Torah explicitly with regard to him that there is a requirement to bring an offering? The Gemara responds: The offering brought by an impure nazirite does not serve as an atonement. Rather, there, the nazirite brings an offering in order to purify himself so that his naziriteship can go into effect while he is in a state of purity. The offering must be brought even if the nazirite became impure unwittingly.

אמרוה רבנן קמיה דרבה אמר להו מכלל דכי לא אתרו ביה ואיכא עדים מיחייב כפירת דברים בעלמא הוא אלמא קסבר רבה הכופר בממון שיש עליו עדים פטור The Sages said this matter before Rabba, i.e., they related the question of Rav Kahana as to whether one who intentionally takes a false oath and was forewarned by witnesses is liable to bring an offering. Rabba said to them: May one conclude by inference that in a case when they did not warn him but there are witnesses to the fact that the defendant owes money to the claimant, he is liable to bring an offering? Isn’t this case merely a verbal denial that does not have any effect with regard to liability to pay? Since there are witnesses who will testify that the defendant owes the claimant, his denial and false oath did not exempt him from payment and he therefore should not be liable to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath. The Gemara infers: Evidently, Rabba holds that one who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking a false oath, since the witnesses will testify to the validity of the claimant’s claim and the denial of the defendant is of no consequence.

א"ל רב חנינא לרבה תניא דמסייע לך (ויקרא ה, כב) וכחש בה פרט למודה לאחד מן האחין או לאחד מן השותפין (ויקרא ה, כב) ונשבע על שקר פרט ללוה בשטר וללוה בעדים Rav Ḥanina said to Rabba: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: The verse states with regard to an oath denying a monetary claim: “And deal falsely therein” (Leviticus 5:22), which serves to exclude one who admits to the truth of the claim of one of a group of brothers or to one of a group of partners, even if he denies the claim to the rest of the brothers or partners. The same verse also states: “And swear to a lie,” which serves to exclude one who borrows money with a promissory note or one who borrows money in the presence of witnesses. Evidently, one is not liable for taking a false oath concerning a monetary claim when there are witnesses who can testify to it.

אמר ליה אי משום הא לא תסייען באומר לויתי ולא לויתי בעדים לויתי ולא לויתי בשטר Rabba said to him: If your proof is because of that baraita, you have not supported us, since that baraita is referring to a case where the defendant says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow in the presence of witnesses, or he says: I borrowed, but I did not borrow with a promissory note. Since his denial is only with regard to the circumstances of the loan and not to the actual debt, he is exempt from liability for taking the false oath.

ממאי מדקתני וכחש בה פרט למודה לאחד מן האחין או לאחד מן השותפין האי לאחד מן האחין ה"ד אילימא דאודי ליה בפלגא דידיה הא איכא כפירה דאידך אלא לאו דאמרי ליה מתרוינן יזפת ואמר להו לא מחד מינייכו יזפי דהויא ליה כפירת דברים בעלמא ומדרישא כפירת דברים סיפא נמי כפירת דברים Rabba elaborates: From where in the baraita is this explanation apparent? From the fact that it teaches that the verse “and deal falsely therein” serves to exclude one who admits to one of the brothers or to one of the partners. What are the circumstances of that case where one admits to one of the brothers? If we say that he admitted only the portion of the debt owed to that brother, then why is he exempt? Isn’t there the denial of the claim of the other brother, which is a denial of a monetary claim? Rather, is it not that the brothers said to him: You borrowed from both of us, and he said to them: No, I borrowed all of the amount in question from only one of you, which is merely a verbal denial, as he admits that he owes the claimed amount and disputes only the circumstances of the debt. And since the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case of a verbal denial, the last clause is also referring to a verbal denial. Consequently, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita.

(סימן חובה כיתות דבעל הבית חומר נזירא) ת"ש אינו חייב על שגגתה ומהו חייב על זדונה אשם בכסף שקלים מאי לאו זדון עדים לא זדון עצמו The Gemara attempts to prove that one who takes a false oath on a deposit is liable to bring an offering even when there are witnesses, and presents a mnemonic to remember the series of proofs: Liability, sets, of the homeowner, stringent, nazirite. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: He is not liable for unwittingly taking a false oath by itself. And what is he liable for when he intentionally takes a false oath? He must bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The Gemara continues: What, is it not referring to a case where he intentionally denies the claim of witnesses, and the mishna nevertheless teaches that he is liable to bring a guilt-offering? The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the mishna is referring to a case where there are no witnesses and he admits on his own that he intentionally took a false oath. Had there been witnesses, he would have been exempt from bringing an offering.

ת"ש היו שתי כתי עדים כפרה הראשונה ואחר כך כפרה השניה שתיהן חייבות מפני שיכולה עדות להתקיים בשתיהן בשלמא שניה תחייב דהא כפרה לה כת ראשונה אלא ראשונה אמאי מיחייבא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (31b) that discusses an oath of testimony: If there were two sets of witnesses who took an oath of testimony, and the first set falsely denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set falsely denied knowledge of the matter, both are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them. The Gemara clarifies: Granted, the second set should be liable, since the first set already denied knowledge of the incident and the validity of the claimant’s monetary claim now depends upon their testimony. But why is the first set liable?

Daf 37b

הא קיימא שניה Doesn’t the second set stand ready to testify, so that the refusal of the first set of witnesses does not affect a monetary claim? Evidently, a denial of a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is still considered a denial.

אמר רבינא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהיתה שניה בשעת כפירת הראשונה קרובין בנשותיהן ונשותיהן גוססות מהו דתימא רוב גוססין למיתה קמ"ל השתא מיהת חיי נינהו ולא שכיבי Ravina said: Here we are dealing with a case where at the time of the denial by the first set, the second set of witnesses were related to one another through their wives, so that the second set was unfit to provide testimony; and their wives were moribund. Lest you say: Most moribund people actually die soon thereafter, and the witnesses are considered fit to provide testimony, the baraita teaches us that in any event they are currently alive and have not died. The second set was therefore unfit to provide testimony.

תא שמע בעל הבית שטען טענת גנב בפקדון ונשבע והודה ובאו עדים אם עד שלא באו עדים הודה משלם קרן וחומש ואשם אם משבאו עדים הודה משלם תשלומי כפל ואשם The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of a homeowner acting as a bailee who falsely claimed that a thief stole a deposit from him, and the homeowner took an oath to that effect and then admitted that he was lying, and witnesses came and testified that the item was not stolen from the homeowner, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If he admitted to his lie before the witnesses came and testified, he pays the principal value of the item and the additional one-fifth payment for denying that he possessed the deposit, and he brings a guilt-offering as atonement for a false oath on a deposit. If he admitted his guilt after the witnesses came and testified, he pays the double payment and brings a guilt-offering. The baraita indicates that even in the case of a monetary claim to which there are witnesses, one is liable to bring a guilt-offering.

הכא נמי כדרבינא The Gemara responds: Here, too, explain this baraita as Ravina explained the previous baraita, that at the time the homeowner took his oath, the witnesses were related through their moribund wives and were unfit to provide testimony.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי תא שמע חמורה ממנה שבועת הפקדון שחייבין על זדונה מכות ועל שגגתה אשם בכסף שקלים מדקאמר לוקה מכלל דאיכא עדים וקאמר על שגגתה אשם בכסף שקלים Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear another proof from that which is taught in a baraita: The halakhot of an oath on a deposit are more stringent than the halakhot of an oath of testimony, as one is liable to receive lashes for intentionally taking a false oath on a deposit, and one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels for taking the oath unwittingly. Ravina infers: From the fact that the baraita states that one is flogged, by inference it can be understood that the baraita is referring to a case where there are witnesses to the fact that the deposit is in the defendant’s possession and the defendant was forewarned, and yet it states: One is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels for taking the oath unwittingly.

אמר להו רב מרדכי בר מינה דההיא דהאמר להו רב כהנא אנא תנינא לה והכי תנינא לה אחד זדונה ואחד שגגתה אשם בכסף שקלים Rav Mordekhai said to them: Apart from this, you cannot cite this baraita as a proof. As, didn’t Rav Kahana already say to the students (37a): I am the one who teaches this baraita and this is how I teach it: An oath on a deposit is more stringent than an oath of testimony, since for taking a false oath on a deposit either intentionally or unwittingly one is liable to bring a guilt-offering worth at least two silver shekels. The baraita is not referring to a case in which there were witnesses who forewarned him.

תא שמע לא אם אמרת בנזיר טמא שכן לוקה תאמר בשבועת הפקדון שאינו לוקה היכי דמי אי דליכא עדים אמאי לוקה אלא פשיטא דאיכא עדים וקתני תאמר בשבועת הפקדון שאינו לוקה מלקא הוא דלא לקי אבל קרבן מייתי תיובתא דרבה תיובתא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from another baraita: No, if you said that the halakha that baraita discusses is true with regard to an impure nazirite, who is indeed flogged for intentionally becoming impure, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of the baraita? If it is a case where there were no witnesses, why is the nazirite flogged? Rather, isn’t it obvious that there are witnesses, and yet, the baraita teaches: Shall you also say that this is the case with regard to one who took an oath on a deposit, who is not flogged? It may be inferred that he does not receive lashes but does bring an offering, even though there are witnesses. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabba is indeed a conclusive refutation.

רבי יוחנן אמר הכופר בממון שיש עליו עדים חייב בשטר פטור אמר רב פפא מאי טעמיה דרבי יוחנן עדים עבידי דמייתי שטר הא מנח § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is liable to bring a guilt-offering for a false oath on a deposit. But if he denies a debt concerning which there is a promissory note, he is exempt. Rav Pappa said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan? It occurs that witnesses die, and it is therefore possible that he would not be found liable through their testimony; he is therefore considered to have denied a monetary claim. By contrast, a promissory note remains in its place, and his denial would never have exempted him from payment.

אמר ליה רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לרב פפא שטרא נמי עביד דמרכס אלא אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע היינו טעמיה דרבי יוחנן משום דהוה שטר שעבוד קרקעות ואין מביאין קרבן על כפירת שעבוד קרקעות Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: This cannot be the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as it also occurs that a promissory note becomes lost. Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: This is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is because a promissory note comprises a lien on land, since the promissory note places a lien on the debtor’s property, and one does not bring an offering for an oath on a deposit for denying a lien on land, since one does not take an oath concerning land.

איתמר משביע עדי קרקע פליגי רבי יוחנן ור"א חד אמר חייב וחד אמר פטור תסתיים דרבי יוחנן דאמר פטור מדאמר רבי יוחנן הכופר בממון שיש עליו עדים חייב שטר פטור וכדרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע תסתיים It was stated: In a case where one administers an oath to witnesses who deny knowing information with regard to ownership of land and they deny knowledge of the matter, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree: One says that the witnesses are liable to bring a sin-offering for a false oath of testimony, and one says that they are exempt. The Gemara notes: It may be concluded that it is Rabbi Yoḥanan who says they are exempt. This can be inferred from the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who denies a monetary claim to which there are witnesses is liable, but one who denies a claim concerning which there is a promissory note is exempt. And this conclusion is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, that the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that a promissory note comprises a lien on land, and one does not bring an offering for denying a lien on land. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, it may be concluded.

א"ל רבי ירמיה לר' אבהו לימא רבי יוחנן ורבי אלעזר בפלוגתא דרבי אליעזר ורבנן קא מיפלגי דתנן הגוזל שדה מחבירו ושטפה נהר חייב להעמיד לו שדה דברי רבי אליעזר וחכ"א אומר לו הרי שלך לפניך Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: Shall we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis? As we learned in a baraita: In the case of one who robbed another of a field and then a river flooded it, he is liable to provide the field’s owner with a different field, since the value of the flooded field was significantly decreased and the robber must return the value of that which he stole; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: He is exempt from doing so, as he can say to the owner: That which is yours is before you. The robber may return the flooded field to its owner without reimbursing him for the loss in its value, since according to the Rabbis, land cannot be stolen. Consequently, the field is considered to be in the possession of its owner, and the thief is not obligated in the mitzva of returning a stolen item.

ואמרינן במאי קמיפלגי רבי אליעזר דריש רבויי ומיעוטי ורבנן דרשי כללי ופרטי Rabbi Yirmeya continues: And we say: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses that discuss an oath on a deposit and the mitzva to return stolen items according to the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions, and the Rabbis interpret them according to the hermeneutical principle of generalizations and details.

רבי אליעזר דריש רבויי ומיעוטי (ויקרא ה, כא) וכחש בעמיתו ריבה בפקדון או בתשומת יד מיעט או מכל אשר ישבע חזר וריבה He explains: Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses: “If anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor…or of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full” (Leviticus 5:21–24), according to the hermeneutical principle of amplifications and restrictions. The phrase “if anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor” amplified the halakha. When the verse states: “In a matter of deposit or of pledge,” it has restricted the halakha to the case of a deposit. When the verse then states: “Or of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full,” it has then amplified the halakha again.

ריבה ומיעט וריבה ריבה הכל מאי ריבה ריבה כל מילי ומאי מיעט מיעט שטרות Accordingly, as the Torah amplified and then restricted and then amplified again, it has amplified the halakha to include everything except for the specific matter excluded by the restriction. What is included due to the fact that the verse has amplified the halakha? The verse has amplified the halakha to include everything that one steals. And what is excluded due to the fact that the verse restricted the halakha? It restricted the halakha to exclude financial documents, which are dissimilar to a deposit in that their value is not intrinsic but rather due to their function. Consequently, according to Rabbi Eliezer, land that was stolen is included in the halakhot stated in these verses, and one who steals land must reimburse the field’s owner.

ורבנן דרשי כללי ופרטי וכחש בעמיתו כלל בפקדון או בתשומת יד או בגזל פרט או מכל אשר ישבע עליו חזר וכלל כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט And the Rabbis interpreted these verses according to the hermeneutical principle of generalizations and details. The phrase “and deal falsely with his neighbor” is a generalization, while the subsequent phrase, “in a matter of deposit or of pledge, or of robbery,” is a detail. When the verse then states: “Or of anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full,” it has then generalized again. In the case of a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail.

מה הפרט מפורש דבר המטלטל וגופו ממון אף כל דבר המטלטל וגופו ממון יצאו קרקעות שאין מטלטל יצאו עבדים שהוקשו לקרקעות יצאו שטרות שאף על פי שמטלטלין אין גופן ממון Accordingly, just as the detail, i.e., a deposit, is explicitly a case of movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, the verse includes anything that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value. Consequently, land has been excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves have been excluded, as they are compared to land with regard to many areas of halakha. Financial documents have been excluded because although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value.

מאן דמחייב כרבי אליעזר ומאן דפטר כרבנן Rabbi Yirmeya concludes: Shall we say that the one who deems the witnesses liable in a case of an oath of testimony concerning land, i.e., Rabbi Elazar, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, that land is included in the mitzva of returning stolen property and in the halakhot of an oath on a deposit, and by extension, in the halakhot of an oath of testimony; and the one who deems them exempt, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that land is excluded from these halakhot?

אמר ליה לא מאן דמחייב כרבי אליעזר ומאן דפטר אמר לך בהא אפילו רבי אליעזר מודה דרחמנא אמר מכל ולא הכל Rabbi Abbahu said to Rabbi Yirmeya: No, the two disagreements do not completely correspond. The one who deems the witnesses liable must in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. But the one who deems them exempt could have said to you: In this case of an oath of testimony, even Rabbi Eliezer concedes that they are exempt from bringing an offering, as the Merciful One states: “Of anything about which he has sworn falsely,” and not: Everything about which he has sworn falsely. The verse indicates that only certain items are included in the halakhot of an oath of testimony. Therefore, land is excluded, since it is dissimilar to the specific instances mentioned in the verse.

אמר רב פפא משמיה דרבא מתניתין נמי דיקא דקתני גנבת את שורי והוא אומר לא גנבתי משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב ואילו גנבת את עבדי לא קתני מ"ט לאו משום דעבד איתקש לקרקעות ואין מביאין קרבן על כפירת שעבוד קרקעות Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: The mishna is also precisely formulated, as it teaches: In a case where one accuses another: You stole my ox, and the defendant says: I did not steal your ox, if the claimant replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, he is liable. The mishna discusses a claim of a stolen ox, whereas it does not teach a claim of: You stole my Canaanite slave. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that a Canaanite slave is compared to land, and one is not liable to bring an offering for a denial in a matter of a lien on land?

אמר רב פפי משמיה דרבא אימא סיפא זה הכלל כל המשלם על פי עצמו חייב ושאינו משלם על פי עצמו פטור זה הכלל לאתויי מאי לאו לאתויי גנבת את עבדי Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: There is no proof from the mishna, as say the last clause of the mishna: This is the principle: For any claim that the defendant would have to pay based on his own admission, he is liable. And for any claim that he would not pay based on his own admission, but by the testimony of witnesses, he is exempt, even if he denies the claim against him and takes an oath to that effect. Rav Pappi asks: What is added by the phrase: This is the principle? Is it not to include even an accusation of: You stole my Canaanite slave, in the halakha of oaths on a deposit?

Daf 38a

אלא מהא ליכא למשמע מינה: Rather, no inference is to be learned from the mishna.

שבועת הפקדון כיצד תן לי פקדון שיש לי בידך כו': תנו רבנן כלל אינו חייב אלא אחת פרט חייב על כל אחת ואחת דברי ר"מ ר' יהודה אומר שבועה לא לך ולא לך ולא לך חייב על כל אחת ואחת § The mishna teaches: What is the case of an oath on a deposit? It is where the claimant said to the defendant: Give me my deposit, which is in your possession, and the defendant replied: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, or the defendant said to him: Nothing of yours is in my possession; the claimant responded: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen. In either case this defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if he lied. The mishna then discusses a case where five people sued him and he took an oath denying all of their claims. With regard to this case, the Sages taught in a baraita: If he included all the denials in one oath, he is liable for only one false oath; if he specified them, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that if he said: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim.

רבי אליעזר אומר לא לך ולא לך ולא לך שבועה חייב על כל אחת ואחת ר"ש אומר עד שיאמר שבועה לכל אחת ואחת The baraita continues: Rabbi Eliezer says that only if he said: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, on my oath, i.e., he said the word oath at the end, is he liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable for his oath concerning each individual claim unless he says: On my oath, to each and every claimant.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל כללו של רבי מאיר פרטו של רבי יהודה כללו של רבי יהודה פרטו של רבי מאיר Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The phrasing where one uses the conjunction: And, between denials is considered by Rabbi Meir to be a general denial and is considered by Rabbi Yehuda to be a specific denial; and the phrasing where one refrains from using the conjunction: And, is considered by Rabbi Yehuda to be a general denial and is considered by Rabbi Meir to be a specific denial.

ור' יוחנן אמר הכל מודים בולא לך שהוא פרט לא נחלקו אלא בלא לך שרבי מאיר אומר פרט ורבי יהודה אומר כלל ואיזהו כללו של ר' מאיר שבועה שאין לכם בידי And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All concede in a case where the defendant says: And nothing of yours, that it is considered specific and that he is liable for his oath concerning each claim, even Rabbi Meir. They disagree only with regard to a case where the defendant said: Nothing of yours, without the conjunctive: And. As Rabbi Meir says: It is considered specific, and Rabbi Yehuda says: It is considered general. And what is the case of a general denial according to Rabbi Meir, where one is liable for only one oath? It is the case where the defendant says, in the plural: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession.

במאי קמיפלגי שמואל דייק מברייתא ור' יוחנן דייק ממתניתין שמואל דייק מברייתא מדקאמר רבי יהודה ולא לך פרטא הוי מכלל דשמעיה לר' מאיר דאמר כללא הוי ואמר ליה ר' יהודה פרטא הוי The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree that they explain the opinion of Rabbi Meir differently? The Gemara responds: Shmuel inferred his explanation from the baraita, and Rabbi Yoḥanan inferred his explanation from the mishna. The Gemara explains: Shmuel inferred his explanation from the baraita as follows: From the fact that Rabbi Yehuda says that the phrase: And nothing of yours, is considered a specific denial, for which one is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim, one may conclude by inference that Rabbi Yehuda understood that Rabbi Meir said that it is considered a general denial, and therefore, Rabbi Yehuda disagreed and said to him: No, it is considered a specific denial.

ור' יוחנן אמר תרוייהו לר' מאיר פרטא הוי ואמר ליה רבי יהודה בולא לך מודינא לך בלא לך פליגנא עלך ושמואל עד דאודי ליה אודויי לפלוג עליה איפלוגי And Rabbi Yoḥanan says in response to this inference that the baraita can be explained differently: Both phrases: Nothing of yours, and: And nothing of yours, are deemed specific denials by Rabbi Meir; and Rabbi Yehuda said to him: With regard to: And nothing of yours, I concede to you that it is considered specific. But with regard to: Nothing of yours, I disagree with you and consider it a general denial. And Shmuel would respond: If that is so, then why does Rabbi Yehuda state in the baraita the instance in which he concedes to Rabbi Meir? Instead of conceding, let him disagree and state the instance in which they differ.

ורבי יוחנן דייק ממתניתין מדקאמר ר' מאיר שבועה שאין לכם בידי כללא הוי מכלל דולא לך פרטא הוי דאי סלקא דעתך ולא לך כללא הוה אדמשמע לן שבועה שאין לכם בידי נשמעינן שבועה לא לך ולא לך ולא לך כל שכן שבועה שאין לכם בידי The Gemara proceeds to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: And Rabbi Yoḥanan inferred his explanation from the mishna as follows: From the fact that Rabbi Meir, who is the tanna associated with unattributed statements in the Mishna, says: If he addressed all of the claimants and said: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, it is deemed a general denial, one may conclude by inference that a denial phrased: And nothing of yours, is deemed specific. As if it would enter your mind that Rabbi Meir also deems: And nothing of yours, to be a general denial, then instead of teaching us that when one states in the plural: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, it is deemed general, let him teach us that when one states: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, it is general, and all the more so it would be clear that when one states in the plural: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, it is considered general.

ושמואל אמר כל האומר ולא לך כאומר שבועה שאין לכם בידי דמי And Shmuel says that one may interpret the statement of Rabbi Meir as follows: Anyone who says: And nothing of yours, is considered as though he says in the plural: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession.

תנן לא לך ולא לך ולא לך תני לא לך The Gemara attempts to bring a proof for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: We learned in the mishna that if the defendant said: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, and nothing of yours, and nothing of yours, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim that he falsely denied. Evidently, Rabbi Meir deems: And nothing of yours, to be specific. The Gemara rejects the proof: Emend the language of the mishna and teach: Nothing of yours, nothing of yours, nothing of yours.

ת"ש תן לי פקדון ותשומת יד וגזל ואבידה תני תשומת יד גזל אבידה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an additional proof from that which is taught in the mishna: In a case where the claimant says: Give me back my deposit, and pledge, and stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, and the defendant responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your deposit, or pledge, or stolen item, or lost item, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Evidently, by using the conjunction: Or, Rabbi Meir deems the denials specific, counter to the explanation of Shmuel. The Gemara rejects the proof: Emend the language of the mishna and teach: On my oath you do not have a deposit, a pledge, a stolen item, a lost item, in my possession.

ת"ש תן לי חטין ושעורין וכוסמין תני שעורין כוסמין The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: In a case where the claimant said: Give me back my wheat, and barley, and spelt that are in your possession, if the defendant responds: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession, he is liable for only one false oath. But if he responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your wheat, or barley, or spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. The mishna is therefore counter to the explanation of Shmuel. The Gemara rejects the proof: Again, emend the language of the mishna and teach: Wheat, barley, spelt, without the conjunction: Or.

והאי תנא כל הכי שביש תני ואזיל אלא הא מני רבי היא דאמר לא שנא כזית כזית ולא שנא כזית וכזית פרטא הוי The Gemara asks: But could it be that this tanna errs so much as he teaches the mishna? The Gemara offers an alternative explanation: According to Shmuel, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: There is no difference if one says: An olive-bulk an olive-bulk, and there is no difference if one says: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk; both are considered specific formulations.

תא שמע מדידיה ר' מאיר אומר אפילו חטה ושעורה וכוסמת חייב על כל אחת ואחת תני חטה שעורה כוסמת The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from Rabbi Meir’s own statement in the mishna: Rabbi Meir says: Even if the defendant says: On my oath I do not have in my possession your grain of wheat, or grain of barley, or grain of spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Clearly, the conjunction: Or, renders the denial specific according to Rabbi Meir, counter to the explanation of Shmuel. The Gemara rejects the proof: Emend the language of the mishna and teach: On my oath I do not have in my possession a grain of wheat, a grain of barley, a grain of spelt of yours.

מאי אפילו אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אפילו חטה בכלל חטין ושעורה בכלל שעורין וכוסמת בכלל כוסמין: The Gemara explains: What novelty is there in a case where one takes an oath in this manner, that Rabbi Meir says: Even? Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: Even the singular form for wheat includes much wheat, and the singular form for barley includes much barley, and the singular form for spelt includes much spelt, i.e., although the defendant refers to the grains in the singular, his denial is referring to all wheat, all barley, and all spelt.

תן לי פקדון ותשומת יד גזל ואבידה שיש לי בידך כו': תן לי חטין ושעורין א"ר יוחנן פרוטה מכולם מצטרפת § The mishna teaches: Give me back my deposit, and pledge, stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, etc. If the claimant said: Give me back my wheat and barley, and spelt, and the defendant responds: On my oath I do not have in my possession your wheat, or barley, or spelt, he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If all of the wheat, barley, and spelt were collectively worth at least one peruta, then even if each type of grain was worth less than one peruta, their total value combines to render him liable.

פליגי בה רב אחא ורבינא חד אמר אפרטי מיחייב אכללי לא מיחייב וחד אמר אכללי נמי מיחייב Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to the ruling of the mishna. One says that when the mishna teaches that one is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim, it means that he is liable for the three specific denials of wheat, barley, and spelt, and he must bring three separate offerings; but he is not liable for the general oath taken at the beginning of his denial, i.e., when he said: On my oath I do not have in my possession. Accordingly, the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan was said with regard to the previous case in the mishna, where the defendant said: On my oath I do not have in my possession. And one says that he is liable also for the general oath taken at the beginning of his denial, so that the defendant is liable to bring a total of four offerings. Accordingly, even if the grains were worth only one peruta collectively and the defendant is not liable for any of the specific oaths, the defendant remains liable to bring an offering for the general oath according to Rabbi Yoḥanan.

והתני ר' חייא הרי כאן חמש עשרה חטאות ואם איתא עשרים הויין האי תנא דפרטי קא חשיב דכללי לא קא חשיב The Gemara questions the second opinion: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach in a baraita: If five people claimed from one defendant wheat, barley, and spelt, and the defendant took an oath denying each claim of each claimant, there are then fifteen sin-offerings here that the defendant is liable to bring? And if it is so that the defendant is liable for the general oath as well, there would be a total of twenty sin-offerings that he is liable to bring. The Gemara responds: That tanna calculated the defendant’s liability for the specific oaths; he did not calculate the defendant’s liability for the general oaths.

והא תני רבי חייא הרי כאן עשרים חטאות ההיא אפקדון ותשומת יד וגזל ואבידה The Gemara now questions the first opinion: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach in a different baraita: There are twenty sin-offerings here? Evidently, Rabbi Ḥiyya does calculate the general oaths. The Gemara responds: That baraita does not count the general oaths either; rather, it is referring to a different case entirely, where each of the five claimants claimed from the defendant a deposit and a pledge and a stolen item and a lost item.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן היו חמשה תובעין אותו ואמרו לו תן לנו פקדון תשומת יד וגזל ואבידה שיש לנו בידך אמר לאחד מהן שבועה שאין לך בידי פקדון תשומת יד גזל ואבידה ולא לך ולא לך ולא לך ולא לך מהו אחדא מיחייב Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: In a case where five people were suing another and they said to him: Give us back our deposit, pledge, and stolen item, and lost item that are in your possession, and the defendant said to one of them: On my oath your deposit, pledge, stolen item, and lost item are not in my possession, and neither are yours, and neither are yours, and neither are yours, and neither are yours, what is the halakha? Is he liable for only one oath for each of the four claimants to whom he said: And neither are yours, since these are considered general oaths?

Daf 38b

או דלמא אכל חדא וחדא מיחייב Or perhaps he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim made by each claimant.

תא שמע דתני רבי חייא הרי כאן עשרים חטאות היכי דמי אי דפריש רבי חייא מנינא אתא לאשמועינן אלא לאו דלא פריש ושמע מינה פרטא הוי: The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in a baraita: There are twenty sin-offerings here that the defendant must bring. The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of the baraita? If the defendant specified each claim of each of the claimants in his oath, does Rabbi Ḥiyya come to teach us a number? Obviously, the defendant is liable to bring twenty offerings. Rather, is it not that the baraita is referring to a case where he did not specify an oath to each claimant, but he specified it to the first claimant and said: And neither are yours, to each of the remaining claimants? And therefore, conclude from the baraita that such a denial is considered specific.

אנסת ופתית את בתי כו': אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן מאי טעמא דרבי שמעון הואיל ועיקר קנס הוא תובע § The mishna teaches that if one accuses another: You raped or you seduced my daughter, and the other says: I did not rape and I did not seduce your daughter, to which the father replied: I administer an oath to you, and the defendant said: Amen, the defendant is liable to bring a guilt-offering if it is false oath, and Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from liability for a false oath on a deposit. The reason is that the payment for rape or seduction is a fine, and one does not pay a fine based on his own admission; therefore, he is also exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for having taken a false oath. The Rabbis hold that he is liable since he would have been liable to pay compensation for humiliation and degradation resulting from her being raped or seduced, which are monetary claims. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon holds that since the father is primarily claiming the fine and his claim to the other payments is secondary, the defendant is exempt from liability.

אמר רבא משל דרבי שמעון למה הדבר דומה לאדם שאמר לחבירו תן לי חטין ושעורין וכוסמין שיש לי בידך אמר לו שבועה שאין לך בידי חטין ואשתכח דחטין הוא דלית ליה הא שעורין וכוסמין אית ליה דפטור דכי אשתבע אחטין אקושטא משתבע Rava says: To what case is this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon compared? It is compared to a case where a person said to another: Give me back my wheat and barley and spelt that are in your possession, and the other said to him: On my oath your wheat is not in my possession; and it was then discovered that it was only wheat that he did not have, but he did have the claimant’s barley and spelt. In that case, the halakha is that he is exempt from liability for an oath on a deposit, as when he took an oath with regard to the wheat, he took a truthful oath.

אמר ליה אביי מי דמי התם בחטין קא כפר ליה בשעורין וכוסמין לא קא כפר ליה הכא בכולה מילתא הוא דקא כפר ליה הא לא דמיא אלא לאומר לחבירו תן לי חטין ושעורין וכוסמין שיש לי בידך שבועה שאין לך בידי כלל ואשתכח חטין הוא דלית ליה הא שעורין וכוסמין אית ליה דמיחייב Abaye said to Rava: Are the two cases comparable? There, in the case of the grain, the defendant denies only the other’s claim of wheat, but he does not deny his claim of barley and spelt. Here, the defendant denies the entire matter, as he claims that he never raped or seduced the man’s daughter. Rather, this explanation is comparable only to a case where one said to another: Give me back my wheat and barley and spelt that are in your possession, and the defendant said to him: On my oath nothing of yours is in my possession at all, and it was then discovered that it was only wheat that he did not have, but he did have the claimant’s barley and spelt. In that case, the halakha is that he is liable for an oath on a deposit. This, then, cannot be the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, as he exempts the defendant from liability.

אלא כי אתא רבין אמר רבי יוחנן לדברי רבן שמעון קנס הוא תובע ולא בושת ופגם לדברי חכמים אף בושת ופגם הוא תובע במאי קא מיפלגי אמר רב פפא ר"ש סבר לא שביק איניש מידי דקיץ ותבע מידי דלא קיץ ורבנן סברי לא שביק מידי דכי מודה ביה לא מיפטר ותבע מידי דכי מודה ביה מיפטר: Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: According to the statement of Rabban Shimon, the father is claiming only the fine and not the compensation for humiliation and degradation resulting from his daughter’s having been raped or seduced. According to the statement of the Rabbis, he is also claiming payment for humiliation and degradation resulting from her having been raped or seduced. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon holds: A person does not forgo a claim to something with a fixed value, such as a fine, and claim something whose value is not fixed and requires an appraisal, such as humiliation and degradation resulting from being raped or seduced. And the Rabbis hold that one does not forgo a claim to something that the defendant is not exempt from paying if he admits his guilt, and claim something that the defendant is exempt from paying if he admits his guilt, such as a fine.

הדרן עלך שבועת הפקדון:

מתני׳ שבועת הדיינין הטענה שתי כסף וההודאה בשוה פרוטה ואם אין ההודאה ממין הטענה פטור MISHNA: By Torah law, the oath imposed by the judges upon one who admits to part of a claim is administered only when the claim is for the value of at least two silver ma’a, and the defendant’s admission is for the value of at least one peruta. And furthermore, if the admission is not of the same type as the claim, i.e., the defendant admitted to a debt that the claimant did not claim, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath.

כיצד שתי כסף לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא פרוטה פטור שתי כסף ופרוטה לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא פרוטה חייב How so? If the claimant said to the defendant: I have two silver ma’a in your possession, and the latter responded: You have only one peruta, a coin made from copper, in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath (see 39b). But if the claimant said: I have two silver ma’a and one peruta in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only one peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath.

מנה לי בידך אין לך בידי פטור מנה לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא חמשים דינר חייב If the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt, as he denies the entire claim. But if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim.

מנה לאבא בידך אין לך בידי אלא נ' דינר פטור מפני שהוא כמשיב אבידה If the claimant said: My late father had one hundred dinars in your possession, and I am now claiming them, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as he is like one returning a lost item, since he could have easily denied the entire claim.

מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן למחר אמר לו תנהו לי נתתיו לך פטור אין לך בידי חייב § The mishna discusses other cases where the defendant denies an entire claim. In a case where one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, I acknowledge that claim; and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. But if he responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, i.e., he denies that a debt ever existed, he is liable to pay, as he already admitted that he owed him the amount.

מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן אל תתנהו לי אלא בעדים למחר אמר לו תנהו לי נתתיו לך חייב מפני שצריך ליתנו בעדים In a case where the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant said to him: Yes, to which the claimant responded: Give the money to me only in the presence of witnesses, then if the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is liable to pay, as he is required to give it to him in the presence of witnesses, and he cannot prove that he did so.

ליטרא זהב יש לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא ליטרא כסף פטור דינר זהב יש לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא דינר כסף וטריסית ופונדיות ופרוטה חייב שהכל מין מטבע אחת § The mishna resumes discussion of the oath imposed by the court in a case where the defendant admits to a part of a claim. If the claimant said: I have a litra, i.e., a specific weight, of gold in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a litra of silver in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as his admission relates to a different item than that which the claim relates to. But if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit, or a pundeyon, or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Since the claim concerns money, the difference between the different types of coins is disregarded, as the claim is essentially referring to the monetary value, not to a specific type of coin.

כור תבואה לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא לתך קטנית פטור כור פירות לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא לתך קטנית חייב שהקטנית בכלל פירות If the claimant said: I have a kor of grain in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half-kor of legumes in my possession, he is exempt. But if the claimant said: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a half-kor of legumes in my possession, he is liable, as legumes are included in produce.

טענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין פטור ורבן גמליאל מחייב If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. According to Rabban Gamliel, one who admits to a part of the claim is liable to take an oath even if the admission is not of the same type as the claim.

הטוען לחבירו בכדי שמן והודה לו בקנקנים אדמון אומר הואיל והודה לו מקצת ממין הטענה ישבע וחכמים אומרים אין ההודאה ממין הטענה אמר רבן גמליאל רואה אני את דברי אדמון With regard to one who claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter then admitted that he owes him pitchers, i.e., the jugs themselves, but not the oil, Admon says: Since he admitted to him with regard to a part of the claim, and his admission was of the same type as the claim, i.e., the claim included both containers and oil and he admitted to owing him containers, he must take an oath. And the Rabbis say: The partial admission in this case is not of the same type as the claim, as he completely denied owing him oil. Rabban Gamliel said: I see the statement of Admon as correct.

טענו כלים וקרקעות והודה בכלים וכפר בקרקעות בקרקעות וכפר בכלים פטור הודה במקצת הקרקעות פטור במקצת הכלים חייב שהנכסים שאין להן אחריות זוקקין את הנכסים שיש להן אחריות לישבע עליהן If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath, as oaths are not taken concerning claims involving land. If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the entire claim, as property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., movable property, binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that the oath about the movable property can be extended to require him to take an oath concerning the land as well.

אין נשבעין על טענת חרש שוטה וקטן ואין משביעין את הקטן אבל נשבעין לקטן ולהקדש: One does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor. And the court does not administer an oath to a minor. But one does take an oath to a minor, or to a representative of the Temple treasury with regard to consecrated property.

גמ׳ היכי משבעינן ליה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב משביעין אותו בשבועה האמורה בתורה דכתיב (בראשית כד, ג) ואשביעך בה' אלהי השמים GEMARA: How does the court administer an oath to someone who is liable to take an oath? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The court administers to him the oath stated in the Torah, as it is written in Abraham’s instruction to his servant: “And I will make you swear by the Lord, the God of heaven” (Genesis 24:3).

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי כמאן כרבי חנינא בר אידי דאמר בעינן שם המיוחד Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In accordance with whose opinion is Rav’s statement? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Idi, who says that when one is liable to take an oath, we require him to take it using the ineffable name of God?

אמר ליה אפי' תימא רבנן דאמרי בכינוי ונפקא מינה צריך לאתפושי חפצא בידיה Rav Ashi said to him: You may even say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that one is merely required to take an oath using an appellation of God. And the practical ramification of Rav’s statement is that just as in the aforementioned verse, Abraham said: “Please put your hand under my thigh, and I will make you swear” (Genesis 24:2–3), instructing his servant to grasp his circumcised penis, which is considered sacred to some degree, so too, in oaths administered by the court, one must grasp a sacred item in his hand while taking the oath.

וכדרבא דאמר רבא האי דיינא דאשבע בה' אלהי השמים נעשה כמי שטעה בדבר משנה וחוזר ואמר רב פפא האי דיינא דאשבע בתפלין נעשה כמי שטעה בדבר משנה וחוזר And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rava; as Rava said: This judge who administers an oath “by the Lord, the God of heaven,” without instructing the litigant to grasp a sacred item, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath. And Rav Pappa said: This judge who administers an oath in which the litigant grasps phylacteries, not a Torah scroll, is considered like one who made a mistake with regard to a matter that appears in the Mishna; in which case his ruling is revoked, and the litigant must repeat the oath.

והלכתא כוותיה דרבא ולית הלכתא כוותיה דרב פפא הלכתא כוותיה דרבא דהא לא נקיט חפצא בידיה ולית הלכתא כוותיה דרב פפא דהא נקיט חפצא בידיה The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, but the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava that if the litigant merely took an oath using the ineffable name of God, he is required to take another oath, as he was not grasping any sacred item in his hand; but the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, that if the litigant was grasping phylacteries he is required to take another oath, as he was grasping a sacred item in his hand, even though it was not a Torah scroll.

שבועה מעומד תלמיד חכם מיושב שבועה בספר תורה תלמיד חכם לכתחלה בתפלין One takes an oath while standing, but a Torah scholar takes an oath while sitting. One takes an oath grasping a Torah scroll ab initio, but a Torah scholar may take an oath grasping phylacteries ab initio.

ת"ר שבועת הדיינין אף היא בלשונה נאמרה § The Sages taught in a baraita: An oath imposed by the judges may also be recited in its language, i.e., in any language spoken by the one taking the oath. It is not required that the oath be in Hebrew.

אומרים לו הוי יודע Before he takes the oath, the judges say to him: Be aware

Daf 38b

או דלמא אכל חדא וחדא מיחייב Or perhaps he is liable for his oath concerning each and every claim made by each claimant.

הדרן עלך שבועת הפקדון:

אומרים לו הוי יודע Before he takes the oath, the judges say to him: Be aware

Daf 39a

שכל העולם כולו נזדעזע בשעה שאמר הקב"ה בסיני (שמות כ, ו) לא תשא את שם ה' אלהיך לשוא that the entire world trembled when the Holy One, Blessed be He, said at Mount Sinai: “You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain, for the Lord will not hold guiltless one who takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7).

וכל עבירות שבתורה נאמר בהן ונקה וכאן נאמר לא ינקה וכל עבירות שבתורה נפרעין ממנו וכאן ממנו וממשפחתו שנאמר (קהלת ה, ה) אל תתן את פיך לחטיא את בשרך ואין בשרו אלא קרובו שנאמר (ישעיהו נח, ז) ומבשרך לא תתעלם And be aware that with regard to all of the other transgressions in the Torah it is stated: “And will…clear the guilty [venakkeh]” (Exodus 34:7); whereas here, with regard to taking a false oath, it is stated: “Will not hold guiltless [lo yenakkeh].” And be aware that with regard to all of the other transgressions in the Torah, punishment is exacted only from the transgressor, whereas here, punishment is exacted from him and from his family, as it is stated: “Do not allow your mouth to bring your flesh into guilt” (Ecclesiastes 5:5). The verse indicates that one who sins with his mouth, by taking a false oath, causes his flesh to be punished as well; and one’s flesh is nothing other than his relative, as it is stated: “And that you not hide yourself from your own flesh” (Isaiah 58:7).

וכל עבירות שבתורה נפרעין ממנו וכאן ממנו ומכל העולם כולו שנאמר (הושע ד, ב) אלה וכחש And be aware that with regard to all of the other transgressions in the Torah, punishment is exacted only from the transgressor; whereas here, punishment is exacted from him and from the entire world, as it is stated: “Swearing, and lying, and murdering, and stealing, and committing adultery, they break all bounds…Therefore, the land mourns, and everyone who dwells therein languishes” (Hosea 4:2–3).

ואימא עד דעביד להו לכולהו לא ס"ד דכתיב (ירמיהו כג, י) מפני אלה אבלה הארץ וכתיב (הושע ד, ג) על כן תאבל הארץ ואומלל כל יושב בה The Gemara suggests: And why not say that punishment is not exacted from the entire world unless he commits all of the sins mentioned in the verse? The Gemara answers: This should not enter your mind, as it is written: “Because of swearing the land mourns” (Jeremiah 23:10), indicating that taking a false oath is sufficient to cause the land to mourn. And it is similarly written in the verse in Hosea: “Therefore, the land mourns, and everyone who dwells therein languishes.” Both verses employ a term of mourning.

וכל עבירות שבתורה אם יש לו זכות תולין לו שנים ושלשה דורות וכאן נפרעין ממנו לאלתר שנאמר (זכריה ה, ד) הוצאתיה נאם ה' צבאות ובאה אל בית הגנב ואל בית הנשבע בשמי לשקר ולנה בתוך ביתו וכלתו ואת עציו ואת אבניו The baraita continues with the judges’ forewarning: And be aware that with regard to all the other transgressions in the Torah, if the transgressor has merit, God suspends his punishment for two or three generations, and only if his descendants follow in his ways are they punished. Whereas here, punishment is exacted from him immediately, as it is stated: “This is the curse that goes forth over the face of the whole land…I cause it to go forth, says the Lord of hosts, and it shall enter into the house of the thief, and into the house of he who swears falsely by My name; and it shall abide in the midst of his house and shall consume it, with its timber and its stones” (Zechariah 5:3–4).

הוצאתיה לאלתר ובאה אל בית הגנב זה הגונב דעת הבריות שאין לו ממון אצל חבירו וטוענו ומשביעו ואל בית הנשבע בשמי לשקר כמשמעו ולנה בתוך ביתו וכלתו ואת עציו ואת אבניו הא למדת דברים שאין אש ומים מכלין אותן שבועת שקר מכלה אותן The baraita analyzes the verse: “I cause it to go forth” means immediately. “And it shall enter into the house of the thief”; this is referring to one who deceives people, e.g., one who has no money in the possession of another, but claims money from him and administers an oath to him in court, thereby causing an oath to be taken in vain. “And into the house of he who swears falsely by My name” is as it indicates, in accordance with its straightforward meaning. From the end of the verse: “And it shall abide in the midst of his house and shall consume it, with its timber and its stones,” you have therefore learned that a false oath consumes things that even fire and water do not consume, such as stones.

אם אמר איני נשבע פוטרין אותו מיד ואם אמר הריני נשבע העומדין שם אומרים זה לזה (במדבר טז, כו) סורו נא מעל אהלי האנשים הרשעים האלה וגו' וכשמשביעין אותו אומרים לו הוי יודע שלא על דעתך אנו משביעין אותך אלא על דעת המקום ועל דעת ב"ד The baraita continues: If the defendant says at this point: I will not take an oath, the court dismisses him immediately, and rules him liable to pay. And if he says: I will take an oath, the people standing there say to each other: “Depart, I pray you, from the tents of these wicked men, and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be swept away in all their sins” (Numbers 16:26). And when the judges administer the oath to him, they say to him: Be aware that we administer an oath to you not according to your understanding of the oath, but according to the objective understanding of the Omnipresent and according to the understanding of the court, i.e., the judges’ intention.

שכן מצינו במשה רבינו כשהשביע את ישראל אמר להן דעו שלא על דעתכם אני משביע אתכם אלא על דעת המקום ועל דעתי שנאמר (דברים כט, יג) ולא אתכם לבדכם וגו' This is as we have found written with regard to Moses, our teacher. When he administered an oath to the Jewish people in the plains of Moab so that they would accept the Torah upon themselves, he said to them: Know that it is not according to your understanding that I administer an oath to you, but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to my understanding. As it is stated: “Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath” (Deuteronomy 29:13), which is homiletically interpreted to mean: Not only according to your intention.

כי את אשר ישנו פה אין לי אלא אותן העומדין על הר סיני דורות הבאים וגרים העתידין להתגייר מנין ת"ל (דברים כט, יד) ואת אשר איננו Having quoted a verse, the baraita tangentially interprets the subsequent verse. From the phrase: “But with he who stands here with us this day” (Deuteronomy 29:14), I have derived only that those who stood at Mount Sinai were included in this covenant. From where do I derive that the subsequent generations, and the converts who will convert in the future, were also included? The verse states: “And also with he who is not here with us this day” (Deuteronomy 29:14).

ואין לי אלא מצוה שקיבלו עליהם מהר סיני מצות העתידות להתחדש כגון מקרא מגילה מנין ת"ל (אסתר ט, כז) קימו וקבלו קיימו מה שקבלו כבר And I have derived only that the mitzvot that the Jewish people accepted upon themselves at Mount Sinai were included in the oath. From where is it derived that mitzvot that were to be initiated in the future, for example, the reading of the Megilla, the Scroll of Esther, on Purim, were also included? The verse states: “The Jews ordained and took upon themselves…that they would keep these two days” (Esther 9:27), which is homiletically interpreted to mean: They ordained, in the generation of Esther, mitzvot that they had already accepted upon themselves by oath in the plains of Moab.

מאי אף היא בלשונה נאמרה § The Gemara analyzes the baraita. What is the precise meaning of the statement: An oath imposed by the judges may also be recited in its language?

כדתנן אלו נאמרין בכל לשון פרשת סוטה וידוי מעשר קריאת שמע ותפלה וברכת המזון ושבועת העדות ושבועת הפקדון וקאמר נמי שבועת הדיינין אף היא בלשונה נאמרה The Gemara answers: It is as we learned in a mishna (Sota 32a): These are recited in any language and it is not required that they be recited in Hebrew: The portion of the warning and the oath administered by the priest to a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota]; the declaration of tithes, which occurs after the third and the sixth year of the seven-year Sabbatical cycle, when one declares that he has given his tithes appropriately; the recitation of Shema; and the Amida prayer; and Grace after Meals; and the oath of testimony, where one takes an oath that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue; and the oath on a deposit, where one takes an oath that he does not have possession of another’s deposit. All these may be recited in any language. And the baraita also states, as an addendum to this halakha, that an oath imposed by the judges may also be recited in its language, i.e., in any language.

אמר מר אומרין לו הוי יודע שכל העולם כולו נזדעזע בשעה שאמר הקב"ה לא תשא את שם ה' אלהיך לשוא מ"ט אילימא משום דאתיהב בסיני עשר דברות נמי אתיהב § The Master said in the baraita above that the judges say to him: Be aware that the entire world trembled when the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: “You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain.” What is the reason that the entire world trembled? If we say it was because this prohibition was given at Mount Sinai, this is difficult, as when the entire world trembled, the rest of the Ten Commandments were also given at Mount Sinai. This quality is not unique to this specific prohibition.

ואלא משום דחמירא ומי חמירא והתנן אלו הן קלות עשה ולא תעשה חוץ מלא תשא חמורות זו כריתות ומיתות ב"ד ולא תשא עמהן And if it is rather due to the fact that this prohibition is severe, is it more severe than all the other prohibitions? But didn’t we learn in a baraita: These are minor transgressions: Violation of an ordinary positive mitzva and an ordinary negative mitzva, except for: “You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain.” And these are major transgressions: Those for which one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] or a court-imposed death penalty; and “You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain” is also among them. Evidently, this transgression is no more severe than transgressions that incur karet or the death penalty.

אלא כדקתני טעמא וכל עבירות שבתורה נאמר בהן ונקה וכאן נאמר לא ינקה Rather, the reason the world trembled particularly when this prohibition was given is as it is taught subsequently in the baraita: And with regard to all of the other transgressions in the Torah it is stated: “And will…clear the guilty,” whereas here, it is stated: “Will not hold guiltless.”

וכל עבירות שבתורה לא נאמר בהן לא ינקה והכתיב (שמות לד, ז) ונקה לא ינקה The Gemara asks: And is it not stated with regard to all of the other transgressions in the Torah that God “will not hold guiltless [lo yenakkeh]” one who transgresses? But isn’t it written: “And Who will by no means clear the guilty [venakkeh lo yenakkeh]” (Exodus 34:7)?

ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדרבי אלעזר דתניא רבי אלעזר אומר אי אפשר לומר ונקה שכבר נאמר לא ינקה א"א לומר לא ינקה שכבר נאמר ונקה הא כיצד מנקה הוא לשבים ואינו מנקה לשאינן שבים The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for that which is derived through the homiletic interpretation of Rabbi Elazar, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar says: It is not possible to say: And will clear the guilty [venakkeh], about all transgressions, since: Will not clear the guilty [lo yenakkeh], is already stated. And it is not possible to say: Will not clear the guilty [lo yenakkeh], since: And will clear the guilty [venakkeh], is already stated. How can these texts be reconciled? The Holy One, Blessed be He, clears those guilty ones who repent and does not clear those who do not repent.

כל עבירות שבתורה נפרעין ממנו וכאן ממנו וממשפחתו וכל עבירות שבתורה ממשפחתו לא § It is stated in the baraita that with regard to all of the transgressions in the Torah, punishment is exacted only from the transgressor, whereas here, punishment is exacted from him and from his family. The Gemara asks: And is punishment not exacted from the transgressor’s family with regard to all of the other transgressions in the Torah?

והכתיב (ויקרא כ, ה) ושמתי אני את פני באיש ההוא ובמשפחתו ותניא אמר ר"ש אם הוא חטא משפחתו מה חטאת לומר לך אין לך משפחה שיש בה מוכס שאין כולה מוכסין ושיש בה לסטים שאין כולה לסטים מפני שמחפין עליו But isn’t it written in the Torah with regard to one who worships Molech: “Then I will set My face against that man, and against his family, and I will cut him off” (Leviticus 20:5)? And it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said: If he sinned, how did his family sin? Why are they punished? This serves to tell you that there is no family that has an unauthorized tax collector among them in which all of the family members are not regarded as unauthorized tax collectors, and similarly, there is no family that has a bandit [listim] among them in which all of the family members are not regarded as bandits. This is because they cover for him. Evidently, punishment is exacted from the transgressor’s family with regard to transgressions other than taking a false oath.

התם בדינא אחרינא הכא בדינא דידיה כדתניא רבי אומר והכרתי אותו מה ת"ל לפי שנאמר ושמתי אני את פני יכול כל המשפחה כולה בהיכרת ת"ל אותו אותו בהיכרת ולא כל המשפחה כולה בהיכרת The Gemara answers: There, with regard to other transgressions, the transgressor’s family is punished with another punishment, less severe than the one the transgressor receives, whereas here, with regard to a false oath, the transgressor’s family is punished with his punishment. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Why must the verse state with regard to one who worships Molech: “And I will cut him off”? Since it is stated earlier in the verse: “Then I will set My face against that man, and against his family,” one might have thought that the entire family is liable to be punished with karet. Therefore, the verse states: “And I will cut him off,” indicating that only he is liable to be punished with karet, whereas his entire family is not liable to be punished with karet.

וכל עבירות שבתורה נפרעין ממנו וכאן ממנו ומכל העולם כולו (שנאמר אלה וכחש וכתיב על כן תאבל הארץ ואימא עד דעביד להו לכולהו לא ס"ד דכתיב מפני אלה אבלה הארץ) § The baraita teaches: And with regard to all of the other transgressions in the Torah, punishment is exacted only from him, whereas here, punishment is exacted from him and from the entire world, as it is stated: “Swearing and lying, and murdering, and stealing, and committing adultery,” and it is written: “Therefore, the land mourns.” The Gemara suggests: And why not say that punishment is not exacted from the entire world unless he commits all the sins mentioned in the verse? The Gemara answers: This should not enter your mind, as it is written: “Because of swearing the land mourns” (Jeremiah 23:10), indicating that a false oath is sufficient to cause the land to mourn.

וכל עבירות שבתורה מכל העולם לא והכתיב (ויקרא כו, לז) וכשלו איש באחיו איש בעון אחיו מלמד שכל ישראל ערבים זה בזה The Gemara asks: And with regard to all of the other transgressions in the Torah, is punishment not exacted from the entire world? But isn’t it written: “And they shall stumble one upon another” (Leviticus 26:37)? This verse is homiletically interpreted to mean that they shall stumble spiritually, one due to the iniquity of another, which teaches that the entire Jewish people are considered guarantors for one another. Apparently, any transgression makes the entire world liable to be punished.

Daf 39b

התם שיש בידם למחות ולא מיחו The Gemara answers: There, in that verse, the reference is to a case where the others had the ability to protest the transgression, and nevertheless, they did not protest. By contrast, when one takes a false oath, the entire world is punished, even those who were not able to protest.

מאי איכא בין רשעים דמשפחתו לרשעים דעלמא בין צדיקים דמשפחתו לצדיקים דעלמא The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the punishment of the wicked people in a transgressor’s family and the punishment of the other wicked people of the world, and between the punishment of the righteous people in his family and the punishment of the other righteous people of the world?

הוא בשאר עבירות בדיניה ורשעים דמשפחה בדין חמור ורשעים דעלמא בדין הקל צדיקי דהכא והכא פטירי The Gemara answers: With regard to other transgressions, the transgressor himself is punished with his own punishment, i.e., that which is written in the Torah for that transgression. And the wicked people of his family, who covered for him, are punished with another severe punishment, and the wicked people of the rest of the world, who refrained from protesting his action, are punished with a light punishment. The righteous people both here and here, i.e., both his family members who did not cover for him, and others who were not able to protest his action, are exempt from punishment.

גבי שבועה הוא ורשעים דמשפחה כדיניה ורשעים דעלמא בדין חמור וצדיקי דהכא והכא בדין הקל: With regard to one who takes a false oath, by contrast, he and the wicked people of his family are all punished with his punishment, i.e., they receive the same punishment he does. And the wicked people of the rest of the world, who refrained from protesting his action, are punished with a severe punishment, and the righteous people both here, in his family, and here, in the rest of the world, are punished with a light punishment, even though they did not behave inappropriately. Accordingly, the consequences of taking a false oath are more severe than those of other transgressions.

אם אמר איני נשבע פוטרין אותו מיד ואם אמר הריני נשבע העומדים שם אומרים זה לזה (במדבר טז, כו) סורו נא מעל אהלי האנשים הרשעים האלה: בשלמא ההוא דקא משתבע קאי באיסורא אלא ההוא דקא משבע ליה אמאי § The baraita states: If the defendant says: I will not take an oath, the court dismisses him immediately, and rules him liable to pay. And if he says: I will take an oath, the people standing there say to each other: “Depart, I pray you, from the tents of these wicked men.” The Gemara asks: Granted that one who is taking the oath stands to transgress the prohibition against taking a false oath; but why is the one administering the oath to him, i.e., the claimant, considered a wicked man?

ההוא מיבעי ליה כדתניא ר"ש בן טרפון אומר (שמות כב, י) שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם מלמד שחלה שבועה על שניהם: The Gemara answers: That designation is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Tarfon says that the verse: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both” (Exodus 22:10), teaches that the punishment for a false oath applies to both the one who took the oath and the one who administered it to him.

וכשמשביעין אותו אומרים לו הוי יודע שלא על דעתך וכו': למה לי למימרא ליה הכי משום קניא דרבא: § The baraita states: And when the judges administer the oath to him, they say to him: Be aware that we administer an oath to you not according to your understanding, but according to the understanding of the Omnipresent and according to the understanding of the court. The Gemara explains: Why does the court need to say this to him? It is due to deceptions like that of the reed in Rava’s court, where the defendant secretly inserted into a hollow reed the money he owed and gave it to the claimant to hold for him, whereupon he took an oath that he had already given him the money. He then took back the reed, as the claimant was unaware of its contents. In this way, he was able to state an oath that was technically true, although he was guilty of deception. To prevent this, the court stipulates that the oath must be true according to the court’s understanding.

הטענה שתי כסף: אמר רב כפירת טענה שתי כסף ושמואל אמר טענה עצמה שתי כסף אפי' לא כפר אלא בפרוטה ולא הודה אלא בפרוטה חייב § The mishna teaches that the court administers an oath to one who admits to part of a claim only when the claim is for at least the value of two silver ma’a. Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the exact meaning of this statement. Rav says that the denial of the claim must be at least the value of two silver ma’a. And Shmuel says that the claim itself must be at least the value of two silver ma’a; i.e., even if the defendant denied only one peruta of the claim, or conversely, if he admitted to only one peruta of the two-ma’a claim, he is liable to take an oath.

אמר רבא דיקא מתניתין כותיה דרב וקראי כותיה דשמואל דיקא מתני' כותיה דרב דקתני הטענה שתי כסף וההודאה שוה פרוטה ואילו כפירת טענה פרוטה לא קתני ותנן נמי ההודאה בפרוטה ואילו כפירה בפרוטה לא קתני Rava said: The language of the mishna is precise in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the biblical verses are precise in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The language of the mishna is precise in accordance with the opinion of Rav, as it teaches: The claim must be for at least the value of two silver ma’a and the admission must be at least the value of one peruta, whereas it does not teach that the minimum denial of the claim is one peruta, indicating that it must be more. And also, we learned in a mishna (Bava Metzia 55a) that the minimum admission to part of a claim that renders one liable to take an oath is the value of one peruta, whereas that mishna does not teach that the minimum denial is the value of one peruta.

וקראי כותיה דשמואל דכתיב (שמות כב, ו) כי יתן איש אל רעהו כסף או כלים לשמור מה כלים שנים אף כסף שנים מה כסף דבר חשוב אף כל דבר חשוב וקאמר רחמנא (שמות כב, ח) כי הוא זה And the verses are precise in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as it is written with regard to the case where an oath is administered due to admission to part of a claim: “If a man delivers to his neighbor silver or vessels to safeguard” (Exodus 22:6). It is derived from the juxtaposition of silver and vessels that just as “vessels,” in the plural, is referring to at least two, so too, “silver” is referring to at least two ma’a of silver. It is derived further that just as silver is an item of substantial value, so too, any item of substantial value is included. And the Merciful One states in the subsequent verses that an oath is administered in a case “where one says: This is it” (Exodus 22:8), i.e., where the defendant admits to only part of the claim of “silver or vessels” and denies the rest of the claim. Evidently, the denial can be for an amount less than two silver ma’a.

ורב ההוא מיבעי ליה להודאה במקצת הטענה ושמואל כתיב הוא וכתיב זה דאי כפר במקצת ואודי במקצת חייב And Rav would respond that the phrase “this is it” is necessary to indicate admission to a part of the claim, but it does not indicate the value being denied, which must be at least two silver ma’a. The Gemara asks: And how does Shmuel derive both halakhot from the verse, namely, that admission to part of a claim is necessary for an oath to be administered, and that the denial can be less than the value of two ma’a? The Gemara answers: It is written: “This is,” and it is written: “It.” The repetition of these similar terms is homiletically interpreted to indicate that if the defendant denied part of the two-ma’a claim and admitted to the other part, he is liable to take an oath.

ורב חד להודאה במקצת הטענה וחד להודאה ממין הטענה ושמואל לאו ממילא שמעת מיניה דחסרה לה טענה And Rav would respond that the repetition should be interpreted differently: One of the two terms is stated to indicate admission of a part of the claim, and the other one is stated to indicate admission of the same type of item as the claim. And Shmuel would respond: Even if you do not accept the derivation from the repetitious words, don’t you derive from this halakha by itself that the denial may be less than two ma’a, since the admission reduces the value of the claim? If the claim was for two ma’a, as derived from the verse, and the defendant admitted to a part of the claim, then the value of denial was clearly less than two ma’a.

אלא אמר לך רב כסף כי אתא מעיקרא לכפירה הוא דאתא דא"כ לכתוב רחמנא כי יתן איש אל רעהו כלים לשמור ואנא אמינא מה כלים שנים אף כל שנים כסף דכתב רחמנא למה לי אם אינו ענין לטענה תנהו ענין לכפירה Rather, Rav could have said to you that when the word “silver” came initially, it came as a source for the value of the denial, not the claim; as if this were not so, if it were meant to refer to the value of the claim, let the Merciful One write in the verse: If a man delivers to his neighbor vessels to safeguard, without mentioning silver, and I would say that just as vessels are at least two, so too, the claim must be for at least two of any item, including coins of silver. Accordingly, why do I need the word “silver” that the Merciful One wrote? Rather, if it is not needed for the matter of the claim, apply it to the matter of the denial, and derive from it that the denial must be at least the value of two silver ma’a.

ושמואל אמר לך אי כתב רחמנא כלים ולא כתב כסף הוה אמינא מאי כלים שנים אף כל שנים אבל דבר חשוב לא בעינן קמ"ל And Shmuel could have said to you that if the Merciful One had written the word “vessels” and had not written the word “silver” I would say that just as vessels are at least two, so too, the claim must be for at least two of any item; but we do not need it to be an item of substantial value. Therefore, the word “silver” teaches us that it must be an item of substantial value, like silver.

תנן שתי כסף יש לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא פרוטה פטור מאי טעמא לאו משום דחסרה לה טענה ותיובתא דשמואל The Gemara attempts to prove Rav’s opinion from the mishna. We learned in the mishna that if the claimant said to the defendant: I have two silver ma’a in your possession, and the latter responded: You have only one copper peruta in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath. What is the reason? Is it not because the amount of the claim that was denied by the defendant was lacking, i.e., was less than, the minimum value of two ma’a? And accordingly, this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel.

אמר לך שמואל מי סברת שוה קתני דוקא קתני מה שטענו לא הודה לו ומה שהודה לו לא טענו The Gemara answers: Shmuel could have said to you: Do you maintain that the case that is taught is one where the claim was for the value of two ma’a? The claim in the case that is taught was specifically for two silver ma’a. The defendant is exempt because the claim was for silver and he admitted to owing one peruta of copper; that which he claimed from him, he did not admit to at all, and that which he admitted to, he had not claimed from him.

אי הכי אימא סיפא שתי כסף ופרוטה יש לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא פרוטה חייב אי אמרת בשלמא שוה משום הכי חייב אלא אי אמרת דוקא אמאי חייב מה שטענו לא הודה לו ומה שהודה לו לא טענו The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause: If the claimant said: I have two silver ma’a and one peruta in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only one peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath. Granted, if you say that the claim was for the value of two ma’a, due to that reason he is liable in this case; unlike the previous case, here the defendant denied a debt of two full ma’a. But if you say the claim was specifically for two silver ma’a and one copper peruta, why is he liable to take an oath? In this case too, that which he claimed from him, he did not admit to at all, and that which he admitted to, he had not claimed from him.

מידי הוא טעמא אלא לשמואל האמר ר"נ אמר שמואל טענו חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחד מהן חייב The Gemara answers: Isn’t this discussion only according to Shmuel? The proof was presented in order to attempt to refute the opinion of Shmuel, and doesn’t Rav Naḥman say that Shmuel says that if one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath? Here too, the claim was for two types of items, silver and copper, and the defendant admitted to owing one of the types, one peruta of copper. Therefore, according to Shmuel he is liable to take an oath.

ה"נ מסתברא מדקתני סיפא ליטרא זהב יש לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא ליטרא כסף פטור אי אמרת בשלמא דוקא קתני משום הכי פטור אלא אי אמרת שוה אמאי פטור ליטרא טובא הוי This, too, stands to reason, from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have a litra of gold in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a litra of silver in my possession, he is exempt. Granted, if you say that the mishna is teaching a case where the claim was specifically for gold, it is due to that reason that he is exempt, as the admission was of a different item from the claim. But if you say the claim was for the value of a litra of gold, why is he exempt? A litra is a large amount, and certainly both the claim and the denial are each worth more than two ma’a.

אלא מדסיפא דוקא רישא נמי דוקא Rather, it is clearly a case where the claim was specifically for two silver ma’a, and from the fact that in the latter clause, the claim was specifically for gold, it should be derived that also in the former clause, the claim was specifically for two ma’a.

לימא תיהוי תיובתא דרב אמר לך רב כולה מתני' שוה וליטרא זהב שאני The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav? The Gemara answers: No, Rav could have said to you that the entire mishna is referring to claims in terms of the value of silver, not actual silver, but the case where the claim was for a litra of gold is different. All of the other cases in the mishna are referring to a certain monetary value, but this case is referring to actual gold, as a litra is not a coin or a monetary unit, but a measurement of weight.

Daf 40a

תדע דקא תני סיפא דינר זהב לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא דינר כסף וטריסית ופונדיון ופרוטה חייב שהכל מין מטבע [אחת] הן א"א בשלמא שוה משום הכי חייב אלא אי אמרת דוקא אמאי חייב The Gemara discusses the basis for Rav’s explanation. Know that the mishna is referring to claims of monetary value, as it teaches in the latter clause that if the claimant said: I have a gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar, or a tereisit, or a pundeyon, or a peruta in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type; they are all coins. Granted, if you say that the claim was for the value of a gold dinar, it is due to that reason that he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim. But if you say that the claim was specifically for a dinar of gold, why is he liable? The claim was for gold, and he admitted to owing silver or copper.

אמר רבי אלעזר בשטענו בדינר מטבעות וקא משמע לן דפרוטה בכלל מטבע איתא דיקא נמי דקתני שהכל מין מטבע אחת The Gemara rejects this proof: Rabbi Elazar says: This mishna is referring to a case where one claimed that the defendant owes him a dinar of coins, i.e., coins worth a dinar. The claim was for specific coins, and not a monetary value. Since the claim concerned coins and not a specific weight of metal, and all coins are used for commercial transactions, all types of coins are considered of the same type. And it teaches us that a peruta is included in the category of a coin. According to this explanation, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: The defendant is liable to take an oath, as they are all of one type [min]; they are all coins. In other words, even a peruta is a type of coin.

ורב שהכל דין מטבע אחת The Gemara asks: And how would Rav, who holds that the claim in this case was for the value of a dinar, explain the fact that the mishna states: As they are all of one type; they are all coins? Why does it matter that they are all of one type? The Gemara answers that according to Rav, the reason the defendant is liable to take an oath is that because the claim is for the value of a dinar, all descriptions of monetary value based on different coins have one status under halakha [din]; they are all coins, and it is of no significance that they are made of different materials.

ורבי אלעזר לימא מדסיפא כשמואל מתרץ רישא נמי כשמואל סבירא ליה The Gemara asks: And concerning the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, shall we say that since he explains the latter clause in the mishna as referring to a specific item and not a value, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, then also with regard to the former clause, that states the claim must be for two silver ma’a, he apparently holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, i.e., that it is referring to two actual ma’a, and not the value of two ma’a?

לא סיפא דוקא דקתני שהכל מין מטבע אחת ורישא כרב או כשמואל The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, Rabbi Elazar explains that the latter clause of the mishna is referring specifically to actual items in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as it teaches explicitly: As they are all of one type; they are all coins. But the former clause can be interpreted either in accordance with the opinion of Rav or in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.

תא שמע דינר זהב זהוב לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא דינר כסף חייב טעמא דאמר ליה זהב זהוב הא סתמא שוה קאמר ליה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof that a claim for a coin is referring to its value: It is taught in a baraita that if the claimant said: I have a coined gold dinar in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a silver dinar in my possession, he is liable to take an oath, as the claim and the admission are both referring to a coin. The Gemara infers: The reason this claim is referring specifically to a coin is that the claimant says to him: You owe me a coined gold dinar; but if the claim was for an unspecified gold dinar, i.e., without specifying that it was coined, the claimant is saying to him that he owes him an item with the value of a dinar, not necessarily a coin, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

אמר רב אשי הכי קאמר כל האומר דינר זהב כאומר דינר זהב זהוב דמי Rav Ashi said in response that according to the opinion of Shmuel, this is what the baraita is saying: Anyone who says: A gold dinar, is considered like one who says: A coined gold dinar; i.e., he is referring to the coin and not to its value.

תני רבי חייא לסיועיה לרב סלע לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא סלע חסר ב' כסף חייב חסר מעה פטור Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches a baraita in support of the opinion of Rav: If the claimant said: I have a sela in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only a sela minus two silver ma’a in my possession, he is liable to take an oath. If the defendant responded: I owe you only a sela minus one silver ma’a, he is exempt. Clearly, the reason is that he denied less than two ma’a of the claim, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא בטענת מלוה והודאת לוה אבל טענת מלוה והעדאת עד אחד אפילו לא טענו אלא בפרוטה חייב § Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that Shmuel says: The requirement that the claim be at least the value of two silver ma’a to render the defendant liable to take an oath was taught only with regard to a case where the oath is due to the claim of the creditor and the partial admission of the debtor. But in a case where the defendant’s liability to take an oath is due to the claim of the creditor and the testimony of one witness in support of the claim, even if the claimant claimed from him only one peruta, the defendant is liable to take an oath.

מאי טעמא דכתיב (דברים יט, טו) לא יקום עד אחד באיש לכל עון ולכל חטאת לכל עון ולכל חטאת הוא דאינו קם אבל קם הוא לשבועה ותניא כל מקום ששנים מחייבין אותו ממון עד אחד מחייבו שבועה What is the reason for this distinction? As it is written: “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin” (Deuteronomy 19:15). It is inferred from here that it is for any iniquity or for any sin that he may not rise up, as the testimony of one witness is not enough for this purpose, but he may rise up to render one liable to take an oath. And it is taught in a baraita: In any place where two witnesses render a defendant liable to pay money, the testimony of one witness renders him liable to take an oath. Therefore, since two witnesses render the defendant liable to pay if the claim is worth at least one peruta, so too, one witness renders him liable to take an oath with regard to a claim of this value.

ואמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל טענו חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחד מהן חייב § And Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owed him wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of these types, he is liable to take an oath, as he admitted to part of a claim.

אמר לו רבי יצחק יישר וכן א"ר יוחנן מכלל דפליג עליה ר"ל איכא דאמרי מישהא הוה שהי ליה ושתיק ליה איכא דאמרי מישתא הוה שתי ליה ושתיק ליה Rabbi Yitzḥak said to him: You have spoken well, and so also said Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that Reish Lakish disagrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to this matter, since Rabbi Yitzḥak mentioned that Rabbi Yoḥanan agreed, and did not reference Reish Lakish, who often engages in disputes with Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: There is no record of Reish Lakish expressing his opinion at that time. There are those who say that this is because he was tarrying and remaining silent, waiting for Rabbi Yoḥanan to finish his statement, and Rabbi Yitzḥak did not find out whether or not he subsequently disagreed with him, and there are those who say that Reish Lakish was drinking at the time, and he therefore remained silent and did not respond to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.

לימא מסייע ליה טענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין פטור ורבן גמליאל מחייב טעמא דטענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין הא חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחד מהן חייב Let us say that the wording of the mishna supports Shmuel’s opinion: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt according to the first tanna is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, it can be inferred he is liable to take an oath.

לא הוא הדין דאפי' חטין ושעורין נמי פטור והאי דקמיפלגי בחטין להודיעך כחו דר"ג The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna states that the first tanna and Rabban Gamliel disagree with regard to a case where the claim was specifically for wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, that the defendant is liable to take an oath even if his admission is not at all of the same type as the claim.

ת"ש טענו כלים וקרקעות הודה בכלים וכפר בקרקעות בקרקעות וכפר בכלים פטור The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or conversely, if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath.

Daf 40b

הודה במקצת קרקעות פטור במקצת כלים חייב If he admitted to part of the claim about the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim about the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.

טעמא דכלים וקרקעות דקרקע לאו בת שבועה היא הא כלים וכלים דומיא דכלים וקרקעות חייב The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, or for wheat and barley, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.

הוא הדין דאפי' כלים וכלים נמי פטור והא דקתני כלים וקרקעות קמ"ל דכי הודה במקצת כלים חייב אף על הקרקעות The Gemara rejects the inference: No, it is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, and the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is exempt. And the reason that the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land is that this teaches us that in a case where the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well.

מאי קמ"ל זוקקין תנינא זוקקין את הנכסים שיש להן אחריות לישבע עליהן The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to a part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): When there is a claim against a person for movable property and land, and he is liable to take an oath concerning the movable property, the movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too.

הא עיקר ההיא אגב גררא נסבה The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, as it discusses the halakhot of oaths, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally, in the context of a broader survey of the difference between these two types of property.

ור' חייא בר אבא אמר ר' יוחנן טענו חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחת מהן פטור והאמר ר' יצחק יישר וכן אמר רבי יוחנן אמוראי נינהו אליבא דר' יוחנן And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba disagrees with Shmuel and says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak say to Rav Naḥman: You have spoken well in the name of Shmuel, i.e., in saying that the defendant is liable to take an oath in the aforementioned case; and so also said Rabbi Yoḥanan? If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Shmuel, and not with Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. The Gemara answers: They are amora’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

ת"ש טענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין פטור ורבן גמליאל מחייב טעמא דטענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין הא חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחד מהן חייב The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof against the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, he is exempt; and Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that he claimed that he owes him wheat and the defendant admitted to owing him barley; but if the claim was for both wheat and barley, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he would be liable to take an oath.

ה"ה דאפילו חטין ושעורין נמי פטור והאי דקתני הכי להודיעך כחו דרבן גמליאל The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that the same is true, i.e., that even if the claim was for both wheat and barley the defendant is exempt. And the fact that the mishna teaches specifically this case, where the claim was specifically for wheat, is in order to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as he holds that even in this case one is liable to take an oath.

ת"ש טענו כלים וקרקעות והודה בכלים וכפר בקרקעות בקרקעות וכפר בכלים פטור הודה במקצת קרקע פטור במקצת כלים חייב טעמא דכלים וקרקעות דקרקע לאו בת שבועה היא הא כלים וכלים דומיא דכלים וקרקעות חייב The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from the mishna: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied the claim of land, or if he admitted to owing him land but denied the claim of vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is that the claim was for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath; but if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type, similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land in that the defendant admitted to owing one type and denied owing the other type, he is liable to take an oath.

ה"ה דאפילו כלים וכלים נמי פטור והא קמשמע לן דהודה במקצת כלים חייב אף על הקרקעות מאי קמ"ל זוקקין תנינא זוקקין את הנכסים שיש להן אחריות לישבע עליהן הא עיקר ההיא אגב גררא נסבה The Gemara rejects this: It is possible that the same is true, that even if the claim was for vessels of one type and vessels of another type he is exempt. And the mishna teaches specifically the case where the claim is for vessels and land because this teaches us that if the defendant admitted to a part of the claim with regard to the vessels, he is liable to take an oath concerning the land as well. The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Does it teach the halakha that an admission to part of the claim about vessels also binds the land to the oath? We learn this in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): The movable property binds the property that serves as a guarantee, so that he is forced to take an oath concerning it too. The Gemara answers: This mishna is the primary reference to this halakha, whereas that mishna cites it incidentally.

איתיביה ר' אבא בר ממל לר' חייא בר אבא טענו שור והודה לו בשה שה והודה לו בשור פטור טענו בשור ושה והודה לו באחד מהן חייב Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from a baraita: If one claimed that another owes him an ox, and the latter admitted to owing him a sheep, or conversely, if the claim was for a sheep and the defendant admitted to owing him an ox, he is exempt from taking an oath. If one claimed that another owes him an ox and a sheep, and the defendant admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.

א"ל הא מני רבן גמליאל היא אי רבן גמליאל אפילו רישא נמי Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who deems the defendant liable to take an oath even if his admission was not of the same type of item as the claim. Rabbi Abba bar Memel responded: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, the defendant should be liable to take an oath even in the first clause of the baraita, where the claim is for an ox and the admission is with regard to a sheep.

אלא הא מני אדמון היא ולא דחויי מדחינא לך אלא תלמוד ערוך הוא בפיו של ר' יוחנן הא מני אדמון היא Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba explained: Rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon, who holds that the admission must be of the same type as the claim, and maintains nevertheless that in a case where one claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the latter admits that he owes him jugs, but not the oil, the defendant is liable to take an oath (see 38b). And I am not dismissing your objection insubstantially; rather, it is a set tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who would say: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Admon.

אמר רב ענן אמר שמואל טענו חטין וקדם והודה לו בשעורין אם כמערים חייב אם במתכוין פטור § Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one intended to claim from another wheat and barley, and claimed that he owes him wheat, and before he finished his claim, the defendant first admitted that he owes him barley, in this case, if the defendant did so as one who employs artifice, so that he would be exempt from taking an oath concerning the wheat, he is liable to take an oath. But if he did so as one who intends to respond to the claim, without any ulterior motive, he is exempt.

ואמר רב ענן אמר שמואל טענו שתי מחטין והודה לו באחת מהן חייב לפיכך יצאו כלים למה שהן And Rav Anan says that Shmuel says: If one claimed that another owes him two needles, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath. It is for this reason that vessels were singled out in the verse, to teach that one is liable to take an oath in a case of admission to part of a claim involving vessels of any value.

אמר רב פפא טענו כלים ופרוטה והודה בכלים וכפר בפרוטה פטור הודה בפרוטה וכפר בכלים חייב Rav Pappa says: If one claimed that another owes him vessels and also one peruta, and the latter admitted to owing him the vessels but denied the claim that he owes him the peruta, he is exempt from taking an oath. If he admitted that he owes him one peruta but denied the claim that he owes him the vessels, he is liable to take an oath.

חדא כרב וחדא כשמואל חדא כרב דאמר כפירת טענה שתי כסף חדא כשמואל דאמר טענו חטין ושעורין והודה לו באחת מהן חייב: The Gemara comments: One of these rulings is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the other one is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The former one, that if the defendant denied owing the peruta he is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who says that the denial of a claim must be of least the value of two silver ma’a in order to render the defendant liable to take an oath. The latter one, that if he denied owing the vessels he is liable to take an oath, is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who says that if one claimed that another owes him both wheat and barley, and the latter admitted to owing him one of them, he is liable to take an oath.

מנה לי בידך אין לך בידי פטור: אמר רב נחמן ומשביעין אותו שבועת היסת מאי טעמא חזקה אין אדם תובע אלא אם כן יש לו עליו § The mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt. Rav Naḥman says: And the court administers an oath of inducement [heisset], an oath instituted by the Sages, to him. What is the reason? There is a presumption that one does not make a claim unless he has a valid case against the other party. Therefore, even though there is no admission to part of the claim, the defendant’s denial should be examined through an oath.

אדרבה חזקה אין אדם מעיז פניו בפני בעל חובו אשתמוטי הוא דקא משתמיט ליה סבר עד דהוה לי ופרענא ליה The Gemara objects: On the contrary; there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor to deny the entire debt. Therefore, the defendant’s denial of the entire claim suggests that he is telling the truth. The Gemara answers that a debtor’s categorical denial is not necessarily out of insolence; he may be temporarily avoiding paying him. He rationalizes doing so by saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have enough money, and then I will repay him.

תדע דאמר רב אידי בר אבין אמר רב חסדא הכופר במלוה כשר לעדות בפקדון פסול לעדות Know that denial of a debt is not considered an outright lie, as Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Ḥisda says: One who denies a claim with regard to a loan is fit to bear witness even if his denial is proven untrue. By contrast, one who denies a claim with regard to a deposit and is proven to be lying is disqualified from bearing witness. The distinction is clearly based on the aforementioned reasoning: A debtor who denies the debt may be avoiding payment until he has enough money, whereas a bailee who denies having been given a deposit clearly intends to steal the item.

רב חביבא מתני אסיפא מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן למחר אמר לו תנהו לי נתתיו לך פטור ואמר רב נחמן משביעין אותו שבועת היסת Rav Ḥaviva teaches Rav Naḥman’s statement as referring to the latter clause in the mishna: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is exempt. And Rav Naḥman says: Nevertheless, the court administers an oath of inducement to him.

מאן דמתני ארישא כל שכן אסיפא The Gemara explains the difference between the two versions of Rav Naḥman’s statement: With regard to the one who teaches it in reference to the former clause, where the defendant denied the existence of the debt, all the more so does this amora agree that an oath of inducement is administered in the case of the latter clause, where the defendant admitted to the existence of the debt, and merely claimed that he paid it.

Daf 41a

ומאן דמתני לה אסיפא הכא הוא דאיכא דררא דממונא אבל התם דליכא דררא דממונא לא But the one who teaches it in reference to the latter clause maintains that specifically here, in this case, an oath of inducement is administered to the defendant, as he admits that there is a matter of financial association between them; but there, in the case of the first clause, where the defendant maintains that the claim is baseless, and there is no matter of financial association between them, the court does not administer to him an oath of inducement.

מאי איכא בין שבועה דאורייתא לשבועה דרבנן איכא בינייהו מיפך שבועה בדאורייתא לא מפכינן שבועה בדרבנן מפכינן § The Gemara asks: Practically speaking, what difference is there between an oath administered by Torah law and an oath administered by rabbinic law, i.e., an oath of inducement? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to the transfer of an oath to the other party. In a case where the defendant suggests that instead of taking an oath himself, the claimant should take an oath and collect that which he claims, if the oath is administered by Torah law, we do not transfer the oath to the claimant; the defendant must either take an oath himself or pay. If the oath is administered by rabbinic law, we do transfer the oath.

ולמר בר רב אשי דאמר בדאורייתא נמי מפכינן שבועה מאי איכא בין דאורייתא לדרבנן איכא בינייהו מיחת לנכסיה בדאורייתא נחתינן לנכסיה בדרבנן לא נחתינן לנכסיה The Gemara asks: And according to Mar bar Rav Ashi, who says that we transfer an oath that is administered by Torah law as well, what difference is there between an oath administered by Torah law and an oath administered by rabbinic law? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to whether or not the court enters the property of the defendant to collect payment if he refuses to take an oath. With regard to an oath administered by Torah law, we enter his property, and with regard to an oath administered by rabbinic law, we do not enter his property.

ולרבי יוסי דאמר בדרבנן נמי נחתינן לנכסי' The Gemara asks: And what is the practical difference according to Rabbi Yosei, who says that even with regard to a debt that is owed by rabbinic law, we enter the property of the debtor to collect the debt?

דתנן מציאת חש"ו יש בהם גזל מפני דרכי שלום ר' יוסי אומר גזל גמור ואמר רב חסדא גזל גמור מדבריהם למאי נפקא מינה להוציאו בדיינין מאי איכא בין דאורייתא לדרבנן As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 59b): A lost item found by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is not acquired by him, since he lacks the legal competence to effect acquisition. Nevertheless, taking such an item from him is considered robbery on account of the ways of peace. Although these individuals lack halakhic competence and are unable to acquire lost items by Torah law, taking such items from them is considered robbery. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery. And Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yosei means that it is full-fledged robbery by rabbinic law. Accordingly, what is the practical difference between the opinion of the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei’s opinion there? The difference is that according to Rabbi Yosei, if one refuses to return the stolen item, it is appropriated by the judges and returned to the one who found it. The Gemara completes its question: Since according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei the court enters one’s property to appropriate even an item that is owed by rabbinic law, what difference is there between an oath administered by Torah law and an oath administered by rabbinic law?

איכא בינייהו שכנגדו חשוד על השבועה בדאורייתא שכנגדו חשוד על השבועה אפכינן ליה שבועה ושמו אאידך בדרבנן תקנתא היא ותקנתא לתקנתא לא עבדינן The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to a case where the one opposing the claimant, the defendant, is suspected with regard to oaths. With regard to an oath administered by Torah law, if the one opposing the claimant is suspected with regard to oaths, we transfer the obligation to take an oath and impose it on the other litigant, i.e., the claimant, who may take an oath and collect that which he claims he is owed. With regard to an oath administered by rabbinic law, the court does not transfer the oath, as transference of an oath is by rabbinic ordinance, and we do not institute one rabbinic ordinance upon another rabbinic ordinance.

ולרבנן דפליגי עליה דרבי יוסי דאמרו בדרבנן לא נחתינן לנכסיה מאי עבדינן ליה משמתינן ליה The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yosei, as they say that with regard to an item that is owed by rabbinic law, we do not enter his property to collect the item, what do we do to one who refuses to take an oath of inducement? The Gemara answers: We excommunicate him until he takes an oath.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי האי נקטיה בכובסיה דנשבקיה לגלימיה הוא אלא מאי עבדינן ליה אמר ליה משמתינן ליה עד דמטי זמן נגדיה ונגדינן ליה ושבקינן ליה Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This sanction is no less severe than entering his property and collecting the debt; it is like grabbing him by his testicles [bekhuveseih] until he surrenders his cloak. Rather, what do we do to him? Rav Ashi said to him: We excommunicate him until the time to flog him comes, i.e., for thirty days, and if he still refuses to take an oath or reach a settlement with the claimant, we flog him and then leave him alone.

אמר רב פפא האי מאן דאפיק שטרא על חבריה ואמר ליה שטרא פרוע הוא אמרינן ליה לאו כל כמינך זיל שלים ואם אמר לשתבע לי אמרינן ליה אשתבע ליה § Rav Pappa said: With regard to one who produced a promissory note against another in court, and the defendant said to him: The debt in the note is already repaid, but for some reason I did not get the promissory note returned to me when I paid you, we say to the defendant: It is not in your power to deny the debt; go pay. But if the defendant said: Let him take an oath to me that I did not repay him, we say to the claimant: Take an oath to him.

א"ל רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי ומה בין זה לפוגם את שטרו Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: But what is the difference between this case and the case of one who vitiates his promissory note by acknowledging that he has received partial payment? In the latter case, the Sages instituted that the creditor can collect the remainder of the debt only after taking an oath that he was not repaid more than the amount he admitted receiving. According to Rav Pappa, an oath can be administered to any creditor who produces a promissory note, even if he did not vitiate it.

א"ל התם אע"ג דלא טעין איהו טענינן ליה אנן הכא אמרינן ליה זיל שלים ליה ואי טעין ואמר אשתבע לי אמרינן ליה זיל אשתבע ליה ואי צורבא מרבנן הוא לא משבעינן ליה Rav Ashi said to him: There, in the case of a creditor who vitiated his promissory note, even if the defendant does not himself make a claim demanding that the creditor take an oath, we, the court, make such a claim on his behalf. Here, in a case where the creditor did not vitiate his promissory note, we say to the defendant: Go pay him the debt, but if the defendant demands an oath, saying: Take an oath to me, we say to the creditor: Go take an oath to him. And if he is a Torah scholar [tzurva merabbanan], we do not administer an oath to him.

א"ל רב יימר לרב אשי צורבא מרבנן משלח גלימא דאינשי אלא לא מזדקקינן ליה לדיניה: Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: Can a Torah scholar uncloak people? Does his being a Torah scholar give him the right to collect money that the defendant claims he does not owe? Rather, if he is a Torah scholar we do not attend to his case.

מנה לי בידך כו': אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסי המלוה את חבירו בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר לי יכול לומר לו פרעתיך בפני פלוני ופלוני והלכו להם למדה"י § The mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant initially acknowledged the debt, but when he claimed the money the next day the defendant said that he already repaid him, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath. Rav Yehuda says that Rav Asi says: In the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the latter is required to repay him in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, if there are no witnesses to the fact that he repaid him, he is liable. Rav Yehuda continues: When I said this in the presence of Shmuel, he said to me that the debtor can say to the claimant: I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and they went overseas.

תנן מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן למחר אמר לו תנהו לי נתתיו לך פטור והא הכא כיון דתבעיה בעדים כמאן דאוזפיה בעדים דמי וקתני פטור The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Asi’s statement: We learned in the mishna that in a case where the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, if the defendant responded: I gave it to you, he is exempt. The Gemara infers: And here, since the claimant claimed the debt from the defendant in the presence of witnesses, and the latter admitted the debt, he is similar to one who lent him the money in the presence of witnesses, and nevertheless, the mishna teaches that the defendant is exempt.

Daf 41b

תיובתא דרב אסי Evidently, he is not required to repay him in the presence of witnesses. The Gemara suggests: This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Asi.

אמר לך רב אסי אנא כי אמרי היכא דמעיקרא אוזפיה בעדים דלא לדידיה הימניה הכא הא הימניה The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rav Asi could have said to you: When I said that the debtor is liable to repay him in the presence of witnesses, it was with regard to a case where the creditor lent the money to him in the presence of witnesses at the outset, as he did not trust him. But here, he trusted him at the outset, as he lent it to him in the absence of witnesses. Therefore, the debtor is not required to repay the debt in the presence of witnesses.

רב יוסף מתני הכי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסי המלוה את חבירו בעדים אינו צריך לפורעו בעדים ואם אמר אל תפרעני אלא בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר לי יכול לומר לו פרעתיך בפני פלוני ופלוני והלכו להם למדינת הים Rav Yosef teaches another version of this discussion, like this: Rav Yehuda says that Rav Asi says: In the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the latter need not repay him in the presence of witnesses. But if the creditor said: Repay me only in the presence of witnesses, the debtor is required to repay him in the presence of witnesses. Rav Yehuda continued: When I said this in the presence of Shmuel, he said to me that the debtor can say to the claimant: I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and they went overseas.

תנן מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן אמר לו אל תתנהו לי אלא בפני עדים למחר אמר לו תנהו לי נתתיו לך חייב מפני שצריך ליתן לו בעדים תיובתא דשמואל The Gemara raises an objection against Shmuel’s opinion: We learned in the mishna that in a case where the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant said to him: Yes, and the claimant then said to him: Give the money to me only in the presence of witnesses, then if the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, and the defendant responded: I already gave it to you, he is liable to pay, as he is required to give it to him in the presence of witnesses. The Gemara suggests: This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel.

אמר לך שמואל תנאי היא דתניא בעדים הלויתיך בעדים פרע לי או יתן או יביא ראיה שנתן רבי יהודה בן בתירא אומר יכול לומר לו פרעתיך בפני פלוני ופלוני והלכו להם למדינת הים The Gemara answers: Shmuel could have said to you that it is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: If the creditor said to the debtor: I lent the money to you in the presence of witnesses and therefore you must repay me in the presence of witnesses, the debtor must either give him the money or bring proof that he already gave it to him. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says that he can say to him: I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and they subsequently went overseas.

פריך רב אחא ממאי דבשעת הלואה קאי דלמא בשעת תביעה קאי והכי קאמר ליה לאו בעדים הלויתיך בעדים היה לך לפורעני אבל בשעת הלואה דברי הכל חייב Rav Aḥa refutes this answer: From where is it derived that the baraita is referring to a case where the creditor said this at the time of the loan? Perhaps it is referring to a case where he made no stipulation at the time of the loan, but rather said this at the time of the claim, when the debtor claimed that he had repaid the debt; and this is what he says to him: Didn’t I lend the money you in the presence of witnesses? You should have repaid me in the presence of witnesses. But if he made this stipulation at the time of the loan, all agree that the debtor is liable. Therefore, there is no evidence that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira agrees with the opinion of Shmuel.

אמר רב פפי משמיה דרבא הלכתא המלוה את חבירו בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים ורב פפא משמיה דרבא אמר המלוה את חבירו בעדים אין צריך לפורעו בעדים ואם אמר אל תפרעני אלא בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים ואם אמר לו פרעתיך בפני פלוני ופלוני והלכו להם למדינת הים נאמן: In conclusion, Rav Pappi says in the name of Rava: The halakha is that if one lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the latter is required to repay him in the presence of witnesses. And Rav Pappa says in the name of Rava: In the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the latter is not required to repay him in the presence of witnesses. But if the creditor says: Repay me only in the presence of witnesses, the debtor is required to repay him in the presence of witnesses. And if he said to him: I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and they went overseas, his claim is deemed credible.

סימן ראוב"ן ושמעו"ן דתנ"ו הלכת"א יזפ"י ופר"ע פלוני ופלוני עפצ"י סטרא"י בהימנות"א כבי תרי: § The Gemara cites several incidents involving loans and witnesses, and provides a mnemonic device for them: Reuven and Shimon, who learned halakha, borrowed, and repaid so-and-so and so-and-so gallnuts for a different debt, deeming them credible like two witnesses.

ההוא דא"ל לחבריה כי פרעתין פרעין לי באפי ראובן ושמעון אזל ופרעיה באפי תרי מעלמא אמר אביי באפי בי תרי אמר ליה באפי בי תרי פרעיה אמר ליה רבא להכי קאמר ליה באפי ראובן ושמעון כי היכי דלא נדחייה The Gemara relates: There was a certain creditor who said to the debtor: When you repay me, repay me in the presence of Reuven and Shimon. The debtor went and repaid him in the presence of two other witnesses from the general public. When the case was brought before the Sages, Abaye said: The creditor said to the debtor to repay him in the presence of two people who would serve as witnesses, and he repaid him in the presence of two people. Therefore, the creditor has no further claim. Rava said to him: It is for this reason that the creditor said to him to repay him in the presence of Reuven and Shimon: So that he will not be able to dismiss him by saying that he repaid him in the presence of other witnesses.

ההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה כי פרעת לי פרעין לי באפי בי תרי דתנו הלכתא אזל פרעיה בין דיליה לדיליה איתניסו הנך זוזי The Gemara relates: There was a certain creditor who said to the debtor: When you repay me, repay me in the presence of two people who have learned halakha. The debtor went and repaid him between the two of them, i.e., in the absence of witnesses. Those dinars were subsequently taken from the creditor due to circumstances beyond his control.

אתא לקמיה דרב נחמן א"ל אין קבולי קבלתינהו מיניה דרך פקדון ואמינא ליהוי גבאי פקדון עד דמתרמו בי תרי דתנו הלכתא ומקיים תנאיה The creditor came before Rav Naḥman for judgment, and said to him: Yes, I received the money from him; but since he did not repay me as stipulated, I accepted it only as a deposit. I accepted it as an unpaid bailee, not as payment, and said to myself: Let it be with me as a deposit until two people who have learned halakha happen to arrive, and the debtor will fulfill his condition. Since the money was taken from me due to circumstances beyond my control, and I had it in my possession only as an unpaid bailee, I am not responsible for it, and the debtor is still liable to repay me.

א"ל כיון דקא מודית דודאי שקלתינהו מיניה פרעון מעליא הוי אי אמרת לקיומי תנאיה זיל אייתינהו דהא אנא ורב ששת דתנינא הלכתא וספרא וספרי ותוספתא וכולא גמרא Rav Naḥman said to him: Since you admit that you certainly took the money from him, it is a proper repayment. If you say that the debtor is still required to fulfill his condition, go bring the money now, as Rav Sheshet and I have learned halakha, and Sifra, and Sifrei, and Tosefta, and the entire Talmud. Let him give you the money in our presence, and the condition will thereby be fulfilled. Since he gave you the money intending to repay the debt, and did not agree to entrust it to you as an unpaid bailee, your claim is not valid.

ההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה הב לי מאה זוזי דאוזיפתך אמר ליה לא היו דברים מעולם אזל אייתי סהדי דאוזפיה ופרעיה אמר אביי מאי ניעבוד אינהו אמרי אוזפיה אינהו אמרי פרעיה רבא אמר כל האומר לא לויתי כאומר לא פרעתי דמי The Gemara relates: There was a certain person who said to another: Give me the hundred dinars that I lent you. The latter said to him: This matter never happened; you did not lend me money. The creditor went and brought witnesses who testified that he lent the money to him and that the debtor had repaid him. Abaye said: What is there for the court to do in this case? The same witnesses said both statements; they said that the creditor lent him the money, and they also said that the debtor repaid him. Rava said: Anyone who says: I did not borrow, is considered like one who says: I did not repay. Since there is testimony that he borrowed the money, and he admits that he did not repay it, he is liable to repay the debt.

ההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה הב לי מאה זוזי דמסיקנא בך א"ל לא פרעתיך בפני פלוני ופלוני אתו פלוני ופלוני אמרי לא היו דברים מעולם סבר רב ששת למימר הוחזק כפרן אמר ליה רבא כל מילתא דלא רמיא עליה דאינש לאו אדעתיה The Gemara relates: There was a certain person who said to another: Give me the hundred dinars that I claim from you. The latter said to him: Didn’t I repay you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so? The two people he mentioned, so-and-so and so-and-so, came and said: This matter never happened. Rav Sheshet thought to say that based on the testimony of the witnesses, the debtor assumes the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts; his claim that he repaid the debt is no longer accepted, and he is liable to pay. Rava said to him: Anything that is not incumbent upon a person is not on his mind, i.e., he is apt to forget it.

ההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה הב לי שית מאה זוזי דמסיקנא בך א"ל ולא פרעתיך מאה קבי The Gemara relates: There was a certain person who said to another: Give me the six hundred dinars that I claim from you. The latter said to him: But didn’t I repay you with one hundred kav

Daf 42a

עפצי דקיימי בשיתא שיתא א"ל לאו בארבעה ארבעה הוו קיימי אתו תרי סהדי ואמרו אין בארבעה ארבעה הוו קיימי אמר רבא הוחזק כפרן אמר רמי בר חמא הא אמרת כל מילתא דלא רמיא עליה דאיניש לאו אדעתיה א"ל רבא קצותא דתרעא מידכר דכירי אינשי of gallnuts [aftzei] that were worth six dinars for each kav at the time? The creditor said to him: Weren’t they worth four dinars for each kav at the time? Two witnesses came and said: Yes, they were worth four dinars per kav. Rava said that the debtor assumes the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts. Rami bar Ḥama said: But didn’t you say that anything that is not incumbent upon a person is not on his mind? Perhaps he merely forgot what the price of gallnuts was at the time that he paid. Rava said to him: People remember the standard, set market price.

ההוא דא"ל לחבריה הב לי מאה זוזי דמסיקנא בך והא שטרא א"ל פרעתיך אמר ליה הנהו סיטראי נינהו אמר רב נחמן איתרע שטרא רב פפא אמר לא איתרע שטרא The Gemara relates: There was a certain person who said to another: Give me the hundred dinars that I claim from you, and this is the promissory note attesting to the debt. The latter said to him: I already repaid you. The creditor said to him: That money you gave me was for a different debt. Rav Naḥman said that the promissory note is undermined by the fact that the creditor admits that he received payment equal to the amount specified in the note, and his claim that there was an additional debt is unsubstantiated. Rav Pappa said that the promissory note is not undermined.

ולרב פפא מאי שנא מההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה הב לי מאה זוזי דמסיקנא בך והא שטרא א"ל לאו אתורי יהבת לי ואתית ואיתיבת אמסחתא וקבילת זוזך ואמר ליה הנהו סיטראי נינהו ואמר רב פפא איתרע שטרא The Gemara asks: But according to Rav Pappa, in what way is this case different from the incident where a certain person said to another: Give me the hundred dinars that I claim from you, and this is the promissory note. The latter said to him: Didn’t you give me that money as an investment to be used for buying oxen to be slaughtered? And you came and sat in the slaughterhouse and received your money, including your share of the profits, from the sale of the slaughtered oxen. And the creditor said to him: That money you gave me was for a different debt. And Rav Pappa said that in that case the promissory note is undermined.

התם כיון דקאמר אתורי יהבת לי ומתורי שקלת איתרע שטרא הכא אימור סיטראי נינהו The Gemara answers: There, since the debtor said: You gave me the money for oxen and you took payment from oxen, and the creditor admitted that this had happened, the promissory note is undermined because there is no support for his claim that there was another debt in addition to the acknowledged transaction for the oxen. Here, say that the payment was in fact for a different debt.

מאי הוי עלה רב פפי אמר לא איתרע שטרא רב ששת בריה דרב אידי אמר איתרע שטרא והלכתא איתרע שטרא What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rav Pappi said: The promissory note is not undermined, and Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: The promissory note is undermined. And the halakha is that the promissory note is undermined.

והני מילי דפרעיה באפי סהדי ולא אידכר ליה שטרא אבל פרעיה בין דידיה לדידיה מיגו דיכול למימר לא היו דברים מעולם יכול נמי למימר סיטראי נינהו וכדאבימי בריה דר' אבהו And this statement applies in a case where he repaid him in the presence of witnesses and did not mention the promissory note to the creditor; but in a case where he repaid him privately, between the two of them, in the absence of witnesses, since [miggo] the creditor can say to him: This matter never happened, i.e., he could deny that he received any payment, he can also say that this money was for a different debt. And this is like the case involving Avimi, son of Rabbi Abbahu, who repaid a debt in the absence of witnesses, and the creditor then claimed that the payment was for another debt (see Ketubot 85a).

ההוא דאמר ליה לחבריה מהימנת לי כל אימת דאמרת לי לא פרענא אזל פרעיה באפי סהדי אביי ורבא דאמרי תרוייהו הא הימניה מתקיף לה רב פפא נהי דהימניה טפי מנפשיה טפי מסהדי מי הימניה The Gemara relates: There was a certain person who said to another who had lent him money: I deem you credible whenever you say to me that I did not repay the debt. He then went and repaid the debt in the presence of witnesses, and the creditor later denied that he had been repaid. Abaye and Rava both say that the witnesses are not deemed credible and the creditor can collect payment, as the debtor deemed him credible at the outset. Rav Pappa objects to this and says: Although he deemed him more credible than himself concerning the possibility that the debtor would claim that he repaid the debt and the creditor would deny having been repaid, did he deem him more credible than witnesses? Therefore, he is exempt.

ההוא דא"ל לחבריה מהימנת לי כבי תרי כל אימת דאמרת לא פרענא אזל פרעיה באפי תלתא אמר רב פפא כבי תרי הימניה כבי תלתא לא הימניה The Gemara relates: There was a certain person who said to another who had lent him money: I deem you credible like two witnesses whenever you say that I did not repay the debt. He went and repaid the debt in the presence of three witnesses. Rav Pappa said that the creditor cannot deny the testimony of three witnesses, as the debtor deemed him credible like two witnesses; he did not deem him credible like three witnesses.

א"ל רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לרב פפא אימור דאמרי רבנן דאזלינן בתר רוב דעות ה"מ לענין אומדנא דכמה דנפישי בקיאי טפי אבל לענין עדות מאה כתרי ותרי כמאה Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Say that although the Sages say that we follow the majority of opinions, and the opinion of three people is therefore accepted against the opinion of two, this statement applies with regard to assessing value, as the more people there are, the more knowledgeable they are. But with regard to testimony, one hundred witnesses are like two, and two are like one hundred. Therefore, in this case there is no distinction between two witnesses and three witnesses.

לישנא אחרינא ההוא דא"ל לחבריה מהימנת לי כבי תרי כל אימת דאמרת לא פרענא אזל ופרעיה באפי תלתא אמר רב פפא כבי תרי הימניה כבי תלתא לא הימניה The Gemara presents another version of the incident: A certain person said to another who had lent him money: I deem you credible like two witnesses whenever you say that I did not repay. He went and repaid the debt in the presence of three witnesses. Rav Pappa said that the creditor cannot deny their testimony, as the debtor deemed him credible like two witnesses; he did not deem him credible like three witnesses.

מתקיף לה רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע תרי כמאה ומאה כתרי ואי א"ל כבי תלתא ואזל פרעיה באפי בי ארבעה כיון דנחית לדעות נחית לדעות: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this: Two witnesses are like one hundred, and one hundred are like two. But if the debtor said to the creditor that he deems him credible like three witnesses, and then went and repaid him in the presence of four, then once he entered, by mentioning a larger number than what is necessary for testimony, the realm of opinions, in which three people carry greater weight than two, he has entered the realm of opinions, and four witnesses are deemed more credible than three. Therefore, the creditor is not deemed credible against them.

אין נשבעין על טענת חרש שוטה וקטן ואין משביעין את הקטן: מ"ט אמר קרא (שמות כב, ו) כי יתן איש אל רעהו כסף או כלים לשמור ואין נתינת קטן כלום: § The mishna teaches: One does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and the court does not administer an oath to a minor. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The Gemara answers that in the passage from which the halakhot of admission to part of a claim are derived, the verse states: “If a man delivers to his neighbor silver or vessels to safeguard” (Exodus 22:6). The word “man” indicates that the reference is only to adults, and delivery by a minor is nothing, i.e., it is not recognized as a halakhically significant act, as a minor is not halakhically competent.

אבל נשבעין לקטן ולהקדש: והא אמרת רישא אין נשבעין על טענת שוטה וקטן § The mishna teaches: But one does take an oath to a minor, or to a representative of the Temple treasury with regard to consecrated property. The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say in the first clause that one does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor?

אמר רב בבא בטענת אביו ור' אליעזר בן יעקב היא דתניא רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר פעמים שאדם נשבע על טענת עצמו כיצד אמר לו מנה לאביך בידי והאכלתיו פרס הרי זה נשבע וזהו שנשבע על טענת עצמו וחכ"א אינו אלא כמשיב אבידה ופטור Rav said: The halakha that one takes an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is with regard to one who comes to court with a claim for a debt owed to his late father, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: There are times when although no one claimed of a person that he owes money, that person takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. How so? If one said to another: Your father had one hundred dinars in my possession, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, he is liable to take an oath that he repaid half; and that is the case of one who takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. And the Rabbis say: In that case he is only like one returning a lost item, as the son did not claim the money at all, and is exempt from taking an oath.

ור' אליעזר בן יעקב לית ליה משיב אבידה פטור אמר רב בשטענו קטן The Gemara asks: But is Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov not of the opinion that one who returns a lost item is exempt from taking an oath attesting to the fact that he did not take anything from it? Rav said: The baraita is referring to a case where a minor advanced a claim against him. The creditor’s minor son claimed that the debtor did not repay any part of the loan to his father. The debtor’s partial admission came in response to that claim. Therefore, his admission is not comparable to the act of returning a lost item.

קטן והאמרת אין נשבעין על טענת חרש שוטה וקטן לעולם גדול ואמאי קרו ליה קטן דלגבי מילי דאבוה קטן הוא The Gemara asks: How can the baraita be referring to the claim of a minor? But didn’t you say in the mishna that one does not take an oath concerning the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor? The Gemara answers: Actually, the reference is to an adult son; and why did Rav call him a minor? It was due to the fact that with regard to his father’s matters, one is like a minor, as he is uncertain about the particulars of his father’s dealings. Here, too, Rav explains that the halakha in the mishna that one takes an oath to a minor is referring to an adult claiming a debt owed to his late father.

אי הכי טענת עצמו טענת אחרים היא טענת אחרים והודאת עצמו The Gemara asks: If so, if the son making the claim has already reached majority, the language of the baraita is imprecise. Why does the tanna describe the individual as one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim? This is not his own claim; it is the claim of others. The Gemara answers: The baraita employed that language because although it is the claim of others, he is taking an oath on the basis of that claim and his own partial admission.

Daf 42b

כולהו נמי טענת אחרים והודאת עצמו נינהו The Gemara challenges: All other cases where the defendant is required to take an oath due to a partial admission are also cases of a claim of others and his own admission. Yet in the baraita Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov introduces his opinion with the term: There are times, indicating that the case to which he is referring, of one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim, is not the standard case of an oath due to a partial admission.

אלא בדרבה קמיפלגי דאמר רבה מפני מה אמרה תורה מודה מקצת הטענה ישבע חזקה אין אדם מעיז פניו בפני בעל חובו והאי בכולי' בעי דליכפריה והאי דלא כפריה משום דאינו מעיז פניו בפני בעל חובו The Gemara answers: Rather, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: For what reason did the Torah say that one who admits to a part of the claim must take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor, who did him a favor by lending money to him. And this person who denies part of the claim actually wants to deny all of the debt, so as to be exempt, and this fact, i.e., that he does not deny all of it, is because a person does not exhibit insolence in the presence of his creditor.

ובכוליה בעי דלודי ליה והאי דלא אודי ליה אישתמוטי הוא דקא משתמיט מיניה סבר עד דהוי לי זוזי ופרענא ליה ורחמנא אמר רמי שבועה עילויה כי היכי דלודי ליה בכוליה Rabba continues: And in order not to exhibit insolence, he wants to admit to the creditor with regard to all of the debt; and this fact, i.e., that he did not admit the entire debt to him, is because he may be temporarily avoiding paying him. He rationalizes doing so by saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have enough money, and then I will repay him. And therefore, the Merciful One says in the Torah: Impose an oath on him in order to induce the debtor to admit the entire debt to him.

ר' אליעזר בן יעקב סבר לא שנא בו ולא שנא בבנו אינו מעיז והלכך לאו משיב אבידה הוא ורבנן סברי בפניו הוא דאינו מעיז אבל בפני בנו מעיז ומדלא מעיז משיב אבידה הוא With regard to this principle, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains: It is no different with regard to the creditor himself, and it is no different with regard to his son; the debtor would not exhibit insolence and deny the debt. And therefore, he is not deemed as one returning a lost item on his own initiative; rather, this is an ordinary case where one admits to a part of a claim and is therefore required to take an oath. And the Rabbis maintain: It is in the presence of the original creditor that one would not exhibit insolence; but in the presence of his son, who did not lend him the money, he would exhibit insolence and deny the claim entirely. And since this debtor is not exhibiting insolence, as he could have denied the loan completely but instead is opting to admit to part of the claim, he is deemed as one returning a lost item, and his claim is accepted without his taking an oath.

מי מצית מוקמת לה כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב הא קתני רישא מנה לאבא בידך אין לך בידי אלא חמשים דינר פטור מפני שמשיב אבידה הוא התם דלא אמר ברי לי הכא דאמר ברי לי The Gemara asks: Can you interpret the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? Isn’t it taught in the former clause that if the claimant said: My late father had one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant responded: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as he is like one returning a lost item? The Gemara answers: There, it is referring to a case where the claimant did not say: I am certain that you owe my father this money, but rather made an uncertain claim. In such a case, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov agrees that the defendant is like one returning a lost item. Here, by contrast, it is a case where he said: I am certain that you owe him.

שמואל אמר לקטן ליפרע מנכסי קטן להקדש ליפרע מנכסי הקדש Returning to the Gemara’s question with regard to the last clause of the mishna, which states that one takes an oath to a minor, or to a representative of the Temple treasury, Shmuel said a different answer: When the mishna spoke about taking an oath to a minor, it was referring to a case where the debtor died; the creditor must take an oath to the minor heir attesting that he was not repaid in order to collect from the minor’s property. Similarly, if one’s debtor consecrated his property, he takes an oath to a representative of the Temple treasury in order to collect from the consecrated property.

לקטן ליפרע מנכסי קטן תנינא מנכסי יתומים לא יפרע אלא בשבועה תרתי למה לי The Gemara challenges: The halakha that one takes an oath to a minor in order to collect from a minor’s property is one that we learn in the mishna (45a): A woman who comes to collect the payment for her marriage contract from the property of orphans collects only by means of an oath. Why do I need two mishnayot to teach this halakha?

הא קמשמע לן כדאביי קשישא דתני אביי קשישא יתומין שאמרו גדולים ואין צריך לומר קטנים בין לשבועה בין לזיבורית The Gemara answers: By mentioning this halakha twice, the Mishna teaches us this: The halakha applies with regard to both minor and adult orphans, in accordance with the statement of Abaye the Elder; as Abaye the Elder taught: The orphans of which the Sages spoke are adult orphans, and needless to say, the same halakha also applies to minor orphans. This principle applies with regard to both the halakha that a debt can be collected from the property of an orphan only by means of an oath, and to the halakha that a debt can be collected from the property of an orphan only from inferior-quality land.

להקדש ליפרע מנכסי הקדש תנינא מנכסים משועבדים לא יפרעו אלא בשבועה ומה לי משועבדים להדיוט ומה לי משועבדים לגבוה With regard to Shmuel’s explanation of the mishna that one takes an oath to a representative of the Temple treasury in order to collect a debt from consecrated property, the Gemara asks: We learn this halakha in the mishna (45a): From liened property that has been sold one collects a debt only by means of an oath. And what difference is it to me whether the property was liened to an ordinary person, and what difference is it to me whether the property was liened to the Most High, i.e., it was consecrated?

איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הדיוט הוא דאדם עושה קנוניא על הדיוט אבל הקדש דאין אדם עושה קנוניא על הקדש קא משמע לן The Gemara answers: It was necessary for this halakha to be stated separately with regard to collecting a debt from the Temple treasury. Otherwise it might enter your mind to say that it is specifically in order to collect a debt from an ordinary person that one is required to take an oath, as a person is liable to collude with another against an ordinary person who purchased property, by producing a promissory note for a debt that was already repaid in order to collect property from the purchasers of land that had been liened to that debt. But one might have thought that in order to collect a debt from the Temple treasury, a person is not required to take an oath, as a person does not collude with another against the Temple treasury. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that one is required to take an oath even in order to collect a debt from the Temple treasury, as one is suspected of collusion in this case as well.

והאמר רב הונא שכיב מרע שהקדיש כל נכסיו ואמר מנה לפלוני בידי נאמן חזקה אין אדם עושה קנוניא על הקדש אמרי ה"מ שכיב מרע דאין אדם חוטא ולא לו אבל גבי בריא ודאי חיישינן: The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Huna say that in the case of a person on his deathbed who consecrated all of his property, and said: So-and-so has one hundred dinars in my possession, his statement is deemed credible, as the presumption is that a person does not collude with another against the Temple treasury? The Sages said in response: That statement applies only in the case of a person on his deathbed, as a person sins only for his own benefit. One is not suspected of deceiving the Temple treasury for the benefit of his heirs. But with regard to a healthy person, we are certainly concerned about collusion, even against the Temple treasury.

מתני׳ ואלו דברים שאין נשבעין עליהן העבדים והשטרות והקרקעות וההקדשות אין בהן תשלומי כפל ולא תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה שומר חנם אינו נשבע נושא שכר אינו משלם MISHNA: And these are items concerning which one does not take an oath by Torah law: Canaanite slaves, and financial documents, and land, and consecrated property. In a case where these items are stolen, there is no payment of double the principal, nor is there payment of four or five times the principal in a case where one stole a consecrated animal and slaughtered or sold it. An unpaid bailee who lost one of these items does not take an oath that he was not negligent in safeguarding it, and a paid bailee does not pay for the loss or theft of one of these items.

ר' שמעון אומר קדשים שחייב באחריותן נשבעין עליהן ושאינו חייב באחריותן אין נשבעין עליהן Rabbi Shimon says there is a distinction between different types of consecrated property: With regard to consecrated property for which one bears the financial responsibility to compensate the Temple treasury in the event of their loss, such as in a case where he vowed to bring an offering and then set aside an animal to be sacrificed in fulfillment of the vow, one takes an oath concerning them, as they are considered his own property. But with regard to consecrated property for which he does not bear the financial responsibility for their loss, one does not take an oath concerning them.

רבי מאיר אומר יש דברים שהן בקרקע ואינן כקרקע ואין חכמים מודים לו כיצד עשר גפנים טעונות מסרתי לך והלה אומר אינן אלא חמש רבי מאיר מחייב שבועה וחכ"א כל המחובר לקרקע הרי הוא כקרקע Rabbi Meir says: There are certain items that are physically on the land but are not treated like land from a halakhic perspective, and the Rabbis do not concede to him concerning this point. How so? If one makes the claim: I assigned you ten grapevines laden with fruit to safeguard, and the other one says: They are only five vines, Rabbi Meir deems the defendant liable to take an oath, as he admitted to a part of the claim, and although the claim concerned grapevines, the primary aspect of the claim was the grapes. And the Rabbis say: The halakhic status of anything that is attached to the land is like the land itself, and therefore he is exempt from taking an oath.

אין נשבעין אלא על דבר שבמדה ושבמשקל ושבמנין כיצד בית מלא מסרתי לך וכיס מלא מסרתי לך והלה אומר איני יודע אלא מה שהנחת אתה נוטל פטור זה אומר עד הזיז וזה אומר עד החלון חייב: One takes an oath only concerning an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number. How so? If the claimant says: I transferred to you a house full of produce, or: I transferred to you a pouch full of money, and the other person says: I do not know how much you gave me, but what you left in my possession you may take, and the amount in the house or pouch at that time is less than that claimed by the claimant, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath, as the amounts in the claim and the admission are undefined. But if this party says that the house was full up to the ledge, and that party says that it was full up to the window, the defendant is liable to take an oath, as the dispute relates to a defined amount.

גמ׳ תשלומי כפל מנלן דתנו רבנן (שמות כב, ח) על כל דבר פשע כלל על שור ועל חמור ועל שה ועל שלמה פרט על כל אבדה חזר וכלל GEMARA: From where do we derive that one is exempt from the payment of double the principal with regard to the items mentioned in the mishna? It is as the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse that discusses double payment: “For every matter of trespass, whether it be for an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for clothing, or for any manner of lost thing…he shall pay double to his neighbor” (Exodus 22:8). This verse is expounded in the following manner: The phrase “for every matter of trespass” is a generalization; the phrase “whether it be for an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for clothing” is a detail; and when the verse states: “Or for any manner of lost thing,” it then generalized again.

כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט מה הפרט מפורש דבר המטלטל וגופו ממון אף כל דבר המטלטל וגופו ממון Consequently, this verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, and one of the thirteen principles of exegesis states that in such a case you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Applying this principle here, one may conclude that just as each of the items mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an item that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, anything that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value is subject to double payment.

יצאו קרקעות שאין מטלטלין יצאו עבדים שהוקשו לקרקעות יצאו שטרות שאע"פ שהן מטלטלין אין גופן ממון הקדש רעהו כתיב: Land is therefore excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves are also excluded, as they are compared to land in many areas of halakha. Financial documents are excluded, since although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value. The value of the paper itself is negligible; documents are valuable only because they serve as proof of monetary claims. Finally, consecrated property is excluded because it is written in the verse: “He shall pay double to his neighbor,” i.e., to his fellow man, but not to a representative of the Temple treasury.

(ולא תשלומי כפל) ולא ארבעה וחמשה: מ"ט תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה אמר רחמנא ולא תשלומי שלשה וארבעה: The mishna teaches: And there is no payment of double the principal, nor is there payment of four or five times the principal for stealing consecrated animals. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the exclusion of the payment of four or five times the principal? The Gemara answers: Since payment of double the principal is excluded, that leaves, in a case where one steals and then slaughters or sells a consecrated animal, a total payment of only three or four times the principal, as the payment of double the principal is included in the larger payment for selling or slaughtering it. Therefore, since the Merciful One states in the Torah fourfold or fivefold payment, and not threefold or fourfold payment, one who steals a consecrated animal and slaughters it or sells it is exempt from the additional payments.

שומר חנם אינו נשבע: מנא הני מילי דתנו רבנן § The mishna teaches: An unpaid bailee who lost one of the excluded items does not take an oath. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers that it is as the Sages taught in a baraita:

Daf 43a

(שמות כב, ו) כי יתן איש אל רעהו כלל כסף או כלים פרט לשמור חזר וכלל כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט מה הפרט מפורש דבר המטלטל וגופו ממון אף כל דבר המטלטל וגופו ממון The verse introduces the halakhot with regard to an unpaid bailee with the phrase: “If a man delivers to his neighbor silver or vessels to safeguard” (Exodus 22:6). The phrase “if a man delivers to his neighbor” is a generalization, “silver or vessels” is a detail, and when the verse states: “To safeguard,” it then generalized again. Consequently, this verse contains a generalization and a detail and a generalization, in which case you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Applying this principle here, one concludes that just as each of the items mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an item that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value, so too, an unpaid bailee takes an oath concerning anything that is movable property and has intrinsic monetary value.

יצאו קרקעות שאין מטלטלין יצאו עבדים שהוקשו לקרקעות יצאו שטרות שאף על פי שמטלטלין אין גופן ממון הקדש רעהו כתיב Land is therefore excluded, as it is not movable property. Canaanite slaves are excluded, as they are compared to land in many areas of halakha. Financial documents are excluded, since although they are movable property, they do not have intrinsic monetary value. Consecrated property is excluded because it is written in the verse: “If a man delivers to his neighbor.” This term indicates that both the one depositing the item and the bailee must be people, and not the Temple treasury.

נושא שכר אינו משלם מנלן דתנו רבנן (שמות כב, ו) כי יתן איש אל רעהו כלל חמור או שור או שה פרט וכל בהמה לשמור חזר וכלל כלל ופרט וכלל כו' עד הקדש רעהו כתיב: § The mishna teaches that a paid bailee does not pay for the loss or theft of one of these items. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse introduces the halakhot with regard to a paid bailee with the phrase: “If a man delivers to his neighbor a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep, or any animal to guard” (Exodus 22:9). The phrase “if a man delivers to his neighbor” is a generalization, the phrase “a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep” is a detail, and when the verse states: “Or any animal to safeguard,” it then generalized again. Consequently, this verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, which excludes any item that is not similar to the detail, as delineated in the previous baraita with regard to an unpaid bailee, up to and including the last clause of that baraita: Consecrated property is excluded because it is written in the verse: “If a man delivers to his neighbor.”

ר"מ אומר יש דברים שהן כקרקע ואינן כקרקע כו': מכלל דרבי מאיר סבר כל המחובר לקרקע אינו כקרקע אדמיפלגי בטעונות ליפלגי בסרוקות § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Meir says: There are certain items that are like land with regard to their form, but are not treated like land from a halakhic perspective; and the Rabbis do not concede that this is so, as they hold that the halakhic status of anything that is attached to the land is like the land itself. The Gemara challenges: By inference, does Rabbi Meir hold that the halakhic status of anything that is attached to the land is not like land? If so, rather than disagreeing with regard to grapevines laden with fruit, let them disagree with regard to fruitless vines, as Rabbi Meir holds that the halakhic status of the vines themselves is not like that of the land.

(אלא) א"ר יוסי ברבי חנינא הכא בענבים עומדות להבצר קמיפלגי דרבי מאיר סבר כבצורות דמיין ורבנן סברי לא כבצורות דמיין: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said that they disagree here not with regard to any item that is attached to the land, as Rabbi Meir concedes that such items usually have the halakhic status of the land itself. The dispute is specifically with regard to grapes that are ready to be harvested, as Rabbi Meir holds that their halakhic status is similar to that of grapes that are already harvested, and the Rabbis hold that their halakhic status is not similar to that of grapes that are already harvested, and that they still have the status of land.

אין נשבעין אלא על דבר שבמדה ושבמשקל כו': אמר אביי לא שנו אלא דאמר ליה בית סתם אבל אמר ליה בית זה מלא ידיעא טענתיה § The mishna teaches that one takes an oath only concerning an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number. How so? If the claimant says: I delivered to you a house full of produce, and the other person says: I do not know how much you gave me, but what you left in my possession you may take, and the amount in the house is less that that claimed by the claimant, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath. Abaye said: They taught this halakha only in a case where the claimant said to him: I gave you a house full of produce, without specification. But if he said to him: I gave you this specific house full of produce, his claim is known and defined, and the defendant is therefore required to take an oath concerning it.

א"ל רבא אי הכי אדתני סיפא זה אומר עד הזיז וזה אומר עד החלון חייב ליפלוג וליתני בדידה במה דברים אמורים בבית מלא אבל בית זה מלא חייב Rava said to him: If so, rather than teaching in the last clause of the mishna: If this party says that the house was full up to the ledge, and that party says that it was full up to the window, the defendant is liable to take an oath, let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself, where the claim was for a house full of produce, and say: In what case is this statement, that the defendant is exempt, said? It is said in a case where the claim was for an unspecified house full of produce; but if the claim was for this particular house full of produce, the defendant is liable to take an oath. Since the mishna did not make this distinction, evidently the defendant is exempt even if the claim is referring to a specific house.

אלא אמר רבא לעולם אינו חייב עד שיטעננו בדבר שבמדה שבמשקל ושבמנין ויודה לו בדבר שבמדה ושבמשקל ושבמנין Rather, Rava said: The defendant is never liable to take an oath unless the claimant claims from him an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number, and the defendant admits to him with regard to a part of the claim that is an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number.

תניא כוותיה דרבא כור תבואה לי בידך והלה אומר אין לך בידי פטור מנורה גדולה יש לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא מנורה קטנה פטור אזורה גדולה יש לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא אזורה קטנה פטור The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If the claimant says: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the other one says: Nothing of yours is in my possession, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath, as he denies the entire debt. If he says: I have a large candelabrum in your possession, and the defendant responds: You have only a small candelabrum in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath, as he admits not to part of the claim, but to possessing a different item. Similarly, if the claimant says: I have a large belt in your possession, and the defendant responds: You have only a small belt in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath.

אבל אמר לו כור תבואה יש לי בידך והלה אומר אין לך בידי אלא לתך חייב מנורה בת עשר ליטרין יש לי בידך אין לך בידי אלא בת חמש ליטרין חייב The baraita continues: But if the claimant said to him: I have a kor of produce in your possession, and the other one says: You have only a half-kor in my possession, he is liable to take an oath. Similarly, if the claimant says: I have a candelabrum weighing ten litra in your possession, and the defendant responds: You have only a five-litra candelabrum in my possession, he is liable to take an oath.

כללו של דבר לעולם אינו חייב עד שיטעננו בדבר שבמדה ושבמשקל ושבמנין ויודה לו בדבר שבמדה ושבמשקל ושבמנין The baraita concludes: The principle of the matter is that the defendant is never liable to take an oath unless the claimant claims from him an item that is defined by size, or by weight, or by number, and the defendant admits to him with regard to a part of the claim that is an item that is defined by size, by weight, or by number.

כללו של דבר לאתויי מאי לאו לאתויי בית זה מלא The Gemara asks: What does the baraita add that was not already taught, by mentioning the principle of the matter? Doesn’t the baraita mention this principle to add that even if the claim is for this specific house full of produce, the defendant is exempt, as this is not considered an item defined by size? Accordingly, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rava.

ומאי שנא מנורה גדולה ומנורה קטנה מה שטענו לא הודה לו ומה שהודה לו לא טענו אי הכי בת עשר בת חמש נמי מה שטענו לא הודה לו ומה שהודה לו לא טענו Having cited the baraita, the Gemara now analyzes it: What is different about a case where the claimant claimed a large candelabrum and the defendant admitted to owing a small candelabrum that renders the defendant exempt from taking an oath? It is because that which he claimed from him, he did not admit to at all, and that which he admitted to, he had not claimed from him. If so, in a case where the claimant claimed a ten-litra candelabrum and the defendant admitted to owing a five-litra candelabrum, the defendant should also be exempt, as that which he claimed from him, a heavier candelabrum, he did not admit to at all, and that which he admitted to, a lighter candelabrum, he had not claimed from him.

אמר ר' שמואל בר רב יצחק הכא במנורה של חליות עסקינן דקא מודה ליה מינה Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Here in the latter case we are dealing with a candelabrum composed of segments that detach; the defendant is liable to take an oath because he admits to owing him part of the candelabrum claimed by the claimant.

אי הכי אזורה נמי ניתני ולוקמי בדלייפי אלא דלייפי לא קתני הכא נמי בשל חליות לא קתני The Gemara asks: If so, let the baraita teach the case in which the defendant is liable to take an oath involving a belt as well, and interpret the case as referring to a belt made of pieces that are connected to each other; the claimant claims a belt with a larger number of pieces, and the defendant claims that he owes him a belt with fewer pieces. Rather, clearly the baraita is not teaching cases involving items made of pieces connected to each other. Here too, in the case of the candelabrum, the baraita is not teaching a case of a candelabrum composed of segments that detach.

אלא אמר ר' אבא בר ממל שאני מנורה הואיל ויכול לגוררה ולהעמידה על חמש ליטרין: Rather, Rabbi Abba bar Memel said that the case of a candelabrum is different because one can scrape a ten-litra candelabrum and reduce it to a five-litra one. Therefore, he admitted to a part of the claim.

מתני׳ המלוה את חבירו על המשכון ואבד המשכון אמר לו סלע הלויתיך עליו ושקל היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתני עליו וסלע היה שוה פטור MISHNA: There is a case of one who lends money to another on the basis of collateral, and the collateral was lost while in the possession of the creditor, and the creditor says to the debtor: I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and that collateral was worth a shekel, i.e., a half-sela. Therefore, you owe me a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says in response to that claim: That is not the case. Rather, you lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth a sela; I owe you nothing. In this case, the debtor is exempt from payment.

סלע הלויתיך עליו ושקל היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתני עליו ושלשה דינרים היה שוה חייב There is a case of a creditor who claims: I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth three dinars, i.e., three-quarters of a sela. In this case, the debtor is liable to take an oath, due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the creditor with a partial admission.

סלע הלויתני עליו ושתים היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתיך עליו וסלע היה שוה פטור סלע הלויתני עליו ושתים היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתיך עליו וחמשה דינרים היה שוה חייב If in that case the debtor said: You lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela, so now you owe me a sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth a sela. Here, the creditor is exempt. If in that case the debtor said: You lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth two sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case; rather, I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth five dinars. Here, the creditor is liable to take an oath due to the fact that he responded to the claim of the debtor with a partial admission.

ומי נשבע מי שהפקדון אצלו שמא ישבע זה ויוציא הלה את הפקדון: And who takes the oath? The one in whose possession the deposit had been located, i.e., the creditor, who took collateral from the debtor. The Sages instituted this provision lest this party, i.e., the debtor, take an oath and the other party, i.e., the creditor, produce the deposit and prove the oath false.

Daf 43b

גמ׳ אהייא אילימא אסיפא ותיפוק ליה דשבועה גבי מלוה GEMARA: To which case is the final statement in the mishna, which says the creditor is the one who takes the oath, referring? If we say it is referring to the case in the latter clause of the mishna, where the debtor claims that the collateral was worth more than the loan, derive this halakha from the fact that the oath is anyway taken by the creditor, as he is the defendant in this case. The additional statement is superfluous.

אמר שמואל ארישא וכן אמר רבי חייא בר רב ארישא וכן א"ר יוחנן ארישא In response, Shmuel says: This statement relates to the case in the first clause of the mishna, where the debtor is the defendant. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav similarly says that it relates to the first clause. And Rabbi Yoḥanan similarly says that it relates to the first clause.

מאי רישא סיפא דרישא סלע הלויתיך עליו ושקל היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתני עליו ושלשה דינרין היה שוה חייב דשבועה גבי לוה היא ושקלוה רבנן מלוה ושדיוה אמלוה The Gemara asks: What did the amora’im mean by: The first clause? The Gemara answers: They were not referring to the very first halakha in the mishna, but rather to the latter part of the first clause: There is a case of a creditor who claims: I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth three dinars, i.e., three-quarters of a sela. In this case, he is liable to take an oath. As in this case, the oath should in principle be taken by the debtor, since he is the one who admitted to a part of the creditor’s claim, but the Sages removed the obligation to take an oath from the debtor and imposed it on the creditor, deeming him liable to take an oath that the collateral was not worth more than a shekel.

והשתא דאמר רב אשי דקיימא לן זה נשבע שאינה ברשותו וזה נשבע כמה שוה הכי קאמר מי נשבע תחלה מי שהפקדון אצלו שמא ישבע זה ויוציא הלה את הפקדון The Gemara notes: And now that Rav Ashi says that we maintain that two oaths are taken in this case, as this party, the creditor, takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession, and that party, the debtor, takes an oath concerning how much the collateral was worth, this is what the mishna is saying: Who takes an oath first? The one in whose possession the deposit had been located, i.e., the creditor, first takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession, lest this party, the debtor, take an oath and then the other party, the creditor, produce the deposit and prove the oath false.

אמר שמואל האי מאן דאוזפיה אלפא זוזי לחבריה ומשכן ליה קתא דמגלא אבד קתא דמגלא אבד אלפא זוזי אבל תרתי קתאתי לא § Shmuel says: With regard to one who lent one thousand dinars to another and took from him the handle of a sickle as collateral, if the handle of the sickle is lost, the creditor has lost the entire sum of one thousand dinars, even though the lost collateral was worth less. But if he took two handles as collateral and only one of them was lost, the creditor does not lose the entire debt; he loses only the value of the handle that he lost.

ורב נחמן אמר אפי' תרתי קתאתי אבד חדא אבד חמש מאה אבד אידך אבד כוליה אבל קתא ונסכא לא נהרדעי אמרי אפילו קתא ונסכא אבד נסכא אבד פלגא אבד קתא אבד כוליה And Rav Naḥman says: Even if he took two handles and only one of them was lost, he has lost five hundred dinars, i.e., half the debt. If the other one was then also lost, he has lost the entire debt. But if he took a handle and a piece of silver as collateral and then lost the handle, he has not lost half the debt, as he presumably relied on the silver, not the handle, for payment. The Sages of Neharde’a say: Even if he took a handle and a piece of silver, and the piece of silver was lost, he has lost half the debt. If the handle was then lost, he has lost the entire debt.

תנן סלע הלויתיך עליו ושקל היה שוה והלה אומר לא כי אלא סלע הלויתני עליו ושלשה דינרין היה שוה חייב לימא ליה הא קבילתיה The Gemara challenges Shmuel’s opinion based on the mishna. We learned in the mishna: There is a case of a creditor who claims: I lent you a sela on the basis of that collateral and it was worth a shekel. And the other individual, the debtor, says: That is not the case; rather, you lent me a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth three dinars, i.e., three-quarters of a sela. In this case, the debtor is liable to take an oath. According to Shmuel’s opinion that if the collateral is lost, the debt is canceled, let the debtor say to him: You have already received repayment of the debt by means of the collateral.

מתניתין בדפריש שמואל בדלא פריש The Gemara answers: The halakha in the mishna is with regard to a case where the creditor stated explicitly that he is taking the collateral only to assure payment of the value of the item, and not as full repayment. Therefore, since there is a dispute with regard to the collateral’s monetary value, the two parties must litigate this matter. Shmuel, by contrast, was referring to a case where the creditor did not state explicitly whether he was taking the collateral to cover only its monetary value or the entire debt. In that case, it is presumed that he took it to cover the entire debt.

לימא כתנאי המלוה את חבירו על המשכון ואבד המשכון ישבע ויטול את מעותיו דברי רבי אליעזר רבי עקיבא אומר יכול הוא שיאמר לו כלום הלויתני אלא על המשכון אבד המשכון אבדו מעותיך The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Shmuel’s ruling is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is stated in a baraita: With regard to one who lends money to another on the basis of collateral, and the collateral was lost, he must take an oath that it was in fact lost and may then take his money; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiva says that the debtor can say to the creditor: Didn’t you lend me the money only on the basis of the collateral? Since the collateral was lost, your money is lost as well.

אבל המלוה אלף זוז בשטר והניח משכון בידו דברי הכל אבד המשכון אבדו מעותיו But with regard to one who lends another person one thousand dinars with a promissory note, and in addition to the note, the debtor left collateral in the creditor’s possession, all agree that since the collateral was lost, his money is lost as well. Since he had a promissory note as proof of the loan, the collateral was clearly taken as potential repayment.

היכי דמי אי דשוי שיעור זוזי The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances under which Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree? If it is a case where the collateral was worth the amount of money that he lent to him,

Daf 44a

מאי טעמיה דרבי אליעזר אלא לאו בדלא שוי שיעור זוזי ובדשמואל קא מיפלגי what is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that although the collateral was lost, the debtor is still liable to pay? Rather, is it not a case where the collateral was not worth the amount of money that he lent him? And accordingly, they disagree with regard to the ruling of Shmuel. Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, that if the collateral is lost the entire debt is canceled, and Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this opinion.

לא בדלא שוי כ"ע לית להו דשמואל והכא בדשוי שיעור זוזי ובדרבי יצחק קא מיפלגי דאמר רבי יצחק מנין לבעל חוב שקונה משכון שנאמר (דברים כד, יג) ולך תהיה צדקה The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, in a case where the collateral was not worth the value of the loan everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. But here the dispute is with regard to a case where the collateral was worth the amount of money that he lent him, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner as long as the item is in his possession? As it is stated with regard to a creditor who returns the collateral to the debtor for his personal use: “And it shall be a righteousness for you” (Deuteronomy 24:13).

אם אינו קונה משכון צדקה מנין לו מכאן לבעל חוב שקונה משכון Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is his righteousness? If the collateral is not his, the creditor would not be giving up anything of his own. From here it is derived that a creditor acquires the collateral. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with this opinion, maintaining that the creditor has the halakhic status of an unpaid bailee with respect to the collateral, so that he is exempt from paying restitution if it is stolen or lost. He can therefore collect the entire debt from the debtor. Rabbi Akiva agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and holds that since the creditor acquires the collateral, he bears financial responsibility to pay its value in the event of its loss. Therefore, he must deduct the value of the collateral when collecting payment of the debt.

לימא דרבי יצחק תנאי היא ותיסברא אימור דאמר רבי יצחק שמשכנו שלא בשעת הלואה משכנו בשעת הלואה מי אמר The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara answers: And how can you understand that? Say that Rabbi Yitzḥak says that a creditor acquires the collateral in a case where he took the collateral from him not at the time of the loan, but afterward, in order to induce him to return the loan, as described in the context of the aforementioned verse. But in a case where the creditor took the collateral from him at the time of the loan, does Rabbi Yitzḥak say that he has acquired it?

אלא משכנו שלא בשעת הלואתו כולי עלמא לא פליגי דאית להו דרבי יצחק והכא במשכנו בשעת הלואתו Rather, in a case where he took the collateral from him not at the time of the loan, everyone agrees that the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is accepted, and here, the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva is with regard to a case where he took the collateral from him at the time of the loan.

ובשומר אבדה קמיפלגי דאיתמר שומר אבדה רבה אמר כשומר חנם And they disagree with regard to the halakhic status of one who is safeguarding a lost item that he found but has not yet returned. As it was stated: With regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item, Rabba says that his halakhic status is like that of an unpaid bailee, who is exempt from paying restitution in the event that the item is lost or stolen,

Daf 44b

ורב יוסף אמר כשומר שכר דמי and Rav Yosef says that it is like that of a paid bailee, as while performing the mitzva of taking care of a lost item he is exempt from performing other mitzvot that involve the outlay of money, and the money that he saves is tantamount to payment received. Similarly, since safeguarding collateral is part of the mitzva to lend money to the needy, one who does so is exempt during that time from performing other mitzvot that involve the outlay of money. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling, that even if the collateral was lost the creditor collects the entire debt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, and Rabbi Akiva’s ruling, that the creditor loses the value of the collateral, is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef.

לימא דרב יוסף תנאי היא לא בשומר אבידה דכולי עלמא אית להו דרב יוסף והכא במלוה צריך למשכון קא מיפלגי מר סבר מצוה קא עביד ומר סבר לאו מצוה קא עביד The Gemara asks: If so, shall we say that the opinion of Rav Yosef is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, with regard to one who is safeguarding a lost item, everyone accepts the opinion of Rav Yosef. And here they disagree with regard to a case where the creditor needs the collateral and uses it with the permission of the debtor, deducting a usage fee from the debt. One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that he is still performing a mitzva by safeguarding it, and is therefore exempt from performing other mitzvot during that time. Consequently, he has the status of a paid bailee. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that since he derives benefit from the collateral, he is safeguarding it for his own benefit, and is not performing a mitzva. Therefore, he has the status of an unpaid bailee.

לימא כתנאי המלוה את חבירו על המשכון ונכנסה שמיטה אף על פי שאינו שוה אלא פלגא אינו משמט דברי רבן שמעון בן גמליאל רבי יהודה הנשיא אומר אם היה משכונו כנגד חובו אינו משמט ואם לאו משמט § The Gemara resumes discussion of Shmuel’s statement that if the creditor loses the collateral, the debt is canceled. Let us say that Shmuel’s ruling is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is stated in a baraita with regard to the halakha that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate debts for which collateral was taken: If one lends money to another on the basis of collateral and the Sabbatical Year commences, then even if the collateral is worth only half the value of the loan, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt; this is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the value of the collateral was commensurate with his debt, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt, but if it was not commensurate with the debt, the Sabbatical Year abrogates the debt.

מאי אינו משמט דקאמר תנא קמא אילימא כנגדו מכלל דרבי יהודה הנשיא סבר כנגדו נמי משמט אלא אמאי תפיס משכון The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: The Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt, which the first tanna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, says? If we say it means that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate that part of the debt that is commensurate with the collateral, but it does abrogate the rest, this indicates by inference that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the Sabbatical Year abrogates the entire debt, including the part commensurate with the collateral as well. But if this is so, why did the creditor seize collateral from the debtor at all?

אלא לאו כנגד כולו ובדשמואל קא מיפלגי Rather, is it not that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt at all, and the debtor is liable to pay an amount commensurate with the entire debt? And accordingly, they disagree with regard to Shmuel’s principle that collateral is considered equivalent to the entire debt, even if it is worth less than the debt.

לא לעולם כנגדו ובהא קמיפלגי תנא קמא סבר כנגדו ורבי יהודה הנשיא סבר כנגדו נמי משמט ודקא אמרת למאי תפיס ליה משכון לזכרון דברים בעלמא: The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, actually, the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt is referring only to the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral, and they disagree with regard to that part of the debt. The first tanna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it abrogates the part of the debt commensurate with the collateral as well. And as for the question you said: For what purpose did he seize collateral from him at all, the answer is that he takes it merely as a reminder, to increase the likelihood that the debt will be paid.

הדרן עלך שבועת הדיינין

מתני׳ כל הנשבעין שבתורה נשבעין ולא משלמין ואלו נשבעין ונוטלין השכיר והנגזל והנחבל ושכנגדו חשוד על השבועה וחנוני על פנקסו MISHNA: All those who take an oath that is legislated by the Torah take an oath and do not pay. By Torah law, one takes an oath only in order to exempt himself from a monetary claim. And these litigants take a rabbinically instituted oath and receive possession of the disputed funds or property, i.e., their claim is upheld by means of the oath, even though they are not in possession of the property in question: A hired worker who claims that he has not received his wages; and one who was robbed and sues the person who robbed him; and one who was injured, who claims compensation from the person who injured him; and one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath. When a person suspected of taking false oaths is liable to take an oath in order to exempt himself, the claimant takes an oath instead and receives payment. And a storekeeper relying on his ledger also takes an oath and is paid.

השכיר כיצד אמר לו תן לי שכרי שיש לי בידך הוא אומר נתתי והלה אומר לא נטלתי הוא נשבע ונוטל רבי יהודה אומר עד שתהא שם מקצת הודאה כיצד אמר לו תן לי שכרי חמשים דינר שיש לי בידך והוא אומר התקבלת דינר זהב How does this halakha apply to the hired worker? The case is where one says to his employer: Give me my wages that are still in your possession. The employer says: I already gave them to you. And that worker says: I have not received them. In such a case, the worker takes an oath that he has not received his wages, and he receives payment from his employer. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the employer. How so? The case is where the worker said to him: Give me my wages, fifty silver dinars, which are still in your possession. And the employer says: You have already received one golden dinar, which is worth twenty-five silver dinars. Since the employer has admitted that he owes part of the sum, the worker takes an oath and is paid the whole sum.

נגזל כיצד היו מעידין אותו שנכנס לביתו למשכנו שלא ברשות הוא אומר כליי נטלת והוא אומר לא נטלתי הוא נשבע ונוטל רבי יהודה אומר עד שתהא שם מקצת הודאה כיצד אמר לו שני כלים נטלת והוא אומר לא נטלתי אלא אחד How does this halakha apply to one who was robbed? The case is where witnesses testified about the defendant that he entered the claimant’s house to seize collateral from him without the authority to do so. The claimant said: You took items that belong to me. And the defendant said: I did not take them. The claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission on the part of the defendant. How so? The case is where the claimant said to him: You took two items. And he says: I took only one. Since the defendant admits that he took one item from the house, the claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his whole claim.

נחבל כיצד היו מעידים אותו שנכנס תחת ידו שלם ויצא חבול ואמר לו חבלת בי והוא אומר לא חבלתי הרי זה נשבע ונוטל רבי יהודה אומר עד שתהא שם מקצת הודאה כיצד אמר לו חבלת בי שתים והלה אומר לא חבלתי בך אלא אחת How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? The case is where witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole but left injured, and the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me. And the defendant says: I did not injure you. The injured party takes an oath and receives compensation. Rabbi Yehuda says: This oath cannot be administered unless there is partial admission. How so? The case is where the claimant said to the defendant: You injured me twice. And the other says: I injured you only once. In such a case, the injured party takes an oath that he was injured twice and receives compensation for both injuries.

שכנגדו חשוד על השבועה כיצד How does this halakha apply to one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath and therefore is not permitted to take the oath?

Daf 44b

הדרן עלך שבועת הדיינין

Daf 45a

אחת שבועת העדות ואחת שבועת הפקדון ואפילו שבועת שוא היה אחד מהן משחק בקוביא ומלוה ברבית ומפריחי יונים וסוחרי שביעית שכנגדו נשבע ונוטל One is considered suspect with regard to oaths if he has been found to have taken a false oath, whether it was an oath of testimony, or whether it was an oath on a deposit, or even an oath taken in vain, which is a less severe prohibition. There are also categories of people who by rabbinic decree are considered suspect with regard to oaths: If one of the litigants was a dice player, or one who lends with interest, or among those who fly pigeons, or among the vendors of produce of the Sabbatical Year, then the litigant opposing him takes an oath and receives payment of his claim.

היו שניהן חשודין חזרה השבועה למקומה דברי רבי יוסי רבי מאיר אומר יחלוקו If both litigants were suspect, the oath returned to its place. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, and will be explained in the Gemara. Rabbi Meir says: Since neither can take an oath, they divide the disputed amount.

והחנוני על פנקסו כיצד לא שיאמר לו כתוב על פנקסי שאתה חייב לי מאתים זוז אלא אומר לו תן לבני סאתים חטין תן לפועלי סלע מעות הוא אומר נתתי והן אומרים לא נטלנו הוא נשבע ונוטל והן נשבעין ונוטלין And how does this halakha apply to the storekeeper relying on his ledger? This ruling is not referring to the case where a storekeeper says to a customer: It is written in my ledger that you owe me two hundred dinars. Rather, it is referring to a case where a customer says to a storekeeper: Give my son two se’a of wheat, or: Give my laborers a sela in small coins. And later the storekeeper says: I gave it to them; but they say: We did not receive it. In such a case, where the father or employer admits that he gave those instructions and it is also recorded in the storekeeper’s ledger, the storekeeper takes an oath that he gave the son the wheat or paid the laborers, and he receives compensation from the father or employer; and the laborers take an oath that they were not paid and receive their wages from the employer.

אמר בן ננס כיצד אלו ואלו באין לידי שבועת שוא אלא הוא נוטל שלא בשבועה והן נוטלין שלא בשבועה Ben Nannas said: How is it that both these and those come to take an oath in vain? One of them is certainly lying. Rather, the storekeeper receives his compensation without taking an oath, and the laborers receive their wages without taking an oath.

אמר לחנוני תן לי בדינר פירות ונתן לו אמר לו תן לי אותו דינר אמר לו נתתיו לך ונתתו באונפלי ישבע בעל הבית שנתן לו את הדינר אמר לו תן לי את הפירות אמר לו נתתים לך והולכתים לתוך ביתך ישבע חנוני רבי יהודה אומר כל שהפירות בידו ידו על העליונה § If one said to a storekeeper: Give me produce valued at a dinar, and he gave him the produce. And later the storekeeper said to him: Give me that dinar you owe me, and the customer said to him: I gave it to you, and you put it in your wallet [be’unpali], the customer shall take an oath that he gave him the dinar. If, after he gave the storekeeper the money, the customer said to him: Give me the produce, and the storekeeper said to him: I gave it to you and you transported it to your house, the storekeeper shall take an oath that he has already filled the order, and he is exempt from supplying the produce. Rabbi Yehuda says: Whoever has the produce in his possession has the advantage, and his claim is accepted without his taking an oath.

אמר לשולחני תן לי בדינר מעות ונתן לו אמר לו תן לי את הדינר אמר לו נתתי לך ונתתו באונפלי ישבע בעל הבית נתן לו את הדינר אמר לו תן לי את המעות אמר לו נתתים לך והשלכת לתוך כיסך ישבע שולחני רבי יהודה אומר אין דרך שולחני ליתן איסר עד שיטול דינר Similarly, if one said to a money changer: Give me small coins valued at a dinar, and he gave him the coins, and subsequently the money changer said to him: Give me the dinar, and the customer said to him: I gave it to you, and you put it in your wallet; the customer shall take an oath that he paid. If the customer gave the money changer the dinar, and then said to him: Give me the coins, and the money changer said to him: I gave them to you and you cast them into your purse, the money changer shall take an oath. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not a money changer’s way to give even an issar until he receives a dinar. Therefore, the fact that the customer received the coins indicates that the money changer already received his payment.

כשם שאמרו הפוגמת כתובתה לא תפרע אלא בשבועה ועד אחד מעידה שהיא פרועה לא תפרע אלא בשבועה מנכסים משועבדים ומנכסי יתומים לא תפרע אלא בשבועה והנפרעת שלא בפניו לא תפרע אלא בשבועה וכן היתומים לא יפרעו אלא בשבועה § These cases of taking an oath are just like other cases where the Sages said that one takes an oath and receives payment. The mishna (see Ketubot 87a) teaches: A woman who vitiates her marriage contract by acknowledging receipt of partial payment may collect the remainder only by taking an oath; or if one witness testifies that her marriage contract has been paid, she may collect it only by taking an oath. She may collect it from liened property that has been sold to a third party, or from the property of orphans, only by taking an oath, and a woman who collects it from her husband’s property when not in his presence may collect it only by taking an oath. And likewise, orphans may collect a loan with a promissory note inherited from their father only by taking an oath.

שבועה שלא פקדנו אבא ולא אמר לנו אבא שלא מצינו בין שטרותיו של אבא ששטר זה פרוע ר' יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר אפי' נולד הבן לאחר מיתת האב הרי זה נשבע ונוטל א"ר שמעון בן גמליאל אם יש עדים שאמר האב בשעת מיתתו שטר זה אינו פרוע הוא נוטל שלא בשבועה Orphans who wish to collect payment of money owed to their father must take the following oath: On our oath our father did not direct us on his deathbed not to collect with this promissory note, and our father did not say to us that this note was paid, and we did not find among our father’s documents a record showing that this promissory note was paid. After taking that oath, they may collect the money. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even if the son was born after the father’s death, he needs to take an oath in order to receive the money owed to his father. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death: This promissory note has not been paid, the son collects the debt without having to take an oath.

ואלו נשבעין שלא בטענה השותפין והאריסין והאפוטרופין והאשה הנושאת והנותנת בתוך הבית ובן הבית אמר לו מה אתה טועניני רצוני שתשבע לי חייב § And these people are sometimes required to take an oath that they do not owe anything even when there is no explicit claim against them: Partners, sharecroppers, stewards [apotropin], a woman who does business from home, where she manages the property of orphans, and the member of the household appointed to manage the household’s affairs. For example, in a case where one of these people said to one of the people whose property he or she manages: What is your claim against me? If the other replied: It is simply my wish that you take an oath to me that you have not taken anything of mine, the former is liable to take that oath.

חלקו השותפין והאריסין אין יכול להשביעו נתגלגל לו שבועה ממקום אחר מגלגלין עליו את הכל והשביעית משמטת את השבועה: Once the partners or the sharecroppers have divided the common property, each taking his share, then one side may not require an oath of the other absent a definite claim. But if an oath was imposed upon him due to some other situation, that oath can be extended to impose upon him any other oath, i.e., it can be extended to apply to any other of their disputes. The mishna adds: And the Sabbatical Year abrogates the obligation to take an oath about a debt, just like it abrogates a debt.

גמ׳ כל הנשבעין שבתורה נשבעין ולא משלמין מנלן דאמר קרא (שמות כב, י) ולקח בעליו ולא ישלם מי שעליו לשלם לו שבועה: GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All those who take an oath that is legislated by the Torah take an oath and do not pay. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that oaths mandated by Torah law serve only to exempt one from payment? We derive it from the fact that the verse states: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both, to see whether he has not put his hand on his neighbor’s goods; and its owner shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution” (Exodus 22:10). According to the verse, with regard to he who would otherwise need to pay, it is on him that the obligation to take the oath is imposed.

ואלו נשבעין ונוטלין כו': מאי שנא שכיר דתקינו ליה רבנן דמשתבע ושקיל אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכות גדולות שנו כאן הלכות הני הלכתא נינהו אלא אימא תקנות גדולות שנו כאן § The mishna teaches: And these litigants take an oath and receive possession of the disputed funds or property, and it lists a hired worker in that category. The Gemara asks: What is different about a hired worker that the Sages instituted for him that he take an oath and receive his wages? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Great halakhot were taught here. The Gemara asks: Halakhot? Are these oaths actually halakhot transmitted to Moses from Sinai, as is usually indicated by the use of the term halakhot? They are instituted by rabbinic law. Rather, say: Great ordinances were taught here.

גדולות מכלל דאיכא קטנות The Gemara asks: Since these ordinances are called great, can one conclude by inference that there are also minor ordinances? Are there rabbinic ordinances that are less important?

אלא אמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל תקנות קבועות שנו כאן עקרוה רבנן לשבועה מבעל הבית ושדיוה אשכיר משום כדי חייו משום כדי חייו דשכיר קנסינן ליה לבעל הבית בעל הבית גופיה ניחא ליה דמשתבע שכיר ושקיל כי היכי דאיתגרון ליה פועלין Rather, Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: Permanent ordinances were taught here; the Sages uprooted the oath from the employer and imposed it upon the hired worker due to the fact that his wages are his livelihood. The Gemara asks: Due to the need to protect the hired worker’s livelihood, do we penalize the employer by leaving him vulnerable to a dishonest worker? The Gemara answers: The employer himself is amenable to the hired worker taking an oath and collecting his wages, so that laborers will accept employment from him. If the workers are not protected in this manner, they will be wary of accepting work.

אדרבה שכיר ניחא ליה דלשתבע בעל הבית ונפקע כי היכי דליגריה בעל הבית בעה"ב על כורחיה אגר שכיר נמי על כורחיה מיתגר אלא בעה"ב טרוד בפועליו הוא The Gemara asks: On the contrary, isn’t it preferable for the hired worker that in the case of a dispute between them the employer takes the oath and is released from payment? He would agree to this arrangement in order to create conditions in which the employer will readily hire him. If employers are exposed to the risk of being cheated by dishonest workers, they will be wary of hiring. The Gemara answers: The employer perforce hires workers, since he needs the work done. The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the hired worker also perforce accept employment, since he needs it for his livelihood? Rather, the reason the worker takes the oath is that the employer is distracted with managing his laborers, so it is reasonable to assume that he forgot to pay.

וליתב ליה בלא שבועה The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if it is presumed that the employer forgot to pay, let him give the wages to the worker without the worker taking an oath.

כדי להפיס דעתו של בעה"ב וליתב ליה בעדים טריחא ליה מילתא וליתב ליה מעיקרא שניהן רוצין בהקפה The Gemara explains: The oath was instituted to alleviate the concerns of the employer, to ensure him that he is not being cheated. And why did the Sages not institute that the employer should give the worker his wages in the presence of witnesses so that it could readily be established whether he was paid? The Gemara answers: Finding witnesses whenever he pays wages would be a burdensome matter for him. And why did the Sages not institute that the employer should give him his wages at the outset, when he hires him, so there would be no need for an oath? The Gemara answers: They both want the work to be done on credit, i.e., before the wages are paid, as sometimes the employer has no money ready when he hires a worker, and the worker also prefers receiving his money at the end of the day.

Daf 45b

אי הכי אפילו קצץ נמי אלמה תניא אומן אומר שתים קצצת לי והלה אומר לא קצצתי לך אלא אחת המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה קציצה ודאי מידכר דכיר ליה If so, then even with regard to the amount fixed as payment, the employer is apt to be forgetful. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita: If the craftsman says: You fixed two coins as my payment and the other, the employer, says: I fixed only one coin as your payment, the halakha is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant? The craftsman must bring witnesses to collect the additional sum; an oath is not sufficient. Why is it not assumed that the employer is distracted, and the craftsman would be allowed to take an oath and collect the amount he claims? The Gemara answers: With regard to the fixing of wages, he certainly remembers.

אי הכי אפי' עבר זמנו נמי אלמה תניא עבר זמנו ולא נתן לו הרי זה אינו נשבע ונוטל The Gemara asks: If so, then even if the time the wages were due had passed, the worker should be able to prove that he has not been paid by taking an oath. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita that if the established time for paying wages had passed, i.e., the night after the work was performed, and the employer had not given the worker his wages, he no longer can take an oath and receive his wages, but rather must bring witnesses to prove that he was not yet paid.

חזקה אין בעל הבית עובר בבל תלין והאמרת בעל הבית טרוד בפועליו הוא הני מילי מקמי דלימטי זמן חיובא הוא כי מטי זמן חיובא רמי אנפשיה ומידכר The Gemara answers: There is a presumption that the employer will not violate the prohibition against delaying payment of wages (see Leviticus 19:13) and will have paid the worker by the deadline. The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say that the employer is distracted with his laborers and is apt to forget to pay? The Gemara responds: This statement, that he is presumed to be distracted, applies only before the time arrives that he incurs liability for delaying payment of wages. When the time that he incurs liability arrives, he takes it upon himself to remember to pay.

וכי שכיר עובר משום (ויקרא יט, יג) בל תגזול גבי בעל הבית איכא תרי חזקי חדא דאין בעל הבית עובר (ויקרא יט, יג) בבל תלין וחדא דאין שכיר משהא שכרו The Gemara asks: Is the hired worker suspected of demanding his wages twice and violating the prohibition against robbery (see Leviticus 19:13)? The Gemara answers: With regard to the employer there are two presumptions supporting his claim that the wages were paid: One is that the employer will not violate the prohibition of delaying payment of wages, and one is that a hired worker will not defer requesting his wages. Therefore, if he is requesting his wages after the deadline, he probably already received them, and he no longer can prove his claim with only an oath.

אמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא ששכרו בעדים אבל שכרו שלא בעדים מתוך שיכול לומר לו לא שכרתיך מעולם יכול לומר לו שכרתיך ונתתי לך שכרך א"ל רבי יצחק יישר וכן אמר רבי יוחנן § Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: The Sages taught that a worker takes an oath and receives his wages only when the employer hired him in the presence of witnesses. But if he hired him not in the presence of witnesses, then since he could have made a more advantageous claim [miggo] and said to him: I never hired you, he can instead say to him: I hired you but already gave you your wages, and that claim is accepted by the court. There is a principle in halakha that one is deemed credible when he makes a less advantageous claim than he could have made. Rabbi Yitzḥak said to Rav Naḥman: That is correct; and so said Rabbi Yoḥanan.

מכלל דפליג עליה ר"ל איכא דאמרי מישתא הוה שתי ליה ושתיק ליה ואיכא דאמרי מישהא הוה שהי ליה ושתיק ליה The Gemara asks: Can one infer from the fact that Rabbi Yitzḥak said that it was specifically Rabbi Yoḥanan who says this, that Reish Lakish, who often engaged in disputes with Rabbi Yoḥanan, disagrees with him, even though Rabbi Yitzḥak did not report that he does? Some say that Reish Lakish was drinking at the time that Rabbi Yoḥanan made his statement and therefore was silent, and some say that he was waiting for him to complete his statement and therefore was silent. It remains unclear whether he disagreed.

איתמר נמי אמר רב מנשיא בר זביד אמר רב לא שנו אלא ששכרו בעדים אבל שכרו שלא בעדים מתוך שיכול לומר לו לא שכרתיך מעולם יכול לומר לו שכרתיך ונתתי לך שכרך It was also stated that Rav Menashya bar Zevid says that Rav says: The Sages taught that a worker takes an oath and receives his wages only when the employer hired him in the presence of witnesses. But if he hired him not in the presence of witnesses, since he could have said to him: I never hired you, he can instead say to him: I hired you but already gave you your wages, and that claim is accepted by the court.

אמר רמי בר חמא כמה מעליא הא שמעתא אמר ליה רבא מאי מעליותא א"כ שבועת שומרין דחייב רחמנא היכי משכחת לה מתוך שיכול לומר לו לא היו דברים מעולם יכול לומר לו נאנסו § Rami bar Ḥama said: How excellent is this halakha. Rava said to him: What is its excellence? If the halakha is so, how can you ever find an instance of the oath of the bailees concerning a deposit that the Merciful One imposed? Since the bailee could say to the owner: These events never occurred, i.e., I never accepted a deposit from you, he can say to him: The deposit was lost by accident. He will not need to take an oath to support his claim, since he would have been deemed credible without taking an oath if he had denied accepting the deposit at all.

דאפקיד ליה בעדים מתוך שיכול לומר לו החזרתיו לך יכול לומר לו נאנסו Rami Bar Ḥama answered: The oath of the bailees is still relevant where the owner deposited the item with him in the presence of witnesses. Rava retorts: Even then, since he could say to him: I already returned it to you, and his claim would be accepted without his taking an oath, he can say to him: The deposit was lost by accident, and his claim will be accepted without his taking an oath.

דאפקיד ליה בשטרא Rami bar Ḥama answered: The oath of the bailees is still relevant where the owner deposited the item with him, with a document given as a receipt. Possession of the receipt serves as evidence that the bailee has not returned the deposit.

מכלל דתרוייהו סבירא להו המפקיד אצל חבירו בעדים אין צריך להחזיר לו בעדים בשטר צריך להחזיר לו בעדים The Gemara comments: By inference from their statements, one may conclude that both Rava and Rami bar Ḥama hold that if one deposits an item with another person in the presence of witnesses, he does not need to return it to him in the presence of witnesses, and his claim that he returned it without witnesses is accepted. But if one deposits an item with another person with a document given as a receipt, he needs to return it to him in the presence of witnesses, who can testify that it was returned.

קרי רמי בר חמא עליה דרב ששת (שמואל א כא, יג) וישם דוד את הדברים האלה בלבו דאשכחיה רב ששת לרבה בר שמואל אמר ליה תני מר מידי בשכיר אמר ליה אין תנינא שכיר בזמנו נשבע ונוטל כיצד בזמן שאמר לו שכרתני ולא נתת לי שכרי והלה אומר שכרתיך ונתתי לך שכרך אבל אמר לו שתים קצצת לי והלה אומר לא קצצתי לך אלא אחת המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה § Rami bar Ḥama would cite this verse about Rav Sheshet: “And David laid up these words in his heart” (I Samuel 21:13), as Rav Sheshet took it upon himself to find sources that would support or contradict the statements of Rav and Shmuel. As it is recounted that Rav Sheshet encountered Rabba bar Shmuel and said to him: Does the Master teach any halakhot about a hired worker? Rabba bar Shmuel said to him: Yes, I teach this baraita (Tosefta 6:1): A hired worker within his time for receiving wages takes an oath and receives payment. How so? This applies in a case when the worker said to the employer: You hired me but did not give me my wages, and the other, the employer, says: I hired you and gave you your wages. But if the hired worker said to him: You fixed two coins as my payment, and the other, the employer, says: I fixed only one coin as your payment, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, who must provide witnesses to testify that the wage was the greater sum.

הא מדסיפא בראיה הוי רישא בלא ראיה Rav Sheshet suggested: Since the latter clause addresses a case in which proof, witness testimony, is required, the first clause must address a case in which proof is not required. This contradicts the statements of Rav and Shmuel above that the worker may take an oath and receive payment only when he has witnesses that this person hired him.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Daf 46a

רישא וסיפא בראיה ראיה דלשלם קתני ראיה דשבועה לא קתני Both the first clause and the latter clause address cases in which proof is required, as even in the first clause the worker must have witnesses testifying that he was actually hired. The baraita does not mention it because it teaches only with regard to proof that requires the employer to pay, but it does not teach with regard to proof that makes it possible for the worker to take an oath and receive payment.

א"ר ירמיה בר אבא שלחו ליה מבי רב לשמואל ילמדנו רבינו אומן אומר שתים קצצת לי והלה אומר לא קצצתי לך אלא אחת מי נשבע אמר להן בזו ישבע בעל הבית ויפסיד אומן קציצה ודאי מידכר דכירי אינשי § Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: After Rav’s death the Sages sent the following message to Shmuel from the study hall of Rav: Our teacher, instruct us with regard to the case where the craftsman says: You fixed two coins as my payment; and the other, the employer, says: I fixed only one coin as your payment. Who takes an oath? Shmuel told them: In that case, the employer shall take an oath to support his claim and the craftsman shall lose the difference. With regard to the fixing of wages, people certainly remember. The Sages instituted the oath taken by the worker where he claims he has not been paid in a situation where it is reasonable to presume that the employer is distracted and apt to forget.

איני והא תני רבה בר שמואל קצץ המע"ה ואי לא מייתי ראיה פקע אמאי ישבע בעל הבית ויפסיד אומן אמר רב נחמן לצדדין קתני או מביא ראיה ויטול או ישבע בעל הבית ויפסיד אומן The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabba bar Shmuel teach in a baraita: If there is a dispute with regard to the sum fixed as wages, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, i.e., the craftsman, and if he does not bring proof, his claim is dismissed. The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: Why? Have the employer take an oath, and only then shall the craftsman lose the difference, in accordance with Shmuel’s ruling. Rav Naḥman said: Shmuel teaches the baraita disjunctively: Either the craftsman brings proof and receives the amount he claims, or the employer takes an oath, and the craftsman loses the difference.

מיתיבי הנותן טליתו לאומן אומן אומר קצצת לי שתים והלה אומר לא קצצתי לך אלא אחת כל זמן שטלית ביד אומן על בעה"ב להביא ראיה נתנה לו בזמנו נשבע ונוטל עבר זמנו המע"ה The Gemara raises an objection to Shmuel’s ruling from a baraita: With regard to one who gives his cloak to a craftsman for mending, and then the craftsman says: You fixed two dinars as my payment, and that one, the owner, says: I fixed only one dinar as your payment, then so long as it is so that the cloak is in the possession of the craftsman, it is incumbent upon the owner to bring proof that the fee was one dinar. If the craftsman gave the cloak back to him, then there are two scenarios: If the claim is lodged in its proper time, i.e., on the day of the cloak’s return, then the craftsman takes an oath and receives the two dinars. But if its proper time passed, then the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, and the craftsman would need to bring proof that the fee was two dinars.

בזמנו מיהא נשבע ונוטל אמאי ישבע בעה"ב ויפסיד אומן The Gemara states the objection: In any event, the baraita states that if the claim is lodged in its proper time, the craftsman takes an oath and receives his payment. According to Shmuel’s ruling why should this be so? The employer should take an oath, and the craftsman should lose the difference.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק הא מני ר' יהודה היא דאמר כל זמן ששבועה נוטה אצל בעה"ב שכיר נשבע ונוטל Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Any time that the basic obligation to take an oath is directed at the employer, as in this case, as he admits to part of the claim, the Sages instituted that the obligation to take the oath is transferred, and the hired worker takes an oath and receives his payment. But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the employer takes an oath and is exempted, as Shmuel ruled.

הי ר' יהודה אילימא ר' יהודה דמתניתין אחמורי קא מחמיר דתנן רבי יהודה אומר עד שתהא שם מקצת הודאה The Gemara asks: To which statement of Rabbi Yehuda is Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak referring? If we say he is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna (44b), how can that be? There, he is being stringent, and restricts the cases where the worker takes an oath and receives payment, more so than the Rabbis, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: The worker does not take an oath and receive payment without any other proof unless there is partial admission on the part of the employer with regard to payment of the wages.

אלא רבי יהודה דברייתא דתניא שכיר כל זמן שלא עבר עליו זמנו הרי זה נשבע ונוטל ואם לאו אינו נשבע ונוטל ואמר ר' יהודה אימתי בזמן שאמר לו תן לי שכרי חמשים דינר שיש לי בידך והוא אומר התקבלת מהן דינר זהב או שאמר לו שתים קצצת והלה אומר לא קצצתי לך אלא אחת Rather, he is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in a baraita; as it is taught: A hired worker, as long as the time allotted for him to receive his wages has not passed, takes an oath and receives payment of his claim, and if not, i.e., the time has passed, he does not take an oath and receive payment. And Rabbi Yehuda said: When does the worker take such an oath? It is in a situation when he said to his employer: Give me my wages of fifty silver dinars, which are still in your possession. And the employer says: You have already received a golden dinar, equal to twenty-five silver dinars, from them. Alternatively, the worker said to him: You fixed two coins as my payment; and the other, the employer, says: I fixed only one coin as your payment.

אבל אמר לו לא שכרתיך מעולם או שאמר לו שכרתיך ונתתי לך שכרך המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה The baraita continues: But if the employer said to him: I never hired you, or he said to him: I hired you but gave you your wages, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, i.e., the worker. Rabbi Yehuda rules that it is only when they disagree about the amount of the wages owed to the worker that the worker takes an oath and is paid his claim by his employer.

מתקיף לה רב שישא בריה דרב אידי אלא קצץ רבי יהודה היא ולא רבנן השתא היכי דמחמיר רבי יהודה מקילי רבנן היכא דמקיל רבי יהודה מחמרי רבנן Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: But is this baraita, which says that the craftsman can take an oath about the sum fixed as the price, the opinion of only Rabbi Yehuda, and not that of the Rabbis? Now, where Rabbi Yehuda is stringent and restricts the opportunities of the worker to take an oath and receive payment in the mishna, the Rabbis are lenient, granting the worker the right to take an oath as proof that he has not been paid, then in a case where Rabbi Yehuda is lenient in the dispute described in the baraita concerning the amount fixed as wages, granting the worker the right to take an oath as proof of his claim, would the Rabbis be stringent with regard to the worker and grant the employer the right to take an oath and be exempt?

ואלא מאי רבנן ואלא הא דתני רבה בר שמואל קצץ המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה מני לא רבי יהודה ולא רבנן The Gemara wonders: Rather, what can be said, that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? But if so, then with regard to that baraita that Rabba bar Shmuel teaches, that in a dispute about the sum fixed for the craftsman’s wages the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, whose opinion is it? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and not that of the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Yehuda the craftsman takes an oath to prove his claim about the wage, and according to the Rabbis, it is the employer who must take an oath to exempt himself from paying the higher wage.

אלא אמר רבא בהא קמיפלגי רבי יהודה סבר בדאורייתא עבדו ליה תקנתא לשכיר ובדרבנן הואי תקנתא ותקנתא לתקנתא לא עבדינן Rather, Rava said that they disagree about this: Rabbi Yehuda holds that only in the case of an oath mandated by Torah law did the Sages institute an ordinance for the benefit of the hired worker that he can take an oath to support his claim. When the employer’s claim contains an admission to part of the claim of the worker, the employer is required by Torah law to take an oath to support his claim. But with regard to an oath mandated by rabbinic law, such as where the employer denies owing any money, where according to Shmuel he still must take an oath, the original oath is already an ordinance, and we do not institute an ordinance to adjust an already-instituted ordinance.

ורבנן סברי בדרבנן נמי עבדינן תקנתא לשכיר וקציצה מידכר דכיר: And the Rabbis hold that with regard to an oath mandated by rabbinic law, we also institute an ordinance for the benefit of the hired worker; but with regard to a dispute about the amount fixed as wages, they maintain that the employer will remember the amount, and therefore he takes the oath and is exempt, as Shmuel ruled. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the worker takes the oath in that case, as the employer admits to part of the claim, and the Sages transferred the oath to the worker as the means by which he can prove his claim. Rav Sheisha’s objection is therefore not valid. The difference between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis is not that Rabbi Yehuda is more stringent; rather, it relates to the circumstances under which they see fit to have the worker take the oath.

נגזל כיצד היו מעידין אותו שנכנס לביתו למשכנו כו': ודלמא לא משכנו מי לא אמר רב נחמן האי מאן דנקיט נרגא בידיה ואמר איזיל ואקטליה לדקלא דפלניא ואשתכח דקטיל ושדי לא אמרינן דהוא קטליה § The mishna teaches: How does the halakha of the worker taking an oath and receiving payment apply to one who was robbed? The case is where witnesses testified about the defendant that he entered the claimant’s house to seize collateral from him without the authority to do so. The claimant said: You took items that belong to me; and the defendant said: I did not take them. The claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. The Gemara challenges: Perhaps he did not seize anything as collateral from him? The witnesses testify only to the fact that he entered the house for that purpose. Doesn’t Rav Naḥman say: With regard to one who takes an ax in his hand and says: I will go and chop down so-and-so’s palm tree, and the palm tree is found chopped down and tossed on the ground, we do not say that he chopped it down, but rather we search for evidence?

אלמא עביד איניש דגזים ולא עביד הכא נמי דגזים ולא עביד אימא ומשכנו וליחזי מאי משכנו אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן בטוענו כלים הניטלין תחת כנפיו Evidently, a person is prone to bluster without acting on his threat. Here, also, it could be that he was blustering about seizing collateral, but did not act on it. The Gemara answers: Say that the case in the mishna is where the witnesses testify that he entered the house and seized collateral from him. The Gemara asks: If so, let us ask the witnesses and see what items he seized as collateral from him, and there will be no need for an oath. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is a case where one claims that the defendant took items that can be carried beneath his garments, and the witnesses could not see what they were.

אמר רב יהודה ראוהו שהטמין כלים תחת כנפיו ויצא § Rav Yehuda says, concerning a similar topic: If witnesses saw a person who entered another’s house, concealed items beneath his garments, and left,

Daf 46b

ואמר לקוחין הן בידי אינו נאמן ולא אמרן אלא בעל הבית שאינו עשוי למכור כליו אבל בעל הבית העשוי למכור את כליו נאמן ושאין עשוי למכור את כליו נמי לא אמרן אלא דברים שאין דרכן להטמין אבל דברים שדרכן להטמין נאמן and then that person says: They were purchased and that is why they are in my possession, he is not deemed credible. And we said this only with regard to items taken from a homeowner who is not apt to sell his items; but with regard to a homeowner who is apt to sell his items, the one taking the items is deemed credible. And even with regard to a homeowner who is not apt to sell his items, we said that the one carrying the items is not deemed credible only with regard to items that are not typically concealed; but with regard to items that are typically concealed, he is deemed credible.

ושאין דרכן להטמין נמי לא אמרן אלא איניש דלא צניע אבל איניש דצניע היינו אורחיה ולא אמרן אלא זה אומר שאולין וזה אומר לקוחין אבל בגנובין לאו כל כמיני' לאחזוקי איניש בגנבי לא מחזקינן And even with regard to items that are not typically concealed, we said that he is not deemed credible only with regard to a person who is not generally secretive, but with regard to a person who is generally secretive, that is his manner, i.e., he would be likely to conceal items beneath his clothing, and he is deemed credible. And we said this only when this one, the homeowner, says: The items are borrowed, and that one who took the items, says: They are purchased, but in a case where the homeowner claims that the items are stolen, it is not in his power to have his accusation accepted, as we do not presume a person to be a thief.

ולא אמרן אלא בדברים העשוין להשאיל ולהשכיר אבל דברים שאין עשוין להשאיל ולהשכיר נאמן דשלח רב הונא בר אבין דברים העשוין להשאיל ולהשכיר ואמר לקוחין הן בידי אינו נאמן כי הא דרבא אפיק זוגא דסרבלא וספרא דאגדתא מיתמי בדברים העשוין להשאיל ולהשכיר Furthermore, we said that the one who claims he purchased the items is not deemed credible only with regard to items that are typically lent or rented, where the homeowner’s claim that they must now be returned is more reasonable; but for items that are not typically lent or rented, the person who took them is deemed credible. As Rav Huna bar Avin sent a ruling to the Sages: With regard to items that are typically lent or rented that someone took and said: They were purchased and that is why they are in my possession, he is not deemed credible. This is like that incident where Rava ruled to expropriate fabric scissors and a book of aggada from orphans whose father had taken them, as they were items that are typically lent or rented.

אמר רבא אפילו שומר נשבע אפי' אשתו של שומר נשבעת בעי רב פפא שכירו ולקיטו מאי תיקו The oath of one who was robbed can be taken by others as well. Rava says: Even a watchman at the house can take the oath, and even the wife of the watchman can take the oath. Rav Pappa asks: With regard to the employer’s regular hired worker or his regular harvester, who are not appointed to safeguard the employer’s property, what is the halakha? The Gemara responds: The question shall stand unresolved.

אמר ליה רב יימר לרב אשי טענו בכסא דכספא מאי חזינא אי איניש דאמיד הוא או איניש דמהימן הוא דמפקדי אינשי גביה משתבע ושקיל ואי לא לא: Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If one states a claim against another that he left his house with a silver cup and is liable to return it, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi replied: We see if the owner of the house is an affluent person, or if he is a trustworthy person with whom people deposit their valuables, as those are people who would typically have a silver cup. If the homeowner is in these categories he takes an oath and receives payment of his claim; but if he is not, he does not receive the benefit of taking an oath in order to prove his claim.

נחבל כיצד: אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא במקום שיכול לחבל בעצמו אבל במקום שאינו יכול לחבל בעצמו נוטל שלא בשבועה § The mishna teaches: How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? If witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole, but left injured, the injured party may take an oath and receive compensation. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The Sages taught that he needs to take an oath in order to receive compensation only if he was injured in a place where he is able to injure himself, but if he was injured in a place where he is unable to injure himself, he receives compensation without taking an oath.

וניחוש דלמא בכותל נתחכך תני רבי חייא שעלתה לו נשיכה בגבו ובין אצילי ידיו ודלמא אחר עביד ליה דליכא אחר: The Gemara challenges: And let us be concerned that perhaps he scraped against a wall and caused the injury himself. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that the mishna is referring to a case where, for example, he has a bite on his back or on his elbows, which must have been caused by someone else. The Gemara challenges: And perhaps a different person did it to him, and not the defendant. The Gemara explains: This is a case where there is no other person with him besides the defendant.

וכשנגדו חשוד [וכו'] ואפי' שבועת שוא: מאי אפילו שבועת שוא § The mishna teaches: How does this halakha apply to one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath and therefore is not permitted to take the oath? One is suspected if he had been found to have taken a false oath, whether it was an oath of testimony or an oath on a deposit, which are prescribed by Torah law, or even an oath taken in vain. The Gemara asks: For what reason does the mishna emphasize: Even an oath taken in vain?

לא מיבעיא קאמר לא מיבעיא הנך דאית בהו כפירת ממון אלא אפילו הא נמי דכפירת דברים בעלמא הוא לא מהימן The Gemara explains: The mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state that one who is suspected of falsifying these oaths is disqualified from taking oaths, as they entail the denial of a monetary claim, i.e., due to the false oath someone incurs financial loss, but it is necessary to state that even that oath, an oath taken in vain, which involves merely the repudiation of one’s verbal commitment, nevertheless grants one the status of a person who is not credible and who is disqualified from taking oaths.

וליתני נמי שבועת בטוי כי קתני שבועה דכי קא משתבע בשקרא קא משתבע אבל שבועת בטוי דאיכא למימר דבקושטא קא משתבע לא קתני The Gemara suggests: And let the tanna also teach that falsifying an oath on an utterance, which is also an oath without monetary consequences, disqualifies one from taking oaths. The Gemara responds: When the tanna teaches which types of false oaths disqualify a person, it includes only oaths with regard to which when one takes the oath, he is at that time falsely taking the oath. But with regard to an oath on an utterance, such as an oath that he will eat a specific fruit that day, where it can be said that he took the oath with true intention and intended to eat that fruit, but ultimately failed to do so, the tanna does not teach, as one who does not fulfill such an oath retains his credibility to take oaths, since he did not consciously lie.

תינח אוכל ולא אוכל אכלתי ולא אכלתי מאי איכא למימר תנא שבועת שוא The Gemara raises a difficulty: It works out well to make this distinction for one who is liable for an oath on an utterance like: I will eat, or: I will not eat, where it is possible that he was not lying when he took the oath. But with regard to oaths about the past like: I ate, or: I did not eat, what can be said, since he certainly took a false oath? The Gemara answers: Teach the mishna, i.e., understand it to mean: An oath taken in vain

Daf 47a

וכל דדמי ליה: and any oath that is similar to it, i.e., that is clearly a falsehood, disqualifies one from further oath taking.

היה אחד מהן משחק בקוביא: הא תו למה לי תנא פסולא דאוריית' וקתני פסולא דרבנן: § The mishna teaches: If one of the litigants was a dice player, or one who lends with interest, or among those who fly pigeons, or among the vendors of produce that grew during the Sabbatical Year, then the litigant opposing him takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. The Gemara asks: Why do I need these additional examples of a person who is suspect with regard to oath taking? The Gemara explains: The mishna first teaches examples of people who are disqualified by Torah law, and then teaches examples of those who are disqualified by rabbinic law.

היו שניהן חשודין: א"ל רבא לרב נחמן היכי תנן א"ל לא ידענא הלכתא מאי א"ל לא ידענא § The mishna teaches: If both litigants were suspect, the oath returned to its place; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Meir says: Since neither can take an oath, they divide the disputed amount. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: How is it actually taught? What is Rabbi Yosei’s opinion and what is Rabbi Meir’s opinion? Rav Naḥman said to him: I do not know. Rava asked him: What is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: I do not know.

איתמר אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן ר' יוסי אומר יחלוקו וכן תני רב זביד בר אושעיא ר' יוסי אומר יחלוקו איכא דאמרי תני רב זביד א"ר אושעיא ר' יוסי אומר יחלוקו אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי עבד רב נחמן עובדא יחלוקו: It was stated that Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says that Rabbi Yosei says: They divide the disputed amount. And similarly, Rav Zevid bar Oshaya teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: They divide the disputed amount. The Gemara records a slightly different version of this tradition: There are those who say that Rav Zevid teaches that Rabbi Oshaya says that Rabbi Yosei says: They divide the disputed amount. Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Naḥman ruled in an actual case that the litigants divide the disputed amount.

חזרה שבועה למקומה: להיכן חזרה א"ר אמי רבותינו שבבבל אמרו חזרה שבועה לסיני רבותינו שבארץ ישראל אמרו חזרה שבועה למחויב לה § Rabbi Yosei rules in the mishna that in a case where both sides are suspect and cannot take an oath, the oath returned to its place. The Gemara asks: To where did it return? What is meant by the oath returning to its place? Rabbi Ami said that our Sages in Babylonia say: The oath returned to Sinai, where God administered an oath to the Jewish people that they would keep the mitzvot of the Torah, including the prohibition against robbery. The litigant who is robbing the other will be punished by God, not the court. Our Sages in Eretz Yisrael said: The oath returned to the one who was initially liable to take it, i.e., the defendant, and since he is disqualified from taking an oath, he must pay.

אמר רב פפא רבותינו שבבבל רב ושמואל רבותינו שבארץ ישראל ר' אבא רבותינו שבבבל רב ושמואל דתנן וכן היתומין לא יפרעו אלא בשבועה והוינן בה ממאן אילימא מלוה אבוהון שקיל בלא שבועה ואינהו בשבועה אלא הכי קאמר וכן היתומין מן היתומין לא יפרעו אלא בשבועה Rav Pappa said that the term: Our Sages in Babylonia, refers to Rav and Shmuel; and the term: Our Sages in Eretz Yisrael, refers to Rabbi Abba. The fact that the term: Our Sages in Babylonia, refers to Rav and Shmuel is as we learned in the mishna (45a): And likewise, orphans may collect a loan with a promissory note inherited from their father only by taking an oath; and we discussed it (see 48a), asking: From whom do they collect a debt by taking an oath? If we say that they collect this way from the borrower, i.e., those who borrowed from their fathers, that would not make sense. Their father would take payment with the promissory note without taking an oath, and they collect only by means of taking an oath? Don’t orphans have privileged status? Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: And even orphans do not collect with their father’s promissory note from the borrower’s orphans, except by means of taking an oath.

ורב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו לא שנו אלא שמת מלוה בחיי לוה אבל מת לוה בחיי מלוה כבר נתחייב מלוה לבני לוה שבועה ואין אדם מוריש שבועה לבניו Rav Pappa continues: And Rav and Shmuel both say that the Sages taught that the lender’s orphans need to take an oath in order to be paid by the borrower’s orphans only when the lender died during the lifetime of the borrower, and the lender’s children had an opportunity to collect directly from the borrower without taking an oath. But if the borrower died during the lifetime of the lender, the lender has already become liable to take an oath to the children of the borrower, since one can collect from orphans only by means of an oath, and a person cannot bequeath an oath, i.e., a debt that requires the taking of an oath in order to be collected, to his children, and no payment is made. The lender’s children cannot take the oath that their father would have taken, that the promissory note has not been paid. The only oath they can take is that their father never told them that it had been paid, and that is insufficient once the father became liable to take an oath. From here it is clear that Rav and Shmuel hold that when no oath can be taken, the oath returns to Sinai, and the court takes no action.

רבותינו שבארץ ישראל רבי אבא דההוא גברא דחטף נסכא מחבריה אתא לקמיה דרב אמי יתיב ר' אבא קמיה אייתי חד סהדא דמחטף חטפא מיניה א"ל אין חטפי ודידי חטפי The fact that the term: Our Sages in Eretz Yisrael, refers to Rabbi Abba is as the following story illustrates. As there was a certain man who snatched a piece of cast metal from another. The one from whom it was taken came before Rav Ami while Rabbi Abba was sitting before him, and he brought one witness who testified that the other man did, in fact, snatch it from him. The one who snatched it said to him: Yes, it is true that I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine.

א"ר אמי היכי לידיינו דייני להאי דינא נימא ליה זיל שלים ליכא תרי סהדי נפטריה איכא חד סהדא נימא ליה זיל אישתבע כיון דאמר מיחטף חטפי הוה ליה כגזלן Rabbi Ami said: How should judges rule in this case? If they were to say to the one who snatched the metal: Go pay for it, that would not be the correct ruling, because there are not two witnesses who saw him snatch it, and the court does not force payment based on the testimony of one witness. If they were to accept his claim and exempt him entirely, that would not be the correct ruling, because there is one witness who testified against him. If they were to say to him: Go take an oath, which is the usual response to counter the testimony of one witness, once he said that he did in fact snatch it, and there is no proof that it is his, he is like a robber, and the court does not allow a robber to take an oath.

א"ל ר' אבא הוה מחויב שבועה ואין יכול לישבע וכל המחויב שבועה ואינו יכול לישבע משלם Rabbi Abba said to him: He is one who is liable to take an oath who is unable to take an oath, and anyone who is liable to take an oath who is unable to take an oath is liable to pay. This illustrates that Rabbi Abba holds that the oath returns to its place, i.e., to the defendant, who is disqualified from taking oaths, and that consequently he must pay.

אמר רבא כוותיה דרבי אבא מסתברא דתני רבי אמי (שמות כב, י) שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם ולא בין היורשין היכי דמי Rava said: It stands to reason that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abba; as Rabbi Ami teaches this baraita: The verse states that “the oath of the Lord shall be between them both” (Exodus 22:10), but not between their heirs. What are the circumstances in which one would be liable to take an oath, but his heirs would be exempt?

אילימא דאמר ליה מנה לאבא ביד אביך ואמר ליה חמשין אית ליה וחמשין לית ליה מה לי הוא ומה לי אבוהא If we say that it is where the lender’s son said to the borrower’s son: One hundred dinars that belonged to my father were in the possession of your father, as a loan, and you must repay me, and the borrower’s son said to him: He had a debt of fifty, and the other fifty he did not have to pay him, i.e., he did not owe it, that is difficult. Under these circumstances, what does it matter to me if it is he, the borrower’s heir, or his father, the original borrower? Since the son is admitting that he owes part of the money and denying the rest with certainty, he is liable to take an oath, just like his father would have been.

אלא לאו דאמר ליה מנה לאבא ביד אביך אמר ליה חמשין ידענא וחמשין לא ידענא Rather, is it not that the lender’s son said to the borrower’s son: One hundred dinars that were my father’s were left in the possession of your father, and you must repay me, and the borrower’s son said to him: Concerning fifty dinars, I know that my father owed them, but I do not know anything about the other fifty dinars.

Daf 47b

אי אמרת בשלמא אביו כי האי גוונא מיחייב איצטריך קרא למיפטר גבי יורשין אלא אי אמרת אביו כי האי גוונא נמי פטור קרא גבי יורשין למה לי Rabba continues: Granted, if you say that his father, in a case like this, would be liable to take an oath, due to his partial admission, then the verse was necessary to exempt the heirs from taking the oath. But if you say that in a case like this, his father is also exempt from taking an oath, why do I need a verse about exempting the heirs? Evidently, an oath reverts to one who is liable to take it, and when he cannot take that oath he must pay the claim against him.

ורב ושמואל האי שבועת ה' מאי קא דרשי ביה The Gemara asks: And as for Rav and Shmuel, who hold that one who cannot take an oath does not have to pay, and therefore there is no difference between the heirs and the father, what do they derive from this verse: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both” (Exodus 22:10)?

מיבעי ליה לכדתניא שמעון בן טרפון אומר שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם מלמד שהשבועה חלה על שניהם The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Shimon ben Tarfon says: The verse: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both,” teaches that when one litigant imposes an oath on the other, and he takes a false oath, the oath applies to them both, i.e., they are both held responsible for the desecration of God’s name.

שמעון בן טרפון אומר אזהרה לעוקב אחר נואף מנין ת"ל (שמות כ, יג) לא תנאף לא תנאיף Since this Sage was mentioned, the Gemara cites some of his other statements. Shimon ben Tarfon says: With regard to the prohibition of following after an adulterer, i.e., providing him with assistance in carrying out adultery, from where is it derived? The verse states: “You shall not commit adultery [lo tinaf ]” (Exodus 20:13). If the verse is vocalized slightly differently, it may be read: You shall not cause adultery [lo tanif ].

(דברים א, כז) ותרגנו באהליכם שמעון בן טרפון אומר תרתם וגיניתם באהלו של מקום Commenting on the verse describing the response of the Jewish people to the spies’ slander of Eretz Yisrael: “And you murmured [vatteragenu] in your tents and said: Because the Lord hated us, He has brought us forth out of the land of Egypt, to deliver us into the hand of the Amorites, to destroy us” (Deuteronomy 1:27), Shimon ben Tarfon says: “Teragenu” is interpreted as though it is composed of two Hebrew expressions: You explored [tartem] the land, and: You disparaged [ginnitem] it, in the tent of the Omnipresent.

(דברים א, ז) עד הנהר הגדול נהר פרת שמעון בן טרפון אומר קרב לגבי דהינא ואידהן דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא עבד מלך כמלך: With regard to the verse: “As far as the great river, the river Euphrates” (Deuteronomy 1:7), Shimon ben Tarfon says: Although it is not the largest river, the Euphrates is called great in accordance with the adage: Draw close to the one anointed with oil and become anointed as well. Because the Euphrates is close to Eretz Yisrael, it is called great. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a similar idea: The servant of a king is like a king.

והחנוני על פינקסו כו': תניא אמר רבי טורח שבועה זו למה א"ל ר' חייא (בר אבא) תנינא שניהם נשבעין ונוטלין מבעל הבית § The mishna teaches that the storekeeper relying on his ledger takes an oath and receives payment. If an employer tells a storekeeper to pay his laborers, and the storekeeper claims he paid them, while the laborers claim that they did not receive payment, both the storekeeper and the laborers take oaths and receive payment from the employer. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Why is there the bother with this oath, that it is imposed upon both of them? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: We learn in the mishna (see 45a) that both of them take an oath and receive payment of their claims from the employer.

קיבלה מיניה או לא קיבלה מיניה ת"ש דתניא רבי אומר פועלין נשבעין לחנוני ואם איתא לבעל הבית מיבעי ליה The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi accept from him that this is the halakha, or did he not accept it from him? Come and hear as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The laborers take an oath to the storekeeper that he had not paid them. And if it is so that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi accepted Rabbi Ḥiyya’s ruling, then Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi should have instead said that the laborers take an oath to the employer.

אמר רבא פועלים נשבעין לבעל הבית במעמד חנוני כי היכי דליכספו מיניה Rava said: Do not conclude that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not accept Rabbi Ḥiyya’s ruling. Rather, interpret his statement as follows: The laborers take an oath to the employer in the presence of the storekeeper, so that they will feel ashamed to lie with him present, since he knows whether or not he paid them.

איתמר שתי כיתי עדים המכחישות זו את זו אמר רב הונא זו באה בפני עצמה ומעידה וזו באה בפני עצמה ומעידה רב חסדא אמר בהדי סהדי שקרי למה לי § It was stated about a similar topic that if there were two sets of witnesses who contradict one another, and it is clear that one set must be testifying falsely, Rav Huna says: This set can come by itself and testify about other cases, and that set can come by itself and testify. Neither set of witnesses is disqualified for future testimony, since there is no way of knowing which was lying. Rav Ḥisda said: Why do I need to become involved with lying witnesses? Since each set of witnesses is possibly untrustworthy, both sets are disqualified.

שני מלוין ושני לווין ושני שטרות היינו פלוגתייהו מלוה ולוה ושני שטרות יד בעל השטר על התחתונה The Gemara cites the circumstances relevant to this dispute. If, after contradicting each other, the two sets of witnesses testified about circumstances involving two distinct lenders, and two distinct borrowers, and therefore two separate promissory notes, each one signed by a different set of witnesses, this sort of scenario is the subject of their dispute. According to Rav Huna both promissory notes are valid, and according to Rav Ḥisda neither is valid. In the case of a single lender, and a single borrower, and two promissory notes, with each signed by a different one of the sets of witnesses, the holder of the promissory note is at a disadvantage and can collect only the lower sum. One of the promissory notes is necessarily not valid, as it is signed by witnesses who testified falsely.

שני מלוין ולוה אחד ושני שטרות היינו מתניתין ב' לווין ומלוה אחד ושני שטרות מאי תיקו In the case of two lenders, and a single borrower, and two promissory notes, this is the same as the mishna, where two claimants who contradict each other come to collect payment from a single person who must pay them both, as the evidence for both claims has a presumption of validity. In the case of two borrowers, and a single lender, and two promissory notes, what is the halakha? Can each of the borrowers claim that the promissory note supporting the claim against him is not valid, as it could have been signed by the untrustworthy set of witnesses; or does each of them have to pay unless he can prove that the promissory note against him was signed by the unfit set of witnesses? The Gemara states: The question shall stand unresolved.

מתיב רב הונא בר יהודה Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection from a baraita:

Daf 48a

אחד אומר גבוה ב' מרדעות ואחד אומר שלש עדותן קיימת אחד אומר ג' ואחד אומר ה' עדותן בטלה ומצטרפין לעדות אחרת If one witness who came to testify about the new moon says that he saw it two oxgoads high above the horizon, and the other one says it was three oxgoads high, their testimony is valid, as a discrepancy of this type is reasonable. But if one says that he saw the moon three oxgoads above the horizon, and the other one says it was five, their testimony is voided. But despite this, they are not disqualified as witnesses, and either of them may join in another testimony.

מאי לאו לעדות ממון אמר רבא הוא ואחר מצטרפין לעדות אחרת של ר"ח דהוי להו תרי וחד ואין דבריו של אחד במקום שנים: What, is it not teaching that they each can join with another witness for testimony about monetary matters, even though each of them is suspected of giving false testimony? This contradicts Rav Ḥisda’s opinion. Rava said, explaining how Rav Ḥisda understands this baraita: He, one of the contradictory witnesses, and another witness may combine for another testimony about the new moon, as in doing so, they become two witnesses against one testifying differently; and the statement of one witness has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses.

אמר לחנוני תן לי בדינר פירות כו': תניא א"ר יהודה אימתי בזמן שהפירות צבורין ומונחין ושניהן עוררין עליהן אבל הפשילן בקופתו לאחוריו המע"ה: § The mishna teaches: If one said to a storekeeper: Give me produce valued at a dinar, and he gave him the produce, and subsequently the storekeeper and the customer dispute whether the customer ever paid the storekeeper, the mishna rules that the customer takes an oath that he paid. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: When does the customer take this oath? He takes it when the produce is collected and situated in front of them, and the two of them are quarreling about it. But if the customer has it bundled in his basket on his back, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, i.e., the storekeeper.

אמר לשולחני תן לי כו': וצריכא אשמעינן הא קמייתא בהך קא אמרי רבנן משום דפירי עבידי דמרקבי וכיון דמרקבי לא משהו ליה אבל מעות דלא מרקבי אימא מודו ליה לרבי יהודה The mishna continues with a similar case: If one said to a money changer: Give me small coins valued at a dinar, and he gave him the coins, and subsequently they dispute whether the customer gave the money changer the dinar, the customer takes an oath that he paid already. The Gemara notes: It is necessary to teach both the case involving the storekeeper and the case involving the money changer, as had it taught us only this first case, one might say that only in that case do the Rabbis say that the customer may take an oath to avoid payment, because produce is prone to spoiling, and since it spoils storekeepers do not retain it but give it to the customer immediately. But with regard to money, which does not spoil, say that they concede to Rabbi Yehuda that a money changer does not give coins to the customer until he has received payment, and the customer does not need to take an oath.

ואי איתמר בהא בהא קאמר רבי יהודה אבל בהך אימא מודה להו לרבנן צריכא: And had the ruling been stated only about that case involving the money changer, one might say that only in that case does Rabbi Yehuda say that the customer need not take an oath to avoid payment, but in this case, involving the storekeeper, say he concedes to the Rabbis. Therefore it is necessary to teach this dispute for both cases.

כשם שאמרו הפוגמת כתובתה [וכו'] וכן היתומים לא יפרעו: ממאן אילימא מלוה אבוהון שקיל בלא שבועה ואינהו בשבועה הכי קאמר וכן היתומים מן היתומים לא יפרעו אלא בשבועה § The mishna teaches (see 45a): Just like other cases where the Sages said that one takes an oath and receives payment, the mishna teaches: A woman who vitiates her marriage contract, etc. And likewise, orphans may not collect with a promissory note inherited from their father except by taking an oath. The Gemara asks: From whom do they collect a debt by taking an oath? If we say that they collect this way from the borrower, i.e., those who borrowed from their father, that would not make sense. Their father would take payment with the promissory note without taking an oath, and they collect only by means of taking an oath? Don’t orphans have privileged status? Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: And even orphans do not collect with their father’s promissory note from the borrower’s orphans except by means of an oath.

רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו לא שנו אלא שמת מלוה בחיי לוה אבל מת לוה בחיי מלוה כבר נתחייב מלוה לבני לוה שבועה ואין אדם מוריש שבועה לבניו Rav and Shmuel both say that the Sages taught that the lender’s orphans need to take an oath in order to be paid by the borrower’s orphans only when the lender died during the lifetime of the borrower, and the lender’s children had an opportunity to collect directly from the borrower without taking an oath. But if the borrower died during the lifetime of the lender, the lender has already become liable to take an oath to the children of the borrower, since one can collect from orphans only by means of an oath, and a person cannot bequeath an oath, i.e., a debt that requires the taking of an oath in order to be collected, to his children, and no payment is made. The lender’s children cannot take the oath that their father would have taken, that the promissory note has not been paid. The only oath they can take is that their father never told them that it had been paid, and that is insufficient once the father became liable to take an oath.

שלחוה קמיה דר' אלעזר שבועה זו מה טיבה שלח להו יורשין נשבעין שבועת יורשין ונוטלין שלחוה בימי רבי אמי אמר כולי האי שלחי לה ואזלי אי אשכחינן בה טעמא מי לא שלחינן להו אלא אמר רבי אמי הואיל ואתא לידן נימא בה מילתא The Sages sent a question to Rabbi Elazar in Eretz Yisrael: What is the nature of this oath to the orphans of the borrower that it has the capacity to prevent the lender’s children from collecting their father’s debt? Rabbi Elazar sent a reply to them: That is not the correct ruling; rather, the heirs take the heirs’ oath, that they have no knowledge that this promissory note was paid, and collect payment of their claim. They sent the same question again to Eretz Yisrael in the days of Rabbi Ami. He said: They continue to send this question to this extent? If we had found a different explanation, wouldn’t we have sent it to them? Nevertheless, Rabbi Ami said: Since this question came to us, let us say something about it.

עמד בדין ומת כבר נתחייב מלוה לבני לוה שבועה ואין אדם מוריש שבועה לבניו לא עמד בדין ומת יורשין נשבעין שבועת יורשין ונוטלין If the litigants stood trial and then the lender died before taking an oath, the lender has already become liable to take an oath to the children of the borrower in accordance with the court’s ruling, and a person cannot bequeath an oath to his children, in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel. If the litigants did not yet stand trial, and the lender died, the lender’s heirs take the heirs’ oath, and collect payment of their claim, as Rabbi Elazar said.

מתקיף לה רב נחמן אטו בי דינא קא מחייבי ליה שבועה מעידנא דשכיב לוה איחייב ליה מלוה לבני לוה שבועה Rav Naḥman objects to this: Is that to say that it is the court that renders the lender liable to take an oath? At the moment the borrower died, the lender was liable to take an oath to the children of the borrower.

אלא אמר רב נחמן אי איתא לדרב ודשמואל איתא אי ליתא ליתא אלמא מספקא ליה והאמר רב יוסף בר מניומי עבד רב נחמן עובדא יחלוקו לדבריו דרבי מאיר קאמר וליה לא סבירא ליה Rather, Rav Naḥman said: If the ruling of Rav and Shmuel is accepted, it is accepted; and if it is not accepted, it is not. The Gemara asks: Evidently, Rav Naḥman is uncertain whether the ruling of Rav and Shmuel is accepted. But didn’t Rav Yosef bar Minyumi say that Rav Naḥman ruled in an actual case against Rav and Shmuel, ruling that where both litigants are suspect about oaths they divide the disputed amount? The Gemara answers: Rav Naḥman stated his uncertainty with regard to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel, who rule in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir that the oath returns to its place, but he himself does not hold accordingly, but rather rules in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yosei, who says that they divide the claim.

מתיב רב אושעיא מתה יורשיה מזכירין את כתובתה עד עשרים וחמש שנים הכא במאי עסקינן שנשבעה ומתה Rav Oshaya raises an objection from a mishna (Ketubot 104a): If a widow died without having received payment of her marriage contract, her heirs, e.g., sons from a previous marriage, may invoke her marriage contract in order to demand payment of it for up to twenty-five years later. Her heirs, who are orphans, can take an oath and collect their claim, even though they are collecting from other orphans, in contradiction to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a situation where the widow took an oath but died before she could collect the payment. When her heirs come to collect, an oath is no longer required.

תא שמע נשא ראשונה ומתה נשא שניה ומת הוא שניה ויורשיה קודמין ליורשי הראשונה ה"נ שנשבעה ומתה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a mishna (Ketubot 90a): In a case where he married his first wife and she died, and by the terms of the marriage contract, her sons inherit the sum promised in her marriage contract after the husband dies, if he subsequently married his second wife, and then he died, the second wife and her heirs take precedence over the heirs of the first wife, in collecting payment of her marriage contract. The heirs of the second wife can collect the marriage contract by taking an oath to the heirs of the first wife, stating that they have no knowledge of their mother having received her marriage contract, even though this is an oath bequeathed to them by their mother. This mishna therefore contradicts the ruling of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara answers: This does not contradict their ruling, because they understand it to also be a situation where the second wife took an oath but died before she collected the payment.

ת"ש אבל יורשיו משביעין אותה ואת יורשיה ואת הבאין ברשותה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another mishna (Ketubot 86b): If a husband stipulated that when his wife collects payment of her marriage contract he will not impose an oath on her or on her heirs or representatives, he may not impose an oath, but his heirs can administer an oath to her, to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority as representatives. Her heirs take an oath to collect from the husband’s heirs, though they are all orphans. This is contrary to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel, and here it is clear that the wife did not take an oath before she died.

אמר רב שמעי' לצדדין קתני אותה באלמנה ויורשיה בגרושה Rav Shemaya said: The mishna is in accordance with Rav and Shmuel’s ruling because it teaches the administration of an oath disjunctively. The heirs can administer an oath to her when she is receiving payment of her marriage contract as a widow, or they can administer an oath to her heirs when she is a divorcée who died after the divorce and before her husband died. Since she died first, her heirs were not bequeathed an oath to her husband’s heirs.

מתיב רב נתן בר הושעיא יפה כח הבן מכח האב Rav Natan bar Hoshaya raises an objection from a baraita: Sometimes the power of the son is greater than the power of the father,

Daf 48b

שהבן גובה בין בשבועה ובין שלא בשבועה והאב אינו גובה אלא בשבועה היכי דמי דמת לוה בחיי מלוה as the son can collect both by taking an oath and without taking an oath, while the father can collect only by taking an oath. What are the circumstances in which this occurs? It is when the borrower died during the life of the lender. The father who is the lender can collect from the borrower’s heirs only if he takes an oath.

וקתני שהבן גובה בין בשבועה ובין שלא בשבועה בשבועה שבועת יורשין שלא בשבועה כרשב"ג And it is taught: As the son can collect both by taking an oath and without taking an oath. He collects by taking an oath when he takes the heirs’ oath, that he has no knowledge that his father’s debt was paid, and he collects without taking an oath in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the mishna, that when there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that a certain promissory note had not been paid, the son collects the debt without taking an oath. In any case, absent testimony to that effect, the father bequeaths the oath to his children and the son can collect by taking an oath, contrary to the ruling of Rav and Shmuel.

אמר רב יוסף הא מני בית שמאי היא דאמרי שטר העומד לגבות כגבוי דמי Rav Yosef said in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say that a debt recorded in a promissory note that stands to be collected is considered as if it is already collected. Therefore, the father is considered to be already in possession of the loan and bequeaths it to his son. Even though the Sages instituted that the son take an oath to the heirs of the borrower, this is not a case of the son inheriting an oath.

איקלע רב נחמן לסורא עול לגביה רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא אמרו ליה ליתי מר נעקרא להא דרב ושמואל אמר להו איכפלי ואתאי כל הני פרסי למעקרא להא דרב ושמואל אלא הבו דלא לוסיף עלה כגון מאי דאמר רב פפא הפוגם את שטרו ומת יורשין נשבעין שבועת יורשין ונוטלין § It is related that Rav Naḥman arrived in the city of Sura. Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna came to see him. They said to him: Let our Master come, and together we will overturn that ruling of Rav and Shmuel. Rav Naḥman said to them: Did I exert myself and come all these parasangs to uproot that ruling of Rav and Shmuel? Rather, let us not extend their ruling by applying it to other situations outside the specific context of when the borrower died during the lifetime of the lender. The Gemara offers an example: This is like what Rav Pappa says: If a creditor vitiates his promissory note, by acknowledging that he has received partial payment and thereby rendering himself liable to take an oath in order to receive the rest, and then he dies, his heirs take the heirs’ oath and collect from the debtor.

ההוא דשכיב ושבק ערבא סבר רב פפא למימר הא נמי דלא לוסיף עלה הוא אמר ליה רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לרב פפא אטו ערבא לאו בתר יתמי אזיל The Gemara relates: There was a certain debtor who died and left a guarantor of his debt, and the orphans of the creditor came to collect from the guarantor. Rav Pappa thought to say: This, too, is a case to which one should not extend Rav and Shmuel’s ruling, as they said only that orphans do not inherit an oath to collect from other orphans, and this should not apply to collecting from a guarantor. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Is that to say that the guarantor will not pursue the orphans and collect from them? Ultimately, collecting from the guarantor is tantamount to collecting from the orphans, and no distinction should be made.

ההוא דשכיב ושבק אחא סבר רמי בר חמא למימר הא נמי דלא לוסיף עלה הוא אמר ליה רבא מה לי שלא פקדני אבא ומה לי שלא פקדני אחי The Gemara relates: There was a certain creditor who died and left a brother as his heir, who wanted to collect from the orphans of the debtor. Rami bar Ḥama thought to say that this, too, is a case to which one should not extend Rav and Shmuel’s ruling, since Rav and Shmuel ruled that one does not bequeath an oath to one’s children, and they did not mention a case where the heir is a brother. Rava said to him: What difference does it make to me if the oath taken by the heir is: My father did not inform me that this debt has been paid, and what difference does it make to me if the oath taken is: My brother did not inform me?

אמר רב חמא השתא דלא איתמר הלכתא לא כרב ושמואל ולא כרבי אלעזר האי דיינא דעבד כרב ושמואל עבד דעבד כרבי אלעזר עבד Rav Ḥama says: Now that the halakha was not stated either in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel or in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, a judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel has ruled, and his ruling is accepted, and a judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar has ruled, and his ruling is accepted.

אמר רב פפא האי שטרא דיתמי לא מקרע קרעינן ליה ולא אגבויי מגבינן ביה אגבויי לא מגבינן ביה דלמא סבירא לן כרב ושמואל ומקרע לא קרעינן ליה דהאי דיינא דעבד כרבי אלעזר עבד Rav Pappa says: When that promissory note of orphans comes before our court, we do not tear it up, but we also do not collect the debt with it. We do not collect the debt with it, since perhaps we should hold in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel that orphans cannot collect debts in a case where their father was required to take an oath to collect, as they cannot take the appropriate oath; but we do not tear it up, since a judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar has ruled.

ההוא דיינא דעבד כרבי אלעזר הוה צורבא מרבנן במתיה אמר ליה אייתינה איגרתא ממערבא דלית הלכתא כרבי אלעזר אמר ליה לכי תייתי אתא לקמיה דרב חמא א"ל האי דיינא דעבד כרבי אלעזר עבד: The Gemara relates: There was a certain judge who ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. There was a Torah scholar in his city. He said to the judge: I will bring a letter from the West, Eretz Yisrael, stating that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. The judge said to him: When you bring such a letter, I will consider it, but for now I stand by my ruling. That Torah scholar came before Rav Ḥama, and Rav Ḥama said to him: A judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar has ruled, and his ruling cannot be voided.

ואלו נשבעין: אטו בשופטני עסקינן הכי קאמר ואלו נשבעין שלא בטענת ברי אלא בטענת שמא השותפין והאריסין § The mishna teaches: And these people are sometimes required to take an oath that they do not owe anything even when there is no explicit claim against them: Partners, sharecroppers, stewards, a woman who does business from home, where she manages the property of orphans, and the member of the household appointed to manage the household’s affairs. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that we are dealing with fools who take an oath even though no claim has been brought against them? The Gemara explains: This is what the mishna is saying: And these people take an oath without it being in response to a definite claim but only to an uncertain claim, i.e., the claimant cannot know with certainty that he is owed money: Partners, sharecroppers, and the others listed in the mishna.

תנא בן בית שאמרו לא שנכנס ויוצא ברגליו אלא מכניס לו פועלין ומוציא לו פועלין מכניס לו פירות ומוציא לו פירות The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 9:3): With regard to the member of the household whom they mentioned in the mishna, this is not referring to one who enters and exits the house on foot as a family friend, but rather to one who engages laborers, and dismisses laborers, gathers produce, and sends out produce in managing the household.

ומאי שנא הני משום דמורו בה התירא The Gemara asks: And what is different about these people listed in the mishna, e.g., partners, such that they are liable to take an oath in response to an uncertain claim? It is because they tend to grant themselves permission to take for themselves from the property for which they are responsible, using as an excuse the effort they invest in their duties.

אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן והוא שיש טענה בינייהו שתי כסף Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said that Rav Naḥman said: One takes an oath in response to an uncertain claim only when there is a claim between them worth at least two silver ma’a.

כמאן כשמואל והתני רבי חייא לסיועיה לרב אימא כפירת טענה כרב: The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? Is it in accordance with that of Shmuel? Shmuel holds that one becomes liable to take an oath after admitting to part of a claim when the value of the entire claim is at least two silver ma’a. Rav holds that the portion one denies he owes must be at least two ma’a (see 39b). But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach a baraita in support of Rav? The Gemara answers: Say that Rav Naḥman means that the value of the denial of a claim is at least two silver ma’a, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

חלקו השותפין והאריסין: איבעיא להו מהו לגלגל בדרבנן § The mishna teaches: Once the partners or the sharecroppers have divided the common property, and each has taken his share, then one side may not require an oath of the other absent a definite claim. A question was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha about extending an oath to an additional situation, in a case where the original oath is by rabbinic law?

ת"ש לוה הימנו ערב שביעית ולמוצאי שביעית נעשה לו שותף או אריס אין מגלגלין טעמא דלוה הימנו ערב שביעית דאתיא שביעית אפקעתיה הא שאר שני שבוע מגלגלין The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita: If one borrowed from another on the eve of, i.e., before, the Sabbatical Year, and upon the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year became his partner or sharecropper, the lender may not extend the partner’s or sharecropper’s oath to an oath about the loan. The Gemara infers: The reason he may not extend the oath is that he borrowed from him on the eve of the Sabbatical Year, so that the Sabbatical Year came and abrogated the loan, rendering the oath irrelevant. Therefore, if he borrowed during the other years of the seven-year Sabbatical cycle, an oath may be extended from the partner’s oath or sharecropper’s oath, which are rabbinic ordinances, to an oath about the loan.

לא תימא הא שאר שני שבוע מגלגלין אלא אימא נעשה לו שותף או אריס ערב שביעית ולמוצאי שביעית לוה הימנו מגלגלין The Gemara rejects that inference: Do not say: Therefore, if he borrowed during the other years of the Sabbatical cycle, an oath may be extended. Rather, say that one should infer from the baraita that if he became his partner or sharecropper on the eve of the Sabbatical Year, and upon the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year he borrowed from him and incurred an oath by Torah law, that oath may be extended.

הא בהדיא קתני לה נעשה לו שותף או אריס ערב שביעית ולמוצאי שביעית לוה הימנו מגלגלין ש"מ מגלגלין בדרבנן ש"מ The Gemara asks: Isn’t that taught explicitly in a baraita? It teaches: If he became his partner or sharecropper on the eve of the Sabbatical Year, and upon the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year he borrowed from him, the oath may be extended. Therefore, the initial inference must be correct. Conclude from it that an oath incurred by rabbinic law may be extended. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

אמר רב הונא Rav Huna says:

Daf 49a

לכל מגלגלין חוץ משכיר שאין מגלגלין רב חסדא אמר לכל אין מקילין חוץ משכיר דמקילין מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו לפתוח לו: Any oath, including one incurred by rabbinic law, may be extended to render the person who takes it liable to take an additional oath, except for the oath of a hired worker, which may not be extended, since the hired worker’s oath was instituted only to alleviate the concerns of the employer. Rav Ḥisda says: For everyone, the Sages are not lenient, in that they extend any oath they incur to impose upon them additional oaths, except for a hired worker, for whom they are lenient. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the rulings of Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them as to whether the court initiates extending an oath for him, i.e., even when the other litigant has not suggested it, the court extends the original oath to include an oath about other claims.

והשביעית משמטת כו': מנה"מ אמר רב גידל אמר רב דאמר קרא (דברים טו, ב) וזה דבר השמטה ואפילו דיבור משמטת: § The mishna teaches: The Sabbatical Year abrogates the obligation to take an oath about a debt, just like it abrogates a debt. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rav Giddel says that Rav says: It is derived from the fact that the verse states: “And this is the matter [devar] of the release: Every creditor shall release that which he has lent to his neighbor; he shall not exact it of his neighbor and his brother, because the Lord’s release has been proclaimed” (Deuteronomy 15:2). Since the word devar also means statement, this teaches that the Sabbatical Year releases, i.e., abrogates, even a statement, i.e., an oath.

הדרן עלך כל הנשבעין

מתני׳ ארבעה שומרין הן שומר חנם והשואל נושא שכר והשוכר MISHNA: There are four types of bailees, to whom different halakhot apply. They are as follows: An unpaid bailee, who receives no compensation for safeguarding the item in his care; and a borrower, who receives an item on loan for his own use without paying a rental fee; a paid bailee, who is paid a salary for safeguarding the deposited item; and a renter, i.e., one who pays a fee for the use of an item or animal.

שומר חנם נשבע על הכל והשואל משלם את הכל In the event that one of these bailees is unable to return the deposited item to its owner, the halakha with regard to liability is dependent upon what happened to the item, and upon the type of bailee: An unpaid bailee takes an oath attesting to the fact that he was not negligent with the care of the item and is then exempt from liability for everything, meaning for all types of damage, whether the item was lost, stolen, damaged, or if the animal died. Conversely, a borrower does not have the option of taking an oath, and pays for everything, whether the item was stolen, lost, damaged, or the animal died, even if it was by unavoidable accident.

נושא שכר והשוכר נשבעין על השבורה ועל השבויה ועל המתה ומשלמין את האבדה ואת הגניבה The halakhot of a paid bailee and a renter are the same: They take an oath concerning an injured animal, and concerning a captured one, and concerning a dead animal, attesting to the fact that these mishaps were not caused by negligence, but rather by unavoidable accident, and then are exempt from liability. But they must pay if the deposit cannot be returned due to loss or theft, even if these were not caused by negligence.

אמר לשומר חנם היכן שורי אמר לו מת והוא שנשבר או נשבה או נגנב או אבד נשבר והוא שמת או נשבה או נגנב או אבד נשבה והוא שמת או נשבר או נגנב או אבד נגנב והוא שמת או נשבר או נשבה או אבד אבד והוא שמת או נשבר או נשבה או נגנב משביעך אני ואמר אמן פטור The mishna clarifies: If the owner of an ox said to an unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? And the unpaid bailee said to him: It died, but the truth was that it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; or if the bailee responded: It was injured, but the truth was that it died or was captured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was captured, but the truth was that it died or was injured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was stolen, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or lost; or if he responded: It was lost, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen, in any of the above cases, if the owner of the ox then said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the unpaid bailee said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering, despite the fact that he took a false oath. The reason is that his false oath did not render him exempt from liability to pay.

היכן שורי אמר לו איני יודע מה אתה סח והוא שמת או נשבר או נשבה או נגנב או אבד משביעך אני ואמר אמן פטור If the owner says to an unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? And the unpaid bailee said to him: I do not know what you are talking about, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the unpaid bailee said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering, since he would not have been liable to pay in any of these cases.

היכן שורי אמר לו אבד משביעך אני ואמר אמן והעדים מעידים אותו שאכלו משלם את הקרן הודה מעצמו משלם קרן וחומש ואשם But if the owner said to the unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? And the unpaid bailee said to him: It is lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the unpaid bailee said: Amen, and then witnesses testify that the bailee consumed it, he pays the owner the principal, since he took the ox for himself. But if there were no witnesses, but after he took the oath he admitted of his own accord that he stole the ox and took a false oath, then he pays the owner the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and he brings a guilt-offering to achieve atonement, as in any other case where one takes a false oath with regard to a deposit.

היכן שורי ואמר לו נגנב משביעך אני ואמר אמן והעדים מעידים אותו שגנבו משלם תשלומי כפל הודה מעצמו משלם קרן וחומש ואשם Similarly, if the owner said to the unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? And the unpaid bailee said to him: It was stolen, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the unpaid bailee said: Amen, and then witnesses testify that the bailee stole it, he pays double the principal. If he admitted of his own accord that he stole it, then he is exempt from double payment for theft, but pays the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and brings a guilt-offering to achieve atonement.

אמר לאחד בשוק היכן שורי שגנבת הוא אומר לא גנבתי והעדים מעידים אותו שגנבו משלם תשלומי כפל טבח ומכר משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה ראה עדים שממשמשין ובאין אמר גנבתי אבל לא טבחתי ולא מכרתי אינו משלם אלא קרן If the owner of an ox said to someone in the marketplace, i.e., a stranger who was not a bailee: Where is my ox that you stole? And the accused says: I did not steal it, and then witnesses testify that the accused did steal it, he pays the double payment. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. If the accused saw witnesses that were approaching to testify against him, and at that point he said: I admit that I stole the animal but I did not slaughter or sell it, he pays only the principal.

אמר לשואל היכן שורי אמר לו If the owner said to a borrower: Where is my ox? And the borrower said to him:

Daf 49a

הדרן עלך כל הנשבעין

אמר לשואל היכן שורי אמר לו If the owner said to a borrower: Where is my ox? And the borrower said to him:

Daf 49b

מת והוא שנשבר או נשבה או נגנב או אבד נשבר והוא שמת או נשבה או נגנב או אבד נשבה והוא שמת או נשבר או נגנב או אבד נגנב והוא שמת או נשבר או נשבה או אבד אבד והוא שמת או נשבר או נשבה או נגנב משביעך אני ואמר אמן פטור It died, but the truth was that it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was injured, but the truth was that it died or was captured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was captured, but the truth was that it died or was injured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was stolen, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or lost; or if he responded: It was lost, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen, in any of the above cases, if the owner of the ox said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the borrower said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing an offering for his false oath, since the oath did not render him exempt from liability to pay. He would have been liable to pay in any case.

היכן שורי אמר לו איני יודע מה אתה סח והוא שמת או נשבר או נשבה או נגנב או נאבד משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב But if the owner said to the borrower: Where is my ox? And the borrower said to him: I do not know what you are talking about, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the borrower said: Amen, the borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as he took an oath that would render him exempt from liability to pay.

אמר לנושא שכר והשוכר היכן שורי א"ל מת והוא שנשבר או נשבה נשבר והוא שמת או נשבה נשבה והוא שמת או נשבר נגנב והוא שאבד אבד והוא שנגנב משביעך אני ואמר אמן פטור If an owner said to a paid bailee or a renter: Where is my ox? And the latter said to him: It died, but the truth was that it was injured or captured; or if he said: It was injured, but the truth was that it died or was captured; or if he said: It was captured, but the truth was that it died or was injured; or if he said: It was stolen, but the truth was that it was lost; or if he said: It was lost, but the truth was that it was stolen, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, the paid bailee or renter is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering.

מת או נשבר או נשבה והוא שנגנב או אבד משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב אבד או נגנב והוא שמת או נשבר או נשבה משביעך אני ואמר אמן פטור If the paid bailee or renter said: It died or was injured or captured, but the truth was that it was stolen or lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, the paid bailee or renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering. If the paid bailee or renter said: It was lost or stolen, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering.

זה הכלל כל המשנה מחובה לחובה ומפטור לפטור ומפטור לחובה פטור מחובה לפטור חייב זה הכלל כל הנשבע להקל על עצמו חייב להחמיר על עצמו פטור: This is the principle: Anyone who changes from one claim of liability to another claim of liability or from one claim of exemption to another claim of exemption or from a claim of exemption to a claim of liability is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering. If he changes from a claim of liability to a claim of exemption, he is liable. This is the principle: Anyone who takes an oath to be lenient with himself is liable; if he takes an oath to be stringent with himself, he is exempt.

גמ׳ מאן תנא ארבעה שומרין אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה ר' מאיר היא אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן מי איכא תנא דלית ליה ארבעה שומרין אמר ליה הכי קאמינא לך מאן תנא דאמר שוכר כנושא שכר דמי (אמר רב נחמן) אמר רבה בר אבוה רבי מאיר היא GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that there are four types of bailees? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: It is Rabbi Meir. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: And is there a tanna who does not accept that there are four types of bailees, as the question and your answer indicate? Rav Naḥman said to him: This is what I am saying to you: Who is the tanna who says that a renter has the same halakhic status as a paid bailee? With regard to this question, Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: It is Rabbi Meir.

והא רבי מאיר איפכא שמעינן ליה דתנן שוכר כיצד משלם ר' מאיר אומר כשומר חנם ר' יהודה אומר כנושא שכר רבה בר אבוה איפכא תני The Gemara challenges: But we have heard that Rabbi Meir said the opposite, as it is taught in a baraita: How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says: He pays like an unpaid bailee. Rabbi Yehuda says: He pays like a paid bailee. The Gemara explains: Rabba bar Avuh taught this baraita while reversing the opinions, stating that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that a renter is like a paid bailee; therefore, he said that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

הני ארבעה הוו שלשה הוו אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק ארבעה שומרין ודיניהן שלשה: The Gemara asks: Are these in fact four types of bailees? There are actually only three, as the halakhot relating to a paid bailee and a renter are identical. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There are indeed four types of bailees with regard to the manner in which they accepted the deposit, but only three halakhot that apply to them.

אמר לשומר חנם כו': היכן שורי כו': אמר לאחד בשוק כו': אמר לשומר כו': היכן שורי אמר לו איני יודע מה אתה סח כו': אמר רב וכולן פטורין משבועת שומרין וחייבין משום שבועת ביטוי ושמואל אמר אף פטורין משום שבועת ביטוי § The following cases were stated in the mishna: If the owner of an ox said to an unpaid bailee: Where is my ox; or if the owner of an ox said to someone in the marketplace: Where is my ox that you stole; or if he said to a bailee: Where is my ox, and the other person said to him: I do not know what you are talking about. With regard to all of these situations referred to in the mishna, Rav says: All of them are exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for falsely taking an oath of the bailees, but they are liable to bring a sin-offering for falsely taking an oath on an utterance. And Shmuel says: They are exempt from bringing a sin-offering for falsely taking an oath on an utterance as well.

במאי קמפלגי שמואל סבר ליתא בלהבא ורב סבר איתיה בלאו והן With regard to what principle do they disagree? Shmuel holds that he is exempt from bringing an offering because there is no possibility of taking that oath with regard to an event that may occur in the future, i.e., that the deposited animal will die or be stolen or be lost, and Shmuel holds that one is not liable for taking an oath on an utterance in the case of any oath that one cannot take with reference to the future. And Rav holds that there is an obligation to bring a sin-offering because it is possible to take both a negative oath and a positive one. One of the conditions necessary in order for one to incur liability for an oath on an utterance is that the oath can be formulated as both a negative and a positive statement. This oath meets that criterion as one can formulate the oath in the negative, e.g., the deposit was not stolen, as well as in the positive, e.g., it was stolen.

והא איפליגו בה חדא זימנא דאתמר שבועה שזרק פלוני צרור לים שבועה שלא זרק רב אמר חייב ושמואל אמר פטור רב אמר חייב דאיתא בלאו והן ושמואל אמר פטור דליתא בלהבא The Gemara challenges: But they already disputed this question on another occasion (see 25a), as it was stated: With regard to one who says: On my oath so-and-so threw a stone into the sea, or: On my oath he did not throw it, Rav says: If it was later discovered that his statement was false, he is liable to bring an offering for his oath. And Shmuel says: He is exempt. Rav says that he is liable, as the oath can be positive or negative. And Shmuel says he is exempt because this oath cannot be stated with regard to the future, since he cannot control what so-and-so does.

צריכא דאי אשמעינן בהא בהא קאמר רב משום דמנפשיה קמישתבע אבל בהך דבי דינא משבעי ליה אימא מודי ליה לשמואל כדרבי אמי דאמר רבי אמי כל שבועה שהדיינים משביעין אותה אין חייבין עליה משום שבועת ביטוי The Gemara explains: It was necessary to state the dispute in the case of a bailee as well, as if they would teach it to us only in the case where one took an oath that so-and-so threw a stone, it may have been understood that it is only in this case that Rav says that the person taking the oath is exempt, since he is taking a false oath of his own accord, but in the case in the mishna here, where it is the court that is administering the oath to him, say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that he is exempt, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ami. As Rabbi Ami says: In the case of any oath that is administered by the judges, one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for falsely taking an oath on an utterance.

ואי איתמר בהא בהא קאמר שמואל אבל בהך אימא מודה ליה לרב צריכא And conversely, if the dispute had been stated only in this case, i.e., the case of the bailee to whom the court administers the oath, one might have said: It is in this case that Shmuel says that he is exempt, in accordance with Rabbi Ami’s statement, but in a case where one took an oath that so-and-so threw a stone, say that Shmuel concedes to Rav that he is liable. Therefore, it is necessary for the dispute to be stated in both cases.

גופא אמר ר' אמי כל שבועה שהדיינין משביעין אותה אין בה משום שבועת ביטוי שנאמר (ויקרא ה, ד) או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים מעצמו כדר"ל דאמר ר"ל כי משתמש בארבע לשונות אי דלמא אלא דהא Having mentioned Rabbi Ami’s ruling, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Ami says: In the case of any oath that is administered by the judges, one is not liable for falsely taking an oath on an utterance, as it is stated in the verse: “Or if [ki] anyone swears clearly with his lips to do evil or to do good, whatever it is that a man shall utter clearly with an oath, and it is hidden from him…and the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his sin” (Leviticus 5:4–6). Only if one takes the oath of his own accord is he liable, as the verse can be understood in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish. As Reish Lakish says: The term ki has four distinct meanings: If, perhaps, rather, and as. According to Rabbi Ami, its meaning in the above verse is: If, indicating that only if one takes the oath of his own accord is he liable.

ר"א אומר כולן פטורין משבועת שומרין וחייבין משום שבועת ביטוי חוץ מאיני יודע מה אתה סח דשואל וגניבה ואבידה דנושא שכר ושבשוכר שהוא חייב שהרי כפרו ממון: Rabbi Elazar says: All of them, i.e., all those listed in the mishna as exempt, are exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking an oath of the bailees, but they are liable to bring a sin-offering for taking an oath on an utterance, except for a borrower who says: I do not know what you are talking about, and a paid bailee or a renter who claims that the deposit was stolen or lost. In these cases, the bailee is liable for taking an oath of the bailees, as he denied a monetary claim, meaning that he wanted to render himself exempt from liability to pay. This halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav.
This chapter explained that a bailee who makes a false claim and takes an oath to that effect is not always liable for falsely taking an oath of the bailees. The principle with regard to this matter was stated at the end of the mishna: Any bailee who makes a false claim that would in any case not render him exempt from liability to pay, and takes an oath to that effect, is not liable for falsely taking an oath of the bailees.

הדרן עלך ארבעה שומרין וסליקא לה מסכת שבועות

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Daf 18a

מאתים ושבעים ושבעה The number of people needed in a city for it to be eligible for a lesser Sanhedrin is 277. This number is based on the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who requires 230 men, but requires an additional 47 men in case it happens that the Sages of the court reach a situation where they are not able to arrive at a verdict, and pairs of judges need to be added, potentially increasing the number of judges on the court from 23 to 70, a maximum of 47 additional judges.

והתניא רבי אומר מאתים שבעים ושמנה לא קשיא הא רבי יהודה הא רבנן The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The number of men needed in a city for it to be eligible for a lesser Sanhedrin is 278? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita that said Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi requires 277 residents is stated in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there are 70 judges on the Great Sanhedrin, and this baraita that quoted the number as 278 is stated in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that there are 71.

תנו רבנן (שמות יח, כא) ושמת עליהם שרי אלפים שרי מאות שרי חמשים ושרי עשרות שרי אלפים שש מאות שרי מאות ששת אלפים שרי חמשים שנים עשר אלף שרי עשרות ששת ריבוא נמצאו דייני ישראל שבעת ריבוא ושמונת אלפים ושש מאות: Apropos the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, which links the issue of the lesser Sanhedrin with the appointment of the ministers in the wilderness, the Gemara relates: The Sages taught: The verse states: “And place over them ministers of thousands, ministers of hundreds, ministers of fifties, and ministers of tens” (Exodus 18:21). The number of ministers of thousands was 600, as there were 600,000 men in total; the number of ministers of hundreds was 6,000; of ministers of fifties, 12,000, and of ministers of tens, 60,000. Therefore, it is found that the total number of judges of the Jewish people was 78,600, and suitable people were found to fill all of these positions.

הדרן עלך דיני ממונות

מתני׳ כהן גדול דן ודנין אותו מעיד ומעידין אותו חולץ וחולצין לאשתו ומייבמין את אשתו אבל הוא אינו מייבם מפני שהוא אסור באלמנה MISHNA: The High Priest judges others if he is sufficiently wise, and others judge him when he transgresses. He testifies before the court and others testify concerning him. He performs ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother performs ḥalitza with his wife; and his brother consummates levirate marriage with his wife. But he does not consummate levirate marriage with his brother’s widow, because it is prohibited for him to marry a widow (see Leviticus 21:14), and can therefore never fulfill the mitzva of levirate marriage, as a yevama is by definition a widow.

מת לו מת אינו יוצא אחר המטה אלא הן נכסין והוא נגלה הן נגלין והוא נכסה ויוצא עמהן עד פתח שער העיר דברי ר"מ If a relative of the High Priest dies, he does not follow the bier carrying the corpse, since it is prohibited for the High Priest to become ritually impure even for immediate relatives (see Leviticus 21:11). Rather, once the members of the funeral procession are concealed from sight by turning onto another street, he is revealed on the street they departed, and when they are revealed, then he is concealed, and in this way, he goes out with them until the entrance of the gate of the city, from where they would take out the corpse, since the dead were not buried in Jerusalem. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רבי יהודה אומר אינו יוצא מן המקדש משום שנאמר (ויקרא כא, יב) ומן המקדש לא יצא Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not emerge from the Temple at all for the burial of his relatives, as it is stated: “And from the Temple he shall not emerge and will not desecrate the Temple of his God; for the separateness of the oil of the anointment of his God is on him” (Leviticus 21:12).

וכשהוא מנחם אחרים דרך כל העם עוברין בזה אחר זה והממונה ממצעו בינו לבין העם וכשהוא מתנחם מאחרים כל העם אומרים לו אנו כפרתך והוא אומר להן תתברכו מן השמים וכשמברין אותו כל העם מסובין על הארץ והוא מיסב על הספסל The mishna continues: And when he consoles others in their mourning when they return from burial, the way of all the people is that they pass by one after another and the mourners stand in a line and are consoled, and the appointed person stands in the middle, between the High Priest and the people. And when he is consoled by others in his mourning, all the people say to him: We are your atonement. And he says to them: May you be blessed from Heaven. And when they comfort him with the first meal after the burial of one of his relatives, all the people recline on the ground as if they are taking his mourning on themselves, and he reclines on the bench out of respect for his status as High Priest.

המלך לא דן ולא דנין אותו לא מעיד ולא מעידין אותו לא חולץ ולא חולצין לאשתו לא מייבם ולא מייבמין לאשתו רבי יהודה אומר אם רצה לחלוץ או לייבם זכור לטוב אמרו לו אין שומעין לו The mishna continues, enumerating the halakhot pertaining to the king in similar matters: The king does not judge others as a member of a court and others do not judge him, he does not testify and others do not testify concerning him, he does not perform ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother does not perform ḥalitza with his wife, and he does not consummate levirate marriage with his brother’s widow and his brother does not consummate levirate marriage with his wife, as all these actions are not fitting to the honor of his office. Rabbi Yehuda says: These are not restrictions, but his prerogative: If he desired to perform ḥalitza or to consummate levirate marriage, he is remembered for good, as this is to the benefit of his brother’s widow. The Sages said to him: They do not listen to him if he desires to do so, as this affects not only his own honor but that of the kingdom.

ואין נושאין אלמנתו ר' יהודה אומר נושא המלך אלמנתו של מלך שכן מצינו בדוד שנשא אלמנתו של שאול שנאמר (שמואל ב יב, ח) ואתנה לך את בית אדוניך ואת נשי אדוניך בחיקך: And no one may marry a king’s widow, due to his honor. Rabbi Yehuda says: Another king may marry the widow of a king, as we found that King David married the widow of King Saul, as it is stated: “And I have given you the house of your master and the wives of your master in your bosom” (II Samuel 12:8).

גמ׳ כהן גדול דן פשיטא דנין אותו איצטריכא ליה הא נמי פשיטא אי לא דיינינן ליה איהו היכי דיין והכתיב (צפניה ב, א) התקוששו וקושו ואמר ר"ל קשט עצמך ואחר כך קשט אחרים GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the High Priest judges others as a member of a court. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Why would one think that he would be unfit to serve as a judge? The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to mention the latter clause: And others judge him, and therefore, it taught the related halakha with it. The Gemara objects: This is also obvious; if others do not judge him, how can he judge others? But isn’t it written: “Gather yourselves together, yea, gather together [hitkosheshu vakoshu]” (Zephaniah 2:1); and Reish Lakish says: This verse teaches a moral principle: Adorn [kashet] yourself first, and then adorn others, i.e., one who is not subject to judgment may not judge others.

אלא איידי דקא בעי למיתני מלך לא דן ולא דנין אותו תנא נמי כה"ג דן ודנין ואי בעית אימא הא קמ"ל כדתניא כהן גדול שהרג את הנפש במזיד נהרג בשוגג גולה ועובר על עשה ועל לא תעשה והרי הוא כהדיוט לכל דבריו Rather, neither halakha concerning the High Priest is a novelty. But since the tanna wants to teach that the king does not judge others and others do not judge him, he also taught that the High Priest judges others and others judge him. And if you wish, say instead that this teaches us the halakha as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 4:1): A High Priest who killed a person intentionally is killed; if he killed unintentionally, he is exiled to a city of refuge, and he transgresses a positive mitzva and a prohibition, and he is like an ordinary person concerning all of his halakhot.

במזיד נהרג פשיטא בשוגג גולה איצטריכא ליה The Gemara analyzes the baraita: A High Priest who killed another intentionally is killed. Isn’t that obvious? Why would he be punished differently than other murderers? It was necessary for it to mention the latter clause: If he killed unintentionally, he is exiled, so it taught the related case with it.

הא נמי פשיטא איצטריך ס"ד אמינא הואיל וכתיב (במדבר לה, כה) וישב בה עד מות הכהן הגדול אימא כל דאית ליה תקנתא בחזרה ליגלי דלית ליה תקנתא בחזרה לא ליגלי דתנן The Gemara objects: This is also obvious. The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the baraita to state the latter clause, lest it enter your mind to say: Since it is written about one who kills unintentionally and is exiled to a city of refuge: “And he should dwell in it until the death of the High Priest” (Numbers 35:25), say: Anyone for whom there is a rectification by returning from the city of refuge is exiled, but one for whom there is no rectification by returning is not exiled. The High Priest has no such rectification, as we learned in a mishna (Makkot 11b):

Daf 18a

הדרן עלך דיני ממונות

Daf 18b

ההורג כהן גדול או כהן גדול שהרג את הנפש אינו יוצא משם לעולם אימא לא ליגלי קמ"ל ואימא הכי נמי אמר קרא (דברים יט, ג) לנוס שמה כל רוצח אפי' כ"ג במשמע: With regard to one who kills a High Priest or a High Priest who killed a person, he never departs from the city of refuge. Therefore, I will say that a High Priest is not exiled at all. For that reason, the baraita above teaches us that he is exiled. The Gemara suggests: Why not say that the halakha is indeed that the High Priest would not be exiled, since he would not be able to return home? The Gemara responds: The verse states concerning the city of refuge: “That every manslayer may flee there” (Deuteronomy 19:3), and even a High Priest is indicated by the inclusive term “every.”

עובר על עשה ועל לא תעשה: לא סגי דלא עבר הכי קאמר אם עבר על עשה ועל לא תעשה הרי הוא כהדיוט לכל דבריו The baraita teaches that a High Priest transgresses a positive mitzva and a prohibition. The Gemara understands the baraita as an independent statement asserting that the High Priest must transgress a positive mitzva and a prohibition, and asks: Is it not possible that he doesn’t transgress a positive mitzva and prohibition; i.e., must the High Priest transgress a positive mitzva and a prohibition? The Gemara responds: This is what the baraita is saying: This is not an independent statement asserting that the High Priest must transgress a positive mitzva and a prohibition; rather, the baraita teaches that if he transgressed a positive mitzva and a prohibition, then he is considered to be like an ordinary person concerning all of his halakhot, judged just as anyone else for common transgressions.

פשיטא סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ותנן אין דנין לא את השבט ולא את נביא השקר ולא את כהן גדול אלא על פי ב"ד של שבעים ואחד ואמר רב אדא בר אהבה (שמות יח, כב) כל הדבר הגדול יביאו אליך דבריו של גדול אימא כל דבריו של גדול קמ"ל The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara responds: No, as it could enter your mind to say that since we learned in the mishna (2a): The court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned, or a false prophet, or a High Priest, only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin, and since Rav Adda bar Ahava says that the phrase “every great matter they shall bring unto you” (Exodus 18:22), refers to the matters of a great person, the High Priest, who is judged in a court of seventy-one, therefore, one might say that this means all the matters of a great person, including non-capital transgressions, are judged in a court of seventy-one. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that for non-capital transgressions, he is treated like an ordinary person, and judged even by a court of three.

ואימא הכי נמי מי כתיב דברי גדול הדבר הגדול כתיב דבר גדול ממש: The Gemara suggests: But why not say that indeed, the halakha is that all cases involving the High Priest must be adjudicated in a court of seventy-one? The Gemara rejects this. Is it written: The matters of a great person? “Every great matter” is written, meaning actually a great matter, one involving a capital transgression, not only one related to a great person.

מעיד ומעידין אותו: מעיד והתניא (דברים כב, א) והתעלמת פעמים שאתה מתעלם ופעמים שאי אתה מתעלם הא כיצד § The mishna teaches that the High Priest testifies before the court and others testify concerning him. The Gemara expresses surprise: He testifies? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that in the verse: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and ignore them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1), the use of the unusual term “and ignore them,” as opposed to the more direct: Do not ignore them, indicates that there are times when you ignore lost items and there are times when you do not ignore them. How so?

כהן והוא בבית הקברות זקן ואינה לפי כבודו או שהיתה מלאכה שלו מרובה משל חבירו לכך נאמר והתעלמת The baraita answers: If the one who found the item was a priest, and the lost item is in the cemetery, where priests are prohibited from entering; or if he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to a lost item of that kind; or if his work, which he would need to suspend in order to tend to and return the item, is of greater value than the lost item of the other, one might think that he must nonetheless return it. Therefore, with regard to those cases, it is stated: “And ignore them.” Since a distinguished individual may ignore a mitzva that is incumbent on others if it is not in keeping with his dignity, perhaps the High Priest would be allowed to ignore the obligation to testify, due to his honor.

אמר רב יוסף מעיד למלך והתנן לא דן ולא דנין אותו לא מעיד ולא מעידין אותו אלא א"ר זירא מעיד לבן מלך בן מלך הדיוט הוא Rav Yosef said: A High Priest testifies only about a king, since such testimony would not compromise his dignity. The Gemara objects: But didn’t we learn in the mishna above that the king does not judge and is not judged, and he does not testify and others do not testify concerning him? Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: The meaning of Rav Yosef’s statement is that a High Priest testifies about a son of a king. The Gemara objects: The son of a king is an ordinary person, without special status in halakha, so it is not in keeping with the High Priest’s dignity to testify concerning him.

אלא מעיד בפני המלך והא אין מושיבין מלך בסנהדרין משום יקרא דכהן גדול אתא ויתיב מקבלי ניהלי לסהדותיה קאי הוא ואזיל ומעיינינא ליה אנן בדיניה Rather, the meaning of Rav Yosef’s statement is that he testifies before the king, and it is not in keeping with the dignity of the High Priest to testify if the king is a presiding judge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t we learn in a baraita (Tosefta 2:8) that a king is not seated on the Sanhedrin? The Gemara explains: Rav Yosef is referring to a special arrangement: Due to the honor of the High Priest, the king comes and sits as one of the judges, they receive his testimony, he rises and goes, and we deliberate about the case.

גופא אין מושיבין מלך בסנהדרין ולא מלך וכהן גדול בעיבור שנה מלך בסנהדרין דכתיב (שמות כג, ב) לא תענה על ריב לא תענה על רב § Having mentioned this baraita, the Gemara turns its attention to the matter itself: A king is not seated on the Sanhedrin, nor is a king or a High Priest seated on a court for intercalating the year. The Gemara explains: With regard to a king on the Sanhedrin, the source is as it is written: “Do not answer in a cause [riv]” (Exodus 23:2), which is explained to mean: Do not answer to a great person [rav]. Therefore, one whose stature will make the other judges afraid to contradict him may not be appointed to the Sanhedrin.

לא מלך וכהן גדול בעיבור שנה מלך משום אפסניא כהן גדול משום צינה The Gemara continues its explanation of the baraita: Nor is a king or a High Priest seated on a court for intercalating the year. A king does not serve as a judge concerning this matter due to the sustenance of soldiers. Taxes were collected on a yearly basis, while the soldiers were paid monthly, so the king had a vested interest in not adding a month to the calendar. A High Priest does not serve as a judge concerning this matter due to the cold. If a month is added to the calendar and the High Priest must perform his Yom Kippur immersions and walk barefoot on the floor of the Temple deeper into the cold autumn, he too will have a vested interest in not adding a month.

א"ר פפא ש"מ שתא בתר ירחא אזיל איני והא הנך ג' רועי בקר דהוו קיימי ושמעינהו רבנן דקאמרי Rav Pappa says: Learn from the ruling concerning the High Priest that the weather of the year follows the months, meaning that changes in the seasons are in accordance with the sequence of the months in the standard, non-intercalated calendar. The High Priest would not want the year to be intercalated, because then the colder weather of Marḥeshvan would occur during Tishrei. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But isn’t that contradicted by the incident of those three cattle herders that were standing around, and the Sages heard them saying various statements about annual weather signs?

חד אמר אם בכיר ולקיש כחדא יינץ דין הוא אדר ואם לאו לית דין אדר וחד אמר אם תור בצפר בתלג ימות ובטיהרא בטול תאינה ידמוך ישלח משכיה דין הוא אדר ואם לאו לית דין אדר וחד אמר אם קידום תקיף לחדא יהא יפח בלועך נפיק לקיבליה דין הוא אדר ואם לאו לית דין אדר ועברוה רבנן לההיא שתא One of them said: If the first grains and the late-ripening grains sprout at the same time, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar but still Shevat. And one of them said: If an ox dies in the morning in the snow, indicating that it is still very cold, and at noon in the shade of a fig tree it sleeps, rubbing against it to strip off its skin because of the heat, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar. And one of them said: If there is a very strong east wind, which is cold, yet the warm air that you blow with your jaw goes out and toward it and overcomes its effect, that is Adar, but if not, that is not Adar. And since those signs had not yet come to pass, the Sages intercalated the calendar that year.

ותסברא רבנן ארעוותא סמוך אלא רבנן אחושבנייהו סמוך ורועי בקר איסתיועי הוא דאיסתייעא מילתייהו: The Gemara rejects this: And can you understand that the Sages relied on cattle herders to determine halakha? Rather, the Sages relied on their own calculations, and those cattle herders were supported inasmuch as their statements were supported by the Sages’ independent conclusion.

חולץ וחולצין כו': קא פסיק ותני לא שנא מן האירוסין ולא שנא מן הנישואין בשלמא מן הנישואין הוי עשה ולא תעשה § The mishna teaches that the High Priest performs ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother performs ḥalitza with his wife, but in any case he does not consummate levirate marriage with his brother’s wife. The Gemara comments: The mishna categorically teaches that the High Priest does not consummate levirate marriage, and there is no difference whether his brother’s wife was a widow from betrothal alone and no difference whether she was a widow from a marriage that had been consummated. Granted, it is understood that he does not consummate levirate marriage with a widow from marriage, since there is both a positive mitzva: “And he shall take a wife in her virginity” (Leviticus 21:13), and also a prohibition: “A widow, or one divorced, or a ḥalala, or a zona, these shall he not take” (Leviticus 21:14),

Daf 19a

ואין עשה דוחה לא תעשה ועשה אלא מן האירוסין אמאי יבא עשה וידחה לא תעשה and there is a principle that a positive mitzva by itself does not override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva. But as for the ruling that he does not consummate levirate marriage with a widow from betrothal, why not? The positive mitzva to consummate levirate marriage should come and override the prohibition.

גזירה ביאה ראשונה אטו ביאה שניה The Gemara answers: The first act of intercourse is prohibited by rabbinic decree due to the likelihood of a second act of intercourse. Although the first act of intercourse would fulfill the positive mitzva of consummating levirate marriage, which would override the prohibition against a High Priest’s engaging in intercourse with a widow, any further intercourse would not be in fulfillment of a mitzva, and would not override the prohibition. Therefore, due to the possibility that the High Priest and the yevama would engage in intercourse a second time, the Sages decreed that even the first act is forbidden.

תניא נמי הכי אם קדמו ובעלו ביאה ראשונה קנו ואסור לקיימן בביאה שניה: The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: If the High Priest or one whose yevama is forbidden to him went ahead and engaged in a first act of intercourse with her, he acquired her as a wife, but it is prohibited to retain that woman as a wife for a second act of intercourse.

מת לו מת כו': ת"ר (ויקרא כא, יב) ומן המקדש לא יצא לא יצא עמהן אבל יוצא הוא אחריהן כיצד הן נכסין והוא נגלה הן ניגלין והוא נכסה: § The mishna teaches with regard to the High Priest that if a relative of his died, he does not follow the bier carrying the corpse. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse concerning the High Priest, which states: “And from the Temple he shall not emerge” (Leviticus 21:12), means: He shall not emerge with them as they escort the bier, but he emerges after them. How so? Once they are concealed from sight by turning onto another street, he is revealed on the street they departed, and when they are revealed, then he is concealed.

ויוצא עד פתח כו': שפיר קאמר ר' יהודה The mishna teaches Rabbi Meir’s opinion, that in the manner just described to escort the deceased, the High Priest emerges with them until the entrance of the gate of the city, which is contrasted with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion that he does not leave the Temple at all. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda is saying well, and his statement is consistent with the straightforward meaning of the verse: “And from the Temple he shall not emerge” (Leviticus 21:12).

אמר לך רבי מאיר אי הכי לביתו נמי לא אלא ה"ק מן המקדש לא יצא מקדושתו לא יצא וכיון דאית ליה הכירא לא אתי למינגע The Gemara responds: Rabbi Meir could have said to you: If so, that you understand the verse so narrowly, he should not go out to his house as well but should be required to stay in the Temple. Rather, this is what it is saying: “And from the Temple [hamikdash] he shall not emerge” means: From his sanctity [mikedushato] he shall not emerge by contracting ritual impurity, and since he has a distinctive indicator in that he does not walk together with those accompanying the bier, he will not come to touch the bier and contract impurity.

ורבי יהודה אגב מרריה דילמא מקרי ואתי ונגע: The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Yehuda respond? The Gemara explains: There is still cause for concern that on account of his bitterness due to the death of his loved one, perhaps it will happen that he comes and touches the bier. Therefore, a more restrictive regimen of separation is necessary.

כשהוא מנחם: ת"ר כשהוא עובר בשורה לנחם את אחרים סגן ומשוח שעבר בימינו וראש בית אב ואבלים וכל העם משמאלו וכשהוא עומד בשורה ומתנחם מאחרים סגן מימינו וראש בית אב וכל העם משמאלו The mishna teaches: And when he consoles others in their mourning when they return from burial, the way of all the people is that they pass by one after another and the mourners stand in a line and are consoled, and the appointed person stands in the middle, between him and the people. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 4:1) in a more detailed manner: When the High Priest passes by in the line to console others, the deputy High Priest and the former anointed High Priest, who had served temporarily and then stepped down, are on his right. And the head of the patrilineal family appointed over the priestly watch performing the sacrificial rites that day in the Temple; and the mourners; and all the people are on his left. And when he is standing in the line among the other mourners and is consoled by others, the deputy High Priest is on his right, and the head of the patrilineal family and all the people are on his left.

אבל משוח שעבר לא אתי גביה מ"ט חלשא דעתיה סבר קא חדי בי א"ר פפא ש"מ מהא מתניתא תלת שמע מינה היינו סגן היינו ממונה ושמע מינה אבלים עומדין וכל העם עוברין ושמע מינה אבלים לשמאל המנחמין הן עומדין The Gemara infers: But the previously anointed one does not come before him. What is the reason? The High Priest will become distraught. He will think: He is happy about me in my bereaved state. Rav Pappa said: Learn from it, from this baraita, three matters. Learn from it that the deputy High Priest is the same as the appointed person, as the baraita is referring to the deputy High Priest in the same function described by the mishna as the appointed one. And learn from it that the way of consoling in a line is that the mourners stand and all the people pass by and console them. And learn from it that the custom is that the mourners stand to the left of the consolers.

ת"ר בראשונה היו אבלים עומדין וכל העם עוברין והיו ב' משפחות בירושלים מתגרות זו בזו זאת אומרת אני עוברת תחלה וזאת אומרת אני עוברת תחלה התקינו שיהא העם עומדין ואבלים עוברין: The Sages taught in a baraita: Initially the mourners would stand, and all the people would pass by one after another and console them. And there were two families in Jerusalem who would fight with each other, as this one would say: We pass by first because we are more distinguished and important, and that one would say: We pass by first. Consequently, they decreed that the people should stand and the mourners pass by, and disputes would be avoided.

(חזר והלך וסיפר סימן): The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the following discussion: Returned; and walk; and converse.

אמר רמי בר אבא החזיר רבי יוסי את הדבר ליושנו בציפורי שיהיו אבלים עומדין וכל העם עוברין ואמר רמי בר אבא התקין רבי יוסי בציפורי שלא תהא אשה מהלכת בשוק ובנה אחריה משום מעשה שהיה ואמר רמי בר אבא התקין ר' יוסי בציפורי שיהיו נשים מספרות בבית הכסא משום ייחוד Rami bar Abba says: Rabbi Yosei returned the matter to its former custom in Tzippori his city, that the mourners would stand and all the people would pass. And Rami bar Abba says: Rabbi Yosei instituted an ordinance in Tzippori that a woman should not walk in the market and have her son following behind her; rather, he should walk in front of her, because of an incident that happened in which bandits abducted a child and assaulted the mother when she came searching for him in his place of captivity. And Rami bar Abba says: Rabbi Yosei instituted an ordinance in Tzippori that women should converse in the bathroom, because of the restrictions on women being secluded with men. Since the public bathrooms there were outside the city a man might enter to take advantage of a woman, but he would be warded off by the women’s conversation.

אמר רב מנשיא בר עות שאילית את רבי יאשיה רבה בבית עלמין דהוצל ואמר לי אין שורה פחותה מעשרה בני אדם ואין אבלים מן המנין בין שאבלים עומדין וכל העם עוברין בין שאבלים עוברין וכל העם עומדין: Rav Menashya bar Ute says: I asked a question of Rabbi Yoshiya the Great in the cemetery of Huzal, and he said this halakha to me: There is no line for consoling mourners with fewer than ten people, and the mourners are not included in the count. This minimum number of consolers applies whether the mourners stand and all the people pass by, or the mourners pass by and all the people stand.

כשהוא מתנחם כו': איבעיא להו כי מנחם הוא אחריני היכי אמר להו ת"ש והוא אומר תתנחמו היכי דמי אילימא כי מנחמי אחריני לדידיה אמר להו איהו תתנחמו נחשא קא רמי להו אלא כי מנחם לאחריני אמר להו תתנחמו ש"מ: § The mishna teaches: And when he is consoled by others in his mourning, all the people say to him: We are your atonement. And he says to them: May you be blessed from Heaven. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When the High Priest consoles others, what should he say to them? Come and hear an answer from a baraita: And he says: May you be consoled. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which he says this? If we say that when others console him in his mourning he says to them: May you be consoled, this does not make sense, because he would be throwing a curse at them by saying that they too will need to be consoled. Rather, it must mean: When he consoles others, he says to them: May you be consoled. Learn from the baraita that this is what he says to console others.

מלך לא דן כו': אמר רב יוסף לא שנו אלא מלכי ישראל אבל מלכי בית דוד דן ודנין אותן דכתיב (ירמיהו כא, יב) בית דוד כה אמר ה' דינו לבקר משפט ואי לא דיינינן ליה אינהו היכי דייני והכתיב (צפניה ב, א) התקוששו וקושו ואמר ר"ל קשט עצמך ואחר כך קשט אחרים § The mishna teaches: A king does not judge and is not judged. Rav Yosef says: They taught this halakha only with regard to the kings of Israel, who were violent and disobedient of Torah laws, but with regard to the kings of the house of David, the king judges and is judged, as it is written: “O house of David, so says the Lord: Execute justice in the morning” (Jeremiah 21:12). If they do not judge him, how can he judge? But isn’t it written: “Gather yourselves together, yea, gather together [hitkosheshu vakoshu]” (Zephaniah 2:1), and Reish Lakish says: This verse teaches a moral principle: Adorn [kashet] yourself first, and then adorn others, i.e., one who is not subject to judgment may not judge others. Since it is understood from the verse in Jeremiah that kings from the Davidic dynasty can judge others, it is implicit that they can also be judged.

אלא מלכי ישראל מ"ט לא משום מעשה שהיה דעבדיה דינאי מלכא קטל נפשא אמר להו שמעון בן שטח לחכמים תנו עיניכם בו ונדוננו שלחו ליה עבדך קטל נפשא שדריה להו שלחו לי' תא אנת נמי להכא (שמות כא, כט) והועד בבעליו אמרה תורה יבא בעל השור ויעמוד על שורו The Gemara asks: But what is the reason that others do not judge the kings of Israel? It is because of an incident that happened, as the slave of Yannai the king killed a person. Shimon ben Shataḥ said to the Sages: Put your eyes on him and let us judge him. They sent word to Yannai: Your slave killed a person. Yannai sent the slave to them. They sent word to Yannai: You also come here, as the verse states with regard to an ox that gored a person to death: “He should be testified against with his owner” (Exodus 21:29). The Torah stated: The owner of the ox should come and stand over his ox.

אתא ויתיב א"ל שמעון בן שטח ינאי המלך עמוד על רגליך ויעידו בך ולא לפנינו אתה עומד אלא לפני מי שאמר והיה העולם אתה עומד שנאמר (דברים יט, יז) ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב וגו' אמר לו לא כשתאמר אתה אלא כמה שיאמרו חבריך The Gemara continues to narrate the incident: Yannai came and sat down. Shimon ben Shataḥ said to him: Yannai the king, stand on your feet and witnesses will testify against you. And it is not before us that you are standing, to give us honor, but it is before the One Who spoke and the world came into being that you are standing, as it is stated: “Then both the people, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord, before the priests and the judges that shall be in those days” (Deuteronomy 19:17). Yannai the king said to him: I will not stand when you alone say this to me, but according to what your colleagues say, and if the whole court tells me, I will stand.

Daf 19b

נפנה לימינו כבשו פניהם בקרקע נפנה לשמאלו וכבשו פניהם בקרקע אמר להן שמעון בן שטח בעלי מחשבות אתם יבא בעל מחשבות ויפרע מכם מיד בא גבריאל וחבטן בקרקע ומתו באותה שעה אמרו מלך לא דן ולא דנין אותו לא מעיד ולא מעידין אותו: Shimon ben Shataḥ turned to his right. The judges forced their faces to the ground out of fear and said nothing. He turned to his left, and they forced their faces to the ground and said nothing. Shimon ben Shataḥ said to them: You are masters of thoughts, enjoying your private thoughts, and not speaking. May the Master of thoughts, God, come and punish you. Immediately, the angel Gabriel came and struck those judges to the ground, and they died. At that moment, when they saw that the Sanhedrin does not have power to force the king to heed its instructions, the Sages said: A king does not judge others and others do not judge him, and he does not testify and others do not testify concerning him, due to the danger of the matter.

לא חולץ ולא חולצין וכו': איני והאמר רב אשי אפילו למאן דאמר נשיא שמחל על כבודו כבודו מחול מלך שמחל על כבודו אין כבודו מחול שנאמר (דברים יז, טו) שום תשים עליך מלך שתהא אימתו עליך מצוה שאני: The mishna teaches that the king does not perform ḥalitza with his brother’s widow and his brother does not perform ḥalitza with his wife, and Rabbi Yehuda says that he may do so if he wishes. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: Is that so? But doesn’t Rav Ashi say: Even according to the one who says that with regard to a Nasi who relinquished the honor due him, his honor is relinquished, nevertheless, with regard to a king who relinquished the honor due him, his honor is not relinquished, as it is stated: “You shall set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15), meaning that his fear should be upon you. The preservation of a king’s honor is mandated by the Torah. How could Rabbi Yehuda allow him to waive it? The Gemara answers: A mitzva is different; a king is not disgraced if he relinquishes his honor to perform a mitzva.

ואין נושאין כו': תניא אמרו לו לר' יהודה נשים הראויות לו מבית המלך ומאי נינהו מירב ומיכל The mishna teaches: And no one may marry the king’s widow, and Rabbi Yehuda says that a king may marry another king’s widow, as proven by King David, who was promised with regard to King Saul after his death: “And I have given you the house of your master and the wives of your master” (II Samuel 12:8). It is taught in a baraita: The Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda: The meaning of the verse is not that David married Saul’s widows, but that he married women appropriate for him from the house of the king. And who are they? Merab and Michal, the daughters of Saul.

שאלו תלמידיו את ר' יוסי היאך נשא דוד שתי אחיות בחייהן אמר להן מיכל אחר מיתת מירב נשאה ר' יהושע בן קרחה אומר קידושי טעות היו לו במירב שנאמר (שמואל ב ג, יד) תנה את אשתי את מיכל אשר ארסתי לי במאה ערלות פלשתים The Gemara relates a discussion about David’s marriage to Merab and Michal from a baraita (Tosefta, Sota 11:9): Rabbi Yosei’s students asked him: How did David marry two sisters while they were both alive? Rabbi Yosei said to them: He married Michal only after the death of Merab, which is permitted. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says a different explanation: His betrothal to Merab was in error and therefore void from the outset, and so Michal was permitted to him. This is as it is stated in the words of King David to Saul’s son Ish-bosheth: “Deliver me my wife Michal, whom I betrothed to me for one hundred foreskins of the Philistines” (II Samuel 3:14).

מאי תלמודא אמר רב פפא מיכל אשתי ולא מירב אשתי The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation here? How does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa learn from this verse that King David’s betrothal to Merab was in error? Rav Pappa says: In the verse, David indicates: Michal is my wife but Merab is not my wife.

מאי קידושי טעות דכתיב (שמואל א יז, כה) והיה האיש אשר יכנו יעשרנו המלך עושר גדול וגו' אזל קטליה אמר לו מלוה אית לך גבאי והמקדש במלוה אינה מקודשת The Gemara asks: What caused the betrothal between David and Merab to be a mistaken betrothal? The Gemara responds: As it is written about Israel’s war against the Philistines and Goliath: “And it shall be that the man who kills him, the king will enrich him with great riches and will give him his daughter, and make his father’s house free in Israel” (I Samuel 17:25). David went and killed Goliath. King Saul said to him: You have a loan in my possession, as I owe you the great wealth that I promised, though David had not given him an actual monetary loan. And the halakha is that with regard to one who betroths a woman by forgiving a loan, she is not betrothed, and therefore David’s betrothal of Merab did not take effect.

אזל יהבה לעדריאל דכתיב (שמואל א יח, יט) ויהי בעת תת את מירב בת שאול לדוד וגו' א"ל אי בעית דאתן לך מיכל זיל אייתי לי מאה ערלות פלשתים אזל אייתי ליה א"ל מלוה ופרוטה אית לך גבאי Saul went and gave Merab to Adriel, as it is written: “But it came to pass at the time when Merab, Saul’s daughter, should have been given to David, that she was given to Adriel the Meholathite as a wife” (I Samuel 18:19). Saul said to David: If you want me to give you Michal, go bring me one hundred foreskins of the Philistines (see I Samuel 18:25–27). David went and brought Saul two hundred foreskins. Saul said to him: Even though you brought the foreskins, the betrothal is not valid, as you, David, have a loan and one peruta in my possession, i.e., the wealth Saul owed him for slaying Goliath as well as the item of lesser monetary value, the foreskins of the Philistines.

שאול סבר מלוה ופרוטה דעתיה אמלוה ודוד סבר מלוה ופרוטה דעתיה אפרוטה Saul and David had a halakhic dispute on this point: Saul reasoned that in the case of one who betroths a woman by forgiving a loan and giving her one peruta, his mind is focused on the loan and not on the additional peruta, and therefore the betrothal is not valid. And David reasoned that in the case of one who betroths a woman by forgiving a loan and giving her one peruta, his mind is focused on the peruta and therefore the betrothal is valid.

ואיבעית אימא דכולי עלמא מלוה ופרוטה דעתיה אפרוטה שאול סבר לא חזו ולא מידי ודוד סבר חזו לכלבי ושונרי And if you wish, say instead: Everyone reasons that in the case of one who betroths a woman by forgiving a loan and giving her one peruta, his mind is focused on the peruta. Saul reasoned that foreskins of Philistines are not fit for any purpose and as such are worth not even one peruta, and that consequently the betrothal did not take effect. And David reasoned that they are fit for dogs and cats as food and as such are worth at least one peruta, and therefore the betrothal takes effect.

ור' יוסי האי תנה את אשתי את מיכל מאי דריש ביה ר' יוסי לטעמיה דתניא רבי יוסי היה דורש מקראות מעורבין The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yosei, who explains that David married Michal after the death of Merab, with regard to this verse: “Deliver me my wife Michal” (II Samuel 3:14), what does he derive from it? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Sota 11:8): Rabbi Yosei would derive meaning from mixed verses that seem contradictory.

כתיב (שמואל ב כא, ח) ויקח המלך את שני בני רצפה בת איה אשר ילדה לשאול את אדמוני ואת מפיבושת ואת חמשת בני מיכל אשר ילדה לעדריאל המחולתי וגו' וכי לעדריאל נתנה והלא לפלטי בן ליש נתנה דכתיב (שמואל א כה, מד) ושאול נתן את מיכל בתו אשת דוד לפלטי בן ליש וגו' The Tosefta continues. It is written: “But the king took the two sons of Rizpah, daughter of Aiah, whom she bore unto Saul, Armoni and Mephibosheth, and the five sons of Michal, daughter of Saul, whom she bore to Adriel, son of Barzillai the Meholathite” (II Samuel 21:8). But did Saul give Michal to Adriel? But didn’t he give her to Palti, son of Laish, as it is written: “Now Saul had given Michal his daughter, David’s wife, to Palti, son of Laish” (I Samuel 25:44)?

אלא מקיש קידושי מירב לעדריאל לקידושי מיכל לפלטי מה קידושי מיכל לפלטי בעבירה אף קידושי מירב לעדריאל בעבירה The Tosefta continues: The first verse does not mean, then, that Michal married Adriel. Rather, the verse compares Merab’s betrothal to Adriel to Michal’s betrothal to Palti: Just as Michal’s betrothal to Palti was effected in transgression, according to all opinions, since she was already married to David, so, too, Merab’s betrothal to Adriel was effected in transgression, since according to halakha she was betrothed to David.

ור' יהושע בן קרחה נמי הכתיב את חמשת בני מיכל בת שאול אמר לך רבי יהושע וכי מיכל ילדה והלא מירב ילדה מירב ילדה ומיכל גידלה לפיכך נקראו על שמה ללמדך שכל המגדל יתום בתוך ביתו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו: The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa as well, isn’t it written: “And the five sons of Michal, daughter of Saul, whom she bore to Adriel” (II Samuel 21:8). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa could have said to you to understand it this way: And did Michal give birth to these children? But didn’t Merab give birth to them for Adriel? Rather, Merab gave birth to them and died, and Michal raised them in her house. Therefore, the children were called by her name, to teach you that with regard to anyone who raises an orphan in his house, the verse ascribes him credit as if he gave birth to him.

(חנינא קרא יוחנן ואשתו אלעזר וגאולה ושמואל בלימודי סימן): רבי חנינא אומר מהכא (רות ד, יז) ותקראנה לו השכנות שם לאמר יולד בן לנעמי וכי נעמי ילדה והלא רות ילדה אלא רות ילדה ונעמי גידלה לפיכך נקרא על שמה The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the following discussion: Ḥanina called; Yoḥanan and his wife; Elazar and redemption; and Shmuel in my studies. Rabbi Ḥanina says: Proof for the aforementioned statement can be derived from here: “And the neighbors gave him a name, saying: There is a son born to Naomi” (Ruth 4:17). And did Naomi give birth to the son? But didn’t Ruth give birth to him? Rather, Ruth gave birth and Naomi raised him. Therefore, he was called by her name: “A son born to Naomi.”

רבי יוחנן אמר מהכא (דברי הימים א ד, יח) ואשתו היהודית ילדה את ירד אביגדור וגו' אלה בני בתיה בת פרעה אשר לקח (לו) מרד מרד זה כלב ולמה נקרא שמו מרד שמרד בעצת מרגלים וכי בתיה ילדה והלא יוכבד ילדה אלא יוכבד ילדה ובתיה גידלה לפיכך נקרא על שמה Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Proof for the aforementioned statement can be derived from here: “And his wife Hajehudijah gave birth to Jered the father of Gedor, and Heber the father of Soco, and Jekuthiel the father of Zanoah, and these are the sons of Bithiah, daughter of Pharaoh, whom Mered took” (I Chronicles 4:18). Mered is Caleb, and why was his name called Mered? Because he rebelled [marad] against the counsel of the spies. And according to the midrash, Jered, Heber, and Jekuthiel all refer to Moses our teacher. And did Bithiah give birth to Moses? But didn’t Jochebed give birth to him? Rather, Jochebed gave birth to him and Bithiah raised him. Therefore, he was called by her name as though she had given birth to him.

רבי אלעזר אמר מהכא (תהלים עז, טז) גאלת בזרוע עמך בני יעקב ויוסף סלה וכי יוסף ילד והלא יעקב ילד אלא יעקב ילד ויוסף כילכל לפיכך נקראו על שמו Rabbi Elazar says: Proof for the aforementioned statement can be derived from here: “You have with Your arm redeemed your people, the children of Jacob and Joseph, Selah” (Psalms 77:16). And did Joseph sire all of the children of Israel? But didn’t Jacob sire them? Rather, Jacob sired them and Joseph sustained them financially. Therefore, they were called by his name; all of Israel were called the children of Joseph.

אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמני א"ר יונתן כל המלמד בן חבירו תורה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו שנאמר (במדבר ג, א) ואלה תולדות אהרן ומשה וכתיב ואלה שמות בני אהרן לומר לך אהרן ילד ומשה לימד לפיכך נקראו על שמו Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: Anyone who teaches another person’s son Torah, the verse ascribes him credit as if he sired him, as it is stated: “Now these are the generations of Aaron and Moses” (Numbers 3:1), and it is written immediately afterward: “And these are the names of the sons of Aaron: Nadav the firstborn and Avihu, Eleazar, and Ithamar” (Numbers 3:2), but it does not mention the names of Moses’ children. This serves to say to you that Aaron sired his children, but Moses taught them Torah. Therefore, the children were also called by his name.

(ישעיהו כט, כב) לכן כה אמר ה' אל בית יעקב אשר פדה את אברהם וכי היכן מצינו ביעקב שפדאו לאברהם אמר רב יהודה שפדאו מצער גידול בנים והיינו דכתיב (ישעיהו כט, כב) לא עתה יבוש יעקב וגו' לא עתה יבוש יעקב מאביו ולא עתה פניו יחוורו מאבי אביו The Gemara cites another derivation connected to child-rearing: “Therefore, so says the Lord to the house of Jacob, who redeemed Abraham; Jacob shall not now be ashamed, neither shall his face now wax pale” (Isaiah 29:22). But where have we found any indication about Jacob that he redeemed Abraham? Rav Yehuda says: It means that he redeemed him from the suffering of raising children, in that Abraham did not have twelve tribes and the resultant hardships involved in raising them, as Jacob did, as Jacob assumed the burden of raising the tribes of Israel. And this is as it is written: “Jacob shall not now be ashamed, neither shall his face now wax pale,” meaning: “Jacob shall not now be ashamed” before his father, and “neither shall his face now wax pale” before his father’s father, since he took upon himself the role that they bore as well.

כתיב פלטי וכתיב פלטיאל אמר ר' יוחנן פלטי שמו ולמה נקרא שמו פלטיאל שפלטו אל מן העבירה מה עשה נעץ חרב בינו לבינה אמר כל העוסק בדבר זה ידקר בחרב זה The Gemara cites a tradition with regard to Palti, son of Laish: It is written in one place “Palti” (I Samuel 25:44), and it is written in another place “Paltiel” (II Samuel 3:15). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Palti was his real name, and why was his name called Paltiel? To teach that God [El ] saved [pelato] him from the sin, by giving him the insight that he may not touch Michal, understanding that she was still David’s wife and therefore forbidden to him. What did he do? He embedded a sword in the bed between him and her, and said: Anyone who engages in this matter, i.e., sexual intercourse, should be stabbed by this sword.

והכתיב (שמואל ב ג, טז) וילך אתה אישה שנעשה לה כאישה והכתיב (שמואל ב ג, טז) הלך ובכה על המצוה דאזיל מיניה עד בחורים שנעשו שניהם כבחורים שלא טעמו טעם ביאה The Gemara challenges this: But isn’t it written: “And her husband went with her, weeping as he went, and followed her to Bahurim” (II Samuel 3:16), referring to Palti as Michal’s husband? The Gemara responds: This means that he became like a husband for her through his affection and concern for her. The Gemara counters: But isn’t it written in that very verse: “weeping as he went”? If from the outset he thought that she was David’s wife, why was he crying? The Gemara responds: He was weeping about the mitzva that left him, as from now on, he would receive no reward for restraining his desire. The end of the verse says that they went “to Bahurim,” meaning that they both became like young men [baḥurim] in that they did not taste sexual intercourse at all.

אמר רבי יוחנן תוקפו של יוסף ענוותנותו של בועז תוקפו של בועז ענוותנותו של פלטי בן ליש תוקפו של יוסף ענוותנותו של בועז דכתיב (רות ג, ח) ויהי בחצי הלילה ויחרד האיש וילפת מאי וילפת אמר רב שנעשה בשרו כראשי לפתות Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Joseph’s power is the humility of Boaz, as Joseph is praised for showing strength with regard to an accomplishment that was insignificant for Boaz (see Genesis, chapter 39). Likewise, Boaz’s power is the humility of Palti, son of Laish, as Palti’s capacity for restraint was greater still. Joseph’s power is the humility of Boaz, as it is written about Boaz: “And it came to pass at midnight that the man was startled and turned himself, and behold, a woman lay at his feet” (Ruth 3:8). What is the meaning of “and turned himself [vayyilafet]”? Rav says: The meaning is that his flesh became like the heads of turnips [lefatot], his sexual organ hardening out of arousal, but even though Ruth was not married he refrained from engaging in intercourse with her; while Joseph had to exert more effort, despite the fact that Potiphar’s wife was married.

Daf 20a

תוקפו של בועז ענוותנותו של פלטי בן ליש כדאמרן Boaz’s power is the humility of Palti, son of Laish, as we said, for he conquered his desire not only for one night, as Boaz did, but for many nights

אמר רבי יוחנן מאי דכתיב (משלי לא, כט) רבות בנות עשו חיל ואת עלית על כולנה רבות בנות עשו חיל זה יוסף ובועז ואת עלית על כולנה זה פלטי בן ליש Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Many daughters have done valiantly, but you excel above them all” (Proverbs 31:29)? “Many daughters have done valiantly”; this is a reference to Joseph and Boaz. “But you excel above them all”; this is a reference to Palti, son of Laish, who exceeded Joseph and Boaz in restraint, as discussed above.

אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמן אמר רבי יונתן מאי דכתיב (משלי לא, ל) שקר החן והבל היופי שקר החן זה יוסף והבל היופי זה בועז יראת ה' היא תתהלל זה פלטי בן ליש Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥman says that Rabbi Yonatan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Grace is deceitful, and beauty is vain, but a woman who fears the Lord, she shall be praised” (Proverbs 31:30). “Grace is deceitful”; this is a reference to Joseph. “And beauty is vain”; this is a reference to Boaz. “Who fears the Lord, she shall be praised”; this is a reference to Palti, son of Laish, who did not sin with Michal. Although the behavior of Joseph and Boaz is commendable, it is “deceitful” and “vain” relative to that of Palti ben Laish.

דבר אחר שקר החן זה דורו של משה והבל היופי זה דורו של יהושע יראת ה' היא תתהלל זה דורו של חזקיה Alternatively: “Grace is deceitful”; this is a reference to the generation of Moses. “And beauty is vain”; this is a reference to the generation of Joshua. “Who fears the Lord, she shall be praised”; this is a reference to the generation of Hezekiah. Although the studying of Torah during the generations of Moses and Joshua was commendable, it was “deceitful” and “vain” relative to that of the generation of Hezekiah, during which the people studied Torah assiduously, despite the suffering caused by of war and foreign rule.

דבר אחר שקר החן זה דורו של משה ויהושע והבל היופי זה דורו של חזקיה יראת ה' היא תתהלל זה דורו של ר' יהודה ברבי אילעאי אמרו עליו על רבי יהודה ברבי אילעאי שהיו ששה תלמידים מתכסין בטלית אחת ועוסקין בתורה: Alternatively: “Grace is deceitful”; this is a reference to the generation of Moses and Joshua. “And beauty is vain”; this is a reference to the generation of Hezekiah. “Who fears the Lord, she shall be praised”; this is a reference to the generation of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ilai, who lived after the decrees of Hadrian, when the people were impoverished and oppressed. It was said about Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ilai, that six of his students would cover themselves with one garment, due to their poverty, and nevertheless they would engage in Torah study. Although the studying of Torah during the generations of Moses, Joshua, and Hezekiah was commendable, it was “deceitful” and “vain” relative to that of the people in the generation of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ilai, who studied Torah despite their hardships.

מתני׳ מת לו מת אינו יוצא מפתח פלטרין שלו רבי יהודה אומר אם רוצה לצאת אחר המיטה יוצא שכן מצינו בדוד שיצא אחר מיטתו של אבנר שנאמר (שמואל ב ג, לא) והמלך דוד הולך אחר המיטה א"ל לא היה הדבר אלא לפייס את העם וכשמברין אותו כל העם מסובין על הארץ והוא מיסב על הדרגש: MISHNA: If a relative of the king dies, he does not emerge from the entrance of his palace [palterin], as it does not befit one of his stature to accompany the deceased. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes to follow the bier, he follows it, as that is what we found with regard to King David, who followed the bier of Abner. As it is stated: “And King David followed the bier” (II Samuel 3:31). The Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda: The matter was only to appease the people, so that they should not suspect David of ordering Abner’s death. And when the people comfort the king with the meal of comfort, all the people recline on the ground, and he reclines on the dargash.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן מקום שנהגו נשים לצאת אחר המיטה יוצאות לפני המיטה יוצאות ר' יהודה אומר לעולם נשים לפני המיטה יוצאות שכן מצינו בדוד שיצא אחר מיטתו של אבנר שנאמר (שמואל ב ג, לא) והמלך דוד הולך אחר המיטה GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: In a place where women were accustomed to follow the bier, they would follow it, and the men would walk in front of the bier, and if the women were accustomed to walk in front of the bier, they would go in front of it. Rabbi Yehuda says: Women always go in front of the bier, as that is what we found with regard to King David, who followed the bier of Abner, as it is stated: “And King David followed the bier,” and presumably David did not go among the women.

אמרו לו לא היה הדבר אלא לפייס את העם ונתפייסו שהיה דוד יוצא מבין האנשים ונכנס לבין הנשים ויצא מבין הנשים ונכנס לבין האנשים שנאמר (שמואל ב ג, לז) וידעו כל העם וכל ישראל כי לא היתה מהמלך להמית את אבנר The Sages said to him: The matter was only to appease the people, and they were appeased. As David would go out from among the men and go in among the women, and went out from among the women and went in among the men, as it is stated: “So all the people and all Israel understood that day that it was not from the king to slay Abner, son of Ner” (II Samuel 3:37).

דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (שמואל ב ג, לה) ויבא כל העם להברות את דוד כתיב להכרות וקרינן להברות בתחלה להכרותו ולבסוף להברותו Rava interpreted a verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And all the people came to comfort David” (II Samuel 3:35)? It is written: “To destroy [lehakhrot],” and we read: “To comfort [lehavrot],” meaning, in the beginning they wanted to destroy him, as they suspected him of ordering Abner’s assassination, and ultimately, when they saw that he was truly mourning, they decided to comfort him.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מפני מה נענש אבנר מפני שהיה לו למחות בשאול ולא מיחה ר' יצחק אמר מיחה ולא נענה ושניהן מקרא אחד דרשו (שמואל ב ג, לג) ויקונן המלך אל אבנר ויאמר הכמות נבל ימות אבנר ידיך לא אסורות ורגליך לא לנחשתים הוגשו Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: For what reason was Abner punished by being killed? It is because he should have protested to Saul about the killing of the priests of Nob (see I Samuel 22:17–19), but he did not protest. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: He did protest, so that is not the reason for his death, but he was not answered. And both of these Sages interpreted one verse: “And the king lamented for Abner, and said: Should Abner die as a churl dies? Your hands were not bound, nor your feet put into fetters; as a man falls before the children of iniquity, so did you fall” (II Samuel 3:33–34).

מאן דאמר לא מיחה הכי קאמר ידיך לא אסורות ורגליך לא לנחשתים הוגשו מאי טעמא לא מחית (שמואל ב ג, לד) כנפול לפני בני עולה נפלת ומ"ד מיחה ולא נענה איתמהויי מתמה הכמות נבל ימות ידיך לא אסורות ורגליך לא לנחשתים מכדי מחויי מחית מ"ט כנפול לפני בני עולה נפלת The Gemara explains how each Sage understands the verse: The one who says he did not protest explains that this is what the verse is saying: As “your hands were not bound, nor your feet put into fetters,” what is the reason you did not protest against Saul? Therefore, since you could have protested but did not, then “as a man falls before the children of iniquity, so did you fall.” And the one who says he protested and was not answered explains that this is what the verse is saying: David wondered: “Should Abner die as a churl dies? Your hands were not bound, nor your feet put into fetters,” since you protested at the right time. Since that is the case, what is the reason that “as a man falls before the children of iniquity, so did you fall”?

למאן דאמר מיחה מ"ט איענש א"ר נחמן (ברבי) יצחק ששהא מלכות בית דוד שתי שנים ומחצה: The Gemara asks: According to the one who says that Abner protested, what is the reason he was punished with this death? Rav Naḥman, son of Rabbi Yitzḥak, says: It is because he delayed the kingdom of the house of David two and a half years, by supporting the kingdom of Ish-bosheth, the son of Saul, for this period of time.

וכשמברין אותו כו': מאי דרגש אמר עולא ערסא דגדא א"ל רבנן לעולא מי איכא מידי דעד האידנא לא אותביניה והשתא מותבינן ליה § The mishna teaches: And when they comfort the king with the meal of comfort, he reclines on the dargash. The Gemara asks: What is a dargash? Ulla says: A bed of fortune, which would be designated in houses for decoration and for good fortune, and no one would sit on it. The Sages said to Ulla: Is there anything which until now we did not authorize one to sit on, but now, in his time of mourning, we seat him on it?

מתקיף לה רבא מאי קושיא דילמא מידי דהוה אאכילה ושתיה דעד האידנא לא אכילניה ולא אשקיניה השתא קא מוכלינן ליה וקא משקינן ליה אלא אי קשיא הא קשיא דרגש אינו צריך לכפותו אלא זוקפו ואי ס"ד ערסא דגדא אמאי אינו צריך לכפותו והתניא הכופה את מטתו לא מטתו בלבד הוא כופה אלא כל מטות שיש לו בתוך ביתו הוא כופה Rava objects to this question: What is the difficulty in this? Perhaps sitting on the dargash is just as it is with eating and drinking. As until now, we did not feed him nor give him drink, but now, in his time of mourning, we feed him and give him drink, in the meal of comfort. Rather, if it is difficult, this is what is difficult, as it is taught in a baraita: Concerning a dargash, the mourner is not required to overturn it during mourning. Rather, he stands it up on its side. And if it enters your mind to say that this is a bed of fortune, why is he not required to overturn it? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to one who overturns his bed during mourning, not only does he overturns his own bed, but rather he overturns all the beds he has in his house?

מאי קושיא דילמא מידי דהוה אמטה מיוחדת לכלים דקתני אם היתה מיוחדת לכלים אינו צריך לכפותה אלא אי קשיא הא קשיא רשב"ג אומר דרגש מתיר קרביטין והוא נופל מאיליו ואי סלקא דעתך ערסא דגדא קרביטין מי אית ליה The Gemara responds: What is the difficulty in this? Perhaps the lack of requirement to overturn the dargash is just as it is with a bed that is designated for the storage of garments, and not for sleeping, as it is taught in a baraita: If it was designated for the storage of garments and not for people to lie down on, he is not required to overturn it. Rather, if it is difficult, this is what is difficult, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One is not required to overturn a dargash. Rather, the mourner loosens the straps [karvitin] and it falls on its own. And if it enters your mind to say that this is a bed of fortune, does such a bed have straps?

אלא כי אתא רבין אמר אמר לי ההוא מרבנן ורב תחליפא שמיה דהוה שכיח בשוקא דגילדאי ואמר ליה מאי דרגש ערסא דצלא א"ר ירמיה א"ר יוחנן דרגש Rather, when Ravin came he said: One of the Sages said to me, and Rav Taḥlifa is his name, that he was often in the market of the leather workers, and he said to him: What is the meaning of dargash? A leather bed. Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The difference between a bed and a dargash is this: A dargash

Daf 20b

סירוגו מתוכו מטה סירוגה מעל גבה has its weaving on its inside, in that the straps woven to hold the bedding are tied in holes inside the bed posts, while a bed has its weaving on its outside, in that its straps are tied around the posts.

מיתיבי כלי עץ מאימתי מקבלין טומאה המטה והעריסה משישופם בעור הדג ואי מטה מסורגת (היא) מעל גבה למה לי שיפת עור הדג אלא הא והא מתוכו מטה אעולי ואפוקי בבזיוני דרגש אעולי ואפוקי באבקתא The Gemara raises an objection from the mishna (Kelim 16:1): From when are wooden vessels considered complete and susceptible to impurity? In the case of a bed or a crib, this happens once they are rubbed with fish skin, which smoothens the wood. The Gemara asks: And if a bed is woven on its back side, as Rabbi Yoḥanan claimed, why do I need rubbing with fish skin? Doesn’t the weaving cover the smooth part of the bed? Rather, instead of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation, say that the weaving of both this and that, a dargash and a bed, is on its inside, and the difference between them is that on a bed, the straps go in and out of holes on the posts, whereas on a dargash, they go in and out of loops.

אמר ר' יעקב אמר ר' יהושע בן לוי הלכה כרשב"ג אמר רבי יעקב בר אמי מטה שנקליטיה יוצאין זוקפה ודיו: Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that a mourner is not required to overturn a dargash, but only to untie the straps around its posts to let it fall on its own. In connection with this matter Rabbi Ya’akov bar Ami says: In the case of a bed whose posts [naklitim] on which the canopy is spread extend, meaning that they are very long, so that the bed will remain high off the ground even if it is overturned, the mourner stands it up in the time of mourning and that is sufficient.

מתני׳ ומוציא למלחמת הרשות על פי בית דין של שבעים ואחד ופורץ לעשות לו דרך ואין ממחה בידו דרך המלך אין לו שיעור וכל העם בוזזין ונותנין לו והוא נוטל חלק בראש: MISHNA: And the king brings out people for conscription in an optional war, i.e., a war that is not mandated by the Torah and is not a war of defense, on the basis of a court of seventy-one, and breaches fences of anyone in his way to create a pathway for himself for his various needs, and no one can protest his power. The pathway of the king has no measure, neither lengthwise nor widthwise, and one cannot protest that this pathway is wider than necessary. And all the people take spoils in war and give them to him, and he takes the first portion of the spoils.

גמ׳ תנינא חדא זימנא אין מוציאין למלחמת הרשות אלא ע"פ ב"ד של שבעים ואחד איידי דתנא כל מילי דמלך תנא נמי מוציאין למלחמת הרשות GEMARA: We already learn this on another occasion in the mishna (2a): And the king may bring out the nation to an optional war only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges. Why did the mishna need to repeat it here? The Gemara explains: Since in the mishna here the tanna taught all matters pertaining to the king, he also taught the halakha of bringing out the nation to an optional war, although this halakha was taught at the beginning of the tractate in the context of the halakhot of the court of seventy-one judges.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל כל האמור בפרשת מלך מלך מותר בו רב אמר לא נאמרה פרשה זו אלא לאיים עליהם שנאמר (דברים יז, טו) שום תשים עליך מלך שתהא אימתו עליך With regard to the king’s rights, the Sages engaged in a dispute: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Concerning all the actions that are stated in the biblical passage about the king (see I Samuel 8:11–17), it is permitted for a king to perform them. Rav says: This biblical passage was stated only in order to threaten the Jewish people, so that they would accept the king’s sovereignty with reverence, as it is stated: “You shall set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15), meaning, it is necessary that his fear should be upon you. But the king is not actually permitted to perform the actions stated there.

כתנאי ר' יוסי אומר כל האמור בפרשת מלך מלך מותר בו ר' יהודה אומר לא נאמרה פרשה זו אלא כדי לאיים עליהם שנאמר שום תשים עליך מלך שתהא אימתו עליך The Gemara comments that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: Concerning all the actions that are stated in the biblical passage about the king, it is permitted for a king to perform them. Rabbi Yehuda says: This biblical passage was stated only in order to threaten the Jewish people, as it is stated: “You shall set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15), meaning, it is necessary that his fear should be upon you.

וכן היה רבי יהודה אומר ג' מצות נצטוו ישראל בכניסתן לארץ להעמיד להם מלך ולהכרית זרעו של עמלק ולבנות להם בית הבחירה The baraita continues: And so would Rabbi Yehuda say: Three mitzvot were commanded to the Jewish people upon their entrance into Eretz Yisrael, which apply only in Eretz Yisrael: They were commanded to establish a king for themselves (see Deuteronomy 17:14–15), and to cut off the seed of Amalek in war (see Deuteronomy 25:17–19), and to build the Chosen House, i.e., the Temple, in Jerusalem (see Deuteronomy 12:10–12).

רבי נהוראי אומר לא נאמרה פרשה זו אלא כנגד תרעומתן שנאמר (דברים יז, יד) ואמרת אשימה עלי מלך וגו' The baraita continues: Rabbi Nehorai says: This biblical passage about appointing a king was stated only in response to the Jewish people’s complaint, as it is stated: “When you come unto the land that the Lord your God gives you, and shall possess it, and shall dwell therein, and shall say: I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are around me” (Deuteronomy 17:14). The verse indicates that appointing a king is not a mitzva and that when Samuel spoke to them, he intended to frighten them so that they might regret their complaint and retract their request for a king.

תניא ר"א אומר זקנים שבדור כהוגן שאלו שנאמר (שמואל א ח, ו) תנה לנו מלך לשפטנו אבל עמי הארץ שבהן קלקלו שנאמר (שמואל א ח, כ) והיינו גם אנחנו ככל הגוים ושפטנו מלכנו ויצא לפנינו It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: The elders of Samuel’s generation asked appropriately, as it is stated: “Give us a king to judge us” (I Samuel 8:6), since they wanted a steady leader in place of Samuel. But the ignoramuses among them ruined it, as it is stated: “But the people refused to heed the voice of Samuel; and they said: No, but there shall be a king over us, that we also may be like all the nations, and that our king may judge us, and emerge before us, and fight our battles” (I Samuel 8:19–20).

תניא רבי יוסי אומר שלש מצות נצטוו ישראל בכניסתן לארץ להעמיד להם מלך ולהכרית זרעו של עמלק ולבנות להם בית הבחירה ואיני יודע איזה מהן תחילה It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: Three mitzvot were commanded to the Jewish people upon their entrance into Eretz Yisrael: To establish a king for themselves, and to cut off the seed of Amalek in war, and to build for themselves the Chosen House in Jerusalem. But I do not know which one they are obligated to do first.

כשהוא אומר (שמות יז, טז) כי יד על כס יה מלחמה לה' בעמלק הוי אומר להעמיד להם מלך תחילה ואין כסא אלא מלך שנאמר (דברי הימים א כט, כג) וישב שלמה על כסא ה' למלך When the verse states: “The hand upon the throne [kes] of the Lord: The Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation” (Exodus 17:16), you must say that this means they are obligated to establish a king for themselves first, before waging war with Amalek, and the verse is interpreted as follows: “Throne of the Lord” is nothing other than a symbolic name for a king, as it is stated: “Then Solomon sat on the throne [kisei] of the Lord as king” (I Chronicles 29:23), indicating that a king sits on “the throne of the Lord.”

ועדיין איני יודע אם לבנות להם בית הבחירה תחלה או להכרית זרעו של עמלק תחלה כשהוא אומר (דברים יב, י) והניח לכם מכל אויביכם וגו' והיה המקום אשר יבחר ה' וגו' הוי אומר להכרית זרעו של עמלק תחלה The baraita continues: And still I do not know whether building them the Chosen House is first, or cutting off the seed of Amalek is first, i.e., after the appointing of the king. When the verse states: “And He will give you rest from all your enemies round about, so that you dwell in safety; then it shall come to pass that the place that the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, there shall you bring all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:10–11), you must say that the Jewish people were to cut off the seed of Amalek first.

וכן בדוד הוא אומר (שמואל ב ז, א) ויהי כי ישב המלך דוד בביתו וה' הניח לו מסביב וכתיב (שמואל ב ז, ב) ויאמר המלך אל נתן הנביא ראה נא אנכי יושב בבית ארזים וגו' The baraita continues: And so the verse states concerning David: “And it came to pass, when King David dwelled in his house and the Lord had given him rest round about from all his enemies” (II Samuel 7:1). And it is written immediately afterward: “That the king said to Nathan the prophet: See now, I dwell in a house of cedar but the Ark of God dwells within curtains” (II Samuel 7:2), and King David then began seeking a site to build the Temple.

אמר ריש לקיש בתחילה מלך שלמה על העליונים שנאמר (דברי הימים א כט, כג) וישב שלמה על כסא ה' ולבסוף מלך על התחתונים שנאמר (מלכים א ה, ד) כי הוא רודה בכל עבר הנהר מתפסח ועד עזה § The Gemara cites another tradition about Solomon’s kingdom. Reish Lakish says: Initially, Solomon ruled even over the supernal worlds, as it is stated: “Then Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord” (I Chronicles 29:23), indicating that his kingdom was like the Lord’s kingdom, reigning over all worlds. But ultimately, after he married foreign wives, he ruled over only the lower worlds, as it is stated: “For he had dominion over all the region on this side of the river, from Tiphsah even to Gaza” (I Kings 5:4).

רב ושמואל חד אמר תפסח בסוף העולם ועזה בסוף העולם וחד אמר תפסח ועזה בהדי הדדי הוו יתבו וכשם שמלך על תפסח ועל עזה כך מלך על כל העולם כולו Rav and Shmuel disagreed with regard to the meaning of this verse: One says that Tiphsah is a name of a place at the end of the world, at one end of Solomon’s kingdom, and Gaza is at the other end of the world. And one says that Tiphsah and Gaza sat next to each other, and the verse serves to teach that just as he ruled over Tiphsah and over Gaza, so he ruled over the whole world.

ולבסוף לא מלך אלא על ישראל שנאמר (קהלת א, יב) אני קהלת הייתי מלך על ישראל וגו' ולבסוף לא מלך אלא על ירושלים שנאמר (קהלת א, א) דברי קהלת בן דוד מלך בירושלים ולבסוף לא מלך אלא על מטתו שנאמר (שיר השירים ג, ז) הנה מטתו שלשלמה וגו' Reish Lakish continues: And ultimately, Solomon declined further still in that he ruled only over Israel, as it is stated: “I, Koheleth, have been king over Israel in Jerusalem” (Ecclesiastes 1:12). And ultimately, he ruled over only Jerusalem, as it is stated: “The words of Koheleth, the son of David, king in Jerusalem” (Ecclesiastes 1:1). And ultimately, he ruled over only his bed, as it is stated: “Behold, it is the bed of Solomon; threescore mighty men are about it, of the mighty men of Israel” (Song of Songs 3:7).

ולבסוף לא מלך אלא על מקלו שנאמר (קהלת ב, י) זה היה חלקי מכל עמלי רב ושמואל חד אמר מקלו וחד אמר גונדו And ultimately, he declined so much that he ruled over only his staff, as it is stated: “And this was my portion from all of my labor” (Ecclesiastes 2:10). Rav and Shmuel disagreed with regard to the meaning of this latter verse as well. One says that the term “this” is a reference to his staff, and one says that it is a reference to his cloak.

הדר או לא הדר רב ושמואל חד אמר הדר וחד אמר לא הדר מאן דאמר לא הדר מלך והדיוט ומאן דאמר הדר מלך והדיוט ומלך: The Gemara asks: Did he return to reign over the whole world, or did he ultimately not return? Rav and Shmuel disagreed about this: One says that he returned, and one says that he did not return. The one who says that he did not return reasons that Solomon was first a king and then an ordinary person [hedyot] and did not return to his reign; and the one who says that he returned reasons that Solomon was first a king and then an ordinary person and ultimately returned to be a king.

פורץ לעשות לו דרך: ת"ר אוצרות מלכים למלך ושאר ביזה שבוזזין מחצה למלך ומחצה לעם אמר ליה אביי לרב דימי ואמרי לה לרב אחא בשלמא אוצרות מלכים למלך אורחא דמלתא אלא שאר ביזה שבוזזין מחצה למלך ומחצה לעם מנלן דכתיב § The mishna teaches that the king breaches fences of anyone in his way to create a pathway for himself. The Sages taught in a baraita: Treasures of kings taken as spoils in war belong to the king, and as for the rest of the spoils that are taken in a war, half is for the king and half is for the people. Abaye said to Rav Dimi, and some say that he said this to Rav Aḥa: Granted, treasures of kings belong to the king. This is the typical manner of kings, as it is fitting that the king should use the treasures of the kings he conquers; but with regard to the rest of the spoils that are taken in a war, where half is for the king and half is for the people, from where do we derive this halakha? He answered Abaye: The source is as it is written:

Daf 21a

(דברי הימים א כט, כב) וימשחו לה' לנגיד ולצדוק מקיש נגיד לצדוק מה צדוק מחצה לו ומחצה לאחיו אף נגיד מחצה לו ומחצה לאחיו “And they made Solomon, son of David, king the second time, and anointed him unto the Lord to be leader, and Tzadok to be priest” (I Chronicles 29:22). This verse compares a leader, referring to King Solomon, to Tzadok, the High Priest: Just as for Tzadok, half of the shewbread given to the priests is for him, the High Priest, and half is for all his brothers, the other priests, so too for the leader, half is for him and half is for his brothers, the rest of the army.

וצדוק גופיה מנלן דתניא רבי אומר (ויקרא כד, ט) והיתה לאהרן ולבניו מחצה לאהרן ומחצה לבניו: The Gemara asks: And with regard to Tzadok himself, from where do we derive that the High Priest takes half? The Gemara responds: As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The Torah states with regard to the apportionment of the shewbread: “And it shall be for Aaron and his sons, and they shall eat it in a holy place” (Leviticus 24:9), from which it is inferred: Half for Aaron and half for his sons.

מתני׳ (דברים יז, יז) לא ירבה לו נשים אלא שמנה עשרה רבי יהודה אומר מרבה הוא לו ובלבד שלא יהו מסירות את לבו ר' שמעון אומר אפילו אחת ומסירה את לבו הרי זה לא ישאנה אם כן למה נאמר לא ירבה לו נשים דאפילו כאביגיל: MISHNA: The king “shall not add many wives for himself” (Deuteronomy 17:17), but only eighteen. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may add many wives for himself, provided that they are not like those who turn his heart away from reverence for God. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he wants to marry only one wife, if she turns his heart away, he should not marry her. If so, why is it stated: “He shall not add many wives for himself”? This teaches that even if his wives are like Abigail, who was righteous and prevented David from sin (see I Samuel, chapter 25), it is prohibited for him to have many wives.

גמ׳ למימרא דר' יהודה דריש טעמא דקרא ור"ש לא דריש טעמא דקרא והא איפכא שמעינן להו GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Yehuda interprets the rationale behind the mitzva in the verse and draws halakhic conclusions based on that interpretation, and Rabbi Shimon does not interpret the rationale in the verse? But didn’t we hear them hold the opposite opinions with regard to interpreting the rationale behind a mitzva in a verse?

דתניא אלמנה בין שהיא ענייה בין שהיא עשירה אין ממשכנין אותה שנאמר (דברים כד, יז) לא תחבול בגד אלמנה דברי רבי יהודה רבי שמעון אומר עשירה ממשכנין אותה ענייה אין ממשכנין אותה ואתה חייב להחזיר לה ואתה משיאה שם רע בשכנותיה As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Metzia 10:3): In the case of a widow, whether she is poor or whether she is wealthy, one may not take collateral from her for a loan, as it is stated: “You may not take the garment of a widow for a pledge” (Deuteronomy 24:17); this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of a wealthy widow, one may take collateral from her. But in the case of a poor widow, one may not take collateral from her, because you are obligated to return it to her, and you will give her a bad name among her neighbors.

ואמרינן מאי קאמר הכי קאמר מתוך שאתה ממשכנה אתה חייב להחזיר לה ואתה משיאה שם רע בשכנותיה אלמא ר' יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ורבי שמעון דריש טעמא דקרא And we say about this dispute: What is Rabbi Shimon saying? This is what he is saying: Because you take collateral from her, you are required to return it to her, as the verse states: “And if he is a poor person, you shall not sleep with his pledge; you shall restore the pledge to him when the sun goes down” (Deuteronomy 24:12–13), and you thereby give her a bad name among her neighbors, who will suspect licentious behavior when they see a man come to her house every morning and evening. Evidently, according to this dispute Rabbi Yehuda does not interpret the rationale in the verse and Rabbi Shimon does interpret the rationale in the verse.

בעלמא רבי יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ושאני הכא דמפרש טעמא דקרא מה טעם לא ירבה לו נשים משום (דברים יז, יז) דלא יסור לבבו The Gemara explains: Generally, Rabbi Yehuda does not interpret the rationale in the verse, but it is different here, as the verse itself explains the rationale in the verse: What is the reason that “he shall not add many wives for himself”? He should not add many wives because of what is articulated in the continuation of the verse: “His heart should not turn.”

ור' שמעון אמר לך מכדי בעלמא דרשינן טעמא דקרא א"כ לכתוב קרא לא ירבה לו נשים ולישתוק ואנא אמינא מה טעם לא ירבה משום דלא יסור לא יסור למה לי אפילו אחת ומסירה את לבו הרי זו לא ישאנה אלא מה אני מקיים לא ירבה דאפילו כאביגיל And Rabbi Shimon could have said to you: Since generally we interpret the rationale in the verse, then if it is so that the prohibition against marrying many wives applies only to wives that are likely to lead his heart astray, the verse should write only: “He shall not add many wives for himself” and then be silent. In that case, I would say, on my own, what is the reason that he shall not add many wives? It is so that his heart should not turn away. Accordingly, why do I need the additional phrase “his heart should not turn away”? It serves to teach another halakha, that even if he wants to marry only one wife, if she turns his heart away, he should not marry her. But then how do I realize the meaning of the verse: “He shall not add many wives for himself”? It means that he should not have many wives even if they are like Abigail.

הני שמונה עשרה מנלן דכתיב (שמואל ב ג, ב) ויולדו לדוד בנים בחברון ויהי בכורו אמנון לאחינועם היזרעאלית ומשנהו כלאב לאביגיל אשת נבל הכרמלי והשלישי אבשלום בן מעכה והרביעי אדוניה בן חגית והחמישי שפטיה בן אביטל והששי יתרעם לעגלה אשת דוד אלה ילדו לדוד בחברון § As for those eighteen women that the king may marry, from where do we derive that number? The Gemara responds: As it is written: “And to David sons were born in Hebron; and his firstborn was Amnon, from Ahinoam the Jezreelitess; and his second, Chileab, from Abigail the wife of Nabal the Carmelite; and the third, Absalom, son of Maacah, the daughter of Talmai, king of Geshur; and the fourth, Adonijah, son of Haggith; and the fifth, Shephatiah, son of Abital; and the sixth, Ithream, of Eglah, David’s wife. These were born to David in Hebron” (II Samuel 3:2–5). In these verses, a total of six wives are mentioned.

וקאמר ליה נביא (שמואל ב יב, ח) אם מעט ואוסיפה לך כהנה וכהנה כהנה שית וכהנה שית דהוו להו תמני סרי And the prophet Nathan said to King David in his rebuke: “And I gave you your master’s house and your master’s wives into your bosom and I gave you the house of Israel and Judah; and if that were too little, then I would add to you like these and like those” (II Samuel 12:8). “Like these”; this is referring to the wives enumerated above, meaning another six. “And like those”; this is referring to another six, so that all together there are eighteen he would be permitted to marry.

מתקיף לה רבינא אימא כהנה תרתי סרי וכהנה עשרין וארבע Ravina objects to this explanation: Say instead: “Like these”; this is referring to an additional six, like the wives enumerated above, totaling twelve. “And like those”; this is referring to all of those enumerated previously, totaling twenty-four.

תניא נמי הכי לא ירבה לו נשים יותר מעשרים וארבע למאן דדריש וי"ו ארבעים ושמנה הוו תניא נמי הכי לא ירבה לו נשים יותר מארבעים ושמנה The Gemara adds: Support for Ravina’s interpretation is also taught in a baraita: “He shall not add many wives to himself”; this means he may not marry more than twenty-four women. The Gemara comments: According to the one who interprets the letter vav, translated as the conjunction “and” in the term “and like those,” to add and expand upon what came before, the vav is written in order to add more, and therefore, there are forty-eight women. The Gemara comments: Support for this interpretation is also taught in a baraita: “He shall not add many wives to himself”; this means he may not marry more than forty-eight women.

ותנא דידן מאי טעמיה אמר רב כהנא מקיש כהנה בתרא לכהנה קמא מה כהנה קמא שית אף כהנה בתרא שית The Gemara asks: And as for the tanna of our mishna, what is his reason for limiting the number to eighteen? Rav Kahana says: The verse compares the latter term: “Like those [kahenna],” to the former term: “Like these [kahenna],” teaching that just as the former term: “Like these,” means six, so too, the latter term: “Like those,” means six and no more.

והא הואי מיכל אמר רב עגלה זו מיכל ולמה נקרא שמה עגלה שחביבה עליו כעגלה וכן הוא אומר (שופטים יד, יח) לולי חרשתם בעגלתי וגו' The Gemara challenges the notion that David had only six wives. But there was also Michal, and so he had at least seven wives. Rav said: One of those six wives, Eglah, is Michal, and why was she called Eglah in the verse? It was because she was dear to him like a calf [egla], and so the verse states that Samson referred to his wife with the same term: “If you had not plowed with my calf you would not have found my secret” (Judges 14:18).

ומי הוו למיכל בני והכתיב (שמואל ב ו, כג) ולמיכל בת שאול לא היה לה ולד עד יום מותה אמר רב חסדא עד יום מותה לא היה לה ביום מותה היה לה The Gemara challenges the identification of Eglah with Michal: And did Michal have children? But isn’t it written: “And Michal the daughter of Saul had no child until the day of her death” (II Samuel 6:23)? Rav Ḥisda said: Until the day of her death she had no child, but on the day of her death she had a child.

מכדי בנים היכא קא חשיב להו בחברון ואילו מעשה דמיכל בירושלים הוה דכתיב (שמואל ב ו, טז) ומיכל בת שאול נשקפה בעד החלון ותרא את המלך דוד מפזז ומכרכר לפני ה' ותבז ואמר רב יהודה ואיתימא רב יוסף שקלתה מיכל למיטרפסה אלא אימא עד אותו מעשה היה לה מכאן ואילך לא היה לה The Gemara challenges this: Now, these children of David’s, where does it count them? In Hebron, as Eglon was listed above with David’s wives in Hebron. But the incident with Michal, in the context of which the verse says she had no children, was in Jerusalem, as it is written: “And it was so, as the Ark of the Lord came into the city of David, that Michal the daughter of Saul looked out the window and saw King David leaping and dancing before the Lord, and she despised him in her heart” (II Samuel 6:16). And Rav Yehuda says, and some say it is Rav Yosef who says: Michal received her punishment [lemitarpesah] immediately, and therefore could not have had children afterward. Rather, say a different explanation: Until that incident, she had a child; from that point forward, she did not have a child.

והכתיב (שמואל ב ה, יג) ויקח דוד עוד פלגשים ונשים בירושלים למלויי שמונה עשר מאי נשים ומאי פלגשים אמר רב יהודה אמר רב נשים בכתובה ובקידושין פלגשים בלא כתובה ובלא קידושין The Gemara challenges the notion that David had only this limited number of wives. But isn’t it written: “And David took more concubines and wives in Jerusalem after he came from Hebron” (II Samuel 5:13). The Gemara responds: All of these were to complete the tally of eighteen and no more. The Gemara asks about this verse: What is the meaning of “wives” and what is the meaning of “concubines” in that verse? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Wives receive a marriage contract and betrothal; concubines are taken without a marriage contract and without betrothal.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב ארבע מאות ילדים היו לו לדוד וכולן בני יפת תואר היו ומגדלי בלוריות היו וכולן יושבין בקרונות של זהב ומהלכין בראשי גייסות היו והם היו בעלי אגרופין של בית דוד Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: David had four hundred children in his army, and all of them were sons of beautiful women taken captive from their gentile homes during war (see Deuteronomy 21:10–14). And they grew their hair in a gentile hairstyle, and they all sat in carriages [bikronot] of gold. And they walked at the head of the troops, and they were the strong-arm enforcers of the house of David, on whose loyalty David’s monarchy relied.

ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב תמר בת יפת תואר היתה שנאמר (שמואל ב יג, יג) ועתה דבר נא (על) המלך כי לא ימנעני ממך ואי ס"ד בת נישואין הואי אחתיה מי הוה שריא ליה אלא שמע מינה בת יפת תואר היתה And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: David’s daughter Tamar was the daughter of a beautiful woman taken captive in war and was born before her mother converted. Therefore, Tamar was not considered the daughter of David according to halakha. The proof of this is in what she said to Amnon, son of David, as it is stated: “Now, therefore, speak, please, to the king, for he will not withhold me from you” (II Samuel 13:13). And if it enters your mind to say that she was the daughter of a woman David married, would David have permitted Amnon’s sister to him as a wife? Rather, learn from this verse that she was the daughter of a beautiful woman who converted after Tamar was born, so halakhically Tamar was not a daughter of David.

(שמואל ב יג, ג) ולאמנון רע ושמו יונדב בן שמעה אחי דוד (והיה) איש חכם וגו' אמר רב יהודה אמר רב איש חכם לרשעה The Gemara continues to interpret the story of Amnon and Tamar. The verse states: “And Amnon had a friend whose name was Jonadab, son of Shimeah, David’s brother, and Jonadab was a very wise man” (II Samuel 13:3). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A wise man for wickedness.

(שמואל ב יג, ד) ויאמר מדוע אתה ככה דל בן המלך ויאמר לו יונדב שכב על משכבך והתחל וגו' עד ועשתה לעיני את הבריה (שמואל ב יג, ט) ותקח המשרת ותצוק לפניו אמר רב יהודה אמר רב שעשתה לו מיני טיגון The verse recounts Jonadab’s words to Amnon: “And he said to him: Why, son of the king, are you so becoming leaner from day to day…and Jonadab said to him: Lie on your bed and feign illness, and when your father comes to see you, say to him: Let my sister Tamar come, please, and give me bread, and she should dress the food in my sight…And she took the pan and poured them out before him” (II Samuel 13:4–5, 9). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This means that Tamar prepared various kinds of fried [tiggun] food for Amnon.

(שמואל ב יג, טו) וישנאה אמנון שנאה גדולה מאוד מ"ט אמר ר' יצחק נימא נקשרה לו ועשאתו כרות שפכה וכי נקשרה לו איהי מאי עבדה אלא אימא קשרה לו נימא ועשאתו כרות שפכה At the end of the story, the verse states: “Then Amnon hated her with exceeding, great hatred, for greater was the hatred with which he hated her than the love with which he had loved her” (II Samuel 13:15). The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Amnon’s intense hatred? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: While he raped her, a hair [nima] of hers became tied around his penis and caused him to be one whose penis has been severed. The Gemara asks: But if the hair became tied around his penis, what did she do? Why would Amnon hold this against her? Rather, say that she intentionally tied a hair around his penis during intercourse, and she made him one whose penis has been severed in order to take revenge on him, and for this he hated her.

איני והא דרש רבא מאי דכתיב (יחזקאל טז, יד) ויצא לך שם בגוים ביפיך שאין להן לבנות ישראל לא שער בית השחי ולא בית הערוה שאני תמר דבת יפת תואר הואי The Gemara challenges this: Is that so? But didn’t Rava interpret a verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And your renown went forth among the nations about your beauty” (Ezekiel 16:14)? This teaches that Jewish women do not have armpit hair or pubic hair. Therefore, Tamar would have had no hair to injure Amnon in that way. The Gemara responds: Tamar is different, as she was the daughter of a beautiful woman, who was a gentile.

(שמואל ב יג, יט) ותקח תמר אפר על ראשה (ואת כתונת) הפסים אשר עליה קרעה תנא משמיה דר' יהושע בן קרחה גדר גדול גדרה תמר באותה שעה אמרו לבנות מלכים כך לבנות הדיוטות על אחת כמה וכמה אם לצנועות כך לפרוצות על אחת כמה וכמה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב באותה שעה גזרו The verse relates that after Amnon raped her: “And Tamar put ashes on her head and rent her garment of many colors that was on her” (II Samuel 13:19). The Sages taught in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa: Tamar established a great fence at that time by way of her public outcry, as people said: If such an occurrence could happen to the daughters of kings, all the more so could it happen to the daughters of ordinary people. If such an occurrence could happen to modest women like Tamar, who resisted, all the more so could it happen to licentious women. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: At that time they decreed

Daf 21b

על הייחוד ועל הפנויה about seclusion, that a man should not be secluded with women who are forbidden to him, and about a single woman.

יחוד דאורייתא הוא דאמר ר' יוחנן משום ר' שמעון בן יהוצדק רמז לייחוד מן התורה מניין שנאמר (דברים יג, ז) כי יסיתך אחיך בן אמך וכי בן אם מסית בן אב אינו מסית אלא לומר לך בן מתייחד עם אמו ואין אחר מתייחד עם כל עריות שבתורה The Gemara objects: Seclusion with a woman forbidden by familial ties is prohibited by Torah law, and was not a rabbinic decree issued in the time of David. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: From where is there an allusion to the halakha that seclusion is forbidden by Torah law? As it is stated: “If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you” (Deuteronomy 13:7). One can ask: But does the son of a mother entice, and does the son of a father not entice? Why mention only the son of a mother? Rather, this verse serves to tell you that only a son may be secluded with his mother. Sons are frequently with their mother, and two half-brothers of one mother consequently have the opportunity to grow close to one another. But another individual may not be secluded with those with whom relations are forbidden by the Torah, including a stepmother. Therefore, half-brothers of one father spend less time together.

אלא אימא גזרו על ייחוד דפנויה Since seclusion, then, is prohibited by Torah law, how did Rav say that it was prohibited by a decree issued in King David’s time? Rather, say that they decreed against seclusion of a man with a single woman, to prevent occurrences like that of Amnon and Tamar.

(מלכים א א, ה) ואדניה בן חגית מתנשא לאמר אני אמלוך אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מלמד שביקש להולמו ולא הולמתו Apropos Amnon, the Gemara cites traditions about another son of David: “Now Adonijah, son of Haggith, exalted himself, saying: I will be king” (I Kings 1:5). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The term “exalted himself” teaches that he sought for the monarchy to fit him, but it did not fit him.

(מלכים א א, ה) ויעש לו רכב ופרשים וחמשים איש רצים לפניו מאי רבותא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב כולן נטולי טחול וחקוקי כפות רגלים היו: The verse continues: “And he prepared for himself chariots and riders and fifty people to run before him” (I Kings 1:5). The Gemara asks: What is the novelty of these actions, since other wealthy people do the same, even if they are not the sons of kings, with designs on the throne? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: What was unique was that the runners all had their spleens removed and had the soles of their feet hollowed, removing the flesh of their feet, and these two procedures enhanced their speed.

מתני׳ לא ירבה לו סוסים אלא כדי מרכבתו וכסף וזהב לא ירבה לו מאד אלא כדי ליתן אספניא וכותב לו ס"ת לשמו יוצא למלחמה מוציאה עמה נכנס הוא מכניסה עמו יושב בדין היא עמו מיסב היא כנגדו שנאמר (דברים יז, יט) והיתה עמו וקרא בו כל ימי חייו: MISHNA: The king “shall not accumulate many horses for himself” (Deuteronomy 17:16), but only enough for his chariot in war and in peace. “Neither shall he greatly accumulate silver and gold for himself” (Deuteronomy 17:17), but only enough to provide his soldiers’ sustenance [aspanya]. And the king writes himself a Torah scroll for his sake, as stipulated in Deuteronomy 17:18. When he goes out to war, he brings it out with him. When he comes in from war, he brings it in with him. When he sits in judgment, it is with him. When he reclines to eat, it is opposite him, as it is stated: “And it shall be with him and he shall read it all the days of his life” (Deuteronomy 17:19).

גמ׳ תנו רבנן (דברים יז, טז) לא ירבה לו סוסים יכול אפילו כדי מרכבתו ופרשיו תלמוד לומר לו לו אינו מרבה אבל מרבה הוא כדי רכבו ופרשיו הא מה אני מקיים סוסים סוסים הבטלנין מניין שאפילו סוס א' והוא בטל שהוא בלא ירבה ת"ל (דברים יז, טז) למען הרבות סוס GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “He shall not accumulate many horses [susim] for himself nor return the people to Egypt for the sake of accumulating horses [sus]” (Deuteronomy 17:16): One might have thought that he shall not have even enough horses for his chariot and riders. Therefore, the verse states: “For himself,” teaching that only if the horses are for himself, for personal pleasure, he shall not accumulate them, but he may accumulate horses for his chariot and riders. How, then, do I realize the meaning of “horses [susim]” in the verse? It is referring to idle horses, which serve no purpose other than glorifying the king. From where is it derived that even if the king has one horse that is idle, that he transgresses “he shall not accumulate”? The verse states: “For the sake of accumulating horses [sus],” with the term for horses written in the singular.

וכי מאחר דאפילו סוס אחד והוא בטל קאי בלא ירבה סוסים למה לי לעבור בל"ת על כל סוס וסוס The Gemara asks: But once the verse taught that even one horse that is idle stands to be included in the prohibition of “he shall not accumulate,” why do I need the plural form “horses” in the first clause of the verse? The Gemara responds: Its purpose is to teach that a king would transgress the prohibition an additional time for each and every idle horse.

טעמא דכתב רחמנא לו הא לאו הכי ה"א אפילו כדי רכבו ופרשיו נמי לא לא צריכא לאפושי: The Gemara questions this ruling: The specific reason for limiting the prohibition to idle horses is that the Merciful One writes: “He shall not accumulate for himself,” which indicates, consequently, that if the Torah had not written this, I would say that even enough horses for his chariot and riders are not permitted; and this is unreasonable, since the king needs an army. The Gemara responds: No, the term “for himself” is necessary to teach that it is permitted for the king to add a reasonable number of horses beyond the necessary minimum, and it is only strictly personal use that is prohibited.

וכסף וזהב לא ירבה לו אלא כדי ליתן אספניא: ת"ר (דברים יז, יז) וכסף וזהב לא ירבה לו יכול אפילו כדי ליתן אספניא ת"ל לו לו אינו מרבה אבל מרבה הוא כדי ליתן אספניא The mishna teaches: “Neither shall he greatly accumulate silver and gold for himself” (Deuteronomy 17:17), but only enough to provide his soldiers’ sustenance. The Sages taught in a baraita: From the command “neither shall he greatly accumulate silver and gold for himself,” one might have thought that he should not have even enough to provide his soldiers’ sustenance. To counter this, the verse states: “For himself,” teaching that only if the silver and gold is for himself, for personal pleasure, he shall not accumulate it, but he may accumulate enough silver and gold to provide his soldiers’ sustenance.

טעמא דכתב רחמנא לו הא לאו הכי הוה אמינא אפילו כדי ליתן אספניא נמי לא לא צריכא להרווחה The Gemara questions this ruling: The specific reason for limiting the prohibition to personal wealth accumulation is that the Merciful One writes: “Neither shall he greatly accumulate silver and gold for himself,” which indicates, consequently, that if the Torah had not written this, I would say that it is not permitted for the king to accumulate even enough silver and gold to provide his soldiers’ sustenance; this is unreasonable, since the king needs an army. The Gemara responds: No, the term “for himself” is necessary to teach that the king is permitted to allow for a liberal appropriation to the military budget, so that the army has a comfortable financial cushion.

השתא דאמרת לו לדרשה (דברים יז, יז) לא ירבה לו נשים מאי דרשת ביה למעוטי הדיוטות The Gemara asks: Now that you have said that the term “for himself” in the verse is stated for the purpose of a derivation for practical halakha, which limits and narrows the verse’s scope, what do you derive from the next phrase in the verse: “He shall not add many wives for himself”? The Gemara answers: That usage of “for himself” serves to exclude ordinary people, to specify that only the king is restricted from having many wives, but a civilian may marry as many women as he wants, provided he can support them financially.

רב יהודה רמי כתיב (מלכים א ה, ו) ויהי לשלמה ארבעים אלף ארוות סוסים למרכבתו וכתיב (דברי הימים ב ט, כה) ויהי לשלמה ארבעת אלפים (ארוות) סוסים הא כיצד אם ארבעים אלף איצטבלאות היו כל אחד ואחד היו בו ד' אלפים ארוות סוסים ואם ד' אלפים איצטבלאות היו כל אחד ואחד היו בו ארבעים אלף ארוות סוסים § Rav Yehuda raises a contradiction: It is written in one verse: “And Solomon had forty thousand stalls of horses for his chariots” (I Kings 5:6), and it is written in another verse: “And Solomon had four thousand stalls for horses and chariots” (II Chronicles 9:25). How can these texts be reconciled? If there were forty thousand large stables [itztablaot], each and every one of them had in it four thousand stalls, or rows, for horses. And alternatively, if there were four thousand large stables, each and every one had in it forty thousand stalls for horses. Therefore the two verses are reconciled.

(רבי) יצחק רמי כתיב (דברי הימים ב ט, כ) אין כסף נחשב בימי שלמה למאומה וכתיב (מלכים א י, כז) ויתן) שלמה את הכסף בירושלים כאבנים לא קשיא כאן קודם שנשא שלמה את בת פרעה כאן לאחר שנשא שלמה את בת פרעה Rabbi Yitzḥak raises a contradiction: It is written in one verse: “Silver was not worth anything in the days of Solomon” (II Chronicles 9:20), and it is written in another verse: “And the king made silver in Jerusalem as stones” (I Kings 10:27), i.e., gems. The Gemara responds: It is not difficult: Here, where silver was worthless, this was before Solomon sinfully married Pharaoh’s daughter. There, where the silver was valuable, this was after Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter.

אמר רבי יצחק בשעה שנשא שלמה את בת פרעה ירד גבריאל ונעץ קנה בים והעלה שירטון ועליו נבנה כרך גדול שברומי Rabbi Yitzḥak says: When Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter, the angel Gabriel descended from Heaven and implanted a pole in the sea. And it gradually raised up a sandbar [sirton] around it, creating new, dry land, and on it the great city of Rome was built. This shows that the beginning of the Jewish people’s downfall to Rome came with Solomon’s marriage to Pharaoh’s daughter.

ואמר ר' יצחק מפני מה לא נתגלו טעמי תורה שהרי שתי מקראות נתגלו טעמן נכשל בהן גדול העולם כתיב (דברים יז, יז) לא ירבה לו נשים אמר שלמה אני ארבה ולא אסור וכתיב (מלכים א יא, ד) ויהי לעת זקנת שלמה נשיו הטו את לבבו And Rabbi Yitzḥak says: For what reason were the rationales of Torah commandments not revealed? It was because the rationales of two verses were revealed, and the greatest in the world, King Solomon, failed in those matters. It is written with regard to a king: “He shall not add many wives for himself, that his heart should not turn away” (Deuteronomy 17:17). Solomon said: I will add many, but I will not turn away, as he thought that it is permitted to have many wives if one is otherwise meticulous not to stray. And later, it is written: “For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart after other gods” (I Kings 11:4).

וכתיב (דברים יז, טז) לא ירבה לו סוסים ואמר שלמה אני ארבה ולא אשיב וכתיב (מלכים א י, כט) ותצא מרכבה ממצרים בשש וגו': And it is also written: “Only he shall not accumulate many horses for himself nor return the people to Egypt for the sake of accumulating horses” (Deuteronomy 17:16), and Solomon said: I will accumulate many, but I will not return. And it is written: “And a chariot came up and went out of Egypt for six hundred shekels of silver” (I Kings 10:29), teaching that not only did Solomon violate the Torah, but he also failed in applying the rationale given for its commandments. This demonstrates the wisdom in the Torah’s usual silence as to the rationale for its mitzvot, as individuals will not mistakenly rely on their own wisdom to reason that the mitzvot are inapplicable in some circumstances.

וכותב ספר תורה לשמו: תנא ובלבד שלא יתנאה בשל אבותיו § The mishna teaches that the king writes a Torah scroll for his sake. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 4:4): The king fulfills the mitzva provided that he does not beautify himself with the Torah scroll of his ancestors for this purpose, i.e., he must write his own scroll.

אמר (רבא) אף על פי שהניחו לו אבותיו לאדם ספר תורה מצוה לכתוב משלו שנאמר (דברים לא, יט) ועתה כתבו לכם את השירה איתיביה אביי וכותב לו ספר תורה לשמו שלא יתנאה בשל אחרים מלך אין הדיוט לא Rava says: With regard to the mitzva for every Jew to write himself a Torah scroll, even if a person’s ancestors left him a Torah scroll, it is a mitzva to write a scroll of one’s own, as it is stated: “Now, therefore, write for yourselves this song and teach it to the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 31:19). Abaye raised an objection to him from a baraita concerning the king’s Torah scroll: And he writes himself a Torah scroll for his sake, so that he does not beautify himself with the Torah scroll of others. Read precisely, this indicates that a king, yes, he is included in the halakha not to have a scroll inherited from his ancestors suffice, but an ordinary person is not.

לא צריכא לשתי תורות וכדתניא (דברים יז, יח) וכתב לו את משנה וגו' כותב לשמו שתי תורות אחת שהיא יוצאה ונכנסת עמו ואחת שמונחת לו בבית גנזיו The Gemara dismisses Abaye’s objection: No, the ruling of that baraita is necessary to teach that the king is commanded to write two Torah scrolls; he writes one scroll as does any Jew, and he writes an additional scroll because he is king. And this is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “That he shall write for himself a second Torah in a scroll, out of that which is before the priests the Levites” (Deuteronomy 17:18). This teaches that he writes for his sake two Torah scrolls, one that goes out and comes in with him at all times, and one that is placed in his treasury.

אותה שיוצאה ונכנסת עמו (עושה אותה כמין קמיע ותולה בזרועו שנאמר (תהלים טז, ח) שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד כי מימיני בל אמוט) אינו נכנס בה לא לבית המרחץ ולא לבית הכסא שנאמר (דברים יז, יט) והיתה עמו וקרא בו מקום הראוי לקראות בו The baraita continues: With regard to the one that goes out and comes in with him, he makes it very small, like an amulet, and he hangs it on his arm, as it is stated: “I have set the Lord always before me; He is at my right hand, that I shall not be moved” (Psalms 16:8). This alludes to the small Torah scroll that is always on his right hand. He does not go into the bathhouse with it, nor into the bathroom, as it is stated: “And it shall be with him and he shall read from it” (Deuteronomy 17:19), meaning, it shall remain in a place that is appropriate for reading from it.

אמר מר זוטרא ואיתימא מר עוקבא בתחלה ניתנה תורה לישראל בכתב עברי ולשון הקודש חזרה וניתנה להם בימי עזרא בכתב אשורית ולשון ארמי ביררו להן לישראל כתב אשורית ולשון הקודש והניחו להדיוטות כתב עברית ולשון ארמי § Mar Zutra says, and some say that it is Mar Ukva who says: Initially, the Torah was given to the Jewish people in Ivrit script, the original form of the written language, and the sacred tongue, Hebrew. It was given to them again in the days of Ezra in Ashurit script and the Aramaic tongue. The Jewish people selected Ashurit script and the sacred tongue for the Torah scroll and left Ivrit script and the Aramaic tongue for the commoners.

מאן הדיוטות אמר רב חסדא כותאי מאי כתב עברית אמר רב חסדא כתב ליבונאה The Gemara asks: Who are these commoners? Rav Ḥisda said: The Samaritans [Kutim]. The Gemara asks: What is Ivrit script? Rav Ḥisda says: Libona’a script.

תניא רבי יוסי אומר ראוי היה עזרא שתינתן תורה על ידו לישראל אילמלא (לא) קדמו משה במשה הוא אומר (שמות יט, ג) ומשה עלה אל האלהים בעזרא הוא אומר (עזרא ז, ו) הוא עזרא עלה מבבל מה עלייה האמור כאן תורה אף עלייה האמור להלן תורה It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 4:5): Rabbi Yosei says: Ezra was suitable, given his greatness, for the Torah to be given by him to the Jewish people, had Moses not come first and received the Torah already. With regard to Moses the verse states: “And Moses went up to God” (Exodus 19:3), and with regard to Ezra the verse states: “This Ezra went up from Babylon and he was a ready scribe in the Torah of Moses, which the Lord, the God of Israel, had given” (Ezra 7:6). Just as the going up stated here, with regard to Moses, is for the Torah, which he received from God and transmitted to the Jewish people, so too, the going up stated there, with regard to Ezra, is for the Torah, as he taught Torah to the Jewish people and was suitable to have originally merited to give it.

במשה הוא אומר (דברים ד, יד) ואותי צוה ה' בעת ההיא ללמד אתכם חקים ומשפטים בעזרא הוא אומר (עזרא ז, י) כי עזרא הכין לבבו לדרוש את תורת ה' (אלהיו) ולעשות וללמד בישראל חוק ומשפט ואף על פי שלא ניתנה תורה על ידו נשתנה על ידו הכתב שנאמר The baraita continues: With regard to Moses the verse states: “And the Lord commanded me at that time to teach you statutes and ordinances” (Deuteronomy 4:14), and with regard to Ezra the verse states: “For Ezra had set his heart to seek the Torah of the Lord his God and to do it and to teach in Israel statutes and ordinances” (Ezra 7:10). And even though the Torah was not given literally by him, the script of the Torah was changed by him, as it is stated:

Daf 22a

(עזרא ד, ז) וכתב הנשתוון כתוב ארמית ומתורגם ארמית וכתיב (דניאל ה, ח) לא כהלין כתבא למיקרא ופשרא להודעא למלכא וכתיב (דברים יז, יח) וכתב את משנה התורה הזאת כתב הראוי להשתנות “And the writing of the letter [hannishtevan] was written in the Aramaic script, and set forth in the Aramaic tongue” (Ezra 4:7). The term “hannishtevan” is similar to the word nishtana, meaning changed, alluding to the fact that the script had been changed. And it is written with regard to the writing on the wall of Belshazzar’s palace: “Then came in all the king’s wise men. But they could not read the writing, nor make known to the king the interpretation” (Daniel 5:8), and the reason they could not read it is that it was written in the new script that Ezra would transmit. And it is written: “That he shall write for himself a second [mishne] Torah” (Deuteronomy 17:18), where “second [mishne]” teaches that it is written in a script that is apt to be changed [lehishtannot].

למה נקרא אשורית שעלה עמהם מאשור The baraita continues: Why is this script called Ashurit? Because it ascended with the Jewish people from Ashur when they returned from their exile in Babylonia.

תניא רבי אומר בתחלה בכתב זה ניתנה תורה לישראל כיון שחטאו נהפך להן לרועץ כיון שחזרו בהן החזירו להם שנאמר (זכריה ט, יב) שובו לביצרון אסירי התקוה גם היום מגיד משנה אשיב לך It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 4:5): Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Initially, the Torah was given to the Jewish people in this script, Ashurit, which is in use today. Once the Jewish people sinned, it turned into an impairment for them and they began writing with a different script, Libona’a. Once they repented, the first script was returned to them, and they resumed writing with Ashurit script, as it is stated: “Return to the stronghold, you prisoners of hope; even today do I declare that I will render double [mishne] unto you” (Zechariah 9:12), meaning that God restored to the Jewish people this script that had been changed [nishtanna].

למה נקרא שמה אשורית שמאושרת בכתב The baraita continues: If this script predates the exile to Babylonia, why is it called Ashurit? Because it is meusheret, beautiful and straight, in script.

רשב"א אומר משום ר' אליעזר בן פרטא שאמר משום רבי אלעזר המודעי כתב זה לא נשתנה כל עיקר שנאמר (שמות כז, י) ווי העמודים מה עמודים לא נשתנו אף ווים לא נשתנו ואומר (אסתר ח, ט) ואל היהודים ככתבם וכלשונם מה לשונם לא נשתנה אף כתבם לא נשתנה The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer ben Perata, who said in the name of Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i: This script did not change at all, as it is stated with regard to the construction of the Tabernacle: “The hooks of [vavei] the poles” (Exodus 27:10). This teaches that just as the poles were not changed, so too, the hooks [vavim] were not changed. The letter vav in Ashurit script has the shape of a hook. Evidently, this is why the term for hook in the Torah is vav. And the verse states: “And to the Jews according to their script and according to their language” (Esther 8:9). This teaches that just as their language was not changed over the generations but remained Hebrew, so too, their script was not changed.

אלא מה אני מקיים את משנה התורה הזאת לשתי תורות אחת שיוצאה ונכנסת עמו ואחת שמונחת לו בבית גנזיו אותה שיוצאה ונכנסת עמו עושה אותה כמין קמיע ותולה בזרועו שנאמר (תהלים טז, ח) שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד The baraita continues: But if the script was in fact not changed, how do I realize the meaning of the phrase “a second [mishne] Torah” (Deuteronomy 17:18)? This serves to teach the halakha concerning the two Torah scrolls that the king writes, one that goes out and comes in with him, and one that is placed in his treasury. With regard to the one that goes out and comes in with him, he makes it very small, like an amulet, and he hangs it on his arm. As it is stated by King David: “I have set the Lord always before me; He is at my right hand, that I shall not be moved” (Psalms 16:8). This verse alludes to the two Torah scrolls, one that is before him and one that is in his right hand.

ואידך האי שויתי מאי דריש ביה ההוא מיבעי ליה כדרב חנה בר ביזנא דאמר רב חנה בר ביזנא אר"ש חסידא המתפלל צריך שיראה עצמו כאילו שכינה כנגדו שנאמר שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד The Gemara asks: And with regard to the other Sage, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who does not hold that the king must write and affix the second scroll to his arm, what does he expound from that verse: “I have set” (Psalms 16:8)? The Gemara responds: He requires that verse in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥana bar Bizna, as Rav Ḥana bar Bizna says that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida says: One who prays needs to see himself as if the Divine Presence is opposite him, as it is stated: “I have set the Lord always before me” (Psalms 16:8).

לר"ש דאמר כתב זה לא נשתנה מאי לא כהלין כתבא למיקרא אמר רב בגימטריא איכתיב להון יטת יטת אידך פוגחמט The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Shimon, who says that this script was not changed at all, what is the reason “they could not read the writing” (Daniel 5:8)? Rav says: Because it was written for them in the obscure code of gimatriyya. It was written: Yod, tet, tav; yod, tet, tav; alef, yod, dalet, khaf; peh, vav, gimmel, ḥet, mem, tet. These letters correspond with: Mem, nun, alef; mem, nun, alef; tav, kuf, lamed; vav, peh, reish, samekh, yod, nun; this is based on the exchange of letters known as at bash, or the exchanging of a letter with its counterpart in the opposite place in the alphabet, e.g., alef, the first letter, for tav, the last letter.

מאי פריש להו (דניאל ה, כה) מנא מנא תקל ופרסין מנא מנא אלהא מלכותך (והשלמת לך) תקיל תקילתא במאזניא והשתכחת חסיר (פרסין) פריסת מלכותך ויהיבת למדי ופרס What did Daniel explain to them? The letters stand for the terms: “Mene mene tekel ufarsin” (Daniel 5:25). He then explained the meaning: “Mene”: God has numbered [mena] the days of your kingdom and brought it to an end. “Tekel”: You are weighed [tekilta] on the scale and are found lacking. “Parsin”: Your kingdom is divided [perisat] and given to the Medes and Persians” (Daniel 5:26–28).

ושמואל אמר ממתוס ננקפי אאלרן ור' יוחנן אמר אנם אנם לקת ניסרפו רב אשי אמר נמא נמא קתל פורסין: And Shmuel says: The writing used the correct letters for those terms, but instead of being written in order, the four words, mene mene tekel ufarsin were written vertically and were therefore meant to be read from the top down. If read in the usual way, from right to left, it says: “Mamtos nankafei a’alran.” And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Each word was written backward, so that read right to left, they spelled, Anem anem leket nisrapu. Rav Ashi says: They were written with the first two letters of each word reversed: Nema nema ketal pursin.

מתני׳ אין רוכבין על סוסו ואין יושבין על כסאו ואין משתמשין בשרביטו ואין רואין אותו כשהוא מסתפר ולא כשהוא ערום ולא כשהוא בבית המרחץ שנאמר (דברים יז, טו) שום תשים עליך מלך שתהא אימתו עליך: MISHNA: One may not ride on the king’s horse, and one may not sit on his throne, and one may not use his scepter, and one may not see him when he is having his hair cut, nor when he is naked, nor when he is in the bathhouse, as it is stated: “You shall set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15), meaning, ensure that his fear should be upon you. All of these actions would lessen one’s fear of and reverence for the king.

גמ׳ אמר רב יעקב א"ר יוחנן אבישג מותרת לשלמה ואסורה לאדניה מותרת לשלמה דמלך היה ומלך משתמש בשרביטו של מלך ואסורה לאדניה דהדיוט הוא GEMARA: Rav Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Abishag the Shunammite was permitted to Solomon but forbidden to Adonijah, who in fact wanted to marry her. She was permitted to Solomon, as he was a king, and a king may use the scepter of a king. Abishag’s status was similar to the king’s scepter, as she had been designated to serve King David. She was forbidden to Adonijah, as he was an ordinary person, not a king.

אבישג מאי היא דכתיב (מלכים א א, א) והמלך דוד זקן בא בימים וגו' ויאמרו לו עבדיו יבקשו וגו' וכתיב (מלכים א א, ג) ויבקשו נערה יפה וגו' וכתיב (מלכים א א, ד) והנערה יפה עד מאד ותהי למלך סוכנת ותשרתהו אמרה נינסבן אמר לה אסירת לי The Gemara clarifies: The story of Abishag, what is it? As it is written: “Now King David was old and stricken in years…and his servants said to him, let there be sought…a young virgin…and let her lie in your bosom, that my lord the king may get heat” (I Kings 1:1–2); and it is written: “So they sought for a beautiful maiden…and found Abishag” (I Kings 1:1–3); and it is written: “And the maiden was very beautiful and she became a companion to the king and ministered to him, but the king did not know her” (I Kings 1:1–4). Abishag said to King David: Marry me. King David said to her: You are forbidden to me, as I already have eighteen wives.

אמרה ליה חסריה לגנבא נפשיה לשלמא נקיט אמר להו קראו לי לבת שבע וכתיב (מלכים א א, טו) ותבא בת שבע אל המלך החדרה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב באותה שעה קינחה בת שבע בשלש עשרה מפות Abishag said to him: When the thief is lacking what to steal, he makes himself like a man of peace. In other words, she was saying that since King David was physically unable to engage in intercourse, he devised an excuse not to marry her. King David said to his attendants: Call Bathsheba to me. And it is written: “And Bathsheba went in to the king into the chamber; now the king was very old and Abishag the Shunammite ministered to the king” (I Kings 1:15). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: At that time, Bathsheba wiped herself with thirteen cloths, corresponding to the number of words in the verse, indicating that she engaged in intercourse with King David thirteen times.

אמר רב שמן בר אבא בוא וראה כמה קשין גירושין שהרי דוד המלך התירו לו לייחד ולא התירו לו לגרש Rav Shemen bar Abba says: Come and see how severe a matter divorce is, as they rendered it permitted for King David to be secluded with Abishag without marrying her, but they did not render it permitted for him to divorce one of his wives to enable him to marry Abishag.

א"ר אליעזר כל המגרש את אשתו ראשונה אפילו מזבח מוריד עליו דמעות שנאמר (מלאכי ב, יג) וזאת שנית תעשו כסות דמעה את מזבח ה' בכי ואנקה מאין עוד פנות אל המנחה ולקחת רצון מידכם וכתיב (מלאכי ב, יד) ואמרתם על מה על כי ה' העיד בינך ובין אשת נעוריך אשר אתה בגדתה בה והיא חברתך ואשת בריתך § Rabbi Eliezer says: Concerning anyone who divorces his first wife, even the altar sheds tears about him, as it is stated: “And further, this you should do: Cover the altar of the Lord with tears, with weeping and sighing, from His no longer showing regard to the offering, nor receiving it with goodwill from your hand” (Malachi 2:13), and it is written: “Yet you say: Why? Because the Lord has been witness between you and the wife of your youth, against whom you have dealt treacherously, though she is your companion and the wife of your covenant” (Malachi 2:14).

א"ר יוחנן ואיתימא ר' אלעזר אין אשתו של אדם מתה אלא אם כן מבקשין ממנו ממון ואין לו שנאמר (משלי כב, כז) ואם אין לך לשלם למה יקח משכבך מתחתיך Rabbi Yoḥanan, and some say Rabbi Elazar, says: A man’s wife does not die unless his creditors ask him for money that he owes and he does not have it, as it is stated: “If you do not have with what to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27). The bed mentioned in the verse alludes to one’s wife.

וא"ר יוחנן כל אדם שמתה אשתו ראשונה כאילו חרב בהמ"ק בימיו שנאמר (יחזקאל כד, טז) בן אדם הנני לוקח ממך את מחמד עיניך במגפה לא תספד ולא תבכה ולא תבוא דמעתך וכתיב (יחזקאל כד, יח) ואדבר אל העם בבקר ותמת אשתי בערב וכתיב (יחזקאל כד, כא) הנני מחלל את מקדשי גאון עוזכם מחמד עיניכם And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: For any man whose first wife dies, it is as if the Temple were destroyed in his days, as it is stated: “Son of man, behold, I take away from you the desire of your eyes with a stroke; yet neither shall you make lamentation nor weep, neither shall your tears run down” (Ezekiel 24:16). And it is written: “So I spoke to the people in the morning and in the evening my wife died” (Ezekiel 24:18). And it is written in the continuation of the same passage: “Behold I will profane My Sanctuary, the pride of your power, the desire of your eyes” (Ezekiel 24:21), illustrating that a man’s wife is as precious to him as the Temple is for the entire Jewish nation.

אמר רבי אלכסנדרי כל אדם שמתה אשתו בימיו עולם חשך בעדו שנאמר (איוב יח, ו) אור חשך באהלו ונרו עליו ידעך ר' יוסי בר חנינא אמר פסיעותיו מתקצרות שנאמר (איוב יח, ז) יצרו צעדי אונו רבי אבהו אמר עצתו נופלת שנאמר (איוב יח, ז) ותשליכהו עצתו Rabbi Alexandri says: For any man whose wife dies in his days, the world is dark for him, as it is stated: “The light shall be dark in his tent and his lamp over him shall be put out” (Job 18:6), since the word tent is commonly employed as a metonym for a wife. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: His steps get shorter, as it is stated: “The steps of his strength shall be constrained” (Job 18:7). Rabbi Abbahu says: His counsel falls, as it is stated: “And his own counsel shall cast him down” (Job 18:7).

אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן קשה לזווגם כקריעת ים סוף שנאמר (תהלים סח, ז) אלהים מושיב יחידים ביתה מוציא אסירים בכושרות (אל תיקרי מוציא אסירים אלא כמוציא אסירים אל תיקרי בכושרות אלא בכי ושירות) Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is as difficult to match a couple as the splitting of the Red Sea, as it is stated: “God makes the solitary dwell in a house; He brings out prisoners into prosperity” (Psalms 68:7). Do not read the verse as “brings out prisoners”; rather, read it as: Like bringing out prisoners. Accordingly, the act described in the first clause of the verse, God’s causing the solitary to dwell in a house, i.e., to marry, is compared to the act described in the next clause in the verse, i.e., bringing out prisoners. And do not read the verse as “into prosperity [bakkosharot]”; rather, read it as: Crying and singing [bekhi veshirot], which alludes to the splitting of the Red Sea, when there was both crying and singing.

איני והאמר רב יהודה אמר רב ארבעים יום קודם יצירת הולד בת קול יוצאת ואומרת בת פלוני לפלוני לא קשיא הא בזווג ראשון הא בזווג שני The Gemara asks: Is that so that it is this difficult to find a match? But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: Forty days before the formation of the fetus a Divine Voice emerges and states: The daughter of so-and-so shall be the wife of so-and-so? Why should matching them be so difficult, since they are prepared for this from before their birth? The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. This latter statement, about predestined matches, is stated with regard to the first match; that former statement, about the difficulty of matchmaking, is stated with regard to the second match.

א"ר שמואל בר נחמן לכל יש תמורה חוץ מאשת נעורים שנא' (ישעיהו נד, ו) ואשת נעורים כי תמאס מתני לה רב יהודה לרב יצחק בריה אין אדם מוצא קורת רוח אלא מאשתו ראשונה שנא' (משלי ה, יח) יהי מקורך ברוך ושמח מאשת Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥman says: For everything that is lost there is a substitute, except for one’s wife from youth who dies, as it is stated: “And a wife from youth, can she be rejected?” (Isaiah 54:6). Rav Yehuda taught Rav Yitzḥak, his son: A man finds calmness of spirit only from his first wife, as it is stated: “Let your fountain be blessed and have joy with the wife of

Daf 22b

נעוריך אמר לו כגון מאן אמר לו כגון אמך your youth” (Proverbs 5:18). Rav Yitzḥak, his son, said to him: Such as whom? Rav Yehuda said to him: Such as your mother.

איני והא מקרי ליה רב יהודה לרב יצחק בריה (קהלת ז, כו) ומוצא אני מר ממות את האשה אשר היא מצודים וחרמים ואמר לו כגון מאן וא"ל כגון אמך מיתקף תקיפא עיבורי מעברא במלה The Gemara wonders: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Yehuda once read to Rav Yitzḥak, his son, from the verse: “And I find more bitter than death the woman whose heart is snares and nets” (Ecclesiastes 7:26)? And Rav Yitzḥak said to him: Such as whom? And Rav Yehuda said to him: Such as your mother. The Gemara responds: This is not a contradiction. Granted, she is difficult and angry, but afterward she is conciliatory, so she is both more bitter than death and a source of calmness and joy for him, at different times.

אמר רב שמואל בר אוניא משמיה דרב אשה גולם היא ואינה כורתת ברית אלא למי שעשאה כלי שנאמר (ישעיהו נד, ה) כי בועליך עושיך ה' צבאות שמו Rav Shmuel bar Unya says in the name of Rav: A woman is raw material, like a vessel that has not been completed, and makes a covenant, becoming truly connected, only to the one who made her a vessel through her first act of sexual intercourse, as it is stated: “For your Maker is your husband, the Lord of hosts is His name” (Isaiah 54:5).

תנא אין איש מת אלא לאשתו ואין אשה מתה אלא לבעלה אין איש מת אלא לאשתו שנאמר (רות א, ג) וימת אלימלך איש נעמי ואין אשה מתה אלא לבעלה שנאמר (בראשית מח, ז) ואני בבאי מפדן מתה עלי רחל: It is taught in a baraita: A man dies only to his wife, i.e., it is primarily she who suffers the pain and sadness resulting from his death, and a woman dies only to her husband. A man dies only to his wife, as it is stated: “And Elimelech, Naomi’s husband, died” (Ruth 1:3), and a woman dies only to her husband, as it is stated in Jacob’s parting words to Joseph: “And as for me, when I came from Paddan, Rachel died on me” (Genesis 48:7).

אין רואין אותו כו': ת"ר מלך מסתפר בכל יום כהן גדול מערב שבת לערב שבת כהן הדיוט אחד לשלשים יום § The mishna teaches: One may not see the king when he is having his hair cut. The Sages taught in a baraita: A king has his hair cut every day. A High Priest waits from the eve of Shabbat to the eve of Shabbat between haircuts. An ordinary priest has his hair cut once every thirty days.

מלך מסתפר בכל יום שנאמר (ישעיהו לג, יז) מלך ביפיו תחזינה עיניך: כהן גדול מע"ש: אמר רב שמואל בר נחמן א"ר יוחנן הואיל ומשמרות מתחדשות The Gemara explains: A king has his hair cut every day, as it is stated: “Your eyes should see the king in his beauty” (Isaiah 33:17), so his beauty must be tended to daily. A High Priest waits from the eve of Shabbat to the eve of Shabbat, as Rav Shmuel bar Naḥman says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Since new priestly watches begin every week on the eve of Shabbat, the High Priest must have his hair cut in order to look his best when the new watch arrives.

כהן הדיוט אחד לשלשים יום דכתיב (יחזקאל מד, כ) וראשם לא יגלחו ופרע לא ישלחו כסום יכסמו את ראשיהם ויליף פרע פרע מנזיר כתיב הכא פרע לא ישלחו וכתיב התם (במדבר ו, ה) גדל פרע שער ראשו מה להלן שלשים אף כאן שלשים ותנן נמי סתם נזירות שלשים יום The Gemara continues its explanation of the baraita: An ordinary priest has his hair cut once every thirty days, as it is written with regard to the priests: “They shall not shave their heads, and long hair they shall not grow out; they shall trim only their heads” (Ezekiel 44:20), and derive by verbal analogy “long hair” in this verse from “long hair” in the verse written with regard to the nazirite. It is written here, with regard to the priests: “And long hair they shall not grow out,” and it is written there, with regard to the nazirite: “Long hair growing on his head” (Numbers 6:5). Just as there, nazirite hair growth is at least thirty days, so too here, it is thirty days, and the priest must cut his hair before it is called long. And we also learn in a mishna (Nazir 5a): A term of naziriteship of unspecified length is thirty days.

והתם מנא לן אמר רב מתנה דאמר קרא קדש יהיה בגימטריא תלתין הוו The Gemara asks: And there, in the verse about the nazirite, from where do we derive that thirty days is the minimum length of a term? Rav Mattana says: As the verse states: “He shall be [yihye] holy” (Numbers 6:5): The word “yihye” has the numerical value of thirty.

אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי אימא לא לירבו כלל אמר ליה אי כתיב לא ישלחו פרע כדקאמרת השתא דכתיב ופרע פרע ליהוי שלוחי לא לישלחו Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Say that the priests should not grow their hair at all, but shave their heads instead. Abaye said to him: Had it been written: They shall not grow long hair, it would be as you said, but now that it is written: “And long hair” (Ezekiel 44:20), it can be somewhat long hair, but they should not grow it out very long.

אי הכי האידנא נמי דומיא דיין מה יין בזמן ביאה הוא דאסור שלא בזמן ביאה שרי אף פרועי ראש בזמן ביאה אסור שלא בזמן ביאה שרי The Gemara asks: If so, that the restriction on priests growing long hair is a mitzva by Torah law and not just a regulation for its time, now too, after the destruction of the Temple, priests should be required to have their hair cut every thirty days. The Gemara responds: The prohibition against priests growing long hair is similar to the prohibition against their drinking wine. Just as with regard to wine, only at the time of their entering the Temple is it forbidden to the priests, but when it is not the time of their entering the Temple it is permitted, so too, with regard to those with long hair, at the time of their entering the Temple, growing their hair long is prohibited, but when it is not the time of their entering the Temple, it is permitted.

ויין שלא בזמן ביאה שרי והתניא רבי אומר אומר אני כהנים אסורין לשתות יין לעולם אבל מה אעשה שתקנתו קלקלתו ואמר אביי כמאן שתי כהני חמרא האידנא כרבי מכלל דרבנן אסרי The Gemara challenges this comparison: And is wine permitted when it is not the time of their entering the Temple? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that actually, it is always prohibited for priests to drink wine, even since the destruction of the Temple, but what can I do, as his repair is his ruin, meaning that it is the same destruction of the Temple that ruined and confused all priestly regulations and that also improved priests’ lifestyle by enabling them to drink. And Abaye said: In accordance with whose opinion do priests drink wine nowadays? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara concludes by inference that if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is singled out as a lone opinion, then the Rabbis prohibit it.

התם היינו טעמא מהרה יבנה בית המקדש ובעינן כהן הראוי לעבודה וליכא ה"נ בעינא כהן הראוי לעבודה וליכא The Gemara responds: There, with regard to drinking wine, this is the reason for the prohibition: The Temple will speedily be built, and we need a priest who is fit for the Temple service; and if the priests drink wine there are none. Therefore, none of them may drink wine. The Gemara objects: If so, here too, with regard to growing hair long, I need a priest who is fit for performing the Temple service as soon as the Temple is rebuilt, and if the priests grow their hair long, there are none.

הכא אפשר דמספר ועייל התם נמי אפשר דניים פורתא ועייל דאמר רב אחא דרך מיל ושינה כל שהוא מפיגין את היין ולאו איתמר עלה אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה לא שנו אלא ששתה כדי רביעית אבל יותר מכדי רביעית כ"ש דדרך טורדתו ושינה משכרתו The Gemara responds: Here it is possible for him to cut his hair and enter the Temple immediately. The Gemara objects: There too, it is possible for him to sleep a little and go in, as Rav Aḥa says: Walking the distance of a mil or sleeping even a minimal amount will dispel the effect of wine that one has drunk. The Gemara responds: But wasn’t it stated with regard to Rav Aḥa’s statement: Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: They taught that the wine’s effect is dispelled in such a way only when he drank a quarter-log, at most, but if he drank more than a quarter-log, all the more so that walking that distance disturbs him and sleep makes him more drunk, unless he sleeps for a long time.

רב אשי אמר שתויי יין דמחלי עבודה גזרו בהו רבנן פרועי ראש דלא מחלי עבודה לא גזרו בהו רבנן Rav Ashi said: The difference between drinking wine and growing hair is this: Concerning priests drunk on wine, who desecrate the Temple service when they perform it while intoxicated, the Sages decreed about them not to drink even after the Temple was destroyed. With regard to long-haired priests, who do not desecrate Temple service by performing it with hair that is too long, the Sages did not decree about them not to grow their hair long after the Temple was destroyed.

מיתיבי ואלו שבמיתה פרועי ראש ושתויי יין The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ashi’s distinction from a baraita (Tosefta, Karetot 1:2): And these are they who are sentenced to death at the hand of Heaven: Priests who enter the Temple with long hair or drunk on wine.

בשלמא שתויי יין דכתיב (ויקרא י, ט) יין ושכר אל תשת אתה ובניך ולא תמותו אלא פרועי ראש מנא לן The Gemara comments: Granted, priests entering the Temple drunk on wine are liable for death, as it is written: “Drink no wine nor strong drink, you, nor your sons with you, when you go into the Tent of Meeting, that you not die; it shall be a statute forever throughout your generations” (Leviticus 10:9). But as for priests with long hair, from where do we derive that they are punished with death at the hand of Heaven?

דאיתקש שתויי יין לפרועי ראש כתיב וראשם לא יגלחו ופרע לא ישלחו (וכתיב) ויין לא ישתו וגו' מה שתויי יין במיתה אף פרועי ראש במיתה The Gemara responds: It is from the fact that priests drunk on wine were juxtaposed to those with long hair. It is written: “They shall not shave their heads, and long hair they shall not grow out” (Ezekiel 44:20), and it is written in the next verse: “Neither shall any priest drink wine when they enter the inner court” (Ezekiel 44:21). Just as priests drunk on wine are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, so too, those with long hair are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven.

ומינה מה שתויי יין דמחלי עבודה אף פרועי ראש דמחלי עבודה קשיא And if so, from this very juxtaposition one may learn that just as priests drunk on wine desecrate the Temple service, so too, those with long hair desecrate the Temple service, which poses a difficulty for Rav Ashi’s statement. The Gemara acknowledges: This poses a difficulty.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי האי עד דלא אתא יחזקאל מאן אמרה וליטעמיך הא דאמר רב חסדא דבר זה מתורת משה רבינו לא למדנו עד שבא יחזקאל ולימדנו (יחזקאל מד, ט) כל בן נכר ערל לב וערל בשר לא יבא אל מקדשי לשרתני עד דלא בא יחזקאל מאן אמרה אלא גמרא גמירי לה ואתא יחזקאל ואסמכה אקרא ה"נ גמרא גמירי לה ואתא יחזקאל ואסמכה אקרא Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This halakha, until Ezekiel came and taught it, who said it? How can a halakha by Torah law be derived from the juxtaposition of verses in Ezekiel? Rav Ashi responds: And according to your reasoning, then, with regard to this statement that Rav Ḥisda says: We did not learn this following matter from the Torah of Moses, our teacher, until Ezekiel came and taught it to us: “No stranger, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter into My Sanctuary to serve Me” (Ezekiel 44:9), until Ezekiel came and taught it, who said it? Rather, this halakha is learned as a tradition and therefore was observed for generations, and Ezekiel came and gave it support by writing a verse. Here too, this halakha is learned as a tradition, and Ezekiel came and gave it support by writing a verse.

(וכי גמרי הלכה למיתה לאחולי עבודה לא גמירי) The Gemara comments: And when they learned this halakha, it was to teach that a priest who violates the restriction is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven. But the fact that it is considered desecration of the Temple service is not learned as a tradition.

מאי כסום יכסמו את ראשיהם תנא כמין תספורת לוליינית מאי תספורת לוליינית אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל תספורתא יחידאה ה"ד אמר רב אשי ראשו של זה בצד עיקרו של זה The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of “they shall trim only their heads” (Ezekiel 44:20)? The Sages taught in a baraita: Like a lulyanit haircut. The Gemara asks: What is a lulyanit haircut? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A unique haircut. The Gemara asks again: What is it like? Rav Ashi says: The hair is cut so that the head of the hair in this row is at the side of the bottom of that row.

שאלו את רבי איזהו תספורת של כ"ג אמר להן צאו וראו מתספורת של בן אלעשה תניא רבי אומר לא על חנם פיזר בן אלעשה את מעותיו אלא כדי להראות בו תספורת של כהן גדול: The Sages asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: What was the haircut of the High Priest? He said to them: Go out and see the haircut of ben Elasa, who was the son-in-law of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and who sported the High Priest’s hairstyle. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Not for nothing did ben Elasa disburse his money on his haircuts, but in order to demonstrate on himself the haircut of the High Priest.

הדרן עלך כהן גדול

Talmud

Talmud - The William Davidson Edition

Davidson | Seder Nezikin | Sanhedrin Chapter 3

Davidson | Seder Nezikin | Sanhedrin Chapter 3 somebody Wed, 01/31/2024 - 07:25 pm

Daf 23a

מתני׳ דיני ממונות בשלשה זה בורר לו אחד וזה בורר לו אחד ושניהן בוררין להן עוד אחד דברי ר"מ וחכמים אומרים שני דיינין בוררין להן עוד אחד MISHNA: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three. They are chosen in the following manner: This litigant chooses one for himself and that litigant chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge for themselves.

זה פוסל דיינו של זה וזה פוסל דיינו של זה דברי ר' מאיר וחכמים אומרים אימתי בזמן שמביא עליהן ראיה שהן קרובין או פסולין אבל אם היו כשרין או מומחין מפי בית דין אינו יכול לפוסלן This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as judges or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them.

זה פוסל עדיו של זה וזה פוסל עדיו של זה דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים אימתי בזמן שמביא עליהן ראיה שהן קרובין או פסולין אבל אם היו כשרין אינו יכול לפוסלן: This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one litigant disqualify the other’s witnesses? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from bearing witness for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as witnesses, he cannot disqualify them.

גמ׳ מאי זה בורר לו אחד וזה בורר לו אחד בתלתא סגי GEMARA: The Gemara assumes that the statement: This litigant chooses one and that litigant chooses one and the two of them choose one more, means that each litigant chooses a court of three judges and the two courts together choose one more court, for a total of nine judges. The Gemara asks: For what purpose does this litigant choose one court for himself and that litigant choose one court for himself; isn’t it sufficient to judge the case with three judges?

הכי קאמר כשזה בורר לו ב"ד אחד וזה בורר לו ב"ד אחד שניהן בוררין להן עוד אחד The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: In a case where this litigant chooses one court for himself, i.e., he requests to be judged before three specific judges, and that litigant chooses one other court of three judges for himself, as he does not wish to be judged before the court that the first litigant requested, in this case, both of them choose one more court for themselves, i.e., they must reach a compromise and decide about the composition of the court that will judge them.

ואפילו לוה מצי מעכב והאמר ר' אלעזר לא שנו אלא מלוה אבל לוה כופין אותו ודן בעירו The Gemara asks: And can even a debtor restrict the choice of the court? But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: The Sages taught that only a creditor can refuse a court chosen by the debtor, due to his desire to be judged by a prominent court, but that as for a debtor, they compel him to appear in the court that presides in his own city.

כדאמר רבי יוחנן בערכאות שבסוריא שנו הכא נמי בערכאות שבסוריא שנו אבל מומחין לא The Gemara answers: It is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says concerning a different matter, that the Sages taught that other matter with regard to the laymen’s courts [be’arkaot] in Syria. Here too, the Sages taught the halakha in the mishna with regard to the laymen’s courts in Syria, which allow even the debtor to refuse to be judged before the court chosen by the creditor, claiming that they are not worthy judges. But if the creditor chooses a court of experts, the debtor does not have the right to refuse to be judged before them.

רב פפא אמר אפילו תימא מומחין כגון בי דינא דרב הונא ודרב חסדא דקאמר ליה מי קא מטרחנא לך Rav Pappa said: You may even say that the mishna is referring to courts of experts in the same city, such as the courts of Rav Huna and of Rav Ḥisda. As in that case, each litigant can say to the other: Am I burdening you by requesting that you be judged by a different court?

תנן וחכ"א שני דיינין בוררין להן עוד אחד ואי ס"ד כדקאמרינן ב"ד בית דין בתר דפסלי להו אזלו ובררו להו בי דינא אחריני We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more for themselves. And if it enters your mind to interpret the mishna as we said before, that each litigant chose a court of three judges, this statement is difficult; after each court was disqualified by one of the litigants, shall the members of both courts go and choose another court for themselves?

ועוד מאי זה בורר לו אחד וזה בורר לו אחד And furthermore, for what reason would the mishna state that the standard procedure for choosing judges is that this litigant chooses one court for himself and that litigant chooses one court for himself, each disqualifying the court that the other chose?

אלא ה"ק כשזה בורר לו דיין אחד וזה בורר לו דיין אחד שניהן בוררין להן עוד אחד Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: When this litigant chooses one judge for himself before whom he requests to be judged, and that litigant chooses one other judge for him-self before whom he requests to be judged, the two litigants then choose one more judge for themselves, and the case is adjudicated by these three judges.

מאי שנא דעבדי הכי אמרי במערבא משמיה דר' זירא מתוך שזה בורר לו דיין אחד וזה בורר לו דיין אחד ושניהן בוררין להן עוד אחד יצא הדין לאמיתו: The Gemara asks: What is different about this procedure; i.e., that the selection of the judges is performed specifically in this manner? The Sages in the West, Eretz Yisrael, say in the name of Rabbi Zeira: As result of the fact that this litigant chooses one judge for himself, and that litigant chooses one judge for himself, and the two litigants choose one more judge for themselves, the true judgment will emerge. Each litigant assumes that the judges he chose do not bear a grudge against him, and he will accept their ruling.

וחכמים אומרים כו': נימא בדרב יהודה אמר רב קמיפלגי § The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to what Rav Yehuda says that Rav says.

דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב אין העדים חותמין על השטר אלא א"כ יודעין מי חותם עמהן רבי מאיר לית ליה דרב יהודה אמר רב ורבנן אית להו דרב יהודה אמר רב As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. One does not sign a document unless he recognizes that those signing with him are fit to bear witness. According to the Gemara’s suggestion, Rabbi Meir does not accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says. Therefore, the litigants can choose the third judge, as the first two judges will be amenable to signing the court order without knowing the third judge. And the Rabbis accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and the judges would not sign the court order without themselves knowing the third judge.

לא דכולי עלמא אית להו דרב יהודה אמר רב ודעת הדיינין כ"ע לא פליגי דבעינן כי פליגי דעת בעלי דינין ר"מ סבר דעת בעלי דינין נמי בעינן ורבנן סברי דעת הדיינין בעינן דעת בעלי דינין לא בעינן The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone accepts that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and everyone agrees with the premise that we need the consent of the first two judges for the appointment of the third. Rather, when they disagree, it is about whether the consent of the litigants is necessary. Rabbi Meir holds that we need the consent of the litigants as well, and the Rabbis hold that although we need the consent of the other two judges, we do not need the consent of the litigants.

גופא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אין העדים חותמין על השטר כו' תניא נמי הכי כך היו נקיי הדעת שבירושלים עושין לא היו חותמין על השטר אלא א"כ יודעין מי חותם עמהן ולא היו יושבין בדין אלא א"כ יודעין מי יושב עמהן ולא היו נכנסין בסעודה אלא אם כן יודעין מי מיסב עמהן: Returning to the matter itself, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. That is also taught in a baraita: This is what the scrupulous people of Jerusalem would do: They would not sign a document unless they knew who was signing with them, and they would not sit in judgment unless they knew who was sitting with them, and they would not join a meal unless they knew who was reclining, i.e., eating, with them.

זה פוסל דיינו כו': כל כמיניה דפסיל דייני § The mishna teaches: This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant. The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to disqualify judges?

א"ר יוחנן בערכאות שבסוריא שנו אבל מומחים לא Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages taught this matter with regard to the laymen’s courts in Syria. In those courts, each litigant can refuse to be judged by the judge the other litigant chose. But this halakha is not stated with regard to a court of expert judges.

הא מדקתני סיפא וחכ"א אימתי בזמן שמביא ראיה שהן קרובין או פסולין אבל אם היו כשרין או מומחין מפי ב"ד אינו יכול לפוסלן מכלל דר' מאיר מומחין נמי קאמר The Gemara challenges: From the fact that the mishna teaches in the latter clause: And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? When he brings evidence that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason; but if they are fit to serve as judges, or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them. By inference, Rabbi Meir is also speaking of a court of experts when he says that one can refuse to be judged.

ה"ק אבל אם היו כשרין נעשו כמומחין מפי ב"ד ואינו יכול לפוסלן The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: But if they are fit to serve as judges they are treated like experts ordained by the court, and he cannot disqualify them.

ת"ש אמרו לו לר"מ לא כל הימנו שפוסל דיין שמומחה לרבים The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita that contradicts this interpretation: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: It is not within a litigant’s power to disqualify a judge who is accepted as an expert for the public. Apparently, Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to an expert judge.

אימא לא כל הימנו שפוסל דיין שהמחוהו רבים עליהם The Gemara answers: Say that the baraita should be emended as follows: It is not within a litigant’s power to disqualify a judge whom the public accepted upon themselves as an expert judge for their matters, just as the halakha is concerning the laymen’s courts in Syria.

תניא נמי הכי לעולם פוסל והולך עד שיקבל עליו ב"ד שמומחה לרבים דברי ר"מ That interpretation is also taught in a baraita, which teaches: A litigant can continuously disqualify the judges chosen by the other litigant forever, until the latter accepts to be judged by a court that is accepted as an expert court for the public; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Clearly, Rabbi Meir concedes that one cannot refuse to have the case judged by an expert court.

והא עדים כמומחין דמי ואמר ר"מ זה פוסל עדיו של זה וזה פוסל עדיו של זה The Gemara asks: But aren’t witnesses like experts, in that their standing is independent of their being accepted by the litigants? And yet Rabbi Meir says: This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant.

הא איתמר עלה אמר ריש לקיש פה קדוש יאמר דבר זה תני עדו The Gemara answers: It was stated with regard to that statement of Rabbi Meir that Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.

עדו למאי אילימא לממון רחמנא פסליה אי לשבועה הימוני מהימן כבי תרי The Gemara asks: For what purpose does his single witness testify? If we say it is to testify about monetary matters, the Merciful One already disqualifies him, as by Torah law the testimony of only one witness is not accepted. If it is to render the defendant liable to take an oath that he does not owe the money being claimed, in this regard the testimony of one witness is deemed credible like two witnesses; the Torah states that if one witness supports the claim of the claimant, the defendant is required to take an oath that he does not owe the money.

לעולם לממון לא צריכא דקבליה עליה כבי תרי The Gemara answers: Actually, the purpose of the testimony is to testify about monetary matters; and no, one should not raise that challenge, as this ruling is necessary only in a case where the litigant initially accepted upon himself the single witness as equivalent to two witnesses. Afterward, he retracted his agreement to accept the single witness’s testimony as if it were that of two witnesses. Rabbi Meir rules that his retraction is valid, and the testimony is not accepted.

מאי קמ"ל דמצי הדר ביה תנינא אמר לו נאמן עלי אבא נאמן עלי אביך נאמנין עלי ג' רועי בקר ר"מ אומר יכול לחזור בו וחכ"א אינו יכול לחזור בו The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us, that one can retract this kind of agreement? We learn this in the following mishna (24a): If one of the litigants says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are legally disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says that the one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say that he cannot retract it, and must accept their verdict.

Daf 23b

ואמר רב דימי בריה דרב נחמן בריה דרב יוסף כגון דקבליה עליה בחד And Rav Dimi, son of Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Yosef, says: This is referring to a case where the litigant accepted one of these people upon himself as one of the judges, in addition to two fit judges. Since the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to a litigant retracting his acceptance of someone who is generally disqualified from judging is stated in the next mishna, why is it stated in this mishna as well?

צריכא דאי תנא אבא ואביך בהא קאמרי רבנן דלא מצי הדר ביה משום דאבא ואביך חזו לעלמא אבל חד כבי תרי דלעלמא לא חזי אימא מודו ליה לר"מ The Gemara answers: The statements in both mishnayot are necessary. As, had the Mishna taught this dispute only with regard to a litigant who said: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, one might have reasoned that only in this case did the Rabbis say that he cannot retract his acceptance, because: My father, and: Your father, are fit to judge for the general public. But in a case where a litigant accepts one witness as equivalent to two witnesses, since one witness is someone who is not fit to testify by himself for the general public one might say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that he can retract his acceptance. Therefore, it is necessary for the dispute to be stated with regard to the case in this mishna as well.

ואי אשמעינן בהא בהא קאמר ר"מ אבל בההיא אימא מודו להו לרבנן צריכא And conversely, if the Mishna would teach us their dispute only with regard to this case, where a litigant effectively accepted one witness as equivalent to two, one might have reasoned that specifically in this case Rabbi Meir says that he can retract his acceptance. But in that case, where he accepted his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge, one might say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that he cannot retract his acceptance. It is therefore necessary for the mishna to state both disputes.

הא מדקתני רישא דיינו וסיפא עדיו אלמא דוקא קתני The Gemara asks: But from the fact that in the former clause the mishna teaches that one litigant can disqualify the judge, in singular, chosen by the other litigant, and in the latter clause the wording is his witnesses, in plural, evidently the mishna teaches this specifically with regard to a case of two witnesses. It is incorrect to emend the text to read witness instead of witnesses.

אמר ר' אלעזר בבא הוא ואחר לפוסלן Rabbi Elazar said: The mishna is referring to a case where the litigant and another person come to disqualify the witnesses, testifying that they are disqualified from bearing witness.

כל כמיניה נוגע בעדותו הוא The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to testify that the witnesses of the other litigant are disqualified from bearing witness? His testimony is tainted by a conflict of interest; how can the court accept it?

אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא כגון שקרא עליו ערער Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: The mishna is referring to a case where he raised a challenge against the witness’s fitness to testify, which cannot be disregarded due to his conflict of interest.

ערער דמאי אילימא ערער דגזלנותא כל כמיניה נוגע בעדותו הוא The Gemara asks: A challenge over which matter? If we say that he raises a challenge by testifying that the witness is guilty of theft or some other transgression, is it in his power to testify to that effect? His testimony is tainted by a conflict of interest.

אלא ערער דפגם משפחה ר' מאיר סבר הני אמשפחה קמסהדי ואיהו ממילא קפסיל ורבנן סברי סוף סוף נוגע בעדותו הוא Rather, it is a challenge over a family flaw. The litigant testifies that the witness’s lineage prevents him from testifying, as he is from a family of Canaanite slaves. Rabbi Meir holds that the litigant’s testimony is accepted, as these witnesses, the litigant and the witness who testifies with him, are testifying about the family of the witness, and the witness is disqualified indirectly. The litigant is therefore not disqualified from giving this testimony due to his conflict of interest. And the Rabbis hold that since his testimony is ultimately tainted by a conflict of interest, it is not accepted.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי יוחנן מחלוקת בשתי כיתי עדים When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is with regard to a case in which one of the litigants claims that there are two sets of witnesses who can testify on his behalf, and the other litigant responds that one of the sets of witnesses is disqualified. In this case, the second litigant’s claim is not tainted by a conflict of interest, as there is another set of witnesses who can testify against him in any event.

דר' מאיר סבר צריך לברר ורבנן סברי אינו צריך לברר אבל בכת אחת דברי הכל אין יכול לפוסלן Rabbi Meir maintains that the litigant cannot give this testimony, as Rabbi Meir holds that a litigant who claims in court to have a certain number of witnesses ready to testify on his behalf is required to substantiate that they exist. Therefore, there is no concern that the other set of witnesses will not be brought to court, causing that litigant to lose the case due to the disqualification of the first set. And the Rabbis hold that one is not required to substantiate the existence of witnesses he claims to have. As the disqualification of the first set of witnesses can cause the first litigant to lose the case, the second litigant is consequently unable to disqualify that first set, due to his conflict of interest. But in a case of one set of witnesses, everyone agrees that a litigant cannot disqualify them, due to his conflict of interest.

אמרו לפניו רב אמי ורב אסי אין שם אלא כת אחת מהו Rav Dimi continued: Rav Ami and Rav Asi said before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If there is only one set of witnesses there, what is the halakha?

אין שם אלא כת אחת והאמרת אבל בכת אחת דברי הכל אין יכול לפוסלן אלא נמצאת כת שניה קרובין או פסולין מהו The Gemara interrupts: If there is only one set of witnesses there, what is the dilemma? But didn’t you already say: But in a case of one set of witnesses, everyone agrees that a litigant cannot disqualify them? Rather, the question should be understood as follows: According to Rabbi Meir, who holds that a litigant can disqualify one of the other litigant’s two sets of witnesses, if the second set is ultimately found to be related to one of the litigants or to each other, or is disqualified from bearing witness for other reasons, what is the halakha? Can the litigant whose witnesses were disqualified then claim that the other litigant was not capable of disqualifying the first set, as it turned out that they were the only witnesses who would be testifying against him?

אמר להן כבר העידו עדים הראשונים איכא דאמרי אמר רב אשי כבר העידו עדים הראשונים Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: The first pair of witnesses, i.e., the second litigant, who disqualified the other litigant’s first set of witnesses, already testified. Since his testimony was valid at the time it cannot be disqualified afterward. Some say this statement in the name of a different amora: Rav Ashi says: The first pair of witnesses already testified.

נימא בפלוגתא דרבי ורבן שמעון בן גמליאל קמיפלגי The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

דתניא הבא לידון בשטר ובחזקה נידון בשטר דברי רבי רשב"ג אומר נידון בחזקה As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who comes to court to be judged concerning a claim against land that is in his possession, if in order to support his claim of ownership he comes to court both with a deed of purchase proving that the land is his and with a claim of presumptive ownership of the land stating that it had been in his possession for the past three years, which would render the deed superfluous, in this case his claim is judged on the basis of the deed. The court examines whether or not the deed is valid. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: His claim is judged on the basis of his presumptive ownership.

והוינן בה בחזקה ולא בשטר אלא אימא אף בחזקה And we discussed this dispute, asking: Can Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel possibly mean that the defendant’s claim is judged on the basis of only his presumptive ownership and not on the basis of his deed, i.e., is his deed of purchase ignored? Clearly, there is no reason to ignore the deed of purchase. Rather, say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel means that the defendant’s claim is judged not only on the basis of the deed of purchase, but even on the basis of his presumptive ownership. In other words, either claim suffices.

וקיי"ל דבצריך לברר פליגי And we maintain that they disagree with regard to whether or not a litigant who claims to have more than one type of evidence is required to substantiate the existence of all his types of evidence. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that one who claims to have a deed of purchase is required to bring it to court and cannot rely on his presumptive ownership, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel he can rely on his presumptive ownership. Apparently, this dispute is parallel to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis in the mishna.

לא אליבא דרשב"ג כ"ע לא פליגי כי פליגי אליבא דרבי דר"מ כרבי The Gemara rejects this: No. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, everyone agrees that there is no need to substantiate the existence of all the types of evidence. When Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rabbi Meir holds that one is required to substantiate the existence of all of his types of evidence, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

ורבנן אמרי לך עד כאן לא קאמר רבי התם אלא בחזקה דמכח שטרא קאתי אבל הכא דהני עדים לאו מכח עדים אחריני קאתו אפילו רבי מודה דא"צ לברר And the Rabbis could have said to you that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says there that one is required to substantiate the existence of his types of evidence only vis-à-vis a claim of presumptive ownership of the land. If one claims that he possesses the deed of sale for his land he cannot rely on his presumptive ownership, as the power of his presumptive ownership comes from the power of the deed; mere possession without an accompanying claim of how one became the owner is disregarded (see Bava Batra 41a). But here, in the case of two sets of witnesses, since the power of these witnesses does not come from the power of the other witnesses, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that one is not required to substantiate the existence of the other set of witnesses.

כי אתא רבין אמר רבי יוחנן רישא When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says a different interpretation of the dispute: The former clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify a judge,

Daf 24a

בעדים פסולין ודיינין כשרין מיגו דפסלי עדים פסלי נמי דייני סיפא בדיינין פסולין ועדים כשרין דמיגו דפסלי דיינין פסלי נמי עדים is stated with regard to a case of disqualified witnesses and fit judges, i.e., the litigant claims that both the witnesses and the judges are disqualified and proves his claim only with regard to the witnesses. Rabbi Meir holds that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as the litigant’s entire claim is deemed credible. The latter clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify witnesses, is stated with regard to a case of disqualified judges and fit witnesses, i.e., the litigant proves his claim only with regard to the judges. Since the judges are disqualified the witnesses were also disqualified.

מתקיף לה רבא בשלמא מיגו דפסלי עדים פסלי נמי דייני איכא בי דינא אחרינא אלא מיגו דפסלי דייני פסלי נמי עדים והא עדים תו ליכא Rava objects to this interpretation: Granted, in the former clause, it is reasonable that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as, since there is the option of going to another court, disqualifying these specific judges has no irreversible effect on the outcome of the case. But in the latter case, how can Rabbi Meir hold that since the judges are disqualified, the witnesses are also disqualified without proof? This disqualification nullifies the entire case, as there are no more witnesses.

לא צריכא דאיכא כת אחרת The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is not referring to a case where there are no other witnesses. The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is necessary only in a case where there is another set of witnesses, which the litigant did not disqualify. Since disqualifying this set will not predetermine the outcome, the litigant’s claim that these witnesses are disqualified is accepted.

הא ליכא כת אחרת מאי הכי נמי דלא מצי פסלי היינו דרב דימי The Gemara asks: But if there is no other set of witnesses, what is the halakha? Is it indeed true that the litigant cannot disqualify them? If so, this is identical to Rav Dimi’s interpretation that the mishna is referring to a case where there are two sets of witnesses.

איכא בינייהו מיגו דמר סבר אמרינן מיגו ומר סבר לא אמרינן מיגו The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the principle that since [miggo] one of the litigant’s claims is found to be correct, it can be assumed that other claims of his are correct as well. As one Sage, Ravin, holds that according to Rabbi Meir, we say miggo, i.e., this principle should be followed, and one Sage, Rav Dimi, holds that we do not say miggo, but rather the litigant is required to prove every claim he makes.

גופא אמר ר"ל פה קדוש יאמר דבר זה תני עדו § The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.

איני והאמר עולא הרואה את ר"ל בבית המדרש כאילו עוקר הרים וטוחנן זה בזה The Gemara asks: Is that so? Was it in character for Reish Lakish to speak of Rabbi Meir with such reverence when disagreeing with his ruling? But doesn’t Ulla say: When one sees Reish Lakish studying Torah in the study hall it is as though he is uprooting mountains and grinding them into each other? Reish Lakish was evidently very sharp in his analyses.

אמר רבינא והלא כל הרואה ר"מ בבית המדרש כאילו עוקר הרי הרים וטוחנן זה בזה Ravina said in response: What is the difficulty? But is it not so that when anyone sees Rabbi Meir studying Torah in the study hall, it is as though he is uprooting the highest of mountains and grinding them into each other? Rabbi Meir was a greater scholar than Reish Lakish, so it was fitting for Reish Lakish to speak of him with reverence.

הכי קאמר בא וראה כמה מחבבין זה את זה The Gemara answers: The question: Is that so, was not stated to raise a difficulty; rather, this is what he is saying, i.e., this is what the Gemara was noting: Come and see how much the Sages love each other. Although Reish Lakish was himself very sharp and a great Torah scholar, he spoke of Rabbi Meir with reverence.

כי הא דיתיב רבי וקאמר אסור להטמין את הצונן אמר לפניו ר' ישמעאל בר' יוסי אבא התיר להטמין את הצונן א"ל כבר הורה זקן The Gemara cites another example of Torah scholars who spoke of each other with reverence. It is like that incident where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold, as this may lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat to keep it hot. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before him: My father ruled that it is permitted to insulate cold food on Shabbat. There is no concern that this will lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi subsequently said to those who asked him about this issue: I retract my previous statement; the elder, Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling on this topic, and I defer to his ruling.

אמר רב פפא בא וראה כמה מחבבין זה את זה דאילו רבי יוסי קיים היה כפוף ויושב לפני רבי דהא ר' ישמעאל בר' יוסי ממלא מקום אבותיו הוה והיה כפוף ויושב לפני רבי וקא אמר כבר הורה זקן Rav Pappa says: Come and see how much they loved each other. As, had Rabbi Yosei still been alive, he would have been subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student, as Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was his fathers’ replacement, i.e., he was as great a Torah scholar as his forebears, and he was subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student. And, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The elder has already issued a ruling on this topic, and he deferred to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling.

א"ר אושעיא מאי דכתיב (זכריה יא, ז) ואקח לי (את) שני מקלות לאחד קראתי נועם ולאחד קראתי חובלים נועם אלו ת"ח שבארץ ישראל שמנעימין זה לזה בהלכה חובלים אלו ת"ח שבבבל שמחבלים זה לזה בהלכה This demonstrates what Rabbi Oshaya says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And I took for myself two staves; the one I called Graciousness, and the other I called Binders” (Zechariah 11:7)? “Graciousness”; these are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are gracious to one another in discussions of halakha. They treat each other with honor and love, as demonstrated in the statements of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. “Binders [ḥovelim]”; these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who injure [shemeḥabbelim] each other in discussions of halakha, i.e., they speak harshly to each other when they disagree.

(זכריה יא, יג) ויאמר (אלי) אלה [שני] בני היצהר העומדים וגו' ושנים זיתים עליה יצהר אמר רבי יצחק אלו ת"ח שבא"י שנוחין זה לזה בהלכה כשמן זית ושנים זיתים עליה אלו ת"ח שבבבל שמרורין זה לזה בהלכה כזית Similarly, it is stated: “Then he said to me: These are the two anointed ones, that stand by the Lord of the whole earth” (Zechariah 4:14), and it is stated: “And two olive trees by it, one upon the right side of the bowl, and the other upon its left side” (Zechariah 4:3). With regard to the expression “anointed ones,” Rabbi Yitzḥak says: These are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are pleasant to each other in discussions of halakha like olive oil, which is not bitter. The verse “and two olive trees by it” should be interpreted as follows: These are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who are bitter to each other in discussions of halakha like an olive.

(זכריה ה, ט) ואשא עיני וארא והנה שתים נשים יוצאות ורוח בכנפיהם ולהנה כנפים ככנפי החסידה ותשאנה האיפה בין השמים ובין הארץ ואומר אל המלאך הדובר בי אנה המה מוליכות את האיפה ויאמר אלי לבנות לה בית בארץ שנער א"ר יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יוחי זו חנופה וגסות הרוח שירדו לבבל The Gemara interprets another verse in Zechariah: “Then I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then I said to the angel that spoke with me: To where do they take the measure? And he said to me: To build her a house in the land of Shinar” (Zechariah 5:9–11). Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: This measure refers to flattery and arrogance that descended to Babylonia, i.e., Shinar.

וגסות הרוח לבבל נחית והאמר מר עשרה קבין גסות ירדו לעולם תשעה נטלה עילם ואחת כל העולם כולו The Gemara asks: And did arrogance descend to Babylonia? But doesn’t the Master say: Ten kav of arrogance descended to the world; Eilam took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one?

אין לבבל נחית ואישתרבובי דאישתרבב לעילם דיקא נמי דכתיב לבנות לה בית בארץ שנער ש"מ The Gemara answers: Yes, it descended to Babylonia, and it made its way to Eilam. The language of the verse is also precise, as it is written: “To build her a house in the land of Shinar,” which indicates that the original intention was to build a house in Babylonia, but it was not built there. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that arrogance did not remain in Babylonia.

והאמר מר סימן לגסות הרוח עניות ועניות לבבל נחית מאי עניות עניות תורה דכתיב (שיר השירים ח, ח) אחות לנו קטנה ושדים אין לה אמר ר' יוחנן זו עילם שזכתה ללמוד ולא זכתה ללמד The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the Master say: A sign of arrogance is poverty? And poverty descended to Babylonia, not to Eilam. The Gemara answers: To what kind of poverty is this referring? It is poverty with regard to Torah, which was characteristic of Eilam. As it is written: “We have a little sister, and she has no breasts” (Song of Songs 8:8), and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This refers to Eilam, whose inhabitants merited to learn Torah but did not merit to teach it. They did not produce Torah scholars capable of imparting their wisdom to others.

מאי בבל א"ר יוחנן בלולה במקרא בלולה במשנה בלולה בתלמוד (איכה ג, ו) במחשכים הושיבני כמתי עולם אמר ר' ירמיה זה תלמודה של בבל: The Gemara asks: What is the homiletic interpretation of the word Babylonia? Rabbi Yoḥanan says, as a tribute to the Jewish community of Babylonia and its Torah scholars: It means mixed with Bible, mixed with Mishna, and mixed with Talmud. Other Sages had a different opinion of the Torah in Babylonia: With regard to the verse: “He has made me dwell in dark places, as those that have been long dead” (Lamentations 3:6), Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is the Talmud of Babylonia, which is not as clear as the Talmud of Eretz Yisrael.

מתני׳ אמר לו נאמן עלי אבא נאמן עלי אביך נאמנים עלי שלשה רועי בקר ר"מ אומר יכול לחזור בו וחכמים אומרים אינו יכול לחזור בו MISHNA: If one litigant says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract it, but must accept their verdict.

היה חייב לחבירו שבועה ואמר לו דור לי בחיי ראשך ר"מ אומר יכול לחזור בו וחכ"א אין יכול לחזור בו: Similarly, one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, which is done while grasping a sacred object, and the latter said to him: Instead of taking an oath, merely vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and demand that the other litigant take an oath, as he is obligated to do by Torah law. And the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer. Once he has agreed to accept a vow, which is of less severity than an oath, he cannot retract his agreement.

גמ׳ אמר רב דימי בריה דרב נחמן בריה דרב יוסף כגון דקבליה עליה בחד GEMARA: Rav Dimi, son of Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Yosef, says: The case of a litigant who accepts his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge is referring to where the litigant accepted this relative upon himself as one of the judges in a court of three, where the other two judges are fit. It is not referring to where he accepted him as the sole judge.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל מחלוקת במחול לך אבל באתן לך דברי הכל יכול לחזור בו ורבי יוחנן אמר באתן לך מחלוקת Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the claimant had said to the defendant: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you if my father or your father rules as judge to that effect, and the claimant subsequently wishes to retract his offer. But in a case where it is the defendant who said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge, everyone agrees that he can retract his offer. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge.

איבעיא להו באתן לך מחלוקת אבל במחול לך דברי הכל אין יכול לחזור בו או דילמא בין בזו ובין בזו מחלוקת A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is the dispute only with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer? Or perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case?

תא שמע דאמר רבא מחלוקת באתן לך אבל במחול לך דברי הכל אין יכול לחזור בו The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from that which Rava says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer.

אי אמרת בשלמא באתן לך מחלוקת אבל במחול לך דברי הכל אין יכול לחזור בו רבא דאמר כרבי יוחנן אלא אי אמרת בין בזו ובין בזו מחלוקת רבא דאמר כמאן Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan too, the dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer; this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha? His statement is in accordance with neither Shmuel’s opinion nor Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion.

רבא טעמא דנפשיה קאמר The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps Rava is stating his own explanation of the dispute.

איתיביה רב אחא בר תחליפא לרבא היה חייב לחבירו שבועה ואמר לו דור לי בחיי ראשך רבי מאיר אומר יכול לחזור בו וחכמים אומרים אין יכול לחזור בו Rav Aḥa bar Taḥlifa raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from the latter clause in the mishna: With regard to one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, and the latter said to him: Vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer.

Daf 24b

מאי לאו באותן הנשבעין ולא משלמין דהוה ליה כמחול לך What, is it not referring to those who take an oath and do not pay, i.e., cases where the defendant is obligated to take an oath that the claim against him is false, and he is thereby exempt from paying? Accordingly, it is the claimant who suggests that the defendant take a vow instead, which is the same as saying: If you take a vow, the money I claim you owe is forgiven you.

לא באותן הנשבעין ונוטלין דהוה ליה כאתן לך The Gemara rejects this objection: No, it is referring to those who take an oath and collect a debt. There are cases where it is the claimant who is obligated to take an oath, and he then collects the money that he claims. In a case where the defendant suggests that the claimant take a vow instead, it is the same as saying: If you take a vow I will give you what you claim.

והא תנא ליה רישא The Gemara challenges: But according to Rava’s interpretation, the mishna already taught the halakha in a case where the defendant says: I will give you, in the first clause, where the defendant accepts unfit judges.

תנא תולה בדעת אחרים ותנא תולה בדעת עצמו The Gemara answers: The mishna taught in the former clause a case where the defendant makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, namely, his father or the father of the claimant; and the mishna taught in the latter clause a case where he makes the outcome dependent on the claimant’s own decision.

וצריכא דאי תנא תולה בדעת אחרים בהא קאמר ר' מאיר דמצי הדר ביה משום דלא גמר ומקני דאמר מי יימר דמזכי ליה אבל תולה בדעת עצמו אימא מודי להו לרבנן And it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases, since if the mishna taught only the case where he makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, one might reason that specifically in this case Rabbi Meir says that he can retract his acceptance of the unfit judges. This is because he presumably did not resolve to transfer the money if these judges deem him liable, as he must have said to himself: Who will say that the judges will rule in favor of the claimant? But in a case where he makes the outcome dependent on the claimant’s own decision by suggesting that he take a vow, say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that the defendant cannot retract his commitment to pay.

ואי אשמעינן בהא בהא קאמרי רבנן אבל בההיא אימא מודו ליה רבנן לר' מאיר צריכא And conversely, if the mishna would teach us only this latter case, where the defendant suggests that the claimant take a vow, one might reason that specifically in this case the Rabbis say that he cannot retract his offer; but in that former case, where he makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that he can retract his acceptance of the unfit judges. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases.

אמר ריש לקיש מחלוקת לפני גמר דין אבל לאחר גמר דין דברי הכל אין יכול לחזור בו ור' יוחנן אמר לאחר גמר דין מחלוקת § Reish Lakish says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerns whether or not one can retract his acceptance of unfit judges before the verdict is issued. But after the verdict is issued, everyone agrees that one cannot retract his acceptance, as he has already been deemed liable. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute concerns whether or not one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued.

איבעיא להו לאחר גמר דין מחלוקת אבל לפני גמר דין דברי הכל יכול לחזור בו או דילמא בין בזו ובין בזו מחלוקת A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is the dispute over whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, but before the verdict is issued, everyone agrees that he can retract his acceptance? Or perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case.

ת"ש דאמר רבא קיבל עליו קרוב או פסול לפני גמר דין יכול לחזור בו לאחר גמר דין אין יכול לחזור בו The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma, as Rava says: If one accepted a relative upon himself as a judge or witness, or if he accepted one who is disqualified for another reason from serving as a judge or a witness, he can retract his acceptance before the verdict is issued. He cannot retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued.

אי אמרת בשלמא לאחר גמר דין מחלוקת אבל לפני גמר דין ד"ה יכול לחזור בו רבא דאמר כרבי יוחנן ואליבא דרבנן אלא אי אמרת בין בזו בין בזו מחלוקת רבא דאמר כמאן Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan too, the dispute concerns whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, but before the verdict is issued everyone agrees that one can retract his acceptance; then this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and according to the opinion of the Rabbis. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha? His statement is in accordance with the opinion of neither Reish Lakish nor Rabbi Yoḥanan.

אלא לאו ש"מ לאחר גמר דין מחלוקת ש"מ Rather, must we not conclude from Rava’s statement that the dispute is over whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from Rava’s statement that this is so.

שלח ליה רב נחמן בר רב (חסדא) לרב נחמן בר יעקב ילמדנו רבינו לפני גמר דין מחלוקת או לאחר גמר דין מחלוקת והלכה כדברי מי שלח ליה לאחר גמר דין מחלוקת והלכה כדברי חכמים Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Ḥisda, sent the following question to Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov: Our teacher, instruct us: Does the dispute concern whether or not one can retract his acceptance before the verdict is issued, or does the dispute concern whether or not one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued? And furthermore, in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov sent to him in response: The dispute concerns whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, and the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

רב אשי אמר הכי שלח ליה באתן לך מחלוקת או במחול לך מחלוקת והלכה כדברי מי שלח ליה באתן לך מחלוקת והלכה כדברי חכמים Rav Ashi says a different version of the question and answer: This is the question that Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Ḥisda, sent to Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov: Is the dispute with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, or is the dispute with regard to a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you? And furthermore, in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? Rav Naḥman bar Ya’akov sent this response to him: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, and the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

בסורא מתני הכי בפומבדיתא מתני הכי א"ר חנינא בר שלמיה שלחו ליה מבי רב לשמואל ילמדנו רבינו לפני גמר דין וקנו מידו מאי שלח להו אין לאחר קניין כלום: In Sura they teach that previous version of the question and the answer. In Pumbedita they teach this following version: Rav Ḥanina bar Shelemya says that they sent the following question from Rav’s study hall to Shmuel: Our teacher, instruct us: In a case where one litigant wishes to retract his acceptance of the judges before the verdict is issued, and the other litigant had performed a formal act of acquisition with him giving legal power to the acceptance, what is the halakha? Shmuel sent them in response: Nothing can be retracted after an act of acquisition was performed.

מתני׳ ואלו הן הפסולין המשחק בקובי' והמלוה בריבית ומפריחי יונים וסוחרי שביעית MISHNA: And these on the following list are the ones who are disqualified by the Sages from bearing witness due to their unseemly behavior, as they are considered wicked individuals guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice [bekubbiyya] for money, and one who lends money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, which may be eaten but may not be sold as an object of commerce.

אמר רבי שמעון בתחילה היו קורין אותן אוספי שביעית משרבו האנסין חזרו לקרותן סוחרי שביעית Rabbi Shimon said: Initially, people would call them: Gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year. Once the tax collectors grew abundant they would then call them: Merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, as the Gemara will explain.

א"ר יהודה אימתי בזמן שאין להן אומנות אלא הוא אבל יש להן אומנות שלא הוא כשרין: Rabbi Yehuda said: When are the people listed above disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one, although they also make money by these inappropriate means, they are fit to bear witness.

גמ׳ משחק בקוביא מאי קא עביד אמר רמי בר חמא משום דהוה אסמכתא ואסמכתא לא קניא GEMARA: With regard to one who plays with dice for money, what is he doing that disqualifies him from bearing witness? Rami bar Ḥama says: He is disqualified because gambling is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], as one who gambles does not have conclusive consent to pay when he loses since he plays under the assumption that he will win. And as an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, the one who wins takes money that is not legally his, and is considered a robber.

רב ששת אמר כל כי האי גוונא לאו אסמכתא היא אלא לפי שאין עסוקין ביישובו של עולם Rav Sheshet says: Any case like this is not an asmakhta. In a game of dice both sides realize that they might lose, and consent at the outset to pay if that happens. Rather, those who play dice are disqualified because they are not involved in settling the world, i.e., in productive occupations that demand hard work. Since they do not realize the effort required of most people to earn a living they might not be scrupulous about other people’s money, and their testimony cannot be relied upon.

מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו דגמר אומנותא אחריתי The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the explanations of Rami bar Ḥama and Rav Sheshet? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where the dice player learns another occupation, and is involved in that occupation as well. According to Rav Sheshet, since he has a productive occupation he is fit to bear witness. According to Rami bar Ḥama, since he is considered a robber, as the money he gains from gambling is not legally his, he is disqualified.

(ותנן) א"ר יהודה אימתי בזמן שאין להן אומנות אלא הוא אבל יש להן אומנות שלא הוא (הרי זה) כשרים אלמא טעמא דמתניתין משום יישובו של עולם הוא קשיא לרמי בר חמא The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama: But we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: When are they disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one they are fit to bear witness. Apparently, the reason that the mishna disqualifies these individuals from bearing witness is that they are not involved in settling the world, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama.

וכי תימא פליגי רבנן עליה דר' יהודה והא"ר יהושע בן לוי כל מקום שא"ר יהודה And if you would say this is not difficult, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, this would be a problem as well. But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: Any place where Rabbi Yehuda says in the corpus of the Mishna:

Daf 25a

אימתי ובמה אינו אלא לפרש דברי חכמים When does this halakha apply, or: In what case is this statement said, he intends only to explain the statement of the Rabbis, not to disagree with them?

רבי יוחנן אמר אימתי לפרש ובמה לחלוק ודכולי עלמא אימתי לפרש הוא Granted, Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and says that only the term: When does this halakha apply, indicates that Rabbi Yehuda intends to explain the previous statement of the Rabbis, but the term: In what case is this statement said, indicates that he intends to disagree. But according to everyone, the term when indicates that he intends to explain the previous statement. This is difficult according to Rami bar Ḥama.

גברא אגברא קא רמית מר סבר פליגי ומר סבר לא פליגי The Gemara responds: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? One Sage, Rami bar Ḥama, holds that Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree even when Rabbi Yehuda employs the term: When does this halakha apply, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and similarly Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that they do not disagree.

ולא פליגי והתניא בין שיש לו אומנות שלא הוא בין שאין לו אומנות אלא הוא הרי זה פסול The Gemara asks: And do they not disagree? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Whether a dice player has an occupation other than this one, or whether he does not have an occupation other than this one, he is disqualified from bearing witness? This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama.

ההיא רבי יהודה משום רבי טרפון היא דתניא רבי יהודה אומר משום רבי טרפון לעולם אין אחד מהן נזיר לפי שלא נתנה נזירות אלא להפלאה: The Gemara answers: That baraita is not the opinion of the Rabbis in the mishna, but rather it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Tarfon. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: In the case where two people quarreled and each of them declared that if the other is right he will become a nazirite, actually, neither of them becomes a nazirite, as naziriteship is determined only by explicitness. A vow of naziriteship does not take effect if the individual does not vow clearly and with certitude. Here too, Rabbi Tarfon maintains that one who bets on games played with dice is considered a thief, as one can acquire the money of another legally only if the latter gives it to him with certain and conclusive intent. Since one who plays dice is not certain that he will have to pay the other player, as he considers it likely that he will win, the transaction is an asmakhta and is legally invalid.

מלוה ברבית: אמר רבא לוה ברבית פסול לעדות והאנן תנן מלוה ברבית מלוה הבאה ברבית § The mishna teaches that one who lends money with interest is disqualified from bearing witness. Rava says: One who borrows money with interest is disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that specifically one who lends money with interest is disqualified? The Gemara answers: The reference in the mishna is to a loan that comes with interest, and is teaching that all those who participate in the loan are disqualified.

בר ביניתוס אסהידו ביה תרי סהדי חד אמר קמי דידי אוזיף בריביתא וחד אמר לדידי אוזפי בריביתא פסליה רבא לבר ביניתוס The Gemara recounts: Two witnesses testified about bar Binittos. One said: He lent money with interest in my presence, and the other one said: He lent me money with interest. Rava rendered bar Binittos disqualified from bearing witness and from serving as a judge.

והא רבא הוא דאמר לוה ברבית פסול לעדות והוה ליה רשע והתורה אמרה אל תשת רשע עד The Gemara asks: But isn’t Rava the one who said that one who borrows money with interest is disqualified from bearing witness? And accordingly the latter witness is considered a wicked man, as by his own account he borrowed money with interest from bar Binittos, and the Torah states: Do not place a wicked man as a witness (see Exodus 23:1). Consequently, the testimony of that witness cannot be accepted, and bar Binittos should not have been disqualified.

רבא לטעמיה דאמר רבא אדם קרוב אצל עצמו ואין אדם משים עצמו רשע The Gemara answers: Rava conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rava says: A person is his own relative and a person cannot make himself wicked. Consequently, the part of the testimony that relates to the witness’s own status is not accepted, while the part that relates to bar Binittos is accepted.

ההוא טבחא דאישתכח דנפקא טריפתא מתותי ידיה פסליה רב נחמן ועבריה אזל רבי מזיה וטופריה סבר רב נחמן לאכשוריה There was a certain slaughterer about whom it was discovered that a tereifa, an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months, emerged from his possession. In other words, he sold tereifa meat without informing the customers of its status. Rav Naḥman disqualified him from bearing witness and removed him from his position as a slaughterer. The slaughterer subsequently went and grew his fingernails and his hair out of remorse over his actions. Rav Naḥman thought to deem him fit again for bearing witness, as he clearly repented, and once someone repents for his sin, his status as a valid witness is restored.

א"ל רבא דילמא איערומי קא מערים Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Perhaps he is employing artifice, pretending to repent in order to be reinstated as a slaughterer.

אלא מאי תקנתיה כדרב אידי בר אבין דאמר רב אידי בר אבין החשוד על הטריפות אין לו תקנה עד שילך למקום שאין מכירין אותו ויחזיר אבידה בדבר חשוב או שיוציא טריפה מתחת ידו בדבר חשוב משלו: Rather, what is his remedy? It is in accordance with the statement of Rav Idi bar Avin; as Rav Idi bar Avin says: One who is suspected of selling tereifot to others has no remedy to restore his fitness to bear witness until he goes to a locale where they do not recognize him and returns a lost item of substantial value that he finds, or removes his own tereifa meat of significant value from his possession. These actions demonstrate that he has repented, as he is willing to lose money for a mitzva. By contrast, if he does so in a place where he is recognized his fitness in not reinstated based on these actions, as perhaps he performed them only in order to be reinstated.

ומפריחי יונים: מאי מפריחי יונים הכא תרגומה אי תקדמיה יונך ליון רבי חמא בר אושעיא אמר ארא § Among the list of those who are disqualified from bearing witness the mishna teaches: And those who fly pigeons. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Those who fly pigeons? Here, in Babylonia, the Sages explained that these are people who gamble on pigeon races, i.e., one says to another: If your pigeon reaches a certain destination before my pigeon I will give you such and such an amount of money. Rabbi Ḥama bar Oshaya says: It is referring to an ara, i.e., one who trains his pigeons to bring him pigeons from the property of others.

מאן דאמר אי תקדמיה יונך ליון מ"ט לא אמר ארא The Gemara asks: With regard to the one who says that it is referring to those who say: If your pigeon reaches a certain destination before my pigeon I will give you such and such an amount of money, what is the reason that he does not say that it is referring to an ara?

אמר לך ארא מפני דרכי שלום בעלמא The Gemara answers: He could say to you that an ara is not considered a robber, as the pigeons that he has his pigeons bring do not actually belong to those from whom he takes them. Rather, they dwell on the property of these individuals, and it is prohibited to take them merely due to the ways of peace.

ומאן דאמר ארא מאי טעמא לא אמר אי תקדמיה יונך ליון אמר לך היינו משחק בקוביא The Gemara asks: And with regard to the one who says that the mishna is referring to an ara, what is the reason that he does not say that it is referring to one who says: If your pigeon reaches a certain destination before my pigeon I will give you such and such an amount of money? The Gemara answers: He could say to you that this individual is the same as one who plays with dice; they both gamble on games of chance. This type of disqualification is already listed in the mishna.

ואידך The Gemara asks: And how would the other Sage, who maintains that the expression: Those who fly pigeons, is referring to those who gamble on racing their pigeons, respond to this claim?

תנא תולה בדעת עצמו ותנא תולה בדעת יונו The Gemara answers that it is necessary for the mishna to teach that both types of gamblers are disqualified. The mishna taught that one who bets on dice, making it dependent on his own decision, as he believes he has a method by which he will win, is disqualified, and the mishna taught that one who bets on pigeon races, making it dependent on the decision of his pigeon, is also disqualified.

וצריכא דאי תנא תולה בדעת עצמו התם הוא דלא גמר ומקני דאמר The Gemara explains: And both are necessary. As had the mishna taught this halakha only with regard to one who bets on dice, making it dependent on his own decision, one might reason that it is specifically there that a gambler is considered a thief. The reason for this is that he presumably does not resolve to transfer the money if he loses; as he says to himself:

Daf 25b

קים לי בנפשאי דידענא טפי אבל תולה בדעת יונו אימא לא I am certain of myself that I know better than my competitor how to win. But with regard to one who makes it dependent on the decision of his pigeon, say that he is not disqualified from bearing witness, as he is aware that he cannot guarantee the results and therefore resolves to transfer the money if he loses.

ואי תנא תולה בדעת יונו דאמר בנקשא תליא מילתא ואנא ידענא לנקושי טפי אבל תולה בדעת עצמו אימא לא צריכא And conversely, had the mishna taught this halakha only with regard to one who makes it dependent on the decision of his pigeon, one might assume that only this type of gambler is disqualified, as he presumably says: The matter, i.e., the race, is determined by knocking on trees and other objects to speed up the pigeons, and I know how to knock better than my opponent. Therefore, he does not resolve to transfer the money if he loses. But with regard to one who makes it dependent on his own decision, say that he is not disqualified from bearing witness, as the roll of the dice is pure chance. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases.

מיתיבי המשחק בקוביא אלו הן המשחקים בפיספסים ולא בפיספסים בלבד אמרו אלא אפילו קליפי אגוזים וקליפי רימונים The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that the expression: Those who fly pigeons, refers to an ara, from a baraita: With regard to the expression one who plays with dice, these are ones who play with pispasim, which are dice of marble or other types of stone. But the Sages did not mean to say that only one who plays with pispasim is disqualified from bearing witness, but rather even one who plays with nutshells or pomegranate shells is disqualified.

ואימתי חזרתן משישברו את פיספסיהן ויחזרו בהן חזרה גמורה דאפילו בחנם לא עבדי And when is their repentance accepted, so that they may resume being fit to bear witness? Once they break their pispasim and repent of them completely, abandoning this occupation entirely, where they do not do this even for nothing, i.e., they do not play even without betting.

מלוה בריבית אחד המלוה ואחד הלוה ואימתי חזרתן משיקרעו את שטריהן ויחזרו בהן חזרה גמורה אפילו לנכרי לא מוזפי The baraita continues: The expression: One who lends with interest, is referring to both the lender and the borrower. Both are disqualified. And when is their repentance accepted? Once they tear their promissory notes and repent of them completely, abandoning this occupation entirely, where they do not lend with interest even to a gentile.

ומפריחי יונים אלו שממרין את היונים ולא יונים בלבד אמרו אלא אפילו בהמה חיה ועוף ואימתי חזרתן משישברו את פגמיהן ויחזרו בהן חזרה גמורה דאפי' במדבר נמי לא עבדי The expression: And those who fly pigeons, is referring to those who induce the pigeons to behave in this manner, i.e., they train them. And the Sages did not mean to say that only those who fly pigeons are disqualified; rather, even those who do this with a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or any type of bird are disqualified. And when is their repentance accepted? Once they break their fixtures [pigmeihen] upon which they stand the competing animals, and repent completely, abandoning this occupation entirely, where they do not do this even in the wilderness, where there is no one from whom to steal.

סוחרי שביעית אלו שנושאין ונותנין בפירות שביעית ואימתי חזרתן משתגיע שביעית אחרת ויבדלו The expression: Merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, is referring to those who do business with the produce of the Sabbatical Year. And when is their repentance accepted? Once another Sabbatical Year occurs and they refrain from selling its produce or from assuming ownership of such produce.

וא"ר נחמיה לא חזרת דברים בלבד אמרו אלא חזרת ממון כיצד אומר אני פלוני בר פלוני כינסתי מאתים זוז בפירות שביעית והרי הן נתונין במתנה לעניים The baraita continues: And Rabbi Neḥemya said: The Sages did not say that verbal repentance alone is sufficient for a merchant who traded in the produce of the Sabbatical Year to be reinstated as a valid witness; rather, returning the money is also necessary. How can one return the money he gained from selling produce of the Sabbatical Year? He says: I, so-and-so the son of so-and-so, gathered, i.e., profited, two hundred dinars from trading in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, and as I gained it improperly, this sum is hereby given as a gift to the poor.

קתני מיהת בהמה בשלמא למאן דאמר אי תקדמיה יונך ליון היינו דמשכחת לה בהמה אלא למ"ד ארא בהמה בת הכי היא The Gemara explains the objection: In any event, it is taught in the baraita that the status of one who flies pigeons applies to one who uses a domesticated animal in the same manner. Granted, according to the one who says that the term: One who flies pigeons, is referring to those who race pigeons, saying: If your pigeon reaches a certain destination before my pigeon I will give you such and such an amount of money, this is how you find a parallel case of one who races a domesticated animal against another animal. But according to the one who says that the term pigeon flyer means an ara, is a domesticated animal capable of luring other domesticated animals?

אין בשור הבר וכמאן דאמר שור הבר מין בהמה הוא דתנן שור הבר מין בהמה הוא רבי יוסי אומר מין חיה The Gemara answers: Yes, the baraita states this with regard to the wild ox, which can be lured away from its owner’s property because it is not a completely domesticated animal. And the baraita states this according to the one who says that the wild ox is a species of domesticated animal, as we learned in a mishna (Kilayim 8:6): The wild ox is a species of domesticated animal. But Rabbi Yosei says: It is a species of undomesticated animal.

תנא הוסיפו עליהן הגזלנין והחמסנין § It was taught in a baraita: The Sages added the robbers and those who force transactions, i.e., who compel others to sell to them, to the list of those who are disqualified from bearing witness.

גזלן דאורייתא הוא לא נצרכא אלא למציאת חרש שוטה וקטן The Gemara asks: A robber is disqualified by Torah law; why is it necessary for the Sages to add such an individual to the list? The Gemara answers: It is necessary only to add one who steals an item found by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who acquire those items by rabbinic law only (see Gittin 59b). Since these people are not considered halakhically competent, by Torah law they do not acquire an item that they find, and consequently one who steals such an item from them is not in violation of a prohibition by Torah law.

מעיקרא סבור מציאת חרש שוטה וקטן לא שכיחא אי נמי מפני דרכי שלום בעלמא כיון דחזו דסוף סוף ממונא הוא דקא שקלי פסלינהו רבנן One possibility is that taking such an item is prohibited by rabbinic law because it constitutes robbery. Nevertheless, initially the Sages did not disqualify such an individual from bearing witness, as they assumed that the case of an item found by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is uncommon. Therefore, it was not deemed necessary to disqualify one who robs them of such an item. Alternatively, the Sages may have reasoned that taking such an item is prohibited merely on account of the ways of peace, i.e., to foster peace and prevent strife and controversy, and is not considered actual robbery. When they realized that ultimately these people were taking property from others and were likely to perform actual robbery, the Sages disqualified them.

החמסנין מעיקרא סבור דמי קא יהיב אקראי בעלמא הוא כיון דחזו דקא חטפי גזרו בהו רבנן Similarly, with regard to those who force transactions, initially the Sages did not disqualify them, as they assumed that their behavior could be excused for two reasons: They would pay money for the items they took, and their forcing transactions was merely occasional; it was not a common practice. When they realized that these people were snatching items regularly, the Sages issued a decree that they are disqualified from bearing witness.

תנא עוד הוסיפו עליהן הרועים הגבאין והמוכסין § It is taught in a baraita: The Sages further added the following to the list of those disqualified from bearing witness: The shepherds, who shepherd their animals in the fields of others and are therefore considered like robbers; the collectors of government taxes, who collect more than the amount that people are legally liable to pay; and the customs officials, who collect customs in an illegal manner.

רועים מעיקרא סבור אקראי בעלמא הוא כיון דחזו דקא מכווני ושדו לכתחילה גזרו בהו רבנן: הגבאין והמוכסין מעיקרא סבור מאי דקיץ להו קא שקלי כיון דחזו דקא שקלי יתירא פסלינהו The Gemara explains: Shepherds were not disqualified at first, as the Sages initially assumed it was merely incidental that they would let their animals graze in the fields of others. When they realized that they would intentionally send the animals to the fields of others from the outset, the Sages issued a decree that they are disqualified from bearing witness. The collectors of taxes and the customs officials were not disqualified at first, as the Sages initially assumed they would take the set amount they were instructed to take. When they realized that these officials were taking more than that, they disqualified them.

אמר רבא רועה שאמרו אחד רועה בהמה דקה ואחד רועה בהמה גסה Rava says: The shepherd that the Sages said is disqualified from bearing witness is referring to both a shepherd of small livestock and a herder of large livestock.

ומי אמר רבא הכי והאמר רבא רועה בהמה דקה בא"י פסולין בחוצה לארץ כשרין רועה בהמה גסה אפילו בא"י כשרין ההוא במגדלים איתמר The Gemara asks: And does Rava say this? But doesn’t Rava say: Shepherds of small livestock in Eretz Yisrael are disqualified from bearing witness, as besides grazing in others’ fields they also ruin the land? Outside of Eretz Yisrael they are fit to bear witness. By contrast, herders of large livestock, even in Eretz Yisrael, are fit to bear witness. The Gemara answers: That was stated with regard to those who raise their animals on their own land, without herding them on land in the public domain.

ה"נ מסתברא מדקתני נאמנין עלי שלשה רועי בקר מאי לאו לעדות The Gemara suggests a proof for Rava’s opinion that a herder of large livestock is also disqualified: This too stands to reason, from the fact that the mishna (24a) teaches that a litigant may state: Three cattle herders are trusted for me in court; by inference, cattle herders are generally disqualified. What, is it not with regard to bearing witness that cattle herders are disqualified, in accordance with Rava’s statement?

לא לדינא דיקא נמי דקתני שלשה רועי בקר ואי לעדות שלשה למה לי The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is with regard to sitting in judgment. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise according to this interpretation, as it teaches: Three cattle herders are trusted for me. And if it is with regard to bearing witness, why do I need three witnesses? Two are enough.

ואלא מאי לדינא מאי איריא שלשה רועי בקר כל בי תלתא דלא גמרי דינא נמי The Gemara asks: But rather, with regard to what are cattle herders disqualified? If it is with regard to sitting in judgment, why does the mishna mention specifically three cattle herders? Any three people who did not study halakha are also disqualified from serving as a court.

הכי קאמר אפילו הני דלא שכיחי ביישוב The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: The litigants can accept as judges even those cattle herders who dwell in the fields and do not frequent the settled area, and are therefore not proficient in the ways of business.

א"ר יהודה סתם רועה פסול סתם גבאי כשר Rav Yehuda says: An ordinary shepherd is disqualified from bearing witness unless the court recognizes him as one who does not let his animals graze in the fields of others. An ordinary tax collector is fit unless the court determines he is one who collects more than people are obligated to pay.

אבוה דר' זירא עבד גביותא תליסר שנין כי הוה אתי ריש נהרא למתא כי הוה חזי רבנן א"ל (ישעיהו כו, כ) לך עמי בא בחדריך כי הוה חזי אינשי דמתא אמר ריש נהרא אתא למתא והאידנא נכיס אבא לפום ברא וברא לפום אבא The Gemara relates a story about a tax collector: The father of Rabbi Zeira collected taxes for thirteen years. When the head tax collector of the river region would come to the city, Rabbi Zeira’s father would prepare the residents ahead of time. When he would see the rabbis, he would say to them as a hint: “Come, my people, enter into your chambers, and shut your doors behind you; hide yourself for a little moment until the indignation has passed” (Isaiah 26:20). He said this so that the head tax collector would not see the rabbis, and it would be possible to lower the taxes of the city. When he would see the ordinary people of the city, he would say to them: Beware, as the head tax collector of the river region is coming to the city, and will now slaughter the father, i.e., take one’s money, before the son, and the son before the father.

Daf 26a

ומיגנזו כולי עלמא כי אתי א"ל ממאן נבעי And everyone would hide. When the head tax collector would arrive, Rabbi Zeira’s father would say to him: From whom shall I request taxes? The city is scarcely populated, and only a small sum of taxes should be imposed on it.

כי ניחא נפשיה א"ל שקולו תליסר מעי דציירי לי בסדינאי והדרו ליה לפלניא דשקלתינהו מיניה ולא איצטריכו לי: When he was dying, he said to those standing around his deathbed: Take thirteen ma’a that are tied up in my sheet and return them to so-and-so, as I took them from him but I did not need them to pay the tax. Evidently, some tax collectors are God-fearing, and should not be disqualified.

א"ר שמעון בתחילה היו קוראין אותן אוספי שביעית: § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon said: Initially people would call them: Gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year. Once the tax collectors grew abundant they would then call them: Merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year.

מאי קאמר אמר רב יהודה ה"ק בתחילה היו אומרים אוספי שביעית כשרין סוחרין פסולין The Gemara asks: What is he saying? What is Rabbi Shimon teaching in this statement? Rav Yehuda says this is what he is saying: Initially the Sages would say that gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year, i.e., those who gather a large quantity of produce of the Sabbatical Year for themselves, are fit to bear witness, but merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year are disqualified.

משרבו ממציאי מעות לעניים ואזלי עניים ואספי להו ומייתו חזרו לומר אחד זה ואחד זה פסולין Once those who would offer money to the poor to gather produce for them grew abundant, and the poor would go and gather the produce for those who hired them and bring it to them, then gathering a large amount of produce of the Sabbatical Year was considered a business. The Sages then said that both this category, gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year, and that category, merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, are disqualified.

קשו בה בני רחבה האי משרבו האנסים משרבו התגרין מיבעי ליה The children of the Sage Raḥava had a difficulty with this explanation, as accordingly this phrase: Once the tax collectors grew abundant, is inaccurate; the mishna should have stated: Once the merchants grew abundant.

אלא בתחילה היו אומרים אחד זה ואחד זה פסולין משרבו האנסין ומאי נינהו ארנונא כדמכריז רבי ינאי פוקו וזרעו בשביעית משום ארנונא חזרו לומר אוספין כשרין סוחרין פסולין Rather, Rabbi Shimon’s statement should be explained differently, as follows: Initially the Sages would say that both this category, gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year, and that category, merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, are disqualified. Once the tax collectors grew abundant it was permitted to gather the produce of the Sabbatical Year. And what tax did they collect? Arnona, which was a heavy tax on property collected both during the Sabbatical Year and in other years, placing pressure on those observing the Sabbatical Year. As Rabbi Yannai proclaimed: Go out and sow the fields during the Sabbatical Year due to the arnona that you must pay. Once this happened, the Sages then said: Gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year are fit to bear witness, as they were no longer viewed as transgressors, but merchants who trade in this produce are still disqualified.

ר' חייא בר זרנוקי ור"ש בן יהוצדק הוו קאזלי לעבר שנה בעסיא פגע בהו ריש לקיש איטפיל בהדייהו אמר איזיל איחזי היכי עבדי עובדא § The Gemara recounts an incident connected tangentially to the discussion concerning the Sabbatical Year: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Zarnokei and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak were going to intercalate the year in Asya, as circumstances did not enable them to perform the intercalation of the year in Eretz Yisrael. Reish Lakish met them and joined with them. He said: I will go see how they do the deed, i.e., how the intercalation is performed practically.

חזייה לההוא גברא דקא כריב אמר להן כהן וחורש אמרו לו יכול לומר אגיסטון אני בתוכו Reish Lakish saw a certain man plowing a field. He said to the other Sages: Look at this priest who is plowing during the Sabbatical Year. They said to him that he could say in his own defense: I am a hired worker [agiston] in the field, which belongs to a gentile. Therefore, it is permitted.

תו חזייה לההוא גברא דהוה כסח בכרמי אמר להן כהן וזמר א"ל יכול לומר לעקל בית הבד אני צריך אמר להם הלב יודע אם לעקל אם לעקלקלות Reish Lakish further saw a certain man pruning vines in the vineyards. He said to the other Sages: Look at this priest who is pruning vines during the Sabbatical Year. They said to him that he could say: I need the branches to make a bale [ekel ] for my olive press, i.e., a basket to hold olives for pressing. Since he is not pruning the vines for agricultural purposes but to use the branches, it is permitted for him to do so in the Sabbatical Year. Reish Lakish said to them, in a play on words: The heart knows whether he is doing so for a bale [ekel ], or whether he is saying this as deceit [la’akalkalot].

הי אמר להו ברישא אילימא הא קמייתא אמר להו ברישא הא נמי לימרו אגיסטון אני בתוכו אלא הא אמר ליה ברישא והדר אמר להו הך The Gemara asks: Which did he say to them first? Which incident occurred first? If we say that first he said to them that first exclamation, that a priest was plowing the field, let them say to him in this latter incident too, in which someone was pruning vines, that he could claim in his defense: I am a hired worker in the field. This would have been a better justification than claiming he needed the branches. Rather, apparently first he said to them this exclamation, that a priest was pruning vines, and only then he said to them that a priest was plowing the field.

מאי שנא כהן משום דחשידי אשביעית The Gemara asks: What is different about a priest? Why did Reish Lakish assume the man was a priest? The Gemara answers: It is because priests are suspected of desecrating the Sabbatical Year.

(דתנן) סאה תרומה שנפלה למאה סאין של שביעית תעלה פחות מיכן ירקבו As we learned in a baraita: A se’a of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, that fell into a hundred se’a of Sabbatical Year produce and was indistinguishable, is nullified, i.e., it no longer has the status of teruma, and can be eaten until the time that Sabbatical Year produce must be removed from one’s possession. If it fell into a lesser quantity of Sabbatical Year produce, the entire mixture must be left to rot, as it is prohibited for non-priests to partake of teruma.

והוינן בה אמאי ירקבו ימכרנו לכהן בדמי תרומה חוץ מדמי אותה סאה And we discussed it: Why must the produce rot? Let its owner sell it to a priest in accordance with its value as teruma, which is less expensive than regular produce because it can be eaten only by priests, and except for the value of that se’a of teruma that fell in, which the owner is required to give to a priest for free. The priest may then partake of the produce, treating the entire mixture as though it has the sanctity of teruma, and both the priest and the owner will benefit.

ואמר רב חייא משמיה דעולא זאת אומרת נחשדו כהנים אשביעית And Rav Ḥiyya said in the name of Ulla: That is to say, i.e., one can infer from the fact that one is not permitted to sell the mixture to a priest, that priests are suspected of desecrating the Sabbatical Year by partaking of its produce after the time it must be removed from one’s possession. They did so because they considered it theirs, the same as teruma, as both mitzvot pertain to the produce of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, produce of the Sabbatical Year should not be given or sold to priests. Similarly, Reish Lakish assumed that those who desecrated the Sabbatical Year were priests.

אמרו טרודא הוא דין כי מטו להתם סליקו לאיגרא שלפוה לדרגא מתותיה After Reish Lakish continually bothered them with his comments, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Zarnokei and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak said: This one is a nuisance. In order to rid themselves of him, when they reached the location where they intended to intercalate the year, they went up to the roof and took the ladder out from under them so that he would stay below and would not be able to join them.

אתא לקמיה דרבי יוחנן א"ל בני אדם החשודין על השביעית כשרין לעבר שנה Sometime later, Reish Lakish came before Rabbi Yoḥanan. Reish Lakish said to him: Are people who are suspected of desecrating the Sabbatical Year fit to intercalate the year? He believed that the two Sages who were sent to intercalate the year treated the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year with disrespect.

הדר אמר לא קשיא לי מידי דהוה אשלשה רועי בקר ורבנן אחושבנייהו סמוך Reish Lakish then said in response to his own question: This is not difficult for me; just as the Sages once intercalated the year in accordance with the assessment of three cattle herders (see 18b), which was permitted, as the Sages depended not on the assessment of the cattle herders but on their own calculation, perhaps here too the Sages depended on their own calculations and not on the decision of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Zarnokei and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak.

והדר אמר לא דמי התם הדור אימנו רבנן ועברוה לההוא שתא הכא קשר רשעים הוא וקשר רשעים אינו מן המנין אמר רבי יוחנן דא עקא Reish Lakish changed his mind and then said: It is not similar. There, in the case of the cattle herders, afterward the Sages were counted, i.e., they made a decision, and intercalated that year themselves. Here, by contrast, it is a conspiracy of wicked people, as the Sages who intercalated the year are disqualified from doing so; and a conspiracy of wicked people is not counted. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This problem you raise is troublesome.

כי אתו לקמיה דרבי יוחנן אמרו ליה קרי לן רועי בקר ולא אמר ליה מר ולא מידי אמר להו ואי קרי לכו רועי צאן מאי אמינא ליה When Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Zarnokei and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak subsequently came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, after hearing about his discussion with Reish Lakish, they said to him bitterly: Reish Lakish referred to us as cattle herders, and the Master said nothing to him in response? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them dismissively: And even if he had referred to you as shepherds, who are disqualified from bearing witness in addition to being disqualified from serving as judges, what should I have said to him? He is correct.

מאי קשר רשעים שבנא הוה דריש בתליסר רבוותא חזקיה הוה דריש בחד סר רבוותא § The Gemara asks: What is the source of the halakha that a conspiracy of wicked people is not counted as part of a group? The Gemara answers: Shebna, a steward and a minister in King Hezekiah’s court, was a prominent and influential figure. He would teach Torah to an audience of 130,000 followers, whereas King Hezekiah would teach Torah to an audience of merely 110,000 followers.

כי אתא סנחריב וצר עלה דירושלים כתב שבנא פתקא שדא בגירא שבנא וסיעתו השלימו חזקיה וסיעתו לא השלימו שנאמר (תהלים יא, ב) כי הנה הרשעים ידרכון קשת כוננו חצם על יתר When Sennacherib came and besieged Jerusalem, Shebna wrote a note and shot it over the wall with an arrow. It read: Shebna and his camp have appeased Sennacherib and are ready to surrender; Hezekiah and his camp have not appeased Sennacherib. As it is stated in allusion to this incident: “For behold, the wicked bend the bow, they have made ready their arrow upon the string” (Psalms 11:2).

הוה קא מסתפי חזקיה אמר דילמא חס ושלום נטיה דעתיה דקוב"ה בתר רובא כיון דרובא מימסרי אינהו נמי מימסרי בא נביא ואמר לו (ישעיהו ח, יב) לא תאמרון קשר לכל אשר יאמר העם הזה קשר כלומר קשר רשעים הוא וקשר רשעים אינו מן המנין Hezekiah was afraid. He said: Perhaps, God forbid, the opinion of the Holy One, Blessed be He, will follow the majority; and since the majority have submitted to the Assyrians, even those who have not submitted will also be submitted into their hands. The prophet Isaiah then came and said to him: “Say not: A conspiracy, concerning all of which this people say: A conspiracy” (Isaiah 8:12). Meaning, it is a conspiracy of wicked people, and a conspiracy of wicked people is not counted. Therefore, although they are many, they are not considered the majority.

הלך לחצוב לו קבר בקברי בית דוד בא נביא ואמר לו (ישעיהו כב, טז) מה לך פה ומי לך פה כי חצבת לך פה קבר הנה ה' מטלטלך טלטלה גבר Shebna went to carve out a grave for himself among the graves of the house of David, as he thought that the kingship would be given to him. The prophet Isaiah then came and said to him: “What have you here, and whom have you here, that you have carved out a grave for yourself here? You, who have carved yourself out a grave on high, and hollowed a habitation for yourself in the rock? Behold, the Lord will make you wander like the wandering of a man; and he will wind you round and round” (Isaiah 22:16–17).

אמר רב טלטולא דגברא קשי מדאיתתא The Gemara mentions tangentially: Rav says that the wandering of a man is more difficult than that of a woman. He derives it from the expression “like the wandering of a man.”

(ישעיהו כב, יז) ועטך עטה אמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא מלמד שפרחה בו צרעת כתיב הכא ועטך עטה וכתיב התם (ויקרא יג, מה) ועל שפם יעטה With regard to the phrase: “And he will wind you round and round,” Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: This teaches that Shebna developed leprosy; it is written here: “And he will wind you round and round [ve’otkha ato],” and it is written there, in the Torah, with regard to a leper: “And the leper in whom the plague is, his clothes shall be torn, and the hair of his head shall go loose, and he shall cover his upper lip [ya’te]” (Leviticus 13:45). The Hebrew word for upper lip is from the same root as the verb in the verse cited from Isaiah.

(ישעיהו כב, יח) צנוף יצנפך צנפה כדור אל ארץ רחבת ידים וגו' תנא הוא ביקש קלון בית אדניו לפיכך נהפך כבודו לקלון כי הוה נפיק איהו אתא גבריאל אחדיה לדשא באפי משרייתיה The Gemara continues to interpret the prophecy about Shebna: “He will violently roll and toss you like a ball into a large country; there you shall die, and there shall be the chariots of your glory, you shame of your lord’s house” (Isaiah 22:18). A baraita taught: He, Shebna, desired shame for his master’s house; therefore his glory turned to shame. This is what happened to him: When he was going out of the gate of Jerusalem to submit to the Assyrians, the angel Gabriel came and held the gate in front of his camp so they could not follow him. Consequently, he went out by himself.

Daf 26b

אמרו ליה משירייתך היכא אמר הדרו בי אמרו ליה אם כן אחוכי קא מחייכת בן נקבוהו בעקביו ותלאוהו בזנבי סוסיהם והיו מגררין אותו על הקוצים ועל הברקנין The Assyrians said to him: Where is your camp? Shebna said: They backed out on me. They said to him: If so, you are mocking us; you led us to believe that behind you stands a large camp of supporters. They punched holes in his heels and hung him by the tails of their horses, and dragged him on the thorns and on the bristles.

אמר רבי אלעזר שבנא בעל הנאה היה כתיב הכא (ישעיהו כב, טו) לך בא אל הסוכן הזה וכתיב התם (מלכים א א, ב) ותהי לו סוכנת Rabbi Elazar says: Shebna was a hedonist. It is written here: “Go, get yourself to this steward [hasokhen], to Shebna, who is over the house” (Isaiah 22:15), and it is written there with regard to Abishag the Shunammite: “And let her be a companion [sokhenet] to him; and let her lie in your bosom, that my lord the king may get heat” (I Kings 1:2).

(ואומר) (תהלים יא, ג) כי השתות יהרסון צדיק מה פעל רב יהודה ורב עינא חד אמר אילו חזקיה וסיעתו נהרסים צדיק מה פעל וחד אמר אילו בית המקדש יהרס צדיק מה פעל ועולא אמר אילו מחשבותיו של אותו רשע אינן נהרסות צדיק מה פעל And following the aforementioned verse: “For behold, the wicked bend the bow, they have made ready their arrow upon the string,” the next verse states: “When the foundations are destroyed, what has the Righteous One done?” (Psalms 11:3). Rav Yehuda and Rav Eina interpret this verse. One says: If Hezekiah and his camp are destroyed, what has the Righteous One done? And one says: If the Temple should be destroyed, what has the Righteous One done? And Ulla says: If the intentions of that wicked person, Sennacherib, are not destroyed, what has the Righteous One done?

בשלמא למאן דאמר אילו מחשבותיו של אותו רשע היינו דכתיב כי השתות יהרסון The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that the verse means: If the intentions of that wicked person are not destroyed, what has the Righteous One done, this is the reason that it is written: “When the foundations [hashatot] are destroyed,” i.e., the intentions of Sennacherib are destroyed, as intentions are called shatot.

ולמ"ד בית המקדש נמי דתנן אבן היתה שם מימות נביאים הראשונים ושתייה היתה נקראת And according to the one who says it is referring to the Temple, the word hashatot is also clear, as we learned in a mishna (Yoma 53b): There was a stone in the Holy of Holies from the days of the early prophets, David and Samuel, who laid the groundwork for construction of the Temple, and this stone was called the Foundation [shetiyya] Stone.

אלא למ"ד חזקיה וסיעתו היכא אשכחן צדיקי דאיקרו שתות But according to the one who says that the reference is to Hezekiah and his camp, where do we find that righteous people are referred to as shatot?

דכתיב (שמואל א ב, ח) כי לה' מצוקי ארץ וישת עליהם תבל ואיבעית אימא מהכא (ישעיהו כח, כט) הפליא עצה הגדיל תושיה The Gemara answers: As it is written: “He raises up the poor out of the dust, He lifts up the needy from the dung hill, to make them sit with princes and inherit the throne of glory; for the pillars of the earth are the Lord’s, and He has set [vayyashet] the world upon them” (I Samuel 2:8). Since the righteous are considered the foundations of the world, this verse is interpreted in reference to them. And if you wish, say instead that it is derived from here: “Wonderful is His counsel, and great His wisdom [tushiyya]” (Isaiah 28:29). Accordingly, the wise, righteous people are called shatot.

א"ר חנן למה נקרא שמה תושיה מפני שהיא מתשת כחו של אדם דבר אחר תושיה שניתנה בחשאי מפני השטן דבר אחר תושיה דברים של תוהו שהעולם משותת עליהם With regard to the latter verse, Rabbi Ḥanan says: Why is the Torah called tushiyya? Because it weakens [matteshet] the strength of a person who engages in its study. Alternatively, tushiyya can be interpreted as an abbreviation: That it was given in secret [shenittena beḥashai]. This was done because of the Satan, lest he claim that the Jewish people are not worthy of it. Alternatively, tushiyya can be interpreted as an abbreviation for amorphous [tohu] matters that seem foreign and strange, but nevertheless the world is founded [meshotat] on them.

אמר עולא מחשבה מועלת אפילו לד"ת שנאמר (איוב ה, יב) מפר מחשבות ערומים ולא תעשינה ידיהם תושיה Ulla says: Thought, i.e., concern, is effective [mo’elet] in disturbing even the study of statements of Torah, as it is stated: “He frustrates the thoughts of the crafty, so that their hands can perform nothing [velo…tushiyya]” (Job 5:12), and tushiyya is a reference to Torah.

אמר רבה אם עסוקין לשמה אינה מועלת שנאמר (משלי יט, כא) רבות מחשבות בלב איש ועצת ה' היא תקום עצה שיש בה דבר ה' היא תקום לעולם: Rabba says: If people engage in Torah study for its own sake, concern is not effective; as it is stated: “There are many devices in a man’s heart; but the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand” (Proverbs 19:21). Rabba interprets this to mean that a counsel that has in it the statement of the Lord shall rise forever and cannot be disturbed.

אמר ר' יהודה אימתי: א"ר אבהו א"ר אלעזר הלכה כרבי יהודה § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: When are all these people, e.g., gamblers and those who lend with interest, disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation other than this one. Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Elazar says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

וא"ר אבהו אמר רבי אלעזר כולן צריכין הכרזה בבית דין And Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Elazar says: All of these require a proclamation in the court. In other words, one is disqualified only after it is proclaimed in court that he was found guilty of this behavior.

רועה פליגי בה רב אחא ורבינא חד אמר בעי הכרזה וחד אמר לא בעי הכרזה With regard to a shepherd, who is also disqualified from bearing witness, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree. One says that he requires a proclamation that he is disqualified due to his being a shepherd, and one says that he does not require a proclamation and is disqualified automatically.

בשלמא למ"ד לא בעי הכרזה היינו דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב סתם רועה פסול אלא למ"ד בעי הכרזה מאי סתם רועה פסול The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that he does not require a proclamation, this is what Rav Yehuda means when he says that Rav says that an ordinary shepherd is disqualified, i.e., he does not require a specific proclamation. But according to the one who says that a shepherd requires a proclamation, what is meant by the statement that an ordinary shepherd is disqualified?

דבסתמא מכרזינן עליה The Gemara answers: It means that in an ordinary case, the court proclaims about him that he is disqualified for having engaged in shepherding. If the court discovers that he regularly engages in this trade, it proclaims immediately that he is disqualified, and the court does not need to prove that he shepherds his flock in the fields of others.

ההיא מתנה דהוו חתימי עלה תרין גזלנין סבר רב פפא בר שמואל לאכשורה דהא לא אכרזינן עלייהו The Gemara recounts: With regard to a certain deed of gift on which the names of two robbers were signed, Rav Pappa bar Shmuel thought to deem it valid despite the identity of the witnesses, as the court did not proclaim about them that they were disqualified.

אמר ליה רבא נהי דבעינן הכרזה בגזלן דרבנן בגזלן דאורייתא מי בעינן הכרזה: Rava said to him: Although we require a proclamation in order to disqualify a robber from bearing witness, this is only with regard to a robber who is guilty of stealing by rabbinic law; with regard to a robber who is guilty of stealing by Torah law, do we require a proclamation? He is disqualified automatically.

סימן דב"ר ועריו"ת גנ"ב: § The Gemara states a mnemonic for the following statements with regard to disqualification from testifying: Something; and forbidden sexual relations; and a thief.

אמר רב נחמן אוכלי דבר אחר פסולין לעדות Rav Naḥman says: Those who eat something else, a euphemism for pork, are disqualified from bearing witness. This is referring to those who accept charity from gentiles, thereby causing a desecration of God’s name. They are tantamount to wicked people guilty of monetary transgressions, as they are willing to desecrate God’s name for monetary gain.

הני מילי בפרהסיא אבל בצינעה לא ובפרהסיא נמי לא אמרן אלא דאפשר ליה לאיתזוני בצינעה וקא מבזי נפשיה בפרהסיא אבל לא אפשר ליה חיותיה הוא The Gemara comments: This statement applies with regard to taking charity from gentiles in public [befarhesya], but if one takes it in private he is not disqualified. And even if he takes it in public, we said that he is disqualified only in a case where he can sustain himself by accepting charity from gentiles in private and despite this he disgraces himself by taking it in public. But if he cannot support himself in any other manner, he is not disqualified, as it is his livelihood.

אמר רב נחמן החשוד על העריות כשר לעדות אמר רב ששת עני מרי ארבעין בכתפיה וכשר Rav Naḥman says: One who due to a rumor is suspected of engaging in forbidden sexual relations is fit to bear witness. Rav Sheshet said to him: Answer me, my Master: The halakha is that one who is rumored to have engaged in forbidden sexual intercourse receives forty lashes on his shoulders, and yet you say he is fit to bear witness?

אמר רבא ומודה רב נחמן לענין עדות אשה שהוא פסול אמר רבינא ואיתימא רב פפא לא אמרן אלא לאפוקה אבל לעיולה לית לן בה Rava said: And Rav Naḥman concedes that he is disqualified with regard to testimony about the status of a married woman, as he is clearly under suspicion with regard to this matter. Ravina says, and some say Rav Pappa says: We said he is disqualified only with regard to testimony that removes her status as a married woman, e.g., testimony that her husband died, as he is suspected of wanting her for himself. But with regard to testimony that establishes her in that status, we have no problem with it.

פשיטא מהו דתימא הא עדיפא ליה דכתיב (משלי ט, יז) מים גנובים ימתקו וגו' קמ"ל דכמה דקיימא הכי שכיחא ליה The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Why should he be suspected of lying in order to render a woman married? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that if he wants her for himself, this situation, i.e., her being married to another, is preferable to him; as it is written: “Stolen waters are sweet and bread eaten in secret is pleasant” (Proverbs 9:17), i.e., the forbidden is more pleasant than the permitted, Rav Pappa teaches us that this is not the case, as the way the woman is now, being unmarried, she is more available to him. He therefore is not motivated to testify falsely that she is married.

ואמר רב נחמן גנב ניסן וגנב תשרי לא שמיה גנב And Rav Naḥman says: A thief of Nisan and a thief of Tishrei, i.e., one who steals during the harvest seasons, is not called a thief and is therefore not disqualified from bearing witness.

הני מילי באריסא ודבר מועט ובדבר שנגמרה מלאכתו The Gemara explains: This statement applies specifically with regard to a tenant farmer, and it is a situation where he took a small amount, and in a case where it was an item whose work was completed, i.e., that needed no further processing. Since the produce was sufficiently processed, the tenant may assume that he deserves additional pay for any further labor and justify taking a small amount of the produce for his effort. Consequently, his theft is not willful.

איכריה דרב זביד חד גנב קבא דשערי ופסליה וחד גנב קיבורא דאהיני ופסליה The Gemara recounts: An incident occurred with the tenant farmers of Rav Zevid. One stole a kav of barley, and Rav Zevid disqualified him from bearing witness, and one stole a cluster of dates, and he disqualified him. The reason for their disqualification is that the quantity of produce they stole is not considered a small amount.

הנהו קבוראי דקבור נפשא ביום טוב ראשון של עצרת שמתינהו רב פפא ופסלינהו לעדות ואכשרינהו רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע The Gemara relates: There were these gravediggers, who buried a person on the first day of the festival of Shavuot, desecrating the Festival. Rav Pappa excommunicated them and then disqualified them from bearing witness, and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, deemed them fit to bear witness.

אמר ליה רב פפא והא רשעים נינהו סברי מצוה קא עבדי Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: But aren’t they wicked people, as they violated a Torah prohibition? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, answered him: They assumed they were doing a mitzva, as they were burying the dead.

והא קא משמתינא להו סברי כפרה קא עבדי לן רבנן: Rav Pappa asked: But didn’t I excommunicate them for this? Nevertheless, they continued to bury people on the Festival. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, answered: They assumed: We were not excommunicated for doing something wrong. Rather, since the mitzva of burying the dead involved desecrating the Festival, the Sages are achieving atonement for us, although our behavior was appropriate.

איתמר § A conspiring witness is one who testified that a certain incident occurred at a particular time and place, and then two other witnesses testify that he was elsewhere at that time. The Gemara discusses the disqualification of a conspiring witness from providing testimony in other cases. It was stated

Daf 27a

עד זומם אביי אמר למפרע הוא נפסל ורבא אמר מיכן ולהבא הוא נפסל concerning a conspiring witness: Abaye says: He is disqualified retroactively, from when he provided his testimony. Any testimony he may have provided after that point in time is retroactively nullified. And Rava says: He is disqualified only from that point forward, i.e., from when he was established to be a conspiring witness, but not retroactively from when he provided his testimony.

אביי אמר למפרע הוא נפסל מעידנא דאסהיד רשע הוא והתורה אמרה (שמות כג, א) אל תשת ידך עם רשע אל תשת רשע עד The Gemara explains the reasons for the two opinions: Abaye says he is disqualified retroactively because it is from that time when he testified that he is considered a wicked man. And the Torah stated: “Do not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness” (Exodus 23:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not allow a wicked man to serve as a witness.

רבא אמר מיכן ולהבא הוא נפסל עד זומם חידוש הוא מאי חזית דסמכת אהני סמוך אהני אין לך בו אלא משעת חידושו ואילך Rava says that he is disqualified only from that point forward because the disqualification of a conspiring witness is a novelty, i.e., it is not based on logic. The reason is that this is a case of two witnesses against two other witnesses, in which case the testimony of neither should be accepted. What did you see that causes you to rely on the second set of witnesses, who testify that the first set were not at the scene of the purported event? You could instead rely upon the first set of witnesses, who testify to the event, and consequently disbelieve the second set. Yet the Torah teaches that the second set of witnesses is always deemed credible and the first set is subjected to punishment as conspiring witnesses. Therefore, as the disqualification of a conspiring witness is an anomaly, you have the right to disqualify him only from the time of its novelty and onward; this counterintuitive disqualification is not applied retroactively.

איכא דאמרי רבא נמי כאביי סבירא ליה ומאי טעם קאמר מכאן ולהבא משום פסידא דלקוחות There are those who say that Rava also holds like Abaye, who says that by rights a conspiring witness should be disqualified retroactively from when he provided his testimony. And what is the reason Rava says that the witness is disqualified only from that point forward? It is due to the potential monetary loss for purchasers, whose acquisitions had been validated by these witnesses between the time of the witnesses’ first testimony and when they were rendered conspiring witnesses. If the disqualification of the witnesses were applied retroactively, as by right it should, all these transactions would be nullified, which would cause a loss to these purchasers.

מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו דאסהידו בי תרי בחד אי נמי דפסלינהו בגזלנותא The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two explanations of Rava’s opinion? After all, according to both explanations Rava did not apply the disqualification of conspiring witnesses retroactively. The Gemara explains that there is a difference between them in a case where two witnesses testify about one of the witnesses that he was not at the scene of the supposed event, and two other witnesses testify about the other witness in a similar manner. Alternatively, there is a practical difference between the two explanations in a case where two witnesses disqualified the first set of witnesses by testifying that the first set had once committed robbery and are therefore unfit to give testimony. If the reason Rava does not disqualify conspiring witnesses retroactively is that it is a novel ruling, it is limited to that case. But if it is to protect purchasers, that would apply to the disqualifications of all witnesses, not only conspiring witnesses.

ואמר ר' ירמיה מדיפתי עבד רב פפי עובדא כוותיה דרבא מר בר רב אשי אמר הלכתא כותיה דאביי And Rav Yirmeya of Difti related: Rav Pappi once performed an action, i.e., issued a practical ruling, in accordance with the opinion of Rava. Mar bar Rav Ashi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.

והלכתא כוותיה דאביי ביע"ל קג"ם The Gemara comments: And in disputes between Abaye and Rava the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, except for six cases in which the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye. They are: In the cases represented by the mnemonic yod, ayin, lamed, kuf, gimmel, mem: Unknown despair [ye’ush]; conspiring witnesses [eidim] who are disqualified retroactively; a side post [leḥi] standing alone; betrothal [kiddushin] that is not given to consummation; revealing intent with a bill of divorce [get]; and an apostate [mumar] who sins rebelliously.

מומר אוכל נבילות לתיאבון דברי הכל פסול § The Gemara cites another dispute between Abaye and Rava with regard to disqualification of a witness. Concerning a transgressor who eats carcasses, i.e., non-kosher meat, due to appetite, i.e., because he desires this type of meat, or because it is less expensive or otherwise more accessible, everyone agrees that he is disqualified from bearing witness; it is suspected that just as he transgresses the halakhot of the Torah to satisfy his appetite, so too, he is willing to testify falsely for personal benefit.

להכעיס אביי אמר פסול רבא אמר כשר With regard to one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence, Abaye says that he is disqualified from bearing witness and Rava says that he is fit.

אביי אמר פסול דהוה ליה רשע ורחמנא אמר אל תשת רשע עד ורבא אמר כשר רשע דחמס בעינן Abaye says he is disqualified because he is wicked, and the Merciful One states: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness. And Rava says that he is fit because for one to be disqualified from bearing witness we require him to be a wicked person guilty of specifically a monetary transgression [deḥamas], e.g., robbery. This is because the verse: “Do not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous [ḥamas] witness” (Exodus 23:1) alludes to such a transgression.

מיתיבי אל תשת רשע עד אל תשת חמס עד אלו גזלנין ומועלין בשבועות מאי לאו אחד שבועת שוא ואחד שבועת ממון The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s opinion from a baraita: The verse: “Do not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous [ḥamas] witness,” is interpreted in the following manner: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness; do not put one who is guilty of a monetary transgression in a position to serve as a witness. These are robbers and those who betray oaths, who are disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara explains the objection: What, doesn’t the category of those who betray oaths refer to both one who takes an oath in vain, without any monetary application, and one who falsely takes an oath concerning monetary matters? Apparently, any transgressor is disqualified, even if he did so to express insolence and not for monetary gain.

לא אידי ואידי שבועת ממון ומאי שבועות שבועות דעלמא The Gemara answers: No, both this and that oath included in the phrase in the baraita: Those who betray oaths, are oaths concerning monetary matters. And accordingly, what is the reason the baraita uses the word oaths, in the plural? The baraita is referring to oaths in general, not to multiple categories of oaths.

מיתיבי אל תשת רשע עד אל תשת חמס עד אלו גזלנין ומלוי רביות תיובתא דאביי תיובתא The Gemara raises an objection to Abaye’s opinion from a baraita: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness; do not put one who is guilty of a monetary transgression in a position to serve as a witness. These are robbers and those who lend money with interest. The fact that only monetary transgressions are mentioned does not accord with the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Abaye is indeed a conclusive refutation.

נימא כתנאי עד זומם פסול לכל התורה כולה דברי רבי מאיר ר' יוסי אומר בד"א שהוזם בדיני נפשות אבל הוזם בדיני ממונות כשר לדיני נפשות The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im: A conspiring witness is disqualified from bearing witness about any matter in the entire Torah. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: In what situation is this statement said? Where he was rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a case of capital law; since he is assumed to have testified falsely with regard to a matter of life and death, he would certainly treat less serious testimonies lightly. Therefore, he is disqualified from bearing witness about any matter. But if he was rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a case of monetary law, he is fit to testify about cases of capital law, as there is no indication that he treats this matter lightly.

נימא אביי כר"מ ורבא כר' יוסי אביי כר"מ דאמר אמרינן מקולא לחומרא ורבא דאמר כרבי יוסי דאמר מחומרא לקולא אמרינן מקולא לחומרא לא אמרינן The Gemara concludes its suggestion: Let us say that the opinion of Abaye is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the opinion of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara clarifies: The opinion of Abaye is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that we say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a minor issue one is disqualified from bearing witness even with regard to a major issue. And the opinion of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that we say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a relatively major issue one is disqualified with regard to a relatively minor issue; but we do not say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a relatively minor issue one is disqualified even with regard to a relatively major issue.

לא אליבא דר' יוסי כ"ע לא פליגי כי פליגי אליבא דר"מ The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No. Everyone agrees that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei one who is rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a minor issue is not suspected of lying about a major issue. When Abaye and Rava disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, i.e., they disagree concerning what Rabbi Meir holds.

אביי כר"מ ורבא עד כאן לא קאמר ר"מ התם אלא גבי עד זומם דממון דרע לשמים ורע לבריות אבל הכא דרע לשמים ואין רע לבריות לא Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and derives from his opinion that one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence is disqualified from bearing witness. And Rava holds that only there, with regard to a conspiring witness in a monetary case, does Rabbi Meir state his ruling that one who is rendered a conspiring witness about a minor issue is suspected of lying with regard to major issues as well. Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that he is both bad toward Heaven, having transgressed the prohibition against bearing false witness, and bad toward people, having caused another to lose money unrightfully. He is therefore suspected of testifying falsely with regard to any matter. But here, with regard to one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence, a person who is bad toward Heaven but is not proven to be bad toward people, he is not disqualified.

והלכתא כוותיה דאביי והא איתותב ההיא רבי יוסי היא The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t his opinion conclusively refuted? The Gemara answers: That baraita from which Abaye’s opinion was refuted is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and Abaye does not accept his opinion.

ותיהוי נמי ר' יוסי ר"מ ור' יוסי הלכה כר' יוסי The Gemara asks: And let it even be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. According to the principles of halakhic ruling, in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. How can his opinion be rejected?

שאני התם דסתם לן תנא כרבי מאיר והיכא סתם לן The Gemara answers: There it is different, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it is a general principle that the halakha is in accordance with rulings found in unattributed mishnayot. The Gemara asks: And where did the tanna teach us such an unattributed mishna?

כי הא דבר חמא קטל נפשא אמר ליה ריש גלותא לרב אבא בר יעקב פוק עיין בה אי ודאי קטל ליכהיוהו לעיניה אתו תרי סהדי אסהידו ביה דודאי קטל אזל איהו אייתי תרי סהדי אסהידו ביה בחד מהנך חד אמר קמאי דידי גנב קבא דחושלא וחד אמר קמאי דידי גנב The Gemara answers that this was established through a certain incident, as that incident occurred in which a man named bar Ḥama killed a person. The Exilarch said to Rav Abba bar Ya’akov: Go investigate this case, and if he certainly killed him, let them put his eyes out. Subsequently two witnesses came and testified that he certainly killed him. Bar Ḥama then went and brought two other witnesses, who testified about one of those first witnesses. One said: He stole, in my presence, a kav of barley; and one said: He stole, in my presence,

Daf

Daf 28a

אשכחן אבות לבנים ובנים לאבות § The Gemara resumes its discussion of the source for the disqualification of relatives from bearing witness. From the fact that the verse: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children” (Deuteronomy 24:16), is not phrased in the singular, i.e., A father shall not be put to death for his child, it is derived that not only are a father and child disqualified from bearing witness about one another, but closely related relatives, i.e., brothers, are also disqualified from bearing witness about each other’s children. Consequently, we found a source for the disqualification of fathers from bearing witness about their children or the children of their brothers, and for the disqualification of children from bearing witness about their fathers or their fathers’ brothers.

וכ"ש אבות להדדי And all the more so, the related fathers, e.g., brothers, are disqualified from bearing witness about each other, as they are certainly more closely related to each other than are a nephew and an uncle.

בנים לבנים מנלן But from where do we derive that one brother’s children cannot bear witness about the children of the other brother?

א"כ ליכתוב קרא לא יומתו אבות על בן מאי בנים דאפילו בנים להדדי The Gemara answers: If so, if the children of one brother can bear witness about the children of the other brother, let the verse write: The fathers shall not be put to death for the child. For what reason is “children” written, in the plural? It is derived from here that even children of brothers are disqualified from bearing witness about each other.

אשכחן בנים להדדי בנים לעלמא מנלן We found a source for the halakha that the children of brothers cannot bear witness about each other. From where do we derive that the children of brothers cannot bear witness together about others?

אמר רמי בר חמא סברא הוא כדתניא אין העדים נעשין זוממין עד שיזומו שניהן ואי ס"ד בנים לעלמא כשרין נמצא עד זומם נהרג בעדות אחיו Rami bar Ḥama says: This halakha is based on logical reasoning, and is not derived from a verse. This is as it is taught in a baraita: The witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses unless they are both rendered conspiring witnesses. And therefore, if it enters your mind that related children are fit to bear witness together about others, a conspiring witness can be found to be executed based on the testimony of his brother, i.e., his relative. Since a conspiring witness is executed for his testimony only if his co-witness is also rendered a conspiring witness, the testimony of his co-witness, who is a relative, is what causes him to be executed. This is tantamount to relatives bearing witness about each other. Therefore, relatives cannot serve as witnesses together.

אמר ליה רבא וליטעמיך הא דתנן שלשה אחין וא' מצטרף עמהן הרי אלו ג' עדיות והן עדות אחת להזמה Rava said to him: But according to your reasoning, there is a difficulty arising from that which we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 56b): If one occupied land for three years, this serves in court as proof that he is the legal owner. If three brothers testify to his three-year possession of the land, with each one testifying separately about one year, and one unrelated individual joins with each of the brothers as the second witness, these are considered three distinct testimonies and are therefore accepted by the court. If they were to be considered one testimony it would not be accepted, as brothers may not testify together. But they are considered one testimony for the purpose of rendering them conspiring witnesses. In other words, they are punished only if all six of the witnesses are rendered conspiring witnesses, and the liability is divided among them.

נמצא עד זומם משלם ממון בעדות אחיו Rava states his objection: If so, a conspiring witness can be found to be paying money due to the testimony of his brother, and nevertheless, the brothers’ testimony is not disqualified.

אלא הזמה מעלמא קאתי ה"נ הזמה מעלמא קאתי Rather, this is clearly not considered tantamount to brothers bearing witness about each other, as the rendering of one as a conspiring witness comes not from his co-witness but from others, i.e., the witnesses who testify that he had been with them. Here too, it cannot be proven logically that relatives are disqualified from bearing witness together, as the rendering of one as a conspiring witness comes from others.

אלא א"כ ליכתוב קרא ובן על אבות אי נמי הם על אבות מאי ובנים אפילו בנים לעלמא Rather, the halakha that relatives are disqualified from bearing witness together is derived from a different source: If it is so that relatives can bear witness together, let the verse write: And a child shall not be put to death for the fathers, or: They shall not be put to death for the fathers. For what reason is “and the children” written in the plural? This indicates that related children are disqualified from bearing witness even about others.

אשכחן קרובי האב קרובי האם מנלן אמר קרא אבות אבות תרי זימני אם אינו ענין לקרובי האב תניהו ענין לקרובי האם The Gemara asks: We found a source for the disqualification of paternal relatives. From where do we derive the disqualification of maternal relatives? The Gemara answers: The verse states “fathers,” “fathers,” i.e., it states the word twice. This repetition is unnecessary, as the verse could have stated: And the children shall not be put to death for them. If the superfluous word “fathers” is not needed to teach the matter of paternal relatives, as this matter was already derived from the verse, apply it to the matter of maternal relatives.

אשכחן לחובה לזכות מנא לן The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that one cannot bear witness to the detriment of his relative, as the verse states: “Shall not be put to death.” From where do we derive that one cannot testify to the benefit of his relative?

אמר קרא יומתו יומתו תרי זימני אם אינו ענין לחובה תנהו ענין לזכות The Gemara answers: The verse states the term “shall not be put to death,” “shall not be put to death,” twice. If it is not needed to teach the matter of testimony to the detriment of one’s relative, as this halakha was already derived from the verse, apply it to the matter of testimony to the benefit of one’s relative.

אשכחן בדיני נפשות בדיני ממונות מנלן The Gemara asks: We found a source for the disqualification of relatives in cases of capital law, as the verse is referring to execution. From where do we derive this halakha in cases of monetary law?

אמר קרא (ויקרא כד, כב) משפט אחד יהיה לכם משפט השוה לכם The Gemara answers that the verse states: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), which is interpreted to mean: A law that is equal for you. In other words, monetary law and capital law essentially follow the same guidelines.

אמר רב אחי אבא לא יעיד לי הוא ובנו וחתנו אף אני לא אעיד לו אני ובני וחתני § Rav says: My paternal uncle will not testify about me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law, in accordance with the ruling of the mishna. Furthermore, I will not testify about him, neither I, nor my son, nor my son-in-law.

ואמאי הו"ל שלישי בראשון ואנן שני בשני תנן שני בראשון תנן שלישי בראשון לא תנן The Gemara asks: And why, for example, can Rav’s son not testify about the brother of his father’s father? But it is the testimony of a member of the third generation with regard to a related member of the first generation, as there is a two-generation difference between them. And we learned in the mishna that a member of the second generation cannot testify about a member of the second generation, e.g., one cannot testify about the son of his paternal uncle. We also learned that a member of the second generation cannot testify about a member of the first generation, e.g., one cannot testify about his uncle. But we did not learn that a member of the third generation cannot testify about a member of the first generation.

מאי חתנו דקתני במתניתין חתן בנו The Gemara answers: In the statement that is taught in the mishna: They themselves, and their sons, and their sons-in-law are considered relatives, what is the ruling of the mishna concerning his son-in-law referring to? It is referring to the son-in-law of his son. Accordingly, the mishna disqualifies the testimony of a member of the third generation about a member of the first generation.

וליתני בן בנו The Gemara asks: But if so, let the mishna teach: And his son and the son of his son, instead of: His son-in-law. This would be a more straightforward manner of conveying the halakha with regard to a member of the third generation testifying about a member of the first generation.

מילתא אגב אורחיה קמ"ל דבעל כאשתו The Gemara answers: By mentioning his son-in-law, the mishna teaches us a matter in passing: That with regard to the different levels of familial relationships, a husband is like his wife. Therefore, there is no difference between one’s son and one’s son-in-law.

ואלא הא דתני רבי חייא שמונה אבות שהן עשרים וארבעה הני תלתין ותרתין הוי The Gemara asks: But if the mishna is referring to the son-in-law of his son, a difficulty is posed by that which Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches in a baraita: Eight fathers, i.e., eight principal relatives mentioned in the mishna, are disqualified, which are twenty-four including the son and son-in-law of each. If the mishna is referring to one’s grandson these are thirty-two, as the son, the son-in-law, and the grandson of each are included.

אלא לעולם חתנו ממש ואמאי קרי ליה חתן בנו כיון דמעלמא קאתי כדור אחר דמי The Gemara consequently rejects the explanation that the mishna is referring to the son-in-law of one’s son: Rather, the mishna is in fact referring to his actual son-in-law. And why does Rav refer to him as the son-in-law of his son, deriving from this case that a member of the third generation cannot testify about a member of the first generation? Since one’s son-in-law comes from outside the family he is considered a more distant relative than his son, as if he belongs to another generation.

אי הכי הוה ליה שלישי בשני ורב אכשר שלישי בשני The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, then the testimony of an individual with regard to the son-in-law of his father is equivalent to that of a member of the third generation with regard to a member of the second generation. And Rav is known to have deemed a member of the third generation fit to bear witness about a member of the second generation.

אלא רב דאמר כרבי אלעזר דתניא רבי אלעזר אומר כשם שאחי אבא לא יעיד לי הוא ובנו וחתנו כך בן אחי אבא לא יעיד לי הוא ובנו וחתנו Rather, Rav stated his ruling not in accordance with the mishna, but in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: Just as my paternal uncle will not testify about me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law, so too, the son of my paternal uncle will not testify about me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law. Accordingly, one cannot testify about the grandchild of his brother.

ואכתי הוה ליה שלישי בשני ורב אכשר שלישי בשני The Gemara asks: But still, according to Rabbi Elazar, the grandson of one’s uncle cannot testify about his great-great uncle, which is the testimony of a member of the third generation about a member of the second generation; and Rav deemed a member of the third generation fit to bear witness about a member of the second generation.

רב סבר ליה כוותיה בחדא ופליג עליה בחדא The Gemara answers: Rav holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar’s opinion in one case, i.e., he disqualifies testimony of a member of the third generation with regard to a member of the first generation, and he disagrees with him in one case, i.e., he does not disqualify the testimony of a member of the third generation about a member of the second generation.

מאי טעמא דרב דאמר קרא לא יומתו אבות על בנים ובנים לרבות דור אחר What is the reason for the opinion of Rav? It is as the verse states: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, and the children shall not be put to death for the fathers.” The phrase “for the children, and the children” is interpreted to include another generation, the grandchildren of one’s brother; they are also disqualified.

ורבי אלעזר על בנים אמר רחמנא פסולי דאבות שדי אבנים And Rabbi Elazar derives his opinion from the fact that the Merciful One states: “For the children,” which is interpreted to mean that the ones disqualified from bearing witness about the fathers are cast on the children as well. In other words, anyone who is disqualified from bearing witness about a father is also disqualified from bearing witness about his children.

אמר רב נחמן אחי חמותי לא יעיד לי בן אחי חמותי לא יעיד לי בן אחות חמותי לא יעיד לי ותנא תונא בעל אחותו ובעל אחות אביו ובעל אחות אמו הן ובניהן וחתניהן § Rav Naḥman says: The brother of my mother-in-law will not testify about me; the son of the brother of my mother-in-law will not testify about me; the son of the sister of my mother-in-law will not testify about me. And the tanna of the mishna also taught this halakha: His sister’s husband, and the husband of his father’s sister, and the husband of his mother’s sister, and his mother’s husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, they themselves, and their sons, and their sons-in-law. This describes the same familial relationship from the perspective of the younger generation.

אמר רב אשי כי הוינן בי עולא איבעי לן אחי חמיו מהו בן אחי חמיו מהו בן אחות חמיו מהו Rav Ashi said: When we were in Ulla’s study hall, we were asked: With regard to testifying about the brother of one’s father-in-law, what is the halakha? With regard to the son of the brother of one’s father-in-law, what is the halakha? With regard to the son of the sister of one’s father-in-law, what is the halakha?

אמר לן תניתוה אחיו ואחי אביו ואחי אמו הן ובניהן וחתניהן And Ulla said to us: You learned the answer to this question in the mishna: His brother, and his paternal uncle, and his maternal uncle, and his mother’s husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, they themselves, and their sons, and their sons-in-law. These relationships are the same as those you were asked about, from the perspective of the younger generation.

רב איקלע למזבן Rav arrived at a certain place to buy

Daf 28b

גוילי בעו מיניה מהו שיעיד אדם באשת חורגו scrolls of parchment. They asked of him there: What is the halakha as to whether a man can testify with regard to the wife of his stepson?

בסורא אמרי בעל כאשתו In Sura they say that Rav gave the following answer: A husband is considered like his wife. Since he is married to the son’s mother, the son’s wife is considered like his daughter-in-law.

בפומבדיתא אמרי אשה כבעלה דאמר רב הונא אמר רב (נחמן) מניין שהאשה כבעלה דכתיב (ויקרא יח, יד) ערות אחי אביך לא תגלה אל אשתו לא תקרב דודתך היא והלא אשת דודו היא מכלל דאשה כבעלה: In Pumbedita they say a different version of Rav’s answer: A wife is considered like her husband. Therefore, the wife of his stepson is considered like his stepson, and he cannot testify about her. As Rav Huna says that Rav Naḥman says: From where is it derived that a wife is considered like her husband? As it is written: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s brother; you shall not approach his wife: She is your aunt” (Leviticus 18:14). Isn’t she the wife of his uncle, and not his aunt, i.e., his father’s sister? It can therefore be concluded, by inference, that a wife is considered like her husband.

ובעל אמו הוא ובנו וחתנו: בנו היינו אחיו § The mishna teaches that among the relatives disqualified from testifying are his mother’s husband, he, i.e., the mother’s husband himself, and his son, and his son-in-law. The Gemara challenges: The son of his mother’s husband is the same as his brother, i.e., his half brother, and the mishna already stated that his brother is disqualified.

אמר רבי ירמיה לא נצרכא אלא לאחי האח Rabbi Yirmeya said: Mentioning this case is necessary only for the half brother of the half brother, i.e., the son of his stepfather from another woman. Although they are not biologically related, they are considered relatives.

רב חסדא אכשר באחי האח אמרו ליה לא שמיע לך הא דר' ירמיה אמר להו לא שמיע לי כלומר לא סבירא לי Rav Ḥisda deemed the testimony of the half brother of the half brother fit. The other Sages said to him: Did you not hear this statement of Rabbi Yirmeya, that the half brother of the half brother is disqualified? Rav Ḥisda said to them: I did not hear this, as if to say: I do not hold in accordance with this opinion.

אי הכי היינו אחיו תנא אחיו מן האב וקתני אחיו מן האם The Gemara asks: If so, the question asked above recurs: The son of his mother’s husband is the same as his brother. The Gemara answers: The mishna taught the case of a paternal half brother, and it also teaches the case of a maternal half brother.

אמר רב חסדא אבי חתן ואבי כלה מעידין זה ע"ז ולא דמו להדדי אלא כי אכלא לדנא § Rav Ḥisda says: The father of the groom and the father of the bride can testify about each other, and this is because they are considered to each other only like a lid on a barrel, which is not part of the barrel, but merely rests on top of it.

אמר רבה בר בר חנה מעיד אדם לאשתו ארוסה אמר רבינא לא אמרן אלא לאפוקי מינה אבל לעיולי לה לא מהימן Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: A man can testify about his betrothed wife; they are considered related only after marriage. Ravina says: We said this halakha only for testimony that removes money from her possession; but for testimony that awards her money, his testimony is not deemed credible, as he will ultimately marry her and benefit from the money.

ולא היא לא שנא לאפוקי ולא שנא לעיולי לא מהימן The Gemara rejects this opinion: But that is not so. There is no difference whether the testimony removes money from her possession, and there is no difference whether it awards her money. In both cases, his testimony is not deemed credible.

מאי דעתיך כדאמר ר' חייא בר אמי משמיה דעולא אשתו ארוסה לא אונן ולא מטמא לה וכן היא לא אוננת ולא מטמאה לו מתה אינו יורשה מת הוא גובה כתובתה The Gemara explains: What is your thinking that you deem a man fit to bear witness concerning his betrothed wife? It is as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: One does not enter acute mourning on the day of the death of his betrothed wife, nor may he become ritually impure to bury her if he is a priest. Similarly, she does not enter acute mourning for him and is not obligated to become ritually impure to bury him. If she dies, he does not inherit her property. If he dies, she collects payment of her marriage contract if he wrote it at the time of the betrothal, as it is treated like any other monetary document. Evidently, a betrothed woman is not considered related to her husband.

התם בשארו תלה רחמנא אכתי לאו שארו היא הכא משום איקרובי דעתא הוא והא איקרבא דעתיה לגבה: The Gemara comments: That halakha does not serve as a proof for the halakha of testimony, as there, with regard to ritual impurity and the like, the Merciful One renders it dependent on the question of whether the woman is “his kin” (Leviticus 21:2), and a betrothed woman is not yet his kin, as they are not yet married. But here, with regard to testimony, it is due to a sense of affinity that he is disqualified, and one feels a sense of affinity toward his betrothed.

חורגו לבדו: ת"ר חורגו לבדו רבי יוסי אומר גיסו ותניא אידך גיסו לבדו ר' יהודה אומר חורגו § The mishna teaches that his stepson alone is disqualified from bearing witness about him, but not his stepson’s sons or sons-in-law. The Sages taught in a baraita: His stepson alone is disqualified. Rabbi Yosei says: His brother-in-law. And it is taught in another baraita: His brother-in-law alone is disqualified. Rabbi Yehuda says: His stepson.

מאי קאמר אילימא הכי קאמר חורגו לבדו והוא הדין לגיסו ואתא ר' יוסי למימר גיסו לבדו והוא הדין לחורגו אלא מתני' דקתני גיסו הוא ובנו וחתנו מני לא ר' יהודה ולא ר' יוסי The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? If we say that this is what it is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, and the same is true with regard to his brother-in-law, i.e., a brother-in-law alone is disqualified but not a brother-in-law’s son or son-in-law; and Rabbi Yosei comes to say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, and the same is true with regard to his stepson; that interpretation is difficult. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna, which teaches that his brother-in-law is disqualified, and this disqualification applies to he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as they both agree that the son and son-in-law of one’s brother-in-law are not disqualified.

ואלא הכי קאמר חורגו לבדו אבל גיסו הוא ובנו וחתנו ואתא ר' יוסי למימר גיסו לבדו אבל חורגו הוא ובנו וחתנו Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, but as for his brother-in-law, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. And Rabbi Yosei comes to disagree and say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, but as for his stepson, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. Accordingly, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

ואלא הא דתני ר' חייא שמונה אבות שהן עשרים וארבעה כמאן לא כר' יוסי ולא כר' יהודה The Gemara asks: But then, in accordance with whose opinion is the baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches, that eight fathers, which are the eight principal relatives mentioned in the mishna, are disqualified, which are twenty-four including the son and son-in-law of each? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

אלא הכי קאמר חורגו לבדו אבל גיסו הוא ובנו וחתנו ואתא ר' יוסי למימר גיסו לבדו וכ"ש חורגו ומתני' ר' יהודה ברייתא ר' יוסי Rather, the above interpretation should be rejected, and this is what the baraita is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, but as for his brother-in-law, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, excluding his son and son-in-law, and all the more so his stepson. And accordingly, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוסי Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

ההיא מתנתא דהוי חתימי עלה תרי גיסי סבר רב יוסף לאכשורה דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כר' יוסי The Gemara relates: There was a certain deed of gift on which two brothers-in-law were signed. Rav Yosef thought to deem it valid, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Yosef assumed that Shmuel was referring to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion as cited in the mishna, that only relatives who are fit to inherit are disqualified, and one does not inherit from his brother-in-law.

אמר ליה אביי ממאי דרבי יוסי דמתניתין דמכשר בגיסו דילמא רבי יוסי דברייתא דפסיל בגיסו Abaye said to him: From where do you conclude that Shmuel was referring to Rabbi Yosei as cited in the mishna, who deems one’s brother-in-law fit to bear witness with or about him? Perhaps he was referring to Rabbi Yosei as cited in the baraita, who deems one’s brother-in-law, though not the latter’s son and son-in-law, disqualified?

לא ס"ד דאמר שמואל כגון אנא ופנחס דהוינן אחי וגיסי אבל גיסי דעלמא שפיר דמי Rav Yosef answered: Do not let it enter your mind that Shmuel was referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei as cited in the baraita; as Shmuel said: For example, my brother Pineḥas and I are disqualified from bearing witness about one another. Apparently, he meant to say: We are disqualified because we are both brothers and brothers-in-law, as we married two sisters. But by inference, other brothers-in-law may well testify about each other.

ודילמא כגון אנא ופנחס משום דגיסו קאמר Abaye raised an objection: But perhaps Shmuel said: For example, Pineḥas and I are disqualified, only because Pineḥas was his brother-in-law; he did not mean to say that they were disqualified only because they were brothers.

אמר ליה זיל קניה בעדי מסירה כר' אלעזר Due to Abaye’s objection, Rav Yosef said to the one holding the deed of gift: Since the witnesses signed on the document are disqualified from bearing witness together, go and acquire the gift by means of the witnesses who observed the transmission of the deed to you, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who maintains that the witnesses who effect the transaction are not those who signed the deed but rather those who observed its transmission. A legal document is signed by witnesses merely to enhance its authority, not to effect the transaction.

והאמר רבי אבא מודה רבי אלעזר במזויף מתוכו שהוא פסול א"ל זיל לא שבקי לי דאותביניה לך: Abaye raised an objection: But doesn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rabbi Elazar concedes with regard to a document whose falsification is inherent in it, that the deed is not valid despite the fact that it was properly transferred? In other words, although the signatures on a legal document are unnecessary insofar as effecting the transaction is concerned, a document that includes invalid signatures is not valid, and this is in order to prevent others from relying upon these witnesses. Rav Yosef said to the one holding the deed of gift: Go away; the rabbis do not let me give you the gift.

ר' יהודה אומר כו': א"ר תנחום א"ר טבלא אמר ר' ברונא אמר רב הלכה כרבי יהודה רבא אמר ר"נ אין הלכה כרבי יהודה וכן אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן אין הלכה כר' יהודה § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says that if the witness married the daughter of one of the litigants he is disqualified even if the daughter died, provided that he has children from her. Rabbi Tanḥum says that Rabbi Tavla says that Rabbi Beruna says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And likewise Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

איכא דמתני לה להא דרבה בר בר חנה אהא את זו דרש רבי יוסי הגלילי (דברים יז, ט) ובאת אל הכהנים הלוים ואל השופט אשר יהיה בימים ההם וכי תעלה על דעתך שאדם הולך אצל שופט שלא היה בימיו אלא זה שהיה קרוב ונתרחק There are those who teach this ruling of Rabba bar bar Ḥana with regard to this baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interpreted this verse: “And you shall come to the priests the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days” (Deuteronomy 17:9). Rabbi Yosei HaGelili asks: What is the meaning of the phrase “who will be in those days”? But will it enter your mind that a person would go to a judge that was not in his days? Rather, this is referring to one who was a relative of one of the litigants due to marriage, and then became not related. The litigant can therefore come before him only in those days that they are not related, and not while they are still related.

אמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן הלכה כר' יוסי הגלילי It is with regard to this baraita that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. The ruling is the same as in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s aforementioned statement, i.e., a relative who became unrelated is fit to bear witness or serve as a judge, but it was stated in a different context.

בני חמוה דמר עוקבא The Gemara relates: The sons of the father-in-law of Mar Ukva

Daf 29a

קרובים ונתרחקו הוו אתו לקמיה לדינא אמר להו פסילנא לכו לדינא were relatives of his and became not related to him, as Mar Ukva’s wife, who was their sister, died. They came before him for judgment. Mar Ukva said to them: I am disqualified from adjudicating for you.

אמרו ליה מאי דעתיך כר' יהודה אנן מייתינן איגרתא ממערבא דאין הלכה כרבי יהודה They said to Mar Ukva: What is your opinion according to which you disqualify yourself? Do you rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that since you have children we are still relatives? We shall bring a letter from the West, Eretz Yisrael, that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

אמר להו אטו בקבא דקירא אידבקנא בכו דלא קאמינא פסילנא לכו לדינא אלא משום דלא צייתיתו דינא: Mar Ukva said to them: Is that to say that I am stuck to you with a kav of wax [kira]? I agree that we are not considered relatives; I am saying that I am disqualified from adjudicating for you only because you will not obey the verdict, and I do not wish to participate in such judgment.

אוהב זה שושבינו וכו': § The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Yehuda, one who loves or one who hates one of the litigants is disqualified from bearing witness. One who loves one of the litigants; this is referring to his groomsman.

וכמה אמר ר' אבא אמר רבי ירמיה אמר רב כל שבעת ימי המשתה ורבנן משמיה דרבא אמרי אפילו מיום ראשון ואילך: The Gemara asks: And for how long is the groomsman disqualified? Rabbi Abba says that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rav says: Throughout all of the seven days of feasting. And the Rabbis say in the name of Rava: Even from the first day after the wedding and onward he is no longer disqualified; he is disqualified only on the wedding day itself.

השונא כל שלא דבר כו': ת"ר (במדבר לה, כג) והוא לא אויב לו יעידנו (במדבר לה, כג) ולא מבקש רעתו ידיננו § The mishna teaches: One who hates the litigant is referring to anyone who, out of enmity, did not speak with the litigant for three days. The Sages taught in a baraita: This halakha is derived from the verse: “And he was not his enemy, neither sought his harm” (Numbers 35:23), that one about whom it can be stated: “And he was not his enemy,” can testify about him. And one who “neither sought his harm” can judge him.

אשכחן שונא אוהב מנלן The Gemara asks: We found a source for the disqualification of one who hates; from where do we derive that one who loves is disqualified?

קרי ביה הכי והוא לא אויב לו ולא אוהב לו יעידנו ולא מבקש רעתו ולא טובתו ידיננו The Gemara answers that one should read into the verse like this: One about whom it can be stated: And he who was not his enemy nor one who loves him, can testify about him; and one who neither sought his harm nor his favor can judge him.

מידי אוהב כתיב אלא סברא הוא אויב מאי טעמא משום דמרחקא דעתיה אוהב נמי מקרבא דעתיה The Gemara asks: Is: One who loves, written in the verse? How can the verse be read in this manner? Rather, the extension of the disqualification to one who loves him as well is based on logical reasoning: What is the reason an enemy is disqualified from bearing witness? It is because he feels a sense of aversion toward that individual and might testify falsely against him. A similar logic can be employed with regard to one who loves, as well: He feels a sense of affinity toward that individual, and might testify falsely on his behalf.

ורבנן האי לא אויב לו ולא מבקש רעתו מאי דרשי ביה The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis, who do not agree with Rabbi Yehuda, derive from this verse: “And he was not his enemy, neither sought his harm”?

חד לדיין The Gemara answers: One part of the verse is necessary for the halakha that a judge who loves or hates one of the litigants is disqualified. The Rabbis agree with this halakha, as such a judge is naturally inclined to favor one of the litigants.

אידך כדתניא אמר רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה והוא לא אויב לו ולא מבקש רעתו מכאן לשני תלמידי חכמים ששונאין זה את זה שאין יושבין בדין כאחד: The other part of the verse is interpreted in accordance with that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: With regard to the verse “And he was not his enemy, neither sought his harm,” it is derived from here that two Torah scholars who hate each other cannot sit in judgment together as one. Because of their hatred they will come to contradict each other’s rulings unjustly.

מתני׳ כיצד בודקים את העדים היו מכניסין אותן לחדר ומאיימין עליהן ומוציאין את כל האדם לחוץ ומשיירין את הגדול שבהן MISHNA: How do the judges examine the witnesses? They bring them into a room in the courthouse and intimidate them so that they will speak only the truth. And they take all the people, other than the judges, outside so that they should not tell the other witnesses the questions the judges ask and the answers the first witness gives, and they leave only the eldest of the witnesses to testify first.

ואומרים לו אמור היאך אתה יודע שזה חייב לזה אם אמר הוא אמר לי שאני חייב לו איש פלוני אמר לי שהוא חייב לו לא אמר כלום עד שיאמר בפנינו הודה לו שהוא חייב לו מאתים זוז And they say to him: Say how exactly you know that this litigant owes money to that litigant, as the plaintiff claims. If he said: The defendant said to me: It is true that I owe the plaintiff, or if he says: So-and-so said to me that the defendant owes the plaintiff, the witness has said nothing and his testimony is disregarded. It is not valid testimony unless he says: The defendant admitted in our presence to the plaintiff that he owes him, e.g., two hundred dinars. By admitting to the debt in the presence of witnesses he renders himself liable to pay the amount that he mentioned.

ואחר כך מכניסין את השני ובודקין אותו אם נמצאו דבריהן מכוונין נושאין ונותנין בדבר And afterward they bring in the second witness and examine him in the same manner. If their statements are found to be congruent the judges then discuss the matter.

שנים אומרים זכאי ואחד אומר חייב זכאי שנים אומרים חייב ואחד אומר זכאי חייב אחד אומר חייב ואחד אומר זכאי אפילו שנים מזכין או שנים מחייבין ואחד אומר איני יודע יוסיפו הדיינין If the opinions of the judges are divided, as two judges say that the defendant is exempt from payment and one says he is liable to pay, he is exempt. If two say he is liable and one says he is exempt, he is liable. If one says he is liable and one says he is exempt, or even if two of the judges deem him exempt or two of them deem him liable, and the other one says: I do not know, the court must add more judges and then rule in accordance with the majority opinion. This is because the one who abstains is considered as though he is not a member of the court.

גמרו את הדבר היו מכניסין אותן הגדול שבדיינין אומר איש פלוני אתה זכאי איש פלוני אתה חייב After the judges finish the matter and reach a decision, they bring in the litigants. The greatest of the judges says: So-and-so, you are exempt from paying; or: So-and-so, you are liable to pay.

ומניין לכשיצא לא יאמר אני מזכה וחביריי מחייבים אבל מה אעשה שחביריי רבו עלי על זה נאמר ((ויקרא יט, טז) לא תלך רכיל בעמך ואומר) (משלי יא, יג) הולך רכיל מגלה סוד: And from where is it derived that when the judge leaves the courtroom he may not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? About this it is stated: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets, but one who is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13).

גמ׳ היכי אמרי' להו אמר רב יהודה הכי אמרינן להו (משלי כה, יד) נשיאים ורוח וגשם אין איש מתהלל במתת שקר GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the judges intimidate the witnesses. The Gemara asks: What do we say to them? Rav Yehuda says that this is what we say to them: It is stated: “As clouds and wind without rain, so is he who boasts himself of a false gift” (Proverbs 25:14). In other words, there will be no rain and no blessing from your deeds if you lie.

אמר (ליה) רבא יכלי למימר שב שני הוה כפנא ואבבא אומנא לא חליף Rava said to him: If so, false witnesses can say to themselves that they do not have to worry about this punishment, according to the folk saying: Seven years there was a famine, but over the craftsman’s door it did not pass. If the witnesses are not farmers, they do not need to worry over lack of rain. Consequently, they will disregard this concern.

אלא אמר רבא אמרינן להו (משלי כה, יח) מפץ וחרב וחץ שנון איש עונה ברעהו עד שקר Rather, Rava said that we say this verse to them: “As a hammer, and a sword, and a sharp arrow, so is a man who bears false witness against his neighbor” (Proverbs 25:18), meaning that a false witness will die prematurely.

אמר (ליה) רב אשי יכלי למימר שב שני הוה מותנא ואיניש בלא שניה לא שכיב Rav Ashi said to him: Here too, false witnesses can say to themselves a folk saying: Seven years there was a pestilence, but a man who has not reached his years did not die; everyone dies at his predestined time. Therefore, they will disregard this concern as well.

אלא אמר רב אשי אמר לי נתן בר מר זוטרא אמרינן להו סהדי שקרי אאוגרייהו זילי דכתיב (מלכים א כא, י) והושיבו שנים אנשים בני בליעל נגדו ויעידוהו לאמר ברכת אלהים ומלך: The Gemara presents another suggestion: Rather, Rav Ashi said: Natan bar Mar Zutra said to me that we say to them that false witnesses are belittled even by those who hire them, and all the more so by others; as it is written that Jezebel said when she ordered witnesses to be hired to testify against Naboth: “And set two men, base fellows, before him, and let them bear witness against him, saying: You cursed God and the king” (I Kings 21:10). Even Jezebel, who gave the orders to hire them, called them “base fellows.”

אם אמר הוא אמר לי כו' עד שיאמרו בפנינו הודה לו שהוא חייב לו מאתים זוז: § The mishna teaches that if the witness said: The defendant said to me: It is true that I owe him, his testimony is disregarded unless he says: The defendant admitted in our presence to the plaintiff that he owes him two hundred dinars.

מסייע ליה לרב יהודה דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב צריך שיאמר אתם עדיי The Gemara comments: This supports the opinion of Rav Yehuda, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The debtor needs to say to the witnesses to the loan or in his admission that he owes the creditor: You are my witnesses. Otherwise, their testimony is not valid.

איתמר נמי א"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן (מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן למחר אמר לו תנהו לי אמר) משטה אני בך פטור It was also stated that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, i.e., you owe me one hundred dinars, and the other said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give it to me, if the other then said to him: I was teasing you, i.e., I did not mean it seriously when I said that I owed it to you, the respondent is exempt.

תניא נמי הכי מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן למחר אמר לו תנהו לי אמר לו משטה אני בך פטור This is also taught in a baraita: If one said to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give it to me, if the other then said to him: I was teasing you, the respondent is exempt.

ולא עוד אלא אפילו הכמין לו עדים אחורי גדר ואמר לו מנה לי בידך אמר לו הן רצונך שתודה בפני פלוני ופלוני אמר לו מתיירא אני שמא תכפיני לדין למחר אמר לו תניהו לי אמר לו משטה אני בך פטור And moreover, the respondent is exempt even in a case where the claimant hid witnesses for the respondent behind a fence so that the respondent would not see them, and said to him: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the respondent said to him: Yes, and the claimant then said to him: Do you wish to admit the debt in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so? And the respondent said to him: I am afraid to do so, lest you compel me to go to judgment, where, based on their testimony, you will be given the right to forcibly take the money from me whenever you want. But between you and me, I admit that I owe you. And the next day the claimant said to him: Give me the one hundred dinars that you admitted to owing me, and the respondent said to him: I was teasing you. The respondent is exempt because he can claim that he stated his admission only to appease the claimant temporarily, and did not mean to actually admit to owing the money, as he did not know that there were witnesses present.

ואין טוענין למסית But the judges do not advance a claim on behalf of an inciter, i.e., one who is accused of inciting others to idol worship.

מסית מאן דכר שמיה חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני אם לא טען אין טוענין לו ובדיני נפשות אע"ג דלא טען טוענין לו ואין טוענין למסית The Gemara asks: An inciter? Who mentioned anything about it? This matter was not discussed in the baraita. The Gemara answers: The baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: If the defendant did not advance a claim that he was teasing the plaintiff, the judges do not advance this claim for him. Apparently, he stated his admission seriously. But in cases of capital law, even if the defendant did not advance any claim on his own behalf, the judges advance a claim on his behalf. But the judges do not advance claims on behalf of an inciter.

מאי שנא מסית אמר ר' חמא בר חנינא מפירקיה דרבי חייא בר אבא שמיע לי שאני מסית דרחמנא אמר (דברים יג, ט) לא תחמול ולא תכסה עליו The Gemara asks: What is different about an inciter, that the court does not seek to deem him innocent? Rabbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina says: I heard at the lecture of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba that an inciter is different, as the Merciful One states concerning him: “Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9). In this unique case, the court is not required to try to deem him innocent.

אמר רבי שמואל בר נחמן אמר רבי יונתן מניין שאין טוענין למסית מנחש הקדמוני דא"ר שמלאי הרבה טענות היה לו לנחש לטעון ולא טען ומפני מה לא טען לו הקב"ה לפי שלא טען הוא Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥman says that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where is it derived that the judges do not advance a claim on behalf of an inciter? It is derived from the incident of the primordial snake who tempted Eve; he was the first inciter. As Rabbi Simlai says: The snake could have advanced many claims on its own behalf, but it did not claim them. And for what reason did the Holy One, Blessed be He, not advance these claims for it, deeming the snake exempt from punishment? Because the snake did not advance these claims itself.

מאי הוה ליה למימר דברי הרב ודברי תלמיד דברי מי שומעין דברי הרב שומעין The Gemara asks: What could he have said? The Gemara answers: The snake could have said that it is not to blame, as when there is a contradiction between the statement of the teacher and the statement of the student, whose statement should one listen to? One should listen to the statement of the teacher. Since God instructed Adam and Eve not to eat from the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, Adam and Eve should have heeded God’s words and not those of the snake.

אמר חזקיה מניין שכל המוסיף גורע שנאמר (בראשית ג, ג) אמר אלהים לא תאכלו ממנו ולא תגעו בו Ḥizkiyya says: From where is it derived that anyone who adds, subtracts? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated that Eve said: “God has said: You shall not eat of it, neither shall you touch it” (Genesis 3:3), whereas God had actually rendered prohibited only eating from the tree but not touching it, as it is stated: “But of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, you shall not eat of it” (Genesis 2:17). Because Eve added that there was a prohibition against touching the tree, the snake showed her that touching it does not cause her to die, and she consequently sinned by eating from it as well.

רב משרשיא אמר מהכא (שמות כה, י) אמתים וחצי ארכו Rav Mesharshiyya says that the idea that one who adds, subtracts can also be proven from here: “Two cubits [amatayim] and a half shall be its length” (Exodus 25:10). Without the letter alef at the beginning of the word amatayim, it would be read matayim, which would mean two hundred cubits. The addition of the alef therefore reduces this term to only two cubits.

רב אשי אמר (שמות כו, ז) עשתי עשרה יריעות Rav Ashi says another example: In the verse: “Eleven [ashtei esrei] curtains” (Exodus 26:7), without the letter ayin at the beginning of the phrase it would read shtei esrei, twelve. Therefore, the additional letter ayin reduces the amount from twelve to eleven.

אמר אביי לא שנו אלא דאמר משטה אני בך אבל אמר Abaye says: With regard to the case of one who denies a debt to which he admitted in the presence of hidden witnesses, the Sages taught that he is exempt only in a case where he says: I was teasing you. But if he says:

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לא היו דברים מעולם הוחזק כפרן These matters never occurred, i.e., I never admitted to this, the defendant assumes the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts, as the witnesses heard his admission. Consequently, he is not trusted to take an oath that he is exempt.

(אמר) רב פפא בריה דרב אחא בר אדא הכי אמרינן משמיה דרבא כל מילי דכדי לא דכירי אינשי Rav Pappa, son of Rav Aḥa bar Adda, says: This is what we say in the name of Rava: The defendant is not rendered a liar, because people do not remember all frivolous matters. Since the admission was not made seriously, perhaps the defendant forgot the incident. Therefore, his denial of its having occurred was not necessarily an outright lie.

ההוא דאכמין ליה עדים לחבריה בכילתיה אמר ליה מנה לי בידך אמר ליה הן אמר עירי ושכבי ליהוו עלך סהדי א"ל לא אמר רב כהנא הא אמר ליה לא The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who hid witnesses in the canopy above his bed to hear the statement of another. That certain man said to him: I have one hundred dinars in your possession. The latter said to him: Yes. The claimant then said: Let those awake and those asleep bear witness about you, hoping to induce him to agree to this testimony, as the respondent might assume that everyone was asleep. The latter said to him: No. When the matter came to court Rav Kahana said: Since he said no to him, his admission did not render him liable.

ההוא דאכמין עדים בקיברא לחבריה א"ל מנה לי בידך אמר ליה הן חיי ומיתי ליהוו עלך סהדי אמר ליה לא א"ר שמעון הא א"ל לא The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain man who hid witnesses in a grave to hear the statement of another. That certain man said to him: I have one hundred dinars in your possession. The latter said to him: Yes. The claimant then said: Let the living and the dead bear witness about you. The respondent said to him: No. Rabbi Shimon said: Since he said no to him, his admission did not render him liable.

אמר רבינא ואיתימא רב פפא שמע מינה מהא הא דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב צריך שיאמר אתם עדיי לא שנא כי אמר לוה ולא שנא כי אמר מלוה ושתיק לוה טעמא דאמר לוה לא אבל אי שתיק הכי נמי Ravina said, and some say Rav Pappa said it: Conclude from it that with regard to that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, that one needs to say to the witnesses of the admission: You are my witnesses, there is no difference whether the debtor said it, and there is no difference whether the creditor said it and the debtor remained silent. The inference is that the reason the Sages deemed the purported debtor exempt in the above cases is that the debtor explicitly said no, i.e., that he does not accept the witnesses, but had he remained silent his admission would have indeed rendered him liable.

ההוא דהוה קרו ליה קב רשו אמר מאן מסיק בי אלא פלוני ופלוני אתו תבעוהו לדינא קמיה דרב נחמן The Gemara relates: There was a certain man whom people called: A kav of debts, as everyone claimed debts from him, who once said: Who can claim debts from me, other than so-and-so and so-and-so? I do not owe money to as many as assumed. Those whom he admitted that he owed came and took him to judgment before Rav Naḥman to claim what he owed them, and he responded in court that his admittance was in jest.

א"ר נחמן אדם עשוי שלא להשביע את עצמו Rav Naḥman said: A person is prone to make false statements so as not to make himself appear sated, i.e., it is possible that he might say falsely in public that he owes money in order that he should not be considered wealthy. Therefore, as long as he has not made a proper admission that he owes a specific sum to a specific individual, he is not liable.

ההוא דהוו קרו ליה עכברא דשכיב אדינרי כי קא שכיב אמר פלניא ופלניא מסקו בי זוזי בתר דשכיב אתו תבעינהו ליורשין The Gemara relates: There was a certain man whom people called: A mouse that lies on dinars, as he was a miser who did not benefit from his money, like a mouse that sits and safeguards gold dinars. This man said on his deathbed: So-and-so and so-and-so claim dinars from me. After he died, they came and sued the heirs.

אתו לקמיה דר' ישמעאל ברבי יוסי אמר להו כי אמרי' אדם עשוי שלא להשביע את עצמו הני מילי מחיים אבל לאחר מיתה לא They came to judgment before Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei. He said to them: When we say a person is prone to make false statements so as not to make himself appear sated, this statement applies to an admission during his lifetime. But after death, i.e., on his deathbed, this does not apply; rather, we presume he told the truth.

פרעו פלגא תבעינהו לדינא לאידך פלגא אתו לקמיה דרבי חייא אמר להו כשם שאדם עשוי שלא להשביע את עצמו כך אדם עשוי שלא להשביע את בניו אמרו ליה ניזיל וניהדר אמר להו כבר הורה זקן The heirs paid half the amount of the claim. The claimants then sued them for the other half. They came to judgment before Rabbi Ḥiyya. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: Just as a person is prone to make false statements so as not to make himself appear sated, so too, a person is prone to make false statements so as not to make his sons appear sated. One might claim falsely on his deathbed that he owes money so that his children will not be considered wealthy. Therefore, there is no room for a claim against the heirs. The heirs then said to him: If so, let us go and overturn the former verdict, and retrieve the amount we paid the claimants. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: The elder, i.e., Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling in this case, and it is not in my power to overturn his ruling.

הודה בפני שנים וקנו מידו כותבין ואם לאו אין כותבין § If one made an admission in the presence of two witnesses that he owes money and they performed a formal act of acquisition with him to verify the admission, the witnesses can write a record of the admission in a document and sign it, thereby granting the creditor more rights. But if they did not perform a formal act of acquisition they may not write a record of the admission in a document, as the debtor presumably wants the loan to retain its status as a loan by oral agreement, which grants fewer rights to the creditor than a loan with a promissory note.

בפני שלשה ולא קנו מידו רב (אמי) אמר כותבין ורב אסי אמר אין כותבין הוה עובדא וחש לה רב להא דרב אסי If he made an admission in the presence of three witnesses and they did not perform a formal act of acquisition with him, Rav Ami says: They can write a record of the admission in a document. Since the admission was made in the presence of three individuals, who are considered a court, it is permitted for a court to write its verdicts. And Rav Asi says: They may not write it in a document; perhaps the debtor intended for them to serve only as witnesses, not as a court. There was an incident in which a person admitted his debt before three witnesses, and Rav was concerned for this opinion of Rav Asi, and ruled that they may not write a record of the admission.

אמר רב אדא בר אהבה הא אודיתא זימנין כתבינן וזימנין לא כתבינן כניפי ויתבי לא כתבינן כנפינהו איהו כתבינן Rav Adda bar Ahava says: With regard to this document of admission, sometimes we write it and sometimes we do not write it. If the three witnesses were gathered and sitting when the debtor made his admission before them, we do not write it, as perhaps he did not intend for them to serve as a court. But if the debtor gathered them, we write the document of admission, as the fact that he took care to bring three people and not just two proves that he intended for them to serve as a court.

רבא אמר אפילו כנפינהו איהו לא כתבינן עד דאמר להו הוו עלי דייני Rava says: Even if he gathered them we do not write it, unless he says to them: Be my judges.

מר בר רב אשי אמר אפילו אמר הוו עלי דייני לא כתבינן עד דקבעי דוכתא ושלחי ומזמני ליה לבי דינא Mar bar Rav Ashi says: Even if he says: Be my judges, we do not write it unless they establish a place for judgment and send messengers and summon him to court. Unless the entire procedure of an admission in court is implemented, the debtor may not have intended that they serve as a court with regard to this matter.

הודה במטלטלי וקנו מידו כותבין ואם לאו אין כותבין במקרקעי ולא קנו מידו מאי אמימר אמר אין כותבין מר זוטרא אמר כותבין והלכתא כותבין If he made an admission with regard to movable property that he owes, and the witnesses performed a formal act of acquisition with him, they can write a record of the admission in a document; but if they did not perform a formal act of acquisition they may not write a record of the admission. But if he made an admission with regard to land, and they did not perform a formal act of acquisition with him, what is the halakha? Is it considered as though an act of acquisition was performed, as land is always available for collection? Ameimar says: They may not write it. Mar Zutra says: They may write it. And the halakha is that they may write it.

רבינא איקלע לדמהריא א"ל רב דימי בר רב הונא מדמהריא לרבינא מטלטלי ואיתנהו בעינייהו מאי אמר ליה כמקרקעי דמו רב אשי אמר כיון דמחסרי גוביינא לא Ravina happened to come to Damharya. Rav Dimi bar Rav Huna of Damharya said to Ravina: If one makes an admission that he owes movable property that is extant, i.e., it is available to be taken immediately, what is the halakha? Should it be considered like land, as it is similarly available for collection, and therefore the witnesses can write a record of the admission? Ravina said to him: It is considered like land. Rav Ashi says: Since it still lacks collection, i.e., it has not been physically transferred from one party to the other, it is not considered like land, and the witnesses may not write a record of the admission unless the debtor asks them to write it.

ההיא אודיתא דלא הוה כתוב בה אמר לנא כתבו וחתמו והבו ליה אביי ורבא דאמרי תרוייהו היינו דריש לקיש § With regard to a certain document of admission in which the following statement was not written: He, the one making the admission, said to us: Write a deed, and sign it, and give it to the creditor, Abaye and Rava both say that this is a case in which the principle of Reish Lakish is applicable.

דאמר ריש לקיש חזקה אין העדים חותמין על השטר אא"כ נעשה גדול As Reish Lakish says: There is a presumption that witnesses do not sign on the document unless the deal was transacted with each party being an adult, even if it is not mentioned explicitly in the document that the witnesses verified this. This reflects the principle that a document is not written by a scribe and signed by witnesses unless they know that the action to which it attests was performed appropriately. In light of this, the fact that a certain detail is missing from the wording of the document does not prove that the detail did not take place, as the action was presumably performed properly. Consequently, a document of admission lacking the sentence: He said to us: Write a deed, and sign it, and give it to the creditor, is valid.

מתקיף לה רב פפי ואיתימא רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע מי איכא מידי דאנן לא ידעינן וספרי דבי דינא ידעי Rav Pappi objects to this, and some say it is Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who raises this objection: Is there anything that we, the Sages, do not know, and the scribes of the court do know? Since not all of the Sages are aware that the witnesses of an admission cannot write a deed of admission unless the one making the admission asks them to, the scribes certainly cannot be expected to ensure that this condition is fulfilled.

שאילינהו לספרי דאביי וידעי לספרי דרבא וידעי The Gemara relates that Abaye’s scribes were asked whether they were aware of this halakha, and they answered that they were aware of it. Rava’s scribes were also asked, and they were also aware of it. Apparently, since writing documents is their profession, scribes are aware of the relevant halakhot.

ההיא אודיתא דהוה כתב ביה דוכרן פיתגמי The Gemara recounts: There was a certain document of admission in which it was written that it was a record of the proceedings that took place in the presence of the witnesses,

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וכל לישני דבי דינא ולא הוה כתב בה במותב תלתא הוינא וחד ליתוהי and all of the formulations of an enactment of the court were written in it. But only two were signed on it, and the following statement was not written in it: We were convened in a session of three judges, and one of the judges is no longer here, as he died or left for another reason. There was therefore room for concern that perhaps there were only two witnesses, and they wrote the document of admission improperly.

סבר רבינא למימר היינו דריש לקיש א"ל רב נתן בר אמי הכי אמרינן משמיה דרבא כל כי האי גוונא חיישינן לב"ד טועין Ravina thought to say that this is a case in which the principle of Reish Lakish, that witnesses do not sign a document unless the action was performed appropriately, applies. Rav Natan bar Ami said to him: This is what we say in the name of Rava: In any cases like this, we are concerned for the possibility of an erroneous court that thinks that two constitute a court.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אי כתב בה בי דינא תו לא צריך Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: If it was written in the document: We, the members of the court, convened, it is unnecessary for the deed to further state that one of the judges is no longer there, as a standard court consists of three judges.

ודילמא בית דין חצוף הוא דאמר שמואל שנים שדנו דיניהן דין אלא שנקראו ב"ד חצוף דכתב ביה בי דינא דרבנא אשי The Gemara asks: But perhaps it was an impudent court, as Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who convened a tribunal and judged, their verdict is a binding verdict; but because they contravened the rabbinic ordinance mandating that a court must be composed of three judges, they are called an impudent court. The Gemara answers: It was a document in which it was written: We, the members of the court of Rabbana Ashi, convened. Rav Ashi’s court presumably conformed to rabbinic protocol.

ודילמא רבנן דבי רב אשי כשמואל סבירא להו דכתיב בו (ואמרנא ליה לרבנא אשי) ואמר לן רבנא אשי The Gemara asks: But perhaps the Sages of the court of Rav Ashi hold like Shmuel, that the verdict of two judges is binding, and they convened an impudent court. The Gemara answers: It is a document in which it is written: And we said to Rabbana Ashi, and Rabbana Ashi said to us. Rav Ashi himself certainly would not have participated in the discussions of an impudent court.

ת"ר אמר להן אחד אני ראיתי אביכם שהטמין מעות בשידה תיבה ומגדל ואמר של פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן בבית לא אמר כלום בשדה דבריו קיימין § The Gemara continues its discussion of when an admission is deemed credible. The Sages taught in a baraita: In a case where one said to the children of another: I saw that your father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, saying: This money belongs to so-and-so, or: This money is second tithe, and the money was found where he said, the halakha depends on the circumstances. If the chest, box, or cabinet was in the house, the witness has said nothing. His testimony about the status of the money is not accepted, as he is only one witness, and he could not have taken the money for himself had he wanted to. But if it was in the field, his statement stands, i.e., is accepted.

כללו של דבר כל שבידו ליטלן דבריו קיימין אין בידו ליטלן לא אמר כלום The principle of the matter is as follows: In any case where it is in the power of the witness to take the money, his statement stands; if it is not in his power to take the money, he has said nothing.

הרי שראו את אביהן שהטמין מעות בשידה תיבה ומגדל ואמר של פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן אם כמוסר דבריו קיימין אם כמערים לא אמר כלום In a case where the children themselves saw that their father hid money in a chest, box, or cabinet, and the father said: This money belongs to so-and-so, or: This money is second tithe, if he said so as one who relays information to his own children, his statement stands. But if he said so as one who employs artifice, i.e., he appears to have told them that the money was not his only so that they would not take it, he has said nothing, and they may spend the money.

הרי שהיה מצטער על מעות שהניח לו אביו ובא בעל החלום ואמר לו כך וכך הן במקום פלוני הן של מעשר שני הן זה היה מעשה ואמרו דברי חלומות לא מעלין ולא מורידין: In a case where one was distressed about money that his father left him as an inheritance, because he could not find it, and the master of the dream, i.e., someone in his dream, came and said to him: It is such and such an amount of money and it is in such and such a place, but the money is second tithe, and he found this amount in the place of which he dreamed; and this was an actual incident that was brought before the Sages, and they said that he can spend the money, as matters appearing in dreams do not make a difference in determining the practical halakha.

שנים אומרים זכאי כו': מיכתב היכי כתבי § The mishna teaches that if two judges say the defendant is exempt and one says he is liable, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: When there is a dispute between the judges, how do they write the verdict?

ר' יוחנן אמר זכאי ריש לקיש אמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין (ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין) רבי (אליעזר) אמר מדבריהן נזדכה פלוני Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They write that he is exempt, without mentioning the dispute. Reish Lakish says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable; they must mention that there was a dispute. Rabbi Eliezer says that they do not specify the names of the judges, but rather they add the phrase: From the statement of the judges so-and-so was deemed exempt, to the wording of the verdict. This indicates that not all the judges agreed that he is exempt, but does not specify which judges came to which conclusion.

מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו לשלומי איהו מנתא בהדייהו דלמאן דאמר זכאי משלם ולמאן דאמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין לא משלם The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these opinions, besides the wording of the verdict? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to whether or not, in a case where it is discovered that the verdict was erroneous, the judge who was in the minority must pay his portion of restitution along with the judges of the majority. As according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, the minority judge pays as well, and according to the one who says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, he does not pay.

ולמ"ד זכאי משלם לימא להו אי לדידי צייתיתון אתון נמי לא שלמיתון The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, why does he pay? Let him say to the other judges: If you would have listened to me you would not have paid either. Why should I have to pay for your mistake?

אלא איכא בינייהו לשלומי אינהו מנתא דידיה למ"ד זכאי משלמי למ"ד פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני ופלוני מחייבין לא משלמי Rather, he does not pay, and the practical difference between the opinions is with regard to whether or not those other judges must pay his portion of the restitution. According to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, they pay the full sum, as they did not mention that there was a dispute over the matter. But according to the one who says that they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, they do not pay the portion of the overruled judge, and he does not pay it either.

ולמאן דאמר זכאי משלמי ולימרו ליה אי לאו את בהדן לא הוה סליק דינא מידי The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that they write that he is exempt, why do they pay his portion? Let them say to him: If you had not been with us the judgment would have had no verdict at all, as two judges cannot issue a verdict. Therefore, you share the responsibility with us and should participate in the payment.

אלא איכא בינייהו משום (ויקרא יט, טז) לא תלך רכיל בעמך רבי יוחנן אמר זכאי משום לא תלך רכיל Rather, the difference between the opinions is only with regard to the wording of the verdict, and is due to the prohibition of: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16). Rabbi Yoḥanan says that they write that he is exempt due to the prohibition of gossip, as derived from the verse: “You shall not go as a talebearer.”

ריש לקיש אמר פלוני ופלוני מזכין ופלוני פלוני מחייבין משום דמיחזי כשיקרא Reish Lakish says they specify: So-and-so and so-and-so deem him exempt, and so-and-so and so-and-so deem him liable, because otherwise the document would have the appearance of falsehood, as not all the judges deemed him exempt.

ור' אלעזר אית ליה דמר ואית ליה דמר הלכך כתבי הכי מדבריהם נזדכה פלוני: And Rabbi Elazar accepts the opinion of this Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, and accepts the opinion of that Sage, Reish Lakish. Therefore, this is what they write: From the statement of the judges, so-and-so was deemed exempt. This wording indicates that the ruling was not based on a consensus among the judges, so that it will not have the appearance of falsehood, but it also does not specify what each judge said, to avoid gossip.

גמרו את הדבר היו מכניסין כו': למאן אילימא לבעלי דינין התם קיימי אלא לעדים § The mishna teaches that after the judges finished the matter and reached a decision, they would bring them in. The Gemara asks: Whom would they bring in? If we say they would bring in the litigants, this cannot be, as they were there the whole time; they never left the room. Rather, they would bring in the witnesses.

כמאן דלא כרבי נתן דתניא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהן כאחד רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה If so, in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan; as it is taught in a baraita: The testimonies of individual witnesses are never combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Their testimonies are combined even in a case where they saw the incident one after the other.

ואין עדותן מתקיימת בבית דין עד שיעידו שניהן כאחד רבי נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום וכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין את דבריו The baraita continues: And furthermore, their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify together as one. Rabbi Natan says: They need not testify together. Rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges hear the statement of this witness today, and when the other witness comes tomorrow the judges hear his statement. The mishna, by contrast, indicates that the verdict must be given with the two witnesses present together.

לא לעולם לבעלי דינין ורבי נחמיה היא דתניא רבי נחמיה אומר כך היה מנהגן של נקיי הדעת שבירושלים מכניסין לבעלי דינין ושומעין דבריהן ומכניסין את העדים ושומעין דבריהם ומוציאין אותן לחוץ ונושאין ונותנין בדבר (גמרו את הדבר מכניסין אותן כו') The Gemara reverses its interpretation of the mishna: No, actually it can be explained that the judges would bring in the litigants; and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Neḥemya says: This was the custom of the scrupulous people of Jerusalem: When they would judge, they would bring in the litigants and hear their statements, and then they would bring in the witnesses and hear their statements in the presence of the litigants, and then they would take them all outside of the courtroom and discuss the matter in their absence. Once they finished the matter they would bring them, i.e., the litigants, in, to hear their verdict.

והתניא גמרו את הדבר מכניסין את העדים ההיא דלא כרבי נתן The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita explicitly: When they finished the matter they would bring in the witnesses? The Gemara answers: That baraita is certainly not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.

גופא לעולם אין עדותן מצטרפת עד שיראו שניהם כאחד רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר אפילו בזה אחר זה במאי קמיפלגי איבעית אימא קרא ואיבעית אימא סברא § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: The testimonies of individual witnesses are never combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Their testimonies are combined even in a case where they saw the incident one after the other. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse, and if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning.

איבעית אימא סברא אמנה דקא מסהיד האי לא קא מסהיד האי ומנה דקא מסהיד האי לא קמסהיד האי ואידך אמנה בעלמא תרוייהו קמסהדי The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning: The first tanna holds that the witnesses must see the incident transpire together, as otherwise, about the one hundred dinars of debt that this one is testifying, that one is not testifying, and about the one hundred dinars that that one is testifying, this one is not testifying. There is only one witness of each incident, which is not sufficient. And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, holds that since both witnesses are testifying about one hundred dinars in general, the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff one hundred dinars.

ואיבעית אימא קרא דכתיב (ויקרא ה, א) והוא עד או ראה או ידע And if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse, as it is written: “And if anyone sins, hearing the voice of adjuration, and he is a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1).

ותניא ממשמע שנאמר (דברים יט, טו) לא יקום עד איני יודע שהוא אחד מה תלמוד לומר אחד The Gemara explains: And it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sins; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); by inference, from that which is stated in the verse: A witness shall not rise up against a man, even without the word “one,” do I not know that it is referring to one witness? After all, the verse is written in the singular. Therefore, what is the meaning when the verse states explicitly: “One witness”?

זה בנה אב כל מקום שנאמר עד הרי כאן שנים עד שיפרט לך הכתוב אחד This established a paradigm, a basis for the principle that in every place in the Torah where the word “witness” is stated, it means that there are two witnesses, unless the verse specifies for you that it is referring to only one witness.

ואפקיה רחמנא בלשון חד למימר עד דחזו תרווייהו כחד ואידך והוא עד או ראה או ידע מ"מ: And according to the first tanna, the Merciful One expresses it in the singular form, i.e., “witness” and not “witnesses,” to say that they are not combined into a testimony of two witnesses unless the two of them saw the incident transpire together as one. And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, derives from the phrase: “And he is a witness, whether he has seen or known,” that in any case where one testifies about what he sees and knows, his testimony is valid.

ואין עדותן מתקיימת בב"ד עד שיעידו שניהן כאחד ר' נתן אומר שומעין דבריו של זה היום וכשיבא חבירו למחר שומעין דבריו במאי קמיפלגי איבעית אימא סברא איבעית אימא קרא The baraita cited above teaches: And furthermore, their testimony does not stand in court unless the two of them testify together as one. Rabbi Natan says: They need not testify together; rather, their testimonies are combined even if the judges hear the statement of this witness today, and when the other witness comes tomorrow the judges hear his statement. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning, and if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse.

אב"א סברא מר סבר עד אחד כי אתי לשבועה אתי לממונא לא אתי The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that they disagree with regard to logical reasoning, as one Sage, the first tanna, holds that when one witness comes to testify, he comes to render the defendant liable to take an oath. This is the halakha when there is one witness against the defendant in a case of monetary law. He does not come to render the defendant liable to pay money, because for this two witnesses are necessary.

ואידך אטו כי אתו בהדי הדדי בחד פומא קא מסהדי אלא מצרפינן להו הכא נמי ליצרפינהו And the other tanna, Rabbi Natan, responds: Is that to say that when they come together, they render the defendant financially liable because they testify with one mouth? Obviously they testify one after the other. Rather, clearly it is the judges who combine their two testimonies into one. Here too, when the witnesses come to court at different times, let the judges combine their testimonies.

ואיבעית אימא קרא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו And if you wish, say that they disagree with regard to the interpretation of a verse: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1),

Daf 30b

ודכולי עלמא כרבנן דפליגי עליה דרבי יהושע בן קרחה והכא באקושי הגדה לראיה קא מיפלגי מר סבר מקשינן הגדה לראיה ומר סבר לא מקשינן and everyone, both the first tanna and Rabbi Natan, holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, and derive from this verse that it is necessary that the witnesses see the incident together, i.e., they were both present and observed the incident at the same time. And here, with regard to whether or not the witnesses must testify in court together, they disagree with regard to whether or not the statement of the witnesses, i.e., their testimony in court, is compared to their observation of the incident. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that we compare their statement to their observation. Therefore, just as they must see the incident together, so too, they must testify together in court. And one Sage, Rabbi Natan, holds that we do not compare their statement to their observation.

רבי שמעון בן אליקים הוה משתקיד עליה דר' יוסי ברבי חנינא למסמכיה ולא קא מיסתייע מילתא יומא חד הוה יתיב קמיה דר' יוחנן The Gemara relates: Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim was striving to ordain Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, and was not successful in his attempts. One day, Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim was sitting before Rabbi Yoḥanan among Rabbi Yoḥanan’s other students.

אמר להו מי איכא דידע הלכה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה או לא א"ל רבי שמעון בן אליקים דין ידע אמר ליה לימא איזו אמר ליה ליסמכיה מר ברישא סמכיה Rabbi Yoḥanan said to his students: Is there anyone who knows whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, or not? Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said to him: This one, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, knows. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: If so, let him say. Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said to him: Let the Master ordain him first; since we are all in need of his wisdom, he is fit for ordination. Rabbi Yoḥanan then ordained Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina.

אמר ליה בני אמור לי כיצד שמעת א"ל כך שמעתי שמודה ר' יהושע בן קרחה לרבי נתן Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: My son, tell me what you heard. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said to him: This is what I heard: That Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Natan that it is unnecessary for the witnesses to testify together.

אמר לזה הוצרכתי השתא ומה עיקר ראיה בהדי הדדי אמר ר' יהושע בן קרחה לא בעינן הגדה מיבעיא Rabbi Yoḥanan was disappointed, and said: For this I needed to ordain him? Now that with regard to the main element of testimony, i.e., observing the incident, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says we do not need both witnesses to see it together, with regard to their statement in court, is it necessary to explicate that there is no requirement that they testify together?

א"ל הואיל ועלית לא תרד אמר ר' זירא שמע מינה גברא רבה כיון דסמיך סמיך Although the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, was unnecessary, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Since you ascended, i.e., you were ordained, you will not descend, even though it was in error. Rabbi Zeira said: Conclude from it that with regard to a great man, once he is ordained, even if it was due to mistaken judgment, he is ordained. The ordination is not canceled.

א"ר חייא בר אבין אמר רב הלכה כר' יהושע בן קרחה בין בקרקעות בין במטלטלין As for the halakha in this matter, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that it is unnecessary for the two witnesses to observe the incident together, both with regard to cases of land and with regard to cases of movable property.

עולא אמר הלכה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה בקרקעות אבל לא במטלטלין Ulla says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land, which is unmovable, and therefore both testimonies are certainly about the same piece of land; but not with regard to movable property, as there is a concern that they are not testifying about the same item.

א"ל אביי הלכה מכלל דפליגי והאמר ר' אבא א"ר הונא אמר רב מודים חכמים לרבי יהושע בן קרחה בעדות קרקע Abaye said to Ulla: If you say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land, by inference you hold that they disagree with regard to this matter. But doesn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rav Huna says that Rav says: The Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to testimony concerning land?

ותני רב אידי בר אבין בנזיקין דבי קרנא מודין חכמים לרבי יהושע בן קרחה בעדות בכור ובעדות קרקע ובעדות חזקה וכן שבבן ושבבת And Rav Idi bar Avin teaches in the halakhot of damages that were taught at the school of the Sage Karna: The Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that the witnesses do not need to see the incident together with regard to testimony concerning a blemish in a male firstborn kosher animal, which renders it permitted to derive benefit from it, and with regard to testimony concerning ownership of land, and with regard to testimony concerning presumptive ownership of land. Since it is clear that they are testifying about the same land, it is unnecessary for them to see it together. And so they concede with regard to testimony over the two pubic hairs of a boy or of a girl, which are a sign of adulthood.

גברא אגברא קא רמית מר סבר פליגי ומר סבר לא פליגי The Gemara rejects Abaye’s question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? One Sage, Ulla, holds that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa even with regard to land, and one Sage, i.e., Rav and Rav Idi, holds that they do not disagree.

מאי וכן שבבן ושבבת אילימא אחד אומר אחת בגבה ואחד אומר אחת בכריסה האי חצי דבר וחצי עדות הוא The Gemara asks tangentially about the statement: And so they concede with regard to testimony over the two pubic hairs of a boy or of a girl: What is this referring to? If we say it is referring to testimony that a girl has reached majority, in which one witness says that he saw one hair on the her lower back and one witness says that he saw one hair on her lower abdomen, that is difficult. A girl is considered to have reached maturity when she has two pubic hairs. In this case, two witnesses separately testify that they have each seen one hair. In this case each testimony is obviously invalid, as it is half a matter and also half a testimony. Not only does each testimony refer to one hair, which is half a matter, it is submitted by one witness, which is half a testimony. Consequently, it is obvious that the girl is not considered to have reached majority in this case.

אלא אחד אומר שתים בגבה ואחד אומר שתים בכריסה Rather, it must be referring to a case where one says that he saw two hairs on her lower back, and the other one says he saw two hairs on her lower abdomen. Since they each testify that she has reached adulthood, it is unnecessary for them to see the same hairs.

אמר רב יוסף אנא אמינא משמיה דעולא הלכה כרבי יהושע בן קרחה בין בקרקעות בין במטלטלין ורבנן דאתו ממחוזא אמרי אמר ר' זירא משמיה דרב בקרקעות אין אבל לא במטלטלין Rav Yosef said: I say in the name of Ulla that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa both with regard to land and with regard to movable property. But the Sages who came from Meḥoza say that Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Rav: With regard to land the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, but not with regard to movable property.

רב לטעמיה דאמר רב הודאה אחר הודאה הודאה אחר הלואה מצטרפי The Gemara comments: Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav says: Testimonies of an admission following an admission are combined into one; if one witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant, and the other witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant in a separate incident, their testimonies are combined. Likewise, testimonies of an admission following a loan are combined into one; where one witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant, and the other one testifies that on a previous date the respondent borrowed money from the claimant in his presence, their testimonies are combined.

הלואה אחר הלואה הלואה אחר הודאה לא מצטרפי Rav continues: But testimonies of a loan following a loan are not combined. If one testifies that the claimant lent the respondent one hundred dinars in his presence, and the other testifies that he lent him one hundred dinars in a separate incident in his presence, their testimonies are not combined, as they are clearly testifying about two separate loans. Similarly, testimonies of a loan following an admission are not combined. If one testifies that the claimant lent money to the respondent, and the other one testifies that on an earlier date the respondent admitted to owing the claimant, their testimonies are not combined.

אשכחיה רב נחמן בר יצחק לרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע א"ל מאי שנא הלואה אחר הלואה דלא דמנה דקא חזי האי לא קא חזי האי הודאה אחר הודאה נמי אמנה דקא מודה קמי האי לא מודי קמי האי Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak encountered Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua. He said to him: What is different about a loan following a loan, in which case the testimonies are not combined, as the one hundred dinars that this witness saw, that witness did not see? In the case of an admission following an admission as well, perhaps the one hundred dinars about which the respondent admitted in the presence of this witness, he did not admit in the presence of that witness. Perhaps his admissions were in reference to two separate loans, and therefore the testimonies should not be combined.

דא"ל להאי בתרא בהאי מנה דאודיי ליה קמך אודיי ליה נמי קמי פלוני Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, answered him: The reference is to a case where the respondent said to this last witness: With regard to the one hundred dinars that I admitted to owing in your presence, I admitted to owing them in the presence of so-and-so, the first witness, as well.

אכתי בתרא ידע קמא לא ידע Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak asked: Still, the last witness knows that he is testifying about the same loan as the first witness, but the first witness does not know this. Since only one witness testifies that it is the same loan, the testimonies still cannot be combined.

דהדר אזיל א"ל לקמא האי מנה דאודיי ליה קמך אודיי ליה נמי קמי פלוני א"ל תנוח דעתך שהתנחת את דעתי Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, answered: It is a case where, after his admission to the second witness, the respondent went back and said to the first witness: With regard to those one hundred dinars that I admitted to owing in your presence, I admitted owing them in the presence of so-and-so as well. Therefore, both witnesses know that they are testifying about the same loan. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: May your mind be settled, as you have settled my mind and put it at ease by answering this question that was troubling me.

א"ל מאי ניחותא דרבא ואיתימא רב ששת שדא בה נרגא לאו היינו הודאה אחר הלואה Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him: What is settling about this explanation? As Rava, and some say Rav Sheshet, threw an ax at my answer, i.e., he rejected my explanation, as follows: According to this interpretation of the case of an admission following an admission, isn’t this the same as an admission following a loan? The case of an admission following an admission is now rendered superfluous, as it adds no new insight on the matter.

אמר ליה היינו דשמיע לי עלייכו דרמיתו דיקלי וזקפיתו להו Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: This is what I heard about you Sages of Meḥoza, that you knock down palm trees and erect them, i.e., you build and then destroy what you built. After you came up with such an excellent explanation, you ruined it yourselves.

נהרדעי אמרי בין הודאה אחר הודאה בין הודאה אחר הלואה בין הלואה אחר הלואה בין הלואה אחר הודאה מצטרפות כמאן כר' יהושע בן קרחה The Sages of Neharde’a say: Whether it is a case of an admission following an admission, or an admission following a loan, or a loan following a loan, or a loan following an admission, in all these cases the testimonies are combined. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who teaches that since both witnesses testify about a debt of one hundred dinars, it is considered like one testimony.

אמר רב יהודה עדות המכחשת זו את זו בבדיקות כשרה בדיני ממונות § Rav Yehuda says: Testimony of two witnesses who contradict the testimony of each other in response to the judges’ examination of the details of the story is valid in cases of monetary law, although a contradiction of this type disqualifies testimony in cases of capital law.

אמר רבא מסתברא מילתיה דרב יהודה באחד אומר בארנקי שחורה ואחד אומר בארנקי לבנה אבל אחד אומר מנה שחור ואחד אומר מנה לבן אין מצטרפין Rava says: The statement of Rav Yehuda is reasonable in a case where one witness says: The money was in a black purse [be’arnaki], and the other one says: It was in a white purse. Since this is a secondary detail, they may not remember it accurately. But if one says: He lent him a black coin, i.e., the coin was dark, and the other one says: He lent him a white coin, the testimonies are not combined. Since they contradict each other with regard to a characteristic of the money itself, one is probably lying.

וארנקי שחורה בדיני נפשות לא והאמר רב חסדא אחד אומר בסייף הרגו ואחד אומר בארירן הרגו אין זה נכון אחד אומר כליו שחורים ואחד אומר כליו לבנים הרי זה נכון The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling: And if witnesses contradict each other with regard to secondary details such as a black purse in cases of capital law, is it the case that their testimony is not accepted? But doesn’t Rav Ḥisda say: In a case where one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, another type of weapon, this is not congruent testimony, as this is a clear contradiction. But if one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were white, this is congruent testimony, as this is not a meaningful discrepancy.

Daf 31a

גברא אגברא קא רמית The Gemara answers: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? Rav Ḥisda holds that a contradiction with regard to secondary details does not disqualify the testimony even in capital law, and Rav Yehuda holds that it does disqualify the testimony. Neither Sage is bound by the statement of the other.

נהרדעי אמרי אפילו אחד אומר מנה שחור ואחד אומר מנה לבן מצטרפים The Sages of Neharde’a say: Even if one says that it was a black coin and the other one says that it was a white coin their testimonies are combined.

כמאן כרבי יהושע בן קרחה אימר דשמעת ליה לרבי יהושע בן קרחה היכא דלא מכחשו אהדדי היכא דמכחשי אהדדי מי אמר The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, that as long as both witnesses testify that the defendant owes the plaintiff the same sum, the testimonies are combined? Say that you heard Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa saying that two testimonies are combined in a case where they do not contradict each other; but in a case where they contradict each other, did he say that they are combined?

אלא הוא דאמר כי האי תנא דתניא אמר ר' שמעון בן אלעזר לא נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל על שתי כיתי עדים שאחת אומרת מאתים ואחת אומרת מנה שיש בכלל מאתים מנה Rather, the Sages of Neharde’a stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of that tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree with regard to a case of two sets of witnesses, where one set says that the plaintiff lent the defendant two hundred dinars, and the other one says that he lent him one hundred dinars. Both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai agree that this is not considered a contradiction, and the testimony is accepted concerning the amount of one hundred dinars, as one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred, i.e., testimony concerning a large amount includes testimony concerning a smaller amount.

על מה נחלקו על כת אחת שבית שמאי אומרים נחלקה עדותן ובית הלל אומרים יש בכלל מאתים מנה With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree over the case of one set of two witnesses, where one witness testifies that the defendant owes the plaintiff two hundred dinars, and the other witness says that he owes him one hundred. As Beit Shammai say that their testimony is divided. Since they are not testifying about the same amount, the entire testimony is disqualified. And Beit Hillel say: One hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred. Apparently, according to Beit Hillel’s opinion, as transmitted by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although the testimonies are not identical, since both attest to the defendant’s liability to pay a certain amount of money, they are combined and accepted to that effect. This is the source for the opinion of the Sages of Neharde’a.

אחד אומר חבית של יין ואחד אומר חבית של שמן הוה עובדא ואתי לקמיה דרבי אמי חייביה רבי אמי לשלומי ליה חביתא דחמרא מיגו חביתא דמשחא With regard to a case where one witness says that the plaintiff gave the defendant a barrel of wine, and the other one says that he gave him a barrel of oil, there was actually such an incident, and it came before Rabbi Ami. Since wine was cheaper than oil, Rabbi Ami deemed the defendant liable to pay the plaintiff only the value of a barrel of wine out of the value of a barrel of oil, an amount both witnesses agreed that he owed.

כמאן כר"ש בן אלעזר אימר דאמר ר"ש [ב"א] היכא דיש בכלל מאתים מנה כי האי גוונא מי אמר The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? Is it in accordance with the opinion transmitted by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? Say that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that two contradicting testimonies can be combined in a case where one hundred dinars is subsumed within two hundred; perhaps one of the witnesses saw only half the loan, and the other one saw it all. But in a case like this, where the testimonies are about completely different items, did he say that they can be combined?

לא צריכא לדמי The Gemara answers: No, this is not a case of a direct contradiction. This ruling is necessary only with regard to monetary value, i.e., where one witness says that the defendant owes the value of a barrel of wine, and the second one says that he owes the value of a barrel of oil. Therefore, it is comparable to a case of one hundred dinars and two hundred dinars.

אחד אומר בדיוטא העליונה ואחד אומר בדיוטא התחתונה אמר רבי חנינא מעשה בא לפני רבי וצירף עדותן: With regard to a case where one witness says that the incident took place on the upper floor [badeyota] and the other one says that it occurred on the lower floor, Rabbi Ḥanina says that an incident like this came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and he combined their testimonies. This was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, that since they agree with regard to the matter itself, the secondary details are insignificant.

ומניין לכשיצא כו': תנו רבנן מניין לכשיצא לא יאמר הריני מזכה וחבירי מחייבין אבל מה אעשה שחבירי רבו עלי תלמוד לומר (ויקרא יט, טז) לא תלך רכיל בעמך ואומר (משלי יא, יג) הולך רכיל מגלה סוד § The mishna teaches: And from where is it derived that when the judge leaves the courtroom, he should not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? About this it is stated: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets, but one who is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13). The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that when the judge leaves he should not say: I deemed you exempt and my colleagues deemed you liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me and consequently you were deemed liable? The verse states: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people” (Leviticus 19:16), and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets” (Proverbs 11:13).

ההוא תלמידא דנפיק עליה קלא דגלי מילתא דאיתמר בי מדרשא בתר עשרין ותרתין שנין אפקיה רב אמי מבי מדרשא אמר דין גלי רזיא: The Gemara relates: There was a certain student, about whom a rumor emerged that he revealed a statement that was stated in the study hall and should have been kept secret, and the rumor emerged twenty-two years after the time the statement was revealed. Rav Ami removed him from the study hall as a punishment. Rav Ami said: This is a revealer of secrets and he cannot be trusted.

מתני׳ כל זמן שמביא ראיה סותר את הדין אמר לו כל ראיות שיש לך הבא מיכן עד שלשים יום מצא בתוך שלשים יום סותר לאחר שלשים יום אינו סותר MISHNA: Any time one of the litigants brings additional proof, he can overturn the verdict that was decided according to previous proofs. If one litigant said to the other: Bring all the proofs that you have from now until thirty days from now, if he found additional proof within thirty days, he can overturn the verdict. If he found it after thirty days, he cannot overturn the verdict anymore.

אמר רשב"ג מה יעשה זה שלא מצא בתוך שלשים ומצא לאחר שלשים Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: He can still overturn the verdict, as what should this litigant, who sought and did not find additional proof within thirty days but found it after thirty days, have done?

אמר לו הבא עדים ואמר אין לי עדים אמר הבא ראיה ואמר אין לי ראיה ולאחר זמן הביא ראיה ומצא עדים הרי זה אינו כלום In a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and the latter said: I have no witnesses, and the former said to him: Bring a proof, and he said: I have no proof, and he later brought a proof or found witnesses, in this case, this proof or these witnesses are worth nothing. It is apparently a false proof or false testimony.

אמר רשב"ג מה יעשה זה שלא היה יודע שיש לו עדים ומצא עדים לא היה יודע שיש לו ראיה ומצא ראיה Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What should this litigant, who did not know that he has witnesses and ultimately found witnesses, or who did not know that he has a proof and ultimately found proof, have done? Therefore, he can still overturn the verdict.

ראה שמתחייב בדין ואמר קרבו פלוני ופלוני ויעידוני או שהוציא ראיה מתחת פונדתו הרי זה אינו כלום: If at the beginning of the discussion in the court one did not bring witnesses or other evidence for his claims, but then he saw that he was about to be deemed liable to pay in the judgment, and said: Bring so-and-so and so-and-so, and they will testify on my behalf, or he pulled out a proof from under his belt [pundato], even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that this is worth nothing. If there was truth in the testimony of these witnesses or in this proof, he would not have hidden it until now.

גמ׳ אמר רבה בר רב הונא הלכה כרשב"ג ואמר רבה בר רב הונא אין הלכה כדברי חכמים GEMARA: With regard to the first halakha in the mishna, Rabba bar Rav Huna says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also says: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

פשיטא כיון דאמר הלכה כרשב"ג ממילא ידענא דאין הלכה כחכמים The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since he says that the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, we know by ourselves that the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

מהו דתימא הני מילי לכתחילה אבל דיעבד שפיר דמי קמ"ל דאי עביד מהדרינן ליה: The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this statement, that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, applies ab initio, but after the fact, even if the court ruled in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the ruling is valid, as their opinion was not entirely rejected, Rabba bar Rav Huna therefore teaches us that if the court acts in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, we send the case back to court.

אמר לו הבא עדים כו' אמר רשב"ג כו': אמר רבה בר רב הונא א"ר יוחנן הלכה כדברי חכמים ואמר רבה בר רב הונא אמר רבי יוחנן אין הלכה כרשב"ג § The mishna teaches that in a case where one litigant said to the other: Bring witnesses, and he admitted that he had none, and he subsequently found witnesses, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that their testimony is valid. Rabba bar Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

פשיטא כיון דאמר הלכה כדברי חכמים ממילא ידענא דאין הלכה כרשב"ג The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since he says that the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, we know by ourselves that the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

הא קמ"ל דבההיא אין הלכה כרשב"ג הא בכולהו הלכה כרשב"ג The Gemara answers: This statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches us that specifically with regard to that halakha, the halakha is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; but with regard to all other statements of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the corpus of the Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

לאפוקי מהא דאמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן כל מקום ששנה רשב"ג במשנתנו הלכה כמותו חוץ מערב וצידן וראיה אחרונה This is to the exclusion of that which Rabba bar bar Ḥanna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement. Whereas in the former dispute in the mishna here, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, in the latter dispute in the mishna here, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabba bar Rav Huna, by contrast, maintains that in the case of a guarantor and in the case in Tzaidan, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

ההוא ינוקא דתבעוהו לדינא קמיה דרב נחמן א"ל אית לך סהדי א"ל לא אית לך ראיה א"ל לא חייביה רב נחמן The Gemara relates: There was a certain child who was taken to court before Rav Naḥman. They said to him: Do you have witnesses on your behalf? The child said to them: No. They continued to ask: Do you have evidence? The child said to them: No. Rav Naḥman deemed him liable, in accordance with the claim of the other litigant.

הוה קא בכי ואזיל שמעוהו הנך אינשי אמרו ליה אנן ידעינן במילי דאבוך אמר רב נחמן בהא אפילו רבנן מודו דינוקא במילי דאבוה לא ידע The child was walking and crying. These people heard him, and said to him: We know about the monetary matters of your father and can testify on your behalf. When he brought them before Rav Naḥman, Rav Naḥman said: In a case like this, even the Rabbis concede that the testimony is accepted, as a child does not know about the monetary matters of his father. Clearly, when he said that he has no witnesses or proof, he said so out of ignorance and was mistaken; there is no concern about artifice.

ההיא איתתא דנפק שטרא מתותי ידה אמרה ליה ידענא בהאי שטרא דפריע הוה הימנה רב נחמן The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman from whose possession a promissory note emerged, i.e., she was appointed to hold it. She said to the judge: I know that this promissory note was repaid. The creditor should not use it to collect. Rav Naḥman deemed her testimony credible and did not allow the creditor to collect the debt.

אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן כמאן כרבי דאמר אותיות נקנות במסירה Rava said to Rav Naḥman: In accordance with whose opinion is your ruling? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that letters, i.e., the content of a promissory note, are acquired by merely transferring the document? In other words, there is no need to write a deed for the transfer of a monetary document from one individual’s ownership to another. By giving it to the recipient, he becomes the owner of the document. Therefore, since the promissory note is in this woman’s possession, she is considered its legal owner, and her claim that it was repaid is consequently accepted.

אמר ליה שאני הכא דאי בעיא קלתיה Rav Naḥman said to him: That is not the reason for my ruling; rather, here it is different. Here the woman’s claim is accepted in any event, as, since the promissory note was in her possession, if she had wanted to, she could have burned it. Therefore, she is presumably telling the truth.

איכא דאמרי לא הימנה רב נחמן אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן והא אי בעיא Some say that there is another version of the story, according to which Rav Naḥman did not deem her testimony credible. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But if she had wanted to,

Daf 31b

קלתיה she could have burned it. Why did you not accept her testimony?

כיון דאיתחזק בבי דינא איבעיא קלתיה לא אמרינן Rav Naḥman answered him: Since the promissory note was ratified in court, we do not say that she is deemed credible to nullify its validity because if she had wanted to, she could have burned it. The validity of a ratified document is not nullified without evidence.

איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן סימפון שיש עליו עדים יתקיים בחותמיו אין עליו עדים ויצא מתחת ידי שליש או שיצא אחר חיתום שטרות כשר אלמא שליש מהימן Rava raised an objection to the ruling of Rav Naḥman from a baraita: A receipt [simfon] of repayment of a debt upon which witnesses are signed is ratified by means of its signatories. The witnesses testify that these are their signatures, and it is thereby ratified. If there are no witnesses signed on it, but the receipt emerged from the possession of a third party serving as a trustee, or if it emerged after the signing of the documents, i.e., the receipt was written on the promissory note beneath the content of the note and the witnesses’ signatures, it is valid. Rava states his objection: Apparently, the testimony of a third party serving as a trustee is deemed credible, as he can testify that the receipt is valid even if it was not signed by witnesses.

תיובתא דרב נחמן (תיובתא) The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Naḥman is indeed a conclusive refutation.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר ר' יוחנן לעולם מביא ראיה וסותר עד שיסתתם טענותיו ויאמר קרבו פלוני ופלוני והעידוני § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One can always bring a proof for his claim and overturn the previous verdict, until his claims are stopped up, i.e., until he has no more claims, and he says: Come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, in which case those witnesses are not allowed to testify.

הא גופא קשיא אמרת יסתתם טענותיו אתאן לרבנן והדר אמרת קרבו איש פלוני ופלוני והעידוני אתאן לרשב"ג The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult. When you say: Until his claims are stopped up, we arrive at, i.e., this represents, the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold in the mishna that once a litigant stops presenting his claims, he cannot present additional claims later. And when you then say: Until he says come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, we arrive at the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that it is only in that case that the testimony is not accepted.

וכי תימא כולה רשב"ג ופרושי קא מפרש מאי עד שיסתתם טענותיו עד שיאמר קרבו פלוני ופלוני והעידוני והא אמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן כל מקום ששנה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל במשנתינו הלכה כמותו חוץ מערב וצידן וראיה אחרונה And if you would say that the entire statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and Rabbi Yoḥanan is explaining his own statement, saying: What is the meaning of the phrase: Until his claims are stopped up? Until he says: Come, so-and-so and so-and-so, and testify on my behalf, this is difficult. But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that anywhere that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement? Evidently, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in this case.

אלא כי אתא רב שמואל בר יהודה א"ר יוחנן לעולם מביא ראיה וסותר עד שיסתתם טענותיו ויאמרו לו הבא עדים ואומר אין לי עדים הבא ראיה ואומר אין לי ראיה אבל באו עדים ממדינת הים או שהיתה דיסקיא של אביו מופקדת ביד אחר הרי זה מביא ראיה וסותר Rather, the Gemara presents another version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement. When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One can always bring a proof and overturn the previous verdict until his claims are stopped up, and the judges say to him: Bring witnesses, and he says: I have no witnesses, and they say to him: Bring evidence, and he says: I have no evidence. This is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna. But if witnesses came from overseas, or if there was a saddlebag [disakkaya] of his father’s documents deposited by another individual, which are cases where he did not know of the evidence, he can bring this evidence and overturn the previous verdict, as there is no concern of artifice.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי יוחנן התוקף את חבירו בדין אחד אומר נדון כאן ואחד אומר נלך למקום הוועד כופין אותו וילך למקום הוועד § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who attacks another in judgment, i.e., tenaciously raises legal claims against another, and one of the litigants says: Let us go to court here in our locale, and the other one says: Let us go to the place of the Assembly, i.e., the Sanhedrin, or another High Court, the former litigant is compelled to go to the place of the Assembly.

אמר לפניו רבי אלעזר רבי מי שנושה בחבירו מנה יוציא מנה על מנה אלא כופין אותו ודן בעירו Rabbi Elazar said before him: My teacher, if so, must one who claims a debt of one hundred dinars from another spend one hundred dinars of travel and lodging expenses for the one hundred dinars he wants to collect? Rather, one is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city.

איתמר נמי א"ר ספרא (אמר רבי יוחנן) שנים שנתעצמו בדין א' אומר נדון כאן ואחד אומר נלך למקום הוועד כופין אותו ודן בעירו ואם הוצרך דבר לשאול כותבין ושולחין It was also stated that Rav Safra says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to two who were struggling in judgment, one of whom says: Let us go to court here, and one of whom says: Let us go to the place of the Assembly, the latter litigant is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city. And if the local court needs to ask a higher court about a certain matter, the judges write to the Assembly, and the higher court sends its response.

ואם אמר כתבו ותנו לי מאיזה טעם דנתוני כותבין ונותנין לו And if one of the litigants says to a court: Write for what reason you judged me in this manner and give it to me, as I do not trust your decision without explanation, the judges write it and give it to him.

והיבמה הולכת אחר היבם להתירה Another halakha was stated with regard to the location of the judgment: And with regard to a woman whose husband had a brother, and he died childless [vehayevama], she follows her brother-in-law [hayavam] for him to free her of the levirate bond through ḥalitza. The yavam does not have to go to her.

עד כמה אמר רבי אמי אפילו מטבריא לצפורי The Gemara asks: How far does she have to go? Rabbi Ami says: Even from Tiberias to Tzippori. This is the halakha even though the court in Tiberias is more prestigious than the one in Tzippori.

אמר רב כהנא מאי קרא (דברים כה, ח) וקראו לו זקני עירו ולא זקני עירה Rav Kahana says: What is the verse that alludes to this halakha? It is the verse that states: “Then the elders of his city shall call him, and speak to him, and if he stands and says: I do not wish to take her” (Deuteronomy 25:8). The fact that the elders of his city, and not the elders of her city, are mentioned indicates that ḥalitza is performed in his city and not in hers.

אמר אמימר הילכתא כופין אותו וילך למקום הוועד א"ל רב אשי לאמימר והא אמר רבי אלעזר כופין אותו ודן בעירו הני מילי היכא דקאמר ליה לוה למלוה אבל מלוה (משלי כב, ז) עבד לוה לאיש מלוה Ameimar says: The halakha is that if one litigant wants to go to the place of the Assembly and the other does not, the latter is compelled to go to the place of the Assembly. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say that he is compelled to appear and be judged in a court that presides in his own city? Ameimar answered: This statement applies in a case where the borrower said to the lender: Let us go to the place of the Assembly; in that case, the debtor is compelled to be judged in his city. But if the lender requests to go to the place of the Assembly, his request is accepted, as it is stated: “The borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7).

שלחו ליה למר עוקבא לדזיו ליה כבר בתיה שלם עוקבן הבבלי קבל קדמנא ירמיה אחי העביר עלי את הדרך ואמרו לו השיאוהו ויראה פנינו בטבריא The Sages sent a letter to Mar Ukva, the Exilarch in Babylonia, which stated: To he who has light upon him, like Moses, who is called the son of Bithiah, Shalom. The letter continued: Ukvan the Babylonian complained before us as follows: Yirmeya, my brother, came past me, i.e., did me a great evil. And therefore tell Yirmeya; induce him [hassiuhu] to see our face in Tiberias, where we will judge his case.

הא גופא קשיא אמרת אמרו לו אלמא דיינוה אתון השיאוהו ויראה פנינו בטבריא אלמא שדרוהו הכא The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult to understand. You said: Tell him. Apparently the intention was: Judge him yourselves in Babylonia. But then the letter states: Induce him to see our face in Tiberias. Apparently the intention was: Send him here.

אלא הכי קאמרי אמרו ליה דיינו אתון אי ציית ציית ואי לא השיאוהו ויראה פנינו בטבריא Rather, this is what the Sages were saying: Tell him, i.e., judge him yourselves. If he listens to the court, he listens, and the issue is resolved. But if he does not listen, induce him to see our face in Tiberias.

רב אשי אמר דיני קנסות הוה ובבבל לא דיינו דיני קנסות והא דשלחו ליה הכי כדי לחלוק כבוד למר עוקבא: Rav Ashi said: That is not the correct understanding of the letter. Rather, it was a case pertaining to the halakhot of fines, and in Babylonia the courts do not adjudicate in cases pertaining to the halakhot of fines, as there are no ordained judges there; such Sages are found only in Eretz Yisrael. Consequently, it was necessary to send the case to Eretz Yisrael. And the fact that they sent the letter to Mar Ukva using this wording, as though he were capable of adjudicating the case himself, was in order to give honor to Mar Ukva, who was a Sage and a leader. They hinted to him that he could not judge this case and that he therefore had to send the defendant to Eretz Yisrael.

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Daf 32a

מתני׳ אחד דיני ממונות ואחד דיני נפשות בדרישה ובחקירה שנאמר (ויקרא כד, כב) משפט אחד יהיה לכם MISHNA: Both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to the requirement for inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses, as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform.

מה בין דיני ממונות לדיני נפשות דיני ממונות בשלשה ודיני נפשות בעשרים ושלשה דיני ממונות פותחין בין לזכות בין לחובה ודיני נפשות פותחין לזכות ואין פותחין לחובה Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. What are the differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law? Cases of monetary law are judged by a court of three judges, and cases of capital law are judged by a court of twenty-three judges. In cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. And in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable.

דיני ממונות מטין על פי אחד בין לזכות בין לחובה ודיני נפשות מטין על פי אחד לזכות ועל פי שנים לחובה In cases of monetary law, the court directs, i.e., issues, the ruling based on a majority of one judge, either to exempt, or to find liable. But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable.

דיני ממונות מחזירין בין לזכות בין לחובה דיני נפשות מחזירין לזכות ואין מחזירין לחובה In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable.

דיני ממונות הכל מלמדין זכות וחובה דיני נפשות הכל מלמדין זכות ואין הכל מלמדין חובה In cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable.

דיני ממונות המלמד חובה מלמד זכות והמלמד זכות מלמד חובה דיני נפשות המלמד חובה מלמד זכות אבל המלמד זכות אין יכול לחזור וללמד חובה In cases of monetary law, one who initially teaches a reason to find the accused liable may then teach a reason to exempt him, and one who initially teaches a reason to exempt him may then teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable.

דיני ממונות דנין ביום וגומרין בלילה דיני נפשות דנין ביום וגומרין ביום In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime.

דיני ממונות גומרין בו ביום בין לזכות בין לחובה דיני נפשות גומרין בו ביום לזכות וביום שלאחריו לחובה לפיכך אין דנין לא בערב שבת ולא בערב יום טוב In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.

דיני ממונות הטמאות והטהרות מתחילין מן הגדול דיני נפשות מתחילין מן הצד In cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit.

הכל כשרין לדון דיני ממונות ואין הכל כשרין לדון דיני נפשות אלא כהנים לוים וישראלים המשיאין לכהונה: All are fit to judge cases of monetary law. But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.

גמ׳ דיני ממונות מי בעינן דרישה וחקירה ורמינהו שטר שזמנו כתוב באחד בניסן בשמיטה ובאו עדים ואמרו היאך אתם מעידין על שטר זה והלא ביום פלוני עמנו הייתם במקום פלוני שטר כשר ועדיו כשרין חיישינן שמא איחרוהו וכתבוהו GEMARA: The mishna teaches that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses. The Gemara asks: Do we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 1:2): With regard to a promissory note whose date is written on the first of Nisan of the Sabbatical Year, and witnesses came and said to the signatory witnesses: How is it that you are testifying concerning this promissory note? But is it not so that on such and such day on which the promissory note was written you were with us in such and such place? The promissory note is nevertheless valid, and its witnesses remain fit to bear witness. The reason they are not proven to have signed the promissory note falsely is that we are concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it, i.e., the loan was given on an earlier date, and the promissory note was postdated.

ואי סלקא דעתך בעינן דרישה וחקירה היכי חיישינן שמא איחרוהו וכתבוהו The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if it enters your mind to say that we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, how are we concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it? The signatory witnesses would be asked on which day they signed the promissory note, and when that does not accord with what is written in the promissory note, their testimony would be disregarded.

וליטעמיך תיקשי לך מתני' שטרי חוב המוקדמין פסולים והמאוחרים כשרין ואי סלקא דעתך בעינן דרישה וחקירה מאוחרין אמאי כשרין The Gemara counters: And according to your reasoning that we do not require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, the mishna elsewhere should pose a difficulty for you as well. As mishnayot are more authoritative than baraitot, it is preferable to raise a contradiction between two mishnayot than to raise a contradiction from a baraita to a mishna. The mishna teaches (Shevi’it 10:5): Antedated promissory notes are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. And if it enters your mind to say we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law and that if there is a contradiction the testimony is not accepted, why are postdated promissory notes valid? The witnesses’ testimony does not accord with what is written in the document.

הא לא קשיא דעדיפא מינה קאמרינן דאפי' אחד בניסן בשמיטה דלא שכיחי אינשי דמוזפי דליכא למימר שמא איחרוהו וכתבוהו דלא מרע לשטריה אפ"ה כיון דשביעית סופה משמטת מכשרינן The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. There is a reason why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna. We are saying a better, i.e., stronger, contradiction than the one from the mishna. As one sees in the baraita that even with regard to a promissory note written on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical Year, when it is not common to find people to lend money, as all debts are canceled at the close of the Sabbatical Year, where it is not as reasonable to say that perhaps they delayed and wrote the promissory note, as one would not damage his promissory note by postdating it so close to the end of the Sabbatical Year; even so, since the Sabbatical Year cancels debts only at its close, we are concerned that the promissory note is postdated and we deem it valid. This is why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna.

מ"מ קשיא: סימן חרפ"ש: The Gemara returns to its question: In any case, the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is difficult. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for the following discussion, with each letter representing the name of a Sage who suggests an answer: Ḥet, reish, peh, shin.

א"ר חנינא דבר תורה אחד דיני ממונות ואחד דיני נפשות בדרישה ובחקירה שנאמר משפט אחד יהיה לכם ומה טעם אמרו דיני ממונות לא בעינן דרישה וחקירה כדי שלא תנעול דלת בפני לוין The Gemara cites the first answer. Rabbi Ḥanina says: By Torah law, both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to inquiry and interrogation of witnesses, as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22). And what is the reason the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not need inquiry and interrogation? It is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. The Sages were concerned that intensive examination of the witnesses would often result in contradictory testimony and render it difficult for lenders to collect their debts. This could lead to people refraining from lending money.

אלא מעתה The Gemara asks: If that is so that the Sages removed the requirement for inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law,

Daf 32b

טעו לא ישלמו כל שכן שתנעול דלת בפני לווין then if the judges erred they should not need to pay the party they wronged, as they can claim that they were prevented from examining the witnesses effectively. The Gemara answers: If that were to be the halakha, all the more so that this would lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If people know that the courts are not responsible for an error in judgment, they will not be willing to lend money.

רבא אמר מתניתין דהכא בדיני קנסות ואידך בהודאות והלואות Rava says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to laws of fines, not standard cases of monetary law. And the other sources, i.e., the mishna in tractate Shevi’it and the baraita, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, are stated with regard to cases of admissions and loans, in which there is cause to relax the procedures of deliberation, as explained.

רב פפא אמר אידי ואידי בהודאה והלואה כאן בדין מרומה כאן בדין שאינו מרומה Rav Pappa says: This and that, i.e., both the mishna here and the other sources, are stated with regard to cases of an admission and a loan. The distinction between them is that the mishna here, which rules that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court suspects that one party is attempting to defraud the other party and have witnesses offer false testimony on his own behalf. There, in the baraita and in the mishna in tractate Shevi’it, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, the ruling is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

כדריש לקיש דריש לקיש רמי כתיב (ויקרא יט, טו) בצדק תשפוט עמיתך וכתיב (דברים טז, כא) צדק צדק תרדף הא כיצד כאן בדין מרומה כאן בדין שאין מרומה This distinction is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: “In justice shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15), and it is written in another verse: “Justice, justice, shall you follow” (Deuteronomy 16:21), with the repetition indicating that it is not enough to merely judge with justice. He continues: How can these texts be reconciled? Here, this latter verse is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court must take extra care to judge with justice; and there, that former verse is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

רב אשי אמר מתני׳ כדשנין קראי אחד לדין וא' לפשרה Rav Ashi says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is as we answered, i.e., in accordance with any one of the answers offered by the other amora’im. And those verses were not stated with regard to fraudulent trials; rather, one is stated with regard to judgment, in which the court must pursue justice extensively, and one is stated with regard to compromise.

כדתניא צדק צדק תרדף אחד לדין ואחד לפשרה כיצד שתי ספינות עוברות בנהר ופגעו זה בזה אם עוברות שתיהן שתיהן טובעות בזה אחר זה שתיהן עוברות וכן שני גמלים שהיו עולים במעלות בית חורון ופגעו זה בזה אם עלו שניהן שניהן נופלין בזה אחר זה שניהן עולין As it is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “Justice, justice, shall you follow,” one mention of “justice” is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats traveling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, as the river is not wide enough for both to pass. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit Ḥoron, where there is a narrow steep path, and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend.

הא כיצד טעונה ושאינה טעונה תידחה שאינה טעונה מפני טעונה קרובה ושאינה קרובה תידחה קרובה מפני שאינה קרובה היו שתיהן קרובות שתיהן רחוקות הטל פשרה ביניהן ומעלות שכר זו לזו How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred.

ת"ר צדק צדק תרדף הלך אחר ב"ד יפה אחר רבי אליעזר ללוד אחר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי לברור חיל § The Sages taught: The verse states: “Justice, justice, shall you follow.” This teaches that one should follow the best, most prestigious, court of the generation. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai to Beror Ḥayil.

תנא קול ריחים בבורני שבוע הבן שבוע הבן אור הנר בברור חיל משתה שם משתה שם The Sages taught: When the gentile authorities issued decrees outlawing observance of the mitzvot, members of Jewish communities devised clandestine ways of indicating observance of mitzvot to each other. For example: If one produces the sound of a millstone in the city called Burni, this is tantamount to announcing: Week of the son, week of the son, i.e., there will be a circumcision. If one displays the light of a lamp in the city called Beror Ḥayil, this is tantamount to announcing: There is a wedding feast there, there is a wedding feast there.

ת"ר צדק צדק תרדף הלך אחר חכמים לישיבה אחר ר' אליעזר ללוד אחר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי לברור חיל אחר רבי יהושע לפקיעין אחר רבן גמליאל ליבנא אחר רבי עקיבא לבני ברק אחר רבי מתיא לרומי אחר רבי חנניא בן תרדיון לסיכני אחר ר' יוסי לציפורי אחר רבי יהודה בן בתירה לנציבין אחר רבי יהושע לגולה אחר רבי לבית שערים אחר חכמים ללשכת הגזית: The Sages taught: The verse states: “Justice, justice, shall you follow.” This teaches that one should follow the Sages to the academy where they are found. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai to Beror Ḥayil, after Rabbi Yehoshua to Peki’in, after Rabban Gamliel to Yavne, after Rabbi Akiva to Bnei Brak, after Rabbi Matya to Rome [Romi], after Rabbi Ḥananya ben Teradyon to Sikhnei, after Rabbi Yosei to Tzippori, after Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira to Netzivin, after Rabbi Yehoshua to the exile [gola], i.e., Babylonia, after Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to Beit She’arim, and after the Sages in the time of the Temple to the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

דיני ממונות פותחין כו': היכי אמרינן אמר רב יהודה הכי אמרינן להו מי יימר כדקאמריתו § The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable. The Gemara asks: How do we say this opening stage of the deliberations? In other words, with what claim does the court begin deliberating? Rav Yehuda said: We say this to the witnesses: Who says that the event occurred as you said? Perhaps you erred?

א"ל עולא והא חסמינן להו וליחסמו מי לא תניא רבי שמעון בן אליעזר אומר מסיעין את העדים ממקום למקום כדי שתיטרף דעתן ויחזרו בהן Ulla said to him: But by confronting the witnesses in this manner, we silence them. The witnesses will think that the court suspects them of lying, and they will not testify. Rav Yehuda said to him: And let them be silenced. Isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says: In cases of capital law, the court brings the witnesses from one place to another place in order to confuse them so that they will retract their testimony if they are lying.

מי דמי התם ממילא קא מידחו הכא קא דחינן להו בידים The Gemara rejects this argument: Are the halakhot comparable? There, where Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says to bring the witnesses from place to place, the witnesses are repressed by themselves, whereas here, we repress them by direct action, and that the court should not do.

אלא אמר עולא הכי אמרינן יש לך עדים להזימם א"ל רבה וכי פותחין בזכותו של זה שהיא חובתו של זה Rather, Ulla says: We say this to the accused: Do you have witnesses to determine that the witnesses who testified against you are conspiring witnesses? Rabba said to him: But do we open the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused that is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses? This claim can lead to the witnesses incurring liability for their testimony.

ומי הויא חובתו והתנן אין עדים זוממין נהרגין עד שיגמר הדין The Gemara questions Rabba’s assumption: But is this to the liability of the witnesses? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Makkot 5b): Conspiring witnesses are not killed for their testimony until the verdict of the one concerning whom they testified is issued? Therefore, if they will be shown to be conspiring witnesses at this early stage of the proceedings, they will not be liable.

הכי אמינא אילו שתיק האי עד דמיגמר דיניה ומייתי עדים ומזים להו הויא ליה חובתו של זה אלא אמר רבה אמרינן ליה יש לך עדים להכחישן The Gemara restates Rabba’s objection: This is what I say: If the accused would be silent until his verdict is issued and then brings witnesses and the court determines them to be conspiring witnesses, it will be found that the statement of the court is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses. Rather, Rabba says: We say to the accused: Do you have witnesses to contradict them? If the first witnesses are contradicted as to the facts of the case, no one is liable.

רב כהנא אמר מדבריכם נזדכה פלוני אביי ורבא דאמרי תרוייהו אמרי' ליה אי לא קטלת לא תדחל רב אשי אמר כל מי שיודע לו זכות יבא וילמד עליו Rav Kahana said: We say to the witnesses: Based on your statements, so-and-so is acquitted. The court issues a pro forma declaration that it is possible to find a reason to acquit based on the testimony of the witnesses, and then they begin the deliberations. Abaye and Rava both say: We say to the accused: For example, if you did not kill anyone, do not fear the consequences of these proceedings, as you will be acquitted. Rav Ashi says: The court announces: Whoever knows of a reason to acquit the accused should come and teach this reason concerning him.

תניא כוותיה דאביי ורבא רבי אומר (במדבר ה, יט) אם לא שכב איש אותך ואם לא שטית וגו' The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Abaye and Rava. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The priest administering the sota rite to the sota says to her: “If no man has lain with you and if you have not gone astray to impurity while under your husband, you shall be free from this water of bitterness that causes the curse. But if you have gone astray while under your husband…” (Numbers 5:19–20). The priest first states the scenario in which the woman is innocent of adultery.

Daf 33a

מיכן שפותחין בדיני נפשות תחלה לזכות: From here it is derived that in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations by first raising a claim to acquit the accused. This baraita corresponds to the explanation of Abaya and Rava that the court notifies the accused that he has nothing to fear if he is innocent.

דיני ממונות מחזירין כו': ורמינהו דן את הדין זיכה את החייב חייב את הזכאי טימא את הטהור טיהר את הטמא מה שעשה עשוי וישלם מביתו § The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, whether with a claim to exempt him or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a judge issued a judgment and erred, so that he exempts a liable party or finds an innocent party liable, or if he ruled that a pure item is impure or ruled that an impure item is pure, and by doing so he caused a litigant a monetary loss; what he did is done, i.e., the judgment stands, and the judge must pay damages from his home, i.e., from his personal funds. This indicates that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises.

אמר רב יוסף לא קשיא כאן במומחה כאן בשאינו מומחה ובמומחה מחזירין והקתני אם היה מומחה לב"ד פטור מלשלם Rav Yosef says: This is not difficult. The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a judge who was an expert, whereas the mishna there in tractate Bekhorot, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a judge who was not an expert. The Gemara asks: And does one bring the accused back in the case of a judge who was an expert? But that mishna in tractate Bekhorot teaches: If he was an expert accepted by the court he is exempt from liability to pay. This indicates that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, even if the judge is an expert; otherwise there would be no need to state that the judge is exempt from liability to pay.

א"ר נחמן כאן שיש גדול הימנו בחכמה ובמנין כאן שאין גדול הימנו בחכמה ובמנין Rav Naḥman says a different explanation: The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a case where there is a court greater than this one in wisdom and number of students that can judge the case again. The mishna there, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a case where there is no court greater than his in wisdom and number of students that can judge the case again. If this judge erred, the error will not be corrected.

רב ששת אמר כאן שטעה בדבר משנה כאן שטעה בשיקול הדעת דאמר רב ששת אמר רב אסי טעה בדבר משנה חוזר טעה בשיקול הדעת אינו חוזר Rav Sheshet says a different explanation: The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a case where the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, i.e., he forgot an explicit mishnaic ruling, in which case the verdict is void. The mishna there, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a case where the judge erred in his deliberation. As Rav Sheshet says that Rav Asi says: In the case of a judge who erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, but in the case of a judge who erred in his deliberation, the decision is not revoked.

א"ל רבינא לרב אשי אפילו טעה בר' חייא ורבי אושעיא א"ל אין אפילו בדרב ושמואל אמר ליה אין אפילו בדידי ודידך א"ל אטו אנן קטלי קני באגמא אנן Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does the category of: Erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, include even one who erred concerning a statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Oshaya, who were among the last of the tanna’im? Rav Ashi said to him: Yes. Ravina asked him: Does it include even one who erred concerning a statement of the first-generation amora’im Rav and Shmuel? Rav Ashi said to him: Yes. Ravina asked him: Does it include even one who erred concerning statements of mine and yours, as we are of the final generation of amora’im? Rav Ashi said to him: Is that to say that we are reed cutters in the pond? That is, our statements are in this category as well.

היכי דמי שיקול הדעת אמר רב פפא כגון תרי תנאי או תרי אמוראי דפליגי אהדדי ולא איתמר הלכתא לא כמר ולא כמר ואיקרי ועבד כחד מינייהו וסוגיא דשמעת' אזלי כאידך היינו שיקול הדעת The Gemara clarifies: What is considered an error in a deliberation? Rav Pappa says: For example, two tanna’im or two amora’im who disagree with each other, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with this Sage or in accordance with that Sage, and it occurred that the judge acted in accordance with one of them, and the discussion of the halakha goes in accordance with the other opinion, i.e., most judges rule in accordance with the opposing opinion; this is an error in a deliberation.

איתיבי' רב המנונא לרב ששת מעשה בפרה (של בית מנחם) שניטלה האם שלה והאכילה רבי טרפון לכלבים Rav Hamnuna raised an objection to Rav Sheshet from the continuation of the mishna cited earlier (Bekhorot 28b): There was an incident involving a cow of the household of Menaḥem whose womb was removed, and when Rabbi Tarfon was consulted he ruled that it is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which is forbidden for consumption. And based on the ruling of Rabbi Tarfon, the questioner fed it to the dogs.

ובא מעשה לפני חכמים ביבנה והתירוה שאמר תודוס הרופא אין פרה וחזירה יוצאת מאלכסנדריא של מצרים אלא אם כן חותכין האם שלה כדי שלא תלד א"ר טרפון הלכה חמורך טרפון אמר לו רבי עקיבא פטור אתה שכל המומחה לרבים פטור מלשלם The mishna continues: And the incident came before the Sages of the court in Yavne, and they ruled that such an animal is permitted and is not a tereifa. As Theodosius [Todos] the doctor said: A cow or pig does not emerge from Alexandria of Egypt unless the residents sever its womb so that it will not give birth in the future. The breeds of cows and pigs in Alexandria were of exceptional quality and the people of Alexandria did not want them reproduced elsewhere. The fact that these animals lived long lives after their wombs were removed proves that the hysterectomy did not render them tereifot. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Tarfon said: Your donkey is gone, Tarfon, as he believed he was required to compensate the owner for the cow that he ruled to be a tereifa. Rabbi Akiva said to him: You are exempt, as any judge accepted as an expert for the public is exempt from liability to pay.

ואי איתא לימא ליה טועה בדבר משנה אתה וטועה בדבר משנה חוזר Rav Hamnuna states his objection to Rav Sheshet: And if it is so that there is a distinction between the two types of judicial errors, let Rabbi Akiva say to Rabbi Tarfon: You err in a matter that appears in the Mishna, as the ruling that an animal whose womb has been removed is permitted is recorded in a mishna (see Ḥullin 54a), and in the case of one who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked.

חדא ועוד קאמר חדא דטועה בדבר משנה אתה וטועה בדבר משנה חוזר ועוד אי נמי בשיקול הדעת טעית מומחה לרבים אתה וכל המומחה לרבים פטור מלשלם The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva states one reason and adds another reason. One: As you err in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and in the case of one who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. Another: Even if you erred in a deliberation, you are a judge accepted as an expert for the public, and any judge accepted as an expert for the public is exempt from liability to pay.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק לרבא מאי קא מותיב רב המנונא לרב ששת מפרה פרה הרי האכילה לכלבים וליתא דתהדר Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: What was the objection raised by Rav Hamnuna to Rav Sheshet from the incident of the cow? After all, the owner had already fed the cow to the dogs, and it is not possible to revoke the ruling and judge the case again.

הכי קאמר ליה אי אמרת בשלמא טעה בדבר משנה אינו חוזר אלמא קם דינא היינו דקא מפחיד ר"ט וקאמר ליה איהו מומחה לב"ד אתה ואתה פטור מלשלם אלא אי אמרת טעה בדבר משנה חוזר לימא ליה כיון דאילו הואי פרה דינך לאו דינא ולא כלום עבדת השתא נמי לא כלום עבדת Rava answered: This is what Rav Hamnuna was saying to Rav Sheshet: Granted, if you say that in the case of a judge who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is not revoked, which evidently indicates that the verdict stands as it is, that is why Rabbi Tarfon feared that he would have to pay, and Rabbi Akiva said to him: You are an expert accepted by the court, and are exempt from liability to pay. But if you say that in the case of a judge who erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, let Rabbi Akiva say to Rabbi Tarfon: Since if the cow were to be here, your verdict is not a verdict and you did nothing, now as well, you did nothing and you are not liable to pay. It was the action of the owner that caused the loss, as he fed the cow to the dogs.

רב חסדא אמר כאן שנטל ונתן ביד כאן שלא נטל ונתן ביד Rav Ḥisda says that the contradiction between the mishna here and the mishna in tractate Bekhorot as to whether or not the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises can be answered as follows: The mishna there in tractate Bekhorot is stated with regard to a case where a judge took the item in question from one litigant and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. In this case, the judge is liable to pay. The mishna here is stated with regard to a case where a judge of the court did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand. The court merely issued a ruling, and the litigants executed the verdict on their own. Therefore, the court is not liable to pay, and the judges retry the case.

בשלמא חייב את הזכאי כגון שנטל ונתן ביד אלא זיכה את החייב היכי משכחת לה דאמר ליה פטור אתה והא לא נטל ונתן ביד כיון דאמר פטור אתה כמו שנטל ונתן ביד דמי The Gemara asks: Granted, one can explain the clause from the mishna in tractate Bekhorot: He finds an innocent party liable, in a case where the judge took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. But how can you find him giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party? As, the judge said to the litigant only: You are exempt from liability to pay, but the judge did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand. The Gemara explains: Once he says: You are exempt from liability to pay, it is considered as if he took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand, as there is no need for any further action.

אלא מתניתין דקתני דיני ממונות מחזירין בין לזכות בין לחובה בשלמא לזכות משכחת לה דא"ל מעיקרא חייב אתה ולא נטל ולא נתן ביד אלא לחובה היכי משכחת לה דאמר ליה פטור אתה והאמרת כיון דא"ל פטור אתה כמו שנטל ונתן ביד דמי The Gemara asks: But what of the mishna, which teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable? Granted, you can find the example of: To exempt, where the court says at the outset to one litigant: You are liable to pay, and a judge did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand, as Rav Ḥisda holds that the verdict is revoked and the court does not pay. But how can you find the example of judging the case again to find him liable? As once the court says to the litigant: You are exempt, the case cannot be judged again. But you said that once a judge says: You are exempt from liability to pay, it is considered as if he took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. If so, the court must pay and the judgment will not be revoked.

חדא קתני דיני ממונות מחזירין לזכות שהיא חובה דכוותה גבי נפשות מחזירין לזכות The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches only that one statement, and it should be understood as follows: In cases of monetary law, the court brings the litigant back to be judged again to exempt that litigant, which is to the liability of the other litigant, while in the corresponding situation with regard to cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to acquit him,

Daf 33b

ואין מחזירין לחובה מחזירין לזכות זכות גרידתא ואין מחזירין לחובה לזכות שהיא חובה but they do not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. When the mishna says: The court brings the accused back to acquit him, this is an acquittal alone and is not to anyone’s liability. When it says: But they do not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable, this is an acquittal that is also a liability. The court does not bring the accused back to acquit him if this entails a liability to another.

חובתיה דמאן הא לא קשיא חובתיה דגואל הדם משום חובתיה דגואל הדם קטלינן ליה להאי ועוד מאי בין בין קשיא The Gemara clarifies: A liability for whom? There is no other litigant in cases of capital law. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, this is to the liability, i.e., the detriment, of the blood redeemer, as he desires that the murderer be killed, and he will no longer be allowed to kill him. The Gemara questions this explanation: Is it reasonable that due to the liability of the blood redeemer, we kill this one and do not reverse the verdict to acquit him even when there is a reason to do so? And further, what is the meaning of the term: Whether with a claim to exempt the accused, or whether with a claim to find him liable? It is clear that this is referring to two separate matters, not to two types of acquittal. The Gemara comments: This is difficult.

רבינא אמר כגון שהיה לו בידו משכון ונטלו ממנו The Gemara cites another explanation of how one can find a judge giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party. Ravina said: It is possible in a case where the one who lodged the claim had in his possession an item belonging to the other litigant that functioned as collateral for a debt, and when the judge issued a verdict in favor of the other he took the collateral from him, thereby physically transferring it to the wrong party.

טימא את הטהור דאגעי ביה שרץ טיהר את הטמא שעירבן בין פירותיו: In the case from the mishna in tractate Bekhorot: He ruled that a pure item is impure, how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is where he had the litigant’s ritually pure item touch a creeping animal to emphasize that he believes it was already impure, and he thereby imparted impurity to it. In that mishna’s case of: He ruled that an impure item is pure, how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is where he mixed this impure produce of the litigant’s with the litigant’s ritually pure produce, and he thereby caused all of the produce to be considered impure.

דיני נפשות כו': ת"ר מניין ליוצא מבית דין חייב ואמר אחד יש לי ללמד עליו זכות מניין שמחזירין אותו ת"ל (שמות כג, ז) נקי אל תהרג § The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. To explain the terms “innocent” and “righteous” in the verse: “And the innocent and the righteous you shall not slay” (Exodus 23:7), the Sages taught: From where is it derived that with regard to one who is leaving the court having been found liable, and someone said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court brings the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: The innocent you shall not slay, and the accused may in fact be innocent.

ומניין ליוצא מב"ד זכאי ואמר אחד יש לי ללמד עליו חובה מניין שאין מחזירין אותו ת"ל (שמות כג, ז) צדיק אל תהרג And from where is it derived that with regard to one who is leaving the court, having been acquitted, and someone says: I have the ability to teach a reason to find him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: “The righteous you shall not slay,” and the accused was found righteous in his trial.

א"ר שימי בר אשי וחילופא למסית דכתיב (דברים יג, ט) לא תחמול ולא תכסה עליו רב כהנא מתני (דברים יג, י) מכי הרג תהרגנו Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: And the opposite of this is the halakha with regard to one who entices others to engage in idol worship, as it is written concerning him: “Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9). He is brought back to court to find him liable, but not to acquit him. Rav Kahana teaches this last halakha citing a different verse concerning the enticer: “But you shall kill him [harog tahargennu]” (Deuteronomy 13:10). The repetition of the verb indicates that he is killed even in circumstances where transgressors of other prohibitions would not be.

בעא מניה רבי זירא מרב ששת חייבי גליות (מניין) אתיא רוצח רוצח Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to be exiled to a city of refuge for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term “murderer” stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:16) and the term “murderer” stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally (see Numbers 35:19).

חייבי מלקיות (מניין) אתיא רשע רשע Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to receive forty lashes is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term “wicked” stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:31) and the term “wicked” stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes (see Deuteronomy 25:2).

תניא נמי הכי חייבי גליות מניין אתיא רוצח רוצח חייבי מלקות מניין אתיא רשע רשע: The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:3): From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to be exiled for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term “murderer” stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term “murderer” stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally. From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to receive forty lashes is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term “wicked” stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term “wicked” stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes.

ואין מחזירין לחובה: אמר ר' חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן והוא שטעה בדבר שאין הצדוקין מודין בו אבל טעה בדבר שהצדוקין מודין בו זיל קרי בי רב הוא § The mishna teaches concerning cases of capital law: But the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And this is the halakha only in a case where the judge erred with regard to a matter for which the Sadducees do not admit to its validity, i.e., he erred in a matter learned from tradition or established by the Sages. But if the judge erred in a matter for which the Sadducees admit to its validity, i.e., a matter that is written explicitly in the Torah, it is a topic that you could go learn in a children’s school, and such an error negates the verdict and is reversed.

בעא מיניה רבי חייא בר אבא מרבי יוחנן טעה בנואף ונואפת מהו א"ל אדמוקדך יקיד זיל קוץ קרך וצלי איתמר נמי א"ר אמי א"ר יוחנן טעה בנואף חוזר Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked of Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is the halakha in the case of a judge who erred with regard to the judgment of an adulterer and adulteress, by ruling that only the man is liable but not the woman? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: While your fire is burning, cut your squash and roast it, i.e., seize the opportunity to add this case to the principle I taught you earlier. It was also stated: Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Concerning a judge who erred with regard to an adulterer, the court revokes the verdict.

אלא היכי דמי אין חוזרין א"ר אבהו אמר רבי יוחנן כגון שטעה שלא כדרכה: The Gemara asks: Rather, what are the circumstances where the court does not revoke the acquittal? Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case where he erred and acquitted the adulterer who engaged in sexual intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse. The halakha that this is considered sexual intercourse is not explicit in a verse. Therefore, if a court acquits one so accused, the verdict is not revoked.

דיני ממונות הכל כו': הכל ואפילו עדים נימא מתניתין ר' יוסי ברבי יהודה היא ולא רבנן § The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. The Gemara asks: In capital cases, may all those present teach a reason to acquit, and even witnesses? The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

דתניא (במדבר לה, ל) ועד אחד לא יענה בנפש בין לזכות בין לחובה ר' יוסי בר' יהודה אומר עונה לזכות ואין עונה לחובה The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die” (Numbers 35:30). A witness cannot state anything other than his testimony, whether to provide a reason to acquit the accused or to provide a reason to find him liable; this is the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A witness may answer to provide a reason to acquit, but a witness may not answer to provide a reason to find the accused liable. The mishna here seems to be in accordance with the minority opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

אמר רב פפא באחד מן התלמידים ודברי הכל Rav Pappa says: When the mishna refers to all those present at the trial, it is not referring to the witnesses but to one of the students sitting before the court, and therefore all agree with the ruling of the mishna.

Daf 34a

מאי טעמא דר' יוסי בר יהודה דאמר קרא (במדבר לה, ל) עד אחד לא יענה בנפש למות למות הוא דאינו עונה אבל לזכות עונה ורבנן אמר ריש לקיש משום דמיחזי כנוגע בעדותו The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As the verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.” One can infer: That he die is the matter concerning which he does not testify, but he does testify to acquit. The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of the Rabbis? Reish Lakish says: A witness cannot offer any statements beyond his testimony because it appears as though he is biased in his testimony. If the court finds the accused liable based on the witness’s testimony, the witness could later be accused of being a conspiring witness. Therefore, it is to his advantage to have the court acquit the accused.

ורבנן האי למות מאי דרשי ביה מוקמי ליה באחד מן התלמידים כדתניא אמר אחד מן העדים יש לי ללמד עליו זכות מניין שאין שומעין לו ת"ל עד אחד לא יענה מניין לאחד מן התלמידים שאמר יש לי ללמד עליו חובה מניין שאין שומעין לו ת"ל אחד לא יענה בנפש למות: The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, in what manner do they interpret this term: “That he die”? The Gemara answers: They establish it as teaching the halakha with regard to one of the students. As it is taught in a baraita: If one of the witnesses said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: “One witness shall not testify.” From where is it derived that if there is one of the students who said: I have the ability to teach a reason to deem him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.”

דיני נפשות המלמד כו': אמר רב לא שנו אלא בשעת משא ומתן אבל בשעת גמר דין מלמד זכות חוזר ומלמד חובה § The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to deem the accused liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit him may not return and teach a reason to deem him liable. Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to the time of the deliberations of the court, but at the time of the verdict, one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable.

מיתיבי למחרת משכימין ובאין המזכה אומר אני המזכה ומזכה אני במקומי המחייב אומר אני המחייב ומחייב אני במקומי המלמד חובה מלמד זכות אבל המלמד זכות אינו יכול לחזור וללמד חובה The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (40a): The following day, i.e., the day after the initial deliberations, the judges would arise early and come to court. One who yesterday was of the opinion to acquit says: I said to acquit, and I acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then teach a reason to deem him liable.

והא למחרת גמר דין הוא וליטעמיך למחרת משא ומתן מי ליכא כי קתני בשעת משא ומתן The Gemara explains the objection: But the following day is at the time of the verdict, and the mishna rules that a judge who had said to acquit may not change his opinion. The Gemara questions this reading of the mishna: And according to your reasoning, are there no deliberations on the following day? The deliberations may resume on the next day. Therefore, one can say that when the mishna teaches that the judge may not change his opinion, it is with regard to the time of the deliberations.

ת"ש דנין אלו כנגד אלו עד שיראה אחד מן המחייבין דברי המזכין ואם איתא ליתני נמי איפכא תנא אזכות קא מהדר אחובה לא קא מהדר The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of that mishna, which teaches that if the number of judges who deem him liable is one more than the number of judges who acquit, they continue to deliberate the matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn someone to death by a majority of one judge. The Gemara states its proof: And if it is so that one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable, let the mishna also teach the opposite possibility. The Gemara explains: The tanna is searching for scenarios of acquittal, he is not searching for scenarios of liability. It may be that the halakha is the same in the opposite case, but the tanna prefers to employ an example of acquittal.

ת"ש דאמר ר' יוסי בר חנינא אחד מן התלמידים שזיכה ומת רואין אותו כאילו חי ועומד במקומו ואמאי נימא אילו הוה קיים הדר ביה השתא מיהא לא הדר ביה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In a case where there was one of the students who argued to acquit and then died, the court views him as if he were alive and standing in his place and voting to acquit. The Gemara asks: But why? According to the opinion of Rav, that a judge may change his opinion at the time of the verdict, let us say: Perhaps if that student were alive, he would retract his opinion and find the accused liable. The Gemara explains: Now, in any event, he did not retract from his opinion. The assumption is that he would not have changed his opinion, although one can do so.

והא שלחו מתם לדברי ר' יוסי בר חנינא מוצא מכלל רבינו אין מוצא איתמר The Gemara questions this explanation: But the Sages sent a statement from there, Eretz Yisrael: According to this version of the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, he engages in a dispute with our teacher, i.e., Rav. Apparently, the previous explanation, which reconciles their opinions, is incorrect. The Gemara answers: That tradition was not accurate, and it was stated that he does not engage in a dispute with Rav.

תא שמע שני סופרי הדיינין עומדין לפניהן אחד מן הימין ואחד מן השמאל וכותבין דברי המזכין ודברי המחייבין The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: After the initial deliberations, two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right, and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable.

בשלמא דברי המחייבין למחר חזו טעמא אחרינא ובעו למעבד הלנת דין אלא דברי המזכין מאי טעמא לאו משום דאי חזו טעמא אחרינא לחובה לא משגחינן בהו The Gemara explains the proof: Granted, they write the statements of those who find the accused liable even though they may not change their opinions, as on the following day they may see another reason to find the accused liable, not the reason they gave the day before. And once this new reason is given, the court is required to perform a suspension of the trial until the following day, as they may not issue a verdict in cases of capital law on the same day as the deliberations. But what is the reason the scribes write the statements of those who acquit the accused? Is it not because the halakha is that if the judges would see another reason to find the accused liable, we do not pay heed to them, and in order to ensure that the judges do not change their opinions, the scribes write their statements?

לא כדי שלא יאמרו שנים טעם אחד משני מקראות כדבעא מיניה רבי אסי מרבי יוחנן אמרו שנים טעם אחד משני מקראות מהו אמר ליה אין מונין להן אלא אחד The Gemara answers: No, the reason they write their statements is so that two of the judges should not say one explanation to acquit from two different verses. If two judges each say the same reason to acquit, but derive their reason from different verses, they are not counted as two votes. As Rabbi Asi asked of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If two of the judges say one explanation to acquit from two different verses, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: We count them only as one, as it is clear that one of the derivations is in error.

מנהני מילי אמר אביי דאמר קרא (תהלים סב, יב) אחת דבר אלהים שתים זו שמעתי כי עז לאלהים מקרא אחד יוצא לכמה טעמים ואין טעם אחד יוצא מכמה מקראות דבי ר' ישמעאל תנא (ירמיהו כג, כט) וכפטיש יפוצץ סלע מה פטיש זה מתחלק לכמה ניצוצות אף מקרא אחד יוצא לכמה טעמים § The Gemara discusses the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan: From where is this matter derived? Abaye says: As the verse states: “God has spoken once, twice I have heard this; that strength belongs to God” (Psalms 62:12). Abaye explains: One verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations, but one explanation does not emerge from several verses. Alternatively, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: “Is not My word like as fire? says the Lord; and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces” (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as this hammer breaks a stone into several fragments, so too, one verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations.

היכי דמי טעם אחד משני מקראות אמר רב זביד כדתנן מזבח מקדש את הראוי לו The Gemara clarifies: What is considered one explanation from two different verses? Rav Zevid says: As we learned in a mishna (Zevaḥim 83a): With regard to certain items that are disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, once they have been placed on the altar they are nevertheless sacrificed, but the altar sanctifies only items that are suited for it, as the Gemara will explain. The tanna’im disagree as to what is considered suited for the altar.

רבי יהושע אומר כל הראוי לאשים אם עלה לא ירד שנאמר (ויקרא ו, ב) העולה על מוקדה מה עולה שהיא ראויה לאשים אם עלתה לא תרד אף כל שהוא ראוי לאשים אם עלה לא ירד Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, e.g., burnt-offerings and the portions of other offerings burned on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, it shall not descend. Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, as it is stated: “It is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt-offering that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too with regard to any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.

רבן גמליאל אומר כל הראוי למזבח אם עלה לא ירד שנאמר היא העולה על מוקדה על המזבח מה עולה שהיא ראויה לגבי מזבח אם עלתה לא תרד אף כל שהוא ראוי למזבח אם עלה לא ירד Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, as it is stated: “It is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar,” from which it is derived: Just as a burnt-offering that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too any item that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.

ותרוייהו מאי קמרבו פסולין מר מייתי לה ממוקדה ומר מייתי לה ממזבח Rav Zevid explains: And what do the two of them include by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that if they ascend they do not descend. One Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, brings proof for this halakha from the term “on the pyre,” and one Sage, Rabban Gamliel, brings proof to this halakha from the term “upon the altar.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

והא התם מיפלג פליגי דקתני סיפא אין בין דברי רבן גמליאל לדברי ר' יהושע אלא הדם והנסכים שר"ג אומר לא ירדו ור' יהושע אומר ירדו The Gemara questions this example: But there, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel disagree, and their explanations cannot therefore be identical. As the latter clause of that mishna teaches: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only with regard to disqualified blood and libations, which are not consumed by the fire, but do ascend onto the altar, as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend, as they are fit to ascend on the altar, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend, as they are not burned on the altar.

אלא אמר רב פפא כדתניא ר' יוסי הגלילי אומר מתוך שנאמר Rather, Rav Pappa says: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From the fact that it is stated:

Daf 34b

(שמות כט, לז) כל הנוגע במזבח יקדש שומע אני בין ראוי בין שאינו ראוי ת"ל (שמות כט, לח) כבשים מה כבשים ראויין אף כל ראוי ר' עקיבא אומר (שמות כט, כה) עולה מה עולה ראויה אף כל ראוי “Whatsoever touches the altar shall be sanctified” (Exodus 29:37), I would derive that this applies to every item, whether it is suited to be an offering, or unsuited to be an offering. The following verse states: “Now this is that which you shall offer upon the altar: Two lambs of the first year day by day continually” (Exodus 29:38); from this I derive: Just as lambs are suited to be offerings, so too, everything that is suited to be an offering is included in this halakha. The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says: The offerings discussed in this passage are each referred to as a burnt-offering (see Exodus 29:42). Therefore, I derive: Just as a burnt-offering is suited for the altar, so too, everything that is suited for the altar is included in this halakha.

ותרוייהו מאי קא ממעטו פסולי מר מייתי לה מכבשים ומר מייתי לה מעולה Rav Pappa explains: And what do the two of them exclude by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that they do not become sanctified if they touch the altar. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, brings proof for this halakha from the term “lambs,” and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term “burnt-offering.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

והאמר רב אדא בר אהבה עולת העוף פסולה איכא בינייהו מאן דמייתי לה מכבשים כבשים אין אבל עולת העוף לא ומאן דמייתי לה מעולה אפילו עולת העוף נמי The Gemara questions this example: But doesn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava say that the difference between them is with regard to a disqualified bird burnt-offering? The one who brings proof for this halakha from the term “lambs” holds that: Lambs, yes, they are included in this halakha, but a bird burnt-offering is not. And the one who brings proof for this halakha from the term “burnt-offering” holds that a bird burnt-offering is also included in this halakha.

אלא אמר רב אשי כדתניא (ויקרא יז, ד) דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך לרבות את הזורק דברי רבי ישמעאל Rather, Rav Ashi said: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who violates the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Tent of Meeting, the verse states: “Whatever man there be of the house of Israel, that kills an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that kills it outside the camp; and to the opening of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed unto that man; he shed blood; and this man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4). This verse serves to include one who sprinkles the blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

ר"ע אומר (ויקרא יז, ח) או זבח לרבות את הזורק ותרוייהו מאי קא מרבו זריקה מר מייתי לה מדם יחשב ומר מייתי לה מאו זבח The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says that when the verse states: “Whatever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, that offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8), it serves to include one who sprinkles blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting. Rav Ashi explains: What do the two tanna’im include by means of these explanations? One who performs sprinkling of the blood outside the Tent of Meeting. One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, brings proof for this halakha from the phrase “blood shall be imputed,” and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term “or sacrifice.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

והאמר רבי אבהו שחט וזרק איכא בינייהו לדברי רבי ישמעאל אינו חייב אלא אחת לדברי ר"ע חייב שתים The Gemara questions this example: But doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say that the difference between them is with regard to one who slaughtered the offering and sprinkled the blood, as according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for only one transgression, and according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable for two transgressions?

הא איתמר עלה אמר אביי אף לדברי ר"ע נמי אינו חייב אלא אחת דאמר קרא (דברים יב, יד) שם תעלה עולותיך ושם תעשה ערבינהו רחמנא לכולהו עשיות: The Gemara responds: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita that Abaye says: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable for only one transgression, as the verse states: “But in the place that the Lord shall choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer your burnt-offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). The Merciful One combined all the actions with regard to offerings as one transgression. According to the explanation of Abaye, there is in fact no practical dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva with regard to this matter, and it serves as an example of one explanation from two different verses.

דיני ממונות דנין ביום וכו': (סימן משפ"ט מענ"ה מט"ה) מנהני מילי א"ר חייא בר פפא דאמר קרא (שמות יח, כו) ושפטו את העם בכל עת § The mishna teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue their ruling even at night. Before discussing this ruling, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for three of the forthcoming discussions: Judgment, answer, incline. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters concerning the time of the deliberations derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Pappa says: As the verse states: “And let them judge the people at all times” (Exodus 18:22), indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night.

אי הכי תחלת דין נמי כדרבא דרבא רמי כתיב ושפטו את העם בכל עת וכתיב (דברים כא, טז) והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו הא כיצד יום לתחלת דין לילה לגמר דין The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so that this is the source of the halakha, the court should be able to conduct the initial stage of the trial at night, as well. The Gemara explains: It is possible to resolve the matter in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: “And let them judge the people at all times,” indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night, and it is written in another verse: “Then it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has” (Deuteronomy 21:16), indicating that cases of inheritance are judged only during the day. Rava explains: How can these texts be reconciled? The verse referring to the day is stated with regard to the initial stage of the trial, and the verse that includes the night is stated with regard to the verdict.

מתניתין דלא כר' מאיר דתניא היה ר"מ אומר מה ת"ל (דברים כא, ה) על פיהם יהיה כל ריב וכל נגע וכי מה ענין ריבים אצל נגעים The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to the priests: “According to their word shall every dispute and every leprous sore be” (Deuteronomy 21:5)? And what do disputes have to do with leprous sores?

אלא מקיש ריבים לנגעים מה נגעים ביום דכתיב (ויקרא יג, יד) וביום הראות בו אף ריבים ביום ומה נגעים שלא בסומין דכתיב (ויקרא יג, יב) לכל מראה עיני הכהן אף ריבים שלא בסומין ומקיש נגעים לריבים מה ריבים שלא בקרובים אף נגעים שלא בקרובים The baraita continues: Rather, the verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous sores, teaching that just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written: “And on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure” (Leviticus 13:14), so too disputes are judged only in the daytime. And just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: “As far as appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12), so too disputes are judged by sighted judges, not by blind judges. And the verse juxtaposes leprous sores to disputes, teaching that just as disputes are judged by independent judges, not by judges who are relatives of the litigants, so too leprous sores are viewed by a priest who is not a relative of the afflicted person.

אי מה ריבים בשלשה אף נגעים בשלשה ודין הוא ממונו בשלשה גופו לא כל שכן ת"ל (ויקרא יג, ב) והובא אל אהרן הכהן או אל אחד וגו' הא למדת שאפילו כהן אחד רואה את הנגעים The baraita continues: If these two matters are juxtaposed, why not say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too leprous sores are viewed by three priests? And this would be supported by a logical inference: If a case involving one’s money is judged by three judges, is it not clear all the more so that the person himself should be viewed by three priests? To counter this, the verse states: “And he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). From this you have learned that even one priest views leprous sores. In any event, as opposed to the mishna, Rabbi Meir holds that disputes are judged only during the day.

ההוא סמיא דהוה בשבבותיה דרבי יוחנן דהוה דאין דינא ולא אמר ליה רבי יוחנן ולא מידי היכי עביד הכי והא"ר יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה ותנן כל הכשר לדון כשר להעיד ויש שכשר להעיד ואין כשר לדון ואמר ר' יוחנן לאתויי סומא באחת מעיניו The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind man who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yoḥanan who would serve as a judge, and Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How did he do this, i.e., allow the blind man to judge? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say: The halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, and we learned in an unattributed mishna (Nidda 49b): Anyone who is fit to judge is fit to testify, but there are those who are fit to testify but not fit to judge. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The latter clause serves to include one who is blind in one of his eyes, who is fit to testify but is not fit to judge. All the more so Rabbi Yoḥanan would agree that the unattributed mishna holds that one blind in both eyes is disqualified from serving as a judge.

ר' יוחנן סתמא אחריתא אשכח דיני ממונות דנין ביום וגומרין בלילה The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna, i.e., the mishna here, which indicates that a blind man can serve as a judge: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. Accordingly, judging cases of monetary law is not compared to viewing leprous sores, which is the source for disqualifying a blind judge.

מאי אולמיה דהאי סתמא מהאי סתמא אי בעית אימא סתמא דרבים עדיף ואי בעית אימא משום דקתני לה גבי הלכתא דדינא The Gemara asks: In what way is the strength of this unattributed mishna greater than the strength of that unattributed mishna? Why would Rabbi Yoḥanan rule in accordance with this one and not that one? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages is preferable, as the mishna in tractate Nidda is written in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir of the baraita. And if you wish, say it is because this unattributed mishna teaches this halakha in the context of the halakhot of judgment. Since this chapter is the primary source for all halakhot of judgments, the ruling written here carries greater weight.

ורבי מאיר האי ושפטו את העם בכל עת מאי דריש ביה אמר רבא לאיתויי יום המעונן דתנן אין רואין את הנגעים שחרית ובין הערבים ולא בתוך הבית ולא ביום המעונן מפני שכהה נראית עזה ולא בצהרים מפני שעזה נראית כהה The Gemara continues its discussion of these opinions. And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: “And let them judge the people at all times”? Rava said: He interprets that it serves to include a cloudy day, teaching that although a priest does not view a leprous sore on a cloudy day, the court may judge a case on a cloudy day. As we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 2:2): A priest does not view leprous sores during the early morning when the sun is not in full force, and not during the late afternoon, and not in a house, and not on a cloudy day. This is because a dull white sore appears bright, and a bright white sore is deemed ritually impure. And a priest does not view leprous sores at midday, because a bright white spot appears dull and the priest will mistakenly deem it ritually pure. The priest views the leprous sores during the late morning or early afternoon.

ורבי מאיר האי ביום הנחילו את בניו מאי עביד ליה ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדתני רבה בר חנינא קמיה דרב נחמן והיה ביום הנחילו את בניו ביום אתה מפיל נחלות ואי אתה מפיל נחלות בלילה א"ל אלא מעתה מאן דשכיב ביממא ירתון ליה בניה ומאן דשכיב בליליא לא ירתון ליה בניה And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: “On the day that he causes his sons to inherit”? He already derived from the juxtaposition to leprous sores that the court cannot issue a verdict at night. The Gemara answers: He requires that verse to teach the halakha that Rabba bar Ḥanina taught in the presence of Rav Naḥman: The verse states: “Then it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has” (Deuteronomy 21:16). The addition of the term “on the day” teaches that it is specifically during the day that you can distribute inheritances, but you cannot distribute inheritances at night. Rav Naḥman said to him: That cannot be the halakha, as, if that is so, then it ought to be that it is only in the case of one who dies during the day that his children inherit from him but that with regard to one who dies at night, his children do not inherit from him, and this is not the case.

דילמא דין נחלות קאמרת דתניא (במדבר כז, יא) והיתה לבני ישראל לחקת משפט אורעה כל הפרשה כולה להיות דין Rav Naḥman suggests: Perhaps you are stating a distinction between day and night with regard to the adjudication of inheritances. A proof for this distinction is as it is taught in a baraita: A verse in the passage concerning inheritance states: “And it shall be for the children of Israel a statute of judgment” (Numbers 27:11), teaching that the entire portion is placed [ure’a] together to be considered a matter of judgment, subject to the procedural rules that apply to a matter of the court.

כדרב יהודה אמר רב דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב שלשה שנכנסו לבקר את החולה רצו כותבין רצו עושין דין שנים כותבין ואין עושין דין And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In a case where there were three people who entered a room to visit an ill person, and the ill person desires to write a will in order to distribute his property following his death, if the visitors wish to do so, they can write his will and sign it as witnesses, and if they wish, they can act in judgment, i.e., they can act as a court in the matter, since they are three. Therefore, they can determine that the will has the validity of an act of the court and transfer the property to the heirs in their capacity as a court. But if only two came to visit the ill person, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment, since three are required to form a court.

ואמר רב חסדא לא שנו אלא ביום אבל בלילה כותבין ואין עושין דין משום דהוו להו עדים ואין עד נעשה דיין אמר ליה אין הכי קאמינא: And Rav Ḥisda says: This halakha was taught only in a case where the three came to visit him during the day; but if the three of them came at night, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment. What is the reason that they cannot act in judgment on the next day? It is because they are already witnesses to the will of the deceased, and there is a principle that a witness cannot become a judge, i.e., one who acts as a witness in a particular matter cannot become a judge with regard to that same matter. Rabba bar Ḥanina said to Rav Naḥman: Yes, it is indeed so that this is what I was saying.

דיני נפשות דנין ביום וכו': מנהני מילי אמר רב שימי בר חייא אמר קרא (במדבר כה, ד) והוקע אותם לה' נגד השמש א"ר חסדא מניין להוקעה שהיא תלייה דכתיב (שמואל ב כא, ו) והוקענום לה' בגבעת שאול בחיר ה' § The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling in the daytime. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to Israelites who worshipped the idol of Peor in the wilderness: “And hang [hoka] them unto the Lord, facing the sun” (Numbers 25:4), indicating that capital cases are judged in the face of the sun, i.e., during the day. Rav Ḥisda says: From where is it derived that hoka’a is hanging? Where the Gibeonites requested to be given Saul’s sons, as it is written: “Vehoka’anum unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul, the chosen of the Lord” (II Samuel 21:6).

Daf 35a

וכתיב (שמואל ב כא, י) ותקח רצפה בת איה את השק ותטהו לה אל הצור בתחלת קציר And it is written: “And Rizpah, daughter of Aiah, took sackcloth and spread it for her upon the rock, from the beginning of harvest until water was poured upon them from heaven; and she suffered neither the birds of the air to rest on them by day, nor the beasts of the field by night” (II Samuel 21:10). It is clear from this verse that the bodies of the children of Saul remained exposed outdoors; presumably, they were hung.

וכתיב (במדבר כה, ד) ויאמר ה' אל משה קח את כל ראשי העם אם העם חטאו ראשי העם מה חטאו The Gemara discusses the incident of the Israelites who worshipped the idol of Peor in the wilderness. And it is written: “And the Lord said unto Moses: Take all the chiefs of the people, and hang them unto the Lord facing the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord may turn away from Israel” (Numbers 25:4). The Gemara asks: If the nation transgressed, in what manner did the chiefs of the people transgress? The verse does not record a transgression of the chiefs, so why were they punished?

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אמר לו הקב"ה למשה חלק להם בתי דינין מ"ט אילימא משום שאין דנין שנים ביום אחד והאמר רב חסדא לא שנו אלא בשתי מיתות אבל במיתה אחת דנין Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The reason for selecting the chiefs of the tribes was not to punish them. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Apportion courts for the chiefs of the tribes, and each court will judge and punish the transgressors of its tribe. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that multiple courts were needed for this? If we say that it is due to the principle that a court does not judge two cases of capital law in one day, and there were many cases to be judged, that cannot be the reason. But doesn’t Rav Ḥisda say: This principle was taught only with regard to two different types of death imposed by a court, as each case needs sufficient time to be fully investigated on its own merits. But the court does judge multiple cases of one type of death, i.e., one transgression, on the same day.

אלא כדי שישוב חרון אף מישראל: The Gemara explains: Rather, the reason for the appointment of multiple courts was in order that the fierce anger of the Lord may turn away from Israel. The fierce anger of God would remain until those who engaged in idol worship were punished. Therefore, it was necessary to try them in due haste.

דיני ממונות גומרין בו ביום כו': מנהני מילי § The mishna teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived?

א"ר חנינא דאמר קרא (ישעיהו א, כא) מלאתי משפט צדק ילין בה ועתה מרצחים ורבא אמר מהכא (ישעיהו א, יז) אשרו חמוץ אשרו דיין שמחמץ את דינו Rabbi Ḥanina said: The verse states prophetically concerning Jerusalem after the destruction of the First Temple: “She that was full of justice, righteousness lodged in her, but now murderers” (Isaiah 1:21). The verse associates lodging, or waiting overnight, with justice. And Rava says that these matters are derived from here: “Learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve [ashru] the oppressed [ḥamotz]” (Isaiah 1:17). This is interpreted: Praise [ashru] the judge who delays [meḥametz] his verdict before he pronounces it.

ואידך אשרו חמוץ ולא חומץ ואידך האי מלאתי משפט מאי עביד ליה And the other amora, Rabbi Ḥanina, who did not derive this halakha from this verse, interprets it as meaning: Relieve the robbery victim [ḥamotz], but not the robber [ḥometz], as do the wicked judges. The Gemara asks: And the other amora, Rava, what does he do with this verse: “She that was full of justice, righteousness lodged in her, but now murderers”?

כדר' אלעזר אמר ר' יצחק דא"ר אלעזר אמר רבי יצחק כל תענית שמלינין בו את הצדקה כאילו שופך דמים שנאמר מלאתי משפט צדק וגו' וה"מ בריפתא ותמרי אבל בזוזי חיטי ושערי לית לן בה: The Gemara answers: Rava interprets it in accordance with the statement that Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says, as Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Every fast day on which the distribution of charity [tzedaka] is left overnight, this is considered as if one spilled the blood of the poor people, as they fasted all day in the expectation that they would receive charity before the day was over in order to purchase food with which to break their fasts. As it is stated: “She that was full of justice [tzedek], righteousness lodged in her, but now murderers.” The Gemara clarifies: And this statement applies with regard to the delaying of the distribution of bread and dates, which are ready to be consumed; but with regard to the delaying of the distribution of money, wheat, and barley, we have no problem with it.

לפיכך אין דנין כו': מ"ט § After teaching that in cases of capital law, the verdict may not be issued on the same day as the deliberations, the mishna states: Therefore, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor on the eve of a Festival. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? What does the halakha that the verdict may not be issued on the same day as the deliberations have to do with not judging cases on those days?

משום דלא אפשר היכי ליעבד לידייניה במעלי שבתא וליגמריה לדיניה במעלי שבתא דילמא חזו טעם לחובה ובעו למיעבד הלנת דין לדייניה במעלי שבתא וליגמריה בשבתא וליקטליה בשבתא אין רציחה דוחה את שבת וליקטליה לאורתא נגד השמש בעינן The Gemara explains: It is because it is not possible to conduct the trial on the eve of Shabbat or the eve of a Festival. As, how should we act? If we say that we should judge him on Shabbat eve and conclude his verdict on Shabbat eve, perhaps we would see a reason to find the accused liable, and in this situation the court is required to perform a suspension of the trial until the following day, as the court may not issue a verdict in cases of capital law on the same day as the deliberations. If we say: We should judge him on Shabbat eve and conclude the verdict on Shabbat, and, if he is found liable, kill him on Shabbat, that cannot be done, as the murder of one liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment does not override Shabbat. And if we say: We should kill him at night, after the conclusion of Shabbat, that cannot be done, as we require that the capital punishment be administered facing the sun, during the daytime.

וליגמרי' לדיניה בשבתא וליקטליה בחד בשבתא נמצא אתה מענה את דינו נידייניה במעלי שבתא ונגמריה בחד בשבתא מינשו טעמייהו אף על גב דשני סופרי הדיינין עומדים לפניהם וכותבין דברי המזכין ודברי המחייבין נהי דבפומא כתבין ליבא דאינשי אינשי הלכך לא אפשר And if we say: We should judge him on Shabbat eve, conclude his verdict on Shabbat, and kill him on Sunday, you are found to have caused a delay in his verdict, as the accused will have to wait overnight knowing he is condemned to death. And if we say: We should judge him on Shabbat eve and conclude his verdict on Sunday, the judges will forget their reasons for their positions in the interim. And even though two judges’ scribes are standing before them, and they write the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable, and they write that which emerged from the mouths of the judges, i.e., their tentative verdict, the hearts of people [enashei] are forgetful [inshei], and they will forget the reasons. Therefore, it is not possible to begin deliberations in cases of capital law on a Shabbat eve or a Festival eve.

א"ל ר"ל לר' יוחנן ותהא קבורת מת מצוה דוחה שבת מק"ו ומה עבודה שדוחה שבת קבורת מת מצוה דוחה אותה מולאחותו § The Gemara discusses a related matter: Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: And the burial of a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva] should override Shabbat by means of an a fortiori inference: If with regard to the Temple service, which overrides Shabbat, yet the burial of a met mitzva overrides it, based on the interpretation of the term written with regard to a nazirite: “Or for his sister” (Numbers 6:7); the Gemara pauses its recounting of the question of Reish Lakish and cites a baraita that teaches this halakha.

כדתני' (במדבר ו, ז) לאביו ולאמו לאחיו ולאחותו מה ת"ל הרי שהיה הולך לשחוט את פסחו ולמול את בנו As it is taught in a baraita: The verses state with regard to a nazirite: “All the days that he consecrates himself unto the Lord he shall not come near to a dead body. He shall not make himself impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister, when they die” (Numbers 6:6–7). Why must the verse state all of these relatives? It teaches that if a nazirite was going to slaughter his Paschal offering or to circumcise his son

Daf 35b

ושמע שמת לו מת יכול יטמא אמרת לא יטמא and he heard that a relative of his died, one might have thought that he should return and become ritually impure with the impurity imparted by a corpse to bury his relative. You said: “He shall not make himself impure”; the death of his relative will not override so significant a mitzva from the Torah.

יכול כשם שאינו מטמא לאחותו כך אינו מטמא למת מצוה ת"ל ולאחותו לאחותו הוא דאינו מטמא אבל מטמא למת מצוה One might have thought: Just as he may not become impure to bury his sister, so he may not become impure to bury a met mitzva. Therefore, the verse states specifically: “Or for his sister”; teaching that he may not become impure only to bury his sister, as others can attend to her burial, but he may become impure to bury a met mitzva.

שבת שנידחת מפני עבודה אינו דין שתהא קבורת מת מצוה דוחה אותה Having cited the baraita proving that the burial of a met mitzva overrides the Temple service, Reish Lakish continues his suggestion: With regard to Shabbat, which is overridden due to the Temple service, is it not logical that the burial of a met mitzva overrides it?

א"ל רציחה תוכיח שדוחה את העבודה ואינה דוחה את השבת Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: The halakha of murder, i.e., the obligation to kill one found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, proves that this is not the case, as it overrides the Temple service, e.g., if the only priest present is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, he is taken to be killed despite this resulting in the negation of the Temple service, but it does not override Shabbat.

רציחה גופה תדחה את השבת מק"ו מה עבודה שדוחה את השבת רציחה דוחה אותה שנאמר (שמות כא, יד) מעם מזבחי תקחנו למות שבת שנידחת מפני עבודה אינו דין שתהא רציחה דוחה אותה The Gemara asks: Murder itself should override Shabbat based on this a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to the Temple service, which overrides Shabbat, nevertheless murder overrides it, and the source for this is as it is stated: “And if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbor, to slay him with guile; you shall take him from My altar, that he may die” (Exodus 21:14); then with regard to Shabbat, which is overridden due to the Temple service, is it not logical that murder should override it?

אמר רבא כבר פסקה תנא דבי ר' ישמעאל דתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל (שמות לה, ג) לא תבערו אש מה ת"ל Rava said in response: It has already been ruled by a tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: What is the meaning when the verse states: “You shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on Shabbat day” (Exodus 35:3)? All labor is forbidden on Shabbat, based on the verse: “In it you shall not do any manner of work” (Exodus 20:10). Why is kindling fire singled out?

מה ת"ל אי לר' יוסי ללאו יצאת אי לרבי נתן לחלק יצאת כדתניא הבערה ללאו יצאת דברי ר' יוסי ר' נתן אומר לחלק יצאת The Gemara interjects: What is the meaning when the verse states this? If this question is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, this transgression was singled out to teach that one who lights a fire on Shabbat violates an ordinary prohibition, as opposed to the performance of other types of labor on Shabbat, for which one is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment. If this question is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, this transgression was singled out to divide the various labors and to establish liability to receive court-imposed capital punishment for performance of any one of them. The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: Kindling of fire was singled out to teach that one who lights a fire on Shabbat violates an ordinary prohibition, this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Natan says: It was singled out to divide the various labors. Either way, it is clear what the meaning of the verse is.

אלא אמר רבא תנא מושבות קשיא ליה מושבות מה ת"ל מכדי שבת חובת הגוף היא וחובת הגוף נוהגת בין בארץ בין בחו"ל (שמות לה, ג) מושבות דכתב רחמנא למה לי The Gemara clarifies: Rather, Rava said: The term “habitations” in the verse poses a difficulty for the tanna: What is the meaning when the verse states: “You shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on Shabbat day”? After all, Shabbat is an obligation on the person himself, not an obligation bound to any specific location. And the halakha is that an obligation on the person himself is practiced whether in Eretz Yisrael or outside of Eretz Yisrael. Why do I need the term “habitations” that the Merciful One writes in the Torah?

משום רבי ישמעאל אמר תלמיד אחד לפי שנאמר (דברים כא, כב) כי יהיה באיש חטא משפט מות והומת שומע אני בין בחול בין בשבת והא מה אני מקיים (שמות לא, יד) מחלליה מות יומת בשאר מלאכות חוץ ממיתת בית דין או אינו אלא אפי' מיתת ב"ד ומה אני מקיים והומת בחול אבל לא בשבת או אינו אלא אפילו בשבת Rava continues: One student said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that since it is stated: “And if there is in a man a sin deserving of death and he is put to death” (Deuteronomy 21:22), I would derive that the court administers capital punishment both during the week and on Shabbat. And accordingly, how do I realize the meaning of what the verse states concerning Shabbat: “Everyone that desecrates it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14)? One possibility is that the term: Desecration of Shabbat, applies only to other cases in which labor is performed, and excludes instances of the death penalty administered by a court, which is not a desecration of Shabbat. Or rather, derive that even the death penalty administered by a court is prohibited as desecration of Shabbat. And how do I realize the meaning of: “And he is put to death”? One possibility is that the mitzva of executing transgressors applies on weekdays, but not on Shabbat. Or rather, the other possibility is that it applies even on Shabbat.

ת"ל לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם ולהלן הוא אומר (במדבר לה, כט) והיו אלה לכם לחקת משפט לדורותיכם בכל מושבותיכם מה מושבות האמור להלן ב"ד אף מושבות האמור כאן בית דין ואמר רחמנא לא תבערו אש בכל מושבותיכם As these verses can be interpreted in either manner, the verse states: “You shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations on Shabbat day,” and there, with regard to the punishment administered to a murderer, the verse states: “And these shall be for you a statute of judgment throughout your generations in all your habitations” (Numbers 35:29). Just as the term “habitations” that is stated there is referring to the act of a court, so too the term “habitations” that is stated here concerning Shabbat is referring to the act of a court. And the Merciful One states: “You shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations.” This teaches that the court does not administer capital punishment on Shabbat.

אמר אביי השתא דאמרת אין רציחה דוחה את השבת אין רציחה דוחה את העבודה מקל וחומר ומה שבת שנידחית מפני העבודה אין רציחה דוחה אותה עבודה שהיא דוחה את השבת אינו דין שלא תהא רציחה דוחה אותה Abaye says: Now that you have said that murder of one condemned by the court does not override Shabbat, one should say that murder does not override the performance of the Temple service either, based on an a fortiori inference: And just as with regard to Shabbat, which is overridden for the performance of the Temple service, murder does not override it, then with regard to performance of the Temple service, which overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that murder should not override it?

אלא הא דכתיב מעם מזבחי תקחנו למות ההוא לקרבן יחיד דלא דחי שבת The Gemara questions this inference: But if so, how would one explain that which is written in the verse concerning one liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment: “You shall take him from My altar, that he may die” (Exodus 21:14)? This verse indicates that the court administering capital punishment does override the performance of the Temple service. The Gemara explains: That verse serves to teach the halakha concerning an offering of an individual, which does not override Shabbat. The verse is teaching that the court takes the priest to execute him even if this will result in the offering of an individual not being sacrificed.

אמר רבא (אי הכי) לא תהא רציחה דוחה קרבן יחיד מק"ו Rava says: If that is so, one should say that murder should not override even an offering of an individual based on an a fortiori inference:

Daf 36a

מה יום טוב שנדחה מפני קרבן יחיד אין רציחה דוחה אותו קרבן יחיד שהוא דוחה את יום טוב אינו דין שלא תהא רציחה דוחה אותו Just as with regard to a Festival, which is overridden due to an offering of an individual, as voluntary offerings of individuals are sacrificed on Festivals, and nevertheless murder does not override it, as the court does not execute one liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment on a Festival, with regard to an offering of an individual, which overrides a Festival, is it not logical that murder should not override it? Therefore, unlike the explanation of Abaye, the court should not take a priest to him in the event he liable to receive capital punishment if this will result in the offering of an individual not being sacrificed.

הניחא למאן דאמר אין נדרים ונדבות קריבין ביום טוב אלא למאן דאמר נדרים ונדבות קריבין ביום טוב מאי איכא למימר Rava clarifies: This works out well according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are not sacrificed on a Festival. Since the offerings of an individual do not override a Festival, there is no place for this a fortiori inference. But according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are sacrificed on a Festival, what is there to say? Why would one not make the above a fortiori inference?

אלא אמר רבא לא מיבעיא למ"ד נדרים ונדבות קריבין ביום טוב דהא לא מתקיים מעם מזבחי כלל Rather, Rava says that Abaye’s explanation of the verse is incorrect according to all opinions. It is not necessary to say that the inference is incorrect according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are sacrificed on a Festival, as according to that opinion one cannot justify the verse of “from My altar” at all, as there is no distinction between the offering of an individual and a communal offering, as both override a Festival. Accordingly, court-imposed capital punishment should not override either type of offering.

אלא אפילו למאן דאמר נדרים ונדבות אין קריבין ביום טוב הכתיב מעם מזבחי מזבחי המיוחד לי ומאי נינהו תמיד ואמר רחמנא (שמות כא, יד) מעם מזבחי תקחנו למות: But even according to the one who says that vow offerings and gift offerings of individuals are not sacrificed on a Festival, in which case Abaye’s explanation is possible, this is difficult. But isn’t it written: “From My altar”? The term “My altar” indicates: My altar, the offering that is designated to Me. And what offering is this? It is the daily offering. And yet, the Merciful One states: “You shall take him from My altar, that he may die.” Accordingly, the verse is not stated specifically with regard to an offering of an individual.

דיני ממונות הטמאות והטהרות כו': אמר רב אנא הואי במניינא דבי רבי ומינאי דידי הוו מתחלי ברישא והא אנן מתחילין מן הגדול תנן § The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. Rav says: I was among the quorum of judges in the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they would commence from me, i.e., I was first when ascertaining the opinions of the judges. The Gemara questions this statement: But we learned in the mishna that the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges, and Rav was one of the junior judges of that court.

אמר רבה בריה דרבא ואיתימא רבי הלל בריה דרבי וולס שאני מניינא דבי רבי דכולהו מנינייהו מן הצד הוו מתחלי Rabba, son of Rava, says, and some say that it was Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Valles, who says: The counting of the vote in the court in the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is different, as all of their deliberations and the counting of the vote would commence from the side benches, where the least significant judges sit. This was because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was held in such high esteem that once he expressed his opinion, no one would be so brazen as to contradict him.

ואמר רבה בריה דרבא ואיתימא רבי הלל בריה דר' וולס מימות משה ועד רבי לא מצינו תורה וגדולה במקום אחד And with regard to the greatness of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rabba, son of Rava, says, and some say that it was Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Valles, who says: From the days of Moses and until the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi we do not find unparalleled greatness in Torah knowledge and unparalleled greatness in secular matters, including wealth and high political office, combined in one place, i.e., in a single individual.

ולא הא הוה יהושע הוה אלעזר והא הוה פנחס הוו זקנים The Gemara asks: But was there not such a person? Wasn’t there Joshua, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: During his time there was Elazar, who was Joshua’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Pinehas, who outlived Elazar? The Gemara answers: There were the Elders, who were equal to Pinehas in Torah knowledge.

והא הוה שאול הוה שמואל והא נח נפשיה כולהו שניה קאמרינן The Gemara further objects: But wasn’t there Saul, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: There was Samuel, who was Saul’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Samuel die in Saul’s lifetime, leaving Saul the leading figure in both domains? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that from the days of Moses until the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

והא הוה דוד הוה עירא היאירי והא נח נפשיה כולהו שניה קאמרינן The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there David, who was both the greatest Torah authority and the most powerful temporal authority of his day? The Gemara answers: There was Ira the Yairite, who was David’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t Ira the Yairite die in David’s lifetime? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

והא הוה שלמה הוה שמעי בן גרא והא קטליה כוליה שניה קאמרינן The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Solomon, who was unparalleled in both domains? The Gemara answers: During his day there was Shimi ben Gera, who was Solomon’s master in Torah knowledge. The Gemara objects: But didn’t Solomon kill him at the beginning of his reign (see I Kings, chapter 2)? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people.

הא הוה חזקיה הוה שבנא והא איקטיל כולהו שניה קאמרינן והא הוה עזרא הוה נחמיה בן חכליה The Gemara further objects: Wasn’t there Hezekiah, who was both the leading Torah scholar of his age and also the king of his people? The Gemara answers: There was Shebnah in that generation, who was Hezekiah’s equal in Torah knowledge. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t he killed in the war against Sennacherib? The Gemara answers: We meant to say that there was no other single individual who reigned supreme in Torah and greatness for all the years that he was the leader of the Jewish people. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Ezra, who was the greatest Torah Sage of his day and the leader of the Jewish people? The Gemara answers: There was Nehemiah, son of Hacaliah, who was his equal.

אמר רב אדא בר אהבה אף אני אומר מימות רבי עד רב אשי לא מצינו תורה וגדולה במקום אחד ולא והא הוה הונא בר נתן הונא בר נתן מיכף הוה כייף ליה לרב אשי: Rav Adda bar Ahava says: I also say a similar statement, that from the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and until the days of Rav Ashi we do not find unparalleled greatness in Torah knowledge and unparalleled greatness in secular matters, including wealth and high political office, combined in one place, i.e., in a single individual. The Gemara asks: But was there not such a person? But wasn’t there Huna bar Natan, who lived during the time of Rav Ashi and enjoyed both great Torah scholarship and great wealth? The Gemara answers: Huna bar Natan was subordinate to Rav Ashi, who was his superior in both domains.

דיני נפשות מתחילין מן הצד: מנא הני מילי אמר ר' אחא בר פפא אמר קרא (שמות כג, ב) לא תענה על ריב לא תענה על רב § The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side benches, where the least significant judges sit. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Aḥa bar Pappa says: The verse states: “Neither shall you answer in a cause [al riv]” (Exodus 23:2), and the Sages interpret: Neither shall you answer after the Master [al rav], i.e., do not dispute the opinion of the greatest among the judges. Therefore, were the judges to commence issuing their opinions from the greatest of them, and he would say that the accused is liable, no judge would acquit him.

רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן מהכא (שמואל א כה, יג) ויאמר דוד לאנשיו חגרו איש [את] חרבו ויחגרו איש [את] חרבו ויחגור גם דוד את חרבו Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The source of this practice is from here: When David decided to punish Nabal the Carmelite, the verse states: “And David said to his men: Every man gird his sword. And every man girded his sword, and David also girded his sword” (I Samuel 25:13). That was a case of capital law, and David, the greatest among them, was last.

אמר רב שונה אדם לתלמידו ודן עמו בדיני נפשות מיתיבי הטהרות והטמאות האב ובנו הרב ותלמידו מונין להם שנים דיני ממונות ודיני נפשות ודיני מכות קידוש החדש ועיבור שנה אב ובנו הרב ותלמידו אין מונין להן אלא אחד Rav says: A person may teach his student the relevant material and then judge cases of capital law with him, and this student can participate in the deliberations and serve as one of the judges. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita (Tosefta 7:2): In cases of ritual purity and impurity, if two of the judges are a father and his son, or a teacher and his student, the court counts them as two opinions. By inference, in cases of monetary law and cases of capital law, and cases of laws involving the punishment of lashes, as well as court proceedings concerning sanctification of the month and the intercalation of the year, if two of the judges are a father and his son, or a teacher and his student, the court counts them as only one opinion, as it is assumed the son or student will merely echo the opinion of his father or teacher. This contradicts the ruling of Rav.

Daf 36b

כי קאמר רב כגון רב כהנא ורב אסי דלגמריה דרב הוו צריכי ולסבריה דרב לא הוו צריכי The Gemara answers: When Rav says his statement, he is referring to not every student, but only those such as Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who needed to learn the halakhic traditions of Rav, but they did not need to learn the reasoning of Rav, as they were capable of conducting their own analysis.

א"ר אבהו עשרה דברים יש בין דיני ממונות לדיני נפשות וכולן אין נוהגין בשור הנסקל חוץ מעשרים ושלשה Rabbi Abbahu says: There are ten ways in which cases of monetary law are different from cases of capital law, as was taught in the beginning of the chapter, and none of them is practiced with regard to a court hearing concerning an ox that is to be stoned, as it is treated as a case of monetary law, except for the requirement that the animal be judged by twenty-three judges, like in cases of capital law.

מנא הני מילי אמר רב אחא בר פפא דאמר קרא (שמות כג, ו) לא תטה משפט אביונך בריבו משפט אביונך אי אתה מטה אבל אתה מטה משפט של שור הנסקל The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Aḥa bar Pappa says: As the verse states: “You shall not incline the judgment of your poor in his cause” (Exodus 23:6). He explains: You may not incline the judgment of, i.e., exert effort to find liable, your poor, but you may incline the judgment of an ox that is to be stoned. The reason for the procedural differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law is to render it more likely that one accused of a capital transgression will be acquitted. This is not a factor when judging the ox.

עשרה הא ט' הוו הא עשרה קתני משום דאין הכל כשרין ועשרים ושלשה חדא היא The Gemara asks: Are there really ten ways in which cases of monetary law are different from cases of capital law? There are only nine differences recorded in the mishna. The Gemara questions this: But the mishna teaches ten differences, not nine. The Gemara clarifies: Although there appear to be ten, there are in fact nine, because the halakha that not all are fit to judge cases of capital law and the halakha that twenty-three judges are required for cases of capital law are one. The reason not all are fit to judge cases of capital law is that the court of twenty-three is derived from the command to Moses: “And they shall bear the burden of the people with you” (Numbers 11:17), which indicates that only those “with you,” i.e., similar in lineage to Moses, can serve on that court (see 17a).

הא איכא אחריתי דתניא אין מושיבין בסנהדרין זקן וסריס ומי שאין לו בנים ר' יהודה מוסיף אף אכזרי וחילופיהן במסית דרחמנא אמר (דברים יג, ט) לא תחמול ולא תכסה עליו: The Gemara answers: But there is another difference, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:5): The court does not seat on the Sanhedrin a very old person or one who is castrated or one who has no children, as those who did not recently raise children may lack compassion. Rabbi Yehuda adds: Even a cruel person is not eligible. The Gemara comments: And the opposite of this is the halakha with regard to one who entices others to engage in idol worship, as the Merciful One states concerning him: “Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9).

הכל כשרין לדון דיני ממונות: הכל לאתויי מאי אמר רב יהודה לאתויי ממזר § The mishna teaches that all are fit to judge cases of monetary law. The Gemara asks: What is added by the mishna’s employing the expansive term all? Rav Yehuda says: It serves to include a child born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer] in the category of those qualified to judge cases of monetary law.

הא תנינא חדא זימנא כל הראוי לדון דיני נפשות ראוי לדון דיני ממונות ויש ראוי לדון דיני ממונות ואין ראוי לדון דיני נפשות והוינן בה לאתויי מאי ואמר רב יהודה לאתויי ממזר חדא לאתויי גר וחדא לאתויי ממזר The Gemara questions this explanation: But we already learn this halakha one time, as it is taught in a baraita: All who are fit to judge cases of capital law are fit to judge cases of monetary law, but there are those who are fit to judge cases of monetary law and are not fit to judge cases of capital law. And we discussed it: What is included in the expansive term all employed by the baraita? And Rav Yehuda says: It serves to include a mamzer. The Gemara responds: One of the two sources serves to include a convert, who is qualified to judge only in cases of monetary law, and one of the two sources serves to include a mamzer.

וצריכ' דאי אשמעינן גר דראוי לבא בקהל אבל ממזר אימא לא ואי אשמעינן ממזר דבא מטיפה כשרה אבל גר דלא בא מטיפה כשרה אימא לא צריכא: The Gemara comments: And both the mishna and baraita are necessary, as the halakha taught by one source cannot be derived from the halakha taught by the other source. As, if the tanna taught us the fitness to judge cases of monetary law only with regard to a convert, one could say that a convert is like a born Jew concerning this, since he is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., marry a Jew of fit lineage, but with regard to a mamzer, who is not fit to enter into the congregation, say that he cannot serve as a judge. And if the tanna taught us the fitness to judge cases of monetary law only with regard to a mamzer, one could say that a mamzer is fit to judge, as he came from seed of unflawed lineage, but with regard to a convert, who does not come from seed of unflawed lineage, say that he cannot serve as a judge. Therefore, both sources are necessary.

ואין הכל כשרין לדון דיני נפשות: מאי טעמא דתני רב יוסף כשם שב"ד מנוקין בצדק כך מנוקין מכל מום אמר אמימר מאי קרא (שיר השירים ד, ז) כולך יפה רעיתי ומום אין בך § The mishna teaches: But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; the judges may be only priests, Levites, or Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains: As Rav Yosef taught: Just as the court is clean in justice, so too, it is clean of any blemish, i.e., it does not include anyone of flawed lineage. Ameimar says: What is the verse from which it is derived? It states: “You are all fair, my love; and there is no blemish in you” (Song of Songs 4:7).

ודילמא מום ממש אמר רב אחא בר יעקב אמר קרא (במדבר יא, טז) והתיצבו שם עמך עמך בדומין לך The Gemara asks: But perhaps you should say that this is referring to an actual blemish, and is teaching that one who has a physical blemish cannot be appointed to the Sanhedrin. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: It is not necessary to learn from this verse the halakha that one who has a physical blemish cannot be appointed to the Sanhedrin, as the verse states in connection with the transfer of the Divine Spirit from Moses to the Elders: “That they may stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16). The term “with you” is explained to mean: With similarity to you, teaching that the members of the Sanhedrin must be whole in body, like Moses.

ודילמא התם משום שכינה אלא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר קרא (שמות יח, כב) ונשאו אתך אתך בדומין לך ליהוי: The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps there, those who were with Moses had to be free of any blemish due to the Divine Presence, which was going to rest upon them, but this is not a requirement for judges to serve on the Sanhedrin. Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The verse states: “So shall they make it easier for you and bear the burden with you” (Exodus 18:22). The term “with you” is explained to mean: They shall be similar to you, without blemish. This verse is referring to the appointment of regular judges, upon whom the Divine Presence does not rest, and teaches that all members of the Sanhedrin must be whole in body, and the verse from Song of Songs teaches that they must have unflawed lineage as well.

מתני' סנהדרין היתה כחצי גורן עגולה כדי שיהו רואין זה את זה ושני סופרי הדיינין עומדים לפניהם אחד מימין ואחד משמאל וכותבין דברי (מחייבין ודברי מזכין) ר' יהודה אומר שלשה אחד כותב דברי המזכין ואחד כותב דברי המחייבין והשלישי כותב דברי המזכין ודברי המחייבין MISHNA: A Sanhedrin of twenty-three was arranged in the same layout as half of a circular threshing floor, in order that all the judges will see one another and the witnesses. And two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who find the accused liable and the statements of those who acquit the accused. Rabbi Yehuda says: There were three scribes. One writes only the statements of those who acquit the accused, one writes only the statements of those who find him liable, and the third writes both the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable, so that if there is uncertainty concerning the precise wording that one of the scribes writes, it can be compared to the words of the third scribe.

Daf 37a

ושלש שורות של תלמידי חכמים יושבין לפניהן כל אחד ואחד מכיר את מקומו הוצרכו לסמוך סומכין מן הראשונה אחד מן השניה בא לו לראשונה אחד מן השלישית בא לו לשניה בוררים להן עוד אחד מן הקהל ומושיבין אותו בשלישית ולא היה יושב במקומו של ראשון אלא יושב במקום הראוי לו: And three rows of Torah scholars sit before the judges, and each and every one among those sitting recognizes his place, i.e., they are seated in accordance with their stature. When the court must ordain an additional judge, e.g., if a judge dies during the proceedings or in the case of a court without a decisive majority (see 40a), the court ordains the greatest Torah scholar from the first row. As a seat in the first row is now vacant, one Torah scholar from the second row comes to the first row, and one Torah scholar from the third row comes to the second row, and the court selects another Torah scholar from among the assembled and they seat him in the third row. And this Torah scholar who moves from the second row to the first row would not sit in the place of the first Torah scholar, who joined the court, rather, he would sit in the place appropriate for him, i.e., at the end of that row, in accordance with his stature.

גמ׳ מנא הני מילי א"ר אחא בר חנינא דאמר קרא (שיר השירים ז, ג) שררך אגן הסהר אל יחסר המזג וגו' GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the Sanhedrin would sit in a semicircle. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says: As the verse states: “Your navel is like a round goblet, let no mingled wine be wanting; your belly is like a heap of wheat set about with lilies” (Song of Songs 7:3).

שררך זו סנהדרין למה נקרא שמה שררך שהיא יושבת בטיבורו של עולם אגן שהיא מגינה על כל העולם כולו הסהר שהיא דומה לסהר This verse is interpreted as referring to the members of the Sanhedrin, who sit in a semicircle. “Your navel”; this is an allusion to the Sanhedrin. And why is it called by way of allusion “your navel”? It is because it sits in the navel of the world, in the Temple. “Goblet [aggan]”; this teaches that the Sanhedrin protects [meginna] the entire world with its merit. “Round [hassahar]”; this teaches that the Sanhedrin is similar to the moon [sahar]. The court sits in a semicircle, like the shape of the moon.

אל יחסר המזג שאם הוצרך אחד מהם לצאת רואין אם יש עשרים ושלשה כנגד סנהדרי קטנה יוצא ואם לאו אינו יוצא: “Let no mingled wine be wanting”; this compares the Sanhedrin to wine mixed with water, which typically involved mixing two parts water with one part wine. This teaches that if one member of the Great Sanhedrin needed to leave, they see: If there are still present in the Chamber of Hewn Stone twenty-three members, i.e., a third of the judges, corresponding to the number of a lesser Sanhedrin, he may leave, but if not, he may not leave.

(שיר השירים ז, ג) בטנך ערימת חטים מה ערימת חטים הכל נהנין ממנה אף סנהדרין הכל נהנין מטעמיהן: (שיר השירים ז, ג) סוגה בשושנים שאפילו כסוגה של שושנים לא יפרצו בהן פרצות The phrase “your belly is like a heap of wheat” teaches that just as with regard to a heap of wheat, all derive benefit from it, so too, with regard to the Sanhedrin, all derive benefit from their explanations of the Torah. The phrase “set about with lilies” is said in praise of the Jewish people, as they do not breach even a fence made of lilies, since the Jewish people observe both Torah law as well as rabbinic ordinances and decrees.

והיינו דאמר ליה ההוא מינא לרב כהנא אמריתו נדה שרי לייחודי בהדי גברא אפשר אש בנעורת ואינה מהבהבת אמר ליה התורה העידה עלינו סוגה בשושנים שאפילו כסוגה בשושנים לא יפרצו בהן פרצות And this is like an incident involving Rav Kahana, as a certain heretic said to Rav Kahana: You say that it is permitted for a menstruating woman to seclude herself with a man, i.e., her husband. Is it possible to set fire to chips of kindling and not have them blaze and burn? How can the couple be relied upon not to engage in sexual intercourse? Rav Kahana said to him: The Torah testifies concerning us that we are “set about with lilies,” as the Jewish people do not breach even a fence made of lilies.

ריש לקיש אמר מהכא (שיר השירים ו, ז) כפלח הרמון רקתך אפילו ריקנין שבך מלאין מצות כרמון ר' זירא אמר מהכא (בראשית כז, כז) וירח את ריח בגדיו אל תיקרי בגדיו אלא בוגדיו Reish Lakish says that the source to rely on them not to transgress is from here: “Your temples [rakkatekh] are like a pomegranate split open” (Song of Songs 6:7), which teaches that even the empty people [reikanin] among you are as full of mitzvot as the pomegranate is full of seeds. Rabbi Zeira says that the source is from here: The verse states concerning the occasion when Isaac blessed Jacob: “And he smelled the smell of his garments, and blessed him, and said: See, the smell of my son is as the smell of a field that the Lord has blessed” (Genesis 27:27). Do not read “his garments [begadav]”; rather, read: His traitors [bogedav], meaning that even traitors and sinners among the Jewish people have qualities “as the smell of a field that the Lord has blessed.”

הנהו בריוני דהוה בשיבבותיה דר' זירא דהוה מקרב להו כי היכי דניהדרו להו בתיובתא והוו קפדי רבנן כי נח נפשיה דר' זירא אמרי עד האידנא הוה חריכא קטין שקיה דהוה בעי עלן רחמי השתא מאן בעי עלן רחמי הרהרו בלבייהו ועבדו תשובה: The Gemara relates: There were certain hooligans [biryonei] who were living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Zeira. He brought them close, i.e., treated them with friendship, in order to cause them to repent of their sins, but the other Sages disapproved of his actions. When Rabbi Zeira died, those hooligans said: Until now, there was the short one with singed legs, i.e., Rabbi Zeira, who would pray for compassion for us. Who will pray for compassion for us now? They thought about this in their hearts and repented. Ultimately, Rabbi Zeira’s actions were proven correct, as they repented.

שלש שורות כו': אמר אביי ש"מ כי ניידי כולהו ניידי ולימא להו עד האידנא הוה יתיבנא ברישא השתא מותביתו לי בדנבי אמר אביי דאמרי ליה הכי הוי זנב לאריות ואל תהי ראש לשועלים: § The mishna teaches that there are three rows of Torah scholars who sit before the court, and if one of the Torah scholars from the first row is elevated to a place on the court, the Torah scholar in the first position of the second row moves to the final position of the first row. Abaye says: Learn from the mishna that when they move, i.e., when the Torah scholars need to move as a result of one of them being elevated to the court, they all move. The Gemara inquires: But let the one being moved from the first position of the second row to the last position of the first row say to the court: Until now I was sitting at the head of the row, but now you are seating me at the tail, i.e., the end, of a row. Abaye says in explanation: That is not a valid claim, as the court can say this to him: Be a tail to the lions and do not be a head to the foxes (Avot 4:15), meaning that it is preferable to be the least among great people than the greatest among lesser people.

מתני׳ כיצד מאיימין את העדים על עידי נפשות היו מכניסין אותן ומאיימין עליהן שמא תאמרו מאומד ומשמועה עד מפי עד ומפי אדם נאמן שמא אי אתם יודעין שסופנו לבדוק אתכם בדרישה ובחקירה MISHNA: How does the court intimidate the witnesses in giving testimony for cases of capital law? They would bring the witnesses in and intimidate them by saying to them: Perhaps what you say in your testimony is based on conjecture, or perhaps it is based on a rumor, perhaps it is testimony based on hearsay, e.g., you heard a witness testify to this in a different court, or perhaps it is based on the statement of a trusted person. Perhaps you do not know that ultimately we examine you with inquiry and interrogation, and if you are lying, your lie will be discovered.

הוו יודעין שלא כדיני ממונות דיני נפשות דיני ממונות אדם נותן ממון ומתכפר לו דיני נפשות דמו ודם זרעותיו תלויין בו עד סוף העולם The court tells them: You should know that cases of capital law are not like cases of monetary law. In cases of monetary law, a person who testifies falsely, causing money to be given to the wrong party, can give the money to the proper owner and his sin is atoned for. In cases of capital law, if one testifies falsely, the blood of the accused and the blood of his offspring that he did not merit to produce are ascribed to the witness’s testimony until eternity.

שכן מצינו בקין שהרג את אחיו שנאמר (בראשית ד, י) דמי אחיך צועקים אינו אומר דם אחיך אלא דמי אחיך דמו ודם זרעותיו דבר אחר דמי אחיך שהיה דמו מושלך על העצים ועל האבנים The proof for this is as we found with Cain, who killed his brother, as it is stated concerning him: “The voice of your brother’s blood [demei] cries out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10). The verse does not state: Your brother’s blood [dam], in the singular, but rather: “Your brother’s blood [demei],” in the plural. This serves to teach that the loss of both his brother’s blood and the blood of his brother’s offspring are ascribed to Cain. The mishna notes: Alternatively, the phrase “your brother’s blood [demei],” written in the plural, teaches that that his blood was not gathered in one place but was splattered on the trees and on the stones.

לפיכך נברא אדם יחידי ללמדך שכל המאבד נפש אחת מישראל מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו איבד עולם מלא וכל המקיים נפש אחת מישראל מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קיים עולם מלא The court tells the witnesses: Therefore, Adam the first man was created alone, to teach you that with regard to anyone who destroys one soul from the Jewish people, i.e., kills one Jew, the verse ascribes him blame as if he destroyed an entire world, as Adam was one person, from whom the population of an entire world came forth. And conversely, anyone who sustains one soul from the Jewish people, the verse ascribes him credit as if he sustained an entire world.

ומפני שלום הבריות שלא יאמר אדם לחבירו אבא גדול מאביך ושלא יהו המינים אומרים הרבה רשויות בשמים The mishna cites another reason Adam the first man was created alone: And this was done due to the importance of maintaining peace among people, so that one person will not say to another: My father, i.e., progenitor, is greater than your father. And it was also so that the heretics who believe in multiple gods will not say: There are many authorities in Heaven, and each created a different person.

ולהגיד גדולתו של הקב"ה שאדם טובע כמה מטבעות בחותם אחד כולן דומין זה לזה ומלך מלכי המלכים הקב"ה טבע כל אדם בחותמו של אדם הראשון ואין אחד מהן דומה לחבירו לפיכך כל אחד ואחד חייב לומר בשבילי נברא העולם And this serves to tell of the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as when a person stamps several coins with one seal, they are all similar to each other. But the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, stamped all people with the seal of Adam the first man, as all of them are his offspring, and not one of them is similar to another. Therefore, since all humanity descends from one person, each and every person is obligated to say: The world was created for me, as one person can be the source of all humanity, and recognize the significance of his actions.

ושמא תאמרו The court says to the witnesses: And perhaps you will say:

Daf 37b

מה לנו ולצרה הזאת והלא כבר נאמר (ויקרא ה, א) והוא עד או ראה או ידע אם לא יגיד וגו' ושמא תאמרו מה לנו לחוב בדמו של זה והלא כבר נאמר (משלי יא, י) באבוד רשעים רנה: Why would we want this trouble? Perhaps it would be better not to testify at all. But be aware, as is it not already stated: “And he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1)? It is a transgression not to testify when one can do so. And perhaps you will say: Why would we want to be responsible for the blood of this person? But be aware, as is it not already stated: “When the wicked perish, there is song” (Proverbs 11:10)?

גמ׳ ת"ר כיצד מאומד אומר להן שמא כך ראיתם שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתם אחריו ומצאתם סייף בידו ודמו מטפטף והרוג מפרפר אם כך ראיתם לא ראיתם כלום GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: How does the court describe testimony based on conjecture? The court says to the witnesses: Perhaps you saw this man about whom you are testifying pursuing another into a ruin, and you pursued him and found a sword in his hand, dripping with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was convulsing. If you saw only this, it is as if you saw nothing, and you cannot testify to the murder.

תניא א"ר שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי אחד שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתי אחריו וראיתי סייף בידו ודמו מטפטף והרוג מפרפר ואמרתי לו רשע מי הרגו לזה או אני או אתה אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים יומת המת היודע מחשבות יפרע מאותו האיש שהרג את חבירו אמרו לא זזו משם עד שבא נחש והכישו ומת It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said as an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not once see one person pursue another into a ruin, and I pursued him and saw a sword in his hand, dripping with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was convulsing. And I said to him: Wicked person, who has killed this man? Either you or I. But what can I do, since your blood is not given over to me, as the Torah states: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and I did not witness you killing him. The One Who knows one’s thoughts shall punish this man who killed another. The Sages said: They did not move from there before a snake came and bit the murderer, and he died.

והאי בר נחש הוא והאמר רב יוסף וכן תני דבי חזקיה מיום שחרב בית המקדש אף על פי שבטלה סנהדרי ארבע מיתות לא בטלו לא בטלו והא בטלו אלא דין ארבע מיתות לא בטלו The Gemara questions this account: But was this murderer fit to die by being bitten by a snake? But doesn’t Rav Yosef say, and so the school of Ḥizkiyya also taught: From the day that the Temple was destroyed, although the Sanhedrin ceased to be extant, the four types of court-imposed capital punishment have not ceased. The Gemara asks: Have they really not ceased? But they have ceased, as court-imposed capital punishment is no longer given. Rather, the intention is that the halakha of the four types of court-imposed capital punishment has not ceased to be applicable.

מי שנתחייב סקילה או נופל מן הגג או חיה דורסתו מי שנתחייב שריפה או נופל בדליקה או נחש מכישו מי שנתחייב הריגה או נמסר למלכות או ליסטין באין עליו מי שנתחייב חנק או טובע בנהר או מת בסרונכי The Gemara explains: How so? For one who would be liable to be executed by stoning, either he falls from a roof or an animal mauls him and breaks his bones. This death is similar to death by stoning, in which the one liable to be executed is pushed from a platform and his bones break from the impact of the fall. For one who would be liable to be executed by burning, either he falls into a fire and is burned or a snake bites him, as a snakebite causes a burning sensation. For one who would be liable to be executed by slaying through decapitation by the sword, either he is turned over to the authorities and they execute him with a sword, or robbers come upon him and murder him. One who would be liable to be executed by strangling either drowns in a river and is choked by the water or dies of diphtheria [bisronekhi], which causes his breathing to become constricted. According to this, a murderer, whose verdict in court would be death by slaying, should not be bitten by a snake.

אמרי ההוא חטא אחריתי הוה ביה דאמר מר מי שנתחייב שתי מיתות ב"ד נידון בחמורה: The Sages say in explanation: That murderer had another sin for which he deserved execution by burning, and as the Master says: One who is found liable by the court to receive two types of court-imposed capital punishment is sentenced to the harsher of the two, and burning is considered a harsher death than slaying (see 50a).

מאומד וכו': בדיני נפשות הוא דלא אמדינן הא בדיני ממונות אמדינן כמאן כר' אחא דתניא ר' אחא אומר גמל האוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא גמל הרוג בצידו בידוע שזה הרגו § The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law the court warns the witnesses not to testify based on conjecture. The Gemara comments: One can infer that it is only in cases of capital law that we do not rule based on conjecture, but in cases of monetary law, we do rule based on conjecture. In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there was a rutting male camel that was rampaging among other camels, and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage caused. The baraita indicates that Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law are decided based on conjecture.

וליטעמיך עד מפי עד דקתני בדיני נפשות הוא דלא אמרינן הא בדיני ממונות אמרינן והתנן אם אמר הוא אמר לי שאני חייב לו איש פלוני אמר לי שהוא חייב לו לא אמר כלום עד שיאמר בפנינו הודה לו שהוא חייב לו מאתים זוז The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning, with regard to that which the mishna teaches, that the court warns the witnesses not to provide testimony based on hearsay, should one infer that it is in cases of capital law that we do not say that testimony based on hearsay is allowed, but in cases of monetary law, we do say that testimony based on hearsay is allowed? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (29a): If the witness said: The defendant said to me: It is true that I owe the plaintiff, or if he says: So-and-so said to me that the defendant owes the plaintiff, the witness has said nothing, i.e., his testimony is disregarded. These two statements by witnesses are examples of testimony based on hearsay, yet they are not valid in cases of monetary law. A witness’s testimony is not valid testimony unless he says, for example: The defendant admitted in our presence to the plaintiff that he owes him two hundred dinars, as by admitting the debt in the presence of witnesses he rendered himself liable to pay the amount that he mentioned.

אלמא אף על גב דפסילי בדיני ממונות אמרינן להו בדיני נפשות הכא נמי אף על גב דפסילי בדיני ממונות אמרינן להו בדיני נפשות: Evidently, although testimony based on hearsay is invalid in cases of monetary law, we tell the witnesses to be aware of this in capital law. Here, too, with regard to testimony based on conjecture, one can say that although testimony based on conjecture is invalid in cases of monetary law, we tell the witnesses to be aware of this in cases of capital law.

הוו יודעים כו': אמר רב יהודה בריה דר' חייא מלמד שעשה קין בהבל אחיו חבורות חבורות פציעות פציעות שלא היה יודע מהיכן נשמה יוצאה עד שהגיע לצוארו § The mishna teaches that the court would say: You should know that cases of capital law are not like cases of monetary law, and would reference the murder of Abel by Cain. Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: By employing the plural term for blood, “The voice of your brother’s blood [demei] cries out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10), the verse teaches that Cain caused multiple wounds and multiple injuries to his brother Abel. As Cain did not know from where the soul departs, he struck him multiple times. This continued until he came to his neck and struck him there, whereupon Abel died.

וא"ר יהודה בריה דר' חייא מיום שפתחה הארץ את פיה וקיבלתו לדמו של הבל שוב לא פתחה שנאמר (ישעיהו כד, טז) מכנף הארץ זמירות שמענו צבי לצדיק מכנף הארץ ולא מפי הארץ איתיביה חזקיה אחיו (במדבר טז, לב) ותפתח הארץ את פיה א"ל לרעה פתחה לטובה לא פתחה And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: From the day the earth opened its mouth and received the blood of Abel, its mouth has not opened again, as it is stated: “From the corner of the earth have we heard songs: Glory to the righteous” (Isaiah 24:16): One can infer that the songs are heard “from the corner of the earth,” but not from the mouth of the earth, as the earth never again opened its mouth. Ḥizkiyya, Rav Yehuda’s brother, raised an objection to Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya: The verse states concerning Korah and his assembly: “And the earth opened her mouth and swallowed them up, and their households, and all the men that appertained unto Korah, and all their goods” (Numbers 16:32). Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, said to him: It opened again for a deleterious purpose; it did not open again for a constructive purpose.

וא"ר יהודה בריה דרבי חייא גלות מכפרת עון מחצה מעיקרא כתיב (בראשית ד, יד) והייתי נע ונד ולבסוף כתיב (בראשית ד, טז) וישב בארץ נוד And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: Exile atones for half of a sin. As initially it is written in the verse concerning Cain that he said: “And I shall be a fugitive [na] and a wanderer [vanad ] in the earth” (Genesis 4:14), and ultimately it is written: “And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the land of Nod” (Genesis 4:16). Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, equates “Nod” with “nad,” and understands that Cain was given only the punishment of being a wanderer. Exile atoned for half his sin, thereby negating the punishment of being a fugitive.

אמר רב יהודה גלות מכפרת שלשה דברים שנאמר (כה אמר ה' וגו') היושב בעיר הזאת ימות בחרב ברעב ובדבר והיוצא ונפל אל הכשדים הצרים עליכם יחיה והיתה לו נפשו לשלל Rav Yehuda says: Exile atones for three matters, i.e., three types of death, as it is stated: “So says the Lord: Behold, I set before you the way of life and the way of death. He that abides in this city shall die by the sword, and by the famine, and by the pestilence; but he that goes out, and falls away to the Chaldeans that besiege you, he shall survive, and his life shall be for him for a prey” (Jeremiah 21:8–9), indicating that exile from Jerusalem will save one from those three deaths.

ר' יוחנן אמר גלות מכפרת על הכל שנאמר (ירמיהו כב, ל) (כה אמר ה') כתבו את האיש הזה ערירי גבר לא יצלח בימיו כי לא יצלח מזרעו איש יושב על כסא דוד ומושל עוד ביהודה ובתר דגלה כתיב (דברי הימים א ג, יז) ובני יכניה אסיר (בנו) שלתיאל בנו אסיר שעיברתו אמו בבית האסורין שלתיאל ששתלו אל שלא כדרך הנשתלין גמירי שאין האשה מתעברת מעומד Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Exile atones for all transgressions and renders a sinner like a new person, as it is stated concerning the king Jeconiah, a descendant of King David: “So says the Lord: Write you this man childless, a man that shall not prosper in his days; for no man of his seed shall prosper, sitting upon the throne of David, and ruling anymore in Judah” (Jeremiah 22:30). And after Jeconiah was exiled it is written: “And the sons of Jeconiah, the same is Assir, Shealtiel his son” (I Chronicles 3:17). The verse employs the plural “sons of” although he had only one son, Shealtiel. “Assir,” literally, prisoner, teaches that his mother conceived him in prison. “Shealtiel,” literally, planted by God, teaches that God planted him in a way atypical of most plants [hanishtalin], i.e., people. It is learned as a tradition that a woman does not conceive when she is standing during sexual intercourse,

Daf 38a

והיא נתעברה מעומד דבר אחר שלתיאל שנשאל על אלתו אל זרובבל שנזרע בבבל ומה שמו נחמיה בן חכליה שמו and the mother of Shealtiel conceived while standing. Alternatively, “Shealtiel” is interpreted as meaning that God [El ] requested [nishal ] dissolution of His oath, as it were, and allowed Jeconiah to father a child. In the continuation of that passage in Chronicles, where the verse refers to the grandson of Jeconiah, Zerubbabel [Zerubavel ], the Gemara interprets that his name teaches that he was sown [nizra], i.e., conceived, in Babylonia [Bavel]. And what was his true name? Nehemiah, son of Hachaliah, was his true name.

יהודה וחזקיה בני רבי חייא הוו יתבי בסעודתא קמי רבי ולא הוו קא אמרי ולא מידי אמר להו אגברו חמרא אדרדקי כי היכי דלימרו מילתא כיון דאיבסום פתחו ואמרו אין בן דוד בא עד שיכלו שני בתי אבות מישראל ואלו הן ראש גולה שבבבל ונשיא שבארץ ישראל שנאמר (ישעיהו ח, יד) והיה למקדש ולאבן נגף ולצור מכשול לשני בתי ישראל Having mentioned the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya, the Gemara relates: Yehuda and Ḥizkiyya, sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya, were sitting at a meal before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they were not saying anything. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to his servants: Add more wine for the young men, so that they will say something. Once they were inebriated, they loosened their tongues and said: The son of David, i.e., the Messiah, will not come until two fathers’ houses are destroyed from Israel, as those two families are preventing the redemption. And they are the head of the exile who is in Babylonia, i.e., the family of the Exilarch, and the Nasi who is in Eretz Yisrael, i.e., the family of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (see 5a), as it is stated in reference to the Messiah: “And he shall be for a sanctuary; but for a stone of stumbling and for a rock of offense to both the houses of Israel” (Isaiah 8:14).

אמר להם בניי קוצים אתם מטילין לי בעיניי א"ל רבי חייא רבי אל ירע בעיניך יין ניתן בשבעים אותיות וסוד ניתן בשבעים אותיות נכנס יין יצא סוד Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: My children, do you throw thorns in my eyes? How can you say this in the presence of the Nasi himself? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: My teacher, do not view their behavior in a negative light. Wine [yayin] is given in letters of seventy, i.e., the numerical value of the letters in the word yayin is seventy, and secret [sod ] is given in letters of seventy, i.e., the numerical value of the letters in the word sod is seventy. When wine enters, secrets emerge.

א"ר חסדא אמר מר עוקבא ואמרי לה א"ר חסדא דרש מרי בר מר מאי דכתיב (דניאל ט, יד) וישקד ה' על הרעה ויביאה עלינו כי צדיק ה' אלהינו משום דצדיק ה' וישקד ה' על הרעה ויביאה עלינו אין צדקה עשה הקב"ה עם ישראל שהקדים גלות צדקיהו ועוד גלות יכניה קיימת Apropos the discussion of exile, Rav Ḥisda says that Mar Ukva says, and some say that Rav Ḥisda says that Mari bar Mar taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And so the Lord has hastened the evil, and brought it upon us; for the Lord our God is righteous in all His works He has done” (Daniel 9:14)? Is it because “the Lord our God is righteous” that “the Lord has hastened the evil, and brought it upon us”? He explains: Yes, because it was a righteous act that the Holy One, Blessed be He, performed for the Jewish people by hastening the exile of Zedekiah while the Jews who had been exiled in the exile of Jeconiah, which preceded it, were still alive, as the wise people among those exiled with Jeconiah were able to instruct those exiled with Zedekiah.

דכתיב ביה בגלות יכניה (מלכים ב כד, טז) החרש והמסגר אלף חרש כיון שפותחין הכל נעשו כחרשין מסגר כיון שסוגרין בהלכה שוב אין פותחין וכמה היו אלף This is as it is written concerning the exile of Jeconiah: “And all the men of might, seven thousand, and the craftsmen [heḥarash] and the smiths [vehammasger] one thousand” (II Kings 24:16). The Gemara interprets: The term “ḥarash,” which can be read as ḥeresh, deaf-mute, is referring to Torah scholars, as when they open their mouths to teach Torah, all the others become as though they were deaf-mutes, as they would listen quietly to the one teaching Torah. The term “masger,” which is related to saggur, meaning closed, teaches that when they close, i.e., finish, teaching the halakha, they do not reopen the discussion, as all has been clarified. And how many were these Torah scholars? One thousand.

עולא אמר שהקדים שתי שנים לונושנתם Ulla says: The righteous act that the Lord performed, referred to in the verse in Daniel, was that He hastened the exile by two years of venoshantem. Moses taught: “When you shall have children, and children’s children, and you shall have remained long [venoshantem] in the land, and shall deal corruptly, and make a carved idol, the likeness of anything, and shall do evil in the sight of the Lord your God, to provoke him to anger, I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that you shall soon utterly perish from off the land into which you go over the Jorden to possess it; you shall not prolong your days upon it, but shall utterly be destroyed” (Deuteronomy 4:25–26). The numerical value of the letters of the word “venoshantem” is 852, and the Jewish people were exiled in the 850th year after entering Eretz Yisrael. Since they were exiled early, not all of the curses enumerated in the verse would be fulfilled.

א"ר אחא בר יעקב שמע מינה מהרה דמרי עלמא תמני מאה וחמשין ותרתין הוו: Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: Learn from it that for the Master of the World, the term soon is referring to 852 years, as the verse states: “You shall soon utterly perish,” and the intended time until the exile was 852 years.

לפיכך כו': תנו רבנן אדם יחידי נברא ומפני מה שלא יהו המינים אומרין הרבה רשויות בשמים דבר אחר מפני הצדיקים ומפני הרשעים שלא יהו הצדיקים אומרים אנו בני צדיק ורשעים אומרים אנו בני רשע § The mishna teaches: Therefore, Adam the first man was created alone. The Sages taught in a baraita: Adam was created alone, and for what reason? So that the heretics will not say: There are many authorities in Heaven, and each created a different person. Alternatively, Adam was created alone due to the righteous and due to the wicked. It was so that the righteous will not say: We are the children of the righteous, and righteousness is natural for us, so there is no need for us to exert ourselves to be righteous, and so that the wicked will not say: We are the children of the wicked and cannot change our ways.

דבר אחר מפני המשפחות שלא יהו משפחות מתגרות זו בזו ומה עכשיו שנברא יחיד מתגרות נבראו שנים על אחת כמה וכמה דבר אחר מפני הגזלנין ומפני החמסנין ומה עכשיו שנברא יחידי גוזלין וחומסין נבראו שנים על אחת כמה וכמה: The baraita continues: Alternatively, he was created alone due to the families, so that the families will not quarrel with each other, each one boasting of the heritage of their progenitor. And if now that Adam was created alone, families still quarrel and each family claims superiority, if there were two people created initially, all the more so would they do this. Alternatively, he was created alone due to the robbers and due to those who take by force that which is not theirs, as the feeling of fraternity among all people, having descended from the same forefather, will limit crime. And if now that Adam was created alone, criminals still rob and take by force that which is not theirs, if there were two people created initially, all the more so would this be the case.

ולהגיד גדולתו כו': תנו רבנן להגיד גדולתו של מלך מלכי המלכים הקדוש ברוך הוא שאדם טובע כמה מטבעות בחותם אחד וכולן דומין זה לזה אבל הקדוש ברוך הוא טובע כל אדם בחותמו של אדם הראשון ואין אחד מהן דומה לחבירו שנא' (איוב לח, יד) תתהפך כחומר חותם ויתיצבו כמו לבוש The mishna teaches: And this serves to tell of the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as when a person stamps several coins with one seal, they are all similar to each other. But the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, stamped all people with the seal of Adam the first man, as all are his offspring, and not one of them is similar to another. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 8:5): The fact that Adam the first man was created alone serves to declare the greatness of the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, as a person stamps several coins with one seal, and they are all similar to each other. But the Holy One, Blessed be He, stamps all people with the seal of Adam the first man, and not one of them is similar to another. As it is stated: “It is changed like clay under the seal and they stand as a garment” (Job 38:14). The verse describes people as being created “under the seal,” but their external appearance is different, just as garments can differ in appearance.

ומפני מה אין פרצופיהן דומין זה לזה שלא יראה אדם דירה נאה ואשה נאה ויאמר שלי היא שנאמר (איוב לח, טו) וימנע מרשעים אורם וזרוע רמה תשבר The baraita asks: And for what reason are their faces not similar to one another? The baraita answers: It is so that a man will not see a beautiful home or a beautiful woman and say: She is mine. If all people looked the same, no one could contradict him. As it is stated in the following verse: “And from the wicked their light is withheld and the high arm shall be broken” (Job 38:15), indicating that the reason people look different from one another is to prevent the wicked from succeeding in their plans.

תניא היה רבי מאיר אומר בשלשה דברים אדם משתנה מחבירו בקול במראה ובדעת בקול ובמראה משום ערוה ובדעת מפני הגזלנין והחמסנין It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir would say: One person is different from another in three ways: In voice, in appearance, and in thought. The differences in voice and appearance are due to a woman forbidden to him, so that people will not exchange spouses one with another. And the differences in thought are due to the robbers and those who take by force that which is not theirs, as, if everyone thought in a similar way, criminals could take advantage of others because they would understand where they keep their valuables.

ת"ר אדם נברא בערב שבת ומפני מה שלא יהו המינים אומרים שותף היה לו להקדוש ברוך הוא במעשה בראשית דבר אחר שאם תזוח דעתו עליו אומר לו יתוש קדמך במעשה בראשית דבר אחר כדי שיכנס למצוה מיד The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 8:7): Adam the first man was created on Shabbat eve at the close of the six days of Creation. And for what reason was this so? So that the heretics will not be able to say that the Holy One, Blessed be He, had a partner, i.e., Adam, in the acts of Creation. Alternatively, he was created on Shabbat eve so that if a person becomes haughty, God can say to him: The mosquito preceded you in the acts of Creation, as you were created last. Alternatively, he was created on Shabbat eve in order that he enter into the mitzva of observing Shabbat immediately.

דבר אחר כדי שיכנס לסעודה מיד משל למלך בשר ודם שבנה פלטרין ושיכללן והתקין סעודה ואחר כך הכניס אורחין שנא' (משלי ט, א) חכמת בנתה ביתה חצבה עמודיה שבעה (משלי ט, ב) טבחה טבחה מסכה יינה אף ערכה שולחנה (משלי ט, ג) שלחה נערותיה תקרא על גפי מרומי קרת Alternatively, he was created on Shabbat eve, after all of the other creations, in order that he enter into a feast immediately, as the whole world was prepared for him. This is comparable to a king of flesh and blood, who first built palaces [palterin] and improved them, and prepared a feast and afterward brought in his guests. As it is stated: “Wisdom has built her house, and she has hewn out her seven pillars. She has killed her beasts; she has mingled her wine; she has also furnished her table. She has sent forth her maidens; she calls upon the top of the highest places of the city” (Proverbs 9:1–3).

חכמת בנתה ביתה זו מידתו של הקב"ה שברא את כל העולם כולו בחכמה חצבה עמודיה שבעה אלו שבעת ימי בראשית טבחה טבחה מסכה יינה אף ערכה שולחנה אלו ימים ונהרות וכל צורכי עולם שלחה נערותיה תקרא זה אדם וחוה The baraita explains: “Wisdom has built her house”; this is referring to the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He, Who created the entire world with wisdom. “She has hewn out her seven pillars”; these pillars are referring to the seven days of Creation, in which the world was established. “She has killed her beasts; she has mingled her wine; she has also furnished her table”; these are referring to the seas and rivers and all the necessities of the world that were created. “She has sent forth her maidens; she calls”; this is referring to Adam and Eve, who were created at the end of Creation.

על גפי מרומי קרת רבה בר בר חנה רמי כתיב על גפי וכתיב על כסא בתחלה על גפי ולבסוף על כסא The verses continue: “Upon the top of the highest places of the city.” Rabba bar bar Ḥana raises a contradiction: It is written: “Upon the top of the highest places,” and it is written afterward: “For she sits at the door of her house, on a seat in the high places of the city” (Proverbs 9:14). Is she at the top or on a seat? He explains: Initially, Adam was alone upon the top of a high place, and ultimately, Adam was on a seat that is set for a bridegroom, when Eve was paired with him.

(משלי ט, ד) מי פתי יסור הנה חסר לב אמרה לו אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא מי פתאו לזה אשה אמרה לו דכתיב (משלי ו, לב) נואף אשה חסר לב The verse states in that passage: “Whoever is thoughtless, let him turn in here; as for him that lacks understanding, she tells him” (Proverbs 9:4). The Gemara explains: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Who lured this man to sin? The woman told him to sin. An allusion to the interpretation that one who is lured to sin by a woman is called one “that lacks understanding” is as it is written: “He who commits adultery with a woman lacks understanding” (Proverbs 6:32).

תניא היה ר' מאיר אומר אדם הראשון מכל העולם כולו הוצבר עפרו שנאמר (תהלים קלט, טז) גלמי ראו עיניך (וכתיב (דברי הימים ב טז, ט) כי ה' עיניו משוטטות בכל הארץ) אמר רב אושעיא משמיה דרב אדם הראשון It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: The dust that served to form Adam the first man was gathered from the entire world, as it is stated: “When I was made in secret and wrought in the lowest places of the earth, Your eyes did see my unshaped flesh” (Psalms 139:15–16), and it is written: “For the eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole earth” (II Chronicles 16:9), indicating that this figure was formed from the whole earth, the place within the view of the Lord’s eyes. Rav Oshaya says in the name of Rav: With regard to Adam the first man,

Daf 38b

גופו מבבל וראשו מארץ ישראל ואבריו משאר ארצות עגבותיו א"ר אחא מאקרא דאגמא his torso was fashioned from dust taken from Babylonia, and his head was fashioned from dust taken from Eretz Yisrael, the most important land, and his limbs were fashioned from dust taken from the rest of the lands in the world. With regard to his buttocks, Rav Aḥa says: They were fashioned from dust taken from Akra De’agma, on the outskirts of Babylonia.

א"ר יוחנן בר חנינא שתים עשרה שעות הוי היום שעה ראשונה הוצבר עפרו שניה נעשה גולם שלישית נמתחו אבריו רביעית נזרקה בו נשמה חמישית עמד על רגליו ששית קרא שמות שביעית נזדווגה לו חוה שמינית עלו למטה שנים וירדו ארבעה תשיעית נצטווה שלא לאכול מן האילן עשירית סרח אחת עשרה נידון שתים עשרה נטרד והלך לו שנאמר (תהלים מט, יג) אדם ביקר בל ילין Rabbi Yoḥanan bar Ḥanina says: Daytime is twelve hours long, and the day Adam the first man was created was divided as follows: In the first hour of the day, his dust was gathered. In the second, an undefined figure was fashioned. In the third, his limbs were extended. In the fourth, a soul was cast into him. In the fifth, he stood on his legs. In the sixth, he called the creatures by the names he gave them. In the seventh, Eve was paired with him. In the eighth, they arose to the bed two, and descended four, i.e., Cain and Abel were immediately born. In the ninth, he was commanded not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge. In the tenth, he sinned. In the eleventh, he was judged. In the twelfth, he was expelled and left the Garden of Eden, as it is stated: “But man abides not in honor; he is like the beasts that perish” (Psalms 49:13). Adam did not abide, i.e., sleep, in a place of honor for even one night.

אמר רמי בר חמא אין חיה רעה שולטת באדם אלא אם כן נדמה לו כבהמה שנאמר (תהלים מט, יג) נמשל כבהמות נדמו: Rami bar Ḥama says in explanation of the end of that verse: A wild animal does not have power over a person unless that person seems to the wild animal like an animal, as it is stated: “He is like the beasts that perish.”

(שע"ה בסו"ף ארמ"י סימן) אמר רב יהודה א"ר בשעה שבקש הקב"ה לבראות את האדם ברא כת אחת של מלאכי השרת אמר להם רצונכם נעשה אדם בצלמנו אמרו לפניו רבש"ע מה מעשיו אמר להן כך וכך מעשיו The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the statements that follow: At the time, to the end, Aramaic. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: At the time that the Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to create a person, He created one group of ministering angels. He said to them: If you agree, let us fashion a person in our image. The angels said before him: Master of the Universe, what are the actions of this person You suggest to create? God said to them: His actions are such and such, according to human nature.

אמרו לפניו רבש"ע (תהלים ח, ה) מה אנוש כי תזכרנו ובן אדם כי תפקדנו הושיט אצבעו קטנה ביניהן ושרפם וכן כת שניה כת שלישית אמרו לפניו רבש"ע ראשונים שאמרו לפניך מה הועילו כל העולם כולו שלך הוא כל מה שאתה רוצה לעשות בעולמך עשה The angels said before him: Master of the Universe: “What is man that You are mindful of him? And the son of man that You think of him?” (Psalms 8:5), i.e., a creature such as this is not worth creating. God outstretched His small finger among them and burned them with fire. And the same occurred with a second group of angels. The third group of angels that He asked said before Him: Master of the Universe, the first two groups who spoke their mind before You, what did they accomplish? The entire world is Yours; whatever You wish to do in Your world, do. God then created the first person.

כיון שהגיע לאנשי דור המבול ואנשי דור הפלגה שמעשיהן מקולקלין אמרו לפניו רבש"ע לא יפה אמרו ראשונים לפניך אמר להן (ישעיהו מו, ד) ועד זקנה אני הוא ועד שיבה אני אסבול וגו' When history arrived at the time of the people of the generation of the flood and the people of the generation of the dispersion, i.e., the Tower of Babel, whose actions were ruinous, the angels said before God: Master of the Universe, didn’t the first set of angels speak appropriately before You, that human beings are not worthy of having been created? God said to them concerning humanity: “Even to your old age I am the same; and even to hoar hairs will I suffer you; I have made and I will bear; and I will carry, and I will deliver you” (Isaiah 46:4), i.e., having created people, I will even suffer their flaws.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אדם הראשון מסוף העולם ועד סופו היה שנאמר (דברים ד, לב) למן היום אשר ברא אלהים אדם על הארץ ולמקצה השמים ועד קצה השמים כיון שסרח הניח הקדוש ברוך הוא ידו עליו ומיעטו שנאמר (תהלים קלט, ה) אחור וקדם צרתני ותשת עלי כפכה Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Adam the first man spanned from one end of the world until the other, as it is stated: “Since the day that God created man upon the earth, and from the one end of heaven unto the other” (Deuteronomy 4:32), meaning that on the day Adam was created he spanned from one end of the heavens until the other. Once Adam sinned, the Holy One, Blessed be He, placed His hand on him and diminished him, as it is stated: “Behind and before You have created me and laid Your hand upon me” (Psalms 139:5), that at first Adam spanned “behind and before,” meaning everywhere, and then God laid His hand on him and diminished him.

אמר ר"א אדם הראשון מן הארץ עד לרקיע היה שנאמר למן היום אשר ברא אלהים אדם על הארץ ולמקצה השמים (עד קצה השמים) כיון שסרח הניח הקב"ה ידו עליו ומיעטו שנאמר אחור וקדם צרתני וגו' קשו קראי אהדדי אידי ואידי חדא מידה היא Rabbi Elazar says: The height of Adam the first man was from the ground until the firmament, as it is stated: “Since the day that God created man upon the earth, and from the one end of heaven unto the other.” Adam stood “upon the earth” and rose to the end of the heavens. Once Adam sinned, the Holy One, Blessed be He, placed His hand on him and diminished him, as it is stated: “Behind and before You have created me and laid Your hand upon me.” The Gemara asks: The interpretations of the verses contradict each other. The first interpretation is that his size was from one end of the world to the other, and the second interpretation is that it was from the earth until the heavens. The Gemara answers: This and that, from one end of the world to another and from the earth until the heavens, are one measure, i.e., the same distance.

ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב אדם הראשון בלשון ארמי ספר שנאמר (תהלים קלט, יז) ולי מה יקרו רעיך אל And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Adam the first man spoke in the language of Aramaic, as it is stated in the chapter of Psalms speaking in the voice of Adam: “How weighty also are Your thoughts to me, O God” (Psalms 139:17).

והיינו דאמר ריש לקיש מאי דכתיב (בראשית ה, א) זה ספר תולדות אדם מלמד שהראהו הקב"ה דור דור ודורשיו דור דור וחכמיו כיון שהגיע לדורו של רבי עקיבא שמח בתורתו ונתעצב במיתתו אמר ולי מה יקרו רעיך אל And this, i.e., that the verse in Psalms is stated by Adam, is what Reish Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “This is the book of the generations of Adam” (Genesis 5:1)? This verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, showed Adam every generation and its Torah interpreters, every generation and its wise ones. When he arrived at his vision of the generation of Rabbi Akiva, Adam was gladdened by his Torah, and saddened by his manner of death. He said: “How weighty also are Your thoughts to me, O God,” i.e., how it weighs upon me that a man as great as Rabbi Akiva should suffer.

ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב אדם הראשון מין היה שנאמר (בראשית ג, ט) ויקרא ה' אלהים אל האדם ויאמר לו איכה אן נטה לבך רבי יצחק אמר מושך בערלתו היה כתיב הכא (הושע ו, ז) והמה כאדם עברו ברית וכתיב התם (בראשית ט, ט) את בריתי הפר And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Adam the first man was a heretic, as it is stated: “And the Lord called to the man and said to him: Where are you”? (Genesis 3:9), meaning, to where has your heart turned, indicating that Adam turned from the path of truth. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: He was one who drew his foreskin forward, so as to remove any indication that he was circumcised. It is written here: “And they like men [adam] have transgressed the covenant” (Hosea 6:7), and it is written there: “And the uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant” (Genesis 17:14).

רב נחמן אמר כופר בעיקר היה כתיב הכא עברו ברית וכתיב התם (את בריתי הפר) (ירמיהו כב, ט) ואמרו על אשר עזבו (את) ברית ה' (אלהי אבותם) Rav Naḥman says: He was a denier of the fundamental principle of belief in God. It is written here: “And they like men [adam] have transgressed the covenant,” and it is written there: “He has broken My covenant,” and it is written in a third verse: “And then they shall answer: Because they have forsaken the covenant of the Lord their God and worshipped other gods and served them” (Jeremiah 22:9).

תנן התם ר"א אומר הוי שקוד ללמוד תורה ודע מה שתשיב לאפיקורוס אמר ר' יוחנן ל"ש אלא אפיקורוס (של) עובדי כוכבים אבל אפיקורוס ישראל כ"ש דפקר טפי § We learned in a mishna there (Avot 2:14): Rabbi Eliezer says: Be persistent to learn Torah, and know what to respond to the heretic [la’apikoros]. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This was taught only with regard to a gentile heretic, but not with regard to a Jewish heretic, as one should not respond to him. All the more so, if one does respond he will become more heretical. His heresy is assumed to be intentional, and any attempt to rebut it will only cause him to reinforce his position.

א"ר יוחנן כ"מ שפקרו המינים תשובתן בצידן (בראשית א, כו) נעשה אדם בצלמנו (ואומר) (בראשית א, כז) ויברא אלהים את האדם בצלמו (בראשית יא, ז) הבה נרדה ונבלה שם שפתם (בראשית יא, ה) וירד ה' לראות את העיר ואת המגדל (בראשית לה, ז) כי שם נגלו אליו האלהים (בראשית לה, ג) לאל העונה אותי ביום צרתי Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Any place in the Bible from where the heretics attempt to prove their heresy, i.e., that there is more than one god, the response to their claim is alongside them, i.e., in the immediate vicinity of the verses they cite. The verse states that God said: “Let us make man in our image” (Genesis 1:26), employing the plural, but it then states: “And God created man in His image” (Genesis 1:27), employing the singular. The verse states that God said: “Come, let us go down and there confound their language” (Genesis 11:7), but it also states: “And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower” (Genesis 11:5). The verse states in the plural: “There God was revealed [niglu] to him when he fled from the face of his brother” (Genesis 35:7), but it also states in the singular: “To God Who answers [haoneh] me in the day of my distress” (Genesis 35:3).

(דברים ד, ז) כי מי גוי גדול אשר לו אלהים קרובים אליו כה' אלהינו בכל קראנו אליו (שמואל ב ז, כג) ומי כעמך כישראל גוי אחד בארץ אשר הלכו אלהים לפדות לו לעם (דניאל ז, ט) עד די כרסוון רמיו ועתיק יומין יתיב Rabbi Yoḥanan cites several examples where the counterclaim is in the same verse as the claim of the heretics. The verse states: “For what nation is there so great that has God so near to them as the Lord our God is whenever we call upon Him?” (Deuteronomy 4:7), where the term “near” is written in plural, kerovim, but the term “upon Him” is written in singular. Another verse states: “And who is like Your people, like Israel, a nation one in the earth, whom God went to redeem unto Himself for a people?” (II Samuel 7:23), where the term “went” is written in plural, halekhu, but the term “Himself” is written in singular. Another verse states: “I beheld till thrones were placed, and one that was ancient of days did sit” (Daniel 7:9); where the term “thrones” is written in plural, kharsavan, but the term “sit” is written in singular.

הנך למה לי כדרבי יוחנן דא"ר יוחנן אין הקב"ה עושה דבר אא"כ נמלך בפמליא של מעלה שנאמר (דניאל ד, יד) בגזירת עירין פתגמא ובמאמר קדישין שאילתא The Gemara asks: Why do I need these instances of plural words? Why does the verse employ the plural at all when referring to God? The Gemara explains: This is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, does not act unless He consults with the entourage of Above, i.e., the angels, as it is stated: “The matter is by the decree of the watchers, and the sentence by the word of the holy ones” (Daniel 4:14).

התינח כולהי עד די כרסוון רמיו מאי איכא למימר אחד לו ואחד לדוד דתניא אחד לו ואחד לדוד דברי ר"ע א"ל ר' יוסי עקיבא עד מתי אתה עושה שכינה חול אלא אחד לדין ואחד לצדקה The Gemara clarifies: This works out well for almost all the verses, as they describe an action taken by God, but what is there to say concerning the verse: “I beheld till thrones were placed”? The Gemara answers: One throne is for Him and one throne is for David, i.e., the messiah, as it is taught in a baraita: One throne is for Him and one throne is for David; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yosei said to him: Akiva! Until when will you desacralize the Divine Presence by equating God with a person? Rather, the correct interpretation is that both thrones are for God, as one throne is for judgment and one throne is for righteousness.

קבלה מיניה או לא קבלה מיניה ת"ש דתניא אחד לדין ואחד לצדקה דברי ר"ע א"ל ר' אלעזר בן עזריא עקיבא מה לך אצל הגדה כלך אצל נגעים ואהלות אלא אחד לכסא ואחד לשרפרף כסא לישב עליו שרפרף להדום רגליו The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Akiva accept this explanation from Rabbi Yosei or did he not accept it from him? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof to the matter from what was taught in another baraita, as it is taught in a baraita: One throne is for judgment and one throne is for righteousness; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to him: Akiva! What are you doing near, i.e., discussing, matters of aggada? Go near tractates Nega’im and Oholot, which examine the complex halakhot of ritual purity, where your knowledge is unparalleled. Rather, the correct interpretation is that while both thrones are for God, one is for a throne and one is for a stool. There is a throne for God to sit upon, and a stool that serves as His footstool.

אמר רב נחמן האי מאן דידע לאהדורי למינים כרב אידית ליהדר ואי לא לא ליהדר אמר ההוא מינא לרב אידית כתיב (שמות כד, א) ואל משה אמר עלה אל ה' עלה אלי מיבעי ליה א"ל זהו מטטרון ששמו כשם רבו דכתיב (שמות כג, כא) כי שמי בקרבו Rav Naḥman says: This one, i.e., any person, who knows how to respond to the heretics as effectively as Rav Idit should respond to them, but if he does not know, he should not respond to them. The Gemara relates: A certain heretic said to Rav Idit: It is written in the verse concerning God: “And to Moses He said: Come up to the Lord” (Exodus 24:1). The heretic raised a question: It should have stated: Come up to Me. Rav Idit said to him: This term, “the Lord,” in that verse is referring to the angel Metatron, whose name is like the name of his Master, as it is written: “Behold I send an angel before you to keep you in the way and to bring you to the place that I have prepared. Take heed of him and obey his voice; do not defy him; for he will not pardon your transgression, for My name is in him” (Exodus 23:20–21).

אי הכי ניפלחו ליה כתיב (שמות כג, כא) אל תמר בו אל תמירני בו אם כן לא ישא לפשעכם למה לי א"ל הימנותא בידן דאפילו בפרוונקא נמי לא קבילניה דכתיב (שמות לג, טו) ויאמר אליו אם אין פניך הולכים וגו' The heretic said to him: If so, if this angel is equated with God, we should worship him as we worship God. Rav Idit said to him: It is written: “Do not defy [tammer] him,” which alludes to: Do not replace Me [temireni] with him. The heretic said to him: If so, why do I need the clause “For he will not pardon your transgression”? Rav Idit said to him: We believe that we did not accept the angel even as a guide [befarvanka] for the journey, as it is written: “And he said to him: If Your Presence go not with me raise us not up from here” (Exodus 33:15). Moses told God that if God Himself does not accompany the Jewish people they do not want to travel to Eretz Yisrael.

אמר ליה ההוא מינא לר' ישמעאל בר' יוסי כתיב (בראשית יט, כד) וה' המטיר על סדום ועל עמורה גפרית ואש מאת ה' מאתו מיבעי ליה א"ל ההוא כובס שבקיה אנא מהדרנא ליה דכתיב (בראשית ד, כג) ויאמר למך לנשיו עדה וצלה שמען קולי נשי למך נשיי מיבעי ליה אלא משתעי קרא הכי הכא נמי משתעי קרא הכי א"ל מנא לך הא מפירקיה דר"מ שמיע לי The Gemara relates: A certain heretic said to Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: It is written: “And the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven” (Genesis 19:24). The heretic raised the question: It should have stated: From Him out of heaven. A certain launderer said to Rabbi Yishmael: Leave him be; I will respond to him. This is as it is written: “And Lemech said to his wives: Adah and Zillah, hear my voice; wives of Lemech, hearken to my speech” (Genesis 4:23). One can raise the question: It should have been written: My wives, and not: “Wives of Lemech.” Rather, it is the style of the verse to speak in this manner. Here too, it is the style of the verse to speak in this manner. Rabbi Yishmael said to the launderer: From where did you hear this interpretation? The launderer said to him: I heard it at the lecture of Rabbi Meir.

דא"ר יוחנן כי הוה דריש ר' מאיר בפירקיה הוה דריש תילתא שמעתא תילתא אגדתא תילתא מתלי ואמר ר' יוחנן ג' מאות משלות שועלים היו לו לרבי מאיר ואנו אין לנו אלא שלש The Gemara comments: This is as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When Rabbi Meir would teach his lecture he would expound one-third halakha, one-third aggada, and one-third parables. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir had, i.e., taught, three hundred parables of foxes, and we have only three.

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Daf 39b

(במדבר כג, ט) ובגוים לא יתחשב “It is a people that shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations” (Numbers 23:9), teaching that where the verse mentions “the nations,” the Jewish people are not included.

רבי אלעזר רמי כתיב (תהלים קמה, ט) טוב ה' לכל וכתיב (איכה ג, כה) טוב ה' לקוויו משל לאדם שיש לו פרדס כשהוא משקה משקה את כולו כשהוא עודר אינו עודר אלא טובים שבהם: The Gemara cites a related statement: Rabbi Elazar raises a contradiction: It is written in one verse: “The Lord is good to all and His compassion is over all His works” (Psalms 145:9), and it is written in a different verse: “The Lord is good to those who wait for Him, to the soul that seeks Him” (Lamentations 3:25). He explains: This can be compared to a person who has an orchard. When he waters it, he waters all of it. Perforce, the water reaches all parts of the orchard, and he cannot discriminate between trees. This is the meaning of the verse: “The Lord is good to all.” By contrast, when he hoes around the trees, he hoes only around the good trees among them. Similarly, when God bestows goodness to the world, all receive it. When He protects people from harm, not all are protected.

לפיכך כל א' וא' כו': (מלכים א כב, לו) ויעבר הרנה במחנה א"ר אחא בר חנינא (משלי יא, י) באבוד רשעים רנה באבוד אחאב בן עמרי רנה § The mishna teaches: Therefore, since all humanity descends from one person, each and every person is obligated to say: The world was created for me. The mishna then teaches that the court says to the witnesses: And perhaps you will say: Why would we want to be responsible for the blood of this person? But be aware, as is it not already stated: “When the wicked perish, there is song” (Proverbs 11:10)? The Gemara teaches: A separate verse relates that after the evil king Ahab was killed: “And the song went throughout the camp” (I Kings 22:36). Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says: The fact that the verse states “the song,” and not a song, indicates that it is referring to a song mentioned elsewhere. Accordingly, the verse: “When the wicked perish, there is song,” alludes to this episode: When Ahab ben Omri perished, there was song.

ומי חדי קודשא בריך הוא במפלתן של רשעים הכתיב (דברי הימים ב כ, כא) בצאת לפני החלוץ ואומרים הודו לה' כי לעולם חסדו ואמר רבי יונתן מפני מה לא נאמר בהודאה זו כי טוב לפי שאין הקדוש ברוך הוא שמח במפלתן של רשעים The Gemara asks: But is the Holy One, Blessed be He, gladdened by the downfall of the wicked? Isn’t it written in the verse describing the victory of the Jewish people in battle: “He appointed them that should sing unto the Lord, and praise in the beauty of holiness, as they went out before the army, and say: Give thanks to the Lord, for His mercy endures forever” (II Chronicles 20:21). And Rabbi Yonatan says: For what reason is it not stated in this praise: “Give thanks to the Lord for He is good, for His mercy endures forever,” as is stated elsewhere, e.g., Psalms 118:1? This is because the Holy One, Blessed be He, is not gladdened by the downfall of the wicked.

דאמר ר' שמואל בר נחמן אמר ר' יונתן מאי דכתיב (שמות יד, כ) ולא קרב זה אל זה כל הלילה באותה שעה בקשו מלאכי השרת לומר שירה לפני הקב"ה אמר להן הקב"ה מעשה ידי טובעין בים ואתם אומרים שירה לפני The Gemara comments: As Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥman says that Rabbi Yonatan says: What is the meaning of that which is written in the passage describing the splitting of the Red Sea: “And the one came not near the other all the night” (Exodus 14:20)? At that time the ministering angels desired to recite a song before the Holy One, Blessed be He. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: My handiwork, i.e., the Egyptians, are drowning in the sea, and you are reciting a song before Me? Apparently, God is not gladdened by the downfall of the wicked.

אמר ר' יוסי בר חנינא הוא אינו שש אבל אחרים משיש דיקא נמי דכתיב (דברים כח, סג) ישיש ולא כתיב ישוש שמע מינה Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: He, i.e., God, does not rejoice in their downfall, but He does cause others to feel joy. The Gemara comments: Accordingly, the language of the verse is also precise, as it is written: “And it shall come to pass, that as the Lord rejoiced over you to do you good, and to multiply you; so the Lord will cause rejoicing [yasis] over you to cause you to perish” (Deuteronomy 28:63), and it is not written: Will have joy [yasus]. The term “yasis” connotes causing joy to others, not that God will experience joy Himself. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from this inference that it is so.

(מלכים א כב, לח) והזונות רחצו וגו' אמר רבי (אליעזר) למרק שתי חזיונות אחת של מיכיהו ואחת של אליהו במיכיהו כתיב (מלכים א כב, כח) אם שוב תשוב בשלום לא דיבר ה' בי באליהו כתיב (מלכים א כא, יט) במקום אשר לקקו הכלבים את דם נבות Apropos the death of Ahab, the Gemara cites another verse from that passage. The verse states: “And they washed the chariot by the pool of Samaria, and the dogs licked up his blood; and the harlots also washed themselves there, according to the word of the Lord that He spoke” (I Kings 22:38). Rabbi Elazar says: “The harlots [hazzonot]” can be read as visions [ḥezyonot], and the verse means: To cleanse, i.e., to fulfill, two visions, one of Micaiah and one of Elijah. This fulfills a vision of Micaiah, as it is written: “If you return at all in peace, the Lord has not spoken by me” (I Kings 22:28). Once Ahab died, Micaiah’s vision was fulfilled. This also fulfills a vision of Elijah, as it is written: “In the place where the dogs licked the blood of Naboth shall the dogs lick your blood, even yours” (I Kings 21:19).

רבא אמר זונות ממש אחאב איש מצונן היה ועשתה לו איזבל שתי צורי זונות במרכבתו כדי שיראה אותן ויתחמם Rava says: The verse is speaking of actual harlots. Ahab was a frigid man, who did not lust for women. And Jezebel, his wife, fashioned two forms of harlots for him in his chariot, in order that he see them while traveling and become aroused. Accordingly, one would understand the verse as stating that the harlots were washed, not that they washed themselves.

(מלכים א כב, לד) ואיש משך בקשת לתומו ויכה ר' אלעזר אמר לפי תומו רבא אמר לתמם שתי חזיונות אחת של מיכיהו ואחת של אליהו: The verse describing the death of Ahab states: “And a certain man drew a bow offhandedly [letummo] and smote the king of Israel” (I Kings 22:34). Rabbi Elazar says: “Letummo” should be understood as offhandedly [lefi tummo], without aiming for Ahab. Rava says: This alludes to the fact that the killing of Ahab served to make whole [letammem] two visions, one of Micaiah and one of Elijah.

סימן קר"א וזכ"ה באדו"ם: כתיב (מלכים א יח, ג) ויקרא אחאב אל עובדיהו אשר על הבית ועובדיה היה ירא ה' מאד מאי קאמר קרא § Before continuing its discussion of Ahab, the Gemara records a mnemonic for the forthcoming statements: Called; and merited; of Edom. It is written: “And Ahab called Obadiah, who was over the household; now Obadiah feared the Lord greatly” (I Kings 18:3). The Gemara asks: What is the verse saying? What is the connection between Obadiah’s fear of the Lord and the call of Ahab?

א"ר יצחק א"ל ביעקב כתיב (בראשית ל, כז) נחשתי ויברכני ה' בגללך ביוסף כתיב (בראשית לט, ה) ויברך ה' את בית המצרי בגלל יוסף ביתא דההוא גברא לא הוה מיבריך שמא לא ירא אלהים אתה יצתה בת קול ואמרה ועובדיה היה ירא את ה' מאד אבל ביתו של אחאב אינו מזומן לברכה Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Ahab said to Obadiah: It is written with regard to Jacob: “And Laban said to him: If now I have found favor in your eyes, I have observed the signs, and the Lord has blessed me for your sake” (Genesis 30:27). It is written with regard to Joseph: “The Lord blessed the Egyptian’s house for Joseph’s sake” (Genesis 39:5). The house of that man, i.e., my house, was not blessed. Perhaps you do not fear God? Immediately, a Divine Voice emerged and said: “Now Obadiah feared the Lord greatly,” but the house of Ahab is not fit for blessing like the houses of those masters.

א"ר אבא גדול שנאמר בעובדיהו יותר ממה שנאמר באברהם דאילו באברהם לא כתיב מאד ובעובדיהו כתיב מאד Rabbi Abba says: The praise that is stated with regard to Obadiah is greater than that which is stated with regard to Abraham. As with regard to Abraham the verse states: “For now I know that you fear God” (Genesis 22:12), and the term “greatly” is not written, and about Obadiah the term “greatly” is written.

א"ר יצחק מפני מה זכה עובדיהו לנביאות מפני שהחביא מאה נביאים במערה שנאמר (מלכים א יח, ד) ויהי בהכרית איזבל את נביאי ה' ויקח עובדיהו מאה נביאים ויחביאם חמשים איש במערה וגו' מאי שנא חמשים איש א"ר אלעזר מיעקב למד שנאמר (בראשית לב, ט) והיה המחנה הנשאר לפליטה רבי אבהו אמר לפי שאין מערה מחזקת יותר מחמשים Rabbi Yitzḥak says: For what reason did Obadiah merit prophecy? It is because he concealed one hundred prophets in a cave, as it is stated: “It was so, when Jezebel cut off the prophets of the Lord, that Obadiah took one hundred prophets, and hid them, fifty men in a cave, and fed them with bread and water” (I Kings 18:4). The Gemara asks: What is different, i.e., why did he decide, to conceal fifty men in each of two caves and not conceal them all together in one cave? Rabbi Elazar says: He learned from the behavior of Jacob to do so, as it is stated: “And he said: If Esau comes to the one camp and smites it, then the camp that is left shall escape” (Genesis 32:9). Obadiah learned from this to divide the prophets and thereby lessen the danger. Rabbi Abbahu says: It is because there is no cave big enough to contain more than fifty people.

(עובדיה א, א) חזון עובדיהו כה אמר ה' אלהים לאדום וגו' מאי שנא עובדיה לאדום The verse states: “The vision of Obadiah. So says the Lord God concerning Edom: We have heard a message from the Lord, and an ambassador is sent among the nations: Arise, and let us rise up against her in battle” (Obadiah 1:1). The Gemara asks: What is different, i.e., what is the reason, that specifically Obadiah prophesied concerning Edom?

אמר רבי יצחק אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא יבא עובדיהו הדר בין שני רשעים ולא למד ממעשיהם וינבא על עשו הרשע שדר בין שני צדיקים ולא למד ממעשיהם אמר אפרים מקשאה תלמידו של רבי מאיר משום רבי מאיר עובדיה גר אדומי היה והיינו דאמרי אינשי מיניה וביה אבא ניזיל ביה נרגא Rabbi Yitzḥak says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Let Obadiah come, who dwells among two wicked ones, Ahab and Jezebel, but did not learn from their actions; and he will prophesy concerning Esau the wicked, the progenitor of Edom, who dwelled among two righteous ones, Isaac and Rebekkah, but did not learn from their actions. Efrayim Miksha’a, a student of Rabbi Meir, said in the name of Rabbi Meir: Obadiah was an Edomite convert. Consequently, he prophesied with regard to Edom. And this is as people say: From and within the forest comes the ax to it, as the handle for the ax that chops the tree is from the forest itself.

(שמואל ב ח, ב) ויך את מואב וימדדם בחבל השכב אותם ארצה אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יוחי היינו דאמרי אינשי מיניה וביה אבא ליזיל ביה נרגא כי אתא רב דימי אמר ירך מתוכה מסרחת The verse states concerning King David: “And he smote Moab and measured them with the line, making them lie down on the ground and he measured two lines to put to death” (II Samuel 8:2). Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: This is as people say: From and within the forest comes the ax to it, as King David was a descendant of Ruth the Moabite. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he stated something similar to this: A thigh rots from within, i.e., when a piece of meat rots, the rotting begins from the inner part of it. Here too, the punishment is administered by one descended from that very nation.

(מלכים ב ג, כז) ויקח את בנו הבכור אשר ימלך תחתיו ויעלהו עולה על החומה רב ושמואל חד אמר לשם שמים וחד אמר לשם ע"ז § The Gemara cites a verse concerning the king of Moab: “Then he took his eldest son, who should have reigned in his stead, and sacrificed him for a burnt offering upon the wall; and there was great indignation against Israel, and they departed from him and returned to their own land” (II Kings 3:27). Rav and Shmuel engage in a dispute concerning this. One says: The king sacrificed his son for the sake of Heaven, and one says: The king sacrificed his son for the sake of idol worship.

בשלמא למאן דאמר לשם שמים היינו דכתיב (מלכים ב ג, כז) ויהי קצף גדול על ישראל אלא למאן דאמר לשם ע"ז אמאי ויהי קצף The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that he sacrificed him for the sake of Heaven, this is as it is written: “And there was great indignation against Israel,” as the gentile attempted to honor God according to his understanding, while the Jewish people were straying from worshipping God, leading to God’s anger against them. But according to the one who says that he sacrificed him for the sake of idol worship, why would the verse state: “And there was…indignation”?

כדר' יהושע בן לוי דריב"ל רמי כתיב (יחזקאל ה, ז) וכמשפטי הגוים אשר סביבותיכם לא עשיתם וכתיב (יחזקאל יא, יב) וכמשפטי הגוים אשר סביבותיכם עשיתם כמתוקנין שבהם לא עשיתם כמקולקלין שבהם עשיתם The Gemara answers: This can be understood in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi raises a contradiction: It is written concerning the Jewish people: “You have not walked in My statutes, neither have you kept My ordinances; nor have you done according to the statutes of the nations that are round about you” (Ezekiel 5:7), and it is also written: “You have done according to the statutes of the nations that are round about you” (Ezekiel 11:12). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains: You did not act like the proper ones among the nations, but you did act like the flawed ones among them. Here as well, the Jewish people learned from the king of Moab to engage in human sacrifice.

(מלכים ב ג, כז) ויסעו מעליו וישובו לארץ אמר רבי חנינא בר פפא באותה שעה ירדו רשעיהן של ישראל למדריגה התחתונה The Gemara discusses the end of that verse: “And they departed from him and returned to their own land [la’aretz]” (II Kings 3:27). Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa says: At that time the enemies of the Jewish people, a euphemism for the Jewish people themselves, descended to the lowest level. He interprets “la’aretz” to mean: To the earth, teaching that the Jewish people were as low as the dust of the earth.

(מלכים א א, ד) והנערה יפה עד מאד א"ר חנינא בר פפא עדיין לא הגיעה לחצי יופי של שרה דכתיב עד מאד ולא מאד בכלל: The chapter closes with the explication of a verse stated with regard to Abishag, who attended King David before his death: “And the damsel was very fair [yafa ad me’od ]” (I Kings 1:4). Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa says: She still did not reach half the beauty of Sarah, as it is written: “Ad me’od,” which can be translated as “up to very fair,” but not including the praise of “very fair.” By contrast, it is written concerning Sarah: “She was very fair” (Genesis 12:14).

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Daf 40a

מתני׳ היו בודקין אותן בשבע חקירות באיזו שבוע באיזו שנה באיזו חודש בכמה בחדש באיזה יום באיזה שעה באיזה מקום ר' יוסי אומר באיזה יום באיזה שעה באיזה מקום MISHNA: The court would examine the witnesses in capital cases with seven interrogations, i.e., interrogatory questions, and they are: In which seven-year period, that is, in which cycle of seven years within a jubilee did the event occur; in which year of the Sabbatical cycle did the event occur; in which month did the event occur; on which day of the month did the event occur; on which day of the week did the event occur; at which hour did the event occur; and in what place did the event occur. Rabbi Yosei says: The court would examine the witnesses with only three interrogations: On which day did the event occur, at which hour, and in what place.

מכירין אתם אותו התרתם בו העובד ע"ז את מי עבד ובמה עבד They would also ask: Do you recognize him as the man who committed the transgression? Did you warn him? They would then ask the witnesses about the particulars of the incident. For example, in the case of one who is an accused idol worshipper, they ask the witnesses: Whom, i.e., which idol, did he worship, and in what manner did he worship it, and so on.

כל המרבה בבדיקות הרי זה משובח מעשה ובדק בן זכאי בעוקצי תאנים With regard to all judges who increase the number of examinations, i.e., who add questions about the details of the event, this is praiseworthy, as this may clarify that the witnesses are lying. An incident occurred and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses by questioning them about the color and shape of the stems of figs in order to unearth a contradiction between the witnesses.

מה בין חקירות לבדיקות חקירות אחד אומר איני יודע עדותן בטילה בדיקות אחד אומר איני יודע ואפילו שנים אומרים אין אנו יודעין עדותן קיימת אחד חקירות ואחד בדיקות בזמן שמכחישין זה את זה עדותן בטילה The mishna explains: What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? With regard to interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. With regard to examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. Both with regard to interrogations and examinations, at a time when the witnesses contradict one another, their testimony is void.

אחד אומר בשנים בחדש ואחד אומר בשלשה בחדש עדותן קיימת שזה יודע בעיבורו של חדש וזה אינו יודע בעיבורו של חדש The mishna clarifies: If one witness says the event occurred on the second of the month, and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, this is not regarded as a contradiction and their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that this witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event occurred on the second of the month, and that witness does not know of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event occurred on the third of the month. Their testimony is not considered incongruent.

זה אומר בשלשה ואחד אומר בחמשה עדותן בטילה By contrast, if this witness says the event occurred on the third of the month and one witness says the event occurred on the fifth of the month, their testimony is void, as this disparity cannot be attributed to a mere error. Therefore, their testimony is not congruent.

אחד אומר בשתי שעות ואחד אומר בשלש שעות עדותן קיימת אחד אומר בשלש ואחד אומר בחמש עדותן בטילה Similarly, if one witness says that the event occurred at two hours, i.e., the second hour of the day from sunrise, and one witness says that the event occurred at three hours, their testimony stands, as one could reasonably err this amount in estimating the hour of the day. By contrast, if one says that the event occurred at three hours, and one says that the event occurred at five hours, their testimony is void.

רבי יהודה אומר קיימת אחד אומר בחמש ואחד אומר בשבע עדותן בטילה שבחמש חמה במזרח ובשבע חמה במערב Rabbi Yehuda says: Also in this case their testimony stands, as one could reasonably err concerning even this length of time. Rabbi Yehuda adds: But if one says that the event occurred at five hours, and one says that the event occurred at seven hours, their testimony is void. Here the difference is recognizable to all, since at five hours the sun is in the east and at seven the sun is in the west, and one could not err concerning this. Therefore, their testimony is not congruent.

ואח"כ מכניסין את השני ובודקין אותו אם נמצאו דבריהם מכוונים פותחין בזכות אמר אחד מן העדים יש לי ללמד עליו זכות או אחד מן התלמידים יש לי ללמד עליו חובה משתקין אותו אמר אחד מן התלמידים יש לי ללמד עליו זכות מעלין אותו ומושיבין אותו ביניהם ולא היה יורד משם כל היום כולו The mishna continues: And afterward, after the court examines the first witness, they bring in the second witness and examine him. If the statements of the witnesses are found to be congruent, the court begins to deliberate the matter. They open the deliberations with an appeal to anyone who can find a reason to acquit the accused. If one of the witnesses said: I can teach a reason to acquit him, or if one of the students sitting before the judges said: I can teach a reason to deem him liable, the judges silence him, i.e., both the witness and the student. The reason is that these people are not allowed to offer information such as this. But if one of the students said: I can to teach a reason to acquit him, they raise him to the seat of the court and seat him among them, and he would not descend from there the entire day, but would sit and participate in their deliberations.

אם יש ממש בדבריו שומעין לו ואפילו הוא אומר יש לי ללמד על עצמי זכות שומעין לו ובלבד שיש ממש בדבריו If the statement of that student has substance, the court listens to him. And if even the accused says: I can teach a reason to acquit me, the court listens to him and considers his statement, provided that his statement has substance.

ואם מצאו לו זכות פטרוהו ואם לאו מעבירין אותו למחר ומזדווגין זוגות זוגות היו ממעטין ממאכל ולא היו שותין יין כל היום ונושאין ונותנין כל הלילה ולמחרת משכימין ובאין לב"ד And if the court found it fit to acquit him during the deliberations, as all or a majority of the judges agreed to acquit him, they excuse him. But if a majority does not find it fit to acquit him, they delay his verdict to the following day, and they then assign pairs of judges to discuss the matter with each other. They would minimize their food intake and they would not drink wine all day. And they would deliberate all night, and the following day they would arise early and come to court and then vote again and tally the votes of the judges.

המזכה אומר אני מזכה ומזכה אני במקומי והמחייב אומר אני מחייב ומחייב אני במקומי המלמד חובה מלמד זכות אבל המלמד זכות אינו יכול לחזור וללמד חובה טעו בדבר שני סופרי הדיינין מזכירין אותו אם מצאו לו זכות פטרוהו ואם לאו עומדים למנין שנים עשר מזכין ואחד עשר מחייבין זכאי One who yesterday was of the opinion to acquit the defendant says: I said to acquit, and I acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then teach a reason to deem him liable. If they erred in the matter, as one of the judges forgot what he had said the previous day, two judges’ scribes, who recorded the statements of the judges, remind him. If the court then found it fit to acquit him unanimously, they excuse him, and if not all of the judges determine to acquit, they stand to count the vote. If twelve judges vote to acquit him and eleven judges deem him liable, he is acquitted.

שנים עשר מחייבין ואחד עשר מזכין ואפילו אחד עשר מזכין ואחד עשר מחייבין ואחד אומר איני יודע ואפילו עשרים ושנים מזכין או מחייבין ואחד אומר איני יודע יוסיפו הדיינין וכמה מוסיפין שנים שנים עד שבעים ואחד The mishna continues: In a case where twelve judges deem him liable and eleven judges acquit; or even if eleven judges acquit and eleven deem him liable and one judge says: I do not know; or even if twenty-two judges acquit or deem him liable and one judge says: I do not know, the judge who said he does not know is disregarded, and the judges add additional judges to the court until they reach a definitive ruling. And how many judges do they add? They add pairs of two judges each time they do not reach a ruling until there are seventy-one judges, but no more than that.

שלשים וששה מזכין ושלשים וחמשה מחייבין זכאי שלשים וששה מחייבין ושלשים וחמשה מזכין דנין אלו כנגד אלו עד שיראה אחד מן המחייבין דברי המזכין: At that point, if thirty-six judges acquit and thirty-five judges deem him liable, he is acquitted. If thirty-six judges deem him liable and thirty-five judges acquit, they continue to deliberate the matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn a defendant to death by a majority of one judge.

גמ׳ מנא הני מילי אמר רב יהודה דאמר קרא (דברים יג, טו) ודרשת וחקרת ושאלת היטב ואומר (דברים יז, ד) והוגד לך ושמעת ודרשת היטב ואומר (דברים יט, יח) ודרשו השופטים היטב GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? What is the source for these seven interrogations? Rav Yehuda says: It is as the verse states with regard to an idolatrous city: “And you shall inquire, and investigate, and ask diligently” (Deuteronomy 13:15); and it states with regard to one who worships idols: “If it be told to you and you have heard it and inquired diligently” (Deuteronomy 17:4); and it states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And the judges shall inquire diligently” (Deuteronomy 19:18). Taken together, there are seven interrogations alluded to in these verses by each instance of the terms inquire, investigate, and diligently.

Daf 40b

ואימא חדא חדא כדכתיבא דא"כ ליכתבינהו רחמנא בחדא כיון דכולהו בהדי הדדי כתיבא מהדדי ילפי וכיון דילפי מהדדי כמאן דכתיב בחדא דמי The Gemara asks: But why not say that each one is as it is written, and conclude that the Torah requires, respectively, three, two, and two interrogations in the three cases of idol worship, an idolatrous city, and conspiring witnesses, discussed in those verses? As, if it is so, i.e., if there is a requirement of seven interrogations in all cases of capital law, let the Merciful One write them in one place, and it would be derived from there to other cases. The Gemara answers: Since they are all written together, i.e., they all employ analogous terminology, one learns the halakhot of one from the other, and once one learns the halakhot of one from the other, they are considered as if they are written in one place.

והא לא דמיא להדדי (סימן פל"ט סיי"ף התרא"ה) The Gemara asks: But those three instances of idol worship, an idolatrous city, and conspiring witnesses are not similar to each other, so how can one derive the halakhot of one from the other? The Gemara records a mnemonic device for the following terms: Escapes, sword, forewarning.

עיר הנדחת להנך תרתי לא דמיא שכן ממונן פלט ע"ז להנך תרתי לא דמיא שכן בסייף עדים זוממין להנך תרתי לא דמיא שכן צריכים התראה What are the differences? The case of an idolatrous city is not similar to those two, i.e., idol worship and conspiring witnesses, because for the others their money escapes their fate. Although the court executes those transgressors, their money is not confiscated. By contrast, in the case of an idolatrous city, not only are the residents executed, all of their property is destroyed. Idol worship is not similar to those two, as the other two transgressions are judged by the sword, while the punishment for idol worship is death by stoning. The case of conspiring witnesses is not similar to those two, as those who transgress the two other transgressions require forewarning in order to be liable for the transgression, while conspiring witnesses are not forewarned before they testify.

בהיטב היטב ילפינן מהדדי וגזירה שוה מופנה דאי לא מופנה איכא למיפרך לאיי אפנויי מופני מדהוה ליה למיכתב ודרשו וחקרו ושני קרא בדיבוריה בהיטב שמע מינה לאפנויי The Gemara explains: This is not an association based on conceptual similarity alone; rather, we learn one from the other based on a verbal analogy employing the words “diligently” and “diligently.” “Diligently” is used in all three verses. The Gemara comments: And this verbal analogy must be free, i.e., these terms must be superfluous in their context. The Torah included them for the express purpose of establishing the verbal analogy. A verbal analogy that is based on otherwise extraneous terms cannot be logically refuted. This is because if these terms are not free, the verbal analogy can be refuted. The Gemara concludes: This is not so [la’ei], i.e., the verbal analogy cannot be refuted, as they are free. The Gemara explains: Since the Torah could have written: And they inquire and investigate, and the verse modified its statement by writing “diligently,” learn from it that this term’s function is to have it be free, to enable a verbal analogy.

ואכתי מופנה מצד אחד הוא בשלמא הנך תרתי מופנה הוא משום דהוה ליה למכתב אלא עיר הנדחת מאי הוה ליה למכתב הא כתיבא כולהו The Gemara challenges this explanation: And yet it is free on only one side, as the term is superfluous in two of the verses but not in all three of them. The Gemara explains: Granted, with regard to these two, idol worship and conspiring witnesses, it is free, because it could have been written only: And you inquire and you investigate, but instead the word “diligently” also appears in the verse. But in the verses concerning an idolatrous city, what could it have written differently? They are all written.

התם נמי אפנויי מופנה מדהוה ליה למכתב דרוש תדרוש או חקור תחקור ושני קרא בדיבוריה בהיטב שמע מינה לאפנויי The Gemara answers: There, it is also free, as the term is superfluous in that verse as well. Since the Torah could have written: You shall inquire, or: You shall investigate, in an emphatic form by doubling the verb, and the verse modified its statement by writing: “And you shall inquire and investigate diligently,” learn from it that this term’s function is to have it be free in order to enable a verbal analogy. By way of this verbal analogy, the Gemara has derived the requirement for seven interrogations in cases of capital law where the punishment is either death by stoning or death by the sword.

ואתו נחנקין בק"ו מנסקלין ומנהרגין ואתו נשרפין בקל וחומר מנסקלים The Gemara continues: And one can learn that this applies to those transgressors who are strangled as well, by means of an a fortiori inference from those transgressors who are stoned and from those who are killed by the sword. Just as in these cases, where the transgression is severe as evidenced by their severe mode of execution, seven interrogations are required, the requirement should apply all the more so to those transgressors who are strangled, who committed a less severe transgression. And one can learn that this applies to those transgressors who are burned as well, by means of an a fortiori inference from those transgressors who are stoned.

הניחא לרבנן דאמרי סקילה חמורה אלא לרבי שמעון דאמר שריפה חמורה מאי איכא למימר The Gemara questions this last inference: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that stoning is more severe than burning (see 49b). Consequently, it is possible to derive by means of an a fortiori inference the halakha of a transgression whose punishment is burning from the halakha of a transgression whose punishment is stoning. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that burning is more severe than stoning, what is there to say?

אלא אמר רב יהודה (דברים יג, טו) והנה אמת נכון והנה אמת נכון הא חד סרי שבע לשבע חקירות דל תלת לגזירה שוה פשא להו חדא Rather, Rav Yehuda said: There are an additional two phrases in the verses that are used to teach the halakha of the seven interrogations. The verse states with regard to the idolatrous city: “And you shall inquire, and investigate, and ask diligently and behold it be truth, the matter certain” (Deuteronomy 13:15). Additionally, the verse states with regard to idol worship: “You have inquired diligently and behold it be truth, the matter certain” (Deuteronomy 17:4). When one adds the two usages of “truth” and “certain” to the seven expressions stated earlier, consequently, there are eleven expressions; seven are used to teach the halakha of the seven interrogations, and of the four that remain, remove three, one for each verse, for the purpose of the verbal analogy, and one remains.

לר"ש לאתויי נשרפין לרבנן מילתא דאתיא בק"ו טרח וכתב לה קרא According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, this additional expression serves to include the halakha that the seven interrogations applies to those transgressors who are burned. According to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, who learned this from an a fortiori inference, the additional expression teaches this same halakha, as with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.

מגדף בה רבי אבהו אימא לאתויי שמנה חקירות ושמנה חקירות מי איכא אלמה לא והאיכא לאתויי בכמה בשעה ותניא נמי הכי היו בודקין אותו בשמנה חקירות Rabbi Abbahu ridiculed this explanation: Say this additional expression serves to add that there are eight interrogations. The Gemara asks: And are there eight interrogations? What interrogation can be added? The Gemara suggests: And why not? But there is the possibility to add this question to the interrogation: When in the hour, i.e., at what time within the hour. And this is also taught in a baraita: They would examine him with eight interrogations.

הניחא לאביי אליבא דר"מ דאמר אין אדם טועה ולא כלום ולהך לישנא נמי דאמר אדם טועה משהו שפיר אלא לאביי אליבא דר' יהודה דאמר אדם טועה חצי שעה ולרבא דאמר טעו אינשי טובא מאי איכא למימר The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the explanation of Abaye of the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says, in explaining Rabbi Meir’s opinion: A person does not err at all, i.e., when witnesses state an hour in which an event occurred, it is assumed that they are completely accurate. And also according to the version of his statement that Abaye says: A person errs a bit; it is well. Consequently, there is a reason to ask at what time during the hour the event occurred. But according to the explanation of Abaye of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says, in explaining Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: A person errs up to half an hour, and according to the opinion of Rava, who says: People err even more than that; what can be said? There is no reason to ask at what time during the hour the event occurred, as any inconsistency will be ascribed to an innocent error.

אלא לאתויי בכמה ביובל The Gemara suggests: Rather, there is the possibility to add the question: In how many years within the jubilee, i.e., in which of the fifty years, the event occurred.

היינו באיזה שבוע אלא לאתויי באיזה יובל ואידך כיון דאמר באיזה שבוע לא בעי באיזה יובל: The Gemara questions this explanation: This is exactly the same question as: In which seven-year period of the jubilee did the event occur, as one can calculate the year within the jubilee by knowing the seven-year period. The Gemara suggests: Rather, there is the possibility to add the question of: In which jubilee cycle did the event occur, in the current cycle or the previous cycle? And the other Sage, i.e., Rabbi Abbahu, who assumes that there cannot be an eighth interrogation, holds that once the witness said in which seven-year period of the jubilee the event occurred, there is no need to ask in which jubilee it occurred, as the court would have no reason to think that he is testifying about an event that occurred fifty years prior.

רבי יוסי אומר: תניא אמר להם רבי יוסי לחכמים לדבריכם מי שבא ואמר אמש הרגו אומר לו באיזו שבוע באיזו שנה באיזו חדש בכמה בחדש § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei says they ask only on which day, at which hour, and in which place the event occurred, but not more. It is taught in a baraita the reasoning behind this dispute: Rabbi Yosei said to the Rabbis: According to your statement that the court asks all seven interrogations, when there is a witness who came to court and said: The accused killed the victim last night, should the judge say to him in his examination: In which seven-year period of the jubilee, in which year, in which month, on which day of the month did the accused murder the victim? What would be the purpose of asking these questions? It suffices that they ask him about the day, the time, and the place.

אמרו לו לדבריך מי שבא ואמר עכשיו הרגו אומר לו באיזה יום באיזה שעה באיזה מקום The Rabbis said to him: According to your statement, when there is a witness who came to court and said: The accused killed the victim just now, should the judge say to him in his examination: On which day, at which hour, in what place did the accused murder the victim? The witness already stated that the murder had just occurred.

אלא אע"ג דלא צריך רמינן עליה כדרבי שמעון בן אלעזר ה"נ אע"ג דלא צריך רמינן עליה כדרבי שמעון בן אלעזר The Rabbis continue: Rather, even according to your opinion, although it is not necessary to ask these questions in this particular case, we impose the obligation to answer all the interrogations on the witnesses, in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that the court beleaguers the witnesses in attempt to confuse them (see 32b). Here too, although it is not necessary to ask these questions in this particular case, we impose the obligation to answer all the interrogations on the witnesses, in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

ור' יוסי אמש הרגו שכיח ברוב עדיות עכשיו הרגו לא שכיח ברוב עדיות: The Gemara asks: And what would Rabbi Yosei respond to this claim? The Gemara explains: He holds that the witness testifying: The accused killed the victim last night, is common in most testimonies. Therefore, this testimony is taken into account when deciding the content of the interrogations. By contrast, the witness testifying: The accused killed the victim just now, is not common in most testimonies, i.e., it is relatively rare. Therefore, this testimony is not taken into account when deciding the content of the interrogations.

מכירים אתם אותו: תנו רבנן מכירים אתם אותו נכרי הרג ישראל הרג התריתם בו קיבל עליו התראה התיר עצמו למיתה המית בתוך כדי דיבור § The mishna teaches that after the interrogations the court asks several questions essential to the testimony, such as: Do you recognize him? The Sages taught in a baraita: In a trial for murder, the court asks the witness: Do you recognize the accused? Did he kill a gentile? Did he kill a Jew? Did you forewarn him? Did he accept the forewarning on himself, i.e., acknowledge the warning? Did he release himself to death, i.e., acknowledge that he is aware that the court imposes capital punishment for murder? Did he kill within the time required for speaking a short phrase, as if not, he could claim he forgot the warning?

העובד ע"ז את מי עבד לפעור עבד למרקוליס עבד ובמה עבד בזיבוח בקיטור בניסוך בהשתחואה In the case of one who is an accused idol worshipper, the court asks the witness: Whom among the idols did he worship? Did he worship Peor? Did he worship Markulis? And in what manner did he worship? Was it by sacrificing an offering, or by burning incense, by pouring wine as a libation, or by prostrating before the idol?

אמר עולא מניין להתראה מן התורה שנאמר (ויקרא כ, יז) ואיש אשר יקח את אחותו בת אביו או בת אמו וראה את ערותה אטו בראייה תליא מילתא אלא עד שיראוהו טעמו של דבר אם אינו ענין לכרת Ulla says: From where in the Torah is the obligation of forewarning derived? As it is stated: “And if a man shall take his sister, his father’s daughter, or his mother’s daughter, and see her nakedness and she see his nakedness, it is a disgraceful deed and they shall be cut off in the sight of their people” (Leviticus 20:17). One can ask: Is that to say that the matter is dependent on sight? The transgression is engaging in sexual intercourse, not seeing each other. Rather, the meaning of “and see” is: He is not liable until he sees the reason of the matter, that it should be clear to him that he is committing a transgression by having been forewarned. If this halakha is not needed for the matter of excision [karet], as this punishment is in the hands of Heaven, and God is aware whether or not he acted intentionally,

Daf 41a

תנהו ענין למלקות apply it to the matter of lashes, as forewarning is required for the court to be able to administer lashes.

דבי חזקיה תנא (שמות כא, יד) וכי יזיד איש על רעהו להרגו בערמה שהתרו בו ועדיין הוא מזיד The school of Ḥizkiyya taught a source for the requirement of forewarning from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to a murderer, as it is states: “But if a man come intentionally upon his neighbor to slay him with guile” (Exodus 21:14). How do the witnesses know that he acted intentionally? It must be that they forewarned him, and still he acts intentionally.

דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא (במדבר טו, לג) המוצאים אותו מקושש עצים שהתרו בו ועדיין הוא מקושש The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a source for the requirement to forewarn transgressors from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to the wood-gatherer on Shabbat in the wilderness, as it is stated: “And they that found him gathering sticks brought him” (Numbers 15:33). By writing “gathering” in the present tense, the verse indicates that they forewarned him, but he is still gathering.

דבי רבי תנא (דברים כב, כד) על דבר אשר ענה על עסקי דיבור The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a source for the requirement to forewarn a transgressor from the verse concerning the court-imposed capital punishment meted out to one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman, as it is stated: “For the matter [devar] that he has humbled his neighbor’s wife” (Deuteronomy 22:24). They make a verbal analogy: For matters involving speech [dibbur], the punishment is given only if the witnesses issued a verbal forewarning.

וצריכא דאי כתב רחמנא אחותו הוה אמינא חייבי מלקות אין חייבי מיתות לא כתב רחמנא כי יזיד The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to have all of these sources, since if the Merciful One would write the requirement of forewarning in the context of “his sister” (Leviticus 20:17) alone, I would say: Those liable to receive lashes, yes, they do require forewarning, but those liable to receive court-imposed capital punishments, whose transgressions are severe, do not require forewarning. Therefore the Merciful One writes, with regard to a murderer: “If a man come intentionally.”

ואי כתב רחמנא וכי יזיד הוה אמינא הני מילי סייף דקיל אבל סקילה דחמורה אימא לא צריכא And if the Merciful One would write only: “If a man come intentionally,” I would say that this statement applies only when the penalty is death by the sword, as that is a lenient form of court-imposed capital punishment. But with regard to stoning, which is a severe form of court-imposed capital punishment, one could say that it does not require forewarning. Therefore, it is necessary to state the requirement of forewarning with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat.

ותרתי בנסקלין למה לי לר"ש לאתויי נשרפין The Gemara asks: And why do I need two verses that state the requirement for forewarning in the context of those liable to be stoned? Both the Shabbat violator and one who commits adultery with a betrothed young woman are punished with stoning. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that death by burning is more severe than death by stoning, the additional verse serves to add the halakha that a forewarning must be issued to those liable to be burned for their transgressions, by way of the application of the principle: If this halakha is not needed for the matter in which it is written, apply it to a different matter.

לרבנן מילתא דאתיא בק"ו טרח וכתב לה קרא ולכתוב רחמנא בנסקלין וליתו הנך וליגמרו מיניה הכא נמי מילתא דאתיא בקל וחומר טרח וכתב לה קרא: According to the opinion of the Rabbis that death by stoning is more severe than death by burning, one can say that even with a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. The Gemara challenges: But let the Merciful One write this halakha only in the context of those liable to be stoned, and let these others be derived from it, as stoning is the most severe punishment. The Gemara answers: Here too, one can say that even with a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.

התיר עצמו למיתה: מנא לן אמר רבא ואיתימא חזקיה אמר קרא (דברים יז, ו) יומת המת עד שיתיר עצמו למיתה § The baraita teaches that one of the questions the court asks of the witnesses is: Did he release himself to death, i.e., did he acknowledge that he is aware that the court imposes capital punishment for murder? The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that he must release himself to death? Rava said, and some say it was Ḥizkiyya who said, that the verse states: “By the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall the dead be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6). By referring to the transgressor as dead even before he is executed, the verse indicates that he is not executed until he releases himself to death, by stating that he is aware that he will be executed for his transgression.

אמר רב חנן עדי נערה המאורסה שהוזמו אין נהרגין מתוך שיכולים לומר לאוסרה על בעלה באנו Rav Ḥanan says: Witnesses who testify to the adultery of a betrothed young woman who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not killed. Although conspiring witnesses are generally punished with the same punishment they attempted to impose on the purported transgressor (see Deuteronomy 19:19), this is an exception. This is because they can say: We did not come to testify in order to have her be executed; rather, we came to forbid her to her husband, as a betrothed or married woman who willingly engages in adulterous sexual intercourse is forbidden to her husband.

והא אתרו בה דלא אתרו בה ואי לא אתרו בה היכי מיקטלא The Gemara challenges this ruling: But they must testify that they forewarned her before her transgression, and a forewarning includes apprising the transgressor of the punishment he or she will receive. How can the witnesses claim that they did not intend this result? The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥanan stated his halakha with regard to a case where they claim they did not forewarn her. The Gemara asks: But if they claim they did not forewarn her, how can she be killed? If she would not have been killed, there is no novelty to Rav Ḥanan’s statement that the witnesses are not killed.

באשה חבירה ואליבא דרבי יוסי בר' יהודה דתניא רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה אומר חבר אין צריך התראה לפי שלא נתנה התראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד The Gemara explains: Rav Ḥanan stated his halakha with regard to a woman who is a ḥavera, knowledgeable in Torah, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A ḥaver does not require forewarning in order to be liable for a transgression, because forewarning is given only in order to distinguish between an intentional and an unintentional act.

וכיון דאינהו לא מיקטלי איהי היכי מיקטלא הויא לה עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה וכל עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה לא שמה עדות The Gemara asks further: But since the witnesses are not killed for their conspiratory testimony in the case of a ḥavera, how can she be killed for her action? Their testimony is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony, i.e., the witnesses cannot be punished for their testimony, and any testimony that you cannot potentially render conspiratory testimony is not categorized as testimony.

הכי נמי קאמר מתוך שאין נהרגין שיכולין לומר לאוסרה על בעלה באנו אף היא אינה נהרגת דהויא לה עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה The Gemara answers: That is also what he is saying: Since the witnesses are not killed, as they can say: We came to forbid her to her husband, she is also not killed, since their testimony is testimony that you cannot potentially render conspiratory testimony.

אלא באשה חבירה דקיימא לן דמיקטלא אליבא דר' יוסי בר' יהודה היכי משכחת לה כשזינתה וחזרה וזינתה The Gemara challenges: But with regard to a woman who is a ḥavera, since we maintain that she can be killed without being forewarned, how can you find this occurring according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As there was no forewarning, the witnesses can claim that their intention was to forbid her to her husband. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case where they testify that she committed adultery and then they testified that she again committed adultery. The witnesses cannot claim that their testimony was meant to forbid her to her husband, as she was already forbidden to him due to the first time she committed adultery.

והא יכולין לומר לאוסרה על בועלה שני באנו שזינתה מבועל ראשון אי נמי שזינתה מקרוביה The Gemara questions this: But the witnesses can say: We come to forbid her to her second paramour. The halakha is that in addition to becoming forbidden to her husband, an adulterous woman becomes forbidden to her paramour. The witnesses can claim that this was their intent in testifying. The Gemara answers: It is found in a case where they testify that she again committed adultery with the first paramour, i.e., the second act was with the same paramour, to whom she was already forbidden. Alternatively, it is found in a case where they testify that she committed adultery with one of her relatives, to whom she is forbidden regardless.

מאי שנא נערה מאורסה דנקט אפילו נשואה נמי אין אלא אפילו האי דלא יתבא תותיה יכולין לומר לאוסרה על בעלה באנו The Gemara clarifies: What is different that Rav Ḥanan chose to state his halakha with regard to a betrothed young woman? His halakha could be stated with regard to a married woman as well. The Gemara answers: Yes, that is correct. But the novelty of this element of his ruling is that even with regard to this betrothed young woman, who does not live under her husband, the witnesses can say: We came to forbid her to her husband.

אמר רב חסדא אחד אומר בסייף הרגו ואחד אומר בארירן הרגו אין זה נכון אחד אומר כליו שחורין ואחד אומר כליו לבנים הרי זה נכון § Rav Ḥisda says: In a case where one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, another weapon, this is not congruent testimony, as this is a clear contradiction. But if one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were white, this is congruent testimony, as this is not a meaningful discrepancy.

מיתיבי נכון שיהא נכון אחד אומר בסייף הרגו ואחד אומר בארירן הרגו אחד אומר כליו שחורין ואחד אומר כליו לבנים אין זה נכון תרגמה רב חסדא בסודר שחנקו בו דהיינו סייף וארירן The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states with regard to testimony: “And behold it be truth, the matter certain” (Deuteronomy 17:4). The meaning of “certain” is that the testimony of the two witnesses must be congruent. If one witness says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, or if one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were white, this is not congruent testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda interpreted that baraita as speaking about a scarf with which the murderer strangled the victim, as this is the same as a contradiction with regard to a sword and an ariran. As Rav Ḥisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.

ת"ש אחד אומר סנדליו שחורין ואחד אומר סנדליו לבנים אין זה נכון התם נמי כגון שבעט בו בסנדלו והרגו The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one of the witnesses says: The sandals of the murderer were black, and one of the witnesses says: The sandals of the murderer were white, this is not congruent testimony. This contradicts the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda can explain that there also, it is speaking of a case where the murderer kicked the victim with his sandal and killed him.

ת"ש מעשה ובדק בן זכאי בעוקצי תאנה אמר רמי בר חמא כגון שעקץ תאנה בשבת דעלה קא מיקטיל The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs, indicating that even a contradiction concerning a minor point such as this would render the testimony incongruent. The Gemara answers: Rami bar Ḥama said: It is speaking there of a case where he picked a fig on Shabbat, as he is killed for that act itself. Picking a fruit from its source of growth is an example of the forbidden labor of reaping, so the testimony about the characteristics of the fig is significant.

והא תניא אמרו לו תחת תאנה הרגו אלא אמר רמי בר חמא כגון ששפדו בייחור של תאנה The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: When ben Zakkai asked the witnesses the question about the stems of figs, they said to him: The murderer killed the victim beneath a fig tree, indicating that it is speaking of a murder case? Rather, Rami bar Ḥama said: The mishna is speaking of a case where the murderer stabbed the victim with a branch of a fig tree. As Rav Ḥisda himself ruled, a contradiction concerning details of the murder weapon renders the testimony incongruent.

ת"ש אמר להן תאנה זו עוקציה דקין עוקציה גסין תאנים שחורות תאנים לבנות אלא אמר רב יוסף מבן זכאי לותיב איניש שאני בן זכאי דבדיקות כחקירות משוי ליה Come and hear a proof, as in that same examination ben Zakkai said to the witnesses: This fig tree about which you are testifying, were its stems thin or were its stems thick? Were the figs on it black or were the figs white? These questions concern the fruit itself, not the characteristics of a branch. Rather, Rav Yosef says: Should a person raise a difficulty from the conduct of ben Zakkai? Ben Zakkai is different, as he equated examinations with interrogations. According to ben Zakkai’s opinion, a contradiction in the witnesses’ answers to an examination is as significant as a contradiction in the witnesses’ answers to an interrogation, and it also renders the testimony incongruent.

מאן בן זכאי אילימא רבי יוחנן בן זכאי מי הוה בסנהדרי והתניא כל שנותיו של רבי יוחנן בן זכאי מאה ועשרים שנה ארבעים שנה עסק בפרקמטיא מ' שנה למד ארבעים שנה לימד § The Gemara clarifies: Who is the ben Zakkai mentioned in the mishna? If we say it is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, was he a member in a Sanhedrin that judged capital cases? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: All the years of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai were 120 years. For forty of those years he dealt in business [biferakmatya], for forty of those years he studied, and for forty of those years he taught and guided the Jewish people.

ותניא ארבעים שנה קודם חורבן הבית גלתה סנהדרי וישבה לה בחנות ואמר ר' יצחק בר אבודימי לומר שלא דנו דיני קנסות דיני קנסות ס"ד אלא שלא דנו דיני נפשות The Gemara continues its question: And it is taught in a baraita: Forty years before the destruction of the Second Temple, the Sanhedrin was exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stone and sat in the store near the Temple Mount. And Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: The intent of the statement concerning the relocation of the Sanhedrin is to say that they no longer judged laws of fines. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that they no longer judged laws of fines? It is known that the Sanhedrin would judge laws of fines for hundreds of years after the destruction of the Temple. Rather, he must have said that the Sanhedrin no longer judged cases of capital law. Once the Sanhedrin left the Chamber of Hewn Stone, the court’s power to judge capital cases was nullified.

ותנן משחרב בית המקדש התקין רבן יוחנן בן זכאי The Gemara concludes its question: And since as we learned in a mishna (Sukka 41a): Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted an ordinance that the mitzva of lulav should be performed even in the rest of the country for seven days in commemoration of the Temple, it is clear that he was in a position of prominence after the destruction of the Temple. Since the Sanhedrin ceased judging cases of capital law forty years before the destruction of the Temple, and Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was in a position of prominence for only forty years, he could not have been a judge in a capital case.

אלא בן זכאי דעלמא הכי נמי מסתברא דאי ס"ד רבן יוחנן בן זכאי קרי ליה ר' בן זכאי The Gemara suggests: Rather, one can say that it was merely a different person named ben Zakkai, not the well-known Sage of that name. The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to say this, as if it enters your mind that this was Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, would Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi call him ben Zakkai, without any title? He must have been referring to someone else.

והתניא מעשה ובדק רבן יוחנן בן זכאי בעוקצי תאנים אלא תלמיד היושב לפני רבו הוה ואמר מילתא ומסתבר להו טעמיה The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita explicitly: An incident occurred, and Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai examined the witnesses with regard to the stems of figs? This proves that the Sage in question is Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. Rather, one can say that at that time, when this incident occurred, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was a student sitting before his teacher, and in those years the Sanhedrin was in its place and judged cases of capital law. And he said a matter in the course of examining the witnesses, and his reasoning was logical to them, and the judges asked his question,

Daf 41b

וקבעוה בשמיה כי הוה למד בן זכאי הוה קרי ליה כתלמיד היושב לפני רבו כי הוה לימד הוה קרי ליה רבן יוחנן בן זכאי כי קרי ליה בן זכאי על שם דמעיקרא וכי קרי ליה רבן יוחנן בן זכאי על שם דהשתא: and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi established it in the mishna in his name. When he was studying, they called him ben Zakkai, in the manner that they would call a student sitting before his teacher, and when he was teaching others they called him Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. In terms of the baraita and the mishna, when they called him ben Zakkai in the Mishna, that was based on the name that he was called initially. And when they called him Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai in the other baraita, that was based on the name that he was called now.

מעשה ובדק כו' מה בין חקירות כו': מאי אפילו שנים אומרים פשיטא כי אמר אחד איני יודע עדותן קיימת כי אמרי בי תרי נמי עדותן קיימת § The mishna teaches: An incident occurred, and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses about the stems of figs. What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two witnesses say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Even if two say? Isn’t it obvious? The mishna already stated that when one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, indicating that knowledge of the answers to these types of questions is not required. Accordingly, when two witnesses say that they do not know, their testimony stands as well. What is the novelty of this ruling?

א"ר ששת ארישא קאי והכי קאמר בחקירות אפילו שנים אומרים ידענו ואחד אומר איני יודע עדותן בטילה כמאן כר"ע דמקיש שלשה לשנים Rav Sheshet said: This clause is referring to the first clause of the mishna, and this is what it is saying: With regard to the interrogations, even if two witnesses say: We know, and one additional witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares in all court proceedings three witnesses to two, holding that just as two witnesses must testify a fully valid testimony, so it is with three. Therefore, if the third witness does not know the answer to an interrogation, the testimony of all three is void.

אמר רבא והא עדותן קיימת קתני אלא אמר רבא ה"ק אפילו בחקירות שנים אומרים ידענו ואחד אומר איני יודע עדותן קיימת כמאן דלא כר"ע Rava says: But the mishna teaches: Their testimony stands, not: Their testimony is void. Rather, Rava said: This is what the mishna is saying: Even with regard to the interrogations, if two witnesses say: We know, and one witness says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as the court accepts the testimony of the two. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? Not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

רב כהנא ורב ספרא תנו סנהדרין בי רבה פגע בהו רמי בר חמא אמר להו מאי אמריתו בה בסנהדרין דבי רבה אמרי ליה ומאי אמרינן בה בסנהדרין גרידתא ומאי קשיא לך The Gemara relates: Rav Kahana and Rav Safra studied tractate Sanhedrin in the school of Rabba. Rami bar Ḥama encountered them. Rami bar Ḥama said to them: What do you say concerning tractate Sanhedrin that you learned in the school of Rabba? Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: And what do we say concerning the regular tractate Sanhedrin? And what is difficult for you? Do you have a specific difficulty you would like answered?

א"ל מהא דקתני מה בין חקירות לבדיקות חקירות אחד אומר איני יודע עדותן בטילה בדיקות אמר אחד איני יודע ואפי' שנים אומרים אין אנו יודעים עדותן קיימת מכדי אידי ואידי דאורייתא היא מאי שנא חקירות ומאי שנא בדיקות Rami bar Ḥama said to them: I have a difficulty from that which is taught in the mishna: What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? In the case of interrogations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know the answer, their testimony is void immediately. In the case of examinations, if one says: I do not know the answer, and even if two say: We do not know the answer, their testimony still stands. Rami bar Ḥama asks: After all, this type of question and that type of question are required by Torah law; what is different about interrogations and what is different about examinations? Why is there a difference in halakha between the two?

א"ל הכי השתא בחקירות אמר אחד איני יודע עדותן בטילה דהויא לה עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה בדיקות אמר אחד מהן איני יודע עדותן קיימת עדות שאתה יכול להזימה הוא Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: How can these cases be compared? With regard to the interrogations, if one witness says: I do not know, their testimony is void, as it is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony. If the witnesses do not state a specific time and place, there is no way for other witnesses to claim that the first witnesses had been with them elsewhere at the time they claim the event occurred. By contrast, with regard to the examinations, if one of the witnesses says: I do not know, their testimony stands, as it is testimony that you can render conspiratory testimony.

אמר להו אי הכי אמריתו בה טובא אמריתו בה אמרי ליה מטיבותיה דמר אמרינן בה טובא מנזיהותיה דמר לא אמרינן בה ולא חדא: Rami bar Ḥama said to them: If you said an incisive statement like this about this tractate, you said much about it. Rav Kahana and Rav Safra said to him: Due to the Master’s goodness, that is, due to your good will and desire to accept our answer to your question, we said much about it. But with the Master’s rebuke and challenge we would not say even one answer about it, i.e., if you had wished to criticize this answer you could have refuted it, and it would be as if we did not say any answer.

אחד אומר כו': עד כמה א"ר אחא בר חנינא אמר ר' אסי אמר רבי יוחנן עד רובו של חודש § The mishna teaches that if one witness says the event occurred on the second of the month and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that one witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, while the other witness does not know of it. Their testimony is considered congruent. The Gemara asks: Until how many days into the month does the court assume that one of the witnesses does not know when the month began? Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Until the majority of the month has passed.

אמר רבא אף אנן נמי תנינא אחד אומר בשלשה ואחד אומר בה' עדותן בטילה ואמאי נימא שזה יודע בשני עיבורין וזה אינו יודע בשני עיבורין אלא לאו משום דברובה ידע Rava says: We learn this in the mishna as well, as it teaches: If one witness says the event occurred on the third of the month and one witness says the event occurred on the fifth of the month, their testimony is void. But why is it void? Let us say that it not a contradiction, as this witness knows of two additions, i.e., that a day was added to the two previous months, and that witness does not know of the two additions. Rather, is it not void because once the majority of the month passed a witness knows what day it is, so that an error of two days cannot occur?

לעולם אימא לך ברובה נמי לא ידע ובשיפורא ידע בחד שיפורא אמר דטעי בתרי שיפורא לא אמר דטעי The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you that a witness may not know the day even once the majority of the month has passed. The reason for the ruling of the mishna is that he knows about the shofar [ubeshipura], which the court would blow at the New Moon. It is possible that with regard to one blast of the shofar it could be said that he erred and was not aware of it. With regard to two blasts of the shofar it cannot be said that he erred. By contrast, in the case of the mishna here, perhaps as long as the witnesses are testifying about two consecutive days within one month, the error of one of them persisted throughout the month.

וא"ר אחא בר חנינא אמר רב אסי אמר רבי יוחנן עד כמה מברכין על החדש עד שתתמלא פגימתה וכמה אמר רבי יעקב בר אידי אמר רב יהודה עד שבעה נהרדעי אמרי עד ששה עשר § Having cited a statement of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, citing Rabbi Asi, citing Rabbi Yoḥanan, the Gemara cites another statement in his name: Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Until how many days into a new month may one recite a blessing on the month, i.e., Birkat HaLevana? Until the flaw of the moon is filled, when it no longer appears deficient. And until how many days is that? Rav Ya’akov bar Idi says that Rav Yehuda says: Until seven days of the month have passed. The Sages of Neharde’a say: Until sixteen days of the month have passed.

Daf 42a

ותרוייהו כר' יוחנן סבירא להו הא למיהוי כי יתרא הא למיהוי כי נפיא The Gemara comments: And they both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan that one can recite the blessing until the flaw of the moon is filled. The dispute is that this one, i.e., Rav Ya’akov bar Idi, who holds one can recite the blessing until seven days have passed, understands Rabbi Yoḥanan to be referring to the day when the moon will be like the string of a bow. Before that point the moon appeared merely as a bow, and after seven days it appears like a half-circle, like a bow that has a string. That one, i.e., the Sages of Neharde’a, who holds one can recite the blessing until sixteen days have passed, understands Rabbi Yoḥanan to be referring to the day when the moon will be like a sieve, i.e., a full circle.

אמר ליה רב אחא מדיפתי לרבינא וליבריך הטוב והמטיב אמר ליה אטו כי חסר מי מברכינן דיין האמת דלבריך הטוב והמטיב וליברכינהו לתרוייהו כיון דהיינו אורחיה לא מברכינן § Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And they should bless the blessing of: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who is good and Who does good, for the benefit that people derive from the light of moon. Ravina said to him: Is that to say that when the moon is shrinking we bless, as we do for other disasters: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, the true Judge, so that we should conversely bless: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who is good and Who does good, when the moon is growing? Rav Aḥa of Difti said to him: You are correct, and we should say them both: The blessing of the true Judge, when the moon is waning, and the blessing of Who is good and Who does good, when the moon is waxing. Ravina answered him: Since this is its nature, we do not bless the moon. The waxing and waning of the moon is not an unexpected occurrence that requires these blessings.

וא"ר אחא בר חנינא א"ר אסי א"ר יוחנן כל המברך על החדש בזמנו כאילו מקבל פני שכינה כתיב הכא (שמות יב, ב) החדש הזה וכתיב התם (שמות טו, ב) זה אלי ואנוהו תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל אילמלא (לא) זכו ישראל אלא להקביל פני אביהן שבשמים כל חדש וחדש דיים אמר אביי הלכך נימרינהו מעומד And Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to anyone who blesses the new month in its proper time, it is as if he greets the Face of the Divine Presence. Alluding to this, it is written here concerning the sanctification of the new month: “This month shall be for you the beginning of months” (Exodus 12:2), and it is written there, where the Jewish people encountered the Divine Presence at the splitting of the sea: “This is my God and I will glorify Him” (Exodus 15:2). The term “this” is employed in both verses. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: If the Jewish people merited to greet the Face of their Father in Heaven only one time each and every month, it would suffice for them, since in the blessing of the moon there is an aspect of greeting the Divine Presence. Abaye said: Therefore, we will say the blessing while standing, in honor of the Divine Presence.

מרימר ומר זוטרא מכתפי (אהדדי) ומברכי א"ל רב אחא לרב אשי במערבא מברכי ברוך מחדש חדשים אמר ליה האי נשי דידן נמי מברכי The Gemara relates: Mareimar and Mar Zutra would lean on one another’s shoulders and recite the blessing. Rav Aḥa said to Rav Ashi: In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they recite the following blessing on the moon: Blessed is He Who renews the months. Rav Ashi said to him: Our women also recite that blessing, meaning that this is an abridged version for the unlettered.

אלא כדרב יהודה דאמר רב יהודה ברוך [וכו'] אשר במאמרו ברא שחקים וברוח פיו כל צבאם חוק וזמן נתן להם שלא ישנו את תפקידם ששים ושמחים לעשות רצון קונם פועלי אמת שפעולתן אמת וללבנה אמר שתתחדש עטרת תפארת לעמוסי בטן שהן עתידין להתחדש כמותה ולפאר ליוצרם על שם כבוד מלכותו ברוך אתה ה' מחדש חדשים Rather, the full version of the blessing is the version of Rav Yehuda. As Rav Yehuda says: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who by His word created the heavens, and by the breath of his mouth all their hosts. He set for them a law and a time, that they should not deviate from their task. And they are joyous and glad to perform the will of their Owner; they are workers of truth whose work is truth. And to the moon He said that it should renew itself as a crown of beauty for those He carried from the womb, as they are destined to be renewed like it, and to praise their Creator for the name of His glorious kingdom. Blessed are You the Lord, Who renews the months.

(משלי כד, ו) כי בתחבולות תעשה לך מלחמה א"ר אחא בר חנינא א"ר אסי א"ר יוחנן במי אתה מוצא מלחמתה של תורה במי שיש בידו חבילות של משנה קרי רב יוסף אנפשיה (משלי יד, ד) ורב תבואות בכח שור: The Gemara presents another statement, citing Rabbi Aḥa, citing Rabbi Asi, citing Rabbi Yoḥanan. The verse states: “For by wise advice you shall make your war” (Proverbs 24:6). Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In whom do you find the war, i.e., the ability to engage in disputes, of Torah? In one who has in his possession bundles, i.e., vast knowledge, of Mishna. One must first learn the primary sources before engaging in disputes of Torah. Rav Yosef would read concerning himself the verse: “And much produce comes by the strength of the ox” (Proverbs 14:4), i.e., one with great strength can bring a large yield. Rav Yosef was known to be particularly well-versed in tannaitic statements.

אחד אומר בשתי שעות כו': א"ר שימי בר אשי לא שנו אלא שעות אבל אחד אומר קודם הנץ החמה ואחד אומר לאחר הנץ החמה עדותן בטילה § The mishna teaches that if one witness says that the event occurred at two hours, i.e., the second hour of the day from sunrise, and one witness says that the event occurred at three hours, their testimony stands. Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: This was taught only when there was a difference in the hours, but if one witness says that the event occurred before the sunrise, and one says that the event occurred after the sunrise, their testimony is void. Although this may be a smaller discrepancy in terms of time, the difference between before and after sunrise cannot be ascribed to an error.

פשיטא אלא אחד אומר קודם הנץ ואחד אומר בתוך הנץ הא נמי פשיטא מהו דתימא הא בגילויא קאי וזהרורי בעלמא הוא דחזא קמ"ל: The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? There is a clear difference between darkness and light. Rather, Rav Shimi bar Ashi said as follows: If one witness says that the event occurred before the sunrise, and one says that the event occurred during the sunrise, their testimony is void. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this also obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this one who says: During the sunrise, was standing in an exposed place and saw a mere shine and thought he saw the sunrise, Rav Shimi bar Ashi teaches us the court does not assume this occurred, and deems the testimony incongruent.

ואחר כך מכניסין כו': אותו היום ותו לא והתניא אם יש ממש בדבריו לא היה יורד משם לעולם ואם אין ממש בדבריו אין יורד כל היום כולו כדי שלא תהא עלייתו ירידה לו אמר אביי תרגומה אאם אין ממש בדבריו: § The mishna teaches: And afterward they bring in the second witness and examine him. Later, the mishna states: But if one of the students said: I can teach a reason to acquit him, they raise him to the seat of the court and seat him among them, and he would not descend from there all day. The Gemara asks: That day and no more? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:3): If the statement of that student has substance he would never descend from there, as his statement demonstrates that he is capable of deliberating with the other judges. But if the statement of that student does not have substance, he would not descend from there the entire day, in order that his ascent should not be a descent for him, i.e., to avoid humiliating him. Abaye said: Interpret the mishna to be with regard to a case when the statement of that student does not have substance.

מצאו לו זכות כו': יין מאי טעמא לא אמר רבי אחא בר חנינא אמר קרא (משלי לא, ד) ולרוזנים אי שכר העוסקין ברזו של עולם אל ישתכרו: The mishna teaches that if the court found it fit to acquit the defendant during the deliberations, as all or a majority of them agree to acquit him, they excuse him. The mishna further teaches that the judges would not drink wine all day. The Gemara asks: What is the reason they did not drink wine? Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that it is because the verse states: “It is not for kings to drink wine, nor for princes [rozenim] to say: Where is strong drink” (Proverbs 31:4). Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina explains: This is a directive to those who deal with the secret of the world [berazo shel olam], i.e., such stringent matters: Do not become drunk.

(מצאו לו זכות כו'): לא ראו מאי § The mishna teaches: If the court found it fit to acquit him during the deliberations, as all or a majority of them agree to acquit him, they release him. It was further taught in the mishna that when the court cannot arrive at a verdict they add judges in pairs of two and deliberate until there is a clear verdict. If they added the maximum number of judges and still cannot reach a clear verdict, they discuss the matter until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit, and changes his position. The Gemara asks: If the judges do not change their position, as they do not see the validity of the position of those who acquit him, what is done?

א"ר אחא פוטרין אותו וכן א"ר יוחנן פוטרין אותו א"ל רב פפא לאביי וליפטריה מעיקרא א"ל הכי א"ר יוחנן כדי שלא יצאו מב"ד מעורבבין Rabbi Aḥa says: They release him, as he was not found liable. And likewise Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They release him. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But if they ultimately release him if the court is deadlocked, why do they attempt to convince each other at all when they should release him from the outset? Abaye said to him: This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The reason is so that they not leave the court confounded, without reaching some definite conclusion, as this would tarnish the reputation of the court.

איכא דאמרי א"ל רב פפא לאביי ולמה לי יוסיפו ליפטריה מבי דינא קמא אמר ליה ר' יוסי קאי כוותך דתניא ר' יוסי אומר כשם שאין מוסיפין על ב"ד של שבעים ואחד כך אין מוסיפין על ב"ד של עשרים ושלשה Some say that this is what Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But why do I need them to add judges at all when they should release him from the first court? Once the first court did not find him liable, they should release him. Why add judges? Abaye said to him: Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with your opinion, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: Just as the court does not add judges to a court of seventy-one, so too, the court does not add judges to a court of twenty-three. If the court of twenty-three cannot arrive at a verdict, they release him.

ת"ר אומר בדיני ממונות נזדקן הדין ואין אומר בדיני נפשות נזדקן הדין The Sages taught: In cases of monetary law one says: The judgment has grown aged, i.e., this matter is very difficult and requires scrutiny, but in cases of capital law one does not say: The judgment has grown aged.

מאי נזדקן הדין אילימא קש דינא איפכא מיבעיא ליה אמר רב הונא בר מנוח משמיה דרב אחא בריה דרב איקא איפוך רב אשי אמר לעולם לא תיפוך ומאי נזדקן הדין חכם דינא The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The judgment has grown aged? If we say that the intention is: The judgment has aged, i.e., taken an extended amount of time but requires additional deliberations, if so, he should say the reverse, as it is more critical to extend deliberations in cases of capital law than in cases of monetary law. Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ said in the name of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika: Reverse the statement, and say that in cases of monetary law one does not say: The judgment has grown aged, but in cases of capital law one does say it. Rav Ashi said: Actually, do not reverse it. And what is the meaning of: The judgment has grown aged? It means that the judgment has grown wise, like an elder who has acquired wisdom. In other words, the deliberations have been exhausted, and it is time to vote on a verdict.

מיתיבי גדול שבדיינין אומר נזדקן הדין אי אמרת בשלמא חכם דינא היינו דאמר גדול אלא אי אמרת קש דינא לא סגיא דלא אמר גדול כסופי הוא דקא מיכסיף נפשיה The Gemara raises an objection to the first explanation from a baraita: In a situation where they did not reach a decision, the greatest among the judges says: The judgment has grown aged. The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, if you say this means: The judgment has grown wise, this would be why the baraita states that the greatest judge says this statement, as arriving at a verdict is an honor for the court, and consequently the greatest of the court should be the one to announce it. But if you say this means: The judgment has aged, is it not enough that the greatest among the judges in particular not say so? Must he humiliate himself by stating that they cannot reach a verdict?

אין אינו דומה מתבייש מעצמו למתבייש מאחרים The Gemara answers: Yes, the greatest of the judges must also announce that the court cannot reach a verdict. Being shamed by oneself is not comparable to being shamed by others. Therefore, it is preferable that the greatest of the judges state this conclusion, rather than having one of the more junior judges state it.

איכא דאמרי אי אמרת בשלמא קש דינא היינו דאינו דומה מתבייש מעצמו למתבייש מאחרים אלא אי אמרת חכם דינא גדול אשבוחי משבח נפשיה והכתיב (משלי כז, ב) יהללך זר ולא פיך Some say they raised an objection to the second explanation: Granted, if you say this means: The judgment has aged, this would be the reason that the greatest one states it, because being shamed by oneself is not comparable to being shamed by others. But if you say this means: The judgment has grown wise, should the greatest judge praise himself? But isn’t it written: “Let another man praise you, and not your own mouth, a stranger and not your own lips” (Proverbs 27:2)?

שאני מילתא דבי דינא דאגדול רמיא כדתנן גמרו את הדבר היו מכניסין אותן גדול שבדיינין אומר איש פלוני אתה זכאי איש פלוני אתה חייב: The Gemara answers: A matter of the court is different, as its administration is incumbent upon the greatest judge. As we learned in a mishna (29a): When they finished deliberating the matter, they would bring in the litigants. The greatest of the judges would say: So-and-so, you are exempt from paying; or: So-and-so, you are liable to pay.

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Davidson | Seder Nezikin | Sanhedrin Chapter 6

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Daf 42b

מתני׳ נגמר הדין מוציאין אותו לסוקלו בית הסקילה היה חוץ לבית דין שנאמר (ויקרא כד, יד) הוצא את המקלל MISHNA: When the trial has ended in a guilty verdict and the condemned man has been sentenced to be stoned, he is taken out to be stoned. The place of stoning was outside the court and a little beyond it, as it is stated with regard to a blasphemer: “Take out him who has cursed to outside the camp, and let all that heard him lay their hands upon his head, and let all the congregation stone him” (Leviticus 24:14).

אחד עומד על פתח בית דין והסודרין בידו וסוס רחוק ממנו כדי שיהא רואהו אומר אחד יש ללמד עליו זכות הלה מניף בסודרין והסוס רץ ומעמידן ואפילו הוא אומר יש לי ללמד על עצמי זכות מחזירין אותו אפילו ארבע וחמש פעמים ובלבד שיש ממש בדבריו: One man stands at the entrance to the court, with cloths [vehasudarin] in his hand, and another man sits on a horse at a distance from him but where he can still see him. If one of the judges says: I can teach a reason to acquit him, the other, i.e., the man with the cloths, waves the cloths as a signal to the man on the horse, and the horse races off after the court agents who are leading the condemned man to his execution, and he stops them, and they wait until the court determines whether or not the argument has substance. And even if he, the condemned man himself, says: I can teach a reason to acquit myself, he is returned to the courthouse, even four or five times, provided that there is substance to his words.

גמ׳ ובית הסקילה חוץ לב"ד הוה ותו לא והא תניא בית הסקילה היה חוץ לשלש מחנות GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And was the place of stoning just outside the court and nothing more? Does it suffice that the place of execution is only a short distance from the court and no further? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The place of stoning was outside the distance that is equivalent to the length of the three camps in the wilderness: The camp of the Divine Presence, the camp of the Levites, and the camp of the Israelites. In Jerusalem there were three corresponding camps: The Temple with its courtyard, the Temple Mount, and the rest of the city. The distance in the wilderness outside of the three camps corresponds to a place outside the city walls and limits.

אין כדקאמרת והא דקתני הכי נפקא מינה דאי נפיק בי דינא ויתיב חוץ לשלש מחנות עבדינן בית הסקילה חוץ לב"ד כי היכי דלא מיתחזי ב"ד רוצחין א"נ כי היכי דתיהוי ליה הצלה The Gemara answers: Yes, it is as you said, that the place of stoning was outside the three camps. And the practical difference from the fact that the mishna teaches the halakha in this manner is that if it happened that the court went out and convened outside the three camps, even then the place of stoning is set up at a certain distance from the court, and not immediately adjacent to it, so that the court should not appear to be a court of killers. Alternatively, the reason the place of stoning must be distanced from the court is so that the condemned man might have a chance to be saved, i.e., so that during the time it takes for him to be taken from the court to the place of stoning someone will devise a claim in his favor.

מנהני מילי דת"ר הוצא את המקלל אל מחוץ למחנה חוץ לג' מחנות אתה אומר חוץ לג' מחנות או אינו אלא חוץ למחנה אחת נאמר כאן מחוץ למחנה ונאמר בפרים הנשרפין חוץ למחנה מה להלן חוץ לשלש מחנות אף כאן חוץ לשלש מחנות The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived that the stoning is carried out outside the three camps? As the Sages taught a baraita with regard to the verse: “Take out him who has cursed to outside the camp” (Leviticus 24:14). This means: Outside the three camps, i.e., even outside the camp of the Israelites. Do you say that he is taken outside the three camps, or is he perhaps taken outside only one camp? Proof is brought that he must be taken outside the three camps: It is stated here that the condemned man is taken “outside the camp” and it is stated with regard to the bulls brought as sin-offerings that are burned that they must be burned “outside the camp” (Leviticus 4:12). Just as there, the bulls brought as sin-offerings are burned when outside the three camps, so too here, the condemned man is taken outside the three camps.

והתם מנלן דתנו רבנן (ויקרא ד, יב) והוציא את כל הפר אל מחוץ למחנה חוץ לשלש מחנות אתה אומר חוץ לשלש מחנות או אינו אלא חוץ למחנה אחת The Gemara asks: And there, with regard to the bulls brought as sin-offerings that are burned, from where do we derive that they must be burned when outside all three camps? As the Sages taught in a baraita: It is stated about the bull brought as a sin-offering of the High Priest: “Even the whole bull shall he carry outside the camp unto a clean place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it” (Leviticus 4:12), meaning that he should take it outside the three camps. Do you say that he takes it outside the three camps, or is he required to take it outside only one camp?

כשהוא אומר (ויקרא ד, יב) אל מחוץ למחנה בפר העדה שאין ת"ל שהרי כבר נאמר (ויקרא ד, כא) ושרף אותו כאשר שרף את הפר הראשון ליתן לו מחנה שניה When the verse states with regard to the bull brought as a communal sin-offering: “He shall carry the bull outside the camp, and burn it as he burned the first bull” (Leviticus 4:21), it requires explanation, as there is no need for the verse to state “outside the camp,” since it is already stated at the end of that same verse: “And burn it as he burned the first bull,” which indicates that all the halakhot of the bull brought as a sin-offering of a High Priest apply to the bull brought as a communal sin-offering. What then does the verse mean when it states “outside the camp”? To give it a second camp, i.e., it indicates that it must be removed not only from the camp of the Divine Presence, corresponding to the Temple, but also from the Levite camp, corresponding to the Temple Mount.

וכשהוא אומר (ויקרא ו, ד) אל מחוץ למחנה בדשן שאין ת"ל שהרי כבר נאמר (ויקרא ד, יב) על שפך הדשן ישרף ליתן לו מחנה שלישית And when another verse states with regard to the removal of the ash: “And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments, and carry forth the ashes outside the camp to a clean place” (Leviticus 6:4), that verse also requires an explanation, as there is no need for the verse to state this, since it is already stated with regard to the bull brought as a sin-offering of a High Priest: “Even the whole bull shall he carry outside the camp to a clean place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it on wood with fire; where the ashes are poured out shall it be burned” (Leviticus 4:12). The repetition of “outside the camp” indicates that he is required to give it a third camp, i.e., teaching that it is burned when outside the Israelite camp, corresponding to the land outside Jerusalem’s walls.

ולילף משחוטי חוץ מה להלן חוץ למחנה אחת אף כאן חוץ למחנה אחת The Gemara challenges this derivation of the halakha governing one who is sentenced to be stoned from the halakha governing the burning of bulls brought as sin-offerings. Perhaps the place of stoning should be learned from the halakha governing offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, about which the verse also uses the expression “outside the camp” (see Leviticus 17:3). Just as there, with regard to offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, these words mean: Outside only one camp, the camp of the Divine Presence, corresponding to the Temple, as the next verse states: “And he did not bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4), i.e., the camp of the Divine Presence, so too here, the condemned man should be stoned outside one camp.

מסתברא מפרים הנשרפין ה"ל למילף The Gemara answers: For three reasons it is reasonable to derive the halakha governing one who is sentenced to be stoned from the halakha governing bulls brought as sin-offerings that are burned.

שכן הוצא אל מחוץ למחנה מכשיר ומכפר The Gemara explains: As with regard to the man to be stoned for blasphemy it states: “Take out [hotze] him who has cursed to outside the camp,” which is similar to what is stated about the sin bull-offerings: “Even the whole bull shall he carry [vehotzi] outside the camp,” whereas with regard to offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard it merely says: “Outside the camp.” Additionally, both in the case of stoning and in the case of the bulls brought as sin-offerings, going outside the camp renders the act fit, as the blasphemer may not be stoned and the bulls may not be burned inside the camp, in contrast to the case of the offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, where slaughtering them outside the camp renders the act forbidden. And additionally, both in the case of stoning and in the case of the bulls brought as sin-offerings, being outside the camp achieves atonement, as both capital punishment and sin-offerings atone for sin.

אדרבה משחוטי חוץ ה"ל למילף The Gemara rejects this reasoning: On the contrary, the halakha governing one who is sentenced to be stoned should be derived from the halakha governing offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, for four reasons.

שכן אדם חוטא בנשמה פיגול The Gemara explains the four reasons: As in both cases it is a person who is outside, either the one who is taken outside for stoning, or the one who slaughters the offerings outside the Temple courtyard, whereas in the case of the bulls brought as sin-offerings, it is the bulls that are carried outside the camp. Additionally, both the blasphemer and the one who slaughters offerings outside the Temple courtyard have committed a sin, while the bull has not. Additionally, both the blasphemer and the one who slaughters offerings outside the Temple courtyard pay with their souls, as slaughtering an offering outside the Temple is punishable with karet. And lastly, both in the case of the blasphemer and in the case of offerings slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, the halakha of disqualification of an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul] is not applicable, whereas this halakha is applicable to the bulls brought as sin-offerings.

מכשיר ממכשיר עדיף ליה The Gemara explains: Nevertheless, the baraita prefers to compare one case requiring going outside the camp to render an act fit and another case requiring going outside the camp to render an act fit, rather than comparing one case requiring going outside the camp to render an act fit and another case of going outside the camp that renders the act forbidden, as this is the most notable of the factors mentioned.

רב פפא אמר משה היכא הוה יתיב במחנה לוייה ואמר ליה רחמנא (ויקרא כד, יד) הוצא את המקלל אל מחוץ למחנה חוץ למחנה לוייה (ויקרא כד, יד) ויוציאו את המקלל אל מחוץ למחנה חוץ למחנה ישראל Rav Pappa said: The matter of the location of the place of stoning can be derived from the verses themselves: Where was Moses sitting when the matter of the blasphemer was brought before him? In the Levite camp, as he was a Levite, and it was there that the blasphemer was brought for trial. And the Merciful One said to Moses: “Take out him who has cursed to outside the camp,” indicating that he should be taken outside the Levite camp into the Israelite camp. And later it says: “And Moses spoke to the children of Israel, and they brought him that had cursed out of the camp, and they stoned him with a stone. And the children of Israel did as the Lord commanded Moses” (Leviticus 24:23), teaching that he was taken outside the Israelite camp as well.

האי מיבעי ליה לעשייה עשייה בהדיא כתיבא The Gemara raises an objection: This additional verse is necessary to teach us about the implementation of God’s instructions, i.e., that the Jewish people did in fact carry out God’s command, but this verse should not be understood as referring to an additional camp. The Gemara answers: The implementation of God’s instructions is written explicitly, as it is stated in the continuation of the verse:

Daf 43a

(ויקרא כד, כג) ובני ישראל עשו כאשר צוה ה' את משה “And the children of Israel did as the Lord commanded Moses.”

אלא מעתה (ויקרא כד, כג) וירגמו אותו אבן מאי עבדי ליה ההוא מבעי ליה לכדתניא וירגמו אותו באבן אותו ולא בכסותו אבן שאם מת באבן אחת יצא The Gemara asks: If that is so, what do they do with the words in the verse: “And they stoned him with a stone”? These words appear to be superfluous, as even without them we would know that God’s instructions to stone the blasphemer were implemented. What then do they serve to teach? The Gemara answers: That phrase is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And they stoned him with a stone.” The word “him” teaches that they stoned him alone, while he was naked, but not while he was in his clothing. The verse uses the singular term “stone [aven]” rather than the plural term stones [avanim] to teach that if the condemned man died after being struck with one stone, the court has fulfilled its obligation.

ואצטריך למיכתב אבן ואיצטריך למיכתב אבנים דאי כתב רחמנא אבן הוה אמינא היכא דלא מת בחדא לא ניתי אחריתי ומיקטליה כתב רחמנא אבנים ואי כתב רחמנא אבנים הוה אמינא מעיקרא נייתי תרתי כתב רחמנא אבן The Gemara notes: And it was necessary to write with regard to the blasphemer that “they stoned him with a stone,” in the singular, and it was necessary to write with regard to the man who gathered sticks on Shabbat that “they stoned him with stones” (Numbers 15:36), in the plural. As, had the Merciful One written only “stone,” I would say that where the condemned man did not die after being struck with one stone, they do not bring other stones and kill him with them. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “stones.” And had the Merciful One written only “stones,” I would say that from the outset they should bring two or more stones. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “stone.”

והא האי תנא נאמר קאמר אילו לא נאמר קאמר וה"ק אילו לא נאמר קרא הייתי אומר גזירה שוה עכשיו שנאמר קרא גזירה שוה לא צריך The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Pappa’s derivation: But this tanna of the baraita cited above said: It is stated here and it is stated elsewhere, thereby basing his derivation on a verbal analogy between the verse concerning the blasphemer and the verse concerning the bulls brought as sin-offerings that are burned. How, then, can Rav Pappa, an amora, disagree and derive the halakha directly from the verse dealing with the blasphemer? The Gemara answers: According to Rav Pappa, the tanna of the baraita said: Had it not been stated, and this is what he is saying: Had a verse not been stated from which it can be directly derived that the condemned man is stoned outside all three camps, I would have said that this can be learned by way of a verbal analogy. But now that such a verse has been stated, the verbal analogy is not needed.

רב אשי אמר משה היכא הוה יתיב במחנה לוייה ואמר ליה רחמנא הוצא את המקלל חוץ למחנה לוייה אל מחוץ למחנה חוץ למחנה ישראל ויוציאו את המקלל לעשייה Rav Ashi said: The location of the place of stoning can be directly derived from the verse discussing the blasphemer but in a slightly different manner. Where was Moses sitting when the matter of the blasphemer was brought before him? In the Levite camp. And the Merciful One said to him: “Take out him who has cursed” (Leviticus 24:14), indicating that he should be taken outside the Levite camp into the Israelite camp. And God continued in that verse: “Outside the camp,” which is an additional command that he should be removed even further, to outside the Israelite camp. And the later verse, which says: “And they brought him that had cursed out of the camp…and the children of Israel did as the Lord commanded Moses” (Leviticus 24:23), teaches us about the implementation of God’s instructions, i.e., that the children of Israel did in fact carry out His command.

עשייה בהדיא כתיב בהו ובני ישראל עשו כאשר צוה ה' את משה ההוא מיבעי ליה חד לסמיכה וחד לדחייה The Gemara raises an objection: The implementation of God’s instructions is written explicitly in this context, as it is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And the children of Israel did as the Lord commanded Moses.” The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary to teach us that not only was the condemned man taken outside the three camps and stoned, but the rest of God’s instructions were also fulfilled. These instructions relate to the placing of the witnesses’ hands upon the head of the condemned man, as it is stated: “And let all that heard him place their hands upon his head” (Leviticus 24:14), and to the witnesses’ pushing of the condemned man from a platform the height of two stories.

אמרו ליה רבנן לרב אשי לדידך כל הני הוציא דכתיבי בפרים הנשרפים מאי דרשת בהו קשיא: The Sages said to Rav Ashi: According to you, that the expression “take out” by itself means outside the camp, and “outside the camp” means outside an additional camp, what do you learn from all those instances of “take out” that are written with regard to the bulls brought as sin-offerings that are burned? According to your explanation, there are many superfluous phrases in the verses. The Gemara comments: Indeed, this is difficult with regard to the opinion of Rav Ashi.

אחד עומד כו': אמר רב הונא פשיטא לי אחד אבן שנסקל בה ואחד עץ שנתלה בו ואחד סייף שנהרג בו ואחד סודר שנחנק בו כולן משל צבור מ"ט דמדידיה לא אמרינן ליה זיל וליתיה וליקטול נפשיה § The mishna teaches that one man stands at the entrance to the court, with cloths in his hand, ready to signal to the court agents leading the condemned man to his execution that some doubt has been raised with respect to the latter’s guilt. Rav Huna says: It is obvious to me that the stone with which the condemned man is stoned and the tree on which his corpse is hung after his execution, or the sword with which he is killed, or the scarf with which he is strangled, all of these come from the property of the community. What is the reason for this? We do not tell the condemned man to go and bring these items from his own property and effectively kill himself.

בעי רב הונא סודר שמניפין בו וסוס שרץ ומעמידן משל מי הוא כיון דהצלה דידיה מדידיה הוא או דילמא כיון דבי דינא מחייבין למעבד בה הצלה מדידהו Rav Huna raised a dilemma: With regard to the cloth that is waved and the horse that races off after the court agents to stop the latter from carrying out the execution, from whose property do they come, that of the condemned man or that of the community? The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Since they are needed to save the man being led to his execution, these items should be taken from his property. Or perhaps, since the court is obligated to take all possible measures to save him from death, they should be taken from them, i.e., the community.

ותו הא דאמר ר' חייא בר רב אשי אמר רב חסדא היוצא ליהרג משקין אותו קורט של לבונה בכוס של יין כדי שתטרף דעתו שנאמר (משלי לא, ו) תנו שכר לאובד ויין למרי נפש ותניא נשים יקרות שבירושלים היו מתנדבות ומביאות אותן לא התנדבו נשים יקרות משל מי הא ודאי מסתברא משל צבור כיון דכתיב תנו מדידהו And furthermore, another question is raised along similar lines: With regard to that which Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Rav Ḥisda says: The court gives one who is being led out to be killed a grain [koret] of frankincense in a cup of wine in order to confuse his mind and thereby minimize his suffering from the fear of his impending death, as it is stated: “Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish, and wine to the bitter in soul” (Proverbs 31:6). And it is taught in a baraita: The prominent women of Jerusalem would donate this drink and bring it to those being led out to be killed. The question is: If these prominent women did not donate this drink, from whom is it taken? The Gemara answers: With regard to this question, it is certainly reasonable that this drink should be taken from the community, as it is written: “Give [tenu] strong drink,” in the plural, indicating that it should come from them, the community.

בעא מיניה רב אחא בר הונא מרב ששת אמר אחד מן התלמידים יש לי ללמד עליו זכות ונשתתק מהו מנפח רב ששת בידיה נשתתק אפילו אחד בסוף העולם נמי התם לא קאמר הכא קאמר מאי § Rav Aḥa bar Huna asked Rav Sheshet: If one of the students sitting before the judges said: I can teach a reason to acquit him, and he became mute and cannot explain himself, what is the halakha in such a case? Does the court take heed of his words, or do they disregard him? Rav Sheshet waved his hands in scorn and said: If the student became mute, the court certainly does not pay attention to him, as were the court to concern themselves with what he said, they would have to be concerned even that perhaps there is someone at the end of the world who can propose an argument in the condemned man’s favor. The Gemara rejects this argument: The cases are not similar. There, no one said that he had a reason to acquit the condemned man. Here, the student already said that he had a reason to acquit the condemned man. The question, therefore, is appropriate. What is the halakha in such a case?

תא שמע דאמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא אחד מן התלמידים שזיכה ומת רואין אותו כאילו חי ועומד במקומו זיכה אין לא זיכה לא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer: As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In a case where there was one of the students who argued to acquit the defendant and then died, the court views him as if he were alive and standing in his place and voting to acquit the defendant. The implication is that if he argued to acquit the defendant and explained his reasoning, yes, the court counts his vote as if he were still alive. But if he did not actually argue to acquit the defendant, but only said that he wished to propose such an argument, his vote is not counted as though he were still alive.

זיכה פשיטא לי אמר תיבעי לך: The Gemara rejects this proof: If the student argued to acquit the defendant, it is obvious to me that he should be counted among those favoring acquittal. But if he only says that he wishes to propose such an argument, let the dilemma be raised whether or not he should be regarded as having presented a convincing argument in favor of acquittal. The question is left unresolved.

אפילו הוא כו': ואפילו פעם ראשונה ושניה והתניא פעם ראשונה ושניה בין שיש ממש בדבריו בין שאין ממש בדבריו מחזירין אותו מכאן ואילך אם יש ממש בדבריו מחזירין אותו אין ממש בדבריו אין מחזירין אותו The mishna teaches: And even if he, the condemned man himself, says: I can teach a reason to acquit myself, he is returned to the courthouse even four or five times, provided that there is substance to his words. The Gemara asks: And is the halakha that there must be substance to his words even the first and second time that the condemned man says that he can teach a reason to acquit himself? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The first and second times that he says that he can teach a reason to acquit himself, they return him to the courthouse and consider whether there is substance to his statement or there is no substance to his statement. From this point forward, if there is substance to his statement they return him to the courthouse, but if there is no substance to his statement, they do not return him. This appears to contradict the mishna.

אמר רב פפא תרגומה מפעם שניה ואילך Rav Pappa said: Explain that the mishna’s ruling applies only from after the second time forward, that from that point on we examine whether there is substance to his words.

מנא ידעי אמר אביי דמסרינן ליה זוגא דרבנן אי איכא ממש בדבריו אין אי לא לא The Gemara asks: How do we know whether or not there is substance to his words? Abaye said: If the condemned man has already been returned twice to the courthouse, we send a pair of rabbis with him to evaluate his claim. If they find that there is substance to his statement, yes, he is returned once again to the courthouse; if not, he is not returned.

ולימסר ליה מעיקרא אגב דבעית לא מצי אמר כל מאי דאית ליה: The Gemara asks: But why not send a pair of rabbis with him from the outset, even the first time, and have them make an initial assessment of his claim? The Gemara answers: Since a man facing execution is frightened by the thought of his impending death, he is not able to say all that he has to say, and perhaps out of fear he will be confused and not provide a substantial reason to overturn his verdict. Therefore, the first two times he is returned to the courthouse without an initial examination of his arguments. Once he has already been returned on two occasions, the court allows for no further delay, and they send two rabbis to evaluate his claim before returning him a third time.

מתני׳ מצאו לו זכות פטרוהו ואם לאו יצא ליסקל וכרוז יוצא לפניו איש פלוני בן פלוני יוצא ליסקל על שעבר עבירה פלונית ופלוני ופלוני עדיו כל מי שיודע לו זכות יבא וילמד עליו: MISHNA: If, after the condemned man is returned to the courthouse, the judges find a reason to acquit him, they acquit him and release him immediately. But if they do not find a reason to acquit him, he goes out to be stoned. And a crier goes out before him and publicly proclaims: So-and-so, son of so-and-so, is going out to be stoned because he committed such and such a transgression. And so-and-so and so-and-so are his witnesses. Anyone who knows of a reason to acquit him should come forward and teach it on his behalf.

גמ׳ אמר אביי וצריך למימר ביום פלוני ובשעה פלונית ובמקום פלוני דילמא איכא דידעי ואתו ומזים להו: GEMARA: Abaye says: And the crier must also publicly proclaim that the transgression was committed on such and such a day, at such and such an hour, and at such and such a place, as perhaps there are those who know that the witnesses could not have been in that place at that time, and they will come forward and render the witnesses conspiring witnesses.

וכרוז יוצא לפניו לפניו אין מעיקרא לא והתניא בערב הפסח תלאוהו לישו והכרוז יוצא לפניו מ' יום ישו יוצא ליסקל על שכישף והסית והדיח את ישראל כל מי שיודע לו זכות יבא וילמד עליו ולא מצאו לו זכות ותלאוהו בערב הפסח The mishna teaches that a crier goes out before the condemned man. This indicates that it is only before him, i.e., while he is being led to his execution, that yes, the crier goes out, but from the outset, before the accused is convicted, he does not go out. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: On Passover Eve they hung the corpse of Jesus the Nazarene after they killed him by way of stoning. And a crier went out before him for forty days, publicly proclaiming: Jesus the Nazarene is going out to be stoned because he practiced sorcery, incited people to idol worship, and led the Jewish people astray. Anyone who knows of a reason to acquit him should come forward and teach it on his behalf. And the court did not find a reason to acquit him, and so they stoned him and hung his corpse on Passover eve.

אמר עולא ותסברא בר הפוכי זכות הוא מסית הוא ורחמנא אמר (דברים יג, ט) לא תחמול ולא תכסה עליו אלא שאני ישו דקרוב למלכות הוה Ulla said: And how can you understand this proof? Was Jesus the Nazarene worthy of conducting a search for a reason to acquit him? He was an inciter to idol worship, and the Merciful One states with regard to an inciter to idol worship: “Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9). Rather, Jesus was different, as he had close ties with the government, and the gentile authorities were interested in his acquittal. Consequently, the court gave him every opportunity to clear himself, so that it could not be claimed that he was falsely convicted.

ת"ר חמשה תלמידים היו לו לישו מתאי נקאי נצר ובוני ותודה אתיוהו למתי אמר להו מתי יהרג הכתיב (תהלים מב, ג) מתי אבוא ואראה פני אלהים אמרו לו אין מתי יהרג דכתיב (שם מא, ו) מתי ימות ואבד שמו Apropos the trial of Jesus, the Gemara cites another baraita, where the Sages taught: Jesus the Nazarene had five disciples: Mattai, Nakai, Netzer, Buni, and Toda. They brought Mattai in to stand trial. Mattai said to the judges: Shall Mattai be executed? But isn’t it written: “When [matai] shall I come and appear before God?” (Psalms 42:3). Mattai claimed that this verse alludes to the fact he is righteous. They said to him: Yes, Mattai shall be executed, as it is written: “When [matai] shall he die, and his name perish?” (Psalms 41:6).

אתיוהו לנקאי אמר להו נקאי יהרג הכתיב (שמות כג, ז) ונקי וצדיק אל תהרוג אמרו לו אין נקאי יהרג דכתיב (תהלים י, ח) במסתרים יהרג נקי Then they brought Nakai in to stand trial. Nakai said to the judges: Shall Nakai be executed? But isn’t it written: “And the innocent [naki] and righteous you shall not slay” (Exodus 23:7)? They said to him: Yes, Nakai shall be executed, as it is written: “In secret places he kills the innocent [naki]” (Psalms 10:8).

אתיוהו לנצר אמר נצר יהרג הכתיב (ישעיה יא, א) ונצר משרשיו יפרה אמרו לו אין נצר יהרג דכתיב (שם יד, יט) ואתה השלכת מקברך כנצר נתעב Then they brought Netzer in to stand trial. He said to the judges: Shall Netzer be executed? But isn’t it written: “And a branch [netzer] shall grow out of his roots” (Isaiah 11:1)? They said to him: Yes, Netzer shall be executed, as it is written: “But you are cast out of your grave like an abhorred branch [netzer]” (Isaiah 14:19).

אתיוהו לבוני אמר אמר בוני יהרג הכתיב (שמות ד, כב) בני בכורי ישראל אמרו לי' אין בוני יהרג דכתיב (שם, כג) הנה אנכי הורג את בנך בכורך Then they brought Buni in to stand trial. Buni said to the judges: Shall Buni be executed? But isn’t it written: “My firstborn son [beni] is Israel” (Exodus 4:22)? They said to him: Yes, Buni shall be executed, as it is written: “Behold, I shall kill your firstborn son [binkha]” (Exodus 4:23).

אתיוהו לתודה אמר תודה יהרג הכתיב (תהלים ק, א) מזמור לתודה אמרו לו אין תודה יהרג דכתיב (שם נ, כג) זובח תודה יכבדנני Then they brought Toda in to stand trial. Toda said to the judges: Shall Toda be executed? But isn’t it written: “A psalm of thanksgiving [toda]” (Psalms 100:1)? They said to him: Yes, Toda shall be executed, as it is written: “Whoever slaughters a thanks-offering [toda] honors Me” (Psalms 50:23).

Daf 43b

אריב"ל כל הזובח את יצרו ומתודה עליו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו כיבדו להקב"ה בשני עולמים העולם הזה והעולם הבא דכתיב (תהלים נ, כג) זובח תודה יכבדנני § Apropos the last verse cited in this baraita, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: With regard to anyone who slaughters his evil inclination after it has tempted him to sin, if he repents and confesses his sin, the verse ascribes him credit as though he had honored the Holy One, Blessed be He, in two worlds, this world and the World-to-Come, as it is written: “Whoever slaughters a thanks-offering [toda] honors Me [yekhabdaneni]” (Psalms 50:23), which can also be read as: Whoever slaughters his evil inclination and confesses [mitvadeh] honors Me, and the two instances of the letter nun in the word yekhabdaneni allude to the two worlds.

ואריב"ל בזמן שבית המקדש קיים אדם מקריב עולה שכר עולה בידו מנחה שכר מנחה בידו אבל מי שדעתו שפלה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו הקריב כל הקרבנות כולן שנאמר (תהלים נא, יט) זבחי אלהים רוח נשברה ולא עוד אלא שאין תפלתו נמאסת שנאמר (תהלים נא, יט) לב נשבר ונדכה אלהים לא תבזה: And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi also says: When the Temple is standing, if a person sacrifices a burnt-offering, he has the reward given for bringing a burnt-offering, and if he sacrifices a meal-offering, he has the reward given for bringing a meal-offering. But as for one whose spirit is humble, the verse ascribes him credit for his prayer as though he has sacrificed all the offerings, as it is stated: “The offerings of God are a broken spirit” (Psalms 51:19), which teaches that a broken spirit is equivalent to the offerings to God, in the plural. And moreover, his prayer is not rejected, as it is stated in the continuation of that verse: “A broken and contrite heart, God, You will not despise.”

מתני׳ היה רחוק מבית הסקילה כעשר אמות אומרים לו התודה שכן דרך כל המומתין מתודין שכל המתודה יש לו חלק לעוה"ב שכן מצינו בעכן שאמר לו יהושע (יהושע ז, יט) בני שים נא כבוד [לה'] אלהי ישראל ותן לו תודה (יהושע ז, כ) ויען עכן את יהושע ויאמר אמנה אנכי חטאתי וכזאת וכזאת וגו' ומנין שכיפר לו וידויו שנאמר (יהושע ז, כה) ויאמר יהושע מה עכרתנו יעכרך ה' ביום הזה ביום הזה אתה עכור ואי אתה עכור לעולם הבא MISHNA: When the condemned man is at a distance of about ten cubits from the place of stoning, they say to him: Confess your transgressions, as the way of all who are being executed is to confess. As whoever confesses and regrets his transgressions has a portion in the World-to-Come. For so we find with regard to Achan, that Joshua said to him: “My son, please give glory to the Lord, God of Israel, and make confession to Him” (Joshua 7:19). And the next verse states: “And Achan answered Joshua, and said: Indeed I have sinned against the Lord, God of Israel, and like this and like that have I done.” And from where is it derived that Achan’s confession achieved atonement for him? It is derived from here, as it is stated: “And Joshua said: Why have you brought trouble on us? The Lord shall trouble you this day” (Joshua 7:25). Joshua said to Achan as follows: On this day of your judgment you are troubled, but you will not be troubled in the World-to-Come.

ואם אינו יודע להתוודות אומרים לו אמור תהא מיתתי כפרה על כל עונותי ר' יהודה אומר אם היה יודע שהוא מזומם אומר תהא מיתתי כפרה על כל עונותי חוץ מעון זה אמרו לו א"כ יהו כל אדם אומר כן כדי לנקות עצמו: And if the condemned man does not know how to confess, either from ignorance or out of confusion, they say to him: Say simply: Let my death be an atonement for all my sins. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the condemned man knows that he was convicted by the testimony of conspiring witnesses, but in fact he is innocent, he says: Let my death be an atonement for all my sins except for this sin. The Sages who disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda said to him: If so, every person who is being executed will say that, to clear himself in the eyes of the public. Therefore, if the condemned man does not make such a statement on his own, the court does not suggest it to him as an alternative.

גמ׳ ת"ר נא אין נא אלא לשון בקשה GEMARA: Since the mishna referred to Achan’s sin, the Gemara cites several statements concerning that incident. The Sages taught in a baraita: Joshua said to Achan: “Please [na] give glory to the Lord, God of Israel, and make confession to Him.” The word “na” is nothing other than an expression of supplication. Why would Joshua employ an expression of supplication when approaching Achan?

בשעה שאמר הקב"ה ליהושע (יהושע ז, יא) חטא ישראל אמר לפניו רבש"ע מי חטא אמר ליה וכי דילטור אני לך הפל גורלות הלך והפיל גורלות ונפל הגורל על עכן אמר לו יהושע בגורל אתה בא עלי אתה ואלעזר הכהן שני גדולי הדור אתם אם אני מפיל עליכם גורל על אחד מכם הוא נופל אמר לו בבקשה ממך אל תוציא לעז על הגורלות שעתידה ארץ ישראל שתתחלק בגורל שנאמר (במדבר כו, נה) אך בגורל יחלק את הארץ The baraita explains: When the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Joshua: “Israel has sinned” (Joshua 7:11), Joshua said to Him: Master of the Universe, who is the one who has sinned? God said to him: Am I an informer [deilator]? Go cast lots and find out for yourself. Joshua then went and cast lots, and the lot fell upon Achan. Achan said to him: Joshua, do you come to execute me merely based on a lot, without any corroborating evidence? You and Elazar the priest are the two most distinguished leaders of the generation, but if I cast a lot upon the two of you, it will perforce fall upon one of you. What then can you prove from a lottery? Joshua said to him: I ask of you, do not spread slander about the lots, as Eretz Yisrael will one day be divided by lots, as it is stated: “Nevertheless, the land shall be divided by lot” (Numbers 26:55). Due to you the results of that lottery may be challenged. Therefore, Joshua used the word “na,” pleading with Achan to confess.

תן תודה אמר רבינא שחודי שחדיה במילי כלום נבקש ממך אלא הודאה תן לו תודה והיפטר מיד ויען עכן את יהושע ויאמר אמנה אנכי חטאתי לה' אלהי ישראל וכזאת וכזאת עשיתי Joshua said to Achan: “Please give glory to the Lord, God of Israel, and make confession to Him.” Ravina says: Joshua won over Achan with his words, saying: Do we ask anything of you but a confession? Make confession to Him and be discharged. Thinking that if he confessed, he would be pardoned, Achan immediately responded: “And Achan answered Joshua, and said: Indeed I have sinned against the Lord, God of Israel, and like this and like that have I done” (Joshua 7:20).

אמר רב אסי אמר רבי חנינא מלמד שמעל עכן בשלשה חרמים שנים בימי משה ואחד בימי יהושע שנאמר כזאת וכזאת עשיתי רבי יוחנן אמר משום ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון חמשה ארבעה בימי משה ואחד בימי יהושע שנאמר אנכי חטאתי וכזאת וכזאת עשיתי With regard to the words “And like this and like that have I done,” Rav Asi says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: This teaches that Achan misused consecrated property from three dedications, i.e., three groups of property that had been dedicated to the Lord. Two were during wars waged in the days of Moses, and one was in the days of Joshua, as it is stated: “And like this and like that have I done,” indicating that he had already committed similar offenses twice before committing the offense in Jericho. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: Achan misused property from five dedications, four during wars waged in the days of Moses, and one in the days of Joshua, as it is stated: “I have sinned against the Lord, God of Israel, and like this and like that have I done,” with each “and” alluding to an additional prior offense.

ועד השתא מאי טעמא לא איענוש א"ר יוחנן משום ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון לפי שלא ענש על הנסתרות עד שעברו ישראל את הירדן The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason that the Jewish people were not punished on Achan’s account until now? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: Because God did not punish the nation as a whole for hidden sins committed by individuals until the Jewish people crossed the Jordan River.

כתנאי (דברים כט, כח) הנסתרות לה' אלהינו והנגלות לנו ולבנינו עד עולם למה נקוד על לנו ולבנינו ועל עי"ן שבעד מלמד שלא ענש על הנסתרות עד שעברו ישראל את הירדן דברי ר' יהודה The Gemara notes that this is subject to a dispute between tanna’im. The verse states: “The hidden matters belong to the Lord our God, but those matters that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever [ad olam], that we may do all the words of this Torah” (Deuteronomy 29:28). Why in a Torah scroll are there dots over each of the letters in the words “to us and to our children” and over the letter ayin in the word “forever [ad]”? The dots, which function like erasures that weaken the force of the words, teach that God did not punish the nation for hidden sins until the Jewish people crossed the Jordan River. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

א"ל ר' נחמיה וכי ענש על הנסתרות לעולם והלא כבר נאמר עד עולם אלא כשם שלא ענש על הנסתרות כך לא ענש על עונשין שבגלוי עד שעברו ישראל את הירדן אלא Rabbi Neḥemya said to him: And does God ever punish the nation as a whole for hidden sins committed by individuals? But isn’t it already stated: “The hidden matters belong to the Lord our God…forever,” indicating that the Jewish people will never be collectively held responsible for the secret sins of individuals? Rather, the dots over the words teach that just as God did not ever punish the nation as a whole for hidden sins committed by individuals, so too, He did not punish the entire nation for sins committed publicly by individuals until the Jewish people crossed the Jordan River. The Gemara asks: But if so,

Daf 44a

עכן מאי טעמא איענוש משום דהוו ידעי ביה אשתו ובניו what is the reason that in the case of Achan they were punished? The Gemara answers: Achan’s offense was not a hidden matter because his wife and children knew about it, and they did not protest.

(יהושע ז, יא) חטא ישראל אמר רבי אבא בר זבדא אע"פ שחטא ישראל הוא אמר ר' אבא היינו דאמרי אינשי אסא דקאי ביני חילפי אסא שמיה ואסא קרו ליה § When God explained to Joshua the reason for the Jewish people’s defeat at the city of Ai, He said: “Israel has sinned” (Joshua 7:11). Rabbi Abba bar Zavda says: From here it may be inferred that even when the Jewish people have sinned, they are still called “Israel.” Rabbi Abba says: This is in accordance with the adage that people say: Even when a myrtle is found among thorns, its name is myrtle and people call it myrtle.

(יהושע ז, יא) וגם עברו את בריתי אשר צויתי אותם גם לקחו מן החרם גם גנבו גם כחשו גם שמו בכליהם אמר ר' אילעא משום ר' יהודה בר מספרתא מלמד שעבר עכן על חמשה חומשי תורה שנאמר חמשה גם The verse in Joshua continues: “They have also transgressed My covenant which I commanded them, and they have also taken of the dedicated property, and also stolen, and also dissembled, and also put it among their own goods.” Rabbi Ile’a says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Masparta: This teaches that Achan also transgressed all five books of the Torah, as the word “also” is stated here five times.

ואמר רבי אילעא משום רבי יהודה בר מספרתא עכן מושך בערלתו היה כתיב הכא וגם עברו את בריתי וכתיב התם (בראשית יז, יד) את בריתי הפר And Rabbi Ile’a says further in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Masparta: Achan, in addition to his other evil actions, would stretch his remaining foreskin in order to conceal the fact that he was circumcised. An allusion to this offense is found in the wording of this verse. Here, with regard to Achan, it is written: “They have also transgressed My covenant,” and there, with regard to circumcision, it is written: “He has violated My covenant” (Genesis 17:14).

פשיטא מהו דתימא במצוה גופיה לא פקר קמ"ל The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he concealed his circumcision, as Rabbi Ile’a said that he transgressed all five books of the Torah? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that while Achan transgressed all five books of the Torah, with regard to a mitzva relating to his own body, such as circumcision, he did not act irreverently, Rabbi Ile’a teaches us that he sinned concerning this mitzva as well.

(יהושע ז, טו) וכי עשה נבלה בישראל א"ר אבא בר זבדא מלמד שבעל עכן נערה המאורסה כתיב הכא וכי עשה נבלה וכתיב התם (דברים כב, כא) כי עשתה נבלה בישראל With regard to Achan, the verse states: “And because he has committed a wanton deed in Israel” (Joshua 7:15). Rabbi Abba bar Zavda says: This teaches that Achan engaged in sexual intercourse with a betrothed young woman. This offense is also alluded to by the wording of the verse. Here, with regard to Achan, it is written: “And because he has committed a wanton deed,” and there, with regard to a betrothed young woman who committed adultery, it is written: “Because she has committed a wanton deed in Israel, to play the harlot in her father’s house” (Deuteronomy 22:21).

פשיטא מהו דתימא כולי האי לא פקר נפשיה קמ"ל רבינא אמר דיניה כנערה המאורסה דבסקילה The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious, as Achan transgressed the entire Torah? The Gemara similarly answers: Lest you say that he did not act irreverently to such an extent, Rabbi Abba bar Zavda teaches us that he paid no heed even to this prohibition. Ravina said: This verbal analogy does not teach what Achan’s offense was; rather, it teaches that his punishment was like that of a betrothed young woman who committed adultery, for which she is executed by stoning.

אמר ליה ריש גלותא לרב הונא כתיב (יהושע ז, כד) ויקח יהושע את עכן בן זרח ואת הכסף ואת האדרת ואת לשון הזהב ואת בניו ואת בנותיו ואת שורו ואת חמורו ואת צאנו ואת אהלו ואת כל אשר לו אם הוא חטא בניו ובנותיו מה חטאו § The Exilarch said to Rav Huna: It is written: “And Joshua took Achan, son of Zerah, and the silver, and the mantle, and the wedge of gold, and his sons, and his daughters, and his oxen, and his asses, and his sheep, and his tent, and all that he had, and all Israel with him…and all Israel stoned him with stones; and they burned them with fire, and stoned them with stones” (Joshua 7:24–25). If Achan sinned, so that he was liable to be stoned, did his sons and daughters also sin, that they too should be stoned?

אמר ליה וליטעמיך אם הוא חטא כל ישראל מה חטאו דכתיב (יהושע ז, כד) וכל ישראל עמו אלא לרדותן ה"נ כדי לרדותן Rav Huna said to the Exilarch: And according to your reasoning that Achan’s family was also punished, if Achan sinned, did all of Israel sin? As it is written: “And all Israel with him.” Rather, Joshua took all of the people to the Valley of Achor not to stone them, but to chastise them and strike fear into their hearts by making them witness the stoning. So too, he took Achan’s household there in order to chastise them.

(יהושע ז, כה) וישרפו אותם באש ויסקלו אותם באבנים בתרתי אמר רבינא הראוי לשריפה לשריפה הראוי לסקילה לסקילה With regard to Achan’s punishment, the verse states: “And they burned them with fire, and stoned them with stones.” The Gemara asks: Did they punish him with two punishments? Ravina says: That which was fit for burning, e.g., an item of clothing, was taken out for burning, and that which was fit for stoning, e.g., an animal, was taken out for stoning.

(יהושע ז, כא) וארא בשלל אדרת שנער אחת טובה ומאתים שקלים כסף רב אמר איצטלא דמילתא ושמואל אמר סרבלא דצריפא § In his confession, Achan states: “And I saw among the spoil a fine mantle of Shinar, and two hundred shekels of silver” (Joshua 7:21). Rav says: A mantle of Shinar is a cloak [itztela] of choice wool [demeilta], and Shmuel says: It is a garment [sarbela] dyed with alum.

(יהושע ז, כג) ויציקום לפני ה' אמר רב נחמן בא וחבטם לפני המקום אמר לפניו רבש"ע על אלו תיהרג רובה של סנהדרין דכתיב (יהושע ז, ה) ויכו מהם אנשי העי כשלשים וששה איש ותניא שלשים וששה ממש דברי ר' יהודה אמר לו ר' נחמיה וכי שלשים וששה היו והלא לא נאמר אלא כשלשים וששה איש אלא זה יאיר בן מנשה ששקול כנגד רובה של סנהדרין With regard to the spoils that Achan took for himself, the verse states: “And they laid them out before the Lord” (Joshua 7:23). Rav Naḥman says: Joshua came and cast down the spoils before God. Joshua said to Him: Master of the Universe, was it because of these small items that the majority of the Sanhedrin were killed? As it is written: “And the men of Ai smote of them about thirty-six men” (Joshua 7:5), and it is taught in a baraita: Thirty-six men, literally, were killed; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Neḥemya said to Rabbi Yehuda: But were they precisely thirty-six men? Didn’t it state only: “About thirty-six men”? Rather, this is a reference to Yair, son of Manasseh, who was killed, and who was himself equivalent in importance to the majority of the Sanhedrin, i.e., thirty-six men.

אמר רב נחמן אמר רב מאי דכתיב (משלי יח, כג) תחנונים ידבר רש ועשיר יענה עזות תחנונים ידבר רש זה משה ועשיר יענה עזות זה יהושע Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The poor man speaks entreaties, but the rich man answers with impudence” (Proverbs 18:23)? “The poor man speaks entreaties”; this is a reference to Moses, who addressed God in a tone of supplication and appeasement. “But the rich man answers with impudence”; this is a reference to Joshua, who spoke to God in a belligerent manner.

מאי טעמא אילימא משום דכתיב ויציקום לפני ה' ואמר רב נחמן בא וחבטן לפני המקום אטו פנחס לא עביד הכי (דכתיב) (תהלים קו, ל) ויעמד פנחס ויפלל ותעצר המגפה ואמר ר' אלעזר ויתפלל לא נאמר אלא ויפלל מלמד שעשה פלילות עם קונו בא וחבטן לפני המקום אמר לפניו רבונו של עולם על אלו יפלו עשרים וארבעה אלף מישראל דכתיב (במדבר כה, ט) ויהיו המתים במגפה ארבעה ועשרים אלף The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Joshua is considered to have answered God with impudence? If we say that it is because it is written: “And he laid them out before the Lord,” and Rav Naḥman says that this means that Joshua came and cast the spoils down before God as part of his argument, this is difficult: Is that to say that Pinehas did not act the same way in the incident involving Zimri and Cozbi? As it is written: “Then stood up Pinehas, and executed judgment [vayefallel], and the plague was stayed” (Psalms 106:30), and Rabbi Elazar says: And he prayed [vayitpallel], is not stated; rather, “and he executed judgment [vayefallel]” is stated, which teaches that he entered into a judgment together with his Creator. How so? He came and cast Zimri and Cozbi down before God, and said to Him: Master of the Universe, was it because of these sinners that twenty-four thousand members of the Jewish people fell? As it is written: “And those that died by the plague were twenty-four thousand” (Numbers 25:9).

ואלא מהכא (יהושע ז, ז) למה העברת העביר את העם הזה את הירדן משה נמי מימר אמר (שמות ה, כב) למה הרעתה לעם הזה אלא מהכא (יהושע ז, ז) ולו הואלנו ונשב בעבר הירדן Rather, Joshua’s belligerence is seen from this verse: “Why have You brought this people over the Jordan” (Joshua 7:7), as if he were complaining about God’s treatment of Israel. This too is difficult, as Moses also said a similar statement: “Why have You dealt ill with this people? Why is it that You have sent me?” (Exodus 5:22). Rather, Joshua’s belligerence is seen from here, from the continuation of the previously cited verse in Joshua: “Would that we had been content and had remained in the Transjordan” (Joshua 7:7).

(יהושע ז, י) ויאמר ה' אל יהושע קום לך דריש ר' שילא א"ל הקב"ה שלך קשה משלהם אני אמרתי (דברים כז, ד) והיה בעברכם את הירדן תקימו ואתם ריחקתם ס' מיל § With regard to the verse that states: “And the Lord said to Joshua: Get you up; why do you lie this way on your face?” (Joshua 7:10), Rabbi Sheila taught in a public lecture: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Joshua: Your own sin is even worse than that of the other Jews who sinned, as I said to the Jewish people: “And it shall be when you have gone over the Jordan, that you shall set up these stones” (Deuteronomy 27:4), and you have already distanced yourselves sixty mil from the Jordan River, and you have yet to fulfill the mitzva.

בתר דנפק אוקים רב אמורא עליה ודרש (יהושע יא, טו) כאשר צוה ה' את משה עבדו כן צוה משה את יהושע וכן עשה יהושע לא הסיר דבר מכל אשר צוה ה' את משה After Rav Sheila finished his lecture and went out, Rav, who had been present but remained silent, placed an interpreter alongside him, who would repeat his lecture in a loud voice so that the public could hear it, and he taught: The verse states: “As the Lord commanded Moses His servant, so did Moses command Joshua, and so did Joshua; he left nothing undone of all that the Lord had commanded Moses” (Joshua 11:15). This indicates that Joshua could not have been guilty of a grave offense such as delaying in setting up the stones.

א"כ מה ת"ל קום לך א"ל אתה גרמת להם והיינו דקאמר ליה בעי (יהושע ח, ב) ועשית לעי ולמלכה כאשר עשית ליריחו ולמלכה וגו' If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Get you up,” hinting that Joshua was in fact responsible for some transgression? The matter should be understood as follows: God said to Joshua: You caused the Jewish people to sin, as had you not dedicated all the spoils of Jericho to the Tabernacle treasury, the entire incident of Achan taking the spoils improperly would not have occurred. And this is what God said to him at Ai: “And you shall do to Ai and her king as you did to Jericho and her king; only its spoil and its cattle shall you take for a prey to yourselves” (Joshua 8:2), instructing Joshua that the Jewish people should keep the spoils.

(יהושע ה, יג) ויהי בהיות יהושע ביריחו וישא עיניו וירא וגו' ויאמר לא כי אני שר צבא ה' עתה באתי [ויפול יהושע אל פניו ארצה וישתחו] היכי עביד הכי והאמר רבי יוחנן אסור לו לאדם שיתן שלום לחבירו בלילה חיישינן שמא שד הוא The verse states: “And it came to pass when Joshua was by Jericho that he lifted up his eyes and looked, and, behold, a man stood over against him with his sword drawn in his hand: And Joshua went to him and said to him, Are you for us or for our adversaries? And he said: No, but I am captain of the host of the Lord; I have now come. And Joshua fell on his face to the earth, and bowed down” (Joshua 5:13–14). The Gemara asks: How could Joshua do so, bowing down to a stranger at night? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: It is prohibited for a person to greet another whom he does not recognize at night, as we are concerned that perhaps the one he doesn’t recognize is a demon? Why was Joshua not concerned about this possibility?

שאני התם דקאמר ליה (יהושע ה, יד) אני שר צבא ה' עתה באתי וגו' ודילמא משקרי גמירי דלא מפקי שם שמים לבטלה The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the stranger said to Joshua: “I am captain of the host of the Lord; I have now come.” The Gemara asks: But perhaps he was in fact a demon and he was lying? The Gemara answers: It is learned as a tradition that demons do not utter the name of Heaven in vain, and since this figure mentioned the name of Heaven, he must have been speaking the truth.

Daf 44b

א"ל אמש ביטלתם תמיד של בין הערביים ועכשיו ביטלתם תלמוד תורה על איזה מהן באת א"ל עתה באתי The Gemara understands the words of the angel that Joshua encountered as a rebuke for some offense Joshua committed: The angel said to Joshua: Yesterday, in the afternoon, you neglected sacrificing the daily afternoon offering because you were engaged in warfare, and now, when it is dark, you neglected Torah study. Joshua asked him: For which of these sins have you come to reprove me? The angel said to him: “I have now come,” i.e., the fact that I did not come before, but waited until now, when it is dark, indicates that the sin of neglecting Torah study is the more severe one.

מיד (יהושע ח, ט) וילן יהושע בלילה ההוא בתוך העמק ואמר רבי יוחנן מלמד שלן בעומקה של הלכה Joshua immediately acted to rectify the matter by deciding that he must devote more time to Torah study, as it is stated: “And Joshua lodged that night” (Joshua 8:9) “into the midst of the valley [ha’emek]” (Joshua 8:13). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This teaches that he lodged all night in the depth [be’omekah] of halakha, thereby atoning for his previous neglect of Torah study.

אמר שמואל בר אוניא משמיה דרב גדול תלמוד תורה יותר מהקרבת תמידין שנאמר (יהושע ה, יד) עתה באתי Shmuel bar Unya says in the name of Rav: Torah study is greater than the sacrificing of the daily offerings, as it is stated: “I have now come,” demonstrating that the neglect of Torah study is a more serious offense than the neglect of the daily offerings.

אמר ליה אביי לרב דימי האי קרא במערבא במאי מוקמיתו ליה (משלי כה, ח) אל תצא לריב מהר פן מה תעשה באחריתה בהכלים אותך רעך ריבך ריב את רעך וסוד אחר אל תגל § Abaye said to Rav Dimi, who descended to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael: How do you explain this verse in the West, Eretz Yisrael: “Do not proceed hastily to litigation, lest you know not what to do in the end of it, when your neighbor has put you to shame. Debate your cause with your neighbor, and do not reveal the secret of another” (Proverbs 25:8–9)?

בשעה שאמר לו הקב"ה ליחזקאל (יחזקאל טז, ג) לך אמור להם לישראל אביך האמורי ואמך חתית אמרה רוח פסקונית לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע אם יבואו אברהם ושרה ויעמדו לפניך אתה אומר להם ומכלים אותם ריבך ריב את רעך וסוד אחר אל תגל Rav Dimi explained as follows: At the time that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Ezekiel: Go say to Israel: “Your father was an Amorite and your mother a Hittite” (Ezekiel 16:3), the spirit Paskonit, which is another name for the angel Gabriel, said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, were the patriarch Abraham and the matriarch Sarah to come now and stand before You, would you speak to them in such a manner and put them to shame? Is it not stated: “Debate your cause with your neighbor, and do not reveal the secret of another”?

ומי אית ליה רשותא כולי האי אין דא"ר יוסי ברבי חנינא שלש שמות יש לו פיסקון איטמון סיגרון פיסקון שפוסק דברים כלפי מעלה איטמון שאוטם עונותיהן של ישראל סיגרון כיון שסוגר שוב אינו פותח The Gemara asks: But does the angel Gabriel have so much authority that he can reprove God in such a manner? The Gemara answers: Yes, as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: He, the angel Gabriel, has three names: Piskon, Itmon, and Sigron. He is called Piskon because he splits [sheposek] words and argues with God on High. He is called Itmon because he conceals [she’otem] the sins of the Jewish people. And he is called Sigron because once he closes [shesoger] his arguments on behalf of the Jewish people, no one reopens the discussion.

(איוב לו, יט) היערוך שועך לא בצר א"ר אלעזר לעולם יקדים אדם תפלה לצרה שאילמלא (לא) הקדים אברהם תפלה לצרה בין בית אל ובין העי לא נשתייר מרשעי ישראל שריד ופליט ריש לקיש אמר כל המאמץ עצמו בתפלה מלמטה אין לו צרים מלמעלה ר' יוחנן אמר לעולם יבקש אדם רחמים שיהו הכל מאמצין את כחו ואל יהו לו צרים מלמעלה: The verse states: “Had you prepared your prayers, before your troubles came” (Job 36:19). Rabbi Elazar says: A person should always offer up prayer before trouble actually arrives, as had the patriarch Abraham not anticipated the trouble at Ai with the prayer he offered between Bethel and Ai, there would have been no remnant or refugee remaining among the enemies of Israel, a euphemism for Israel itself, as Israel suffered a defeat at Ai from which there is ordinarily no recovery. Reish Lakish says: The verse should be understood as follows: Anyone who concentrates himself and his energy in prayer in the world below will have no enemies in Heaven above causing him trouble. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The verse should be understood in a slightly different manner: A person should always pray for mercy that all heavenly beings should strengthen his power of prayer, and that he should have no enemies causing him trouble in Heaven above.

מנין שכיפר לו וידויו וכו': תנו רבנן מנין שכיפר לו וידויו שנאמר (יהושע ז, ב) ויאמר לו יהושע מה עכרתנו יעכרך ה' היום הזה היום הזה אתה עכור ואי אתה עכור לעולם הבא וכתיב (דברי הימים א ב, ו) ובני זרח זמרי ואיתן והימן וכלכל ודרדע כולם חמשה מאי כולם חמשה כולן חמשה הן לעוה"ב § The mishna teaches: From where is it derived that Achan’s confession achieved atonement for him? The Sages taught likewise in a baraita: From where is it derived that Achan’s confession achieved atonement for him? As it is stated: “And Joshua said: Why have you brought trouble on us? The Lord shall trouble you this day” (Joshua 7:25). Joshua said to Achan: On this day of your judgment you are troubled, but you will not be troubled in the World-to-Come. And elsewhere it is written: “And the sons of Zerah were Zimri and Ethan and Heman and Calcol and Dara, five of them in all” (I Chronicles 2:6). What do the words “five of them in all” serve to teach? All five sons are destined to receive a share in the World-to-Come. According to the Sages, Zimri is Achan, son of Zerah, as will be explained. Since Achan has a share in the World-to-Come, his confession must have achieved atonement for him.

כתיב זמרי וכתיב עכן רב ושמואל חד אמר עכן שמו ולמה נקרא שמו זמרי שעשה מעשה זמרי וחד אמר זמרי שמו ולמה נקרא שמו עכן שעיכן עונותיהן של ישראל: In one place, among the five sons of Zerah, it is written: “Zimri,” without any mention of Achan (I Chronicles 2:6), and in another place it is written: “And Joshua took Achan, son of Zerah” (Joshua 7:24). Rav and Shmuel both say that Zimri and Achan are one and the same, but they disagree about his real name. One of them says: His real name was Achan. Why then was he called Zimri? He was called Zimri because he acted like Zimri, i.e., just as Zimri engaged in sexual intercourse with a Midianite woman, Achan engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman. And the other one says: His real name was Zimri. Why then was he called Achan? He was called Achan because he acted like a snake [she’iken] and caused the punishment of the sins of the Jewish people.

אם אינו יודע להתוודות כו' רבי יהודה אומר כו' לנקות עצמן: וינקו עצמן כדי שלא להוציא לעז על בתי דינין ועל העדים § The mishna teaches that if the condemned man does not know how to confess, they say to him: Say simply: Let my death be an atonement for all my sins. Rabbi Yehuda says that if he knows that he was wrongfully convicted, he should say: Let my death be an atonement for all my sins except for this sin. The Sages counter that if such a confession is acceptable, anyone who is sentenced to execution would state it to clear himself in the eyes of the public. The Gemara challenges: Let them clear themselves. Why should the court intervene if the condemned man wishes to proclaim his innocence? The Gemara answers: They intervene so as not to cast aspersions on the courts and on the witnesses who testified against him.

ת"ר מעשה באדם אחד שיצא ליהרג אמר אם יש בי עון זה לא תהא מיתתי כפרה לכל עונותי ואם אין בי עון זה תהא מיתתי כפרה לכל עונותי וב"ד וכל ישראל מנוקין והעדים לא תהא להם מחילה לעולם וכששמעו חכמים בדבר אמרו להחזירו אי אפשר שכבר נגזרה גזירה אלא יהרג ויהא קולר תלוי בצואר עדים The Sages taught: An incident occurred involving a person who was being taken out to be executed after having been convicted by the court. He said: If I committed this sin for which I am being executed, let my death not be an atonement for all my sins; but if I did not commit this sin for which I am being put to death, let my death be an atonement for all my sins. And the court that convicted me and all the people of Israel are clear of responsibility, but the witnesses who testified falsely against me will never be forgiven. And when the Sages heard this, they said: It is impossible to bring him back to court and reconsider the verdict, as the decree has already been decreed. Rather, he shall be executed, and the chain of responsibility for his wrongful execution hangs around the necks of the witnesses.

פשיטא כל כמיניה לא צריכא דקא הדרי בהו סהדי The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that he should be executed? Is it in his power to have his sentence overturned just because he says he is innocent? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state that the condemned man is executed even when the witnesses retracted their testimony.

וכי הדרי בהו מאי הוי כיון שהגיד שוב אינו חוזר ומגיד לא צריכא דאע"ג דקא יהבי טעמא למילתייהו (כי ההוא מעשה דבעיא מיכסא): The Gemara asks: Even if the witnesses retracted their testimony, what of it? It is still clear that the condemned man is to be executed, as the halakha is that once a witness has stated his testimony, he may not then state a revision of that testimony. In other words, a witness’s retraction of his testimony has no validity. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state that the condemned man is executed even when the witnesses retracted their testimony and gave an explanation for having lied in their initial statement. This is like that incident involving Ba’aya the tax collector, where it was discovered that witnesses had falsely accused the son of Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ in revenge for the son’s having sentenced to death for sorcery the witnesses’ relatives.

מתני׳ היה רחוק מבית הסקילה ארבע אמות מפשיטין אותו את בגדיו האיש מכסין אותו מלפניו והאשה מלפניה ומאחריה דברי רבי יהודה וחכ"א האיש נסקל ערום ואין האשה נסקלת ערומה: MISHNA: When the condemned man is at a distance of four cubits from the place of stoning, they take off his clothes. They cover a man’s genitals in the front, and a woman is covered both in the front and in the back; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. But the Rabbis say: A man is stoned naked, i.e., wearing only that cloth covering, but a woman is not stoned naked, but is stoned while clothed.

Daf 45a

גמ׳ תנו רבנן האיש מכסין אותו פרק אחד מלפניו ואשה שני פרקים בין מלפניה בין מלאחריה מפני שכולה ערוה דברי ר' יהודה וחכמים אומרים האיש נסקל ערום ואין האשה נסקלת ערומה GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a man is stoned naked but a woman is not stoned naked. With regard to this matter the Sages taught a related baraita: They cover a man’s genitals with one piece of cloth in the front, and a woman is covered with two pieces of cloth, both in the front and in the back, because all of that area is nakedness, which may not be viewed. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. But the Rabbis say: A man is stoned naked, but a woman is not stoned naked.

מאי טעמייהו דרבנן אמר קרא (ויקרא כד, יד) ורגמו אותו מאי אותו The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that a man is stoned naked, but a woman is not? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And all the congregation shall stone him” (Leviticus 24:14). What does the verse intend to teach when it emphasizes that they stone “him”?

אילימא אותו ולא אותה והכתיב (דברים יז, ה) והוצאת את האיש ההוא או את האשה ההיא אלא מאי אותו אותו בלא כסותו הא אותה בכסותה רבי יהודה אומר אותו בלא כסותו לא שנא איש ולא שנא אשה If we say that this serves to teach that they stone only him, the man, but not her, i.e., women are not punished with stoning, there is a difficulty. As isn’t it written explicitly: “And you shall bring forth that man or that woman…and stone them with stones until they die” (Deuteronomy 17:5)? Rather, what does the verse mean to teach when it stresses that they stone “him”? If he is a man, they stone just him, without his clothes, but if the condemned party is a woman, they stone her with her clothing. Rabbi Yehuda says: The emphasis on the word “him” teaches that they stone him alone, i.e., without his clothes, but as is the case with all other punishments stated in the Torah, there is no difference for a man and no difference for a woman, meaning the same halakha applies to both men and women.

למימרא דרבנן חיישי להרהורא ורבי יהודה לא חייש להרהורא והא איפכא שמענא להו דתנן הכהן אוחז בבגדיה אם נקרעו נקרעו ואם נפרמו נפרמו עד שמגלה את לבה וסותר את שערה רבי יהודה אומר אם היה לבה נאה לא היה מגלהו ואם היה שערה נאה לא היה סותרו The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the Rabbis are concerned that the sight of a naked woman will arouse sexual thoughts among the onlookers, and Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about such sexual thoughts? But didn’t we hear them say just the opposite, as we learned in a mishna (Sota 7a) with regard to a sota, a woman suspected of adultery by her husband, and who was made to undergo the ordeal of the bitter waters: And the priest grabs hold of her clothing and pulls it, without concern about what happens to it. If the clothes are torn, they are torn; if the stitches come apart, they come apart. And he pulls her clothing until he reveals her heart, i.e., her chest. And then he unbraids her hair. Rabbi Yehuda says: If her heart was attractive he would not reveal it, and if her hair was attractive he would not unbraid it. This seems to indicate that it is Rabbi Yehuda who is concerned about the sexual thoughts of the onlookers.

אמר רבה התם היינו טעמא שמא תצא מב"ד זכאה ויתגרו בה פירחי כהונה הכא הא מקטלא וכי תימא אתי לאיתגרויי באחרנייתא אמר רבה גמירי אין יצר הרע שולט אלא במי שעיניו רואות Rabba said: There, in the case of a sota, this is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda says that the priest does not reveal the woman’s chest or unbraid her hair: Perhaps the sota will leave the court having been proven innocent, and the young priests in the Temple who saw her partially naked will become provoked by the sight of her. Here, in the case of a woman who is stoned, she is killed by being stoned, and there is no concern about the onlookers’ becoming provoked after her death. The Gemara comments: And if you would say that the fact that she is killed is irrelevant to their having sexual thoughts because the onlookers will be provoked with regard to other women, this is not a concern, as Rabba says: It is learned as a tradition that the evil inclination controls only that which one’s eyes see.

אמר רבא דר' יהודה אדר' יהודה קשיא דרבנן אדרבנן לא קשיא אלא אמר רבא דרבי יהודה אדר' יהודה לא קשיא כדשנין Rava says: Is the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda difficult, while the contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis is not difficult? There is also an apparent contradiction between the two rulings of the Rabbis, as with regard to a sota, they are not concerned about sexual thoughts, but with regard to a woman who is stoned they are concerned. Rather, Rava says: The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as we answered above.

דרבנן אדרבנן נמי לא קשיא אמר קרא (יחזקאל כג, מח) ונוסרו כל הנשים ולא תעשינה כזמתכינה הכא אין לך ייסור גדול מזה Rava continues: The contradiction between one ruling of the Rabbis and the other ruling of the Rabbis is not difficult either. With regard to a sota, the verse states that other women should be warned: “Thus will I cause lewdness to cease out of the land, that all women may be chastened not to do like your lewdness” (Ezekiel 23:48). In order to serve as an example and warning to other women, a woman suspected of adultery must undergo public disgrace, and therefore the concern about the sexual thoughts that her partially naked body might arouse is disregarded. Here, with regard to stoning, you have no chastening greater than seeing this stoning itself.

וכ"ת ליעביד בה תרתי אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר קרא (ויקרא יט, יח) ואהבת לרעך כמוך ברור לו מיתה יפה And if you would say that two forms of chastening, both stoning and humiliation, should be done to her, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The verse states: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), teaching that even with regard to a condemned prisoner, select a good, i.e., a compassionate, death for him. Therefore, when putting a woman to death by stoning, she should not be humiliated in the process.

לימא דרב נחמן תנאי היא לא דכולי עלמא אית להו דרב נחמן והכא בהא קמיפלגי מר סבר בזיוני דאיניש עדיפא ליה טפי מניחא דגופיה ומר סבר ניחא דגופיה עדיף מבזיוני: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that whether one rules in accordance with the statement of Rav Naḥman is a dispute between tanna’im, and according to Rabbi Yehuda there is no mitzva to select a compassionate death. The Gemara refutes this: No, it may be that everyone agrees with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: Minimizing one’s degradation is better for him than seeing to his physical comfort, i.e., than minimizing his physical pain. Therefore, the Rabbis view the more compassionate death as one without degradation, even if wearing clothes will increase the pain of the one being executed, as the clothes will absorb the blow and prolong his death. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one’s physical comfort is better for him than minimizing his degradation, and therefore the one being executed prefers to be stoned unclothed, without any chance of the clothing prolonging his death, even though this increases his degradation.

מתני׳ בית הסקילה היה גובה שתי קומות אחד מן העדים דוחפו על מתניו נהפך על לבו הופכו על מתניו ואם מת בה יצא MISHNA: The place of stoning from which the condemned man is pushed to his death is a platform twice the height of an ordinary person. He is made to stand at the edge of the platform, and then one of the witnesses who testified against him pushes him down by the hips, so that he falls face up onto the ground. If he turned over onto his chest, with his face downward, the witness turns him over onto his hips. And if he dies through this fall to the ground, the obligation to stone the transgressor is fulfilled.

ואם לאו השני נוטל את האבן ונותנו על לבו אם מת בה יצא ואם לאו רגימתו בכל ישראל שנאמר (דברים יז, ז) יד העדים תהיה בו בראשונה להמיתו ויד כל העם באחרונה: And if the condemned man does not die from his fall, the second witness takes the stone that has been prepared for this task and places, i.e., casts, it on his chest. And if he dies with the casting of this first stone, the obligation to stone the transgressor is fulfilled. And if he does not die with the casting of this stone, then his stoning is completed by all of the Jewish people, i.e., by all the people who assembled for the execution, as it is stated: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterward the hand of all the people” (Deuteronomy 17:7).

גמ׳ תנא וקומה שלו הרי כאן שלש ומי בעינן כולי האי ורמינהו מה בור שהוא כדי להמית עשרה טפחים אף כל כדי להמית עשרה טפחים GEMARA: A tanna taught in a baraita: Adding together the height of the platform, which is twice the height of an ordinary person, and the condemned man’s own height, it turns out that there is a height here three times the height of an ordinary person. The Gemara asks: Do we really need all that height to kill him? The Gemara raises a contradiction to the baraita from what was taught in a mishna (Bava Kamma 50b) when discussing the halakhot of damage caused by a pit: Why does the Torah specify a pit when one is liable for the damage caused by any type of excavation that he digs into the ground? This teaches that just as a pit that is of sufficient depth to cause one’s death from falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that are of sufficient depth to cause one’s death may be no less than ten handbreadths. If a fall of ten handbreadths is sufficient to kill a person, why must the platform from which the condemned man is pushed be twice the height of an ordinary person?

אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר קרא (ויקרא יט, יח) ואהבת לרעך כמוך ברור לו מיתה יפה אי הכי ליגבהיה טפי משום דמינוול: Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The verse states: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), teaching that even with regard to a condemned man, select a good, i.e., a compassionate, death for him. Therefore, even though the one being executed is likely to die from a fall from a lesser height, a platform is built that is twice the height of an ordinary person in order to ensure a quick and relatively painless death. The Gemara challenges: If so, they should raise the platform even higher. The Gemara answers: This is not done, because if the condemned man were pushed from a higher platform, he would become seriously disfigured, and this would no longer be considered a compassionate form of death.

אחד מן העדים דוחפו: תנו רבנן מניין שבדחייה ת"ל (שמות יט, יג) ירה ומנין שבסקילה ת"ל סקל § The mishna teaches that one of the witnesses who had testified against the condemned party pushes him off the platform. Concerning this halakha the Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that the punishment of stoning can be fulfilled by pushing the condemned party from a high place, so that he dies from his fall? The verse states with regard to those who crossed the boundaries that were set up around Mount Sinai and touched the mountain: “Take heed to yourselves, that you not go up into the mountain, or touch the border of it; whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death; no hand shall touch him, but he shall be stoned or shall be thrown down” (Exodus 19:12–13). And from where is it derived that this punishment can be fulfilled with actual stoning? The verse states: “He shall be stoned.”

ומנין שבסקילה ובדחייה ת"ל (שמות יט, יג) סקל יסקל או ירה יירה ומנין שאם מת בדחייה יצא תלמוד לומר או ירה יירה מניין שאף לדורות כן And from where is it derived that this punishment is sometimes fulfilled both by stoning and by pushing, i.e., if the transgressor did not die from his fall, he is then stoned? The verse states: “He shall be stoned or shall be thrown down.” And from where is it derived that if the condemned man died from the pushing, the obligation to stone him has been fulfilled, and there is no further need to actually stone him? The verse states: “Or shall be thrown down,” with the term “or” indicating that only one of the two options must be fulfilled. And from where is it derived that this is the halakha not only at Mount Sinai, but even with regard to future generations?

Daf 45b

ת"ל סקל יסקל: The verse states: “He shall be stoned [sakol yissakel ],” with the doubled verb form indicating that the halakha applies in all places and at all times.

ואם לאו עד השני נוטל את האבן: נוטל והתניא רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר אבן היתה שם משוי שני בני אדם נוטלה ונותנה על לבו אם מת בה יצא וליטעמיך תיקשי לך היא גופא משוי שני בני אדם נוטלה ונותנה על לבו § The mishna teaches that if the condemned party does not die from his fall, the second witness takes the stone that had been prepared for this task and casts it on his chest. The Gemara asks: Does the witness take the stone by himself? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: A stone was there with a weight that could be lifted only by two men. The witness takes it and places, i.e., casts, it on the condemned party’s chest. If he dies with the casting of this stone, the obligation to stone the transgressor is fulfilled. This indicates that one individual could not lift the stone by himself. The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, the baraita itself should pose a difficulty for you, as it first states that the stone was of a weight that could be lifted only by two men, and then it says that the witness takes it and places it on the condemned party’s chest, apparently acting alone.

אלא דמדלי לה בהדי חבריה ושדי לה איהו כי היכי דתיתי מרזיא: Rather, both the mishna and the baraita should be explained as follows: The second witness lifts the stone together with the other witness, but then the second witness alone casts it so that it should fall with force upon the condemned party’s chest, as two people working together cannot aim their throw with precision.

ואם לאו רגימתו כו': והתניא מעולם לא שנה בה אדם מי קאמינא דעביד דאי מיצריך קאמינא The mishna teaches: And if the condemned party does not die with the first stone, then his stoning is completed by all of the Jewish people. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Never did a person repeat the stoning, as the condemned party always died with the first stone cast upon him? The Gemara answers: Did we say that they acted so? Rather, we said that if the condemned party did not die with the casting of the first stone and it was necessary to try again, the stoning is completed by all of the people who assembled for the execution.

אמר מר אבן היתה כו' והתניא אחת אבן שנסקל בה ואחת עץ שנתלה עליו ואחד סייף שנהרג בו ואחד סודר שנחנק בו כולן נקברין עמו לא צריכא דמתקני ומייתי אחריני חלופייהו The Master said in the baraita that a stone was there, indicating that a special stone was kept in the place of stoning and used time and time again for this purpose. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The stone with which the condemned party was stoned and the tree on which his corpse was hung, or the sword with which he was killed, or the cloth with which he was strangled, all of them are buried together with him? If so, the same stone could not have been used for every execution. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that after the stones were buried with the transgressor, they would prepare other stones and bring them to the place of stoning in their place.

נקברין עמו והתניא אין נקברין עמו אמר רב פפא מאי עמו עמו בתפיסתו The baraita teaches that all of the items used in the execution are buried together with the transgressor. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita that they are not buried together with the transgressor? Rav Pappa said: What does the baraita mean when it says that these items are buried together with him? They are not actually buried together with him in the same grave; rather, they are buried within his grasp, i.e., in the area surrounding his grave.

אמר שמואל נקטעה יד העדים פטור מאי טעמא דבעינא (דברים יז, ז) יד העדים תהיה בו בראשונה וליכא § Shmuel says: If the witnesses’ hands were severed after the transgressor was sentenced to be stoned, so that they can no longer stone him themselves, the transgressor is exempt from punishment and is not executed. What is the reason for this? This is because I need to fulfill what is stated in the verse: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death” (Deuteronomy 17:7), and here this is not possible.

אלא מעתה עדים גידמין דמעיקרא הכי נמי דפסילי שאני התם דאמר קרא יד העדים שהיתה כבר The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the witnesses themselves must stone the transgressor or else the sentence is not carried out, if the witnesses lacked hands from the outset, when they offered their testimony, are they also disqualified? The Gemara answers: There it is different, as the verse states: “The hand of the witnesses,” indicating that the hands that were there already when the witnesses gave their testimony must throw the first stone when the transgressor is executed. If the witnesses already lacked hands at the time of their testimony, others can throw the first stone.

מיתיבי כל מקום שיעידוהו שנים ויאמרו מעידין אנו באיש פלוני שנגמר דינו בב"ד פלוני ופלוני ופלוני עדיו הרי זה יהרג תרגמא שמואל בהן הן עדיו The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel from what is taught in a mishna (Makkot 7a): In any place where two witnesses testify before a court and say: We testify about so-and-so that his death sentence was issued in such and such a court, and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, he is executed, and there is no need to retry him. This seems to indicate that the transgressor is put to death even if the witnesses are not there to throw the first stone. The Gemara explains: Shmuel interpreted the mishna as referring to a case where the witnesses who testify about the transgressor’s conviction in a different court are the same witnesses who had testified against him at his original trial, and they are present to throw the first stone.

ומי בעינן קרא כדכתיב והתניא (במדבר לה, כא) מות יומת המכה רוצח הוא אין לי אלא במיתה הכתובה בו מנין שאם אי אתה יכול להמיתו במיתה הכתובה בו שאתה ממיתו בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו ת"ל מות יומת המכה מכל מקום The Gemara raises another difficulty against the opinion of Shmuel: But do we really need to fulfill what is stated in the verse exactly as it is written? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse with regard to a murderer states: “He that smote him shall be put to death, for he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21)? I have derived only that the murderer is put to death with the mode of execution written concerning him, i.e., decapitation. From where do I derive that if you cannot put him to death with the mode of execution written concerning him, e.g., if he is escaping from the court, you can put him to death with any mode of execution with which you can put him to death? The verse states: “He that smote him shall be put to death [mot yumat],” where the doubled verb teaches that he is put to death in any case, by any mode of execution. Here too, the condemned party should be executed even if the witnesses cannot cast the first stone.

שאני התם דאמר קרא מות יומת The Gemara answers: There, concerning a murderer, it is different, as the verse explicitly states: “He that smote him shall be put to death,” which serves to include all modes of execution.

וליגמר מיניה משום דהוה רוצח וגואל הדם שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובין הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין The Gemara asks: But why not learn from this halakha a principle that can be applied in all cases of capital punishment? The Gemara responds: This case does not prove a principle, because the halakhot of the murderer and of the blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of one who was killed who takes it upon himself to redeem his relative’s death, are two verses that come as one, and the rule is that two verses that come as one do not teach a principle. In other words, if a halakha is stated in the Torah with regard to two individual cases, the halakha is understood to apply only to those cases. Had the halakha applied to all other relevant cases as well, it would not have been necessary for the Torah to teach it twice. The fact that two cases are mentioned indicates that they are the exceptions rather than the rule.

רוצח הא דאמרן גואל הדם מאי היא דתניא (במדבר לה, כא) גואל הדם ימית את הרוצח מצוה בגואל הדם ומניין שאם אין לו גואל שב"ד מעמידין לו גואל שנאמר (במדבר לה, יט) בפגעו בו מכל מקום The Gemara explains: The halakha that capital punishment need not necessarily be imposed in accordance with the Torah’s specific instructions is taught with regard to two cases, that of the murderer and that of the blood redeemer. The case of a murderer is this halakha that we said. With regard to the case of a blood redeemer, what is it? As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “The blood redeemer shall slay the murderer when he meets him” (Numbers 35:21). This mitzva of redeeming the death caused by an unintentional killer falls on the blood redeemer, a relative of the victim. And from where is it derived that if the victim has no blood redeemer the court appoints a blood redeemer for him? As it is stated: “When he meets him,” which teaches that in any case he shall slay the murderer, whether he is a relative or a court-appointed blood redeemer.

א"ל מר קשישא בריה דרב חסדא לרב אשי ומי לא בעינן קרא כדכתיב והתנן היה אחד מהן גידם או אילם או חיגר או סומא או חרש אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: And do we not need to fulfill what is stated in the verse exactly as it is written? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sanhedrin 71a) with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son: If one of the boy’s parents is with-out a hand, or is mute, or lame, or blind, or deaf, the boy is not rendered a stubborn and rebellious son?

שנאמר (דברים כא, יט) ותפשו בו ולא גידמין (דברים כא, יט) והוציאו אותו ולא חיגרין (דברים כא, ז) ואמרו ולא אילמין (דברים כא, כ) בננו זה ולא סומין (דברים כא, כ) איננו שומע בקולנו ולא חרשין This halakha is derived as it is stated: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him, and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of his place” (Deuteronomy 21:19). This serves to teach: His father and mother “lay hold of him,” but not those without a hand who cannot grab him; “and bring him out,” but not those who are lame and cannot take him out. And it is stated: “And they shall say to the elders of his city: This our son is stubborn and rebellious; he does not obey our voice; he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deuteronomy 21:20). This verse serves to teach: “And they shall say,” but not mute people; “this our son,” but not the blind, who cannot point to the boy; “he does not obey our voice,” but not the deaf.

מאי טעמא לאו משום דבעינן קרא כדכתיב לא שאני התם דכוליה קרא יתירא הוא What is the reason that in all these cases the boy is not rendered a stubborn and rebellious son? Is it not because we need to fulfill what is stated in the verse exactly as it is written, and this principle should hold true with regard to other verses as well? The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, there, in the case of the stubborn and rebellious son, it is different, as the entire verse is superfluous. Therefore, all of the conditions inferred from the verse must be precisely met or else the boy cannot be rendered a stubborn and rebellious son. One cannot apply this principle to other verses.

ת"ש אין לה רחוב אין נעשית עיר הנדחת דברי רבי ישמעאל ר' עקיבא אומר אין לה רחוב עושין לה רחוב The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from what is taught in a baraita with regard to an idolatrous city, the majority of whose inhabitants engaged in idol worship, about which the verse states: “And you shall gather all the spoil of it into the midst of the open place of the city, and shall burn with fire both the city and the entire plunder taken in it” (Deuteronomy 13:17): If the city does not have an open place, it is not rendered an idolatrous city; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: If it does not have an open place, they make an open place for it.

עד כאן לא פליגי אלא דמר סבר רחובה דמעיקרא בעינן ומר סבר רחובה דהשתא נמי כדמעיקרא דמי אבל דכ"ע בעינן קרא כדכתיב The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree only with regard to this detail, that one Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, holds that we need an open place that existed from the outset when the idolatry was committed, while the other Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that an open place that exists now is like an open place that existed from the outset. But everyone agrees that we need to fulfill what is stated in the verse exactly as it is written.

תנאי היא דתנן אין לו בהן יד בהן רגל אזן ימנית אין לו טהרה עולמית רבי אליעזר אומר נותן על מקומו ויוצא רבי שמעון אומר נותן על שמאלו ויוצא: The Gemara answers: This issue is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 14:9) concerning the purification process of a leper, during the course of which blood and oil must be applied to his right thumb, right big toe, and right ear: If the leper has no right thumb, right big toe, or right ear, he can never attain ritual purity, as he cannot fulfill the conditions of the verse. Rabbi Eliezer says: In such a case, the priest may apply the blood and oil to the place where the missing finger, toe, or ear should have been, and the leper has thereby fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: The priest may apply it to his left thumb, left big toe, or left ear, and the leper has thereby fulfilled his obligation. The first tanna apparently holds that the Torah’s instructions must be fulfilled exactly as they are written, while Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree and say that when this is impossible, they are dispensable.

מתני׳ כל הנסקלין נתלין דברי רבי אליעזר וחכ"א אינו נתלה אלא המגדף והעובד ע"ז MISHNA: The corpses of all those who are stoned are hung after their death; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: Only the corpse of the blasphemer, who has cursed God, and the corpse of the idol worshipper are hung.

האיש תולין אותו פניו כלפי העם והאשה פניה כלפי העץ דברי רבי אליעזר וחכ"א האיש נתלה ואין האשה נתלית אמר (להן) רבי אליעזר והלא שמעון בן שטח תלה נשים באשקלון אמרו לו שמונים נשים תלה ואין דנין שנים ביום אחד: The corpse of a man is hung facing the people, but the corpse of a woman, out of modesty, is hung with facing the tree; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: the corpse of a man is hung, but the corpse of a woman is not hung. Rabbi Eliezer said to the Rabbis: Did Shimon ben Shataḥ not hang in Ashkelon women who were found guilty of witchcraft, proving that the corpse of a woman who is executed is also hung? They said to him: No proof can be brought from here, as he hanged eighty women on that day, and the halakha is that the same court may not judge even two people charged with capital transgressions on the same day. It is therefore clear that he was not acting in accordance with Torah law, but rather his execution of the eighty women was an extraordinary punishment necessitated by unusually pressing circumstances.

גמ׳ ת"ר (דברים כא, כב) והומת ותלית יכול כל המומתין נתלין ת"ל (דברים כא, כג) כי קללת אלהים תלוי מה מקלל זה שבסקילה אף כל שבסקילה דברי רבי אליעזר GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the corpses of all those who are killed by stoning are hung after their death. The Sages taught in a related baraita: The verse states: “And if a man has committed a sin worthy of death, and he is put to death, and you shall hang him on a tree” (Deuteronomy 21:22): One might have thought that the corpses of all those who are put to death are hung. To counter this, the verse states: “His body shall not remain all night upon the tree…for he that is hung is a curse of God” (Deuteronomy 21:23), teaching that just as the blasphemer, who is liable to be punished by stoning, is hung after his death, so too, all those who are liable to be punished by stoning are later hung, but those who are liable to be executed in other ways are not hung after their death. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

וחכ"א מה מקלל זה שכפר בעיקר אף כל שכפר בעיקר The baraita continues: And the Rabbis say: Just as the blasphemer, who denies the principle of belief in God, is hung after his death, so too, all who deny the principle of belief in God are hung after they die. But others, even if they are liable to be punished by stoning, are not hung after they are put to death.

במאי קא מיפלגי רבנן דרשי כללי ופרטי רבי אליעזר דריש ריבויי ומיעוטי The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what do they disagree? The Rabbis interpret the verses based on the principle of generalizations and details, one of the methods by which the Torah is interpreted. And Rabbi Eliezer interprets them based on the principle of amplifications and restrictions, a different approach to biblical exegesis.

רבנן דרשי כללי ופרטי והומת ותלית כלל כי קללת פרט אי הוו מקרבי להדדי אמרינן אין בכלל אלא מה שבפרט הני אין מידי אחרינא לא How so? The Rabbis expound the verses based on the principle of generalizations and details. The phrase “And he is put to death, and you shall hang him” is a generalization, as no particular offense is specified. The phrase “For he that is hung is a curse of God” is a detail, as a specific transgression is mentioned. Were the generalization and the detail next to each other in the same verse, we would apply the principle of generalizations and details and say that the generalization includes only that which is stated in the detail. Therefore, this transgressor, the blasphemer, yes, his corpse is subject to being hung after he is executed, but the corpse of anyone else is not.

Daf 46a

השתא דמרחקי מהדדי אהני לרבויי עבודת כוכבים דדמי ליה בכל מילי Now that the generalization and the detail are distant from each other, i.e., they are written in different verses, the verses serve to include one who was found guilty of idol worship, as he is similar to the blasphemer in all matters. He too is subject to be hung after he is executed.

ור' אליעזר דריש ריבויי ומיעוטי והומת ותלית רבוי כי קללת מיעוט אי הוו מקרבי להדדי לא הוו מרבינן אלא עבודת כוכבי' דדמי לה בכל מילי השתא דמרחקי מהדדי אהני לרבויי שאר הנסקלין: And Rabbi Eliezer, by contrast, interprets the verses based on the principle of amplifications and restrictions. The phrase “And he is put to death, and you shall hang him” is an amplification. The phrase “For he that is hung is a curse of God” is a restriction. Were the amplification and the restriction right next to each other, we would apply the principle of amplifications and restrictions and include only one who is guilty of idol worship, as he is similar to the blasphemer in all ways. Now that they are distant from each other, the verses serve to include all those who are liable to be stoned to death. All of their corpses are hung after they are put to death.

האיש תולין וכו': מ"ט דרבנן אמר קרא (דברים כא, כב) ותלית אותו אותו ולא אותה ור' אליעזר אותו בלא כסותו § The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, the corpse of a man is hung facing the people while the corpse of a woman is hung facing the tree, whereas the Rabbis say that the corpse of a woman is not hung at all. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of the Rabbis? The Gemara answers: As the verse states: “And if a man has committed a sin worthy of death, and he is put to death, and you shall hang him on a tree” (Deuteronomy 21:22), which teaches that you shall hang him on a tree after his death, but you shall not hang her on a tree after her death. And Rabbi Eliezer would respond that that the inference to be drawn from this verse is that after his death they hang him by himself, without his clothing.

ורבנן אין הכי נמי אלא אמר קרא (דברים כא, כב) וכי יהיה באיש חטא איש ולא אשה The Gemara asks: And from where do the Rabbis derive that the corpse of the executed man is hung without his clothing? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that they agree that the word “him” teaches that the corpse is hung without clothing. But the source of their ruling is the verse that states: “And if a man has committed a sin,” which indicates that a man is hung after he is put to death, but a woman is not hung after she is put to death.

ור' אליעזר האי וכי יהיה באיש מאי דריש ביה אמר ריש לקיש ההוא למעוטי בן סורר ומורה והתניא בן סורר ומורה נסקל ונתלה דברי ר' אליעזר אלא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק לרבות בן סורר ומורה מאי טעמא The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Eliezer, what does he learn from this clause of the verse: “And if a man has committed a sin”? Reish Lakish says: That clause of the verse serves to exclude a stubborn and rebellious son, who, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, is not hung after he is executed, because he is not a man. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: A stubborn and rebellious son is first stoned and afterward his corpse is hung; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer? Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: That part of the verse comes to include a stubborn and rebellious son, that his corpse is also hung. What is the reason for this?

דאמר קרא וכי יהיה באיש חטא איש ולא בן חטא מי שעל חטאו נהרג יצא בן סורר ומורה שעל שום סופו נהרג הוי מיעוט אחר מיעוט ואין מיעוט אחר מיעוט אלא לרבות: The Gemara explains: As the verse states: “And if a man has committed a sin,” indicating that only the corpse of a man is hung, but not that of a child, thereby excluding a stubborn and rebellious son. And the word “sin” indicates that only the corpse of one who is put to death on account of a sin is hung, to the exclusion of a stubborn and rebellious son, who is executed not because of a sin that he has already committed but on account of what he is likely to do in the future. This is an example of a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, as both expressions indicate that a stubborn and rebellious son is not hung after he is put to death. And there is a hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify the halakha and include additional cases. In this case, it serves to teach that the corpse of a stubborn and rebellious son is hung after he is put to death.

אמר להן רבי אליעזר והלא שמעון בן שטח תלה נשים כו': אמר רב חסדא לא שנו אלא בשתי מיתות אבל במיתה אחת דנין והא מעשה דשמעון בן שטח דמיתה אחת הואי וקא אמרו ליה דאין דנין § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer said to the Rabbis: Did Shimon ben Shataḥ not hang in Ashkelon women who were found guilty of witchcraft? And the Rabbis replied that no proof can be brought from there since he hanged eighty women on a single day, which clearly indicates that this was an extraordinary measure and therefore cannot serve as a precedent for normative halakha. Rav Ḥisda says: They taught that one court may not judge two capital cases on one day only when the two cases involve two different modes of execution, but when they involve only one mode of execution, the court may in fact judge them on the same day. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the incident relating to Shimon ben Shataḥ involved only one mode of execution, as all the women were accused of witchcraft, and yet the Rabbis said to him that the court may not judge them on one day.

אלא אי איתמר הכי איתמר לא שנו אלא במיתה אחת כעין שתי מיתות והיכי דמי כגון שתי עבירות אבל במיתה אחת ועבירה אחת דנין Rather, if a ruling was stated citing Rav Ḥisda, this is what was stated: They taught that one court may not judge two capital cases on one day only when the two cases involving one mode of execution are similar to two cases involving two different modes of execution. And what are the circumstances of such a situation? For example, when there are two different transgressions that are punishable by the same mode of execution, the court may not judge two such cases in one day. But where there is only one mode of execution and only one transgression, the court may in fact judge two cases on one day.

מתיב רב אדא בר אהבה אין דנין שנים ביום אחד ואפילו בנואף ונואפת תרגמא רב חסדא בבת כהן ובועלה Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection from a baraita that states: The same court may not judge two people charged with capital transgressions on one day, not even an adulterer and an adulteress. This indicates that a court may not judge two cases on one day even if the two cases involve only one mode of execution and the same transgression. Rav Ḥisda interpreted the baraita as referring to a case of adultery involving the daughter of a priest and the man with whom she engaged in intercourse, as the daughter of a priest is liable to receive death by burning, while the man is liable to receive death by stoning if the woman was betrothed to another man, or strangulation if she was married to another man.

או בבת כהן וזוממי זוממיה Or, the baraita is referring to a case of adultery involving the daughter of a priest and those who rendered as conspiring witnesses the witnesses who rendered as conspiring witnesses the witnesses who testified about her.

תניא ר"א בן יעקב אומר שמעתי שבית דין מכין ועונשין שלא מן התורה ולא לעבור על דברי תורה אלא כדי לעשות סייג לתורה It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: I heard that the court may administer lashes and capital punishment, even when not required by Torah law. And they may not administer these punishments with the intention of violating the statement of the Torah, i.e., to disregard the punishment stated in the Torah and administer another punishment; rather, they may administer these punishments to erect a fence around the Torah, so that people will fear sinning.

ומעשה באחד שרכב על סוס בשבת בימי יונים והביאוהו לבית דין וסקלוהו לא מפני שראוי לכך אלא שהשעה צריכה לכך שוב מעשה באדם אחד שהטיח את אשתו תחת התאנה והביאוהו לבית דין והלקוהו לא מפני שראוי לכך אלא שהשעה צריכה לכך: And an incident occurred involving one who rode a horse on Shabbat during the days of the Greeks, and they brought him to court and stoned him, not because he deserved that punishment, as riding a horse on Shabbat is forbidden only by rabbinic decree, but because the hour required it, as people had become lax in their observance of Shabbat and therefore it became necessary to impose the severe punishment for a relatively minor offense. Another incident occurred involving a man who engaged in intercourse with his wife in public under a fig tree, and they brought him to court and flogged him, not because that punishment was fitting for him, as such conduct is not forbidden by the Torah, but because the hour required it. People had become remiss in matters of modesty; therefore, stringent measures had to be taken to rectify the situation.

מתני׳ כיצד תולין אותו משקעין את הקורה בארץ והעץ יוצא ומקיף שתי ידיו זו על גב זו ותולה אותו רבי יוסי אומר הקורה מוטה על הכותל ותולה אותו כדרך שהטבחין עושין MISHNA: How do they hang the corpse of one who was put to death by stoning? They sink a post into the earth with a piece of wood jutting out, forming a T-shaped structure. And the court appointee then places the dead man’s two hands one upon the other, ties them, and hangs him by his hands. Rabbi Yosei says: The post is not sunk into the ground; rather, it leans against a wall, and he hangs the corpse on it the way that butchers do with meat.

ומתירין אותו מיד ואם לן עובר עליו בלא תעשה שנאמר (דברים כא, כג) לא תלין נבלתו על העץ כי קבר תקברנו כי קללת אלהים תלוי וגו' כלומר מפני מה זה תלוי מפני שבירך את השם ונמצא שם שמים מתחלל The dead man hangs there for only a very short time, and then they immediately untie him. And if he was left hanging overnight, a prohibition is transgressed, as it is stated: “His body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but you shall bury him that day, for he that is hung is a curse of God” (Deuteronomy 21:23). That is to say: Were the corpse left hanging on the tree overnight, people would ask: For what reason was this one hung after he was put to death? They would be answered: Because he blessed God, a euphemism for blasphemy. And therefore the name of Heaven would be desecrated were the dead man’s corpse to remain hanging, reminding everybody of his transgression.

אמר רבי מאיר בשעה שאדם מצטער שכינה מה לשון אומרת קלני מראשי קלני מזרועי אם כן המקום מצטער על דמן של רשעים שנשפך קל וחומר על דמן של צדיקים Rabbi Meir said: The phrase “for he that is hung is a curse [kilelat] of God” should be understood as follows: When a man suffers in the wake of his sin, what expression does the Divine Presence use? I am distressed [kallani] about My head, I am distressed about My arm, meaning, I, too, suffer when the wicked are punished. From here it is derived: If God suffers such distress over the blood of the wicked that is spilled, even though they justly deserved their punishment, it can be inferred a fortiori that He suffers distress over the blood of the righteous.

ולא זו בלבד אמרו אלא כל המלין את מתו עובר בלא תעשה הלינהו לכבודו להביא לו ארון ותכריכים אינו עובר עליו And the Sages said not only this, that an executed transgressor must be buried on the same day that he is killed, but they said that anyone who leaves his deceased relative overnight with-out burying him transgresses a prohibition. But if he left the deceased overnight for the sake of the deceased’s honor, e.g., to bring a coffin or shrouds for his burial, he does not transgress the prohibition against leaving him unburied overnight.

ולא היו קוברין אותו בקברות אבותיו אלא שתי בתי קברות היו מתוקנין לבית דין אחת לנהרגין ולנחנקין ואחת לנסקלין ולנשרפין נתעכל הבשר מלקטין את העצמות וקוברין אותן במקומן והקרובים באים ושואלים בשלום הדיינין ובשלום העדים כלומר שאין בלבנו עליכם שדין אמת דנתם After the executed transgressor is taken down he is buried, and they would not bury him in his ancestral burial plot. Rather, two graveyards were established for the burial of those executed by the court: One for those who were killed by decapitation or strangled, and one for those who were stoned or burned. Once the flesh of the deceased had decomposed, they would gather his bones and bury them in their proper place in his ancestral burial plot. And soon after the execution, the relatives of the executed transgressor would come and inquire about the welfare of the judges and about the welfare of the witnesses, as if to say: We hold no grudges against you, as you judged a true judgment.

Daf 46b

ולא היו מתאבלין אבל אוננין שאין אנינות אלא בלב: And the relatives of the executed man would not mourn him with the observance of the usual mourning rites, so that his unmourned death would atone for his transgression; but they would grieve over his passing, since grief is felt only in the heart.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן אילו נאמר חטא ותלית הייתי אומר תולין אותו ואחר כך ממיתין אותו כדרך שהמלכות עושה תלמוד לומר (דברים כא, כב) והומת ותלית ממיתין אותו ואח"כ תולין אותו הא כיצד משהין אותו עד סמוך לשקיעת החמה וגומרין את דינו וממיתין אותו ואח"כ תולין אותו אחד קושר ואחד מתיר כדי לקיים מצות תלייה GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: Were it stated: And if a man has committed a sin worthy of death you shall hang him on a tree, I would have said that first they hang him and only afterward they put him to death, the way the gentile government does, executing the transgressor by hanging. Therefore, the verse states: “And if a man has committed a sin worthy of death, and he is put to death, and you shall hang him on a tree” (Deuteronomy 21:22), teaching that first they put him to death, and only afterward they hang him. How so? They delay the verdict until it is near to sunset, and then they conclude his judgment, and they put him to death, and immediately afterward hang him. One ties him to the hanging post, and another immediately unties him, in order to fulfill the mitzva of hanging the corpse of the executed transgressor.

ת"ר (דברים כא, כב) עץ שומע אני בין בתלוש בין במחובר ת"ל (דברים כא, כג) כי קבר מי שאינו מחוסר אלא קבורה יצא זה שמחוסר קציצה וקבורה The Sages taught: From the verse: “And you shall hang him on a tree,” I would derive that the body may be hung either on a tree that has been detached from the ground or on one that is still attached to the ground. Therefore, the verse states: “His body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but you shall bury him [kavor tikberennu] that day” (Deuteronomy 21:23). Based on the doubled verb, it is derived that not only must the transgressor’s body be buried, but the tree on which it is hung must also be buried. As the verse employs the same term to instruct that both must be buried, the verse teaches that the corpse must be hung on a tree that has already been detached from the ground and is lacking only burial, just as the corpse is lacking only burial. This serves to exclude hanging the corpse on a tree that is still attached to the ground and is lacking both cutting down and burial.

ר' יוסי אומר מי שאינו מחוסר אלא קבורה יצא זה שמחוסר תלישה וקבורה ורבנן תלישה לאו כלום היא: Rabbi Yosei says: The tree upon which the corpse is hung is not sunk into the ground; rather, it is leaned against a wall, as the verse teaches that the tree must be lacking only burial. This serves to exclude hanging the corpse on a tree that is lacking both detachment and burial. And the Rabbis say: Detaching from the ground a tree that had already been cut down and was later sunk back into the ground is nothing, i.e., it is an insignificant act.

כלומר מפני מה זה תלוי מפני שבירך כו': תניא אומר ר"מ משלו משל למה הדבר דומה לשני אחים תאומים בעיר אחת אחד מינוהו מלך ואחד יצא לליסטיות צוה המלך ותלאוהו כל הרואה אותו אומר המלך תלוי צוה המלך והורידוהו: § The mishna teaches: That is to say: Were the dead man’s corpse to remain hanging, reminding everyone of his transgression, people would ask: For what reason was this one hung? They would be answered: Because he blessed God, a euphemism for blasphemy, and the name of Heaven would be desecrated. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir says: The Sages told a parable: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to two brothers who were twins and lived in the same city. One was appointed king, while the other went out to engage in banditry. The king commanded that his brother be punished, and they hanged his twin brother for his crimes. Anyone who saw the bandit hanging would say: The king was hanged. The king, therefore, commanded that his brother be taken down, and they took the bandit down. Similarly, people are created in God’s image, and therefore God is disgraced when a corpse is hung for a transgression that the person has committed.

אמר ר' מאיר כו': מאי משמע אמר אביי כמאן דאמר קל לית אמר ליה רבא א"כ כבד עלי ראשי כבד עלי זרועי מיבעי ליה אלא אמר רבא כמאן דאמר קיל לי עלמא The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir said that the phrase “For he that is hung is a curse [kilelat] of God” should be understood as follows: When a man suffers in the wake of his sin, the Divine Presence says: I am distressed [kallani] about My head, I am distressed about My arm. The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? How does Rabbi Meir understand the word kilelat? Abaye says: When a man is hung after he is put to death, God is like one who said: I am not light [kal leit], meaning: My head is heavy for Me, My arm is heavy for Me. God is in distress when He has to administer punishment. Rava said to him: If so, he should have said explicitly: My head is heavy for Me, My arm is heavy for Me. Rather, Rava said: When a man is hung after he is put to death, God is like one who said: The world is light for me [kil li alma], meaning: I am light, and therefore the world is heavy for Me, and I am in distress.

האי מיבעי ליה לגופה א"כ נימא קרא מקלל מאי קללת ואימא כוליה להכי הוא דאתא א"כ נימא קרא קלת מאי קללת ש"מ תרתי: The Gemara asks: This word “kilelat” is needed for what it itself teaches, namely that a blasphemer is hung after he has been stoned. How, then, can it be interpreted as alluding to God’s distress at the death of a transgressor? The Gemara answers: If so, the verse should have stated: One who curses [mekallel ]. What is the meaning of kilelat? It serves to teach the statement taught by Rabbi Meir. The Gemara asks: If so, say perhaps that the entire verse comes for this purpose, to underscore the dignity of the transgressor, who was created in God’s image, and not to teach the halakha governing a blasphemer. The Gemara responds: If so, the verse should have stated: Lightness [kilat]. What is the meaning of kilelat? Conclude two conclusions from it: Conclude that the blasphemer is hung after he has been stoned, and conclude that God is distressed at the death of a transgressor.

ולא זו בלבד כו': א"ר יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יוחי מנין למלין את מתו שעובר עליו בל"ת ת"ל כי קבר תקברנו מכאן למלין את מתו שעובר בלא תעשה § The mishna teaches that everyone, not only an executed transgressor, must be buried on the day of his death, if that is at all possible. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai: From where is it derived that one who leaves his deceased relative overnight without burying him transgresses a prohibition? The verse states: “But you shall bury him [kavor tikberennu]” (Deuteronomy 21:23), doubling the verb for emphasis. From here it is derived that one who leaves his deceased relative overnight without burying him transgresses a prohibition.

איכא דאמרי אמר רבי יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יוחי רמז לקבורה מן התורה מניין ת"ל כי קבר תקברנו מכאן רמז לקבורה מן התורה There are those who say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai: From where in the Torah is there a hint to the mitzva of burial? The verse states: “But you shall bury him [kavor tikberennu],” doubling the verb for emphasis. From here there is a hint to the mitzva of burial in the Torah.

א"ל שבור מלכא לרב חמא קבורה מה"ת מניין אישתיק ולא א"ל ולא מידי אמר רב אחא בר יעקב אימסר עלמא בידא דטפשאי דאיבעי ליה למימר כי קבור The Gemara relates: King Shapur, the monarch of Persia, once said to Rav Ḥama: From where in the Torah is there a hint to the mitzva of burial? What proof is there that the dead must be buried and not treated in some other manner? Rav Ḥama was silent and said nothing to him, as he could not find a suitable source. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: The world has been handed over to the foolish, as Rav Ḥama should have said to King Shapur that the mitzva of burial is derived from the verse: “But you shall bury him” (Deuteronomy 21:23).

דליעבד ליה ארון תקברנו לא משמע ליה The Gemara explains: In that case, King Shapur could have replied that the verse merely proves that a coffin should be made for the deceased so that he can be placed in it, not that the deceased should be buried in the ground, as the verse could be understood as instructing that the corpse be placed in some sort of receptacle, not in the ground. The Gemara challenges: Rav Ḥama could still have claimed that the mitzva of burial is derived from the doubled verb “you shall bury him [kavor tikberennu].” The Gemara answers: In that case, King Shapur could have replied that he does not learn anything from a doubled verb, which seems to be merely a stylistic choice and not the source of a new halakha.

ונימא מדאיקבור צדיקי מנהגא בעלמא מדקבריה הקב"ה למשה דלא לישתני ממנהגא The Gemara asks: But let Rav Ḥama say that the mitzva to bury the dead is derived from the fact that the righteous forefathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were all buried. The Gemara answers: King Shapur could have said that this was merely a custom of the time, but not a mitzva. The Gemara asks: Rav Ḥama could have derived the mitzva from the fact that the Holy One, Blessed be He, buried Moses, which proves that this is the proper way to handle the dead. The Gemara answers: King Shapur could still have said that God acted in this manner in order not to deviate from the general custom, but this does not prove that burying the dead is a mitzva.

ת"ש (מלכים א יד, יג) וספדו לו כל ישראל וקברו אותו דלא לישתני ממנהגא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that burying the dead is a mitzva, as the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite said about Abijah, son of Jeroboam: “And all Israel shall eulogize him and bury him” (I Kings 14:13). The Gemara answers: From here, too, there is no proof, as they may have buried Abijah in order not to deviate from the general custom of the world, and not because they were required to do so.

(ירמיהו טז, ד) לא יספדו ולא יקברו לדומן על פני האדמה יהיו דלישתנו ממנהגא The Gemara proposes another proof: Jeremiah pronounced a curse upon the wicked, saying: “They shall not be eulogized, nor shall they be buried; but they shall be as dung upon the face of the earth” (Jeremiah 16:4), which proves that when no curse has been pronounced, the dead should be buried. The Gemara rejects this proof: From here, too, there is no proof that it is a mitzva to bury the dead, as Jeremiah cursed the wicked, saying that they would deviate from the general custom and not be buried. Due to all these difficulties, Rav Ḥama was unable to adduce incontrovertible proof that there is a mitzva to bury the dead.

איבעיא להו קבורה משום בזיונא הוא או משום כפרה הוא § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is burial obligatory on account of disgrace, i.e., so that the deceased should not suffer the disgrace of being left exposed as his body begins to decompose, or is it on account of atonement, i.e., so that the deceased will achieve atonement by being returned to the ground from which he was formed?

למאי נפקא מינה דאמר לא בעינא דליקברוה לההוא גברא אי אמרת משום בזיונא הוא לא כל כמיניה ואי אמרת משום כפרה הוא הא אמר לא בעינא כפרה מאי The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference that arises from knowing the reason that burial is necessary? The Gemara answers: There is a difference in a case where one said before he died: I do not want them to bury that man, i.e., myself. If you say that burial is required on account of disgrace, it is not in his power to waive his own burial, as his family shares in the disgrace. But if you say that burial is required on account of atonement, didn’t he effectively say: I do not want atonement, and with regard to himself one should be able to do as he wishes? What, then, is the halakha?

ת"ש מדאיקבור צדיקי ואי אמרת משום כפרה צדיקי לכפרה צריכי אין דכתיב (קהלת ז, כ) אדם אין צדיק בארץ אשר יעשה טוב ולא יחטא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the fact that the righteous patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were all buried. And if you say that burial is required on account of atonement, do the righteous need atonement? The Gemara rejects this proof: Yes, even the righteous are in need of atonement, as it is written: “For there is no righteous person on earth who does good and never sins” (Ecclesiastes 7:20), and so even the righteous need atonement for the few sins that they committed over the course of their lifetimes.

ת"ש וספדו לו כל ישראל וקברו אותו ואי אמרת כי היכי דתיהוי ליה כפרה הנך נמי ליקברו כי היכי דתיהוי להו כפרה האי דצדיק הוא תיהוי ליה כפרה הנך לא ליהוי להו כפרה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the verse referring to Abijah, son of Jeroboam: “And all Israel shall eulogize him and bury him, for he alone of Jeroboam shall come to the grave” (I Kings 14:13). And if you say that burial is required so that the deceased should achieve atonement, these too, i.e., Jeroboam’s other sons, should also be buried so that they should achieve atonement. The Gemara rejects this argument: This son, Abijah, who was righteous, should achieve atonement through his death and burial, but these other sons, who were wicked, should not achieve atonement even in death.

ת"ש לא יספדו ולא יקברו דלא תיהוי להו כפרה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the curse pronounced by Jeremiah upon the wicked: “They shall not be eulogized, nor shall they be buried” (Jeremiah 16:4), which indicates that it is not on account of atonement that burial is required, as were that the case the wicked are certainly in need of atonement, and therefore they should be buried. The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as Jeremiah’s intention might be that the wicked should not achieve atonement. Therefore, the question of whether burial is necessary in order to prevent disgrace or achieve atonement remains unresolved.

איבעיא להו הספידא יקרא דחיי הוי או יקרא דשכבי הוי למאי נפקא מינה דאמר לא תספדוה לההוא גברא אי נמי לאפוקי מיורשין § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the eulogy delivered for the honor of the living relatives of the deceased, or is it delivered for the honor of the dead? The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two possible reasons? The Gemara answers: There is a difference in a case where one said before he died: Do not eulogize that man, i.e., myself. If the eulogy is delivered to honor the deceased, he is able to forgo this honor, but if it is delivered to honor the living, he is not, as it is not in the power of one individual to forgo the honor of others. Alternately, the difference is with regard to whether it is possible to collect the eulogist’s fee from the heirs. If the eulogy is to honor the dead, it is possible to collect this fee from the heirs, even against their will, but if it is to honor the living, they are able to forgo this honor.

ת"ש (בראשית כג, ב) ויבא אברהם לספוד לשרה ולבכותה ואי אמרת משום יקרא דחיי הוא משום יקרא דאברהם משהו לה לשרה שרה גופה ניחא לה כי היכי דמייקר בה אברהם The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the verse that states: “And Abraham came to eulogize Sarah and weep over her” (Genesis 23:2), indicating that Sarah’s funeral was delayed until Abraham returned from Beersheba to Hebron to eulogize her. And if you say that a eulogy is delivered due to the honor of the living, would they have unduly delayed burying Sarah due to Abraham’s honor? The Gemara rejects this argument: It was satisfactory to Sarah herself that her funeral was delayed so that Abraham could be honored by eulogizing her. Since Sarah herself would prefer that Abraham eulogize her, there was no disgrace in waiting for Abraham to arrive.

ת"ש וספדו לו כל ישראל וקברו אותו ואי אמרת משום יקרא דחיי הוא הנך בני יקרא נינהו ניחא להו לצדיקיא דמייקרי בהו אינשי The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different resolution of this dilemma from the verse referring to Abijah, son of Jeroboam: “And all Israel shall eulogize him and bury him” (I Kings 14:13). And if you say that a eulogy is delivered due to the honor of the living, are these people, Jeroboam’s surviving family, worthy of this honor? The Gemara answers: It is satisfactory to the righteous when other people are honored through them. Since that is their wish, they are eulogized even if their wicked relatives are honored as a result.

ת"ש לא יספדו ולא יקברו לא ניחא לצדיקיא דמייקרי ברשיעייא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the curse pronounced by Jeremiah upon the wicked: “They shall not be eulogized, nor shall they be buried” (Jeremiah 16:4). If you say that a eulogy is delivered due to the honor of the living, why should the wicked not be eulogized, as perhaps they are survived by righteous people who are worthy of this honor? The Gemara answers: It is not satisfactory to the righteous when they are honored through the wicked, and therefore they prefer that a eulogy not be delivered for their wicked relatives.

תא שמע (ירמיהו לד, ה) בשלום תמות ובמשרפות אבותיך המלכים הראשונים אשר היו לפניך כן ישרפו לך והוי אדון יספדו לך ואי אמרת משום יקרא דחיי הוא מאי נפקא ליה מיניה הכי קאמר ליה לייקרו ביך ישראל כי היכי דמתייקרי באבהתך The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from what Jeremiah said to Zedekiah: “You shall die in peace; and with the burnings of your fathers, the former kings that were before you, so shall they make a burning for you; and they will eulogize you, saying: Ah, master” (Jeremiah 34:5). And if you say that a eulogy is delivered due to the honor of the living relatives of the deceased, what difference does it make to him if he is eulogized? The Gemara answers: It is possible that a eulogy is to honor the living, and this is what Jeremiah is saying to Zedekiah: Enjoy the thought that Israel shall be honored through you at your funeral just as they were honored through your ancestors at their funerals.

Daf 47a

ת"ש (תהלים טו, ד) נבזה בעיניו נמאס זה חזקיהו מלך יהודה שגירר עצמות אביו על מטה של חבלים ואי משום יקרא דחיי הוא מ"ט The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from what was taught with regard to the verse: “In his eyes a vile person is despised, but he honors them that fear the Lord” (Psalms 15:4). This is referring to Hezekiah, king of Judea, who dragged the bones of his father, Ahaz, on a bier made of ropes, and he did not bury Ahaz in a manner befitting a king in order to disgrace him for his sinful conduct. And if the eulogy and other funeral rites are meant to honor the living, what is the reason that he acted this way, in a manner that brought disgrace upon himself and all of the Jewish people?

כי היכי דתיהוי ליה כפרה לאבוה ומשום כפרה דאבוה משהו ליה ליקרא דישראל ישראל גופייהו ניחא להו דמיחלי יקרייהו לגביה The Gemara answers: Hezekiah did this so that his father would achieve atonement for his sins through his disgrace. The Gemara asks: Can it be that for his father’s atonement they would defer the honor of all of Israel, who would have been honored by a proper eulogy for their late king? The Gemara answers: It was satisfactory to the people of Israel themselves to forgo their honor for him in order that their former king achieve atonement for his sins.

ת"ש אמר להן אל תספדוני בעיירות ואי אמרת יקרא דחיי מאי נפקא ליה מינה קסבר ליתייקרו ביה ישראל טפי The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Before he died, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to his disciples: Do not eulogize me in the small towns that you pass as you take my body out for burial, but eulogize me only in the larger cities. And if you say that a eulogy is delivered in honor of the living, what difference does it make to him if he is eulogized also in the smaller towns? The Gemara answers: He thought that the people of Israel would be more greatly honored through him if they gathered together for the eulogies in the larger cities.

ת"ש הלינו לכבודו להביא לו ארון ותכריכין אינו עובר עליו מאי לאו לכבודו של מת לא לכבודו של חי The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one left his deceased relative unburied overnight for the sake of his honor, e.g., in order to bring him a coffin or shrouds, he does not transgress the prohibition of “his body shall not remain all night.” What, is it not referring to the honor of the deceased? The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to the honor of the living relatives of the deceased.

ומשום כבודו של חי מבית ליה למת אין כי אמר רחמנא (דברים כא, כג) לא תלין נבלתו על העץ דומיא דתלוי דאית ביה בזיון אבל הכא כיון דלית ביה בזיון לא The Gemara asks: But can it be that due to the honor of the living, they allow the deceased to remain unburied overnight? The Gemara answers: Yes, as when the Merciful One states: “His body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but you shall bury him that day” (Deuteronomy 21:23), it teaches that the prohibition applies only to cases similar to that of a person whose body is hung after his death, who suffers degradation when his corpse is left hanging overnight. But here, since the deceased does not suffer degradation when the funeral is delayed, as the delay is in order that the burial will be performed with greater dignity, there is no violation of the prohibition, and he may be left unburied overnight.

ת"ש הלינו לכבודו לשמע עליו עיירות להביא לו מקוננות להביא לו ארון ותכריכין אינו עובר עליו שכל העושה אינו אלא לכבודו של מת ה"ק כל העושה לכבודו של חי אין בו בזיון למת The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one left his deceased relative unburied overnight for the sake of his honor, for example, in order to assemble the people from the neighboring towns for the funeral, or to bring him professional lamenters, or to bring him a coffin or shrouds, he does not transgress the prohibition of “his body shall not remain all night,” as anyone who acts in such a manner does so only for the sake of honoring the dead. This indicates that the eulogy and other funeral rites are performed to honor the deceased. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is what the baraita is saying: Anyone who acts in such a manner for the sake of honoring the living does not transgress the prohibition, as there is no degradation of the dead.

ת"ש ר' נתן אומר סימן יפה למת שנפרעין ממנו לאחר מיתה מת שלא נספד ולא נקבר או שחיה גוררתו או שהיו גשמים מזלפין על מטתו זהו סימן יפה למת ש"מ יקרא דשכבי הוא שמע מינה: The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: It is a good sign for the deceased when he is punished after his death and does not receive an honorable burial or eulogy, as his lack of honor brings him atonement for his sins. For example, if the deceased was not eulogized, or if he was not buried, or if a wild animal dragged his corpse, or if rain fell on his bier, this is a good sign for the deceased. Learn from the baraita that a eulogy is delivered for the honor of the dead, so that when he is deprived of this honor, he achieves atonement for his sins. The Gemara affirms: Learn from the baraita that this is so.

לא היו קוברין כו': וכל כך למה לפי שאין קוברין רשע אצל צדיק דאמר ר' אחא בר חנינא מנין שאין קוברין רשע אצל צדיק שנאמר (מלכים ב יג, כא) ויהי הם קוברים איש והנה ראו את הגדוד וישליכו את האיש בקבר אלישע ויגע האיש בעצמות אלישע ויחי ויקם על רגליו § The mishna teaches that they would not bury the executed transgressor in his ancestral burial plot, but rather in one of two special graveyards set aside for those executed by the court. The Gemara explains: And why is all this necessary? It is necessary because a wicked man is not buried next to a righteous man. As Rav Aḥa bar Ḥanina says: From where is it derived that a wicked man is not buried next to a righteous man? As it is stated: “And it came to pass, as they were burying a man, that behold, they spied a raiding party; and they cast the man into the tomb of Elisha; and as the man came there, he touched the bones of Elisha, and he revived and stood up on his feet” (II Kings 13:21). The man, who was not righteous, was miraculously resurrected so that he would not remain buried alongside Elisha.

אמר ליה רב פפא ודילמא לאיקיומא (מלכים ב ב, ט) ויהי נא פי שנים ברוחך אלי אמר ליה אי הכי היינו דתניא על רגליו עמד ולביתו לא הלך Rav Pappa said to Rav Aḥa bar Ḥanina: What proof is there from here? Perhaps the man was resurrected in order to fulfill Elisha’s request of Elijah: “I pray you, let a double portion of your spirit be upon me” (II Kings 2:9), as now Elisha resurrected two people, the son of the Shunammite woman and this man, as opposed to Elijah, who had resurrected only one person? Rav Aḥa bar Ḥanina said to Rav Pappa: If so, there is a difficulty, as is this a reasonable explanation in light of what is taught in a baraita: The words “and stood up on his feet” indicate that he arose, but he did not go to his home. The man did not in fact live again but for a moment, indicating that he was resurrected not in order to fulfill Elisha’s request for a double portion of Elijah’s spirit, but in order to prevent the disgrace of having a wicked man buried next to Elisha.

אלא ויהי נא פי שנים היכי משכחת לה דאחייא א"ל רבי יוחנן שריפא צרעת נעמן שהיא שקולה כמת דכתיב (במדבר יב, יב) אל נא תהי כמת The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to the verse: “I pray you, let a double portion of your spirit be upon me,” where do you find that Elisha resurrected a second person? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: That request was fulfilled when he cured Naaman’s leprosy (see II Kings, chapter 5), an affliction that is considered to be equivalent to death, as it is written with regard to Miriam’s leprosy: “Let her not be as one dead” (Numbers 12:12).

וכשם שאין קוברין רשע אצל צדיק כך אין קוברין רשע חמור אצל רשע קל וליתקון ארבע קברות שני קברות גמרא גמירי לה The mishna teaches that two graveyards were established for the burial of those executed by the court, one for those who were killed by decapitation or strangulation, and one for those who were stoned or burned. The Gemara explains: Just as a wicked man is not buried next to a righteous man, so too an extremely wicked man, i.e., one who committed a grave offense is not buried next to a less wicked man, i.e., one who committed a less severe offense. The Gemara challenges: If so, let them establish four different graveyards, one for each of the different modes of judicial execution. The Gemara answers. It is learned as a tradition that there are two graveyards for those executed by the court, and no more.

אמר עולא א"ר יוחנן אכל חלב והפריש קרבן והמיר דתו וחזר בו הואיל ונדחה ידחה § Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one unwittingly ate forbidden fat and separated an offering for this sin, and he then became an apostate and subsequently retracted his apostasy, despite his retraction, since the offering was rejected from being sacrificed while he was an apostate, it shall remain rejected.

איתמר נמי א"ר ירמיה אמר ר' אבהו א"ר יוחנן אכל חלב והפריש קרבן ונשתטה וחזר ונשתפה הואיל ונדחה ידחה It was also stated that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one unwittingly ate forbidden fat and separated an offering for this sin, and he then became insane, and later he regained his sanity, the animal that he had dedicated as a sin-offering may not be sacrificed. Since the offering was rejected from being sacrificed while he was insane, it shall remain rejected.

וצריכא דאי אשמעינן קמייתא משום דאיהו דחה נפשיה בידים אבל האי דממילא קא דחי אימא כישן דמי The Gemara explains: And it was necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to teach us this halakha in both cases. As, had he taught us only the first halakha, with regard to the apostate, I would say that only in that case is the animal rejected forever, because the owner actively rejected himself when he became an apostate. But in this case of insanity, where the owner was rejected automatically, not of his own choice, I would say that he is considered as one who is asleep, so that as soon as he regains his sanity, his offering is once again fit.

ואי אשמעינן הכא משום דאין בידו לחזור אבל התם דבידו לחזור אימא לא צריכא And had he taught us the halakha only in this second case of insanity, I would say that only in that case is the animal rejected forever, because it was not in the owner’s power to regain his sanity, as one who is insane cannot cure himself. But there, with regard to an apostate, who has the power to retract his apostasy, I would say that his animal is not permanently rejected. It was therefore necessary to teach us the halakha in both cases.

אמר רב יוסף אף אנן נמי תנינא היו בה קדשים קדשי מזבח ימותו קדשי בדק הבית יפדו והוינן בה אמאי ימותו כיון דאיקטול הויא להו כפרה וליסקו לגבוה לאו משום דאמרינן הואיל ונדחו ידחו Rav Yosef said: We, too, learn a similar halakha in a baraita: If consecrated items were found in an idolatrous city, they are not destroyed together with the rest of the property of the city. Animals that had been consecrated to be offered on the altar must be left to die, and property that had been consecrated for Temple maintenance may be redeemed and is then desacralized. And we discussed it: Why must the animals that had been consecrated for the altar be left to die? Once the idolaters are killed, they achieve atonement, and therefore it should be possible to sacrifice their offerings to the Most High. Is it not the case that the animals must be left to die because we say: Since they were rejected when their owners engaged in idol worship, they remain rejected even after their owners achieve atonement for their sins with their death?

א"ל אביי מי סברת מת מתוך רשעו הויא ליה כפרה מת מתוך רשעו לא הויא ליה כפרה דתני רב שמעיה יכול אפילו פירשו אבותיו מדרכי ציבור יטמא ת"ל בעמיו בעושה מעשה עמיו Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Do you maintain that one who dies in his state of wickedness without repenting achieves atonement? This is not the case, as one who dies in his state of wickedness without repenting does not achieve atonement, as Rav Shemaya taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the priests: “There shall none be defiled for the dead among his people, but for his kin that is near to him, for his mother, and for his father” (Leviticus 21:1–2). One might have thought that even if his father had become an apostate and separated himself from the ways of the community, his son the priest shall become ritually impure in order to bury him. Therefore, the verse states: “Among his people,” which teaches that a priest may become ritually impure only for one who performs the actions of his people, that is, one who conducts himself as a Jew. This indicates that one who dies in his wickedness without repenting does not achieve atonement.

א"ל רבא מי קא מדמית נהרג מתוך רשעו למת מתוך רשעו מת מתוך רשעו כיון דכי אורחיה קמיית לא הויא ליה כפרה נהרג מתוך רשעו כיון דלאו כי אורחיה מיית הויא ליה כפרה Rava said to Abaye: Are you comparing one who was killed in his state of wickedness to one who died in his state of wickedness? An unrepentant sinner who died in his state of wickedness does not achieve atonement, since he died a natural death and there was nothing to bring about his atonement. But a transgressor who was killed in his state of wickedness achieves atonement, even without repentance, since he did not die a natural death, but rather he was executed.

תדע דכתיב (תהלים עט, א) מזמור לאסף אלהים באו גוים בנחלתך טמאו את היכל קדשך [וגו'] נתנו את נבלת עבדיך מאכל לעוף השמים בשר חסידיך לחיתו ארץ מאי עבדיך ומאי חסידיך לאו חסידיך חסידיך ממש עבדיך הנך דמחייבי דינא דמעיקרא וכיון דאיקטול קרי להו עבדיך Know that this is so, as it is written: “A song to Asaf. O God, nations are come into Your inheritance; they have defiled your Holy Temple; they have laid Jerusalem in heaps. The dead bodies of Your servants they have given to be food to the birds of the sky, the flesh of Your pious ones to the beasts of the earth” (Psalms 79:1–2). What is the meaning of “Your servants” and what is the meaning of “Your pious ones”? Is it not so that the term “Your pious ones” is referring to literally, Your pious ones, those who had always feared God; whereas “Your servants” is referring to those who had initially been liable to receive punishment for their sins, but once they were killed, they are called “Your servants”? This indicates that a transgressor who was executed achieves atonement even without repentance.

אמר ליה אביי מי קא מדמית Abaye said to Rava: Are you comparing

Daf 47b

הרוגי מלכות להרוגי בית דין הרוגי מלכות כיון דשלא בדין קא מיקטלי הויא להו כפרה הרוגי בית דין כיון דבדין קא מיקטלי לא הוי להו כפרה those referred to in the verse in Psalms who were killed by a heathen government to those inhabitants of an idolatrous city who were killed by a Jewish court? Those who were killed by a heathen government, since they were killed unjustly, achieve atonement through their deaths, even without repentance. But those who were killed by a Jewish court, since they were killed justly for their sins, do not achieve atonement unless they repent.

תדע דתנן לא היו קוברין אותו בקברות אבותיו ואי סלקא דעתך כיון דאיקטול הויא להו כפרה ליקברו מיתה וקבורה בעינן The Gemara adds: Know that this is true, as we have learned in the mishna: They would not bury the executed transgressor in his ancestral burial plot. And if it enters your mind to say that once the transgressors are executed by the court, they achieve atonement, let them be buried in their ancestral burial plots. The Gemara rejects this argument: An executed transgressor cannot be buried in his ancestral burial plot, because in order to achieve atonement, both death and burial are needed. But once he is buried in the graveyard set aside for the wicked, he achieves full atonement.

מותיב רב אדא בר אהבה לא היו מתאבלין אלא אוננין שאין אנינות אלא בלב ואי סלקא דעתך כיון דאיקבור הויא להו כפרה ליאבלו Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection to this from another ruling in the mishna: The relatives of the executed transgressor would not mourn him with the observance of the usual mourning rites, but they would grieve over his passing, since grief is felt only in the heart. And if it enters your mind to say that once the executed transgressors are buried they achieve atonement, let the relatives of the executed transgressor mourn him as well, as he has already achieved atonement.

בעינן נמי עיכול בשר דיקא נמי דקתני נתעכל הבשר מלקטין את העצמות וקוברין אותן במקומן שמע מינה The Gemara refutes this argument: An executed transgressor is not mourned, because in order to achieve atonement, decomposition of his flesh is also needed. Once his flesh has decayed, he has achieved full atonement. The Gemara notes that the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Once the flesh of the deceased had decomposed, they would gather his bones and bury them in their proper place in his ancestral burial plot, indicating that with the decomposition of his flesh, the executed transgressor achieves atonement, so that he may be buried alongside his righteous relatives. The Gemara affirms: Learn from the mishna that this is so.

רב אשי אמר אבילות מאימתי קא מתחלת מסתימת הגולל כפרה מאימתי קא הויא מכי חזו צערא דקברא פורתא הלכך הואיל ואידחו ידחו Rav Ashi says that an alternative resolution of the objection raised by Rav Adda bar Ahava may be suggested: When does the obligation of mourning a deceased relative commence? It begins from the time of the sealing of the grave with the grave cover. And when is atonement achieved? Atonement is achieved when the deceased begins to see and experience a bit of the anguish of the grave. Consequently, since the mourning rites were set aside at the time that they should have begun, they remain permanently set aside, even after the executed transgressor has in fact achieved atonement.

אי הכי למה לי עיכול בשר משום דלא אפשר The Gemara asks: If so, that the executed transgressor achieves atonement as soon as he experiences a bit of the anguish of burial, why do I need decomposition of his flesh to occur before he can be reburied in his ancestral burial plot? The Gemara answers: Because it is impossible to move a partly decomposed body in a respectful manner, and therefore they wait until the body is fully decomposed.

קבריה דרב הוו שקלי מיניה עפרא לאישתא בת יומא אתו אמרו ליה לשמואל אמר להו יאות עבדין קרקע עולם הוא וקרקע עולם אינה נאסרת דכתיב (מלכים ב כג, ו) וישלך את עפרה על קבר בני העם מקיש קבר בני העם לעבודת כוכבים § It was related that people would take dirt from the grave of Rav as a cure for a one-day fever. A number of people came and told Shmuel about this practice, thinking that perhaps the dirt should be forbidden, as one may not derive benefit from a corpse. Shmuel said to them: They are acting properly, as the dirt in the grave is natural ground, and natural ground does not become forbidden in any situation, as it is written: “And he brought out the ashera from the house of the Lord…and beat it into dust, and cast the dust of it upon the graves of the common people” (II Kings 23:6). This verse juxtaposes the graves of the common people to objects of idol worship.

מה עבודת כוכבים במחובר לא מיתסרא דכתיב (דברים יב, ב) אשר אתם יורשים אותם את אלהיהם על ההרים הרמים על ההרים אלהיהם ולא ההרים אלהיהם הכא נמי במחובר לא מיתסר This teaches that just as objects of idol worship are not forbidden when attached to the ground; the Gemara interjects by teaching the source of this halakha: As it is written: “You shall utterly destroy all the places, in which the nations whom you are to dispossess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every leafy tree. And you shall overthrow their altars, and break their pillars, and burn their asherim with fire” (Deuteronomy 12:2–3); i.e., there is an obligation to destroy their gods that are upon the mountains, but there is no obligation to destroy the mountains that are themselves their gods, meaning that if people worshipped the mountain itself as a god, there is no need to destroy it, as anything that is attached to the ground does not become forbidden. The Gemara resumes the comparison: Here too, with regard to the prohibition against deriving benefit from a corpse, the dirt in the grave that is attached to the ground does not become forbidden.

מיתיבי החוצב קבר לאביו והלך וקברו במקום אחר הרי זה לא יקבר בו עולמית הכא במאי עסקינן בקבר בנין The Gemara raises an objection against this ruling from a baraita: If one hews a grave for his deceased father in one place, and he then goes and buries him in a different place, the son may never be buried in the grave that he had dug, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from a grave that had been prepared for another. This indicates that even that which is attached to the ground can become an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing not with a grave dug in the ground, but with a cave that was constructed above ground out of rocks that were hewn from the ground. In such a case all of the stones used in the construction become forbidden, as they were detached from the ground.

תא שמע קבר חדש מותר בהנאה הטיל בו נפל אסור בהנאה הכא נמי בקבר בנין The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different proof from that which was taught in a baraita: With regard to a fresh grave that was not designated for anyone in particular, one is permitted to derive benefit from it. But if even a non-viable newborn that died was cast into it, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave. This indicates that even a grave that is attached to the ground can become forbidden. The Gemara answers: Here too, the reference is to a grave that was constructed above ground out of rocks that were detached from the ground.

תא שמע נמצא אתה אומר שלש קברות הן קבר הנמצא קבר הידוע קבר המזיק את הרבים קבר הנמצא מותר לפנותו פינהו מקומו טהור ומותר בהנאה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from another baraita: It turns out that you say that there are three types of graves, and each type is governed by different halakhot with regard to whether or not a corpse may be removed from the grave and buried elsewhere: A newly found grave, a known grave, and a grave that causes damage to the public. How so? With regard to a newly found grave, i.e., a grave in which a corpse had been buried without the permission of the property’s owner, one is permitted to remove the corpse from the grave and bury it elsewhere. After he has removed the corpse, the place of the grave is ritually pure and he is permitted to derive benefit from it.

קבר הידוע אסור לפנותו פינהו מקומו טמא ואסור בהנאה With regard to a known grave, i.e., a grave in which a corpse had been buried with the permission of the property’s owner, it is prohibited to remove the corpse from the grave and bury it elsewhere. If one went ahead and removed the corpse, the place of the grave is ritually impure and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

קבר המזיק את הרבים מותר לפנותו פינהו מקומו טהור ואסור בהנאה הכא נמי בקבר בנין As for a grave that causes damage to the public, e.g., a grave that was dug on a public road and causes the passersby to contract ritual impurity, one is permitted to remove the corpse from the grave and bury it elsewhere. After he has removed the corpse, the place is ritually pure, but nevertheless, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. This indicates that even that which is attached to the ground can become forbidden, even after the corpse has been removed from the grave. The Gemara answers: Here too, the reference is to a grave that was constructed above ground.

וקבר הנמצא מותר לפנותו דילמא מת מצוה הוא ומת מצוה קנה מקומו שאני מת מצוה דקלא אית ליה Having cited this last baraita, the Gemara raises a question about one of its details: As for a newly found grave, is one really permitted to remove the corpse just because it was buried there without the owner’s permission? But perhaps this is a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva]. If the deceased has no relatives or acquaintances to bury him, everyone is obligated to assist in his burial. And the halakha is that a met mitzva acquires its place, i.e., the corpse is buried where it was found, and one is not permitted to remove it. The Gemara answers: A met mitzva is different, as it generates publicity. Were the corpse buried in the newly found grave that of a met mitzva, people would have heard about it.

איתמר האורג בגד למת אביי אמר אסור ורבא אמר מותר § It was stated that the amora’im disagreed about the halakha in the following case: With regard to one who weaves a garment for one who has died, what is the halakha? Abaye says: It is prohibited to derive benefit from the garment, even if it was never actually used as a shroud. And Rava says: It is permitted to derive benefit from the garment.

אביי אמר אסור הזמנה מילתא היא ורבא אמר מותר הזמנה לאו מילתא היא The Gemara explains their respective opinions. Abaye says that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the garment, since he maintains that mere designation of an item is a significant matter, i.e., all the relevant halakhot of an item already apply once an item is designated for a specific purpose, whether or not it has been used for that purpose. Therefore, a garment woven for one who had died is forbidden as if it had already been used as a shroud. And Rava says that the garment is permitted, as he maintains that mere designation is nothing, and therefore the garment becomes prohibited only once it is actually used as a shroud.

מאי טעמא דאביי גמר (במדבר כ, א) שם (דברים כא, ד) שם מעגלה ערופה מה עגלה ערופה בהזמנה מיתסרא האי נמי בהזמנה מיתסרא The Gemara explains further: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of Abaye? He derives a verbal analogy between the word “there” written in the context of a grave, from the word “there” written in the context of a heifer whose neck is broken. The verse states concerning a grave: “And Miriam died there and she was buried there” (Numbers 20:1), and the verse states concerning a heifer whose neck is broken: “And the elders of that city shall bring down the heifer to a hard valley, which is neither plowed nor sown, and shall break the heifer’s neck there in the valley” (Deuteronomy 21:4). Just as it becomes prohibited to derive benefit from a heifer whose neck is broken through mere designation, i.e., as soon as the animal is designated as such, here too, it becomes prohibited to derive benefit from the items relating to a dead person through mere designation.

ורבא גמר (דברים יב, ב) שם שם מעבודת כוכבים מה עבודת כוכבים בהזמנה לא מיתסרא אף הכא נמי בהזמנה לא מיתסרא And Rava derives a verbal analogy between the word “there” written in the context of a grave from the word “there” written in the context of objects of idol worship. The verse states concerning objects of idol worship: “The places in which the nations…served their gods there” (Deuteronomy 12:2). Just as it does not become prohibited to derive benefit from objects of idol worship through mere designation, but only through actual ritual worship, so too, here it does not become prohibited to derive benefit from items relating to a deceased person through mere designation.

ורבא מאי טעמא לא גמר מעגלה ערופה אמר לך The Gemara asks: And Rava, what is the reason that he does not derive a verbal analogy from a heifer whose neck is broken? The Gemara answers: Rava could have said to you:

Daf 48a

משמשין ממשמשין גמרינן לאפוקי עגלה ערופה דהיא גופה קדושה We derive the halakha governing the accessories relating to a dead person, e.g., a shroud, from the halakha governing the accessories used in idol worship, e.g., the animal sacrificed to the idol. This is to the exclusion of a heifer whose neck is broken, which is itself consecrated for the ceremony taking place in the valley and is not an accessory used in that ceremony.

ואביי מ"ט לא גמר מעבודת כוכבים אמר לך מידי דאורחיה ממידי דאורחיה גמרינן לאפוקי עבודת כוכבים דלאו אורחא: The Gemara asks: And Abaye, what is the reason that he did not derive the halakha by way of a verbal analogy from the halakha governing accessories used in idol worship? The Gemara answers: Abaye could have said to you that we learn the halakha governing something that involves a proper way of conduct, i.e., burying the dead, from the halakha governing something that involves a proper way of conduct, i.e., the rite relating to the heifer whose neck is broken, as these are both mitzvot by Torah law. This is to the exclusion of objects of idol worship, which do not involve a proper way of conduct.

(סימן כפ"ה נפשי"ה דחציב"א נכיס"א דאומנ"א) § The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the forthcoming series of attempted proofs concerning the dispute between Rava and Abaye: Scarf; monument; that was hewed; pouch; craftsman.

מיתיבי כפה שהוא טמא מדרס ונתנתו לספר טהור מן המדרס אבל טמא (מגע מדרס) אימא נתנתו וכרכתו The Gemara raises an objection against Rava from a baraita discussing ritual impurity that is contracted by treading: If a scarf is ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading, e.g., after a zav sat or lay down upon it, and its owner then designated it as a cover for a Torah scroll, it is pure of the more severe level of ritual impurity, that which is imparted by treading, even without immersion, because it is no longer an object intended to be lied on or sat upon. But it is still impure with the less severe ritual impurity, that which is contracted by touching that which is treaded upon. This indicates that mere designation has halakhic significance and validity. The Gemara rejects this argument: Say that the baraita should read as follows: The owner of the scarf designated it as a cover for a Torah scroll and wrapped it around the scroll, so that there was not only designation, but an action as well.

למה לי נתנתו וכרכתו כדרב חסדא דאמר רב חסדא האי סודרא דאזמניה למיצר ביה תפילין וצר ביה תפילין אסור למיצר ביה פשיטי אזמניה ולא צר ביה צר ביה ולא אזמניה שרי למיצר ביה פשיטי The Gemara asks: If there was an action, why do I need for the baraita to say that the owner designated it and wrapped it? Wouldn’t wrapping alone have sufficed? The Gemara answers: The baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to this cloth that one designated for the purpose of bundling phylacteries in it, if he already bundled phylacteries in it, then it is forbidden to bundle coins in it, as it was designated and used as an accessory of a sacred object. But if he merely designated it for that purpose but did not yet bundle phylacteries in it, or if he bundled phylacteries in it but did not previously designate it for bundling phylacteries, then it is permitted to bundle coins in it. Consequently, in the case of the scarf, it was necessary both to designate it as a cover for the Torah scroll and to actually wrap it around the scroll.

ולאביי דאמר הזמנה מילתא היא אזמניה אע"ג דלא צר ביה צר ביה אי אזמניה אין אי לא אזמניה לא And according to Abaye, who said that designation is a significant matter, the halakha is as follows: If he designated the cloth for the purpose of bundling phylacteries in it, even if he did not bundle phylacteries in it, it is prohibited to bundle money in it. In a case where he already bundled phylacteries in it, if he designated the cloth for bundling phylacteries, yes, it is prohibited to bundle money in it; but if he did not designate it for bundling phylacteries, bundling money in the cloth is not prohibited.

ת"ש נפש שבנאו לשם חי מותר בהנאה הוסיף בו דימוס אחד לשם מת אסור בהנאה הכא במאי עסקינן דרמא ביה מת The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof against Rava: With regard to a monument that was built as a memorial for the sake of an individual while he was still alive, one is permitted to derive benefit from it, as it is like any other construction; but if even a single row of stones was added to it for the sake of a corpse, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from it, apparently even before the deceased is buried there. This seems to indicate that mere designation is a significant matter. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the corpse was placed under the monument, so that it became forbidden not through mere designation, but by way of an action.

אי הכי מאי איריא הוסיף כי לא הוסיף נמי לא צריכא אע"ג דפנייה The Gemara asks: If so, why does the baraita specifically mention that a row of stones was added? If the deceased was buried under the monument, one should be prohibited from deriving benefit from it even when a row of stones was not added, as the entire monument has been used for the dead. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary for the baraita to state that a row of stones was added in order to teach us that even if the corpse was later removed from the grave, the monument remains forbidden since it had been designated for a corpse.

אמר רפרם בר פפא אמר רב חסדא אם היה מכירו חולצו ומותר Rafram bar Pappa says that Rav Ḥisda says: If the corpse was later removed from the grave and one recognizes the row of stones that had been added to the monument in the dead man’s honor, he may remove that row of stones, and it is permitted to derive benefit from the rest of the construction.

ת"ש החוצב קבר לאביו והלך וקברו בקבר אחר הרי זה לא יקבר בו עולמית התם משום כבוד אביו The Gemara suggests: Come and hear yet another proof against Rava from a baraita: If one hewed a grave for his deceased father in one place, and then went and buried him in a different place, the son may never be buried in the grave that he had dug. This indicates that mere designation is a significant matter. The Gemara answers: There, the son may not be buried in the grave that he had dug because that would detract from the honor that he must show his father, not because the designation is significant with regard to the status of a grave in general.

הכי נמי מסתברא דקתני סיפא רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר אף החוצב אבנים לאביו והלך וקברו במקום אחר הרי זה לא יקבר בהן עולמית The Gemara comments: So, too, it is reasonable that the son may not be buried in the grave that he had dug only because of the honor due to his father, as the latter clause of the same baraita teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if one hewed stones for his father’s grave and then went and buried him in a different place, the son himself may never be buried in a tomb constructed from those stones.

אי אמרת בשלמא משום כבוד אביו שפיר אלא אי אמרת משום הזמנה טווי לאריגה מי איכא למאן דאמר The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the son may not be buried in the grave that he dug for his father because of the honor that must be shown his father, it is well understood why he can also not be buried in tomb constructed from stones that he hewed for his father’s grave. But if you say that it is because of designation, the son should be permitted to be buried in such a tomb, as is there anyone who says that spinning yarn in order to weave it into cloth for shrouds is regarded as designating an item for a dead person, resulting in a prohibition against deriving benefit from the yarn? In such a case there is certainly no prohibition, and the case of hewing stones for a tomb is analogous to a case of spinning yarn in order to weave it into cloth.

ת"ש קבר חדש מותר בהנאה הטיל בו נפל אסור בהנאה הטיל אין לא הטיל לא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof in support of Rava from a baraita: With regard to a fresh grave that was not designated for a particular individual, one is permitted to derive benefit from it. But if even a non-viable newborn that died was cast into it, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave. It may be inferred from here that if a non-viable newborn was cast into the grave, yes, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, but if it was not cast into the grave, one is not prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, indicating that mere designation is insignificant.

ה"ה דאע"ג דלא הטיל ולאפוקי מדרבן שמעון בן גמליאל דאמר אין לנפלים תפיסת הקבר קמ"ל The Gemara rejects this inference: The same is true even if a non-viable newborn was not cast into the grave; one is still prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, merely by virtue of the designation. Why, then, does the baraita say that a non-viable newborn was cast into the grave? This serves to exclude the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says: A non-viable newborn does not take possession of its grave to render it forbidden even once it is buried there. To counter this opinion, the baraita teaches us that this opinion is not accepted, and a non-viable newborn is treated like any other corpse.

ת"ש מותר המתים למתים מותר המת ליורשיו הכא במאי עסקינן שגבו מחיים The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof in support of Rava’s opinion from a mishna (Shekalim 2:5): The money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. The money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. Evidently, money that had been designated for the sake of a dead person but was not actually used for burying him does not become forbidden, and his heirs may use it. The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with money that had been collected for the deceased during his lifetime. It was thought that a certain individual was soon to die, and money was collected to cover the costs of his burial. Since at the time the money was collected the person was alive, the money had not been designated for the sake of a dead person. Therefore, one is permitted to derive benefit from it, and it is given to the heirs of the deceased.

הא לא תני הכי דתנן מותר המתים למתים מותר המת ליורשיו ותני עלה כיצד גבו למתים סתם זהו מותר המתים למתים גבו למת זה זהו מותר המת ליורשיו The Gemara raises an objection: But we were not taught this, as we learned in the mishna: The money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. The money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. And it is taught with regard to this mishna in a baraita: How so? If they collected money for the purpose of burying the dead without specification, this is the case about which they said that the money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. But if they collected money for the sake of this particular dead person, this is the case about which they said that the money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. This indicates that the mishna is discussing a case where the money was designated for a one who had already died.

וליטעמיך אימא סיפא ר"מ אומר לא יגע בהן עד שיבא אליהו ר' נתן אומר יעשנו דימוס על קברו או זילוף לפני מטתו The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause of that same mishna, which appears to support the opinion of Abaye: Rabbi Meir says: If money was left over from the sum collected for the burial of a particular dead person, the money may not be touched until Elijah comes and resolves the uncertainty as to whether or not the money is forbidden. Rabbi Natan says: The leftover money shall be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier as he is brought for burial. This indicates that there are certain tanna’im who maintain that mere designation is in fact significant.

אלא אביי מתרץ לטעמיה ורבא מתרץ לטעמיה אביי מתרץ לטעמיה דכ"ע הזמנה מילתא היא ת"ק סבר דחזי ליה תפיס דלא חזי ליה לא תפיס Rather, Abaye can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning, and Rava, too, can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning. The Gemara explains: Abaye can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning, as follows: According to everyone, i.e., the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Natan, mere designation is a significant matter. The first tanna holds that the sum that it is fitting to spend for the burial of the particular dead person is encompassed by the prohibition, and the sum that it is not fitting to spend is not encompassed by the prohibition. Therefore, whatever money is not required for his burial is given to his heirs, as it was never included in the prohibition.

ור"מ מספקא ליה אי תפיס אי לא תפיס הלכך לא יגע בהן עד שיבא אליהו ור' נתן פשיטא ליה דודאי תפיס הלכך יעשה דימוס על קברו And Rabbi Meir is uncertain as to whether the sum that it is not fitting to spend for his burial is encompassed by the prohibition or is not encompassed by the prohibition. Therefore, the leftover money may not be touched until Elijah comes and clarifies the matter. And it is obvious to Rabbi Natan that all of the money collected is certainly encompassed by the prohibition, including the money that it is not fitting to spend for the deceased’s burial. Therefore, whatever money is left over should be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier.

ורבא מתרץ לטעמיה לכ"ע הזמנה לאו מילתא היא תנא קמא סבר כי בזו ליה אחולי מחיל זילותיה גבי יורשין And Rava, too, can explain the mishna according to his line of reasoning, as follows: According to everyone, i.e., the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Natan, mere designation is nothing, and so the money collected for the burial of a particular dead person does not become forbidden. And the disagreement is about an entirely different manner. The first tanna holds that even though the heirs of the deceased disgraced him by collecting money for his burial, the deceased still forgoes his disgrace for the benefit of his heirs, and therefore the leftover money is given to them.

ור"מ מספקא ליה אי מחיל אי לא מחיל הלכך לא יגע בהן כו' ורבי נתן פשיטא ליה דלא מחיל הלכך יעשה דימוס על קברו או זילוף לפני מטתו And Rabbi Meir is uncertain as to whether the deceased forgoes his disgrace or does not forgo it. Therefore, the leftover money may not be touched until Elijah comes and clarifies the issue. And it is obvious to Rabbi Natan that the deceased does not forgo his disgrace. Therefore, whatever money is left over should be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased, or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier.

ת"ש היו אביו ואמו מזרקין בו כלים מצוה על האחרים להצילן The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof in support of Rava’s opinion from a baraita: If the father and the mother of the deceased were throwing garments onto their late son’s bier so that they would be buried along with him, it is a mitzva for the others present to save those garments from being lost. This indicates that mere designation is insignificant, as were it significant, one would be prohibited to derive benefit from the garments as soon as the parents cast them onto the bier.

Daf 48b

התם משום מררייהו אי הכי היינו דקתני עלה אמר רשב"ג במה דברים אמורים שלא נגעו במטה אבל נגעו במטה אסורין The Gemara rejects this proof: There, the parents threw the garments onto their son’s bier because of their bitterness over his death, but they did not really mean to designate the garments to be buried with him. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, how can one understand that which is taught with regard to this baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? It is stated with regard to a case where the garments did not yet touch the bier before they were saved. But if they already touched the bier, they are forbidden. If no importance is ascribed to what is done out of bitterness, why should the garments that touched the bier be forbidden?

תרגמה עולא במטה הנקברת עמו דמחלפי בתכריכי המת Ulla interpreted the baraita as referring to a case where the garments were thrown onto a bier that was to be buried together with the son, and it is possible that those garments might be mistaken for shrouds of the deceased. The Sages decreed that it is prohibited to derive benefit from such garments, lest people mistakenly think that just as they are permitted, so too, actual shrouds are permitted. There is no proof from here that mere designation is significant and that articles designated for the dead are permanently forbidden.

ת"ש כיס שעשאו להניח בו תפילין אסור להניח בו מעות הניח בו תפילין יניח בו מעות אימא עשאו והניח בו תפילין אסור להניח בו מעות כדרב חסדא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof in support of Abaye’s opinion from a baraita: If one fashioned a pouch in which to put phylacteries, it is prohibited to put money in it. If he put phylacteries in it, but he did not designate it beforehand for that purpose, he may still put money in it. The ruling of the first clause indicates that designation is significant. The Gemara rejects this proof: Say that the baraita should be understood as follows: If one fashioned a pouch for phylacteries and then put the phylacteries in it, it is prohibited to put money in it. This is in accordance with the ruling of Rav Ḥisda, that if one designated a cloth for the purpose of bundling phylacteries in it and then he wrapped the phylacteries in it, he may no longer use the cloth to hold money.

ת"ש אמר לאומן עשה לי תיק של ספר או נרתיק של תפילין עד שלא נשתמש בהן קודש מותר להשתמש בהן חול נשתמש בהן קודש אסור להשתמש בהן חול The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another baraita that supports the opinion of Rava: If one said to a craftsman: Fashion me a case [tik] for a Torah scroll, or: Fashion for me a bag [nartik] for phylacteries, as long as he has not yet used them for a sacred purpose, it is permitted for him to use them for a mundane purpose. But if he already used them for a sacred purpose, it is prohibited for him to use them for a mundane purpose. This indicates that mere designation is nothing until the item is actually used for the purpose for which it had been designated.

תנאי היא דתניא ציפן זהב או שטלה עליהן עור של בהמה טמאה פסולות עור בהמה טהורה כשירות אע"פ שלא עיבדן לשמן ר"ש ב"ג אומר אף עור בהמה טהורה פסולות עד שיעבדו לשמן The Gemara explains: The matter of whether or not mere designation is significant is a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: If one took phylacteries and coated them with gold or patched them with the hide of a non-kosher animal, they are unfit. But if one patched them with the hide of a kosher animal then they are fit, and this is so even though he did not prepare them, i.e., the hides, for their sake, i.e., for the sake of their use in a mitzva. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if he patched them with the hide of a kosher animal they are unfit, and they remain unfit until he prepares them for their sake. Preparing the hide for the sake of the mitzva is analogous to designating it for that purpose. The first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who disagree as to whether the hide must be prepared for the sake of the mitzva, differ as to whether designation is significant.

א"ל רבינא לרבא מי איכא דוכתא דרמו ביה מת וארגי בגד למת א"ל אין כגון שכבי דהרפניא In connection with what was stated previously, that the amora’im disagree whether one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a garment woven for the sake of a dead person, Ravina said to Rava: Is there really such a place where the deceased is first placed on a bier and only afterward do they begin to weave a garment for the deceased? Rava said to Ravina: Yes, this is practiced on behalf of, for example, the dead of Harpanya, where the people are so poor that they cannot prepare shrouds for themselves during their lifetimes.

דרש מרימר הלכתא כוותי' דאביי ורבנן אמרי הלכתא כוותי' דרבא והלכתא כוותיה דרבא Mareimar taught that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye that mere designation is significant. And the Rabbis say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava that mere designation is nothing. The Gemara concludes that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava that mere designation is nothing.

ת"ר הרוגי מלכות נכסיהן למלך הרוגי ב"ד נכסיהן ליורשין ר' יהודה אומר אף הרוגי מלכות נכסיהן ליורשין אמרו ליה לרבי יהודה והלא כבר נאמר (מלכים א כא, יח) הנה בכרם נבות אשר ירד שם לרשתו § The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to those executed by a Jewish king for crimes that they committed against him, their property belongs to the king. As for those executed by the court for a capital transgression, their property belongs to their heirs. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even with regard to those executed by a Jewish king, their property belongs to their heirs. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But isn’t it already stated: “Arise, go down to meet Ahab, king of Israel, who is in Samaria; behold he is in the vineyard of Naboth, where he is gone down there to inherit it” (I Kings 21:18)? The wording of the verse indicates that Ahab went down there by right, proving that the property of those executed by the king legally belongs to the king.

אמר להן בן אחי אביו היה וראוי ליורשו היה והלא הרבה בנים היו לו אמר להן אותו ואת בניו הרג שנא' (מלכים ב ט, כו) אם לא את דמי נבות ואת דמי בניו ראיתי ורבנן ההוא בנים הראוין לצאת ממנו Rabbi Yehuda said to them: Ahab was Naboth’s cousin, the son of his paternal uncle, and therefore he was fit to inherit from him. Accordingly, he took possession of the property in his capacity as an heir, and not as the king. They said to him: But Naboth had many sons. Why, then, did they not inherit from him? Rabbi Yehuda said to them: Ahab executed Naboth and also his sons, as it is stated: “I have seen yesterday the blood of Naboth and the blood of his sons” (II Kings 9:26). The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis counter this claim? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that verse is referring to the sons who would have issued from him had Naboth not been executed. Ahab was held accountable for the blood of Naboth and for the blood of his unborn children.

בשלמא למאן דאמר נכסיהן למלך היינו דכתיב (מלכים א כא, יג) ברך נבות אלהים ומלך אלא למאן דאמר נכסיהן ליורשין למה לי ומלך The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, according to the one who says that the property of those executed by the king belongs to the king, that is the reason that it is written that Jezebel arranged for witnesses to falsely testify that “Naboth cursed God and the king” (I Kings 21:13). Since Naboth cursed the king, Ahab could execute him and seize his property. But according to the one who says that the property of those executed by the king belongs to their heirs, why do I need the testimony that Naboth cursed the king? It would have sufficed for the witnesses to testify that he cursed God, in which case he would have been executed by the court, and Ahab would have taken possession of the vineyard as his heir.

ולטעמיך אלהים למה לי אלא לאפושי ריתחא ה"נ לאפושי ריתחא The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, that the witnesses testified that Naboth cursed the king so that Ahab could execute him and seize his property, why do I need the additional testimony that Naboth cursed God? Rather, you must say that the witnesses were instructed to testify that Naboth cursed both God and the king in order to increase the anger of the judges by accusing him of a second offense. So too, it can be argued that according to Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning, the witnesses testified that Naboth also cursed the king in order to increase the anger of the judges. No proof can be brought from here that the property of those executed by the king belongs to the king.

בשלמא למאן דאמר נכסיהן למלך היינו דכתיב (מלכים א ב, כח) וינס יואב אל אהל ה' ויחזק בקרנות המזבח וכתיב (מלכים א ב, כב) ויאמר לא (אצא) כי פה אמות אלא למאן דאמר נכסיהן ליורשין מאי נפקא ליה מינה לחיי שעה The Gemara raises another difficulty: Granted, according to the one who says that the property of those executed by the king belongs to the king, that is the reason that it is written: “And Joab fled to the tent of the Lord and caught hold of the horns of the altar” (I Kings 2:28), describing Joab’s actions after it became known that he supported Adonijah, and furthermore it is written: “And he said, I will not leave, for here I will die” (I Kings 2:30). Joab did not want to be put to death by the king because he did not want his property to pass into the king’s possession. But according to the one who says that the property of those executed by the king belongs to their heirs, what difference did taking refuge in the Sanctuary make to him? The Gemara answers: Joab fled to the sanctuary in order to live a short while longer. Consequently, there is no proof from here to either side of the dispute.

(מלכים א ב, ל) וישב בניהו את המלך דבר לאמר כה דיבר יואב וכה ענני אמר ליה זיל אימא ליה תרתי לא תעביד בהאי גברא אי קטלית ליה קבול לטותיה דלטייה אבוך ואי לא שבקיה דליקו בלטותיה דלטייה אבוך (מלכים א ב, לא) ויאמר לו המלך עשה כאשר דבר ופגע בו וקברתו § The Gemara continues to discuss the incident involving Joab. After Joab took refuge in the Sanctuary and King Solomon sent Benaiah, son of Jehoiada, to fall upon him, Benaiah ordered Joab to leave the sanctuary, whereupon Joab refused. The verse then states: “And Benaiah brought the king word back, saying: So said Joab, and so he answered me” (I Kings 2:30). The Gemara explains: Joab said to him: Go and say to Solomon: You cannot perform two actions to this man, i.e., to me, Joab. If you kill him, i.e., me, you and your descendants will receive the curses with which your father cursed me. And if you do not wish to receive those curses, let him go so that he may receive the curses with which your father cursed him. And the next verse states: “And the king said to him: Do as he has said, and fall upon him, and bury him.” Solomon thereby accepted his father’s curses upon himself and his descendants.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב כל קללות שקילל דוד את יואב נתקיימו בזרעו של דוד (שמואל ב ג, כט) אל יכרת מבית יואב זב ומצורע ומחזיק בפלך ונופל בחרב וחסר לחם Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: All the curses with which David cursed Joab were ultimately fulfilled in David’s descendants, due to the curse that Solomon accepted upon himself. David cursed Joab: “Let the house of Joab never lack such as are afflicted with a discharge, or a leper, or that hold onto a staff, or fall by the sword, or lack bread” (II Samuel 3:29).

זב מרחבעם דכתיב (מלכים א יב, יח) והמלך רחבעם התאמץ לעלות במרכבה לנוס ירושלים וכתיב (ויקרא טו, ט) וכל המרכב אשר ירכב עליו הזב יטמא The Gemara clarifies: The curse of being afflicted “with a discharge,” i.e., a zav, was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Rehoboam, as it is written: “And King Rehoboam made speed to get him up to his chariot [bamerkava] to flee to Jerusalem” (I Kings 12:18), and it is written: “And whatever saddle [hamerkav] he that has a discharge rides upon shall be unclean” (Leviticus 15:9). The similarity between the words merkava and merkav indicates that Rehoboam was a zav.

מצורע מעוזיהו דכתיב (דברי הימים ב כו, טז) ובחזקתו גבה לבו עד להשחית וימעל בה' אלהיו ויבא אל היכל ה' להקטיר על מזבח הקטרת וכתיב (דברי הימים ב כו, יט) והצרעת זרחה במצחו The curse of “a leper” was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Uzziah, as it is written: “But when he was strong, his heart was lifted up to his destruction; for he transgressed against the Lord his God, and went into the Temple of the Lord to burn incense upon the altar of incense” (II Chronicles 26:16). And it is also written: “And leprosy broke out on his forehead” (II Chronicles 26:19).

מחזיק בפלך מאסא דכתיב (מלכים א טו, כג) רק לעת זקנתו חלה את רגליו ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב שאחזו פודגרא א"ל מר זוטרא בריה דרב נחמן לרב נחמן היכי דמי א"ל כמחט בבשר החי מנא ידע אי בעית אימא מיחש הוה חייש ביה ואיבעית אימא מרביה הוה גמיר לה ואיבעית אימא (תהלים כה, יד) סוד ה' ליראיו ובריתו להודיעם The curse of those who “hold onto a staff” was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Asa, as it is written concerning him: “But in the time of his old age, he was diseased in his feet” (I Kings 15:23). And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This means that he was seized with gout [podagra]. Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said to Rav Naḥman: What are the circumstances and symptoms of this disease? Rav Naḥman said to him: The pain is similar to the pain of a needle piercing live flesh. The Gemara asks: How did Rav Naḥman know what gout is like? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that he himself suffered from the disease. And if you wish, say that he learned it as a tradition from his teacher. And if you wish, say that he knew this through divine inspiration, as the verse states: “The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him; and He will show to them His covenant” (Psalms 25:14).

נופל בחרב מיאשיהו דכתיב (דברי הימים ב לה, כג) ויורו (המורים) למלך יאשיהו ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב שעשו כל גופו ככברה The curse of those who “fall by the sword” was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Josiah, as it is written: “And the archers shot at King Josiah” (II Chronicles 35:23), and Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: They shot him with so many arrows that they turned his whole body into a sieve.

וחסר לחם מיכניה דכתיב (מלכים ב כה, ל) וארוחתו ארוחת תמיד נתנה לו אמר רב יהודה אמר רב היינו דאמרי אינשי The curse of those who “lack bread” was fulfilled among Solomon’s descendants in Jeconiah, as it is written concerning him: “And as for his food allowance, there was a continual food allowance given him by the king, a daily portion for every day, all the days of his life” (II Kings 25:30). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This explains the adage that people say:

Daf 49a

תהא לוטא ולא תהא לאטה Be the one who is cursed and not the one who curses, as a curse eventually returns to the one who curses.

אתיוה ליואב דייניה אמר ליה מאי טעמא קטלתיה לאבנר אמר ליה גואל הדם דעשאל הואי עשאל רודף הוה אמר ליה היה לו להצילו באחד מאבריו The Gemara returns to discuss the incident of Joab: They brought Joab before Solomon, who judged him. Solomon said to Joab: What is the reason that you killed Abner? Joab said to him: I was the blood redeemer of the blood of Asahel; when Abner murdered my brother Asahel I killed him, in fulfillment of my duty as his blood redeemer. Solomon said to him: But Asahel was pursuing Abner with the intention of killing him, and therefore he had the status of a pursuer. Since Abner killed Asahel in an act of self-defense, you had no right to kill him as a redeemer of Asahel’s blood. Joab said to Solomon: Abner could have saved himself by wounding Asahel in one of his limbs. Having failed to do so, he was guilty of murder, and I was therefore entitled to kill him.

אמר ליה לא יכיל ליה א"ל השתא בדופן חמישית כיון ליה דכתיב (שמואל ב ב, כג) ויכהו אבנר באחרי החנית אל החומש וא"ר יוחנן בדופן חמישית במקום שמרה וכבד תלויין בו באחד מאיבריו לא יכיל ליה Solomon said to him: Abner was not able to injure Asahel, because he was running and could not aim with precision. Joab said to Solomon: Now Abner was able to aim and hit him precisely in the fifth rib, as it is written: “And Abner smote him with the butt end of the spear in the ḥomesh” (II Samuel 2:23), and Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this means that he hit him in the fifth rib, the place where the gallbladder and liver hang. If Abner could aim with precision at the fifth rib, could he not have successfully aimed at one of Asahel’s limbs?

אמר ליה ניזיל אבנר מאי טעמא קטלתיה לעמשא אמר ליה עמשא מורד במלכות הוה דכתיב (שמואל ב כ, ד) ויאמר המלך לעמשא הזעק לי את איש יהודה שלשת ימים וגו' וילך עמשא להזעיק את יהודה ויוחר וגו' Solomon said to Joab: Set aside Abner, as you have presented a convincing argument that you are not liable for his death. But what is the reason you killed Amasa? Joab said to him: I killed Amasa in punishment for his having rebelled against the king, as it is written: “And the king said to Amasa: Muster to me the men of Judah within three days, and be you here present. And Amasa went to call the men of Judah, but he was later than the set time that he had assigned to him” (II Samuel 20:4–5).

אמר ליה עמשא אכין ורקין דרש Solomon said to him: Amasa was not guilty of rebelling against the king because he interpreted the words akh and rak in a restrictive manner, and in that way he limited the king’s authority.

אשכחינהו דפתיח להו במסכתא אמר כתיב (יהושע א, יח) כל איש אשר ימרה את פיך ולא ישמע את דבריך לכל אשר תצונו יומת יכול אפילו לדברי תורה תלמוד לומר רק חזק ואמץ How so? Amasa found the men of Judah starting to study a new tractate. He said to himself: It is written: “Any man who rebels against your commandment, and will not listen to your words in all that you command him, he shall be put to death” (Joshua 1:18), indicating that the king of Israel has unlimited power. Based on these words alone, one might have thought that the king must be obeyed even when that would lead to abstention from the study of the words of Torah. Therefore, that same verse states: “Only [rak] be strong and of a good courage.” The word “rak” is a restrictive term that serves to limit the king’s authority in a situation where obeying his command will minimalize the study of Torah. Consequently, Amasa was justified when he did not muster the men of Judah at the appointed time, and you had no right to kill him.

אלא ההוא גברא מורד במלכות הוה דכתיב (מלכים א ב, כח) והשמועה באה עד יואב כי יואב נטה אחרי אדניה ואחרי אבשלום לא נטה Solomon continued: Rather, the opposite is true. That man, you, Joab, rebelled against the king, as it is written: “Then tidings came to Joab, for Joab had followed after Adonijah, though he had not followed after Absalom. And Joab fled to the tent of the Lord and caught hold of the horns of the altar” (I Kings 2:28). Joab followed Adonijah, thereby rebelling against Solomon, the lawful king.

מאי לא נטה אמר רב יהודה שביקש לנטות ולא נטה ומאי טעמא לא נטה אמר רבי אלעזר עדיין ליחלוחית של דוד קיימת The Gemara asks: What does the verse mean to teach when it says that Joab did not follow Absalom? Rav Yehuda says: It serves to teach that Joab wanted to follow Absalom, but in practice he did not follow him. The Gemara asks: If he wanted to do so, what is the reason that Joab did not follow Absalom? Rabbi Elazar says: When Absalom rebelled against his father, David was still in full possession of his vitality, meaning he was still strong, and Joab feared him.

רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר עדיין איצטגניני של דוד קיימין דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב ארבע מאות ילדים היו לו לדוד כולן בני יפת תואר היו ומגדלי בלורית היו ומהלכין בראשי הגייסות היו והן הן בעלי אגרופין של דוד Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: David’s stars [itztagninei], the planetary influences that determined his fortune, still stood for him. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: David had four hundred children in his army, and all of them were sons of beautiful women taken captive from their gentile homes during war (see Deuteronomy 21:10–14), and they grew their hair in a gentile hair style, and they would go at the head of the troops, and they were the strong-arm enforcers of the house of David, on whose loyalty David’s monarchy relied. As long as David was supported by this force, Joab was afraid to challenge him.

ופליגא דרבי אבא בר כהנא דאמר רבי אבא בר כהנא אילמלא דוד לא עשה יואב מלחמה ואילמלא יואב לא עסק דוד בתורה דכתיב (שמואל ב ח, טו) ויהי דוד עושה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו ויואב בן צרויה על הצבא מה טעם דוד עשה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו משום דיואב על הצבא ומה טעם יואב על הצבא משום דדוד עושה משפט וצדקה לכל עמו The Gemara notes: And those who view Joab in a negative light disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Abba bar Kahana, as Rabbi Abba bar Kahana says: Were it not for David, who studied Torah, Joab would not have been able to wage war successfully, and were it not for the military acumen of Joab, David would not have been able to study Torah. As it is written: “And David executed judgment and justice to all his people, and Joab, son of Zeruiah, was over the army” (II Samuel 8:15–16). What is the reason that David “executed judgment and justice to all his people”? He was able to do so because “Joab, son of Zeruiah, was over the army,” assisting him and fighting his battles. And what is the reason that “Joab, son of Zeruiah, was over the army”? He was able to do so because “David executed judgment and justice to all his people.”

(שמואל ב ג, כו) ויצא יואב מעם דוד וישלח מלאכים אחרי אבנר וישיבו אותו מבור הסירה מאי בור הסירה אמר רבי אבא בר כהנא בור וסירה גרמו לו לאבנר שיהרג § The verse states: “And Joab went out from David, and sent messengers after Abner, and they brought him back from Bor Sirah” (II Samuel 3:26). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the name Bor Sirah? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana says: A well [bor] and a thorn [vesira] caused Abner to be killed. Abner became liable to be killed when he failed to take advantage of two opportunities to bring about a reconciliation between King Saul and David. First, when David cut off a corner of Saul’s robe after he entered a cave in order to relieve himself, and second, when David found Saul sleeping and took the jug of water and the spear from next to his head. Rather than tell Saul that David could have killed him and refrained from doing so, Abner suggested to Saul that his robe may have been torn by a thornbush and that his jug of water may have been taken by one of his own men. These two incidents are alluded to by the words bor, well, i.e., jug of water, and sira, thornbush.

(שמואל ב ג, כז) ויטהו יואב אל תוך השער לדבר אתו בשלי אמר רבי יוחנן שדנו דין סנהדרי א"ל מ"ט קטלתיה לעשאל עשאל רודף היה היה לך להצילו באחד מאיבריו לא יכילי ליה השתא בדופן חמישית כוונת ליה באחד מאיבריו לא יכלת ליה The verse states: “And Joab took him aside in the gate to speak with him quietly” (II Samuel 3:27). Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Joab judged Abner according to the halakha of the Sanhedrin, which would sit in judgment by the gate of the city. How so? Joab said to Abner: What is the reason that you killed Asahel? Abner said to him: Asahel was pursuing me with the intention to kill me, and therefore he had the status of a pursuer, whom I had the right to kill in self-defense. Joab said to Abner: Even so, you could have saved yourself by wounding one of his limbs. Abner replied: I was not able to do so as I was running and could not aim with precision. Joab said to him: Now seeing that you were able to aim and hit him precisely in the fifth rib, could you not have successfully aimed at one of his limbs?

לדבר אתו בשלי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב על עיסקי שלו (שמואל ב ג, כז) ויכהו שם אל החומש אמר רבי יוחנן בדופן חמישית מקום שמרה וכבד תלויין בו The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of “to speak with him quietly [basheli]”? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: He took him aside to speak to him by way of deception [shalu]. As for what is stated: “And Abner smote him with the butt end of the spear in the ḥomesh” (II Samuel 2:23), Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He hit him in the fifth [ḥamishit] rib, the place where the gallbladder and liver hang.

(מלכים א ב, לב) והשיב ה' את דמו על ראשו אשר פגע בשני אנשים צדיקים וטובים ממנו טובים שהיו דורשין אכין ורקין והוא לא דרש צדיקים שהן בפה ולא עשו והוא באיגרת עשה § The verse states that Solomon said to Benaiah, son of Jehoiada, concerning Joab: “And the Lord shall return the blood upon his own head, for he fell upon two men more righteous and better than he” (I Kings 2:32). The Gemara explains: Amasa and Abner were “better” that Joab, as they interpreted the words akh and rak in a restrictive manner that limited the king’s authority, while he did not interpret them in that way, demonstrating that they were greater than him in Torah. Amasa and Abner were also “more righteous” than Joab, as they both received oral instructions directly from Saul to slay the priests of Nov and they did not do so, whereas Joab was instructed by David in a letter to kill Uriah and he did so.

(שמואל ב כ, י) ועמשא לא נשמר בחרב אשר ביד יואב אמר רב שלא חשדו The verse states: “But Amasa took no heed of the sword in Joab’s hand” (II Samuel 20:10). Rav says: Amasa took no heed of the sword because he did not suspect that Joab was capable of murdering him.

(מלכים א ב, לד) ויקבר בביתו במדבר אטו ביתו מדבר הוא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב כמדבר מה מדבר מופקר לכל אף ביתו של יואב מופקר לכל דבר אחר כמדבר מה מדבר מנוקה מגזל ועריות אף ביתו של יואב מנוקה מגזל ועריות (דברי הימים א יא, ח) ויואב יחיה את שאר העיר אמר רב יהודה אפילו מוניני וצחנתא טעים פריס להו: The verse states with regard to Joab: “And he was buried in his own house, in the wilderness” (I Kings 2:34). The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Joab’s house was a wilderness? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Joab’s house was like the wilderness; just as the wilderness is freely open to all, so too, Joab’s house was freely open to all, as he generously opened his house to the poor and made them feel like members of the household. Alternatively, Joab’s house was like the wilderness; just as the wilderness is clean of theft and sexual immorality, as it is uninhabited, so too, Joab’s house was clean of theft and sexual immorality, owing to his righteousness. As for the verse: “And Joab kept alive the rest of the city” (I Chronicles 11:8), Rav Yehuda says: Not only would Joab feed the poor, but he would even give them treats of types of small fish so they would lack for nothing.

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Davidson | Seder Nezikin | Sanhedrin Chapter 7

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Daf 49b

מתני׳ ארבע מיתות נמסרו לבית דין סקילה שריפה הרג וחנק רבי שמעון אומר שריפה סקילה חנק והרג זו מצות הנסקלין: MISHNA: Four types of the death penalty were given over to the court, with which those who committed certain transgressions are executed. They are, in descending order of severity: Stoning, burning, killing by decapitation, and strangulation. Rabbi Shimon says: They are, in descending order of severity: Burning, stoning, strangulation, and killing. This execution, described in the previous chapter, is referring to the mitzva of those who are stoned, i.e., to the process of execution by stoning.

גמ׳ אמר רבא אמר רב סחורא אמר רב הונא כל מקום ששנו חכמים דרך מניין אין מוקדם ומאוחר חוץ משבעה סמנין GEMARA: Rava says that Rav Seḥora says that Rav Huna says: Wherever the Sages taught a halakha by means of a list, there is no significance to the order of their list, except for in the mishna that discusses the seven abrasive substances, where the order is significant.

דתנן שבעה סמנין מעבירין על הכתם רוק תפל ומי גריסי' ומי רגלים ונתר ובורית קמוליא (ואשלך) As we learned in a mishna (Nidda 61b): One applies seven abrasive substances to the stain found on a woman’s clothing in order to find out whether the stain is from menstrual blood, and therefore ritually impure, or whether it is another type of stain, and therefore pure. These substances are: Bland spittle, which is the spittle of someone who has not yet tasted anything in the morning; moisture of grits, which is the spittle of one who has chewed the grits of beans; urine; natron; lye [borit]; Kimolian earth [kimuleya]; and potash. If the stain disappears as a result of the application of all of these substances, the stain is considered to have been from blood.

וקתני סיפא העבירן שלא כסידרן או שהעבירן שבעתן כאחד לא עשה ולא כלום And it is taught in the latter clause of that mishna that the order of the substances is essential, as it states: If one applied them not in the order prescribed for them, or applied all seven of them at once, he has done nothing; the laundering has not been effective.

רב פפא סבא משמיה דרב אמר אף ארבע מיתות מדקא מפליג רבי שמעון ש"מ דוקא קתני ואידך בפלוגתא לא קא מיירי Rav Pappa the elder says in the name of Rav: The four types of the death penalty are also taught in order. This is apparent from the fact that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first order; conclude from it that it is taught in an exact order. The Gemara adds: And the other Sage, Rav Huna, does not include this mishna among those in which the order is significant, as he is not speaking of mishnayot where there is a dispute with regard to the correct order.

רב פפא אמר אף סדר יומא דתנן כל מעשה יום הכפורים האמורים על הסדר אם הקדים מעשה לחבירו לא עשה ולא כלום Rav Pappa says: The order of the service in the Temple on the Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, is also taught in its proper order, as we learned in a mishna (Yoma 60a): With regard to all actions performed in the context of the service of Yom Kippur, which are stated in the Mishna, as in the Torah, in order, the halakha is: If the High Priest performed one action before another, i.e., if he diverged from the order that is written, it is as though he has done nothing.

ואידך ההוא חומרא בעלמא And the other Sage, Rav Huna, does not include this mishna because that is merely a stringency. Although a change in the order invalidates the Yom Kippur service, this is not due to the importance of some rites relative to others, but because this order was established by the Torah.

רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע אמר אף סדר תמיד דקתני עלה זהו סדר תמיד ואידך ההוא למצוה בעלמא Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: The order of the daily offering, described in the mishna at the end of tractate Tamid (33b), is also essential; as it is taught with regard to it: This is the order of the daily offering, indicating that it should be performed in exactly that order. And the other Sage, Rav Huna, does not include this mishna, as that requirement is merely for the mitzva. In other words, it is preferable that the offering be sacrificed in that order, but it is not disqualified if one deviates from that order.

ולאפוקי ממצות חליצה דתנן מצות חליצה בא הוא ויבמתו לפני בית דין היו נותנין לו עצה ההוגנת לו שנאמר (דברים כה, ח) וקראו לו זקני עירו ודברו אליו And Rav Huna’s principle excludes the mitzva of the ritual through which a man whose married brother dies childless [yavam] frees his late brother’s wife [yevama] of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza]; i.e., it teaches that the order of that ceremony is not essential. As we learned in a mishna (Yevamot 106b): The mitzva of ḥalitza is performed in this manner: The yavam and his yevama come before the court, and the judges of the court offer him advice that is appropriate for him as to whether to enter levirate marriage or to perform ḥalitza, as it is stated: “And the elders of his city shall call him and speak to him” (Deuteronomy 25:8).

והיא אומרת (דברים כה, ז) מאן יבמי וגו' והוא אומר לא חפצתי לקחתה ובלשון הקדש היו אומרין And if they decide to perform ḥalitza, she says: “My brother-in-law refused to establish a name for his brother in Israel, he did not wish to consummate the levirate marriage” (Deuteronomy 25:7), and afterward he says: “I do not wish to take her” (Deuteronomy 25:8). And they would say these statements in the sacred tongue, Hebrew.

ונגשה יבמתו אליו לעיני הזקנים וחלצה נעלו וירקה בפניו רוק הנראה לדיינין וענתה ואמרה ככה יעשה לאיש וגו' ונקרא שמו בישראל וגו' The verse states: “His yevama shall approach him, before the elders, and remove his shoe from on his foot and spit before him” (Deuteronomy 25:9). Accordingly, she removes his shoe and she spits before him a quantity of spittle that is visible to the judges. “And she shall respond and say: So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house. And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of he who had his shoe removed” (Deuteronomy 25:9–10).

ואמר רב יהודה מצות חליצה קוראה וקורא חולצת ורוקקת וקוראה And Rav Yehuda says that this is the correct order for the mitzva of ḥalitza: She recites the sentence beginning with “My brother-in-law refused” (Deuteronomy 25:7), and afterward he recites “I do not wish to take her” (Deuteronomy 25:8). Then she removes the shoe, and spits, and recites: “So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9).

והוינן בה מאי קמ"ל מתניתין היא הא קמ"ל מצוה הכי ואי אפיך לית לן בה תניא נמי הכי בין שהקדים חליצה לרקיקה או רקיקה לחליצה מה שעשה עשוי And we discussed it: What is Rav Yehuda teaching us? This is already stated in the mishna. The answer is that this is what Rav Yehuda teaches us: It is a mitzva to perform ḥalitza like this, i.e., this is the proper order, but if one switched the order we have no problem with it; the ḥalitza is still valid, as the order of the ritual is not essential. This is also taught in a baraita: Whether one performed the removal of the shoe before the spitting, or the spitting before the removal of the shoe, what she did is done, i.e., the ḥalitza is valid.

ולאפוקי מהא דתנן כהן גדול משמש בשמונה כלים והדיוט בארבעה בכתונת במכנסים במצנפת ואבנט מוסיף עליהן כהן גדול חושן ואפוד ומעיל וציץ And Rav Huna’s principle also excludes that which we learned in a mishna (Yoma 71b): The High Priest serves, i.e., performs the Temple service, wearing eight garments, and the ordinary priest performs the Temple service wearing four. An ordinary priest performs the Temple service in a tunic, in trousers, in a mitre, and in a belt. The High Priest adds another four garments beyond those worn by the ordinary priest: A breastplate, and an ephod, and a robe, and a frontplate. The order listed in this mishna indicates that the tunic was put on first.

ותניא מנין שלא יהא דבר קודם למכנסים שנאמר (ויקרא טז, ד) ומכנסי בד יהיו על בשרו And it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that nothing precedes the donning of the trousers when the priest dresses? As it is stated: “He shall wear a sacred tunic of linen; and trousers of linen shall be on his flesh” (Leviticus 16:4). This indicates that the trousers come first, as they are worn directly on the flesh, proving that the list in the mishna is not in accordance with the order in which the priests dressed.

ותנא מאי טעמא אקדמיה לכתונת משום דאקדמיה קרא וקרא מאי טעמא אקדמיה משום דמכסיא כולה גופיה עדיפא ליה: The Gemara asks: But if so, what is the reason the tanna mentions the tunic first? The Gemara answers: Because the verse mentions it first. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason the verse mentions it first? The Gemara answers: Because it covers his entire body, the Torah prefers to mention it first.

סקילה שריפה כו': סקילה חמורה משריפה שכן ניתנה למגדף ולעובד ע"ג מאי חומרא שכן פושט ידו בעיקר § The mishna states the types of the death penalty in descending order of severity: Stoning, burning, killing by decapitation, and strangulation. The Gemara discusses the basis for this order. Stoning is considered more severe than burning, as stoning is meted out to one who blasphemes, i.e., one who curses God, and to one who worships idols. For what reason is the severity of these transgressions considered greater than others? Because the transgressor undermines the fundamental tenets of Judaism.

אדרבה שריפה חמורה שכן ניתנה לבת כהן שזינתה ומאי חומרא שכן מחללת את אביה The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; burning is more severe than stoning, as it is meted out to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery (see Leviticus 21:9). And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater than others? Because through her sin she profanes not only herself but her father as well.

Daf 50a

קסברי רבנן נשואה יוצאה לשריפה ולא ארוסה ומדאפקה רחמנא לארוסה בסקילה ש"מ סקילה חמורה The Gemara answers: The Rabbis hold that only the married daughter of a priest who committed adultery is singled out from all those who commit adultery, for burning, but not one who is betrothed, as a betrothed woman who committed adultery, whether or not she is the daughter of a priest, is executed by stoning. And since the Merciful One singles out a betrothed woman who is not married from all married women who commit adultery, to be executed by stoning, conclude from it that stoning is more severe than burning.

סקילה חמורה מסייף שכן ניתנה למגדף ולעובד עבודת כוכבים ומאי חומרא כדאמרן Stoning is considered more severe than decapitation by the sword, as it is meted out to one who blasphemes and to one who worships idols. And for what reason is the severity of these transgressions considered greater than others? As we said, it is because the transgressors undermine the fundamental tenets of Judaism.

אדרבה סייף חמור שכן ניתן לאנשי עיר הנדחת ומאי חומרא שכן ממונן אבד The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; decapitation by the sword would appear to be more severe than stoning, as it is meted out to the people of an idolatrous city, who also undermine the fundamental tenets of Judaism. And for what reason is the severity of this case of an idolatrous city considered greater than others? Because the transgressors are not only executed, their property is destroyed as well.

אמרת איזה כח מרובה כח המדיח או כח הנידח הוי אומר כח המדיח ותניא מדיחי עיר הנדחת בסקילה The Gemara answers: In response to this objection, you should say: The severity of which transgression is greater: The severity of the transgression of the one who subverts the city, inciting them to sin, or the severity of the transgression of the subverted? You must say that the severity of the transgression of the subverter is greater. And it is taught in a baraita: The subverters of an idolatrous city are executed by stoning. Evidently, stoning is a more severe type of execution than decapitation.

סקילה חמורה מחנק שכן ניתן למגדף ולעובד עבודת כוכבים ומאי חומרא כדאמרן Stoning is considered more severe than strangulation, as it is meted out to one who blasphemes and to one who worships idols. And for what reason is the severity of these transgressions considered greater? As we said, it is because the transgressors undermine the fundamental tenets of Judaism.

אדרבה חנק חמור שכן ניתן למכה אביו ואמו ומאי חומרא שכן הוקש כבודן לכבוד המקום The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; strangulation is more severe, as it is meted out to one who wounds his father or his mother. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater? Because the honor of one’s parents is compared to the honor of the Omnipresent (see Kiddushin 30b).

מדאפקיה רחמנא לארוסה בת ישראל מכלל נשואה בת ישראל מחנק לסקילה ש"מ סקילה חמורה The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One singles out the case of a betrothed Jewish woman from the category of a married Jewish woman, changing the punishment of a betrothed Jewish woman who committed adultery from strangulation to stoning, conclude from it that stoning is more severe.

שריפה חמורה מסייף שכן ניתנה לבת כהן שזינתה ומאי חומרא שכן מחללת את אביה Burning is considered more severe than decapitation by the sword, as it is meted out to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater than others? Because she profanes both herself and her father.

אדרבה סייף חמור שכן ניתן לאנשי עיר הנדחת ומאי חומרא שכן ממונן אבד The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; decapitation by the sword is more severe, as it is meted out to the people of an idolatrous city. And for what reason is the severity of this case considered greater? Because the transgressors are not only executed, their property is destroyed as well.

נאמר אביה בסקילה ונאמר אביה בשריפה מה אביה האמור בסקילה סקילה חמורה מסייף אף אביה האמור בשריפה שריפה חמורה מסייף The Gemara answers: The severity of burning is derived by means of a verbal analogy. The term “her father” is stated with regard to stoning, in the verse: “And the men of her city shall stone her with stones and she shall die, because she has done a depraved thing in Israel, to play the harlot in the house of her father” (Deuteronomy 22:21), and the term “her father” is stated with regard to burning, in the verse: “And the daughter of a priest, when she profanes herself by playing the harlot, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 21:9). Therefore, just as, concerning the term “her father” that is stated with regard to stoning it is established that stoning is more severe than decapitation by the sword, so too, concerning the term “her father” that is stated with regard to burning, it may be established that burning is more severe than decapitation by the sword.

שריפה חמורה מחנק שכן ניתנה לבת כהן שזינתה ומאי חומרא כדאמרן Burning is considered more severe than strangulation, as it is meted out to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater? As we said, because she profanes both herself and her father.

מדאפקיה רחמנא לנשואה בת כהן מכלל נשואה בת ישראל מחנק לשריפה ש"מ שריפה חמורה The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One singles out the case of the married daughter of a priest from the category of a married Jewish woman, changing the punishment of the married daughter of a priest who committed adultery from strangulation to burning, conclude from it that burning is more severe than strangulation.

סייף חמור מחנק שכן ניתן לאנשי עיר הנדחת ומאי חומרא שכן ממונם אבד Decapitation by the sword is considered more severe than strangulation, as it is meted out to the people of an idolatrous city. And for what reason is the severity of this case considered greater? Because their property is destroyed as well.

אדרבה חנק חמור שכן ניתן למכה אביו ואמו ומאי חומרא שכן הוקש כו' The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; strangulation is more severe, as it is meted out to one who wounds his father or his mother. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater? Because the honor of one’s parents is compared to the honor of the Omnipresent.

אפילו הכי פושט ידו בעיקר עדיף: The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, the transgression of one who undermines the fundamental tenets of Judaism is more severe, as he defiles the honor of the Omnipresent Himself, so his punishment must certainly be the most severe.

רבי שמעון אומר כו': שריפה חמורה מסקילה שכן ניתנה לבת כהן שזינתה ומאי חומרא שכן מחללת את אביה § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says that the order of severity is burning, stoning, strangulation, and killing. The Gemara explains the basis for his opinion. Burning is considered more severe than stoning, as burning is meted out to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater than the others? Because she profanes both herself and her father.

אדרבה סקילה חמורה שכן ניתנה למגדף ולעובד עבודת כוכבים ומאי חומרא שכן פושט ידו בעיקר The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; stoning is more severe, as it is meted out to one who blasphemes and to one who worships idols. And for what reason is the severity of these transgressions greater? Because the transgressor undermines the fundamental tenets of Judaism.

רבי שמעון לטעמיה דאמר אחת ארוסה ואחת נשואה יצאה לשרפה ומדאפקיה רחמנא לארוסה בת כהן מכלל ארוסה בת ישראל מסקילה לשריפה ש"מ שריפה חמורה The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says that the daughter of a priest, whether she is betrothed or married, is singled out for burning. And since the Merciful One singles out the case of the betrothed daughter of a priest from the category of a betrothed Jewish woman, changing her punishment from execution by stoning to execution by burning, conclude from it that burning is more severe than stoning, as the punishment for a priest’s daughter who committed adultery must certainly be more severe than that of the daughter of a non-priest.

שריפה חמורה מחנק שכן ניתנה לבת כהן שזינתה ומאי חומרא כדאמרן The Gemara continues to explain the order of severity according to Rabbi Shimon. Burning is considered more severe than strangulation, as it is meted out to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater? As we said, it is because she profanes both herself and her father.

אדרבה חנק חמור שכן ניתן למכה אביו ואמו ומאי חומר' שכן הוקש כבודם לכבוד המקו' The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; strangulation is more severe, as it is meted out to one who wounds his father or his mother. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater? Because the honor of one’s parents is compared to the honor of the Omnipresent.

מדאפקיה רחמנא לנשואה בת כהן מכלל נשואה בת ישראל מחנק לשריפה ש"מ שריפה חמורה The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One singles out the case of the married daughter of a priest who committed adultery from the category of a married Jewish woman who committed adultery, changing her punishment from execution by strangulation to execution by burning, conclude from it that burning is more severe than strangulation.

שריפה חמורה מסייף שכן ניתנה לבת כהן שזינתה ומאי חומרא כדאמרן Burning is considered more severe than decapitation by the sword, as it is meted out to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater? As we said, it is because she profanes both herself and her father.

אדרבה סייף חמור שכן ניתן לאנשי עיר הנדחת ומאי חומרא שכן ממונם אבד The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; decapitation by the sword is more severe, as it is meted out to the people of an idolatrous city. And for what reason is the severity of this case considered greater? Because their property is destroyed as well.

אמרת וכי איזה כח מרובה כח המדיח או כח הנידח The Gemara answers: In response to this objection, you should say: But the severity of which transgression is greater: The severity of the transgression of the subverter, or the severity of the transgression of the subverted?

Daf 50b

הוי אומר כח המדיח וקל וחומר ומה חנק שחמור מסייף שריפה חמורה ממנו סייף הקל לא כ"ש You must say that the severity of the transgression of the subverter is greater. Since those who subverted the people of an idolatrous city are executed by stoning, this is evidently a more severe type of capital punishment than decapitation. And it is inferred a fortiori that if it is so that concerning strangulation, which is more severe than decapitation by the sword, nevertheless burning is more severe than it, is it not all the more so obvious that burning is more severe than decapitation by the sword, which is a more lenient type of execution compared to strangulation?

סקילה חמורה מחנק שכן ניתנה למגדף ולעובד עבודת כוכבים ומאי חומרא כדאמרן Stoning is considered more severe than strangulation, as it is meted out to one who blasphemes and to one who worships idols. And for what reason is the severity of these transgressions considered greater? As we said, it is because the transgressors undermine the fundamental tenets of Judaism.

מדאפקיה רחמנא לארוסה בת ישראל מכלל נשואה בת ישראל מחנק לסקילה שמע מינה סקילה חמורה The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One singles out the case of the betrothed daughter of a non-priest who committed adultery from the category of a married Jewish woman who committed adultery, changing her punishment from execution by strangulation to execution by stoning, conclude from it that stoning is more severe.

סקילה חמורה מסייף שכן ניתנה למגדף כו' אדרבה סייף חמור שכן ניתן לאנשי עיר הנדחת ומאי חומרא שכן ממונם אבד Stoning is considered more severe than decapitation by the sword, as it is meted out to one who blasphemes and to one who worships idols. The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; decapitation by the sword is more severe, as it is meted out to the people of an idolatrous city. And for what reason is the severity of this case considered greater? Because their property is destroyed as well.

אמרת וכי איזה כח מרובה כח המדיח או כח הנידח הוי אומר כח המדיח וקל וחומר ומה חנק שחמור מסייף סקילה חמורה ממנו סייף הקל לא כ"ש The Gemara answers that in response to this objection you should say: But the severity of which transgression is greater: The severity of the transgression of the subverter, or the severity of the transgression of the subverted? You must say that the severity of the transgression of the subverter is greater. Since those who subverted the people of an idolatrous city are executed by stoning, this punishment is evidently more severe than decapitation. And it is inferred a fortiori that if it is so that concerning strangulation, which is more severe than decapitation by the sword, nevertheless stoning is more severe than it, is it not all the more so obvious that stoning is more severe than decapitation by the sword, which is a more lenient type of execution compared to strangulation?

חנק חמור מסייף שכן ניתן למכה אביו ואמו ומאי חומרא כדאמרן Strangulation is more severe than decapitation by the sword, as it is meted out to one who wounds his father or his mother. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater? As we said, because the honor of one’s parents is compared to the honor of the Omnipresent.

אדרבה סייף חמור שכן ניתן לאנשי עיר הנדחת ומאי חומרא שכן ממונם אבד The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary; decapitation by the sword is more severe, as it is meted out to the people of an idolatrous city. And for what reason is the severity of this transgression considered greater? Because their property is destroyed as well.

אמרת וכי איזה כח מרובה כח המדיח או כח הנידח הוי אומר כח המדיח ותניא מדיחי עיר הנדחת בסקילה ר"ש אומר בחנק The Gemara answers that you should say in response to this objection: But the severity of which transgression is greater: The severity of the transgression of the subverter, or the severity of the transgression of the subverted? You must say that the severity of the transgression of the subverter is greater, and it is taught in a baraita: The subverters of an idolatrous city are executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: By strangulation. Therefore, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, it is clear that strangulation is a more severe type of capital punishment than decapitation.

מרגלא בפומיה דרבי יוחנן נערה המאורסה בת כהן שזינתה בסקילה ר"ש אומר בשריפה זינתה מאביה בסקילה ר"ש אומר בשריפה § Rabbi Yoḥanan was wont to say the following baraita: A betrothed young woman who is the daughter of a priest and who committed adultery is executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: She is executed by burning. A betrothed young woman who is the daughter of a non-priest and who engaged in intercourse with her father is executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: By burning.

מאי קמ"ל לרבנן נשואה יצאה לשריפה ולא ארוסה לר' שמעון אחת ארוסה ואחת נשואה יצאה לשריפה וטעמא מאי משום דלרבנן סקילה חמורה לר' שמעון שריפה חמורה The Gemara asks: What does this baraita teach us? The Gemara answers: It teaches us that according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the married daughter of a priest is singled out for burning, and not a betrothed one, who is executed by stoning. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the daughter of a priest, whether she is betrothed or married, is singled out for burning. And what is the reason for their respective opinions with regard to the punishment of the daughter of a priest? It is because according to the Rabbis stoning is more severe than burning, whereas according to Rabbi Shimon burning is more severe.

נפקא מינה למי שנתחייב שתי מיתות ב"ד נידון בחמורה In addition to the case of the priest’s daughter who committed adultery, there is a practical difference between these two opinions, which is that one who was sentenced to two different court-imposed death penalties for two sins he committed is punished with the more severe of the two, and these tanna’im disagree as to which type of death penalty is more severe.

מאי רבי שמעון דתניא רבי שמעון אומר שני כללות נאמרו בבת כהן What is the source of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that a priest’s betrothed daughter who committed adultery is executed by stoning? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: Two general halakhot are stated in the Torah with regard to the daughter of a priest, one rendering the betrothed daughter of a priest who committed adultery liable to be executed by stoning, and the other rendering the married daughter of a priest who committed adultery liable to be executed by strangulation.

בבת כהן ולא בבת ישראל אימא אף בבת כהן The Gemara interrupts the baraita and asks: Are they stated only with regard to the daughter of a priest, and not with regard to the daughter of a non-priest? Aren’t these halakhot stated with regard to the daughter of a non-priest as well? Rather, emend the text and say: These two halakhot are stated with regard to the daughter of a priest as well.

והוציא הכתוב נשואה מכלל נשואה וארוסה מכלל ארוסה The baraita continues: The verse: “And the daughter of a priest, when she profanes herself by playing the harlot, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 21:9), is stated with regard to both a betrothed woman and a married woman. And the verse thereby singles out the married daughter of a priest from the category of an ordinary married woman, whose punishment is execution by strangulation, and it singles out the betrothed daughter of a priest from the category of an ordinary betrothed woman, who is executed by stoning.

מה כשהוציא הכתוב נשואה מכלל נשואה להחמיר אף כשהוציא הכתוב ארוסה מכלל ארוסה להחמיר Therefore, just as when the verse singles out the married daughter of a priest from the category of a married woman it is to render her punishment more severe, so too, when the verse singles out the betrothed daughter of a priest from the category of a betrothed woman it is to render her punishment more severe. This indicates that burning is a more severe type of capital punishment than stoning.

זוממי נשואה בת כהן בכלל זוממי נשואה בת ישראל וזוממי ארוסה בת כהן בכלל זוממי ארוסה בת ישראל The punishment for the conspiring witnesses concerning the married daughter of a priest, who testified falsely that she committed adultery, is included in the punishment for the conspiring witnesses concerning the married daughter of a non-priest, and the punishment for the conspiring witnesses concerning the betrothed daughter of a priest is included in the punishment for the conspiring witnesses concerning the betrothed daughter of a non-priest. The Torah is not more severe with them; the conspiring witnesses in the case of any married woman accused of committing adultery are strangled, and the conspiring witnesses in the case of any betrothed woman accused of committing adultery are stoned.

ת"ר (ויקרא כא, ט) ובת איש כהן כי תחל יכול אפילו חללה את השבת ת"ל (ויקרא כא, ט) לזנות בחילולין שבזנות הכתוב מדבר The Sages taught: The verse states: “And the daughter of a priest [ish kohen], when she profanes herself by playing the harlot, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 21:9). One might have thought that the expression “when she profanes [ki teḥel]” is referring even to one who desecrated [ḥillela] Shabbat; she too should be executed by burning. To counter this, the verse states: “By playing the harlot”; the verse is speaking of profanation through promiscuity.

יכול אפילו פנויה נאמר כאן אביה ונאמר להלן אביה מה להלן זנות עם זיקת הבעל אף כאן זנות עם זיקת הבעל One might have thought even if she is unmarried and she engaged in promiscuous intercourse she should be executed by burning. This is incorrect, as here it is stated: “Her father,” and there it is stated with regard to a betrothed woman who committed adultery: “Because she has done a depraved thing in Israel, to play the harlot in the house of her father” (Deuteronomy 22:21). Just as there, the reference is to the promiscuous intercourse of one who has a bond to a husband, so too here, the reference is to the promiscuous intercourse of one who has a bond to a husband.

או אינו אומר אביה אלא להוציא את כל האדם כשהוא אומר (ויקרא כא, ט) היא מחללת הוי כל אדם אמור Or perhaps one might have thought that the verse states “her father” only in order to exclude all men except her father, i.e., she is liable to be executed by burning only if she engaged in intercourse with her father. To counter this, when it states “she profanes,” indicating that it is she who profanes her father and not her father who profanes himself and her, all men are stated, i.e., included.

הא מה אני מקיים אביה נאמר כאן אביה ונאמר להלן אביה מה להלן זנות עם זיקת הבעל אף כאן זנות עם זיקת הבעל Therefore, how do I realize the meaning of the expression “she profanes her father”? What halakha does it teach? The baraita answers: Here it is stated: “Her father,” and there it is stated: “Her father.” Just as there, the reference is to the promiscuous intercourse of one who has a bond to a husband, so too here, the reference is to the promiscuous intercourse of one who has a bond to a husband.

אי מה להלן נערה והיא ארוסה אף כאן נערה והיא ארוסה נערה והיא נשואה בוגרת והיא ארוסה בוגרת והיא נשואה ואפילו הזקינה מנין The baraita asks: If the halakha of the priest’s daughter who committed adultery is compared, by means of a verbal analogy, to the halakha of a betrothed woman who committed adultery, then perhaps one should say that just as there the reference is specifically to a young woman, i.e., to one whose first signs of maturity appeared within the past half year, who is betrothed, so too here, in the case of the daughter of a priest, the reference is to a young woman who is betrothed. But if she is a young woman who is married, or a grown woman who is betrothed, or a grown woman who is married, or even if she grew old, and is not normally referred to as a daughter, from where is it derived that her punishment is execution by burning?

תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כא, ט) ובת כהן מכל מקום The verse states: “And the daughter of a priest,” in any case. It is derived from the conjunction “and,” represented by the letter vav, that this punishment applies to any woman who is the daughter of a priest.

בת כהן The verse states: “The daughter of a priest.”

Daf 51a

אין לי אלא שניסת לכהן ניסת ללוי ולישראל לעובד כוכבים לחלל לממזר ולנתין מניין ת"ל (ויקרא כא, ט) ובת איש כהן אע"פ שאינה כהנת I have a source only for the case of a priest’s daughter who married a priest. From where do I derive that she is also liable to be executed by burning if she married a Levite or an Israelite, a Samaritan, a priest disqualified due to flawed lineage [ḥalal], a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer], or a Gibeonite? The verse states: “And the daughter of a priest,” indicating that this halakha applies even if she is not now a priestess, having married a non-priest.

(ויקרא כא, ט) היא בשריפה ואין בועלה בשריפה היא בשריפה ואין זוממיה בשריפה It is derived from the verse: “She shall be burned with fire,” that she is executed by burning, but her paramour is not executed by burning; his punishment is the same as that of one who engages in adulterous intercourse with the betrothed or married daughter of a non-priest. It is further derived from the word “she” that she is executed by burning, but witnesses who testified concerning her that she committed adultery and who were proven to be conspiring witnesses are not executed by burning.

רבי אליעזר אומר את אביה בשריפה ואת חמיה בסקילה The baraita concludes: Rabbi Eliezer says: If she is with her father she is executed by burning, and if she is with her father-in-law she is executed by stoning, as the Gemara will explain below.

אמר מר יכול אפילו חיללה שבת חיללה שבת בת סקילה היא § After quoting this baraita, the Gemara now clarifies and discusses it. The Master said in the baraita: One might have thought that even one who desecrated Shabbat should be executed by burning. The Gemara asks: If she desecrated Shabbat she is liable to be executed by stoning, just like anyone else who desecrates Shabbat, so why would one think that because she is the daughter of a priest she should be executed by burning, a less severe type of capital punishment?

אמר רבא הא מני ר"ש היא דאמר שריפה חמורה סד"א הואיל ואחמיר בהו רחמנא בכהני דרבי בהו מצות יתירות תידון בשריפה קא משמע לן Rava says: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that burning is more severe than stoning. It might enter your mind to say that since the Merciful One treats priests more stringently, in that He gave them additional mitzvot, the daughter of a priest should be punished for desecrating Shabbat by burning, which, according to Rabbi Shimon, is more severe than stoning. Therefore, the verse teaches us that with regard to the desecration of Shabbat, the daughter of a priest receives the same punishment as the rest of the Jewish people.

מאי שנא מיניה דידיה The Gemara asks: In what way is she different from the priest himself? A priest who desecrates Shabbat is executed by stoning, so why would one have thought that the daughter of a priest should be punished by burning?

סלקא דעתך אמינא איהו דאשתריא ליה שבת לגבי עבודה היא כיון דלא אשתריא שבת לגבה אימא תידון בשריפה קא משמע לן The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that concerning the priest himself, the halakhot of Shabbat are less stringent, as acts that are forbidden on Shabbat are permitted to him with regard to the performance of the Temple service. Therefore, one might have thought that if a priest desecrates Shabbat in a manner that is forbidden to him, his punishment should not be more severe than that of a non-priest. But concerning her, the daughter of a priest, since acts that are forbidden on Shabbat are not permitted to her at all, as she does not perform the Temple service, one might say that she should be punished by burning, which is more severe. Therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so.

יכול אפילו פנויה הא לזנות כתיב The baraita teaches: One might have thought that even if she is unmarried and engages in promiscuous intercourse she should be executed by burning. The Gemara asks: Why might one think this? Isn’t it written in the verse: “When she profanes herself by playing the harlot [liznot]”? This term is referring to a sinful relationship such as adultery and not to the promiscuous intercourse of an unmarried woman.

כדר"א דאמר פנוי הבא על הפנויה שלא לשום אישות עשאה זונה The Gemara answers: The statement of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: An unmarried man who engages in intercourse with an unmarried woman, not for the purpose of marriage, has rendered her a zona, i.e., a woman who has engaged in intercourse with a man forbidden to her by the Torah. In the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, the term liznot is referring to any promiscuous intercourse.

או אינו אומר אביה אלא להוציא את כל אדם אלא מאי ניהו שזינתה מאביה מאי איריא בת כהן אפילו בת ישראל נמי The baraita teaches: Or perhaps one might have thought that the verse states “her father” only in order to exclude all men other than her father. The Gemara asks: Rather, what case is the verse referring to? Is it a case where she engaged in intercourse with her father? If so, why does the verse specifically mention the daughter of a priest? Even the daughter of a non-priest is executed by burning in such a case.

דאמר רבא אמר לי רב יצחק בר אבודימי אתיא הנה הנה The Gemara answers that the prohibition of and punishment for intercourse between a father and daughter are not stated explicitly in the Torah; rather, they are derived by means of two verbal analogies. As Rava said: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi said to me: This prohibition is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word henna in the verse: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, their nakedness you shall not uncover; for theirs [henna] is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), and the word henna in a different verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness. They [henna] are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). This verbal analogy indicates that just as it is prohibited to engage in intercourse with one’s granddaughter and with one’s wife’s daughter or granddaughter, so too, it is prohibited to engage in intercourse with one’s daughter.

אתיא זמה זמה Furthermore, it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word “lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17) and the word “lewdness” in the verse: “And if a man take with his wife also her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire, both he and they, so that there be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14), that one who engages in intercourse with his daughter or granddaughter is liable to be executed by burning.

איצטריך סד"א קרא לאפוקי מדרבא מדגלי רחמנא בבת כהן ולא בבת ישראל קמ"ל Since the punishment for engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter is derived from a verbal analogy and is not stated explicitly, it was necessary for the verse to indicate that the daughter of a priest is liable to be executed by burning even if she commits adultery with a man who is not her father. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that the verse concerning the daughter of a priest is stated to exclude the statement of Rava in the following manner: From the fact that the Merciful One revealed this punishment explicitly with regard to the daughter of a priest and not with regard to the daughter of a non-priest, it may be derived that the punishment of burning does not apply to the daughter of a non-priest. Therefore, the verse teaches us through the expression “she profanes” that it is referring to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery with any man, and not just with her father.

בת כהן אין לי אלא שניסת לכהן ניסת ללוי לישראל ולעובד כוכבים ולחלל לנתין ולממזר מניין תלמוד לומר בת איש כהן אף על פי שאינה כהנת The baraita teaches: From the expression “the daughter of a priest,” I have a source only for the case of a priest’s daughter who married a priest. From where is it derived that she is also liable to be executed by burning if she married a Levite, an Israelite, a Samaritan, a ḥalal, a Gibeonite, or a mamzer? The verse states: “And the daughter of a priest,” indicating that this halakha applies even if she is not now a priestess.

משום דאינסבא להו להני לאו בת כהן היא ותו מידי כהנת לכהן כתיב The Gemara asks: Because she married one of these men who are not priests, is she no longer the daughter of a priest? Why should her punishment be different in these cases? And furthermore, is it written: A priestess who married a priest? The verse refers only to the status of her father, not to that of her husband.

סד"א (ויקרא כא, ט) כי תחל לזנות אמר רחמנא הני מילי היכא דקא מתחלא השתא אבל הא כיון דקא מתחלא וקיימא מעיקרא The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that when the Merciful One states: “When she profanes herself by playing the harlot,” it indicates that this matter applies only in a case where she profanes herself now by committing adultery. But in this case, where she is married to a non-priest, since she is already profaned from the outset, from the time of her marriage, the verse does not apply to her.

דאמר מר (ויקרא כב, יב) ובת כהן כי תהיה לאיש זר כיון שנבעלה לפסול לה פסלה The Gemara clarifies: If she is married to a man of flawed lineage, she is already profaned. As the Master said, it is derived from the verse: “And if a priest’s daughter be married to a non-priest, she shall not eat of that which is set apart from the sacred” (Leviticus 22:12), that once she engaged in intercourse with one who is unfit for her, he has disqualified her from ever partaking of teruma.

ללוי וישראל נמי (ויקרא כב, יג) ושבה אל בית אביה כנעוריה מכלל דכי איתיה גביה לא אכלה And if she is married to a Levite or an Israelite, she is also disqualified from partaking of teruma for as long as they are married; as the verse states: “But if a priest’s daughter is a widow, or divorced, and has no child, and returns to her father’s house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13). By inference, while she is with her non-priest husband, she does not partake of teruma.

אימא לא תידון בשריפה קמ"ל Evidently, the marriage of the daughter of a priest to anyone who is not a priest involves some measure of profanation, and therefore one might say that she should not be punished by burning, the punishment unique to the daughter of a priest, if she committed adultery. Therefore, the verse teaches us that the punishment of execution by burning applies to any daughter of a priest, regardless of the status of her husband.

ודלא כר"מ דתניא בת כהן שניסת לישראל ואכלה תרומה משלמת את הקרן ואינה משלמת את החומש ומיתתה בשריפה The Gemara adds: And this baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a priest’s daughter who married an Israelite and then unwittingly partook of teruma, she pays the principal, as she partook of teruma to which she has no rights, but she does not pay the additional one-fifth, the fine paid by a non-priest who partakes of teruma unwittingly. This is because she is not completely disqualified from the priesthood; if she were to be widowed or divorced without children, it would again be permitted for her to partake of teruma. And, as befits the daughter of a priest, if she commits adultery, her death penalty is by burning.

ניסת לאחד מן הפסולין משלמת קרן וחומש ומיתתה בחנק דברי ר' מאיר Rabbi Meir continues: But if she married one of the men who are unfit for her, e.g., a ḥalal, a mamzer, or a Gibeonite, and she unwittingly partook of teruma, she pays the principal and the additional one-fifth, as she is permanently disqualified from partaking of teruma. And similarly, if she commits adultery, her death penalty is by strangulation, like the daughter of a non-priest, as she is completely disqualified from the priesthood. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וחכמים אומרים זו וזו משלמות קרן ולא חומש ומיתתן בשריפה And the Rabbis say: Both this one, who married an Israelite, and that one, who married a man of flawed lineage, pay the principal and not the additional one-fifth, as they do not entirely forfeit their priesthood, and their death penalty is by burning, in accordance with the above baraita.

ר"א אומר את אביה בשריפה ואת חמיה בסקילה מאי את אביה ואת חמיה The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita, which teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: If she is with her father she is executed by burning, and if she is with her father-in-law, she is executed by stoning. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the expressions: With her father, and: With her father-in-law?

אילימא את אביה מאביה ואת חמיה מחמיה מאי איריא בת כהן אפילו בת ישראל נמי בתו בשריפה וכלתו בסקילה If we say that with her father means she engages in intercourse with her father, and with her father-in-law means she engages in intercourse with her father-in-law, why is this halakha stated specifically with regard to the daughter of a priest? Even in the case of the daughter of a non-priest the halakha is the same; in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his daughter, they are executed by burning, and in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law, they are executed by stoning.

אלא את אביה ברשות אביה ואת חמיה ברשות חמיה Rather, the expression: With her father, means under her father’s authority, i.e., she is still betrothed and not married yet, and the expression: With her father-in-law, means under her father-in-law’s authority, i.e., she is married.

כמאן אי כרבנן האמרי נשואה יצאת לשריפה ולא ארוסה אי כרבי שמעון האמר אחת ארוסה ואחת נשואה בשריפה The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, don’t they say that the married daughter of a priest who committed adultery is singled out for execution by burning, but not one who is betrothed? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say that both the betrothed daughter of a priest and the married one are executed by burning? The opinion of Rabbi Eliezer does not accord with either of these opinions.

ואי כרבי ישמעאל האמר ארוסה יצאת לשריפה ולא נשואה את חמיה חנק הוא And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael (see 51b), doesn’t he say that only the betrothed daughter of a priest is singled out for execution by burning, but not one who is married? In his opinion, if the daughter of a priest is under the authority of her father-in-law, i.e., if she is married, her punishment is death by strangulation, like any other married woman who committed adultery.

שלח רבין משמיה דרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא כך היא הצעה של משנה לעולם כרבנן והכי קאמר כל שהוא למטה ממיתת אביה ומאי ניהו נשוא' בת ישראל דאילו נשוא' בת ישראל בחנק הכא במיתת אביה בשריפה Ravin sent the following explanation in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina: This is the explanation [hatza’a] of this mishna, i.e., the baraita: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And this is what it is saying: With regard to any act of adultery whose punishment is less severe than the death penalty for one who engages in intercourse with her father, here, in the case of the daughter of a priest, she receives the death penalty of one who engages in intercourse with her father, namely, execution by burning. And what act of adultery carries a less severe punishment than intercourse with one’s father? It is the case of the married daughter of a non-priest; as the married daughter of a non-priest who committed adultery is executed by strangulation.

כל שהיא למעלה ממיתת אביה ומאי ניהו ארוסה בת ישראל דאילו ארוסה בת ישראל בעלמא בסקילה הכא במיתת חמיה בסקילה With regard to any act of adultery whose punishment is more severe than the death penalty for one who engages in intercourse with her father, here, in the case of the daughter of a priest, she receives the death penalty of one who engages in intercourse with her father-in-law, namely, execution by stoning. And what case is it? It is the case of the betrothed daughter of a non-priest, as in general, the betrothed daughter of a non-priest who committed adultery is executed by stoning.

מתקיף לה ר' ירמיה מידי למעלה למטה קתני אלא אמר רבי ירמיה Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this explanation: Does the baraita teach the words more and less? These words, central to this interpretation, are not mentioned at all. Rather, Rabbi Yirmeya says an alternative interpretation:

Daf 51b

לעולם כרבי ישמעאל והכי קאמר את אביה ברשות אביה בשריפה ואת חמיה מחמיה בסקילה וכל אדם בחנק Actually, Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and this is what he is saying: The expression: With her father, means under her father’s authority, i.e., she is still betrothed, and she is executed by burning if she commits adultery. And the expression: With her father-in-law, means that after getting married, she engages in intercourse with her father-in-law, and she is therefore executed by stoning. And if she commits adultery with any other man after getting married, she is executed by strangulation, like any other married woman.

אמר רבא מאי שנא או אידי ואידי ממש או אידי ואידי רשות Rava says: What is different between the wording of the two clauses of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that allows for them to be understood differently? Either explain this one and that one literally, i.e., that she engages in intercourse with her father or father-in-law, or explain this one and that one as referring to the authority of the father or father-in-law.

אלא אמר רבא לעולם כר"ש וקסבר ר"א נשואה כארוסה מה ארוסה חד דרגא מסקינן לה מסקילה לשריפה אף נשואה חד דרגא מסקינן לה מחנק לסקילה Rather, Rava says: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that burning is more severe than stoning, and Rabbi Eliezer holds that the halakha of the married daughter of a priest is comparable to that of the betrothed one. Just as with regard to the betrothed daughter of a priest we raise her punishment by one level vis-à-vis the betrothed daughter of a non-priest, from stoning to burning, so too, with regard to the married daughter of a priest, we raise her punishment by one level vis-à-vis the married daughter of a non-priest, from strangulation to stoning.

מתקיף לה ר' חנינא הא אידי ואידי ר"ש בשריפה קאמר Rav Ḥanina objects to this explanation: Doesn’t Rabbi Shimon himself say that both in this case and in that case, i.e., whether she is betrothed or married, the daughter of a priest is executed by burning? His opinion cannot be interpreted contrary to his own statement.

אלא אמר רבינא לעולם כרבנן ואיפוך את אביה בסקילה ואת חמיה בשריפה והאי דקאמר את אביה סירכא בעלמא נקט: Rather, Ravina says: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that the married daughter of a priest is executed by burning and the betrothed daughter of a priest is executed by stoning. And reverse the wording of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement as follows: When she is with her father, i.e., when she is betrothed, she is executed by stoning, and when she is with her father-in-law, i.e., when she is married, she is executed by burning. And the fact that the tanna states the phrase: With her father, instead of simply stating that she is betrothed, is because he was merely drawn to the common usage, i.e., the wording of the verse, and employed it.

אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר רב הלכה כדשלח רבין משמיה דרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר רב יוסף הלכתא למשיחא Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: The halakha in this matter is in accordance with the explanation that Ravin sent in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. Rav Yosef said in response: Does one issue a halakha for the messianic period? Since the destruction of the Temple, courts do not have the authority to adjudicate capital cases (see 52b), and this authority will be restored only once the Temple is rebuilt, in the messianic period. Therefore, what is the purpose of stating the halakha in this matter when it is not currently relevant?

א"ל אביי אלא מעתה שחיטת קדשים לא ליתני הלכתא למשיחא אלא דרוש וקבל שכר הכא נמי דרוש וקבל שכר Abaye said to him: If that is so, let the tanna not teach all the halakhot of the slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., tractate Zevaḥim, as it is entirely a halakha for the messianic period. Rather, one studies these halakhot due to the principle of: Study Torah and receive reward, i.e., one is rewarded for the study of Torah regardless of its practical applicability. Here too, study Torah and receive reward.

הכי קאמרי הלכתא למה לי סוגיא דשמעתא הלכה קאמר Rav Yosef responded: This is what I meant to say: Why do I need the halakha with regard to this subject to be stated? Is a halakha stated in the discussion of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement? The statements of the amora’im are merely explanations of how to understand the wording of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement, but there is no difference between them with regard to the halakha.

מאי רבי ישמעאל דתניא (ויקרא כא, ט) ובת [איש] כהן כי תחל לזנות בנערה והיא ארוסה הכתוב מדבר § The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael that the betrothed daughter of a priest who committed adultery is executed by burning, whereas the married daughter of a priest who committed adultery is executed by strangulation. What is the source for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? It is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “And the daughter of a priest, when she profanes herself by playing the harlot” (Leviticus 21:9), the verse is speaking of a young woman who is betrothed.

אתה אומר בנער' והיא ארוסה או אינו אלא אפי' נשואה ת"ל (ויקרא כא, יח) איש אשר ינאף את אשת רעהו מות יומת הנואף והנואפת הכל היו בכלל הנואף והנואפת הוציא הכתוב בת ישראל בסקילה ובת כהן בשריפה מה כשהוציא הכתוב את בת ישראל לסקילה ארוסה ולא נשואה אף כשהוציא הכתוב בת כהן לשריפה ארוסה ולא נשואה Do you say that it is referring only to a young woman who is betrothed, or that it is referring even to a married woman? The verse states: “And a man who commits adultery with another man’s wife, he who commits adultery with his neighbor’s wife, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall be put to death” (Leviticus 20:10). All adulterers were included in the category of: “The adulterer and the adulteress,” and were executed by strangulation, until the verse singled out the betrothed daughter of a non-priest for execution by stoning and the daughter of a priest for execution by burning. It is therefore derived that just as when the verse singles out the daughter of a non-priest for stoning the Torah states that the reference is to a woman who is betrothed and not married, so too, when the verse singles out the daughter of a priest for burning it is referring to a woman who is betrothed and not married.

זוממיה ובועלה בכלל (דברים יט, יט) ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם וגו' The baraita continues: The conspiring witnesses concerning the daughter of a priest, and the paramour of the daughter of a priest, are included in the verse: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19).

בועלה מאי כאשר זמם איכא אלא זוממיה בכלל מיתת בועלה The Gemara interjects and asks: What reason is there for the punishment of “as he conspired” to be applied with regard to her paramour? Rather, the baraita should be read: Her conspiring witnesses are included in the death penalty of her paramour, i.e., they are executed by strangulation, which they sought to impose upon her paramour. They are not executed by burning, which is the death penalty that they sought to impose upon her.

משום שנאמר ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו ולא לאחותו דברי רבי ישמעאל This is because it is stated: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother,” which is interpreted to mean: “To his brother,” but not to his sister. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

ר"ע אומר אחת ארוסה ואחת נשואה יצאת לשריפה יכול אפילו פנויה נאמר כאן אביה ונאמר להלן אביה מה להלן זנות עם זיקת הבעל אף כאן זנות עם זיקת הבעל Rabbi Akiva says: Both the betrothed and the married daughter of a priest are singled out for execution by burning. One might have thought that even an unmarried daughter of a priest who engaged in promiscuous intercourse should be executed by burning. This is incorrect, as here it is stated: “Her father,” and there it is stated, with regard to a betrothed woman who committed adultery: “Her father” (Deuteronomy 22:21). It is derived through a verbal analogy that just as below, the reference is to the promiscuous intercourse of one who has a bond to a husband, so too here, the reference is to the promiscuous intercourse of one who has a bond to a husband.

א"ל ר' ישמעאל אי מה להלן נערה והיא ארוסה אף כאן נערה והיא ארוסה Rabbi Yishmael said to him: If the halakha of a priest’s daughter who committed adultery is compared to the halakha of a betrothed woman who committed adultery, then it can be inferred that just as there the reference is specifically to a young woman who is betrothed, so too here, the reference is to a young woman who is betrothed. This serves as a proof for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, which is that only the betrothed daughter of a priest is executed by burning.

א"ל ר"ע ישמעאל אחי (ויקרא כא, ט) בת ובת אני דורש Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yishmael, my brother, I derive it from the fact that the verse could have stated: “The daughter of a priest,” but instead states: “And the daughter of a priest,” with the conjunction “and,” that married daughters of priests are also included in this punishment.

א"ל וכי מפני שאתה דורש בת ובת נוציא זו לשריפה אם משמע להביא את הנשואה הביא את הפנויה ואם משמע להוציא את הפנויה הוציא את הנשואה Rabbi Yishmael said to him: And because you derive this from the difference between the term “the daughter” and the term “and the daughter,” we should take this married daughter of a priest out to be executed by burning? This derivation of yours is inconsistent, because if the conjunction “and” indicates the inclusion of the married daughter of a priest, then it should include the unmarried daughter of a priest too. And if it indicates the exclusion of an unmarried one, exclude the married one as well.

ור"ע אהני גזירה שוה למעוטי פנויה ואהני בת ובת לרבות את הנשואה The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Akiva respond? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Akiva, the verbal analogy between the halakha of the daughter of a priest and the halakha of a betrothed woman serves to exclude the case of an unmarried daughter of a priest from execution by burning, and the distinction between the terms “the daughter” and “and the daughter” serves to include the case of a married woman.

ורבי ישמעאל סבר מדקאמר ליה בת ובת ש"מ הדר ביה מגזירה שוה And Rabbi Yishmael challenged Rabbi Akiva’s opinion because he thought that since Rabbi Akiva had said to him that a married woman is included due to the distinction between “the daughter” and “and the daughter,” it was possible to conclude from it that Rabbi Akiva had retracted his derivation from the verbal analogy, which would have included a married woman, and instead derived the halakha only from the conjunction “and” in the term “and the daughter.” But in fact, Rabbi Akiva combined this derivation with the verbal analogy.

ור' ישמעאל האי בת ובת מאי דריש ביה מיבעי ליה לכדתני אבוהי דשמואל בר אבין לפי שמצינו שחלק הכתוב בזכרים בין תמימים לבעלי מומין יכול נחלוק בבנותיהן ת"ל בת ובת The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he derive from this distinction between “the daughter” and “and the daughter”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which the father of Shmuel bar Avin taught in a baraita: Since we find that the verse differentiates with regard to male priests between unblemished priests and blemished priests, as only unblemished priests may perform the Temple service, one might have thought we should differentiate between their daughters as well, and rule that the daughter of a blemished priest should not be sentenced to execution by burning for adultery. Therefore, instead of stating: “The daughter,” the verse states: “And the daughter,” to include the daughter of a blemished priest.

ורבי עקיבא (ויקרא כא, ו) מוהם מקריבים והיו קדש נפקא The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Akiva derive this? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “They shall be holy to their God, and not profane the name of their God; for the offerings of the Lord, the bread of their Lord, they offer; and they shall be holy” (Leviticus 21:6). From the phrase “And they shall be holy” it is derived that all priests are considered holy, even if they cannot bring offerings in the Temple. Consequently, there is no difference in this regard between the daughter of a blemished priest and the daughter of an unblemished priest.

ור' ישמעאל אי מההיא הוה אמינא ה"מ אינהו אבל בנותיהן לא קמ"ל The Gemara asks: And why does Rabbi Yishmael not derive this halakha from this verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael would say: If it were to be derived from that verse, I would say that this matter applies with regard to the priests themselves, who are considered holy even if they are blemished, but not with regard to their daughters. Therefore, the term “and the daughter” teaches us that the halakha with regard to the daughters of blemished priests is just like the halakha with regard to the daughters of unblemished priests.

ורבי ישמעאל The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael,

Daf 52a

האי (ויקרא כא, ט) את אביה היא מחללת מאי דריש ביה what does he derive from this verse: “She profanes her father” (Leviticus 21:9), if he does not employ the term “her father” for a verbal analogy concerning a young betrothed woman who committed adultery, as Rabbi Akiva does?

מבעי ליה לכדתניא היה רבי מאיר אומר מה ת"ל את אביה היא מחללת שאם היו נוהגין בו קודש נוהגין בו חול כבוד נוהגין בו בזיון אומרין ארור שזו ילד ארור שזו גידל ארור שיצא זו מחלציו The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir would say: Why must the verse state: “She profanes her father”? To teach that if initially they would treat her father in a sacred manner, now they treat him in a profane manner. If previously they would treat him with honor, they now treat him with degradation. They say: Cursed is the one who bore this daughter, cursed is the one who raised this daughter, cursed is the one from whose loins this daughter emerged.

אמר רב אשי כמאן קרינן רשיעא בר רשיעא ואפי' לרשיעא בר צדיקא כמאן כהאי תנא: Rav Ashi says: In accordance with whose opinion do we call even a wicked person who is the son of a righteous person: A wicked person, the son of a wicked person? In accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, Rabbi Meir, who says that a sinful daughter profanes her father, and he too is treated with disgrace.

זו מצות הנסקלין: מאי תנא דקתני זו מצות הנסקלין § The mishna teaches: This describes the mitzva of those who are stoned, i.e., the process of execution by stoning. The Gemara asks: What was taught in the mishna with regard to which it teaches now: This describes the mitzva of those who are stoned?

משום דתנא נגמר הדין מוציאין אותו לסקלו בית הסקילה היה גבוה שתי קומות ואיידי דקא בעי למיתנא מצות הנשרפין תנא נמי זו מצות הנסקלין: The Gemara answers: The Mishna states this because it teaches in the previous chapter (42b): When the trial has ended in a guilty verdict and the condemned man has been sentenced to stoning, he is taken out to be stoned. And it continues (45a): The place of stoning from which the condemned party is pushed to his death is a platform twice the height of an ordinary person. And since the Mishna wants to teach in the next mishna: The mitzva of those who are burned, and it will then proceed to describe the processes involved in carrying out the other forms of execution, it also teaches in this mishna: This describes the mitzva of those who are stoned, in order to summarize what was taught up to this point.

מתני׳ מצות הנשרפין היו משקעין אותו בזבל עד ארכובותיו ונותנין סודר קשה לתוך הרכה וכורך על צוארו זה מושך אצלו וזה מושך אצלו עד שפותח את פיו ומדליק את הפתילה וזורקה לתוך פיו ויורדת לתוך מעיו וחומרת את בני מעיו MISHNA: The mitzva of those who are burned, i.e., the process of execution by burning, is carried out in the following manner: The executioners submerge the condemned one in dung up to his knees so he cannot move, and they place a rough scarf within a soft one, so his throat will not be wounded, and wrap these scarves around his neck. This one, i.e., one of the witnesses, pulls the scarf toward himself, and that one, the other witness, pulls it toward himself, until the condemned one is forced to open his mouth, as he is choking. And another person then lights the wick and throws it into his mouth, and it goes down into his intestines and burns his intestines and he dies.

ר' יהודה אומר אף הוא אם מת בידם לא היו מקיימין בו מצות שריפה אלא פותח את פיו בצבת שלא בטובתו ומדליק את הפתילה וזורקה לתוך פיו ויורדת לתוך מעיו וחומרת את בני מעיו Rabbi Yehuda says: But if this one who is condemned to death by burning accidentally died at their hands by strangulation, they have not fulfilled the mitzva of execution by burning for this person. Rather, the process is carried out in the following manner: One opens the mouth of the condemned person with prongs, against his will, and one lights the wick and throws it into his mouth, and it goes down into his intestines and burns his intestines and he dies.

אמר רבי אלעזר (בן) צדוק מעשה בבת כהן אחת שזינתה והקיפוה חבילי זמורות ושרפוה אמר לו מפני שלא היה בית דין של אותה שעה בקי: Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok said: An incident occurred with regard to a certain priest’s daughter who committed adultery, and they wrapped her in bundles of branches and burned her, contrary to the process described in the mishna. The Sages said to him: That court did not act properly; they did so because the court at that time was not proficient in halakha.

גמ׳ מאי פתילה אמר רב מתנה פתילה של אבר GEMARA: What kind of wick is the mishna referring to? Rav Mattana says: A wick of lead, i.e., a long, thin piece of lead in the shape of a wick, which is melted and poured down into the intestines.

מנא לן אתיא שריפה שריפה מעדת קרח מה להלן שריפת נשמה וגוף קיים אף כאן שריפת נשמה וגוף קיים From where do we derive that burning means this kind of death? It is derived from a verbal analogy between the burning that is described in the context of capital punishment (see Leviticus 21:9) and the burning described with regard to the assembly of Korah, when they were burned by God (see Numbers 17:4). Just as there, with regard to the assembly of Korah, they were killed by the burning of the soul within the body, but the body itself remained intact, so too here, the condemned one is executed by the burning of the soul, but the body remains intact. He is not executed by means of the burning of the body with wood, as in that case the body would be consumed.

רבי אלעזר אמר אתיא שריפה שריפה מבני אהרן מה להלן שריפת נשמה וגוף קיים אף כאן שריפת נשמה וגוף קיים Rabbi Elazar says that there is a different source for this method of burning: It is derived from a verbal analogy between the burning that is described in this context and the burning that is described with regard to the deaths of Nadav and Avihu, the sons of Aaron (see Leviticus 10:6). Just as there, Nadav and Avihu were killed by the burning of the soul, but the body remained intact, so too here, the execution is carried out by the burning of the soul, but the body remains intact.

מאן דיליף מעדת קרח מנא ליה דכתיב (במדבר יז, ג) ואת מחתות החטאים האלה בנפשותם שנשמתן נשרפת וגוף קיים The Gemara asks: From where does the one who derives that burning means this kind of death from the assembly of Korah derive that their bodies were not burned? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which is written: “And the firepans of these men who have sinned with their souls” (Numbers 17:3), which indicates that only their souls were burned, but their bodies were intact.

ואידך ההיא שריפה ממש היא ומאי בנפשותם שנתחייבו שריפה על עסקי נפשותם The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, who does not derive that burning means this kind of death from here, interpret the deaths of the assembly of Korah? The Gemara answers: That burning was actual burning of their bodies. And what is the meaning of the term: “With their souls”? It means that they were deemed liable to be killed by burning due to matters of sustaining their souls, i.e., they sinned because Korah helped them fulfill their bodily desires, and consequently they followed him.

כדריש לקיש דאמר ריש לקיש מאי דכתיב (תהלים לה, טז) בחנפי לעגי מעוג חרק עלי שנימו בשביל חנופה שהחניפו לקרח על עסקי לגימה חרק עליהן שר של גיהנם שניו This latter explanation is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish. As Reish Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “With the flattering mockeries of spitefulness [maog] they gnash at me with their teeth” (Psalms 35:16)? It means that because of the flattery of those people who flattered Korah over matters of eating, i.e., because of the food and drink that he would give them, the minister of Gehenna gnashed his teeth over them, as they eventually sinned and fell into his hands. The word maog is interpreted homiletically here as alluding to uga, cake.

ומאן דיליף מבני אהרן מנא ליה דכתי' (ויקרא י, ב) וימותו לפני ה' כעין מיתה The Gemara asks: And from where does the one who derives that burning means this kind of death from the sons of Aaron derive that their bodies were not burned? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which is written: “And fire came out from before the Lord, and devoured them, and they died before the Lord” (Leviticus 10:2). The term “and they died” indicates that it was similar to a natural death, in which the body remains intact.

ואידך ההוא שריפה ממש הואי ומאי דכתיב וימותו דאתחיל בהו מגואי כעין מיתה דתניא אבא יוסי בן דוסתאי אומר שני חוטין של אש יצאו מבית קודש הקדשים ונחלקו לארבע ונכנסו שנים בחוטמו של זה ושנים בחוטמו של זה ושרפום The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, who does not derive that burning means this kind of death from here, interpret the death of the sons of Aaron? The Gemara answers: That burning was actual burning. And in that case, what is the meaning of that which is written: “And they died”? It means that the fire started from within them, and therefore it was similar to a natural death, which occurs within the person. As it is taught in a baraita: Abba Yosei ben Dostai says: Two threads of fire came out of the Holy of Holies and split into four, and two entered the nostrils of this one, and the other two entered the nostrils of that one, and the threads of fire burned them.

והכתיב (ויקרא י, ב) ותאכל אותם אותם ולא בגדיהם The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And devoured them [vatokhal otam]”? The usage of the expanded term “vatokhal otam,” instead of the terser vatokhlem, indicates a limitation, i.e., only they were consumed, to the exclusion of their bodies. The Gemara answers: The verse means that the fire devoured “them,” but not their clothes.

ונילף מפרים הנשרפים מה להלן שריפה ממש אף כאן שריפה ממש The Gemara asks: And let us derive the correct method of execution by burning from the halakha of the bull offerings that are burned. Just as there, the reference is to actual burning, so too here, perhaps there should be actual burning.

מסתברא מאדם הוה ליה למילף שכן אדם חוטא נשמה פיגול The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that one should derive the halakha with regard to capital punishment from the death of a person, i.e., either from the assembly of Korah or the sons of Aaron, as they share common elements: They deal with a person, a sinner, and a soul that is taken through burning, i.e., the person dies as a result of the burning. Furthermore, the halakha of an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul], is not relevant in either case, whereas it is relevant to bull offerings that are burned.

אדרבה מפרים הנשרפים הוה ליה למילף שכן מכשיר לדורות The Gemara asks: On the contrary, one should derive the halakha with regard to capital punishment from the bull offerings that are burned, as both enable the fulfillment of a mitzva, whereas the deaths of the assembly of Korah and the sons of Aaron were not mitzvot. Furthermore, both of these are fixed halakhot for all future generations, whereas the deaths of the assembly of Korah and the sons of Aaron were onetime incidents.

הנך נפישין The Gemara answers: Those elements that are shared by capital punishment and the deaths of the assembly of Korah and the sons of Aaron are more numerous than the elements that are shared by capital punishment and the bulls that are burned. Therefore, the halakha is derived from the assembly of Korah and the sons of Aaron.

מאן דיליף מעדת קרח מאי טעמא לא יליף מבני אהרן ההוא שריפה ממש הואי ונילף מינה The Gemara asks: With regard to the one who derives this halakha from the assembly of Korah, what is the reason he does not derive it from the sons of Aaron? Because in his opinion that was actual burning. But if this is the case, let us derive from the death of the sons of Aaron that execution by burning should be performed with actual burning; why does he derive from the assembly of Korah that hot lead should be used?

אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר קרא (ויקרא יט, יח) ואהבת לרעך כמוך ברור לו מיתה יפה Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The verse states: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), which teaches that even with regard to a condemned prisoner one should select a good, i.e., a compassionate, death for him. The method of burning described in the mishna is certainly faster and less painful than the burning of the entire body.

וכי מאחר דאיכא דרב נחמן גזרה שוה למה לי The Gemara asks: And since there is the halakha of Rav Naḥman, why do I need the verbal analogy? Even without this proof execution by burning would have been performed with hot lead, as it is a less painful form of death.

אי לאו גזרה שוה הוה אמינא שריפת נשמה וגוף קיים לאו שריפה היא כלל ואי משום ואהבת לרעך כמוך לפיש ליה חבילי זמורות כי היכי דלישרוף לעגל קמ"ל: The Gemara answers: Were it not for the verbal analogy, I would say that a death that includes the burning of the soul, but the body itself remains intact, is not burning at all, and that it does not fulfill the mitzva of execution by burning. And if it is necessary to alleviate the condemned one’s pain due to the halakha of “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), let the court increase for him the bundles of branches, so that he will burn quicker. Therefore, the verbal analogy teaches us that even internal burning is regarded as burning, and once this has been established it is taken into consideration that he must be executed in the least painful way.

וכבר היו משה ואהרן מהלכין בדרך ונדב ואביהוא מהלכין אחריהן וכל ישראל אחריהן אמר לו נדב לאביהוא אימתי ימותו שני זקנים הללו ואני ואתה ננהיג את הדור אמר להן הקב"ה הנראה מי קובר את מי אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי נפישי גמלי סבי דטעיני משכי דהוגני Apropos the deaths of Nadav and Avihu, an aggadic midrash on this subject is quoted: And it had already happened that Moses and Aaron were walking on their way, and Nadav and Avihu were walking behind them, and the entire Jewish people were walking behind them. Nadav said to Avihu: When will it happen that these two old men will die and you and I will lead the generation, as we are their heirs? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: We shall see who buries whom. Rav Pappa says: This explains the adage that people say: Many are the old camels that are loaded with the skins of young camels.

אמר רבי (אליעזר) Rabbi Eliezer says:

Daf 52b

למה תלמיד חכם דומה לפני עם הארץ בתחלה דומה לקיתון של זהב סיפר הימנו דומה לקיתון של כסף נהנה ממנו דומה לקיתון של חרש כיון שנשבר שוב אין לו תקנה To what is a Torah scholar compared when he is standing before an ignoramus? At first, when he does not know him, the ignoramus considers him to be like a goblet [lekiton] of gold. Once he has conversed with him concerning mundane matters, he considers him to be like a goblet of silver, i.e., the stature of the Torah scholar is downgraded in the eyes of the ignoramus. Once the scholar has received benefit from the ignoramus, he considers him to be like an earthenware goblet, which once broken cannot be fixed.

אימרתא בת טלי בת כהן שזינתה הואי אקפה רב חמא בר טוביה חבילי זמורות ושרפה The Gemara relates: Imrata bat Talei was a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. Rav Ḥama bar Toviyya surrounded her with bundles of branches and burned her.

אמר רב יוסף טעה בתרתי טעה בדרב מתנה וטעה בדתניא (דברים יז, ט) ובאת אל הכהנים הלוים ואל השופט אשר יהיה בימים ההם בזמן שיש כהן יש משפט בזמן שאין כהן אין משפט: Rav Yosef says: Rav Ḥama bar Toviyya erred with regard to two halakhot. He erred with regard to the ruling of Rav Mattana, i.e., that burning is performed using a wick of lead, and he erred with regard to that which is taught in a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And you shall come to the priests, the Levites, and to the judge that will be in those days” (Deuteronomy 17:9), that at a time when there is a priest serving in the Temple, i.e., when the Temple is built, there is judgment of capital cases. By inference, at a time when there is no priest, there is no judgment of capital cases.

אמר רבי אלעזר ברבי צדוק מעשה בבת כהן שזינתה וכו': אמר רב יוסף בית דין של צדוקים הוה § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, said: An incident occurred with regard to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery, and she was executed by actual burn-ing, and the Sages said to him that the court at that time was not proficient in halakha. Rav Yosef says: It was a court of the Sadducees, who interpreted the verse according to its straightforward meaning.

הכי אמר להו והכי אהדרו ליה והתניא אמר רבי אלעזר ברבי צדוק זכורני כשהייתי תינוק ומורכב על כתיפו של אבא והביאו בת כהן שזינתה והקיפוה חבילי זמורות ושרפוה אמרו לו קטן היית ואין מביאין ראיה מן הקטן שני מעשים הוו The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok say that to the Sages, and did the Sages answer him in that manner? But isn’t a different version of the exchange taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: I remember when I was a child, and was riding on my father’s shoulders. And they brought a priest’s daughter who had committed adultery, and surrounded her with bundles of branches and burned her. The Sages said to him: You were a minor at that time and one cannot bring proof from the testimony of a minor, as perhaps you did not understand the proceedings properly. The two versions of this exchange do not accord with each other. The Gemara answers: There were two separate incidents, and Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok testified with regard to both.

הי אמר להו ברישא אילימא הא קמייתא אמר להו ברישא א"ל כשהוא גדול ולא אשגחו ביה אמר להו כשהוא קטן ואשגחו ביה The Gemara asks: Which incident did he tell the Sages about first? If we say that first he told them about this first incident, i.e., the one that is recounted in the mishna, this is unreasonable; if he first told them about the incident that occurred when he was an adult, and they paid no attention to him, but rejected his statement by responding that the court was not proficient in halakha, would he tell them afterward about the incident that occurred when he was a small child and think that they would pay attention to him?

אלא הא אמר להו ברישא ואמרו ליה קטן היית ואמר להו כשהוא גדול ואמרו ליה מפני שלא היה בית דין של אותה שעה בקי: Rather, it is clear that he first told them about that incident, i.e., the one recounted in the baraita, and they said to him: You were a minor, and one cannot bring proof from the testimony of a minor. And then he told them about the incident that occurred when he was an adult, and they said to him: The court did so because the court at that time was not proficient in halakha.

מתני׳ מצות הנהרגין היו מתיזין את ראשו בסייף כדרך שהמלכות עושה רבי יהודה אומר ניוול הוא לו אלא מניחין את ראשו על הסדן וקוצץ בקופיץ אמרו לו אין מיתה מנוולת מזו: MISHNA: The mitzva of those who are killed, i.e., the process of execution by decapitation, is carried out in the following manner: The executioners cut off his head with a sword, the way that the monarchy does when a king sentences a person to death. Rabbi Yehuda says: This manner of execution is improper, as it degrades him. Rather, they place the head of the condemned on the block, and chop it off with a cleaver [bekofitz]. The Rabbis said to him: If you are concerned about his degradation, there is no death penalty more degrading than that. It is better for him to be executed in the manner described first.

גמ׳ תניא אמר להן רבי יהודה לחכמים אף אני יודע שמיתה מנוולת היא אבל מה אעשה שהרי אמרה תורה (ויקרא יח, ג) ובחקותיהם לא תלכו GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:3): Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: I too, know that it is a degrading death, but what shall I do, as the Torah states: “And you shall not follow their statutes” (Leviticus 18:3), i.e., it is prohibited to adopt the practices of the gentiles.

ורבנן כיון דכתיב סייף באורייתא לא מינייהו קא גמרינן The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: Since decapitation by the sword is written in the Torah, it is not from the gentiles that we learn it. This is Torah law, and the custom of the gentiles is not taken into consideration. It is of no import that they have a corresponding type of execution.

דאי לא תימא הכי הא דתניא שורפין על המלכים ולא מדרכי האמורי היכי שרפינן והכתיב ובחקותיהם לא תלכו אלא כיון דכתיב שריפה באורייתא דכתיב (ירמיהו לד, ה) ובמשרפות אבותיך וגו' לאו מינייהו קא גמרינן והכא נמי כיון דכתיב סייף באורייתא לאו מינייהו קא גמרינן As, if you do not say so, that a Jewish custom is not forbidden even if the gentiles have the same custom, then that which is taught in a baraita poses a difficulty. The baraita teaches: One burns vessels and clothes over the deaths of kings as an expression of grief, and this is not forbidden for being of the ways of the Amorites. How can we perform this burning? But isn’t it written: “And you shall not follow their statutes”? Rather, since burning items over the death of a king is written in the Torah, as it is written: “And with the burnings of your fathers, the first kings who came before you, so shall they make a burning for you” (Jeremiah 34:5), it is not from the gentiles that we learn it. And here too, since decapitation by the sword is written in the Torah, it is not from them that we learn it.

והא דתנן באידך פירקין אלו הן הנהרגין הרוצח ואנשי עיר הנדחת בשלמא עיר הנדחת כתיב בהו (דברים יג, טז) לפי חרב אלא רוצח מנלן § The Gemara asks: And with regard to that which we learned in a mishna in another chapter of this tractate (76b): These transgressors are those who are killed by decapitation: The murderer and the people of an idolatrous city, there is a difficulty. Granted, the people of an idolatrous city are executed in this manner, as it is written concerning them: “You shall smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword” (Deuteronomy 13:16). But with regard to a murderer, from where do we derive that he is executed by decapitation?

דתניא (שמות כא, כ) נקם ינקם נקימה זו איני יודע מה הוא כשהוא אומר (ויקרא כו, כה) והבאתי עליכם חרב נוקמת נקם ברית הוי אומר נקימה זו סייף The Gemara answers that it is derived as it is taught in a baraita: It is stated in the verse: “And if a man smites his slave or his maidservant by the staff and he dies under his hand, he shall be avenged” (Exodus 21:20). Prima facie, I do not know what this vengeance is referring to. When it says: “And I will bring upon you the sword avenging the vengeance of the covenant” (Leviticus 26:25), you must say that vengeance is decapitation by the sword.

ואימא דבריז ליה מיברז לפי חרב כתיב The Gemara asks: But why not say that the executioner should stab him with a sword, rather than decapitate him? The Gemara answers: It is written with regard to the people of an idolatrous city: “With the edge of the sword,” indicating that the execution should be administered with the edge of the sword and not its point.

ואימא דעביד ליה גיסטרא אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר קרא (ויקרא יט, יח) ואהבת לרעך כמוך ברור לו מיתה יפה The Gemara asks: But say that the executioner should cut him in half [gistera], down the middle of his body. The Gemara answers that Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The verse states: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), which teaches that even with regard to a condemned prisoner, one should select a good, i.e., a compassionate, death for him. Cutting his body in half is not a compassionate manner of execution.

אשכחן דקטל עבדא בר חורין מנא לן The Gemara asks: We have found proof that one who killed a Canaanite slave is executed by decapitation. But from where do we derive that one who kills a freeman is executed in the same manner?

ולאו קל וחומר הוא קטל עבדא בסייף בר חורין בחנק The Gemara answers: But is it not inferred a fortiori? If one who killed a Canaanite slave is executed by the sword, should one who killed a freeman be executed merely by strangulation?

הניחא למאן דאמר חנק קל אלא למ"ד חנק חמור מאי איכא למימר This Gemara rejects this answer: This works out well according to the one who says that strangulation is a more lenient type of capital punishment than decapitation. But according to the one who says that strangulation is more severe than decapitation, what can be said? It is possible that one who murdered a freeman is in fact executed by strangulation.

נפקא ליה מדתניא (דברים כא, ט) ואתה תבער הדם הנקי מקרבך הוקשו כל שופכי דמים לעגלה ערופה מה להלן בסייף ומן הצואר אף כאן בסייף ומן הצואר The Gemara answers: The mishna derives it from that which is taught in a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And so shall you put away the innocent blood from your midst” (Deuteronomy 21:9), that all spillers of blood are compared to the heifer whose neck is broken as atonement for an unresolved murder. Just as there, the heifer is killed by the sword and at the neck, so too here, murderers are executed by the sword and at the neck.

אי מה להלן בקופיץ וממול עורף אף כאן בקופיץ וממול עורף אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר קרא ואהבת לרעך כמוך ברור לו מיתה יפה: The Gemara challenges: If so, perhaps it should be derived that just as there, the heifer is decapitated with a cleaver and at the nape of the neck, so too here, murderers should be decapitated with a cleaver and at the nape of the neck. The Gemara answers that Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The verse states: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), which teaches that even with regard to a condemned prisoner, one should select a good, i.e., a compassionate, death for him. Although the type of capital punishment is derived from the heifer whose neck is broken, the most compassionate method of decapitation is selected.

מתני׳ מצות הנחנקין היו משקעין אותו בזבל עד ארכובותיו ונותן סודר קשה לתוך הרכה וכורך על צוארו זה מושך אצלו וזה מושך אצלו עד שנפשו יוצאת: MISHNA: The mitzva of those who are strangled is carried out in the following manner: The agents of the court submerge the condemned one in dung up to his knees so he cannot move, and one of them places a rough scarf within a soft one, and wraps it around his neck. This one, i.e., one of the witnesses, pulls the scarf toward him, and that one, the other witness, pulls it toward him, until the soul of the condemned one departs.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן (ויקרא כ, י) איש פרט לקטן (ויקרא כ, י) אשר ינאף את אשת איש פרט לאשת קטן (ויקרא כ, י) אשת רעהו פרט לאשת אחרים GEMARA: The Sages taught: The verse states: “And a man who commits adultery with another man’s wife, even he who commits adultery with his neighbor’s wife, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall be put to death” (Leviticus 20:10). The term: “A man,” is interpreted as excluding a minor boy who committed adultery before he came of age. The phrase: “Who commits adultery with another man’s wife,” is interpreted as excluding the wife of a minor boy; marriage to a minor is not considered halakhic marriage. “His neighbor’s wife” excludes the wife of another, i.e., a gentile, who is not referred to as “his neighbor.”

(ויקרא כ, ב) מות יומת בחנק אתה אומר בחנק או אינו אלא באחת מכל מיתות האמורות בתורה אמרת כל מקום שנאמר מיתה בתורה סתם אין אתה רשאי למושכה להחמיר עליה אלא להקל עליה דברי רבי יאשיה “Shall be put to death” means death by strangulation. Do you say that his execution is by strangulation, or is it rather by one of all the other types of death penalty stated in the Torah? You must say that it is by strangulation, as everywhere that the death penalty is stated in the Torah without specification you may not take it to be more stringent with regard to it, i.e., to mean that the sinner should be sentenced to a severe type of execution; rather, you must take it to be more lenient with regard to it, i.e., that a lenient type of execution should be applied. Consequently, the sinner is sentenced to be executed by strangulation, which is the least severe type of capital punishment. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

רבי יונתן אומר לא מפני שהיא קלה אלא כל מיתה האמורה בתורה סתם אינה אלא חנק The baraita continues: Rabbi Yonatan says: It is not because strangulation is the most lenient type of capital punishment; rather, there is a principle that every death penalty stated in the Torah without specification is nothing other than strangulation, whereas the other types of capital punishment must be stated explicitly in the verse.

רבי אומר נאמר מיתה בידי שמים ונאמר מיתה בידי אדם מה מיתה האמורה בידי שמים מיתה שאין בה רושם אף מיתה האמורה בידי אדם מיתה שאין בה רושם Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan: Death at the hand of Heaven is stated in the Torah, and death at the hands of a person, i.e., court-imposed capital punishment, is stated in the Torah. Just as the death at the hand of Heaven that is stated in the Torah is a death that leaves no external mark, so too, the death at the hands of a person that is stated in the Torah is a death that leaves no external mark, i.e., strangulation.

ואימא שריפה מדאמר רחמנא בת כהן בשריפה מכלל דהא לאו בת שריפה היא The Gemara asks: But why not say that perhaps it is referring to execution by burning, which also leaves no external mark? The Gemara answers: From the fact that the Merciful One states explicitly that a priest’s daughter who committed adultery is executed by burning one can learn by inference that this other woman who committed adultery is not liable to be executed by burning, but rather by a different type of execution that does not leave a mark, i.e., strangulation.

Daf 53a

בשלמא לר' יונתן כדקא מפרש רבי טעמא אלא לרבי יאשיה ממאי דאיכא חנק בעולם אימא סייף Granted, according to Rabbi Yonatan it is clear the punishment for adultery is strangulation, in the manner that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explains the reason for his opinion. But according to Rabbi Yoshiya, from where is it derived that there is a punishment of execution by strangulation in the world, i.e., in halakha, at all? Since this type of capital punishment is not mentioned in the Torah explicitly, say that decapitation by the sword is the least severe type, as it is mentioned in the Torah.

אמר רבא ארבע מיתות גמרא גמירי להו Rava said: The four types of the death penalty are learned as a tradition. There is no question as to the types of capital punishment that exist in halakha. Rather, the question is which type of execution is meted out as punishment for which sins.

מאי לא מפני שהיא קלה קמיפלגי בפלוגתא דרבי שמעון ורבנן The Gemara asks: What is meant by Rabbi Yonatan’s statement: It is not because strangulation is the most lenient type of capital punishment? The Gemara answers: At the root of the matter, Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshiya disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, i.e., whether strangulation or decapitation is the least severe type of execution. Consequently, Rabbi Yonatan does not employ the reasoning that strangulation is the least severe.

א"ל רבי זירא לאביי שאר הנסקלין דלא כתיב בהו סקילה דגמרי מאוב וידעוני במאי גמרי במות יומתו גמרי או בדמיהם בם גמרי § Rabbi Zeira said to Abaye: With regard to the rest of those transgressors, other than necromancers and sorcerers, who are stoned to death, with regard to whom stoning is not explicitly written in the Torah because their punishment is derived via a verbal analogy from that of a necromancer and a sorcerer, about which the verse states: “They shall be put to death, they shall stone them with stones, their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:27); through what verbal analogy is their punishment derived? Is it derived from the phrase “they shall be put to death,” or is it derived from the phrase “their blood shall be upon them”?

א"ל בדמיהם דמיהם בם גמרי דאי במות יומתו גמרי דמיהם דמיהם למה לי Abaye said to him: It is derived from a verbal analogy between “their blood” and “their blood shall be upon them.” As, if it is derived from “they shall be put to death,” why do I need the verbal analogy between “their blood” and “their blood”? Why does this term need to be written with regard to the various halakhot?

אלא מאי בדמיהם דמיהם גמרי מות יומתו למה לי The Gemara asks: Rather, what is more reasonable? If it is derived from the verbal analogy between “their blood” and “their blood,” the same problem arises: Why do I need the phrase “they shall be put to death”?

כדתניא (במדבר לה, כא) מות יומת המכה רוצח הוא אין לי אלא במיתה הכתובה בו מניין שאם אי אתה יכול להמיתו במיתה הכתובה בו שאתה ממיתו בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו תלמוד לומר מות יומת המכה מ"מ The Gemara answers: This expression is necessary, as another halakha is derived from it. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse with regard to a murderer states: “He that smote him shall be put to death, for he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). I have derived only that the murderer is put to death with the mode of execution written concerning him, i.e., by decapitation. From where do I derive that if you cannot put him to death with the mode of execution written concerning him, e.g., if the condemned man will escape if one does not kill him, that you put him to death with any mode of execution with which you can put him to death? The verse states: “He that smote him shall be put to death [mot yumat],” the doubled verb teaching that he is put to death in any case, i.e., by any mode of execution.

אמר ליה רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא ואי במות יומתו גמרי מאי קא קשיא ליה This exchange between Rabbi Zeira and Abaye was subsequently discussed by later amora’im. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: And if the halakha that there are transgressors other than necromancers and sorcerers who are punished by stoning is derived from “they shall be put to death,” what is difficult according to Rabbi Zeira? It appears from Rabbi Zeira’s question that he was troubled by the possibility that this halakha is derived from the phrase “they shall be put to death.”

אילימא אשת איש קא קשיא ליה למיתי ולמיגמר מות יומת מאוב וידעוני מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה If we say that the case of adultery of a married woman would pose a difficulty according to Rabbi Zeira, as it is stated: “The adulterer and the adulteress shall be put to death” (Leviticus 20:10), and therefore perhaps we should derive and learn from the phrase “they shall be put to death” stated with regard to a necromancer and a sorcerer that just as there, with regard to a necromancer and a sorcerer, they are executed by stoning, so too here, with regard to adultery, the transgressors should be executed by stoning, this does not pose a difficulty.

מדאמר רחמנא ארוסה בסקילה מכלל דנשואה לאו בסקילה Rav Aḥa of Difti explains why it does not pose a difficulty: From the fact that the Merciful One states that a betrothed woman who committed adultery is executed by stoning, by inference we learn that a married woman who committed adultery is not executed by stoning, but rather she is executed by a less severe type of execution. Therefore, it could not have been derived from the case of a necromancer and a sorcerer that the punishment for the adultery of a married woman is execution by stoning.

ואלא מכה אביו ואמו קא קשיא ליה למיתי ולמיגמר מאוב וידעוני And if it is rather the case of one who wounds his father or his mother that poses a difficulty according to Rabbi Zeira, as it is stated: “And he who smites his father or his mother shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:15), and therefore perhaps we should derive and learn from the punishment of a necromancer and a sorcerer that one who wounds his father or his mother should be executed by stoning, this too does not pose a difficulty.

עד דגמרי מאוב וידעוני ליגמרו מאשת איש דאי אתה רשאי למושכה להחמיר עליה אלא להקל עליה Rav Aḥa of Difti explains why it does not pose a difficulty: Rather than deriving the punishment of one who wounds his father or his mother from a necromancer and a sorcerer, let us derive it from adultery with a married woman, as everywhere that the death penalty is stated in the Torah without specification you may not take it to be more stringent with regard to it, i.e., to mean that the sinner should be sentenced to a severe type of execution; rather, you must take it to be more lenient with regard to it, i.e., that a lenient type of execution should be applied. Since in both the case of adultery and the case of one who wounds his parent the type of execution is evidently not stoning, why was Rabbi Zeira troubled by the possibility that the source for execution by stoning in cases other than a necromancer and a sorcerer is derived from the phrase: “They shall be put to death”?

אמר ליה שאר הנסקלין גופייהו קא קשיא ליה דאי במות יומת גמרי עד דגמרי מאוב וידעוני ליגמרו מאשת איש: Ravina said to Rav Aḥa of Difti: It is the halakha concerning the rest of those who are stoned, themselves, which poses a difficulty according to Rabbi Zeira. This is because if their punishment is derived from the phrase “they shall be put to death,” then rather than deriving from the case of a necromancer and a sorcerer that these transgressors are executed by the severe method of stoning, let us derive from the case of one who commits adultery with a married woman, with regard to whom “they shall be put to death” is also stated, that they should be executed by strangulation, the less severe method. He therefore verified that it is derived from the phrase “their blood shall be upon them,” that they are executed by stoning.

מתני׳ אלו הן הנסקלין הבא על האם ועל אשת האב ועל הכלה ועל הזכור ועל הבהמה והאשה המביאה את הבהמה והמגדף והעובד עבודת כוכבים והנותן מזרעו למולך ובעל אוב וידעוני והמחלל את השבת והמקלל אביו ואמו והבא על נערה המאורסה והמסית והמדיח והמכשף ובן סורר ומורה MISHNA: These transgressors are those who are stoned to death: One who engages in intercourse with his mother; or with his father’s wife, even if she is not his mother; or with his daughter-in-law; or with a male; or with an animal; and a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal. And one who blasphemes, and one who engages in idol worship. And one who gives of his offspring to Molekh, and a necromancer, and a sorcerer. And one who desecrates Shabbat, and one who curses his father or his mother, and one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, and an inciter who incites individuals to idol worship, and a subverter who incites an entire city to idol worship, and a warlock, and a stubborn and rebellious son.

הבא על האם חייב עליה משום אם ומשום אשת אב רבי יהודה אומר אינו חייב אלא משום האם בלבד The mishna elaborates: One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his mother who is also his father’s wife is liable to bring two sin-offerings for his intercourse with her: One due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s mother and one due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s father’s wife. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable to bring only one sin-offering, due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s mother.

הבא על אשת אב חייב משום אשת אב ומשום אשת איש בין בחיי אביו בין לאחר מיתת אביו בין מן האירוסין בין מן הנישואין One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his father’s wife while his father is married to her is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s father’s wife and one due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a married woman. He is liable due to the former prohibition both during his father’s lifetime and after his father’s death, and whether the relationship between the woman and his father is one of betrothal or one of marriage.

הבא על כלתו חייב עליה משום כלתו ומשום אשת איש בין בחיי בנו בין לאחר מיתת בנו בין מן האירוסין בין מן הנישואין: Likewise, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law during his son’s lifetime is liable to bring two sin-offerings for his intercourse with her: One due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter-in-law, and one due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a married woman. The former liability applies both during his son’s lifetime and after his son’s death, and whether the relationship between the woman and his son is one of betrothal or one of marriage.

גמ׳ תניא רבי יהודה אומר אם לא היתה אמו ראויה לאביו אינו חייב אלא משום האם בלבד GEMARA: With regard to one who engages in intercourse with his mother, it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not suitable for his father, as their marriage was forbidden, he is liable only due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s mother, and not due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s father’s wife.

מאי אינה ראויה לו אילימא חייבי כריתות וחייבי מיתות בית דין מכלל דרבנן סברי אע"ג דאינה ראויה לו הא לית ליה קידושין בגווה This is clarified: What does it mean that she is not suitable for him? If we say that the mother and father were liable to receive the punishment of excision from the World-to-Come [karet], or liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty for their intercourse, in which case their marriage did not take effect and therefore Rabbi Yehuda holds that in this case there is no prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s father’s wife, this poses a difficulty. As accordingly, by inference, in may be understood that the Rabbis hold that there is such a prohibition even if she is not suitable for him. Doesn’t everyone agree that in such a case the father has no capability of betrothal with regard to her? Even if they cohabit, she is not considered his wife.

אלא חייבי לאוין ור' יהודה סבר לה כרבי עקיבא דאמר אין קידושין תופסין בחייבי לאוין Rather, it is clear that Rabbi Yehuda is referring to a case where the father and mother are liable for violating a prohibition for their intercourse, but they are not liable to receive karet or capital punishment. And Rabbi Yehuda in this matter holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that betrothal does not take effect with those women with regard to whom one is liable for violating a prohibition if one engages in intercourse with them. The Rabbis disagree with this; in their opinion, betrothal does take effect in such cases, although a prohibition is involved. Therefore, the mother is considered the father’s wife, and the son is liable for engaging in intercourse with his father’s wife as well as for engaging in intercourse with his mother.

מתיב רב אושעיא איסור מצוה ואיסור קדושה חולצות ולא מתייבמות Rav Oshaya raises an objection to this explanation, as it is stated in a mishna in tractate Yevamot (20a): If a yevama is forbidden to her yavam by a prohibition resulting from a mitzva or by a prohibition stemming from sanctity, then since in these cases the levirate bond is not fundamentally nullified, she performs ḥalitza in order to become free of the levirate bond, and due to the prohibition she does not enter into levirate marriage.

Daf 53b

איסור מצוה שניות מדברי סופרים ואמאי קרו להו איסור מצוה שמצוה לשמוע דברי חכמים The mishna explains: A prohibition resulting from a mitzva is referring to secondary forbidden relatives, e.g., one’s son’s daughter-in-law, who are forbidden by rabbinic law. The Sages instituted this prohibition in order to distance people from incest. The Gemara explains: And why do the Sages call it a prohibition resulting from a mitzva? Because it is a mitzva to listen to the words of the Sages.

איסור קדושה אלמנה לכהן גדול גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט ואמאי קרו להו איסור קדושה דכתיב (ויקרא כא, ו) קדושים יהיו לאלהיהם The mishna continues: A prohibition stemming from sanctity is referring to the marriage of a widow to a High Priest, or to the marriage of a divorcée or of a woman who has performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza], to an ordinary priest. The Gemara explains: And why do the Sages call it a prohibition stemming from sanctity? As it is written with regard to the priests: “They shall be sanctified to their God” (Leviticus 21:6).

ותניא עלה רבי יהודה מחליף And it is taught in a baraita with regard to this mishna: Rabbi Yehuda switches the terms; he refers to the marriage of a divorcée or of a ḥalutza to a priest as a prohibition resulting from a mitzva, and to the marriage of secondary relatives as a prohibition stemming from sanctity.

חלופי הוא דמחליף הא חליצה בעיא ואי סלקא דעתך ר' יהודה כר' עקיבא סבירא ליה מכדי חייבי לאוין לרבי עקיבא כחייבי כריתות דמי וחייבי כריתות לאו בני חליצה ויבום נינהו The Gemara infers: He switches the terms but does not dispute the halakha; but even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that if a priest marries a ḥalutza and then dies, she requires ḥalitza. And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, this poses a difficulty; after all, those liable for violating prohibitions, according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, are considered like those liable to receive karet, and those liable to receive karet are not capable of performing ḥalitza and levirate marriage, as the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply to such relationships.

לדבריו דתנא קמא קאמר וליה לא סבירא ליה The Gemara resolves the difficulty: Rabbi Yehuda does hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and as for his comment with regard to the definitions of a prohibition resulting from a mitzva and a prohibition stemming from sanctity, he merely stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of the first tanna; but he himself does not hold accordingly.

כי אתא רבי יצחק תני כדתנן רבי יהודה אומר אינו חייב אלא משום האם בלבד § When Rav Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he taught a baraita as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: One who engages in intercourse with his mother who is also his father’s wife is liable to bring only one sin-offering, due to the fact that she is his mother, whether or not her marriage to his father was legitimate.

וטעמא מאי אמר אביי דאמר קרא (ויקרא יח, ז) אמך היא משום אמו אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום אשת אב The Gemara asks: And what is the reason for this? Abaye says: It is because the verse states: “The nakedness of your father and the nakedness of your mother you shall not uncover: She is your mother; you shall not uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:7). Rabbi Yehuda derives from this verse that you shall render him liable due to the fact that she is his mother, but you shall not render him liable to bring another sin-offering due to the fact that she is his father’s wife.

אלא מעתה (ויקרא יח, ח) ערות אשת אביך לא תגלה ערות אביך היא משום אשת אב אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום אמו The Gemara asks: If that is so, it should be derived from the verse: “The nakedness of your father’s wife you shall not uncover; it is your father’s nakedness” (Leviticus 18:8), that you shall render him liable due to the fact that she is his father’s wife, but you shall not render him liable due to the fact that she is his mother.

אלא אמו שהיא אשת אביו קאי הכא וממעט לה קאי הכא וממעט לה השתא אמו שאינה אשת אביו מיחייב אשת אביו שאינה אמו מיחייב אמו שהיא אשת אביו לא מיחייב כלל But if so, with regard to one’s mother who is his father’s wife, it is found that the verse stands, i.e., is written, here, with regard to intercourse with one’s mother, and excludes liability due to the fact that she is his father’s wife, and stands there, with regard to intercourse with one’s father’s wife, and excludes liability due to the fact that she is his mother. The result now is that for his mother who is not his father’s wife he is rendered liable, and for his father’s wife who is not his mother he is rendered liable, but for his mother who is his father’s wife he is not rendered liable at all, which seems absurd.

ותו לרבנן נמי הכתיב אמך היא אלא ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדרב שישא בריה דרב אידי לרבי יהודה נמי ההוא מיבעי ליה לכדרב שישא בריה דרב אידי And furthermore, according to the Rabbis too, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and hold that one who engages in intercourse with his mother who is married to his father is liable to bring two sin-offerings, isn’t the verse: “She is your mother,” written; i.e., how do they explain this verse? Rather, that phrase is necessary for the halakha derived from it by Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, as the Gemara will soon explain (54a). Therefore, according to Rabbi Yehuda as well, that phrase is necessary for the halakha derived by Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the mishna cannot be derived from it.

אלא אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר קרא ערותה משום ערוה אחת אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום שתי ערות Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says that there is a different source for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: The verse states: “You shall not uncover her nakedness [ervatah],” in the singular form, from which it is derived that you shall render him liable for one forbidden sexual relationship [erva], but you shall not render him liable for two types of forbidden sexual relationships.

אלא מעתה (ויקרא יח, טו) ערות כלתך לא תגלה אשת בנך היא לא תגלה ערותה הכי נמי משום ערוה אחת אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום שתי ערות The Gemara asks: If that is so, then from the verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your daughter-in-law; she is your son’s wife, you shall not uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:15), should it also be derived that you shall render him liable for one forbidden sexual relationship, but you shall not render him liable for two types of forbidden sexual relationships?

והתנן הבא על כלתו חייב עליה משום כלתו ומשום אשת איש בין בחיי בנו בין לאחר מיתת בנו ולא פליג ר' יהודה But didn’t we learn in the mishna: One who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law is liable to bring two sin-offerings for his intercourse with her: One due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter-in-law, and one due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a married woman; the former liability applies both during his son’s lifetime and after his son’s death. And Rabbi Yehuda does not dispute this halakha.

אלא כיון דחד גופא הוא אע"ג דתרי איסורי נינהו כתיב ערותה הכא נמי כיון דחד גופא הוא אע"ג דתרי איסורי נינהו כתיב ערותה Rather, it must be explained that since the daughter-in-law has one body, although engaging in intercourse with her involves two prohibitions, the term “her nakedness [ervatah],” in the singular, is written. Here too, with regard to one’s father’s wife, since she has one body, although there are two prohibitions, the term “her nakedness [ervatah]” is written.

אלא אמר רבא קסבר ר' יהודה ערות אביך זו אשת אביך ומייתי לה בגזירה שוה Rather, Rava says that there is an alternative source for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: Rabbi Yehuda holds that concerning the meaning of the phrase “the nakedness of your father,” this is referring to your father’s wife. And he derives this interpretation by means of a verbal analogy from the verse: “And the man who lies with his father’s wife, he has uncovered his father’s nakedness” (Leviticus 20:11).

ומשמע בין אשת אביו שהיא אמו בין אשת אביו שאינה אמו אמו שאינה אשת אביו מניין ת"ל ערות אמך לא תגלה אמך היא משום אמו אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום אשת אביו And the Torah indicates that she is forbidden whether she is his father’s wife who is his mother or whether she is his father’s wife who is not his mother. From where is it derived that one who engages in intercourse with his mother who is not his father’s wife is liable? The verse states subsequently: “The nakedness of your mother you shall not uncover.” And from the ensuing phrase: “She is your mother,” it is derived that in a case where his mother is also his father’s wife, you shall render him liable due to the fact that she is his mother, but you shall not render him liable due to the fact that she is his father’s wife.

Daf 54a

תניא כוותיה דרבא (ויקרא כ, יא) איש פרט לקטן § It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: With regard to the verse: “And the man who lies with his father’s wife, he has uncovered his father’s nakedness; both of them shall be put to death, their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:11), the term: “The man,” excludes a minor.

(ויקרא כ, יא) אשר ישכב את אשת אביו משמע בין אשת אביו שהיא אמו ובין אשת אביו שלא אמו אמו שאינה אשת אביו מניין ת"ל (ויקרא כ, יא) ערות אביו גלה מופנה להקיש ולדון ממנו גזרה שוה The phrase “who lies with his father’s wife” indicates that he is liable to receive capital punishment whether she is his father’s wife who is his mother or whether she is his father’s wife who is not his mother. From where is it derived that he is liable in a case where she is his mother who is not his father’s wife? The verse states: “He has uncovered his father’s nakedness.” Although this phrase does not relate directly to the case of one’s mother who is not his father’s wife, the halakha in this case is derived from this phrase as it is free, i.e., the phrase is superfluous in this context, and is evidently included in the verse in order to compare between the two cases and learn a verbal analogy from it, as the baraita will elaborate below.

מות יומתו בסקילה אתה אומר בסקילה או אינו אלא באחת מכל מיתות האמורות בתורה נאמר כאן דמיהם בם ונאמר באוב וידעוני דמיהם בם מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה From the phrase “both of them shall be put to death” it is derived that they are executed by stoning. The baraita asks: Do you say that that they are executed by stoning, or is it rather by one of all the other types of the death penalty that are stated in the Torah? The baraita answers: It is stated here: “Their blood shall be upon them,” and it is stated with regard to a necromancer and a sorcerer: “Their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:27). Just as there the verse states that a necromancer and a sorcerer are executed by stoning, so too here, with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his father’s wife, the transgressors are executed by stoning.

עונש שמענו אזהרה מניין ת"ל (ויקרא יח, ז) ערות אביך לא תגלה ערות אביך זו אשת אביך The baraita asks: We have learned the punishment for one who engages in intercourse with his father’s wife. From where is the prohibition against doing this act derived? The baraita answers: The verse states: “The nakedness of your father and the nakedness of your mother you shall not uncover” (Leviticus 18:7); the phrase “the nakedness of your father” is referring to your father’s wife.

אתה אומר אשת אביך או אינו אלא ערות אביך ממש נאמר כאן ערות אביך לא תגלה ונאמר להלן (ויקרא כ, יא) ערות אביו גלה מה להלן באישות הכתוב מדבר אף כאן באישות הכתוב מדבר The baraita asks: Do you say that the reference is to your father’s wife, or is it rather referring to the nakedness of your father literally, i.e., to homosexual intercourse with one’s father? The baraita answers: It is stated here: “The nakedness of your father…you shall not uncover,” and it is stated there, in the verse that describes the punishment: “And the man who lies with his father’s wife, he has uncovered his father’s nakedness” (Leviticus 20:11). Just as there, the verse is speaking of marriage, i.e., it is not referring to the father himself but to his wife, so too here, the verse is speaking of marriage, i.e., his father’s wife.

ומשמע בין אשת אביו שהיא אמו בין אשת אביו שאינה אמו אמו שאינה אשת אביו מניין תלמוד לומר (ויקרא יח, ז) ערות אמך לא תגלה And the verse indicates that one’s father’s wife is forbidden to him whether she is his father’s wife who is his mother or whether she is his father’s wife who is not his mother. From where is it derived that she is forbidden to him in a case where she is his mother who is not his father’s wife? The verse states: “The nakedness of your mother you shall not uncover” (Leviticus 18:7).

אין לי אלא באזהרה שעשה הכתוב אמו שאינה אשת אביו כאמו שהיא אשת אביו עונש מניין The baraita asks: I have derived only with regard to the prohibition that the verse renders the halakha of his mother who is not his father’s wife like that of his mother who is his father’s wife. But with regard to the punishment, from where do I derive that they share the same halakha?

נאמר כאן ערות אביך לא תגלה ונאמר להלן ערות אביו גלה מה באזהרה עשה הכתוב אמו שאינה אשת אביו כאמו שהיא אשת אביו אף בעונש עשה הכתוב אמו שאינה אשת אביו כאמו שהיא אשת אביו The baraita answers, expounding on the verbal analogy it mentioned earlier: It is stated here, in the verse that describes the prohibition: “The nakedness of your father…you shall not uncover” (Leviticus 18:7), and it is stated there, in the verse that describes the punishment: “He has uncovered his father’s nakedness” (Leviticus 20:11). It is derived from this verbal analogy that just as with regard to the prohibition, the verse renders his mother who is not his father’s wife like his mother who is his father’s wife, i.e., both are forbidden, so too, with regard to the punishment, the verse renders his mother who is not his father’s wife like his mother who is his father’s wife.

(ויקרא יח, ז) אמך היא משום אמו אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום אשת אב It is derived from the phrase: “She is your mother” (Leviticus 18:7), that you render him liable due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with his mother, but you do not render him liable due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with his father’s wife. The baraita ends here. Since the halakhot in the collection of baraitot where this baraita appears, Torat Kohanim, are in accordance with the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda, the baraita supports the opinion of Rava, who explains the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in this manner.

ורבנן ערות אביך ממש The Gemara discusses the baraita, asking: And how do the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, interpret the phrase “the nakedness of your father”? The Gemara answers: They hold that this phrase is meant literally, i.e., that it is referring to homosexual intercourse. They do not accept the verbal analogy from which Rabbi Yehuda derives that the reference is to intercourse with one’s father’s wife.

האי (ויקרא יח, כב) מואת זכר נפקא לחייב עליו שתים The Gemara asks: Isn’t this prohibition against homosexual intercourse with one’s father derived from the verse: “And you shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination” (Leviticus 18:22)? The Gemara answers: The prohibition is stated specifically with regard to one’s father in order to render him liable to bring two sin-offerings for unwittingly engaging in intercourse with his father.

וכדרב יהודה דאמר רב יהודה נכרי הבא על אביו חייב שתים הבא על אחי אביו חייב שתים And it is in accordance with the statement of Rav Yehuda, as Rav Yehuda says: A gentile who engages in intercourse with his father is liable for committing two transgressions. Likewise, one who engages in intercourse with his father’s brother is liable for committing two transgressions.

אמר רבא מסתברא מילתא דרב יהודה בישראל בשוגג ובקרבן והאי דקאמר נכרי לישנא מעליא הוא דאי סלקא דעתך נכרי ממש דינו מאי ניהו קטלא בתרי קטלי קטלת ליה Rava says: It stands to reason that the statement of Rav Yehuda is with regard to a Jew who does this unwittingly. And the statement that he is liable for committing two transgressions concerns his liability to bring an offering, i.e., he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And even though the fact remains that he said gentile, it is a euphemism, as he did not want to attribute such a sin to a Jew. As if it enters your mind that the reference is literally to a gentile, the statement that he is liable for committing two transgressions is meaningless; what is his punishment for such a transgression? It is death. Could you kill him twice? Rather, it must be referring to a Jew who acted unwittingly.

תניא נמי הכי הבא על אביו חייב שתים הבא על אחי אביו חייב שתים This halakha is also taught in a baraita: One who engages in intercourse with his father is liable for committing two transgressions. One who engages in intercourse with his father’s brother is liable for committing two transgressions, as it is stated: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s brother” (Leviticus 18:14).

איכא דאמרי דלא כרבי יהודה Some say that this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as in his opinion there is no special prohibition against homosexual intercourse with one’s father. He interprets the verse: “The nakedness of your father…you shall not uncover” as referring to one’s father’s wife. Accordingly, one who engages in homosexual intercourse with his father or with his father’s brother is liable only due to the general prohibition against homosexual intercourse.

ואיכא דאמרי אפילו תימא רבי יהודה ומייתי לה בק"ו מאחי אביו ומה אחי אביו דקורבה דאביו הוא חייב שתים אביו לא כ"ש And some say: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and that he derives that there is a specific prohibition against homosexual intercourse with one’s father by an a fortiori inference from the prohibition concerning one’s father’s brother. And the inference is as follows: If for intercourse with one’s father’s brother, who is merely his father’s relative, one is liable for committing two transgressions, for intercourse with his father, is it not clear all the more so that he should be liable for committing two transgressions?

וקמיפלגי בפלוגתא דאביי ורבא מר סבר עונשין מן הדין ומר סבר אין עונשין מן הדין And the Sages who provide these two interpretations of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Abaye and Rava. One Sage, he of the second interpretation, holds that one administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference. Even with regard to a prohibition that is derived a fortiori, one who transgresses it is liable. And one Sage, he of the first interpretation, holds that one does not administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference.

ורבנן אזהרה לאשת אביו מנא להו נפקא להו מערות אשת אביך לא תגלה The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, from where do they derive the prohibition of intercourse with one’s father’s wife? The Gemara answers: They derive it from the verse: “The nakedness of your father’s wife you shall not uncover; it is your father’s nakedness” (Leviticus 18:8).

ור' יהודה ההוא מיבעי ליה לאזהרה לאשת אביו לאחר מיתה The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda derive from this verse, since he derives the prohibition from the verse: “The nakedness of your father…you shall not uncover”? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for the prohibition of one’s father’s wife after his father’s death; even though his father is dead, his father’s wife remains forbidden to him.

ורבנן ההוא מסיפא דקרא נפקא ערות אביך היא The Gemara asks: And from where do the Rabbis derive that halakha? The Gemara answers: That halakha is derived from the last clause of the verse: “It is your father’s nakedness.”

ורבי יהודה ההוא מיבעי ליה משום אשת אב אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום אשת איש The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda derive from that clause? The Gemara answers: That clause is necessary to teach the halakha that if one engages in intercourse with his father’s wife, you render him liable due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with his father’s wife, but you do not render him liable due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a married woman.

והאנן תנן הבא על אשת אב חייב עליה משום אשת אב ומשום אשת איש בין בחיי אביו בין לאחר מיתת אביו ולא פליג רבי יהודה The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: One who engages in intercourse with his father’s wife is liable to bring two offerings, one due to the fact that she is his father’s wife and one due to the fact that she is a married woman, and he is liable due to the former prohibition both during his father’s lifetime and after his father’s death? The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yehuda does not dispute this. So how can it be suggested that in Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, one who engages in intercourse with his father’s wife is not liable for engaging in intercourse with a married woman?

אמר אביי פליג בברייתא Abaye says: He disputes this ruling in a baraita. Although it is not mentioned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda disputes this ruling, it mentioned in a different source.

ורבנן עונש דאשת אביו לאחר מיתה מנא להו בשלמא רבי יהודה מייתי לה בגזרה שוה אלא רבנן מנא להו The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, from where do they derive the punishment for one who engages in intercourse with his father’s wife after his father’s death? Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is derived by means of a verbal analogy. But from where do the Rabbis, who do not accept the verbal analogy, derive it?

אמרי לך ההוא ערות אביו גלה דמפיק לה רבי יהודה לגזירה שוה מפקי ליה אינהו לעונש דאשת אביו לאחר מיתה The Gemara answers: The Rabbis can say to you that it is derived as follows: With regard to that phrase, “he has uncovered his father’s nakedness,” from which Rabbi Yehuda derives a verbal analogy, they derive from it the punishment for one who engages in intercourse with his father’s wife after his father’s death.

ורבנן עונש לאמו שאינה אשת אביו מנא להו אמר רב שישא בריה דרב אידי אמר קרא אמך היא עשאה הכתוב לאמו שאינה אשת אביו כאמו שהיא אשת אביו: The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, from where do they derive the punishment for one who engages in intercourse with his mother who is not his father’s wife? Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, says: The verse states: “She is your mother” (Leviticus 18:7). The verse renders the halakha of his mother who is not his father’s wife like that of his mother who is his father’s wife.

הבא על כלתו כו': ולחייב נמי משום אשת בנו אמר אביי פתח הכתוב בכלתו וסיים באשת בנו לומר לך זו היא כלתו זו היא אשת בנו: The mishna teaches with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law that he is liable both due to the fact that she is his daughter-in-law and due to the fact that she is a married woman. The Gemara asks: And let him also be liable due to engaging in intercourse with his son’s wife, as it is stated in the verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your daughter-in-law; she is your son’s wife, you shall not uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:15). Abaye says: The verse begins with his daughter-in-law and ends with his son’s wife, to tell you that these are not two prohibitions; rather, his daughter-in-law [kallato] is his son’s wife. They are one and the same.

מתני׳ הבא על הזכור ועל הבהמה והאשה המביאה את הבהמה בסקילה אם אדם חטא בהמה מה חטאה אלא לפי שבאה לאדם תקלה על ידה לפיכך אמר הכתוב תסקל ד"א שלא תהא בהמה עוברת בשוק ויאמרו זו היא שנסקל פלוני על ידה: MISHNA: A man who engages in intercourse with a male or with an animal, and a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal, are executed by stoning. The animal is likewise stoned to death. The mishna asks: If the person sinned by doing this, how did the animal sin? Rather, because a calamity was caused to a person by it, therefore the verse states that it should be stoned, so that it does not cause another to sin. Alternatively, it is so that this animal will not pass through the marketplace, and those who see it will say: This is the animal because of which so-and-so was stoned, and its existence would shame his memory.

גמ׳ זכר מנא לן דת"ר (ויקרא כ, יג) איש פרט לקטן אשר ישכב את זכר בין גדול בין קטן משכבי אשה מגיד לך הכתוב ששני משכבות באשה GEMARA: From where do we derive the prohibition and punishment for homosexual intercourse with a male? It is as the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And if a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall be put to death, their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:13): The word “man” excludes a minor boy. The phrase “lies with a male” is referring to any male, whether he is an adult man or whether he is a minor boy. The phrase “as with a woman [mishkevei isha],” referring to lying with a woman, appears in the plural. The verse teaches you that there are two manners of lying with a woman for which one who engages in intercourse with a woman forbidden to him is punished, vaginal and anal intercourse.

א"ר ישמעאל הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד Rabbi Yishmael says: This phrase is written to come to teach about the punishment for homosexual intercourse, and the halakha that one is liable for anal intercourse with a woman who is forbidden to him is found to be derived from it.

מות יומתו בסקילה אתה אומר בסקילה או אינו אלא באחת מכל מיתות האמורות בתורה נאמר כאן דמיהם בם ונאמר באוב וידעוני דמיהם בם מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה The phrase “they shall be put to death” is referring to execution by stoning. Do you say that they are executed by stoning, or is it rather by one of all the other types of death penalty that are stated in the Torah? It is stated here: “Their blood shall be upon them,” and it is stated with regard to a necromancer and a sorcerer: “Their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:27). Just as there the verse states that a necromancer and a sorcerer are executed by stoning, so too here, they are executed by stoning.

Daf 54b

עונש שמענו אזהרה מניין ת"ל (ויקרא יח, כב) ואת זכר לא תשכב משכבי אשה תועבה היא We have learned the punishment for homosexual intercourse, but from where is the prohibition derived? The verse states: “And you shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination” (Leviticus 18:22).

למדנו אזהרה לשוכב אזהרה לנשכב מניין ת"ל (דברים כג, יח) לא יהיה קדש מבני ישראל ואומר (מלכים א יד, כד) וגם קדש היה בארץ עשו ככל התועבות הגוים אשר הוריש וגו' דברי רבי ישמעאל We have learned from here the prohibition for the one who engages in homosexual intercourse actively. From where do we derive the prohibition for one who engages in homosexual intercourse passively? The verse states: “There shall not be a sodomite [kadesh] among the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18). And another verse, cited to clarify the meaning of the term kadesh, states: “And there were also sodomites [kadesh] in the land, they did according to all the abominations of the nations which the Lord drove out before the children of Israel” (I Kings 14:24). This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

רבי עקיבא אומר אינו צריך הרי הוא אומר ואת זכר לא תשכב משכבי אשה קרי ביה לא תשכב Rabbi Akiva says: It is not necessary to derive this halakha from the verse: “There shall not be a sodomite.” Rather, it says: “And you shall not lie [tishkav] with a male as with a woman.” Read into the verse: You shall not enable your being lain with [tishakhev] by a male.

בהמה מנא לן דתנו רבנן (ויקרא כ, טו) איש פרט לקטן אשר יתן שכבתו בבהמה בין גדולה בין קטנה § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one who engages in intercourse with an animal is liable to receive capital punishment? It is as the Sages taught: “And if a man lies with an animal, he shall be put to death, and you shall kill the animal” (Leviticus 20:15). The word “man” excludes a minor boy. The phrase “lies with an animal” is referring to any animal, whether old or young.

מות יומת בסקילה אתה אומר בסקילה או אינו אלא באחת מכל מיתות האמורות בתורה נאמר כאן תהרגו ונאמר להלן (דברים יג, י) כי הרג תהרגנו מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה The phrase “shall be put to death” refers to execution by stoning. Do you say that they are executed by stoning, or is it rather by one of all the other types of death penalty that are stated in the Torah? It is stated here: “You shall kill,” and it is stated there, with regard to an inciter: “But you shall kill him…and you shall stone him with stones and he shall die” (Deuteronomy 13:10–11). Just as there the verse states that an inciter is executed by stoning, so too here, one who engages in bestiality is executed by stoning.

למדנו עונש לשוכב עונש לנשכב מנלן ת"ל (שמות כב, יח) כל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת אם אינו ענין לשוכב תניהו ענין לנשכב We have learned the punishment for one who engages in bestiality actively, but from where do we derive the punishment for one who engages in bestiality passively? The verse states: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). If this verse is not needed for the matter of the one who actively lies with an animal, i.e., a male who sexually penetrates an animal, apply it to the matter of the one who causes an animal to lie with him, by being penetrated by the animal, i.e., any type of intercourse with an animal is punishable by death.

למדנו עונש בין לשוכב בין לנשכב אזהרה מניין ת"ל (ויקרא יח, כג) ובכל בהמה לא תתן שכבתך לטמאה בה We have therefore learned the punishment for both one who engages in bestiality actively and one who engages in bestiality passively, but from where is the prohibition derived? The verse states: “And you shall not lie with any animal to defile yourself with it” (Leviticus 18:23).

למדנו אזהרה לשוכב לנשכב מניין ת"ל (דברים כג, יח) לא יהיה קדש מבני ישראל ואומר (מלכים א יד, כד) וגם קדש היה בארץ וגו' דברי רבי ישמעאל We have learned the prohibition for one who engages in bestiality actively. From where do we derive the prohibition for one who engages in bestiality passively? The verse states: “There shall not be a kadesh among the children of Israel,” and another verse states: “And there were also kadesh in the land,” which shows that anyone who engages in intercourse in a way that is like the abominations of the nations is called a kadesh. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

רבי עקיבא אומר אינו צריך הרי הוא אומר לא תתן שכבתך לא תתן שכיבתך Rabbi Akiva says: It is not necessary to derive the halakha prohibiting passively engaging in bestiality from this verse. Rather, it says: “You shall not lie [shekhovtekha],” which can be read as follows: You shall not enable your being lain with [shekhivatkha].

הבא על הזכור והביא עליו זכר The Gemara discusses cases to which these halakhic expositions are relevant: What is the halakha of one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with a male, and unwittingly causes a male to engage in intercourse with him, within one lapse of awareness, i.e., without realizing in the interim that these behaviors are forbidden? Is he considered to have transgressed two separate prohibitions and therefore liable to bring two sin-offerings, or is he considered to have transgressed one prohibition twice and liable to bring only one sin-offering?

אמר ר' אבהו לדברי רבי ישמעאל חייב שתים חדא מלא תשכב וחדא מלא יהיה קדש לדברי ר"ע אינו חייב אלא אחת לא תשכב לא תשכב חדא היא Rabbi Abbahu says: According to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, he is liable for transgressing two different prohibitions: One is derived from the verse: “You shall not lie,” and the other one is derived from the verse: “There shall not be a sodomite,” which includes one who engages in homosexual intercourse passively. But according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable for only one prohibition, as the prohibitions of “you shall not lie [tishkav]” and you shall not enable your being lain with [tishakhev] are one statement in the verse.

הבא על הבהמה והביא בהמה עליו אמר רבי אבהו לדברי ר' ישמעאל חייב שתים חדא מלא תתן שכבתך וחדא מלא יהיה קדש לדברי רבי עקיבא אינו חייב אלא אחת שכבתך ושכיבתך חדא היא Similarly, with regard to one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an animal, and then unwittingly causes an animal to engage in intercourse with him within one lapse of awareness, Rabbi Abbahu says: According to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for transgressing two different prohibitions. One is derived from the verse: “You shall not lie,” and the other one is derived from the verse: “There shall not be a sodomite.” But according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable for only one prohibition, as the prohibitions of “you shall not lie [shekhovtekha]” and you shall not enable your being lain with [shekhivatkha] are one statement in the verse.

אביי אמר אפי' לדברי רבי ישמעאל נמי אינו חייב אלא אחת דכי כתיב לא יהיה קדש בגברי כתיב Abaye says: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for only one prohibition, as when it is written: “There shall not be a sodomite,” it is written only with regard to intercourse with men, but not with regard to bestiality.

אלא לרבי ישמעאל אזהרה לנשכב מנא ליה נפקא ליה (שמות כב, יח) מכל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת אם אינו ענין לשוכב תניהו ענין לנשכב The Gemara asks: But according to Abaye, from where does Rabbi Yishmael derive the prohibition for one who engages in bestiality passively? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death.” If this verse is not needed for the matter of the one who actively lies with the animal, apply it to the matter of the one who causes the animal to lie with him.

ואפקיה רחמנא לנשכב בלשון שוכב מה שוכב ענש והזהיר אף נשכב ענש והזהיר And it is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the halakha of one who engages in bestiality passively using the term for one who engages in bestiality actively: Just as with regard to one who engages in bestiality actively the Torah both punishes for this action and prohibits it, so too, with regard to one who engages in bestiality passively, the Torah both punishes for this action and prohibits it.

הנרבע לזכר והנרבע לבהמה אמר רבי אבהו לדברי רבי עקיבא חייב שתים חדא מלא תשכב וחדא מלא תתן שכבתך לדברי רבי ישמעאל אינו חייב אלא אחת אידי ואידי לא יהיה קדש הוא With regard to the case of one who was unwittingly sodomized by a male and then unwittingly was one with whom an animal copulated within one lapse of awareness, Rabbi Abbahu says that according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable for transgressing two prohibitions. One is derived from the verse: “You shall not lie with a male,” and the other one is derived from the verse: “You shall not lie with any animal.” According to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for transgressing only one prohibition, as both this prohibition and that prohibition are derived from the verse: “There shall not be a sodomite.”

אביי אמר אפילו לדברי רבי ישמעאל נמי חייב שתים דכתיב כל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת אם אינו ענין לשוכב תניהו ענין לנשכב ואפקיה רחמנא לנשכב בלשון שוכב מה שוכב ענש והזהיר אף נשכב ענש והזהיר Abaye says: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for transgressing two prohibitions, as it is written: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death.” If the verse is not needed for the matter of one who engages in bestiality actively, as this prohibition is stated explicitly in the verse: “And you shall not lie with any animal” (Leviticus 18:23), apply it to the matter of one who engages in bestiality passively. And it is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the halakha of one who engages in bestiality passively using the term for one who engages in bestiality actively: Just as with regard to one who engages in bestiality actively the Torah both punishes for this act and prohibits it, so too, with regard to one who engages in bestiality passively, the Torah both punishes for this act and prohibits it.

אבל הבא על הזכור והביא זכר עליו הבא על הבהמה והביא בהמה עליו בין לר' אבהו בין לאביי לרבי ישמעאל חייב שלש לרבי עקיבא חייב שתים But with regard to one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with a male, and then unwittingly causes a male to engage in intercourse with him, and who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an animal, and then unwittingly causes an animal to engage in intercourse with him, performing all of these actions in one lapse of awareness, in this case, both according to Rabbi Abbahu and according to Abaye, the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael is that he is liable for transgressing three prohibitions; the ones mentioned above and the prohibition of: “There shall not be a sodomite,” whereas according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva he is liable for transgressing only two prohibitions.

תנו רבנן זכור לא עשו בו קטן כגדול בהמה עשו בה קטנה כגדולה § The Sages taught: With regard to intercourse with a male, the Torah does not deem a younger boy to be like an older boy; but with regard to intercourse with an animal, the Torah does deem a young animal to be like an old animal.

מאי לא עשו בו קטן כגדול אמר רב לא עשו ביאת פחות מבן תשע שנים כבן תשע שנים ושמואל אמר לא עשו ביאת פחות מבן שלש שנים כבן שלש שנים The Gemara asks: What does it mean that the Torah does not deem a younger boy to be like an older boy? Rav says: It means that the Torah does not deem the intercourse of one who is less than nine years old to be like the intercourse of one who is at least nine years old, as for a male’s act of intercourse to have the legal status of full-fledged intercourse the minimum age is nine years. And Shmuel says: The Torah does not deem the intercourse of a child who is less than three years old to be like that of one who is three years old.

במאי קמיפלגי רב סבר כל דאיתיה בשוכב איתיה בנשכב וכל דליתיה בשוכב ליתיה בנשכב The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rav and Shmuel disagree? The Gemara answers: Rav holds that any halakha that applies to one who engages in intercourse actively applies to one who engages in intercourse passively, and any halakha that does not apply to one who engages in intercourse actively does not apply to one who engages in intercourse passively. Therefore, just as one who engages in intercourse actively is not liable if he is less than nine years old, as the intercourse of such a child does not have the halakhic status of intercourse, so too, if a child who is less than nine years old engages in homosexual intercourse passively, the one who engages in intercourse with him is not liable.

ושמואל סבר משכבי אשה כתיב And Shmuel holds: It is written: “And you shall not lie with a male as with a woman,” indicating that the halakha of a male who engages in intercourse passively is like that of a woman; just as the intercourse of a woman has the halakhic status of intercourse from when she is three years old, the same is true with regard to a male who engages in intercourse passively. Consequently, in Shmuel’s opinion, one who engages in intercourse with a male who is older than three is liable.

תניא כוותיה דרב זכר בן תשע שנים ויום אחד It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav: One who engages in homosexual intercourse with a male aged nine years and one day,

Daf 55a

הבא על הבהמה בין כדרכה בין שלא כדרכה והאשה המביאה את הבהמה עליה בין כדרכה בין שלא כדרכה חייב or one who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether in a typical manner or in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and similarly a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether in a typical manner or in an atypical manner, is liable. This baraita sets the minimum age for the passive male at nine years and one day.

דרש רב נחמן בר רב חסדא באשה שני משכבות ובבהמה משכב אחד Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda taught: With regard to a woman there are two manners of lying. A woman who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether it is vaginal or anal intercourse, is liable. But with regard to a man who engages in intercourse with an animal there is only one manner of lying, i.e., vaginal intercourse.

מתקיף לה רב פפא אדרבה אשה דאורחה היא אמשכב מיחייב אמידעם אחרינא לא מחייב בהמה דלאו אורחא היא לחייב עלה על כל נקב ונקב Rav Pappa objects to this opinion: On the contrary, a woman, whose typical manner of intercourse is vaginal, is rendered liable for lying with an animal only in that manner; she is not rendered liable for something else, i.e., for engaging in anal intercourse with an animal. With regard to a man who engages in intercourse with an animal, by contrast, since it is not its typical conduct to engage in intercourse with a man, he should be rendered liable for engaging in intercourse with it through each and every orifice.

תניא (דלא כתרוייהו) זכר בן תשע שנים ויום אחד הבא על הבהמה בין כדרכה בין שלא כדרכה והאשה המביאה את הבהמה עליה בין כדרכה בין שלא כדרכה חייב It is taught in a baraita in accordance with neither of their opinions: One who engages in homosexual intercourse with a male aged nine years and one day, or one who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether in a typical manner, or in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, and similarly, a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal, whether in a typical manner or in an atypical manner, are liable. Evidently, there is no difference between the nature of the transgression of a woman who engages in bestiality and a man who engages in bestiality in this regard.

א"ל רבינא לרבא המערה בזכור מהו Ravina said to Rava: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with another male, i.e., insertion of the penis, without completing the intercourse, what is the halakha? Is he liable for engaging in homosexual intercourse?

המערה בזכור (ויקרא יח, כב) משכבי אשה כתיב ביה אלא המערה בבהמה מהו The Gemara comments: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with a male, what is the question? The expression “as with a woman” (Leviticus 18:22) is written with regard to him, which indicates that any act that is considered an act of intercourse with a woman is also considered an act of intercourse with a man. Rather, the question is as follows: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with an animal, what is the halakha?

א"ל אם אינו ענין להעראה דכתיבא גבי אחות אביו ואחות אמו דלא צריכא דהא איתקש להעראה דנדה תניהו ענין להעראה דבהמה Rava said to him: In the verse: “And you shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister nor of your father’s sister; for he has made naked [he’era] his relative” (Leviticus 20:19), the word he’era alludes to the initial stage of intercourse [ha’ara]. If the word he’era is not needed for the matter of the initial stage of intercourse in the context where it is written, i.e., for the prohibition of intercourse with one’s father’s sister and one’s mother’s sister, as it is not necessary in that context since the halakha of the initial stage of intercourse with regard to all forbidden sexual relations is compared by the Torah to the halakha of the initial stage of intercourse mentioned with regard to a menstruating woman, apply it instead to the matter of the initial stage of intercourse with an animal. The superfluous expression that appears in the verse concerning one’s aunt teaches that the initial stage of intercourse is considered intercourse even with regard to an animal.

מכדי בהמה מחייבי מיתות ב"ד היא למה לי דכתיב להעראה דידה גבי חייבי כריתות לכתביה גבי חייבי מיתות בית דין וליגמור חייבי מיתות בית דין מחייבי מיתות בית דין The Gemara asks: Since one who engages in intercourse with an animal is among those who are liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, why do I need the halakha of one who performs the initial stage of intercourse with an animal to be written in a verse concerning those who are liable to receive karet, i.e., the case of one who engages in intercourse with his aunt? Let the Torah write this halakha with regard to those who are liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, and one would then derive this halakha concerning those who are liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty from the halakha of those who are liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty, and not from the less relevant halakha of one who engages in intercourse with his aunt, who is punished with karet.

הואיל וכוליה קרא לדרשא הוא דאתי כתיבא נמי מילתא דדרשא The Gemara answers: Since the entire verse about the punishment of one who engages in intercourse with the sister of his father or mother is superfluous, and comes for the sake of exposition, as this halakha is already stated in other verses (see Leviticus 18:12–13), this matter, i.e., the fact that the initial stage of intercourse is halakhically defined as intercourse, is also written in this verse for the purpose of an exposition, i.e., in order to indicate that this principle holds true with regard to bestiality as well.

בעא מיניה רב אחדבוי בר אמי מרב ששת המערה בעצמו מהו אמר ליה קבסתן Rav Aḥadevoi bar Ami asked Rav Sheshet: With regard to one who performs the initial stage of homosexual intercourse on himself, what is the halakha? Is he liable for homosexual intercourse? Rav Sheshet said to him: You disgust me with your question; such an act is not possible.

אמר רב אשי מאי תיבעי לך בקושי לא משכחת לה כי משכחת לה במשמש מת למאן דאמר משמש מת בעריות פטור הכא פטור ולמאן דאמר חייב הכא מיחייב תרתי מיחייב אשוכב ומיחייב אנשכב Rav Ashi said: What is your dilemma? With regard to doing so with an erect penis, you cannot find such a case. You can find it only when one performs this act of intercourse with a flaccid penis. And the halakha is subject to a dispute: According to the one who says that a man who engages in intercourse with a flaccid penis, with one of those with whom relations are forbidden, is exempt, as that is not considered intercourse, here too, when one does so to himself, he is exempt. And according to the one who says that he is liable, he is rendered liable here for transgressing two prohibitions according to Rabbi Yishmael; he is rendered liable for engaging in homosexual intercourse actively, and he is rendered liable for engaging in homosexual intercourse passively.

בעו מיניה מרב ששת עובד כוכבים הבא על הבהמה מהו תקלה וקלון בעינן והכא תקלה איכא קלון ליכא או דילמא תקלה אע"פ שאין קלון The students asked Rav Sheshet: With regard to a gentile who engages in intercourse with an animal, what is the halakha? Must the animal be killed? The Gemara elaborates: Do we need two reasons to kill the animal, namely that it caused a calamity and that it caused shame, and therefore here the animal is not killed, as while there is a calamity, as it caused a person to sin and be executed, there is no shame, as the Jewish court is not responsible for the shame of a gentile? Or perhaps one reason is enough, and an animal is killed because of the calamity it caused even if there is no shame?

אמר רב ששת תניתוה מה אילנות שאין אוכלין ואין שותין ואין מריחין אמרה תורה השחת שרוף וכלה הואיל ובא לאדם תקלה על ידן המתעה את חבירו מדרכי חיים לדרכי מיתה על אחת כמה וכמה Rav Sheshet said: You learned the answer to this question in a baraita: If with regard to trees, which neither eat nor drink nor smell, and nevertheless, if they are used in idolatrous rites, the Torah says: Destroy, burn, and demolish them (see Deuteronomy, chapters 7, 12), and the reason is since a calamity was caused to people by them, then with regard to one who leads another astray from the ways of life to the ways of death, all the more so he is liable to be destroyed. It can be derived from here that any item used for a transgression that renders one liable to be executed should be destroyed.

אלא מעתה עובד כוכבים המשתחוה לבהמתו תיתסר ומקטלא מי איכא מידי דלישראל לא אסר ולעובד כוכבים אסר The Gemara challenges this ruling: If that is so, in the case of a gentile who bows down to his animal, the animal should be forbidden, i.e., it should be prohibited to derive benefit from it, and it should be killed. The Gemara answers: Is there anything that is not forbidden to a Jew, but is forbidden to a gentile? Since a Jew who bows down to an animal does not render it forbidden (see Temura 29b), a gentile who does so does not render it forbidden either.

ישראל גופיה ליתסר מידי דהוה ארביעה אמר אביי זה קלונו מרובה וזה קלונו מועט The Gemara challenges that assumption: With regard to a Jew himself who bows down to his animal, let the animal be forbidden, just as it is in a case of bestiality, when the animal is forbidden and is killed. Abaye says: The cases are not the same. In this case, where one commits bestiality, his shame is great; but in that case, where one worships an animal, his shame is slight, and he will not be so disgraced if the animal is left alive.

והרי אילנות דאין קלונן מרובה ואמרה תורה השחת שרוף וכלה בבעלי חיים קאמרינן דחס רחמנא עלייהו The Gemara asks: But with regard to trees that are used in idolatrous rites, in which case the shame of the idol worshippers is not great, the Torah nevertheless says: Destroy, burn, and demolish them. The Gemara answers: We are speaking of living animals. The halakha is different there, as the Merciful One has pity on them. Therefore, if the shame of the person is not great, the animal is not killed.

רבא אמר אמרה תורה בהמה נהנית מעבירה תיהרג Rava says that there is a different reason for the distinction between an animal that was worshipped and an animal with which one committed bestiality: The Torah states that because the animal enjoyed the transgression, it must be killed. This cannot be said about an animal that was worshipped.

והרי אילנות דאין נהנין מעבירה ואמרה תורה השחת שרוף וכלה בבעלי חיים קאמרינן דחס רחמנא עלייהו The Gemara asks: But with regard to trees that are used in idolatrous rites, which do not enjoy the transgression, nevertheless the Torah says: Destroy, burn, and demolish. The Gemara answers: We are speaking of living animals. The halakha is different there, as the Merciful One has pity on them. Therefore, an animal is killed only if it enjoyed the transgression.

ת"ש ד"א שלא תהא בהמה עוברת בשוק ויאמרו זו היא שנסקל פלוני על ידה מאי לאו The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna to the dilemma concerning an animal with which a gentile committed bestiality: Alternatively, it is so that this animal will not pass through the marketplace, and those who see it will say: This is the animal because of which so-and-so was stoned, and its existence would shame his memory. What, is it not

Daf 55b

מדסיפא תקלה וקלון רישא תקלה בלא קלון והיכי דמי עובד כוכבים הבא על הבהמה evident from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna includes two reasons for the killing of the animal, namely both the calamity and the shame caused by the animal, that the first clause, the first reason stated in the mishna, is referring to a case of a calamity with-out shame? And what are the circumstances of a calamity without shame? It is the case of a gentile who engages in intercourse with an animal. In that case there is a calamity, as the gentile is executed, but his shame is not the concern of the Jewish court.

לא סיפא תקלה וקלון רישא הא קמ"ל דאפילו קלון בלא תקלה נמי מיחייבי והיכי דמי ישראל הבא על הבהמה בשוגג וכדבעי רב המנונא The Gemara rejects this proof: No. The latter clause is referring to a case of both a calamity and shame, but this first clause teaches us that even in a case where there is a circumstance of shame alone without the calamity of execution, the court is obligated to kill the animal. Although the mishna employs the term: Calamity, it is possible that this is referring to the calamity of the transgression, not the execution of the transgressor. And what are the circumstances of this case? It is a case of a Jew who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an animal, and this is just like the case about which Rav Hamnuna raises a dilemma.

דבעי רב המנונא ישראל הבא על הבהמה בשוגג מהו תקלה וקלון בעינן והכא קלון איכא תקלה ליכא או דילמא קלון אע"פ שאין תקלה As Rav Hamnuna raises a dilemma: With regard to a Jew who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an animal, what is the halakha? Is the animal stoned to death? Do we need both a calamity and shame in order to put it to death, and therefore here the animal is not killed, as there is shame, but there is no calamity of execution, or perhaps shame is enough, even if there is no calamity?

אמר רב יוסף תא שמע בת שלש שנים ויום אחד מתקדשת בביאה ואם בא עליה יבם קנאה וחייבין עליה משום אשת איש Rav Yosef says: Come and hear a resolution from a mishna (Nidda 44b): A girl who is three years and one day old whose father arranged her betrothal is betrothed with intercourse, as the legal status of intercourse with her is that of full-fledged intercourse. And in a case where the childless husband of a girl who is three years and one day old dies, if his brother, the yavam, engages in intercourse with her, he acquires her as his wife; and if she is married, a man other than her husband is liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to the prohibition of intercourse with a married woman.

ומטמאה את בועלה לטמא משכב תחתון כעליון ניסת לכהן אוכלת בתרומה בא עליה אחד מן הפסולים פסלה מן הכהונה The mishna continues: And if she is impure due to menstruation, she transmits impurity to one who engages in intercourse with her, who then renders all the items designated for lying beneath him impure like the items designated for lying above him. If she marries a priest, she may partake of teruma like any other wife of a priest. If she is unmarried and one of the men who are unfit for the priesthood, e.g., a mamzer or ḥalal, engages in intercourse with her, he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, and if she is the daughter of a priest, she is disqualified from partaking of teruma.

ואם בא עליה אחד מכל העריות האמורות בתורה מומתין על ידה והיא פטורה The mishna continues: And if one of any of those with whom relations are forbidden, who are stated in the Torah, engaged in intercourse with her, e.g., her father or father-in-law, they are executed by the court for engaging in intercourse with her, and she is exempt because she is a minor.

אחד מכל עריות ואפילו בהמה והא הכא דקלון איכא תקלה ליכא וקתני מומתין על ידה The Gemara infers: One of any of those with whom relations are forbidden apparently includes even an animal. And here, there is shame but there is no calamity, as she is not executed due to her status as a minor, and yet the mishna teaches: They are executed for engaging in intercourse with her. Evidently, the animal is killed.

כיון דמזידה היא תקלה נמי איכא ורחמנא הוא דחס עלה עלה דידה חס אבהמה לא חס The Gemara rejects this proof: Since she committed this transgression intentionally, there is a calamity as well, and it is the Merciful One who has pity on her due to her young age, and exempts her from punishment. And although the Merciful One has pity on her, He does not have pity on the animal. Therefore, it cannot be proven from here that shame without a calamity is sufficient cause for the animal to be put to death, because calamity is present in this case.

אמר רבא ת"ש בן תשע שנים ויום אחד הבא על יבמתו קנאה ואינו נותן גט עד שיגדיל ומטמא כנדה לטמא משכב תחתון כעליון Rava says: Come and hear a proof from the subsequent mishna (Nidda 45a): With regard to a boy who is nine years and one day old, whose brother died childless, and who engaged in intercourse with his yevama, his brother’s widow, the status of the intercourse is that of full-fledged intercourse and he has acquired her as his wife, but if he chooses to end the marriage, he cannot give her a bill of divorce until he reaches majority. And he becomes ritually impure like a menstruating woman after engaging in intercourse with her, and then renders all the items designated for lying beneath him impure like the items designated for lying above him.

פוסל ואינו מאכיל ופוסל את הבהמה מעל גבי המזבח ונסקלת ע"י ואם בא על אחת מכל העריות האמורות בתורה מומתים על ידו The mishna continues: If he is disqualified from the priesthood and engages in intercourse with the daughter of a priest, he disqualifies her from partaking of teruma; but if he is a priest who marries an Israelite woman, he does not enable her to partake of teruma. And if he engages in intercourse with an animal, he disqualifies the animal from being sacrificed upon the altar, and the animal is stoned on the basis of intercourse with him. And if he engaged in intercourse with one of any of those with whom relations are forbidden, who are stated in the Torah, they are executed by the court on the basis of intercourse with him, but he is exempt.

והא הכא קלון איכא תקלה ליכא וקתני נסקלת על ידו The Gemara infers: And here, in a case where he engages in intercourse with an animal, there is shame, but there is no calamity, and yet the mishna teaches that the animal is stoned on the basis of intercourse with him, indicating that shame is sufficient for the animal to be killed.

כיון דמזיד הוא תקלה נמי איכא ורחמנא הוא דחס עילויה עליה דידיה חס רחמנא אבהמה לא חס רחמנא The Gemara rejects this proof: Since he committed this transgression intentionally, there is a calamity as well, and it is the Merciful One who has pity on him due to his minority. Although the Merciful One has pity on him, the Merciful One does not have pity on the animal. Therefore, it cannot be proven from here that shame without a calamity is sufficient cause for the animal to be put to death, because calamity is present in this case.

תא שמע דבר אחר שלא תהא בהמה עוברת בשוק ויאמרו זו היא שנסקל פלוני על ידה מאי לאו מדסיפא תקלה וקלון רישא קלון בלא תקלה והיכי דמי ישראל הבא על הבהמה בשוגג The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna (54a): Alternatively, it is so that this animal will not pass through the marketplace, and those who see it will say: This is the animal because of which so-and-so was stoned. What, is it not evident from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna includes two reasons for the killing of the animal, namely both the calamity and the shame caused by the animal, that the first clause, the first reason stated in the mishna, is referring to a case of shame without a calamity? And what are the circumstances of shame without a calamity? It is the case of a Jew who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an animal.

לא סיפא תקלה וקלון רישא תקלה בלא קלון והיכי דמי עובד כוכבים הבא על הבהמה וכדבעו מיניה מרב ששת: The Gemara rejects this proof: No, perhaps the latter clause is referring to a case where there is both a calamity and shame, while the first clause is referring to a case where there is a calamity without shame. And what are the circumstances of a calamity without shame? It is the case of a gentile who engages in intercourse with an animal, as the students asked Rav Sheshet. The dilemma is left unresolved. No conclusive answer can be inferred from the mishna for either this dilemma or for the dilemma raised by the students of Rav Sheshet.

מתני׳ המגדף אינו חייב עד שיפרש השם א"ר יהושע בן קרחה MISHNA: One who blasphemes, i.e., one who curses God, is not liable unless he utters the name of God and curses it. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said:

Daf 56a

בכל יום דנין את העדים בכינוי יכה יוסי את יוסי On every day of a blasphemer’s trial, when the judges judge the witnesses, i.e., interrogate the witnesses, they ask the witnesses to use an appellation for the name of God, so that they do not utter a curse of God’s name. Specifically, the witnesses would say: Let Yosei smite Yosei, as the name Yosei has four letters in Hebrew, as does the Tetragrammaton.

נגמר הדין לא הורגין בכינוי אלא מוציאין כל אדם לחוץ שואלין את הגדול שביניהן ואומר לו אמור מה ששמעת בפירוש והוא אומר והדיינין עומדין על רגליהן וקורעין ולא מאחין When the judgment is over, and the court votes to deem the defendant guilty, they do not sentence him to death based on the testimony of the witnesses in which they used an appellation for the name of God, without having ever heard the exact wording of the curse. Rather, they remove all the people who are not required to be there from the court, so that the curse is not heard publicly, and the judges interrogate the eldest of the witnesses, and say to him: Say what you heard explicitly. And he says exactly what he heard. And the judges stand on their feet and make a tear in their garments, as an act of mourning for the desecration of the honor of God. And they do not ever fully stitch it back together again.

והשני אומר אף אני כמוהו והשלישי אומר אף אני כמוהו: And the second witness says: I too heard as he did, but he does not repeat the curse explicitly. And the third witness, in the event that there is one, says: I too heard as he did. In this manner, the repetition of the invective sentence is limited to what is absolutely necessary.

גמ׳ תנא עד שיברך שם בשם GEMARA: The Sage taught in a baraita: A blasphemer is not liable unless he blesses, a euphemism for curses, the name of God with the name of God, e.g., by saying: Let such and such a name strike such and such a name.

מנהני מילי אמר שמואל דאמר קרא (ויקרא כד, טז) ונוקב שם וגו' בנקבו שם יומת The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Shmuel says: It is derived from that which the verse states: “And he who blasphemes [venokev] the name of the Lord shall be put to death; all the congregation shall stone him; the convert as well as the homeborn, when he blasphemes [benokvo] the name, he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16). It is derived from the repetition of the phrase “blasphemes the name” that the reference is to cursing the name of God with the name of God.

ממאי דהאי נוקב לישנא דברוכי הוא דכתיב (במדבר כג, ח) מה אקב לא קבה אל ואזהרתיה מהכא (שמות כב, כז) אלהים לא תקלל The Gemara asks: From where is it derived that this word nokev is a term for blessing, i.e., cursing? The Gemara answers that it is derived from the statement of Balaam, who was sent by Balak to curse the Jewish people: “How shall I curse [ekkov] whom God has not cursed?” (Numbers 23:8). And the prohibition against cursing God is derived from here: “You shall not curse God” (Exodus 22:27).

ואימא מיברז הוא דכתיב (מלכים ב יב, י) ויקב חור בדלתו ואזהרתיה מהכא (דברים יב, ג) ואבדתם את שמם לא תעשון כן לה' אלהיכם The Gemara asks: But say that perhaps the meaning of nokev is not cursing, but rather making a hole, as it is written: “And made a hole [vayyikkov] in its lid” (II Kings 12:10). According to this, the word nokev is referring to one who makes a hole and damages the written name of God. And the prohibition against doing so is derived from here: “And you shall destroy their name out of that place. You shall not do so to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:3–4).

בעינא שם בשם וליכא The Gemara answers: It is derived from the repetition of nokev that for one to be liable, it is necessary that his transgression involve the name of God with the name of God, and such a transgression is not possible if the reference is to making a hole.

ואימא דמנח שני שמות אהדדי ובזע להו ההוא נוקב וחוזר ונוקב הוא ואימא דחייק שם אפומא דסכינא ובזע בה ההוא חורפא דסכינא הוא דקא בזע The Gemara challenges: But say that such a transgression is possible, as one can place two written names of God, one on top of the other, and tear through them at once. The Gemara explains: That would be defined as making a hole and again making a hole, not making a hole in one name by means of another name. The Gemara asks: But say that one can etch the name of God on the point of a knife and cut through another name with it. The Gemara answers: In that case, it is the point of the knife that is cutting, not the name of God.

אימא פרושי שמיה הוא דכתיב (במדבר א, יז) ויקח משה ואהרן את האנשים האלה אשר נקבו בשמות ואזהרתיה מהכא (דברים ו, יג) את ה' אלהיך תירא The Gemara asks: Say that nokev means the utterance of the ineffable name of God. As it is written: “And Moses and Aaron took these men that are pointed out [nikkevu] by name” (Numbers 1:17). And the prohibition to do so is derived from here: “You shall fear the Lord, your God” (Deuteronomy 6:13).

חדא דבעינא שם בשם וליכא ועוד הויא ליה אזהרת עשה ואזהרת עשה לא שמה אזהרה The Gemara answers: One answer is that for one to be liable, it is necessary that his transgression involve the name of God with the name of God, and such a transgression is not possible if the reference is to uttering the ineffable name of God. Furthermore, the prohibition derived from the verse “You shall fear the Lord, your God” is a prohibition stated as a positive mitzva, and a prohibition stated as a positive mitzva is not considered a prohibition.

ואיבעית אימא אמר קרא (ויקרא כד, יא) ויקב ויקלל למימרא דנוקב קללה הוא The Gemara presents an alternative proof that nokev is referring to cursing: And if you wish, say instead that the verse states: “And the son of the Israelite woman blasphemed [vayyikkov] the name and cursed” (Leviticus 24:11). That is to say that the meaning of nokev is to curse.

ודילמא עד דעבד תרוייהו לא סלקא דעתך דכתיב (ויקרא כד, יד) הוצא את המקלל ולא כתיב הוצא את הנוקב והמקלל שמע מינה חדא היא The Gemara asks: But perhaps this verse does not prove that the meaning of nokev is to curse; rather, it indicates that one is not liable to be executed unless he does both, i.e., both nokev and cursing God? The Gemara answers: This shall not enter your mind, as it is written: “Bring forth the one who cursed…and stone him” (Leviticus 24:14), and it is not written: Bring forth the nokev and one who cursed. Conclude from it that it is one act and not two.

תנו רבנן איש מה ת"ל איש איש לרבות את העובדי כוכבים שמוזהרין על ברכת השם כישראל ואינן נהרגין אלא בסייף שכל מיתה האמורה בבני נח אינה אלא בסייף § The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Anyone who curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15), that the verse could have stated: One [ish] who curses his God. Why must the verse state: “Anyone [ish ish]”? It is to include the gentiles, who are prohibited from blessing, i.e., cursing, the name of God, just like Jews are. And they are executed for this transgression by the sword alone, as all death penalties stated with regard to the descendants of Noah are by the sword alone.

והא מהכא נפקא מהתם נפקא ה' זו ברכת השם The Gemara asks: But is this halakha derived from here? Rather, it is derived from there: “And the Lord God commanded the man” (Genesis 2:16), as is stated in a baraita that will soon be quoted at length: “The Lord,” this is referring to the blessing, i.e., cursing, of the name of God. This verse concerns Adam, the first man, and is therefore binding on all of humanity.

אמר ר' יצחק נפחא לא נצרכא אלא לרבותא הכינויין ואליבא דרבי מאיר Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: The verse “anyone who curses his God” is necessary only to include gentiles who curse God using the appellations for the name of God, rather than mentioning the ineffable name, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

דתניא (ויקרא כד, טו) איש איש כי יקלל אלהיו ונשא חטאו מה תלמוד לומר והלא כבר נאמר (ויקרא כד, טז) ונוקב שם ה' מות יומת לפי שנאמר ונוקב שם מות יומת יכול לא יהא חייב אלא על שם המיוחד בלבד מניין לרבות כל הכינויין תלמוד לומר איש כי יקלל אלהיו מכל מקום דברי רבי מאיר As it is taught in a baraita: Why must the verse state: “Anyone who curses his God shall bear his sin”? But isn’t it already stated: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16)? Rather, since it is stated: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death,” one might have thought that one will be liable only for cursing the ineffable name of God. From where is it derived that the verse includes one who curses any of the appellations as well? The verse states: “Anyone who curses his God,” to indicate that one is liable to be executed in any case. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וחכמים אומרים על שם המיוחד במיתה ועל הכינויין באזהרה And the Rabbis say: For cursing the ineffable name of God, one is punished by death, and for cursing the appellations, one is liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition.

ופליגא דרבי מיישא דאמר רבי מיישא בן נח שבירך את השם בכינויים לרבנן חייב The Gemara comments: And Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, who holds that according to the Rabbis, gentiles are not liable for cursing appellations for the name of God, disagrees with the opinion of Rav Meyasha. As Rav Meyasha says: A descendant of Noah who blessed God by one of the appellations is liable to be executed even according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

מאי טעמא דאמר קרא (ויקרא כד, טז) כגר כאזרח גר ואזרח הוא דבעינן בנקבו שם אבל עובד כוכבים אפילו בכינוי What is the reason? It is because the verse states: “The convert as well as the homeborn, when he blasphemes the name, he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16), from which it is derived that it is only in the case of a convert or a homeborn Jew that we require the condition: “When he blasphemes the name,” i.e., he is liable to be executed only if he curses the ineffable name. But a gentile is liable to be executed even due to merely cursing an appellation.

ורבי מאיר האי כגר כאזרח מאי עביד ליה גר ואזרח בסקילה אבל עובד כוכבים בסייף סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל ואיתרבו איתרבו קמ"ל The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Meir do with this part of the verse: “The convert as well as the homeborn”? What does he derive from it? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir derives that a convert or a homeborn Jew is liable to be executed by stoning for this transgression, but a gentile is executed by the sword. This exclusion is necessary as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that since gentiles are included in the halakhot of this verse, they are included in all the halakhot of blasphemy. Therefore the verse teaches us that they are not stoned.

ורבי יצחק נפחא אליבא דרבנן האי כגר כאזרח מאי עביד ליה גר ואזרח הוא דבעינן שם בשם אבל עובד כוכבים לא בעינן שם בשם The Gemara asks: And what does Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa do with this part of the verse: “The convert as well as the homeborn,” according to the opinion of the Rabbis, since Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa holds that the Rabbis do not deem either a Jew or a gentile liable for cursing an appellation of God’s name? The Gemara answers: He derives that it is specifically with regard to a convert and a homeborn Jew that we require the condition that he curse a name of God by a name of God; but with regard to a gentile, we do not require that he curse a name of God by a name of God in order for him to be liable.

איש איש למה לי דיברה תורה כלשון בני אדם The Gemara asks: Why do I need the inclusive term “anyone who curses his God,” according to the opinions that do not derive from it that a gentile is liable for cursing an appellation of God’s name? The Gemara answers: No halakha is derived from it; it is not a superfluous term, as the Torah spoke in the language of people.

תנו רבנן שבע מצות נצטוו בני נח דינין וברכת השם ע"ז גילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים וגזל ואבר מן החי § Since the halakhot of the descendants of Noah have been mentioned, a full discussion of the Noahide mitzvot is presented. The Sages taught in a baraita: The descendants of Noah, i.e., all of humanity, were commanded to observe seven mitzvot: The mitzva of establishing courts of judgment; and the prohibition against blessing, i.e., cursing, the name of God; and the prohibition of idol worship; and the prohibition against forbidden sexual relations; and the prohibition of bloodshed; and the prohibition of robbery; and the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal.

Daf 56b

רבי חנניה בן (גמלא) אומר אף על הדם מן החי רבי חידקא אומר אף על הסירוס רבי שמעון אומר אף על הכישוף Rabbi Ḥananya ben Gamla says: The descendants of Noah are also commanded concerning the prohibition against consuming the blood from a living animal. Rabbi Ḥideka says: They are also commanded concerning castration, i.e., they are prohibited to castrate any living animal. Rabbi Shimon says: They are also commanded concerning the prohibition against engaging in sorcery.

רבי יוסי אומר כל האמור בפרשת כישוף בן נח מוזהר עליו (דברים יח, י) לא ימצא בך מעביר בנו ובתו באש קוסם קסמים מעונן ומנחש ומכשף וחובר חבר ושואל אוב וידעוני ודורש אל המתים וגו' ובגלל התועבות האלה ה' אלהיך מוריש אותם מפניך ולא ענש אלא אם כן הזהיר Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to every type of sorcery that is stated in the passage about sorcery, it is prohibited for a descendant of Noah to engage in it. This is derived from the verses: “When you come into the land that the Lord your God gives you, you shall not learn to do like the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you one who makes his son or his daughter pass through the fire, a diviner, a soothsayer, or an enchanter, or a warlock, or a charmer, or one who consults a necromancer and a sorcerer, or directs inquiries to the dead. For whoever does these things is an abomination to the Lord; and because of these abominations, the Lord your God is driving them out from before you” (Deuteronomy 18:9–12). Evidently, the Canaanites were punished for these practices; and since God would not have punished them for an action unless He first prohibited it, these practices are clearly prohibited to gentiles.

רבי אלעזר אומר אף על הכלאים מותרין בני נח ללבוש כלאים ולזרוע כלאים ואין אסורין אלא בהרבעת בהמה ובהרכבת האילן Rabbi Elazar says: The descendants of Noah were also commanded concerning the prohibition of diverse kinds. Nevertheless, it is permitted for the descendants of Noah to wear diverse kinds of wool and linen and to sow diverse kinds of seeds together, and they are prohibited only with regard to breeding diverse species of animals and grafting diverse species of trees.

מנהני מילי אמר ר' יוחנן דאמר קרא (בראשית ב, טז) ויצו ה' אלהים על האדם לאמר מכל עץ הגן אכול תאכל § The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, the Noahide mitzvot, derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is from that which the verse states: “And the Lord God commanded the man, saying: Of every tree of the garden you may freely eat; but from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, you shall not eat from it, for on the day that you eat from it, you shall die” (Genesis 2:16–17).

ויצו אלו הדינין וכן הוא אומר (בראשית יח, יט) כי ידעתיו למען אשר יצוה את בניו וגו' The verse is interpreted homiletically as follows: With regard to the term “and…commanded,” these are the courts of judgment; and so it states in another verse: “For I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord, to do righteousness and justice” (Genesis 18:19).

ה' זו ברכת השם וכן הוא אומר (ויקרא כד, טז) ונוקב שם ה' מות יומת אלהים זו עבודת כוכבים וכן הוא אומר (שמות כ, ב) לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על האדם זו שפיכות דמים וכן הוא אומר (בראשית ט, ו) שופך דם האדם וגו' With regard to the term “the Lord,” this alludes to blessing the name of God; and so it states in another verse: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord…shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16). “God,” this alludes to idol worship; and so it states: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exodus 20:2). “The man,” this alludes to bloodshed; and so it states: “One who sheds the blood of man, by man his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6).

לאמר זו גילוי עריות וכן הוא אומר (ירמיהו ג, א) לאמר הן ישלח איש את אשתו והלכה מאתו והיתה לאיש אחר מכל עץ הגן ולא גזל אכל תאכל ולא אבר מן החי With regard to the term “saying,” this alludes to forbidden sexual relations; and so it states: “Saying, if a man sends his wife, and she goes from him and becomes another man’s…will that land not be greatly polluted? But you have played the harlot with many lovers” (Jeremiah 3:1). “Of every tree of the garden” alludes to the fact that one may partake only of items that are permitted to him, as they belong to him, and he may not partake of stolen items. “You may freely eat” alludes to the fact that one may eat fruit, but not a limb from a living animal.

כי אתא רבי יצחק תני איפכא ויצו זו עבודת כוכבים אלהים זו דינין When Rav Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he taught two of the expositions in the opposite order: “And…commanded,” this alludes to idol worship. “God,” this alludes to courts of judgment.

בשלמא אלהים זו דינין דכתיב (שמות כב, ז) ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים אלא ויצו זו ע"ז מאי משמע The Gemara asks: Granted, the source for the exposition: “God [Elohim],” this alludes to courts of judgment, is clear; as it is written: “Then the master of the house shall come near the judges [ha’elohim]” (Exodus 22:7). Evidently, judges are called elohim. But with regard to the exposition: “And…commanded,” this alludes to idol worship, from where is this inferred?

רב חסדא ורב יצחק בר אבדימי חד אמר (שמות לב, ח) סרו מהר מן הדרך אשר צויתים עשו להם וגו' וחד אמר (הושע ה, יב) עשוק אפרים רצוץ משפט כי הואיל הלך אחרי צו Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi both give answers to this question. One of them says that it is inferred from the verse: “They have turned aside quickly out of the way that I commanded them; they have made them a molten calf” (Exodus 32:8). The word “commanded” is mentioned here in the context of idol worship. And the other one says that it is inferred from the verse: “Ephraim is oppressed, crushed in justice, because he willingly went after filth [tzav]” (Hosea 5:11). The word tzav, used in this context in reference to idol worship, is the same Hebrew word used in the phrase: “And…commanded [vaytzav].”

מאי בינייהו איכא בינייהו עכו"ם שעשה ע"ז ולא השתחוה לה למאן דאמר עשו משעת עשייה מיחייב למאן דאמר כי הואיל הלך עד דאזיל בתרה ופלח לה The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two sources? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in the case of a gentile who fashioned an idol but did not bow to it, i.e., he has not yet worshipped it. According to the one who says that the proof is from the verse: “They have made them a molten calf,” he is rendered liable from the time of fashioning it. According to the one who says that the proof is from the verse: “Because he willingly went after filth,” he is not liable until he goes after it and worships it.

אמר רבא ומי איכא למאן דאמר עכו"ם שעשאה ע"ז ולא השתחוה לה חייב והתניא בעכו"ם דברים שבית דין של ישראל ממיתין עליהן בן נח מוזהר עליהן אין בית דין של ישראל ממיתין עליהן אין בן נח מוזהר עליהן למעוטי מאי לאו למעוטי עכו"ם שעשה ע"ז ולא השתחוה לה Rava says: And is there anyone who says that a gentile who fashioned an idol but did not bow to it is liable? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to idol worship, matters, i.e., transgressions, for which a Jewish court executes a Jew who commits one of them, are prohibited to a descendant of Noah. But with regard to transgressions for which a Jewish court does not execute a Jew who commits one of them, a descendant of Noah is not prohibited from doing them. To exclude what transgressions, i.e., to determine that they do not apply to gentiles, is this stated? Is it not to exclude the case of a gentile who fashioned an idol but did not bow to it? Since Jews are not executed for this transgression, gentiles should not be liable for this act either.

אמר רב פפא לא למעוטי גיפוף ונישוק Rav Pappa says: No, it is possible that it is stated to exclude embracing and kissing the idol; neither a Jew nor a gentile who embraces or kisses an idol is liable. No proof can be brought from here with regard to a gentile who fashions an idol but does not worship it.

גיפוף ונישוק דמאי אילימא כדרכה בר קטלא הוא אלא למעוטי שלא כדרכה The Gemara asks: Embracing and kissing an idol in what manner? If we say that he did so in its standard manner of worship, i.e., that embracing and kissing is the standard method of worshipping this idol, certainly he is liable to receive the death penalty. Rather, it is stated to exclude a case where he did not do so in its standard manner of worship.

דינין בני נח איפקוד והתניא עשר מצות נצטוו ישראל במרה שבע שקיבלו עליהן בני נח והוסיפו עליהן דינין ושבת וכיבוד אב ואם § The Gemara asks with regard to the list of the Noahide mitzvot: Were the descendants of Noah commanded to establish courts of judgment? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The Jewish people were commanded to observe ten mitzvot when they were in Marah: Seven that the descendants of Noah accepted upon themselves, and God added to them the following mitzvot: Judgment, and Shabbat, and honoring one’s father and mother.

דינין דכתיב (שמות טו, כה) שם שם לו חוק ומשפט שבת וכיבוד אב ואם דכתיב (דברים ה, יא) כאשר צוך ה' אלהיך ואמר רב יהודה כאשר צוך במרה The mitzva of judgment was given at Marah, as it is written with regard to Marah: “There He made for them a statute and an ordinance” (Exodus 15:25). Shabbat and honoring one’s father and mother were given at Marah, as it is written concerning them in the Ten Commandments: “Observe the day of Shabbat to keep it holy, as the Lord your God commanded you” (Deuteronomy 5:12), and similarly: “Honor your father and your mother, as the Lord your God commanded you” (Deuteronomy 5:16). The phrase “as the Lord your God commanded you” indicates that they had already been commanded to observe these mitzvot previously. And Rav Yehuda says: “As the Lord your God commanded you” in Marah. Apparently, the mitzva of establishing courts is not included in the seven Noahide mitzvot.

אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה לא נצרכה אלא לעדה ועדים והתראה Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: Establishing courts is a Noahide mitzva. The additional mitzva that was given in Marah was necessary only with regard to the details of the halakhot of the justice system, e.g., that a defendant in a capital case is punished only by a full panel of twenty-three judges of the Sanhedrin, and only if there are two witnesses who testify concerning him, and only if he was issued a forewarning before his transgression.

אי הכי מאי והוסיפו עליהן דינין The Gemara asks: If so, and the mitzva given at Marah is a specification of the halakhot of the justice system, what is the meaning of the sentence: And God added to them: Judgment? The details of a preexisting mitzva would not be referred to as an added mitzva.

אלא אמר רבא לא נצרכה אלא לדיני קנסות אכתי והוסיפו בדינין מיבעי ליה Rather, Rava says: The mitzva given at Marah was necessary only with regard to the halakhot of fines. Since these are not halakhot that pertain to the basic performance of justice, but rather concern an additional fine for the guilty party, they were not given to the descendants of Noah. The Gemara asks: According to this interpretation, the language of the baraita is still inaccurate, as it should have stated: And God added to them more halakhot of judgment.

אלא אמר רב אחא בר יעקב לא נצרכה אלא להושיב בית דין בכל פלך ופלך ובכל עיר ועיר והא בני נח לא איפקוד והתניא כשם שנצטוו ישראל להושיב בתי דינין בכל פלך ופלך ובכל עיר ועיר כך נצטוו בני נח להושיב בתי דינין בכל פלך ופלך ובכל עיר ועיר Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: It was necessary only for the additional requirement to establish a court in each and every province and in each and every city. The Gemara asks: And were the descendants of Noah not commanded with regard to this matter? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Just as the Jewish people were commanded to establish courts in each and every province and in each and every city, so too, the descendants of Noah were commanded to establish courts in each and every province and in each and every city?

אלא אמר רבא האי תנא תנא דבי מנשה הוא דמפיק ד"ך ועייל ס"ך Rather, Rava says: This tanna, who holds that the mitzva of establishing courts of judgment is not included in the Noahide mitzvot, is the tanna of the school of Menashe, who removes from the list of the Noahide mitzvot two mitzvot whose mnemonic is dalet, kaf, which stands for judgment [dinim] and blessing the name of God [birkat Hashem], and inserts in their place two mitzvot whose mnemonic is samekh, kaf, standing for castration [seirus] and diverse kinds [kilayim].

דתנא דבי מנשה שבע מצות נצטוו בני נח ע"ז וגילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים גזל ואבר מן החי סירוס וכלאים As the school of Menashe taught: The descendants of Noah were commanded to observe seven mitzvot: The prohibitions of idol worship, and forbidden sexual relations, and blood-shed, and robbery, and eating a limb from a living animal, and castration, and diverse kinds.

רבי יהודה אומר אדם הראשון לא נצטווה אלא על ע"ז בלבד שנאמר ויצו ה' אלהים על האדם רבי יהודה בן בתירה אומר אף על ברכת השם ויש אומרים אף על הדינים Rabbi Yehuda says: Adam, the first man, was commanded only with regard to the prohibition of idol worship, as it is stated: “And the Lord God commanded the man” (Genesis 2:16). Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: He was also commanded concerning blessing the name of God. And some say that he was also commanded concerning establishing courts of judgment.

כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב אלהים אני לא תקללוני אלהים אני לא תמירוני אלהים אני יהא מוראי עליכם כמאן כיש אומרים The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, in interpretation of the aforementioned verse: Since I am “God,” do not curse Me; since I am “God,” do not exchange Me with another god; since I am “God,” My fear shall be upon you? The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with what some say, i.e., that the phrase “and the Lord God commanded the man” includes the prohibitions against cursing God’s name and idol worship, as well as the mitzva of establishing a system of law and justice, so that the fear of God will be upon the people.

תנא דבי מנשה אי דריש ויצו אפילו הנך נמי אי לא דריש ויצו הני מנא ליה The Gemara challenges: If the tanna of the school of Menashe interprets the verse “and the Lord God commanded” homiletically, even these mitzvot, cursing the name of God and establishing courts, should be included. And if he does not interpret the verse “and the Lord God commanded” homiletically, from where does he derive these seven mitzvot in his list?

לעולם לא דריש ויצו הני כל חדא וחדא באפי נפשיה כתיבא ע"ז וגילוי עריות The Gemara answers: Actually, he does not interpret the verse “and the Lord God commanded” homiletically, but with regard to these mitzvot in his list, each and every one of them is written separately in the Torah. The prohibitions of idol worship and forbidden sexual relations are stated,

Daf 57a

דכתיב (בראשית ו, יא) ותשחת הארץ לפני האלהים ותנא דבי רבי ישמעאל בכל מקום שנא' השחתה אינו אלא דבר ערוה ועבודת כוכבים דבר ערוה שנא' (בראשית ו, יב) כי השחית כל בשר את דרכו עבודת כוכבים דכתיב (דברים ד, טז) פן תשחיתון ועשיתם וגו' as it is written: “And the earth was corrupt before God” (Genesis 6:11), presumably referring to a transgression, and the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Anywhere that the term corruption is stated, it is referring to nothing other than a matter of licentiousness and idol worship. The Gemara cites proofs for this claim: Corruption refers to a matter of licentiousness, as it is stated: “For all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth” (Genesis 6:12); the word “way” alludes to sexual intercourse. And corruption also refers to idol worship, as it is written: “Lest you deal corruptly, and make you a graven image” (Deuteronomy 4:16).

ואידך אורחייהו דקא מגלי The Gemara asks: And how do the other tanna’im, who do not derive from the verse “And the earth was corrupt before God” that the descendants of Noah are prohibited from engaging in idol worship and forbidden sexual relations, interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, the verse merely exposes the behavior of the generation of Noah.

שפיכות דמים דכתיב (בראשית ט, ו) שופך דם האדם וגו' ואידך קטלייהו הוא דקמגלי According to the school of Menashe, the prohibition of bloodshed for the descendants of Noah is stated separately in the Torah, as it is written: “One who sheds the blood of man, by man his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The Gemara asks: And how do the other tanna’im interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, the verse reveals the type of death penalty administered to the descendants of Noah, but it is not the source for the prohibition of bloodshed.

גזל דכתיב (בראשית ט, ג) כירק עשב נתתי לכם את כל וא"ר לוי כירק עשב ולא כירק גנה ואידך ההוא למישרי בשר הוא דאתא The prohibition of robbery is stated, according to the school of Menashe, as it is written: “Every moving thing that is alive shall be for food for you; like the green herbs I have given you all” (Genesis 9:3). And Rabbi Levi says: Like the green herbs that sprout all over by themselves and are ownerless, and not like the vegetation of a garden, which belongs to the garden’s owner alone. This indicates that robbery is prohibited. The Gemara asks: And how do the other tanna’im interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that verse comes to permit the consumption of meat.

אבר מן החי דכתיב (בראשית ט, ד) אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו ואידך ההוא למישרי שרצים הוא דאתא The prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal is stated in the Torah, as it is written: “Only flesh with its life, which is its blood, you shall not eat” (Genesis 9:4), i.e., it is prohibited to eat flesh while the animal that it comes from is still alive. And how do the other tanna’im interpret this verse? In their opinion, that verse comes to permit eating a limb from living creeping animals; this prohibition does not apply to creeping animals (see 59b).

סירוס דכתיב (בראשית ט, ז) שרצו בארץ ורבו בה ואידך לברכה בעלמא The prohibition of castration that applies to the descendants of Noah is stated, as it is written: “And you be fruitful and multiply, swarm in the earth and multiply in it” (Genesis 9:7), indicating that nothing may be done to prevent reproduction. And the other tanna’im hold that this verse is written merely as a blessing, not as a mitzva.

כלאים דכתיב (בראשית ו, כ) מהעוף למינהו ואידך ההוא לצותא בעלמא The prohibition of diverse kinds that applies to the descendants of Noah is stated, as it is written: “Of the fowl after their kind and of the cattle after their kind, of every creeping thing of the ground after its kind” (Genesis 6:20), indicating that each species must be kept separate, and that crossbreeding is prohibited. And according to the other tanna’im, that verse does not indicate a mitzva; rather, the reason for keeping the species separate in Noah’s Ark was merely for the sake of companionship, as animals are most comfortable in the company of other members of their own species.

אמר רב יוסף אמרי בי רב על שלש מצות בן נח נהרג: גש"ר סימן: על גילוי עריות ועל שפיכות דמים ועל ברכת השם Rav Yosef says: They say in the study hall that a descendant of Noah is executed for transgressing three mitzvot, which are represented by the letters gimmel, shin, reish in a mnemonic device: For forbidden sexual relations, for bloodshed, and for blessing, i.e., cursing, the name of God.

מתקיף לה רב ששת בשלמא שפיכות דמים דכתיב (בראשית ט, ו) שופך דם האדם וגו' אלא הנך מנא להו Rav Sheshet objects to this statement: Granted, a descendant of Noah is executed for bloodshed, as it is written: “One who sheds the blood of man, by man his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6). But with regard to those other prohibitions, from where do the Sages derive that a descendant of Noah who transgresses them is executed?

אי גמר משפיכות דמים אפילו כולהו נמי אי משום דאיתרבאי מאיש איש עבודת כוכבים נמי איתרבי מאיש איש If they derive it from the punishment for bloodshed by means of an analogy, then descendants of Noah should be executed even if they transgressed any of the other Noahide mitzvot. If they are executed because they are included in the term “anyone” and similarly, the term “no one” stated with regard to these two prohibitions, as it is stated with regard to cursing the name of God: “Anyone who curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15), and it is stated with regard to forbidden sexual relations: “No one shall approach any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6), then gentiles should be executed for idol worship too, as they are included in the term “anyone” stated in that context (see Leviticus 20:2).

אלא אמר רב ששת אמרי בי רב על ארבע מצות בן נח נהרג Rather, Rav Sheshet says that Rav Yosef’s version should be rejected, and that this is what they say in the study hall: A descendant of Noah is executed for transgressing four mitzvot; the three that were listed, and idol worship.

ועל עבודת כוכבים בן נח נהרג והתניא בעבודת כוכבים דברים שב"ד של ישראל ממיתין עליהן בן נח מוזהר עליהן אזהרה אין מיתה לא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אזהרה שלהן זו היא מיתתן The Gemara asks: And is a descendant of Noah executed for idol worship? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to idol worship, matters for which a Jewish court executes the transgressor are prohibited to a descendant of Noah. The Gemara infers: Yes, there is a prohibition for a descendant of Noah, but there is no death penalty. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: Their prohibition is their death penalty. Since the only punishment mentioned in the Torah for transgressing a Noahide mitzva is execution, any descendant of Noah who transgresses is liable to be executed.

רב הונא ורב יהודה וכולהו תלמידי דרב אמרי על שבע מצות בן נח נהרג גלי רחמנא בחדא והוא הדין לכולהו Rav Huna, Rav Yehuda, and all of the other students of Rav say: A descendant of Noah is executed for transgressing any of the seven Noahide mitzvot; the Merciful One revealed this punishment with regard to one mitzva, the prohibition of bloodshed, and the same is true with regard to all of them.

ועל הגזל בן נח נהרג והתניא על הגזל גנב וגזל וכן יפת תואר וכן כיוצא בהן כותי בכותי וכותי בישראל אסור וישראל בכותי מותר ואם איתא ניתני חייב The Gemara asks: But is a descendant of Noah executed for robbery? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to the following types of robbery: One who steals or robs, and likewise one who engages in intercourse with a married beautiful woman who was taken as a prisoner of war, and likewise all actions similar to these, if they are done by a gentile to another gentile, or by a gentile to a Jew, the action is prohibited; but if a Jew does so to a gentile, it is permitted? The Gemara explains the question: And if it is so that a gentile is liable to be executed for robbery, and it is not merely prohibited to him, let the baraita teach that he is liable to be executed.

משום דקבעי למיתני סיפא ישראל בכותי מותר תנא רישא אסור The Gemara answers: Because the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause that if a Jew does so to a gentile, it is permitted, he taught in the former clause that if a gentile does one of these, it is prohibited. If the baraita were to state that if a gentile does so, he is liable, it would have to state that if a Jew does so to a gentile, he is exempt, because this is the opposite of liable. That would indicate that it is actually prohibited for a Jew to do so to a gentile, and that he is merely exempt from liability, which is not the case. Therefore, the word prohibited is used with regard to a gentile. Therefore, this does not prove that a gentile is exempt from capital punishment.

והא כל היכא דאית ליה חיובא מיתנא קתני דקתני רישא על שפיכות דמים כותי בכותי וכותי בישראל חייב ישראל בכותי פטור The Gemara challenges: But wherever there is liability for capital punishment, this tanna teaches it; as it is taught in the first clause: With regard to bloodshed, if a gentile murders another gentile, or a gentile murders a Jew, he is liable. If a Jew murders a gentile, he is exempt. Evidently, the term liable is used in the baraita.

התם היכי ליתני ליתני אסור ומותר והתניא כותי ורועי בהמה דקה לא מעלין ולא מורידין The Gemara answers: There, in that case, how should the tanna teach it? Should he teach it using the terms prohibited and permitted, indicating that a Jew may kill a gentile ab initio? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that with regard to a gentile, and likewise with regard to Jewish shepherds of small livestock, who were typically robbers, one may not raise them out of a pit into which they fell, and one may not lower them into a pit? In other words, one may not rescue them from danger, but neither may one kill them ab initio. With regard to robbery, the term permitted is relevant, as it is permitted for a Jew to rob a gentile.

כיוצא בו בגזל מאי היא אמר רב אחא בר יעקב לא נצרכה אלא לפועל בכרם The Gemara returns to discuss the details of the prohibition of robbery mentioned in the baraita, which included actions similar to it. The Gemara asks: With regard to robbery, to what actions similar to it is the baraita referring? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: It is necessary only to teach the halakha of a laborer working in a vineyard who eats from the fruit of the vineyard; his action is similar to robbery, and it is prohibited for a gentile to do so.

פועל בכרם אימת אי בשעת גמר מלאכה התירא הוא אי לאו בשעת גמר מלאכה גזל מעליא הוא The Gemara asks: When does this laborer in a vineyard eat from the fruit? If he does so at the time of the completion of the work, i.e., while he is harvesting the fruit, it is permitted for him to do so, just as a Jew working for another Jew is allowed to do so. If it is not at the time of the completion of its work, eating the fruit is full-fledged robbery, and there is no novel element to this case.

אלא אמר רב פפא לא נצרכה אלא לפחות משוה פרוטה אי הכי כותי בישראל אסור הא בר מחילה הוא נהי דבתר הכי מחיל ליה צערא בשעתיה מי לית ליה Rather, Rav Pappa says that the mention in the baraita of actions similar to robbery is necessary only to teach the halakha of one who robs another of less than the value of one peruta. The Gemara asks: If so, why does the baraita state that it is prohibited for a gentile to do so to a Jew? Isn’t a Jew apt to forgive such a tiny debt? Why is this considered robbery? The Gemara answers: Although afterward the owner forgives him, does he not incur distress at the time of the robbery? Consequently, at the time of the robbery the robber commits a transgression and is liable to be punished for it.

כותי בכותי כיוצא בהן כיון דלאו בני מחילה נינהו גזל מעליא הוא The Gemara challenges: If the mention of actions similar to robbery is referring to the robbery of less than the value of one peruta, what is the novel element in the case of a gentile who robs a gentile? Since they are not apt to grant forgiveness, robbing a gentile of even a minuscule amount is considered full-fledged robbery, and not merely similar to robbery.

אלא אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא לא נצרכה אלא לכובש שכר שכיר כותי בכותי וכותי בישראל אסור ישראל בכותי מותר Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says that there is a different explanation: It is necessary only to teach the halakha of one who withholds the wages of a hired laborer; for a gentile to do so to another gentile and for a gentile to do so to a Jew is prohibited, but for a Jew to do so to a gentile is permitted. This case is less obvious than other types of robbery, as instead of taking an item from the victim, the robber withholds money that is due to the victim.

כיוצא ביפת תואר מאי היא כי אתא רב דימי א"ר אלעזר א"ר חנינא בן נח שייחד שפחה לעבדו ובא עליה נהרג עליה The Gemara clarifies further: What is the action that is similar to engaging in intercourse with a beautiful woman who is a prisoner of war, to which the baraita is referring? When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: In the case of a descendant of Noah who designated a maidservant as a mate for his slave, and then he himself engaged in intercourse with her, he is executed on her account. Although the maidservant is his property and is not the slave’s full-fledged wife, nevertheless, he is guilty of adultery.

כיוצא בו דשפיכות דמים לא תניא אמר אביי אי משכחת דתניא רבי יונתן בן שאול היא דתניא רבי יונתן בן שאול אומר רודף אחר חבירו להורגו ויכול להצילו באחד מאבריו ולא הציל The Gemara comments: The baraita does not teach that a descendant of Noah is liable for actions similar to bloodshed. Abaye says: If you find a baraita that teaches this, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says: If a person pursues another to kill him, and the one being pursued can save himself by injuring one of the limbs of the pursuer, but he does not save himself in this manner and instead kills the pursuer,

Daf 57b

נהרג עליו he is executed for killing him even though he acted in self-defense, and a descendant of Noah is also killed for this.

אשכח ר' יעקב בר אחא דהוה כתיב בספר אגדתא דבי רב בן נח נהרג בדיין א' ובעד אחד שלא בהתראה מפי איש ולא מפי אשה ואפילו קרוב משום רבי ישמעאל אמרו אף על העוברין § Rabbi Ya’akov bar Aḥa found that it was written in a book of Aggadot in the study hall of Rav: Contrary to the halakha with regard to a Jew, a descendant of Noah is executed on the basis of the verdict of even one judge, and by the testimony of even one witness, and without being given forewarning before committing the transgression. He can be judged or testified against only by the mouth of a man and not by the mouth of a woman; but even a relative may judge his case or testify against him. The Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that a descendant of Noah is executed even for killing fetuses.

מנהני מילי אמר רב יהודה דאמר קרא (בראשית ט, ה) אך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש אפילו בדיין אחד The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Yehuda says: They are derived from that which the verse states: “And your blood of your lives I will require; at the hand of every animal I will require it; and at the hand of man, even at the hand of every man’s brother, I will require the life of man” (Genesis 9:5). It is derived from the term “I will require,” which is stated in the singular, that a descendant of Noah is executed on the basis of the verdict of even one judge.

(בראשית ט, ה) מיד כל חיה אפילו שלא בהתראה (בראשית ט, ה) אדרשנו ומיד האדם אפילו בעד אחד (בראשית ט, ה) מיד איש ולא מיד אשה אחיו אפילו קרוב It is derived from the phrase “at the hand of every animal” that one is executed even without forewarning, as an animal certainly cannot forewarn someone. It is derived from the phrase “I will require it; and at the hand of man,” with “I” stated in the singular, that the sentence is issued on the basis of the testimony of even one witness. It is derived from the phrase “at the hand of every man,” that the judgment and testimony must be at the hand of a man, but not at the hand of a woman. It is derived from the term “his brother” that the testimony of the witness is accepted even if he is a relative of the defendant.

משום רבי ישמעאל אמרו אף על העוברין מאי טעמיה דרבי ישמעאל דכתיב (בראשית ט, ו) שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך איזהו אדם שהוא באדם הוי אומר זה עובר שבמעי אמו It is stated in that book of Aggadot that the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: A descendant of Noah is executed even for killing fetuses. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? The Gemara answers: It is derived from that which is written: “One who sheds the blood of a person, by a person [ba’adam] his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The word ba’adam literally means: In a person, and is interpreted homiletically: What is a person that is in a person? You must say: This is a fetus that is in its mother’s womb. Accordingly, a descendant of Noah is liable for killing a fetus.

ותנא קמא תנא דבי מנשה הוא דאמר כל מיתה האמורה לבני נח אינו אלא חנק ושדי ליה האי באדם אסיפיה דקרא ודרוש ביה הכי באדם דמו ישפך איזהו שפיכות דמים של אדם שהוא בגופו של אדם הוי אומר זה חנק The Gemara comments: And the first tanna, who does not derive the halakha concerning fetuses, is the tanna of the school of Menashe, who says that all death penalties stated with regard to the descendants of Noah are referring to nothing other than strangulation. And he interprets this verse as follows: Cast, i.e., redirect, this term: “In a person,” and explain it with regard to the latter part of the verse, and interpret it homiletically like this: “In a person, his blood shall be shed.” In what manner is a person’s blood shed while it is in the person’s body, without external bleeding? You must say that this is strangulation. It is therefore derived that the execution of a descendant of Noah is by strangulation.

מתיב רב המנונא ואשה לא מפקדה והכתיב (בראשית יח, יט) כי ידעתיו למען אשר יצוה וגו' Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to the statement in the book of Aggadot that a descendant of Noah can be judged or testified against only by a man and not by a woman: And is a woman who is a descendant of Noah not commanded to establish courts of judgment? But isn’t it written with regard to Abraham, who at that point had the status of a descendant of Noah: “For I have known him, to the end that he may command his sons and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord, to do righteousness and justice” (Genesis 18:19). The word “household” is referring to the women, indicating that they are also commanded to execute justice.

הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה בניו לדין ביתו לצדקה He raises the objection and he resolves it: Abraham commanded his sons to carry out justice, whereas his household, the women in his family, he commanded to give charity; the Hebrew word for righteousness [tzedek] can also mean charity [tzedaka].

אמר ליה רב אויא סבא לרב פפא אימא בת נח שהרגה לא תיהרג מיד איש ולא מיד אשה כתיב אמר ליה הכי אמר רב יהודה שופך דם האדם מכל מקום Rav Avya the Elder said to Rav Pappa: Why not say that a female descendant of Noah who killed someone should not be executed; as it is written: “At the hand of every man,” and not “at the hand of every woman”? Rav Pappa said to him: This is what Rav Yehuda says: It is derived from the phrase “one who sheds the blood of a person” that one who murders is liable to be executed in any case, whether that person is male or female.

אימא בת נח שזינתה לא תיהרג דכתיב (בראשית ב, כד) על כן יעזב איש ולא אשה א"ל הכי אמר רב יהודה (בראשית ב, כד) והיו לבשר אחד הדר ערבינהו קרא Rav Avya asked further: Why not say that a female descendant of Noah who committed adultery should not be executed, as it is written: “Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be one flesh” (Genesis 2:24); a man, but not a woman? Rav Pappa said to him: This is what Rav Yehuda says: At the end of the verse it states: “And they shall be one flesh.” The verse then combines men and women, indicating that the same halakha applies to both.

ת"ר איש מה תלמוד לומר (ויקרא יח, ו) איש איש לרבות את הכותים שמוזהרין על העריות כישראל § The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “No one [ish ish] shall approach any that is kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6): The verse could have stated: One [ish] shall not approach. Why must the verse state “no one”? It is to include the gentiles, who are prohibited from engaging in forbidden sexual relations, as Jews are.

והא מהכא נפקא מהתם נפקא לאמר זה גילוי עריות The Gemara asks: But is it derived from here? It is derived from there, from the verse that was already interpreted as teaching this halakha: “And the Lord God commanded the man, saying” (Genesis 2:16), this alludes to forbidden sexual relations (see 56b).

התם בעריות דידהו והכא בעריות דידן דקתני סיפא בא על עריות ישראל נידון בדיני ישראל The Gemara answers: There, the verse is referring to their women, gentiles, with whom relations are forbidden. And here it is referring to our women, Jews, with whom relations are forbidden. In other words, a gentile who engages in intercourse with a married Jewish woman is liable. As it is taught in the latter clause of the baraita: If a gentile engages in intercourse with those Jewish women with whom relations are forbidden, i.e., a married Jewish woman, he is judged according to the halakhot of the Jews.

למאי הלכתא אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה לא נצרכה אלא לעדה ועדים והתראה The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is this gentile judged according to the halakhot of the Jews? Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The statement of the baraita is necessary only to teach these halakhot: That he must be judged by a Sanhedrin, and that he is punished only if two witnesses testify concerning him, and only if he was issued a forewarning before his transgression.

מגרע גרע The Gemara asks: Should the halakha of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with a forbidden Jewish woman be less stringent than that of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with a forbidden gentile woman, in which case these conditions do not apply?

אלא א"ר יוחנן לא נצרכה אלא לנערה המאורסה דלדידהו לית להו דדיינינן להו בדינא דידן Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The statement of the baraita is necessary only to teach the halakha in the case of a gentile who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young Jewish woman, which does not apply to gentiles. By halakha, only marriage applies to gentiles, not betrothal. Therefore, we judge them according to our halakha in that case.

אבל אשת איש בדינא דידהו דיינינן להו והתניא בא על נערה המאורסה נידון בסקילה על אשת איש נידון בחנק ואי בדינא דידהו סייף הוא The Gemara asks: And with regard to gentiles who engage in intercourse with a married Jewish woman, do we judge them according to their halakha? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If a gentile engages in intercourse with a betrothed young Jewish woman, he is punished by stoning; if he engages in intercourse with a married Jewish woman he is punished by strangulation? The Gemara explains its question: And if they are judged according to their halakha, he would be executed by the sword.

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק מאי אשת איש דקתני כגון שנכנסה לחופה ולא נבעלה דלדידהו לית להו דיינינן להו בדינא דידן Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of the phrase: A married woman, which the tanna teaches? It is referring to a case where the woman had entered the wedding canopy but had not yet engaged in intercourse with her husband, in which case she is considered married according to the halakhot that apply to Jews but not according to the halakhot that apply to gentiles. Since with regard to gentiles, marriage has not yet taken effect, we judge them according to our halakhot. Therefore, a gentile who engages in intercourse with such a Jewish woman is executed by strangulation.

דתני ר' חנינא בעולת בעל יש להן נכנסה לחופה ולא נבעלה אין להן As Rabbi Ḥanina teaches: Gentiles can have the status of a married woman who has engaged in intercourse with her husband, i.e., such a woman is considered married according to their laws, but they cannot have the status of a married woman who has entered the wedding canopy but has not engaged in intercourse with her husband.

תניא כוותיה דר' יוחנן כל ערוה שב"ד של ישראל ממיתין עליה בן נח מוזהר עליה אין ב"ד של ישראל ממיתין עליה אין בן נח מוזהר עליה דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים הרבה עריות יש שאין בית דין של ישראל ממיתין עליהן ובן נח מוזהר עליהן It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Any forbidden sexual relations for which a Jewish court administers capital punishment are prohibited to a descendant of Noah, and any forbidden sexual relations for which a Jewish court does not administer capital punishment are not prohibited to a descendant of Noah; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: There are many types of forbidden sexual relations for which a Jewish court does not administer capital punishment and are nevertheless prohibited to a descendant of Noah.

בא על עריות ישראל נידון בדיני ישראל בא על עריות בן נח נידון בדיני בן נח ואנו אין לנו אלא נערה המאורסה בלבד If a gentile engages in intercourse with those Jews with whom relations are forbidden, he is judged according to the halakhot of the Jews. If he engages in intercourse with those descendants of Noah with whom relations are forbidden, he is judged according to the halakhot of the descendants of Noah. And we have only the case of a betrothed young woman as a case where a gentile is judged according to the halakhot of the Jews, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

ונחשוב נמי נכנסה לחופה ולא נבעלה האי תנא תנא דבי מנשה הוא דאמר כל מיתה האמורה לבני נח אינו אלא חנק אידי ואידי חנק הוא The Gemara suggests: And let the tanna also count the case of a woman who had entered the wedding canopy but had not yet engaged in intercourse with her husband. The Gemara explains: This tanna is the tanna of the school of Menashe, who says that all death penalties stated with regard to the descendants of Noah are referring to nothing other than strangulation, and since the punishment in Jewish halakha for engaging in intercourse with a married woman is also strangulation, both this punishment and that punishment are strangulation; there is no difference between the halakha for Jews and the halakha for gentiles in such a case.

וסבר רבי מאיר כל ערוה שבית דין של ישראל ממיתין עליה בן נח מוזהר עליה והא תניא גר With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir stated in the first clause of the baraita, the Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Meir hold that any forbidden sexual relations for which a Jewish court administers capital punishment is prohibited to a descendant of Noah? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert

Daf 58a

שהיתה הורתו שלא בקדושה ולידתו בקדושה יש לו שאר האם ואין לו שאר האב who was not conceived in sanctity, as his parents were still gentiles, but his birth was in sanctity, as his mother converted before his birth, he has maternal kinship, i.e., his relationship to his mother’s relatives is recognized, but he does not have paternal kinship.

הא כיצד נשא אחותו מן האם יוציא מן האב יקיים אחות האב מן האם יוציא מן האב יקיים How so? If he married his maternal half sister, who was born before him and converted, he must divorce her. Although by Torah law they are considered unrelated, as a convert is considered to be reborn and all his previous family relationships are disregarded according to halakha, the Sages prohibited their marriage, lest he think that as a Jew it is permitted for him to engage in behaviors that were previously forbidden to him. If she is his paternal half sister, he may maintain her as his wife, as it is permitted for a gentile to marry his paternal half sister. If he married his father’s maternal half sister, he must divorce her. If he married his father’s paternal half sister, he may maintain her as his wife.

אחות האם מן האם יוציא אחות האם מן האב ר"מ אומר יוציא וחכ"א יקיים שהיה ר"מ אומר כל ערוה שהיא משום שאר אם יוציא משום שאר האב יקיים If she is his mother’s maternal half sister, he must divorce her. If she is his mother’s paternal half sister, Rabbi Meir says he must divorce her, and the Rabbis say he may maintain her as his wife. As Rabbi Meir would say: With regard to any forbidden relative who is forbidden due to maternal kinship, whether the woman is his paternal relative, e.g., his father’s maternal half sister, or his maternal relative, he must divorce her; whereas if she is forbidden due to paternal kinship, he may maintain her as his wife.

ומותר באשת אחיו ובאשת אחי אביו ושאר כל עריות מותרות לו לאתויי אשת אביו And according to all opinions, he is permitted to marry his brother’s wife and his father’s brother’s wife, and all other relatives with whom relations are forbidden in the case of born Jew are also permitted to him. The expression: And all other relatives with whom relations are forbidden, is added to include his father’s wife, who is permitted to him if she was widowed or divorced from his father.

נשא אשה ובתה כונס אחת ומוציא אחת ולכתחילה לא יכנוס מתה אשתו מותר בחמותו ואיכא דאמרי אסור בחמותו With regard to a gentile who married a woman and her daughter and they all converted, he may marry one but must divorce the other one; and he should not marry the second of them ab initio. If his wife, the daughter, died, he is permitted to maintain his mother-in-law as his wife. And some say that he is prohibited from maintaining his mother-in-law. In any event, Rabbi Meir clearly holds that several forbidden relationships for which a Jew is not liable to receive capital punishment, but only karet, are forbidden to descendants of Noah as well, namely, intercourse with one’s sister or one’s parent’s sister.

אמר רב יהודה לא קשיא הא ר"מ אליבא דר' אליעזר והא ר"מ אליבא דר"ע Rav Yehuda says: This is not difficult; this baraita cites the statement of Rabbi Meir according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and that previously mentioned baraita cites the statement of Rabbi Meir according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

דתניא (בראשית ב, כד) על כן יעזב איש את אביו ואת אמו רבי אליעזר אומר אביו אחות אביו אמו אחות אמו ר"ע אומר אביו אשת אביו אמו אמו ממש As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be one flesh” (Genesis 2:24), that Rabbi Eliezer says: “His father” is referring to his father’s sister, i.e., one must abandon the possibility of marrying his father’s sister and marry someone else. “His mother” is referring to his mother’s sister. Rabbi Akiva says: “His father” is referring to his father’s wife; “his mother” is referring to his mother, literally.

(בראשית ב, כד) ודבק ולא בזכר (בראשית ב, כד) באשתו ולא באשת חבירו (בראשית ב, כד) והיו לבשר אחד מי שנעשים בשר אחד יצאו בהמה וחיה שאין נעשין בשר אחד “And shall cleave to his wife,” but not to a male; such a relationship is not defined as cleaving. “To his wife,” but not to the wife of another man. “And they shall be one flesh” indicates that he should marry one of those with whom he can become one flesh, i.e., they can bear children together. This excludes domesticated and undomesticated animals, with which one is prohibited from engaging in bestiality, as they do not become one flesh. All these are forbidden to the descendants of Noah.

אמר מר רבי אליעזר אומר אביו אחות אביו אימא אביו ממש היינו ודבק ולא בזכר § The Master said in this baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: “His father” is referring to his father’s sister. The Gemara asks: Why not say that it is referring to his father, literally, prohibiting homosexual intercourse with one’s father? The Gemara answers: This prohibition is derived from another phrase in the verse: “And shall cleave to his wife,” but not to a male; this includes his father.

אימא אשת אביו היינו באשתו ולא באשת חבירו אימא לאחר מיתה דומיא דאמו מה אמו דלאו אישות אף אביו דלאו אישות The Gemara asks: Why not say that “his father” is referring to his father’s wife? The Gemara answers: This prohibition is derived from the term “to his wife,” but not to the wife of another man. The Gemara asks: Why not say that it is referring to his father’s wife after his father’s death, when she is no longer a married woman? The Gemara answers: The term “his father” is interpreted in a way that is similar to the interpretation of the term “his mother.” Just as his mother is not forbidden due to her marriage to his father, but rather due to her relationship to him, so too, the term “his father” is not referring to a relative who is forbidden to him due to her marriage.

אמו אחות אמו ואימא אמו ממש היינו באשתו ולא באשת חברו ואימא לאחר מיתה דומיא דאביו מה אביו דלאו ממש אף אמו דלאו ממש Rabbi Eliezer says that “his mother” is referring to his mother’s sister. The Gemara asks: But why not say that it is referring to his mother, literally? The Gemara answers: This prohibition is derived from the term “to his wife,” but not to the wife of another man; and his mother is his father’s wife. The Gemara asks: But why not say that it is referring to his mother after his father’s death, when she is no longer married? The Gemara answers: The term “his mother” is interpreted in a way that is similar to the interpretation of the term “his father.” Just as the term “his father” is not interpreted literally, so too, the term “his mother” is not interpreted literally.

רע"א אביו אשת אביו ואימא אביו ממש היינו ודבק ולא בזכר א"ה אשת אביו נמי היינו באשתו ולא באשת חברו לאחר מיתה Rabbi Akiva says: “His father” is referring to his father’s wife. The Gemara asks: But why not say it is referring to his father, literally? The Gemara answers: That prohibition is derived from the term “and shall cleave to his wife,” but not to a male. The Gemara challenges: If so, the prohibition of his father’s wife is also derived from another term: “To his wife,” but not to the wife of another man. The Gemara explains: The term “to his wife” is referring to his father’s wife after his father’s death, when she is no longer married.

אמו אמו ממש היינו באשתו ולא באשת חברו אמו מאנוסתו Rabbi Akiva says: “His mother” is referring to his mother, literally. The Gemara challenges: That prohibition is derived from the term “to his wife,” but not to the wife of another man. The Gemara explains: According to Rabbi Akiva, the term “his mother” is referring to his mother whom his father raped, i.e., she was never his father’s wife.

במאי קא מיפלגי ר"א סבר With regard to what principle do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree? Rabbi Eliezer holds

Daf 58b

אביו דומיא דאמו ואמו דומיא דאביו לא משכחת לה אלא באחווה that the term “his father” should be interpreted in a way that is similar to the term “his mother,” and “his mother” should be interpreted in a way that is similar to “his father.” You find such an interpretation only with regard to sisterhood, i.e., “his father” is referring to his father’s sister, and “his mother” is referring to his mother’s sister.

ורבי עקיבא מוטב לאוקמיה באשת אביו דאיקרי ערות אביו לאפוקי אחות אביו דשאר אביו איקרי ערות אביו לא איקרי And Rabbi Akiva holds that it is preferable to interpret the term “his father” as referring to his father’s wife, who is referred to as his father’s nakedness in the verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s wife; it is your father’s nakedness” (Leviticus 18:8), to the exclusion of his father’s sister, who is referred to as his father’s kin in the verse: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s sister; she is your father’s kin” (Leviticus 18:12), and who is not referred to as his father’s nakedness.

ת"ש (שמות ו, כ) ויקח עמרם את יוכבד דודתו מאי לאו דודתו מן האם Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva from the verse: “And Amram took Jochebed his aunt as a wife” (Exodus 6:20). What, was she not his maternal aunt? Presumably, Jochebed was the sister of Kohath, Amram’s father, from both of Kohath’s parents, and not from his father alone. Evidently, a descendant of Noah may marry his father’s sister.

לא דודתו מן האב The Gemara rejects this proof: No, she was his paternal aunt, Kohath’s half sister. Since she was not Kohath’s sister from his mother’s side, she was not forbidden to Amram.

ת"ש (בראשית כ, יב) וגם אמנה אחותי בת אבי היא אך לא בת אמי מכלל דבת האם אסורה Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer from what Abraham said to Abimelech with regard to Sarah: “And moreover, she is my sister, the daughter of my father, but not the daughter of my mother; and so she became my wife” (Genesis 20:12). By inference, the daughter of the mother of a descendant of Noah is forbidden to him.

ותסברא אחותו הואי בת אחיו הואי וכיון דהכי הוא לא שנא מן האב ולא שנא מן האם שריא אלא התם הכי קאמר ליה קורבא דאחות אית לי בהדה מאבא ולא מאמא The Gemara rejects this proof: But how can you understand that Sarah was Abraham’s sister? She was his brother’s daughter. By tradition, it is known that Sarah was Haran’s daughter Iscah. And since that was so, there is no difference whether they were paternal relatives, and there is no difference whether they were maternal relatives; in any event she was permitted to him, even according to the halakha of Jews. Rather, this is what Abraham was saying to Abimelech there: She is related to me like a sister, as the daughter of my brother is like a sister, and our relationship is from the side of my father but not from the side of my mother.

ת"ש מפני מה לא נשא אדם את בתו כדי שישא קין את אחותו שנאמר (תהלים פט, ג) כי אמרתי עולם חסד יבנה הא לאו הכי אסירא Come and hear a proof from a baraita: For what reason did Adam not marry his daughter? So that Cain would marry his sister and they would procreate immediately, as it is stated: “For I have said: The world shall be built on kindness [ḥesed]” (Psalms 89:3). This verse alludes to the fact that at the beginning of the world’s existence it was permitted for men to marry their sisters, which was later forbidden in the verse: “And if a man shall take his sister…it is a shameful thing [ḥesed]” (Leviticus 20:17). The Gemara infers: If it had not been so, if God had not specially permitted Cain to marry his sister, she would have been forbidden to him. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who deems it permitted for a gentile to marry his sister.

כיון דאשתרי אשתרי The Gemara rejects this proof: Once it was permitted for Cain to marry his sister, it was permitted for all descendants of Noah to do so, and it was forbidden only to Jews.

אמר רב הונא כותי מותר בבתו וא"ת מפני מה לא נשא אדם את בתו כדי שישא קין את אחותו משום עולם חסד יבנה Rav Huna says: A gentile is permitted to marry his daughter. And if you say, for what reason did Adam not marry his daughter? It was so that Cain would marry his sister, because it is stated: “The world shall be built on kindness.”

ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב הונא כותי אסור בבתו תדע שלא נשא אדם את בתו ולא היא התם היינו טעמא כדי שישא קין את אחותו משום דעולם חסד יבנה And there are those who say that Rav Huna did not say this; rather, Rav Huna says: A gentile is prohibited from marrying his daughter. Know that this is the halakha, as Adam did not marry his daughter. The Gemara rejects this statement: But that is not so, as there, this is the reason Adam did not marry his daughter: So that Cain would marry his sister, because it is stated: “The world shall be built on kindness.”

אמר רב חסדא עבד מותר באמו ומותר בבתו יצא מכלל כותי ולכלל ישראל לא בא § Rav Ḥisda says: A Canaanite slave is permitted to marry his mother, and he is permitted to marry his daughter. This is because he has left the category of a gentile by immersing in a ritual bath for the purpose of becoming a slave to a Jew, and consequently all his previous family relationships are disregarded according to halakha; but he has not entered the category of a Jew, as evidenced by the fact that he is not obligated to observe all of the mitzvot of male Jews. Therefore, the decree of the Sages prohibiting the maternal relatives of converts does not apply to him.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר ר' אלעזר אמר ר' חנינא בן נח שייחד שפחה לעבדו ובא עליה נהרג עליה When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: In the case of a descendant of Noah who designated a maidservant as a mate for his slave, and then he himself engaged in intercourse with her, he is executed for adultery on her account.

מאימת אמר רב נחמן מדקראו לה רביתא דפלניא מאימת התרתה אמר רב הונא משפרעה ראשה בשוק The Gemara asks: From when is she considered the slave’s mate? Rav Naḥman says: From the time that she is called so-and-so’s girl. The Gemara asks: From when is she released from her relationship with the slave? Rav Huna says: From the time that she exposes her head in the marketplace. Since married women would cover their hair, even among the gentiles, by exposing her hair she proves that she no longer wishes to remain with him.

א"ר אלעזר א"ר חנינא בן נח שבא על אשתו שלא כדרכה חייב שנאמר (בראשית ב, כד) ודבק ולא שלא כדרכה Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: A descendant of Noah who engages in intercourse with his wife in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, is liable for engaging in forbidden sexual intercourse, as it is stated: “And shall cleave to his wife” (Genesis 2:24), an expression that indicates natural intercourse, but not intercourse in an atypical manner.

אמר רבא מי איכא מידי דישראל לא מיחייב וכותי מיחייב Rava says: Is there any action for which a Jew is not deemed liable, but a gentile is deemed liable for performing it? A Jew is not liable for engaging in anal intercourse with his wife.

אלא אמר רבא בן נח שבא על אשת חבירו שלא כדרכה פטור מאי טעמא באשתו ולא באשת חבירו ודבק ולא שלא כדרכה Rather, Rava says that the verse is to be understood as follows: A descendant of Noah who engages in intercourse with the wife of another man in an atypical manner is exempt. What is the reason? The verse states: “And shall cleave to his wife,” but not to the wife of another. With regard to this prohibition, the verse states: “And shall cleave,” indicating vaginal intercourse, and not intercourse in an atypical manner.

א"ר חנינא עובד כוכבים שהכה את ישראל חייב מיתה שנאמר (שמות ב, יב) ויפן כה וכה וירא כי אין איש [ויך את המצרי] וגו' Rabbi Ḥanina says: A gentile who struck a Jew is liable to receive the death penalty, as it is stated when Moses saw an Egyptian striking a Hebrew: “And he turned this way and that way, and when he saw that there was no man, he struck the Egyptian and hid him in the sand” (Exodus 2:12).

וא"ר חנינא הסוטר לועו של ישראל כאילו סוטר לועו של שכינה שנאמר (משלי כ, כה) מוקש אדם ילע קודש: And Rabbi Ḥanina says: One who slaps the cheek of a Jew is considered as though he slapped the cheek of the Divine Presence; as it is stated: “It is a snare [mokesh] for a man to rashly say [yala]: Holy” (Proverbs 20:25). The verse is interpreted homiletically to mean: One who strikes [nokesh] a Jew is considered as though he hurt the cheek [lo’a] of the Holy One.

מגביה עבדו שבת סימן: אמר ריש לקיש המגביה ידו על חבירו אע"פ שלא הכהו נקרא רשע שנאמר (שמות ב, יג) ויאמר לרשע למה תכה רעך למה הכית לא נאמר אלא למה תכה אף על פי שלא הכהו נקרא רשע The Gemara states a mnemonic for the upcoming statements of Reish Lakish: Raises, his slave, Shabbat. Reish Lakish says: One who raises his hand to strike another, even if he ultimately does not strike him, is called wicked, as it is stated: “And two men of the Hebrews were struggling with each other, and he said to the wicked one: Why should you strike your friend?” (Exodus 2:13). The phrase: Why did you strike, is not stated, but rather: “Why should you strike,” indicating that one who raised his hand to strike another, even if he ultimately did not strike him, is called wicked.

(אמר) זעירי א"ר חנינא נקרא חוטא שנאמר (שמואל א ב, טז) ואם לא לקחתי בחזקה וכתיב (שמואל א ב, יז) ותהי חטאת הנערים גדולה מאד Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: One who raises his hand to strike another is called a sinner; as it is stated: “And the priest’s lad would come…and would say to him, but you shall give now, and if not, I will take by force” (I Samuel 2:15–16), and it is written with regard to this behavior: “And the sin of the youths was very great” (I Samuel 2:17).

רב הונא אמר תיקצץ ידו שנאמר (איוב לח, טו) וזרוע רמה תשבר רב הונא קץ ידא Rav Huna says: His hand should be cut off, as it is stated: “And the high arm shall be broken” (Job 38:15). If one habitually lifts his arm to strike others, it is better that it be broken. The Gemara relates that Rav Huna cut off the hand of a person who would habitually hit others.

ר"א אומר אין לו תקנה אלא קבורה: שנאמר (איוב כב, ח) ואיש זרוע לו הארץ Rabbi Elazar says: Such a violent person has no remedy but burial, as it is stated: “And as a mighty man [ve’ish zero’a], who has the earth” (Job 22:8). The expression ish zero’a literally means: A man of the arm, and the verse is interpreted homiletically to mean that one who habitually strikes others deserves to be buried.

וא"ר אלעזר לא נתנה קרקע אלא לבעלי זרועות שנאמר ואיש זרוע לו הארץ And Rabbi Elazar states a different interpretation of that verse: The land is given only to mighty men who can protect themselves from all enemies; as it is stated: “And as a mighty man, who has the earth.”

ואר"ל מאי דכתיב (משלי יב, יא) עובד אדמתו ישבע לחם אם עושה אדם עצמו כעבד לאדמה ישבע לחם ואם לאו לא ישבע לחם And in connection with that statement, the Gemara notes that Reish Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “One who works [oved] his land shall have plenty of bread” (Proverbs 12:11)? If a person makes himself like a slave [ke’eved] to the land, devoting his efforts to it, he will have plenty of bread, but if not, he will not have plenty of bread.

ואר"ל עובד כוכבים ששבת חייב מיתה שנא' (בראשית ח, כב) ויום ולילה לא ישבותו ואמר מר אזהרה שלהן זו היא מיתתן אמר רבינא אפי' שני בשבת And Reish Lakish says: A gentile who observed Shabbat is liable to receive the death penalty, as it is stated: “And day and night shall not cease” (Genesis 8:23), which literally means: And day and night they shall not rest. This is interpreted homiletically to mean that the descendants of Noah may not take a day of rest. And the Master said (57a) that their prohibition is their death penalty, i.e., the punishment for any prohibition with regard to descendants of Noah is execution. Ravina says: If a descendant of Noah observes a day of rest on any day of the week, even one not set aside for religious worship, e.g., on a Monday, he is liable.

וליחשבה גבי ז' מצות כי קא חשיב שב ואל תעשה קום עשה לא קא חשיב The Gemara challenges this: But let the tanna count this prohibition among the seven Noahide mitzvot. The Gemara explains: When the tanna counts the seven mitzvot, he counts only those that require one to sit and refrain from action, i.e., those that include a prohibition against performing a certain action. He does not count mitzvot that require one to arise and take action.

Daf 59a

והא דינין קום עשה הוא וקא חשיב קום עשה ושב אל תעשה נינהו The Gemara challenges: But the mitzva of establishing courts of judgment is a mitzva to stand up and take action, and nevertheless he counts it among the seven mitzvot. The Gemara answers: This mitzva contains a requirement to stand up and take action, i.e., the obligation to establish courts and carry out justice, and it also contains a requirement to sit and refrain from action, i.e., the prohibition against doing injustice.

ואמר ר' יוחנן עובד כוכבים שעוסק בתורה חייב מיתה שנאמר (דברים לג, ד) תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה לנו מורשה ולא להם And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A gentile who engages in Torah study is liable to receive the death penalty; as it is stated: “Moses commanded us a law [torah], an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob” (Deuteronomy 33:4), indicating that it is an inheritance for us, and not for them.

וליחשבה גבי שבע מצות מ"ד מורשה מיגזל קא גזיל לה מאן דאמר מאורסה דינו כנערה המאורסה דבסקילה The Gemara challenges: But if so, let the tanna count this prohibition among the seven Noahide mitzvot. The Gemara explains: According to the one who says that the verse is referring to the Torah as an inheritance, this prohibition is included in the prohibition of robbery, as a gentile who studies Torah robs the Jewish people of it. According to the one who says that the verse is referring to the Torah as betrothed, as the spelling of the Hebrew word for betrothed [me’orasa], is similar to that of the word for inheritance [morasha], the punishment of a gentile who studies Torah is like that of one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, which is execution by stoning.

מיתיבי היה ר"מ אומר מניין שאפילו עובד כוכבים ועוסק בתורה שהוא ככהן גדול שנאמר (ויקרא יח, ה) אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם כהנים לוים וישראלים לא נאמר אלא האדם הא למדת שאפילו עובד כוכבים ועוסק בתורה הרי הוא ככהן גדול The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement from a baraita: Rabbi Meir would say: From where is it derived that even a gentile who engages in Torah study is considered like a High Priest? It is derived from that which is stated: “You shall therefore keep My statutes and My ordinances, which if a man does he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5). The phrase: Which if priests, Levites, and Israelites do they shall live by them, is not stated, but rather: “A man,” which indicates mankind in general. You have therefore learned that even a gentile who engages in Torah study is considered like a High Priest.

התם בשבע מצות דידהו: The Gemara answers: There, in the baraita, the reference is to a gentile who engages in the study of their seven mitzvot. It is a mitzva for a gentile to study the halakhot that pertain to the seven Noahide mitzvot, and when he does so he is highly regarded.

ר' חנינא בן גמליאל אומר אף הדם מן החי: ת"ר (בראשית ט, ד) אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו זה אבר מן החי רבי חנינא בן גמליאל אומר אף הדם מן החי § The baraita that lists the Noahide mitzvot (56a) teaches that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: The descendants of Noah are also commanded concerning the prohibition against consuming the blood from a living animal. The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “Only flesh with its life, which is its blood, you shall not eat” (Genesis 9:4), this is the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: The blood from a living animal is also prohibited in this verse.

מ"ט דרבי חנינא בן גמליאל קרי ביה בשר בנפשו לא תאכל דמו בנפשו לא תאכל ורבנן ההוא למישרי שרצים הוא דאתא The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel? The Gemara answers: He reads into the verse: Flesh with its life you shall not eat; blood with its life you shall not eat. The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis explain the mention of blood in this verse? After all, in their opinion, blood from a living animal is not forbidden. The Gemara answers: That comes to permit eating limbs from living creeping animals. The verse indicates that the prohibition does not apply to creeping animals, whose blood is not considered separate from their flesh (see 59b).

כיוצא בדבר אתה אומר (דברים יב, כג) רק חזק לבלתי אכל הדם כי הדם הוא הנפש וגו' (רק חזק לבלתי אכל הדם זה אבר מן החי כי הדם הוא הנפש זה דם מן החי) The baraita continues: Similarly, you can say that according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, blood from a living animal is also forbidden to the Jewish people in particular; as it is stated: “Only be steadfast in not eating blood, as the blood is the life, and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23). With regard to the statements: “Only be steadfast in not eating blood,” this is a limb from a living animal; “as the blood is the life,” this is blood from a living animal.

ורבנן ההוא לדם הקזה שהנשמה יוצאה בו הוא דאתא The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who hold that there is no specific prohibition with regard to blood from a living animal, interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: That verse comes to teach the prohibition against consuming blood spilled in the process of bloodletting, as this is blood through which the soul departs (see Karetot 20b).

למה לי למיכתב לבני נח ולמה לי למשני בסיני The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, why do I need the Torah to write this halakha with regard to descendants of Noah, and why do I need the Torah to repeat it at Sinai with regard to Jews? Aren’t Jews also descendants of Noah?

כדר' יוסי בר' חנינא דא"ר יוסי בר' חנינא כל מצוה שנאמרה לבני נח ונשנית בסיני לזה ולזה נאמרה The Gemara answers that it is to be understood in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina; as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Any mitzva that was first stated with regard to the descendants of Noah and was repeated at Sinai was stated for this group and for that group, i.e., it applies to both gentiles and Jews.

לבני נח ולא נשנית בסיני לישראל נאמרה ולא לבני נח ואנו אין לנו אלא גיד הנשה ואליבא דר' יהודה But a mitzva that was stated with regard to the descendants of Noah and was not repeated at Sinai among the mitzvot given to the Jewish people was stated for the Jewish people and not for the descendants of Noah. And we have only the prohibition against eating the sciatic nerve to which this classification applies, and this is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the verse: “Therefore the children of Israel do not eat the sciatic nerve, which is on the hollow of the thigh, until this day” (Genesis 32:32), is referring to the sons of Jacob, who were commanded to observe this prohibition even though they had the status of descendants of Noah.

אמר מר כל מצוה שנאמרה לבני נח ונשנית בסיני לזה ולזה נאמרה אדרבה מדנשנית בסיני לישראל נאמרה ולא לבני נח § The Master said in a baraita: Any mitzva that was stated with regard to the descendants of Noah and was repeated at Sinai was stated for this group and for that group. The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary, from the fact that it was repeated at Sinai, clearly it can be derived that it was stated for the Jewish people and not for the descendants of Noah, as if it pertains to the descendants of Noah as well, why repeat it at Sinai? Aren’t the Jewish people are also descendants of Noah?

מדאיתני עבודת כוכבים בסיני ואשכחן דענש עובדי כוכבים עילווה ש"מ לזה ולזה נאמרה: The Gemara answers: From the fact that the prohibition of idol worship was repeated at Sinai, and we find that God punished gentiles for it, conclude from it that any mitzva that was repeated at Sinai was stated for this group and for that group, and not only for the Jewish people.

לבני נח ולא נשנית בסיני לישראל נאמרה ולא לבני נח: אדרבה מדלא נישנית בסיני לבני נח נאמרה ולא לישראל ליכא מידעם דלישראל שרי ולעובד כוכבים אסור It is further stated in the baraita that a mitzva that was stated with regard to the descendants of Noah and was not repeated at Sinai was stated for the Jewish people and not for the descendants of Noah. The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary, from the fact that it was not repeated at Sinai, clearly it can be derived that it was stated for the descendants of Noah and not for the Jewish people. The Gemara answers: There is nothing that is permitted to a Jew and forbidden to a gentile.

ולא והרי יפת תואר התם משום דלאו בני כיבוש נינהו The Gemara asks: And is there not? But isn’t there the permission for a Jew to take a married beautiful woman, who was taken as a prisoner of war, to be his wife? For a gentile to do so is forbidden. The Gemara answers: There, the reason gentiles are prohibited from doing so is because they are not authorized to conquer. It is not permitted for gentiles to wage wars of conquest, and the halakha of marrying a beautiful woman is stated only with regard to a war of conquest. Therefore the fact that a beautiful woman who is a prisoner of war is permitted only to a Jew and not to a gentile does not indicate that gentiles have a higher degree of sanctity.

והרי פחות משוה פרוטה התם משום דלאו בני מחילה נינהו: The Gemara asks: But isn’t stealing less than the value of one peruta prohibited to a gentile and permitted to a Jew? The Gemara answers: There it is because gentiles are not apt to grant forgiveness of debts, even of less than the value of one peruta. Therefore, for a gentile to take even such a minuscule amount is considered robbery. Jews normally forgive such small amounts.

כל מצוה שנאמרה לבני נח ונישנית בסיני לזה ולזה נאמרה It is stated in the baraita that any mitzva that was stated with regard to the descendants of Noah and was repeated at Sinai was stated both for this group and for that group.

Daf 59b

והרי מילה שנאמרה לבני נח דכתיב (בראשית יז, ט) ואתה את בריתי תשמור ונשנית בסיני (ויקרא יב, ג) וביום השמיני ימול לישראל נאמרה ולא לבני נח The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the mitzva of circumcision, which was stated with regard to descendants of Noah, i.e., Abraham and his descendants, who had the status of descendants of Noah at that time? As it is written that God said to Abraham with regard to the mitzva of circumcision: “And as for you, you shall keep My covenant, you and your offspring after you, throughout their generations” (Genesis 17:9). And it was repeated at Sinai for the Jewish people: “And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), and nevertheless it was stated for the Jewish people alone and not for the descendants of Noah.

ההוא למישרי שבת הוא דאתא ביום ואפילו בשבת The Gemara answers: That verse stated at Sinai is not necessary for the mitzva itself, but rather it comes to permit circumcision on Shabbat. It is derived from the phrase “on the eighth day” that circumcision must always be performed on the eight day, and this is the halakha even if it falls on Shabbat. Therefore the mitzva is not considered to have been repeated at Mount Sinai.

והרי פריה ורביה שנאמרה לבני נח דכתיב (בראשית ט, ז) ואתם פרו ורבו ונשנית בסיני (דברים ה, כו) לך אמור להם שובו לכם לאהליכם לישראל נאמרה ולא לבני נח The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the mitzva of procreation, which was stated with regard to the descendants of Noah? As it is written: “And you, be fruitful and multiply, swarm in the land and multiply in it” (Genesis 9:7). And it was repeated at Sinai, in the verse: “Go say to them: Return to your tents” (Deuteronomy 5:26), when the Jewish men were commanded to resume conjugal relations with their wives after having been commanded to separate from them in preparation for the giving of the Torah. Nevertheless, the mitzva of procreation was stated for the Jewish people and not for the descendants of Noah.

ההוא לכל דבר שבמנין צריך מנין אחר להתירו הוא דאתא The Gemara answers: That verse stated at Sinai is not necessary for the mitzva itself, but rather it comes to teach another halakha: That any matter that was prohibited by an official vote of the Sanhedrin requires another vote to permit it. Even if a rabbinic prohibition is no longer relevant, it is not automatically canceled, but rather a special ruling is required to cancel it. This is derived from the fact that it was necessary for God to issue a declaration (Deuteronomy 5:26) specifically canceling the prohibition that had been issued before the giving of the Torah.

אי הכי כל חדא וחדא נמי נימא משום מילתא איתני The Gemara asks: If so, let us say with regard to each and every one of the seven Noahide mitzvot that it was repeated because of an additional matter the Torah teaches, and the descendants of Noah are exempt from them all.

הכי קאמר אזהרה מיהדר ומיתנא בה למה לי The Gemara answers that this is what Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, is saying: After stating a prohibition with regard to the descendants of Noah, why do I need the Torah to then repeat the prohibition itself for the Jewish people? If the only purpose is to teach an additional halakha, it is unnecessary to repeat it in the form of a prohibition, e.g., “You shall not murder…you shall not commit adultery” (Exodus 20:13). Therefore, it is derived from the fact that the entire prohibition is repeated, and not just the new details, that it applies both to Jews and to descendants of Noah.

ואין לנו אלא גיד הנשה בלבד ואליבא דר' יהודה הני נמי לא איתני It is stated in the baraita: And we have only the prohibition against eating the sciatic nerve to which this classification applies, and this is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: But these aforementioned mitzvot also, procreation and circumcision, were not repeated at Sinai in order to teach that they apply to the descendants of Noah as well as to the Jewish people, but rather were mentioned for other purposes, and therefore, they apply only to the Jewish people, similar to the prohibition against eating the sciatic nerve.

הני איתני לשום מילתא בעלמא הא לא איתני כלל The Gemara answers: These mitzvot were repeated for the sake of teaching some other matter. By contrast, this prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve was not repeated at all; it is mentioned only in Genesis. Therefore, circumcision and procreation are not included in the category of mitzvot that were given to the descendants of Noah and were not repeated at Sinai.

אי בעית אימא מילה מעיקר' לאברהם הוא דקא מזהר ליה רחמנא ואתה את בריתי תשמור אתה וזרעך אחריך לדורותם אתה וזרעך אין איניש אחרינא לא If you wish, say that there is another explanation for the fact that the mitzva of circumcision does not apply to the descendants of Noah despite the fact that it was repeated for the Jewish people: From the outset, it was Abraham, and not all the descendants of Noah, that the Merciful One commanded to perform this mitzva; as He said to him: “And as for you, you shall keep My covenant, you and your offspring after you, throughout their generations” (Genesis 17:9). The Gemara infers: “You and your offspring,” yes; another person, no.

אלא מעתה בני ישמעאל לחייבו (בראשית כא, יב) כי ביצחק יקרא לך זרע The Gemara challenges: If that is so, the descendants of Ishmael should also be obligated to observe circumcision, as they are also the offspring of Abraham. The Gemara explains: The verse states: “For through Isaac, offspring shall be called yours” (Genesis 21:12), which means that Ishmael’s descendants are not called the offspring of Abraham.

בני עשו לחייבו ביצחק ולא כל יצחק The Gemara challenges: Granted, Ishmael’s descendants are not considered the offspring of Abraham, but at least the descendants of Esau, Isaac’s son, should be obligated to observe circumcision. The Gemara explains: Since the term: “Through Isaac [beYitzḥak],” also means: Of Isaac, it is derived that the mitzva applies to only some of Isaac’s offspring, but not all the descendants of Isaac. This serves to exclude the descendants of Esau.

מתקיף לה רב אושעיא אלא מעתה בני קטורה לא לחייבו האמר ר' יוסי בר אבין ואיתימא ר' יוסי בר חנינא (בראשית יז, יד) את בריתי הפר לרבות בני קטורה Rav Oshaya objects to this: If that is so, the descendants of Keturah, Abraham’s second wife, should not be obligated to observe circumcision. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei bar Avin says, and some say that it is Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina who says that the verse: “And the uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant” (Genesis 17:14) is stated to include the descendants of Keturah in the obligation to observe circumcision.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אדם הראשון לא הותר לו בשר לאכילה דכתיב (בראשית א, כט) לכם יהיה לאכלה ולכל חית הארץ ולא חית הארץ לכם § Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Meat was not permitted to Adam, the first man, for consumption, as it is written: “And God said: Behold, I have given you every herb that brings forth seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in which is the fruit of a tree that gives forth seed; for you it shall be for food, and for every animal of the earth, and for every fowl of the air, and for everything that creeps upon the earth, in which there is a living soul, every green herb for food. And it was so” (Genesis 1:29–30). It is derived God told Adam: Eating vegetation is permitted to people and animals, but eating the animals of the earth is not permitted to you.

וכשבאו בני נח התיר להם שנאמר (בראשית ט, ג) כירק עשב נתתי לכם את כל יכול לא יהא אבר מן החי נוהג בו ת"ל (בראשית ט, ד) אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו יכול אף לשרצים ת"ל אך But when the children of Noah came, God permitted them to eat meat; as it is stated: “Every moving thing that lives shall be for food for you; as the green herb I have given you all” (Genesis 9:3). One might have thought that accordingly, even the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal does not apply to the descendants of Noah; therefore the verse states: “Only flesh with its life, which is its blood, you shall not eat” (Genesis 9:4). One might have thought that the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal applies even to creeping animals; therefore the verse states “only,” a term used for exclusion, indicating that creeping animals are not included.

ומאי תלמודא א"ר הונא דמו מי שדמו חלוק מבשרו יצאו שרצים שאין דמם חלוק מבשרם The Gemara asks: And what is the derivation? What is the proof that it is creeping animals that are excluded from this prohibition and not another type of animal? Rav Huna says: The term “its blood” indicates that the prohibition pertains to animals whose blood is halakhically considered separate from their flesh. This excludes creeping animals, whose blood is not considered separate from their flesh.

מיתיבי (בראשית א, כו) ורדו בדגת הים מאי לאו לאכילה לא למלאכה The Gemara raises an objection to the assertion that eating meat was prohibited to Adam, from the verse: “And have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that creeps upon the land” (Genesis 1:28). What, is it not stated with regard to consumption, i.e., doesn’t this verse mean that people may eat the meat of animals? The Gemara answers: No, the verse is referring to using animals for labor.

ודגים בני מלאכה נינהו אין כדרחבה דבעי רחבה הנהיג בעיזא ושיבוטא מאי The Gemara asks: But are fish capable of performing labor? The Gemara answers: Yes, they are capable, in accordance with the statement of Raḥava; as Raḥava asked the following question: If one drove a wagon to which a goat and a shibbuta fish were harnessed together, what is the halakha? Has he violated the prohibition of diverse kinds, in the same way that one does when plowing with an ox and a donkey together? In any event, Raḥava’s question indicates that there is a way, albeit far-fetched, for a fish to perform labor.

ת"ש (בראשית א, כו) ובעוף השמים מאי לאו לאכילה לא למלאכה Come and hear a proof that it was permitted for Adam to eat meat, from the phrase in the aforementioned verse: “And have dominion…and over the fowl of the air.” What, is it not stated with regard to consumption? The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to labor.

ועופות בני מלאכה נינהו אין כדבעי רבה בר רב הונא דש באווזין ותרנגולין לר' יוסי ברבי יהודה מאי The Gemara asks: But are birds capable of performing labor? The Gemara answers: Yes, they are capable, as Rabba bar Rav Huna raises a dilemma: If one threshed with geese and chickens, what is the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, derives from the verse: “You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads” (Deuteronomy 25:4), that a laborer in a field is entitled to eat from the produce during his work only if his work involves both his hands and his feet, like an ox, which treads with its forelegs as well as its hind legs. Rabba bar Rav Huna raises a dilemma as to whether the prohibition against muzzling an animal while it is being used for labor in the field applies to geese and chickens, which have only two feet. In any event, it is indicated in that dilemma that birds can perform labor.

תא שמע (בראשית א, כח) ובכל חיה הרומשת על הארץ ההוא לאתויי נחש הוא דאתא Come and hear a proof from the phrase: “And have dominion…and over every living thing that creeps upon the land.” Creeping animals certainly cannot be used for labor. Apparently, the verse is referring to eating them. The Gemara answers: That phrase comes to include the snake, which was capable of performing labor when it was created.

דתניא ר"ש בן מנסיא אומר חבל על שמש גדול שאבד מן העולם שאלמלא (לא) נתקלל נחש כל אחד ואחד מישראל היו מזדמנין לו שני נחשים טובים אחד משגרו לצפון ואחד משגרו לדרום להביא לו סנדלבונים טובים ואבנים טובות ומרגליות ולא עוד אלא שמפשילין רצועה תחת זנבו ומוציא בה עפר לגנתו ולחורבתו As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Woe over a great attendant that has been lost to the world; as had the snake not been cursed that it should go on its belly, there would have been two fine snakes at the disposal of each and every one of the Jewish people. One he would send to the north, and the other one he would send to the south, to bring him precious sandalbonim, a type of precious stone, and other precious stones and pearls. Moreover, he would attach a strap under his snake’s tail like a harness to an animal, and use it to take dirt out to his garden and to rebuild his ruin, as he does with other animals. This demonstrates that the snake was capable of performing labor.

מיתיבי היה ר' יהודה בן תימא אומר אדם הראשון מיסב בגן עדן היה והיו מלאכי השרת צולין לו בשר ומסננין לו יין הציץ בו נחש וראה בכבודו ונתקנא בו התם בבשר היורד מן השמים The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to the assertion that eating meat was prohibited to Adam: Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima would say: Adam, the first man, would dine in the Garden of Eden, and the ministering angels would roast meat for him and strain wine for him. The snake glanced at him and saw his glory, and was jealous of him, and for that reason the snake incited him to sin and caused his banishment from the Garden. According to this, evidently Adam would eat meat. The Gemara answers: There the reference is to meat that descended from heaven, which was created by a miracle and was not the meat of animals at all.

מי איכא בשר היורד מן השמים אין כי הא דר"ש בן חלפתא הוה קאזיל באורחא פגעו בו הנך אריותא דהוו קא נהמי לאפיה אמר (תהלים קד, כא) הכפירים שואגים לטרף נחיתו ליה תרתי אטמתא חדא אכלוה וחדא שבקוה אייתיה ואתא לבי מדרשא בעי עלה דבר טמא הוא זה או דבר טהור א"ל אין דבר טמא יורד מן השמים The Gemara asks: Is there such a thing as meat that descends from heaven? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is like this incident: As Rabbi Shimon ben Ḥalafta was walking along the way, he encountered those lions that were roaring at him, intending to eat him. He said: “The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their food from God” (Psalms 104:21), and they deserve to receive food. Two thighs of an animal descended from heaven for him. The lions ate one of these thighs, and they left the other one. He took it and entered the study hall, and inquired about it: Is this thigh a kosher item or a non-kosher item? The Sages said to him: Certainly it is kosher, as a non-kosher item does not descend from heaven.

בעי מיניה ר' זירא מר' אבהו ירדה לו דמות חמור מהו א"ל יארוד נאלא הא אמרי ליה אין דבר טמא יורד מן השמים: In connection to that story, it is related that Rabbi Zeira asked Rabbi Abbahu: If the likeness of a donkey had descended for him, what would the halakha have been? Would it have been permitted? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Foolish bird [yarud nala]. The Sages already said to him that a non-kosher item does not descend from heaven; therefore, it must be kosher.

ר"ש אומר אף על הכישוף: מ"ט דר"ש דכתיב § In the baraita that lists the Noahide mitzvot (56a), it is stated that Rabbi Shimon says that the descendants of Noah were also commanded concerning the prohibition against engaging in sorcery. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara answers: As it is written:

Daf 60a

(שמות כב, יז) מכשפה לא תחיה וכתיב (שמות כב, יח) כל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת כל שישנו בכלל כל שוכב עם בהמה ישנו בכלל מכשפה לא תחיה: “You shall not allow a witch to live” (Exodus 22:17), and it is written in the following verse: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). It is derived from here that anyone who is included in the prohibition of: “Whoever lies with an animal,” including gentiles, is included in the command: “You shall not allow a witch to live.”

ר"א אומר אף הכלאים: מנה"מ אמר שמואל דאמר קרא (ויקרא יט, יט) את חקתי תשמרו חוקים שחקקתי לך כבר (ויקרא יט, יט) בהמתך לא תרביע כלאים ושדך לא תזרע כלאים The baraita teaches that Rabbi Elazar says that descendants of Noah were also commanded about the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Shmuel says: They are derived from that which the verse states: “My statutes you shall keep. You shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). God is saying: Keep the statutes that I have already instituted for you, i.e., mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, namely, “you shall not breed your animal with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed.”

מה בהמתך בהרבעה אף שדך בהרכבה מה בהמתך בין בארץ בין בחוצה לארץ אף שדך בין בארץ בין בחוצה לארץ The Gemara derives the details of this prohibition from the verse: Just as the Noahide prohibition concerning your animal applies with regard to breeding animals of different species, and not with regard to plowing with animals of two different species working together, which is prohibited only for Jews, so too, the Noahide prohibition in your field applies with regard to grafting one species onto another, which is equivalent to breeding, but it is not prohibited for gentiles to sow different seeds together. Furthermore, just as the Noahide prohibition against breeding your animal applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael, so too, the Noahide prohibition against grafting diverse kinds in your field applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael.

אלא מעתה (ויקרא יח, ה) ושמרתם את חקתי ואת משפטי חקים שחקקתי לך כבר The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the term “My statutes” is understood as referring to mitzvot that were already given to the descendants of Noah, then the verse: “You shall therefore keep My statutes and My ordinances” (Leviticus 18:5), referring to the entire Torah, should also obligate the descendants of Noah, as it would be referring to: Statutes that I have already instituted for you.

התם ושמרתם את חקותי דהשתא הכא את חקותי תשמרו חקים דמעיקרא תשמרו: The Gemara answers: There the verse states: “You shall therefore keep My statutes,” indicating only those statutes that I am giving you now, whereas here, in the verse concerning diverse kinds, the wording is “My statutes you shall keep,” meaning statutes that obligate you from the outset you shall keep in the future.

א"ר יהושע בן קרחה כו': § After clarifying the halakhot of the descendants of Noah, the Gemara returns to the halakhot stated in the mishna with regard to one who blasphemes. It is stated in the mishna that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said that during a blasphemer’s trial, the judges ask the witnesses to use an appellation for the name of God so that they do not utter a curse of God’s name. Specifically, they would use the sentence: Let Yosei smite Yosei, as the name Yosei has four letters in Hebrew, like the Tetragrammaton.

אמר רב אחא בר יעקב אינו חייב עד שיברך שם בן ארבע אותיות לאפוקי בן שתי אותיות דלא Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: The blasphemer is not liable unless he blesses, i.e., curses, the Tetragrammaton, the four-letter name of God, which is to the exclusion of one who curses the two-letter name of God, spelled yod heh, who is not liable.

פשיטא יכה יוסי את יוסי תנן מהו דתימא מילתא בעלמא הוא דנקט קמ"ל The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? We learned in the mishna that the expression used in court is let Yosei smite Yosei, which indicates a four-letter name. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the tanna mentions this statement as a mere example but does not intend that the witnesses use the four-letter name in particular, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov teaches us that one is liable only for cursing the Tetragrammaton.

איכא דאמרי אמר רב אחא בר יעקב ש"מ שם בן ארבע אותיות נמי שם הוא There are those who say that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says as follows: Conclude from the mishna that the Tetragrammaton is also a name for which one is liable, and he is liable not only for cursing the forty-two-letter name of God.

פשיטא יכה יוסי את יוסי תנן מהו דתימא עד דאיכא שם רבה ומילתא בעלמא הוא דנקט קמ"ל: The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? We learned in the mishna that the expression used in court is let Yosei smite Yosei. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that one is not liable unless there is a grand name that he curses, i.e., the forty-two-letter name, and the tanna mentions this statement as a mere example, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov teaches us that one is liable even for cursing the Tetragrammaton, and the name Yosei is mentioned specifically.

נגמר הדין כו': § The mishna teaches: When the judgment is over, and judges need to hear the exact wording of the curse so they can sentence the defendant, the eldest of the witnesses repeats the curse, and the judges rise and make a tear in their clothing.

עומדין מנלן א"ר יצחק בר אמי דאמר קרא (שופטים ג, כ) ואהוד בא אליו והוא יושב בעליית המקרה אשר לו לבדו ויאמר אהוד דבר אלהים לי אליך ויקם מעל הכסא והלא דברים קל וחומר ומה עגלון מלך מואב שהוא נכרי ולא ידע אלא בכינוי עמד ישראל ושם המפורש על אחת כמה וכמה The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the judges must stand? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ami says: It is derived from that which the verse states about Eglon: “And Ehud came to him, and he was sitting by himself alone in his cool upper chamber. And Ehud said: I have a message from God [Elohim] to you. And he arose out of his seat” (Judges 3:20). And are these matters not inferred a fortiori? And if Eglon, king of Moab, who was a gentile and knew the name of God only by an appellation, stood in honor, all the more so must a Jew stand if he hears the ineffable name.

קורעין מנלן דכתיב (מלכים ב יח, לז) ויבא אליקים בן חלקיהו [וגו'] ושבנא הסופר ויואח בן אסף המזכיר אל חזקיהו קרועי בגדים ויגידו לו את דברי רבשקה: The mishna teaches that upon hearing the curse the judges each make a tear in their garments. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers that it is derived from that which is written: “Then came Eliakim, son of Hilkiah, who was over the household, and Shebna the scribe, and Joah, son of Asaph, the recorder, to Hezekiah with torn garments, and they told him Rabshakeh’s statement” (II Kings 18:37). Apparently, since they heard the blasphemous statement of Rabshakeh they were obligated to make a tear in their garments.

לא מאחין: מנלן It is furthermore stated that the judges do not ever fully stitch the tear together again. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this?

א"ר אבהו אתיא קריעה קריעה כתיב הכא קרועי בגדים וכתיב התם (מלכים ב ב, יב) ואלישע רואה והוא מצעק אבי אבי רכב ישראל ופרשיו ולא ראהו עוד ויחזק בבגדיו ויקרעם לשנים קרעים ממשמע שנאמר ויקרעם לשנים איני יודע שהן קרעים ומה ת"ל קרעים מלמד שהן קרועים לעולם Rabbi Abbahu says: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the tearing stated in this regard and the tearing stated with regard to Elijah’s ascendance to heaven. It is written here, with regard to those who heard Rabshakeh’s blasphemy: “With torn garments,” and it is written there: “And Elisha saw it, and he cried: My father, my father, the chariots of Israel and its horsemen. And he saw him no more, and he grabbed hold of his clothes and tore them into two pieces” (II Kings 2:12). From the meaning of that which is stated: “And tore them into two,” do I not know that they are pieces? And why must the verse state: “Pieces”? This teaches that they remain torn forever; they may never be fully stitched back together, but only partially sewn.

ת"ר אחד השומע ואחד שומע מפי שומע חייב לקרוע והעדים אין חייבין לקרוע שכבר קרעו בשעה ששמעו The Sages taught: Both one who hears the curse himself and one who hears it from the one who heard it are obligated to make a tear in their garments. But the witnesses are not obligated to make a tear when they testify, as they already made a tear when they heard it from the blasphemer himself.

וכי קרעו בשעה ששמעו מאי הוי הא קא שמעי השתא לא ס"ד דכתיב (מלכים ב יט, א) ויהי כשמוע המלך חזקיהו (את דברי רבשקה) ויקרע את בגדיו המלך חזקיהו קרע והם לא קרעו The Gemara asks: And if they made a tear when they heard the curse, what of it? Aren’t they also hearing the curse now? The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind that they are obligated to make a tear a second time, as it is written: “And it came to pass, when King Hezekiah heard the statement of Rabshakeh, that he tore his clothes” (II Kings 19:1). It can be inferred that King Hezekiah tore his clothes, but those who reported the blasphemy did not tear their clothes a second time.

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל השומע אזכרה מפי העובד כוכבים אינו חייב לקרוע וא"ת רבשקה ישראל מומר היה § Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who hears a mention of God’s name in a blasphemous manner from a gentile is not obligated to make a tear in his garments. And if you object and say that those who heard the blasphemy of Rabshakeh made a tear even though he was a gentile, that is not correct, as Rabshakeh was an apostate Jew.

ואמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל אין קורעין אלא על שם המיוחד בלבד לאפוקי כינוי דלא And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One makes a tear only for hearing a curse of the ineffable name of God, to the exclusion of hearing a curse of an appellation for the name of God, for which one does not make a tear.

ופליגי דרבי חייא בתרוייהו דאמר רבי חייא השומע אזכרה בזמן הזה אינו חייב לקרוע שאם אי אתה אומר כן נתמלא כל הבגד קרעים The Gemara notes: And Shmuel disagrees with Rav Ḥiyya with regard to two matters. As Rabbi Ḥiyya says: One who hears a mention of God’s name in a blasphemous context nowadays is not obligated to make a tear, as if you do not say so, the entire garment will be full of tears.

ממאן אילימא מישראל מי פקירי כולי האי אלא פשיטא מעובד כוכבים ואי שם המיוחד מי גמירי אלא לאו בכינוי The Gemara clarifies: From whom does one hear these mentions of God’s name about which Rabbi Ḥiyya says that one’s entire garment would be full of tears? If we say that he hears from it a Jew, are Jews irreverent to such an extent that they demean the name of God? Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Ḥiyya is referring to hearing it from a gentile. And if you say that the reference is to cursing the ineffable name, have the gentiles learned it? They have no knowledge of his name. Rather, is it not referring to cursing by an appellation of God’s name?

ושמע מינה בזמן הזה הוא דלא הא מעיקרא חייב שמע מינה: And conclude from it that it is specifically nowadays that, according to Rav Ḥiyya, one is not obligated to make a tear in his garment when hearing the curse of a gentile and when hearing a curse of God that referred to God with an appellation, but initially, when the fundamental halakha was practiced, one was obligated to make a tear in these cases, contrary to the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.

השני אומר אף אני כמוהו: אמר ר"ל שמע מינה אף אני כמוהו כשר בדיני ממונות ובדיני נפשות ומעלה הוא דעביד רבנן והכא כיון דלא אפשר אוקמוה רבנן אדאורייתא § The mishna teaches that after the eldest witness states the exact wording of the curse, the second witness does not repeat it, but he says: I too heard as he did. Reish Lakish says: Conclude from it that saying: I too heard as he did, is valid testimony by Torah law, both in cases of monetary law and in cases of capital law. And the requirement that every witness must relate his testimony separately is a higher standard that the Sages instituted, and here, since it is not possible to fulfill this requirement, as it is not appropriate for a blasphemous statement to be repeated several times, the Sages established the matter according to Torah law and did not require that every witness repeat the curse.

דאי ס"ד פסול הכא משום דלא אפשר קטלינן לגברא: As if it enters your mind that saying: I too heard as he did, is not valid testimony by Torah law, here, in the case of blasphemy, would we execute the man without full testimony because it is not possible to allow the repetition of blasphemy? Clearly, such testimony is valid by Torah law.

והשלישי אומר אף אני כמוהו: סתמא כר"ע דמקיש ג' לשנים: The mishna teaches: And the third witness says: I too heard as he did. The Gemara comments: The unattributed tanna of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who compares three witnesses to two. Rabbi Akiva maintains that just as in a case where there are two witnesses, the disqualification of one disqualifies all of the testimony, so too, even if there are three witnesses, and one of the three is disqualified, all of the testimony is disqualified. Similarly, here too he holds that if there are three witnesses, each of them must testify concerning the curse.

Daf 61a

אסורה וריש לקיש אמר מותרת Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering of idol worship, even if its blood was not ultimately sprinkled for idol worship or its forbidden fat burned for that purpose. And Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.

הניחא לר' יוחנן אלא לריש לקיש בעי קרא Rava bar Rav Ḥanan concludes his analysis: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who derives this halakha from another source, this statement in the baraita works out well. The verse that mentions the slaughter of an animal in idol worship apparently teaches a principle, as it is superfluous with regard to the halakha of slaughter itself, as stated in the baraita. But according to Reish Lakish, who does not derive from any verse that one can have intention from one rite to another rite, one needs this verse to derive precisely this halakha, that one can have intention from one rite to another rite. Consequently, the verse is not superfluous, and it cannot be assumed that it teaches a principle with regard to the forms of idol worship that are punishable by death.

מתקיף לה רב פפא ולרבי יוחנן לא בעי קרא עד כאן לא קא אסר רבי יוחנן אלא בהמה אבל גברא לא בר קטלא הוא ואתא קרא לחיובי גברא לקטלא Rav Pappa objects to this: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, does one not need a verse to teach the halakha in a case of intention from one rite to another rite? Rabbi Yoḥanan initially only prohibits deriving benefit from the animal; but if not for this verse, the man who slaughtered the animal would not be liable to receive the death penalty. And therefore the verse comes to render the man liable to receive the death penalty. Therefore this verse is not superfluous according to Rabbi Yoḥanan either.

מתקיף לה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ולר"ל מי בעי קרא עד כאן לא קא שרי ר"ל אלא בהמה אבל גברא בר קטלא הוא מידי דהוה אמשתחוה להר דהר מותר ועובדה בסייף Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, objects to Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s challenge to the derivation in the baraita: And even according to Reish Lakish, does one need a verse to teach that the one who slaughtered the animal is liable? Reish Lakish only permits one to derive benefit from the animal; but the man is certainly liable to receive the death penalty. This is just as the halakha is in the case of one who bows to a mountain, as deriving benefit from the mountain is permitted, but nevertheless the one who worshipped it is liable to be executed by the sword. Therefore, the verse that states that one who slaughters an offering in idol worship is liable to be executed is superfluous with regard to the issue of intention from one rite to another.

א"ל רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא למאי דקאמר ליה רבא בר רב חנן לאביי אימא יצאה השתחואה ללמד על הכלל כולו (דברים יב, ל) איכה יעבדו למעוטי מאי Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: According to what Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye, that there is room to say that bowing was singled out in the verse to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship carries the death penalty, there is a difficulty. With regard to the verse: “Take heed to yourself that you not be ensnared to follow them…saying, how do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), which indicates that one is liable for worshipping an idol in the manner that the gentiles worship it, this is stated to exclude what?

וכי תימא למעוטי הפוער עצמו לזובחים מהשתחואה נפקא מה השתחואה דרך כיבוד אף כל דרך כיבוד And if you would say that this verse is stated to exclude one who defecates before an idol that is worshipped by sacrificing offerings, it is not necessary to derive this halakha from this verse, as it is derived from the halakha of bowing to an idol, as follows: Just as bowing is an honorable form of worship and is punishable by death, so too, any honorable form of worship is punishable by death when performed as idol worship, which excludes an offensive act such as defecating. Therefore, the halakha that one is not liable for defecating before an idol can be derived from bowing.

אלא למעוטי הפוער עצמו למרקוליס ס"ד אמינא הואיל ועבודתו בזיון הוא אף כל בזיון קמ"ל Rather, this verse is stated to exclude one who defecates before the idol called Mercury, which is not its typical manner of worship. It might enter your mind to say that since the standard manner of worship of Mercury, namely, throwing stones at it, is in any event an act of degradation, so too, one who performs any act of degradation as worship of Mercury should be liable. Therefore, the verse teaches us that one is liable only for worshiping Mercury in its standard manner of worship.

אלא הא דאמר רבי אליעזר מנין לזובח בהמה למרקוליס שהוא חייב שנאמר (ויקרא יז, ז) ולא יזבחו עוד את זבחיהם לשעירים The Gemara raises an objection: But Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s interpretation of the verses appears to contradict that which Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that one who sacrifices an animal to Mercury is liable? As it is stated: “And they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the satyrs” (Leviticus 17:7).

אם אינו ענין לכדרכה דכתיב איכה יעבדו תניהו ענין לשלא כדרכה Rabbi Eliezer explains: If the verse is not needed for the matter of one who worships an idol in its typical manner, i.e., one who sacrifices an animal as an offering to an idol that is worshipped by sacrificing offerings, as the halakha in this case is already written in the aforementioned verse: “How do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise,” apply it to the matter of one who worships an idol not in its typical manner, by sacrificing an offering to an idol that is not typically worshipped by sacrificing offerings. Therefore, one who sacrifices an offering to Mercury is liable, even though that is not its typical form of worship.

שלא כדרכה מהשתחואה נפקא According to Rava bar Rav Ḥanan, by contrast, it is derived that one is liable for worshipping an idol in any honorable manner, even not in its typical manner of worship, from the halakha of bowing.

התם בזובח להכעיס The Gemara answers: There, in the verse mentioned by Rabbi Eliezer, the reference is to one who sacrifices an offering to Mercury not as a form of worship, but rather in order to express insolence toward the Torah prohibition against sacrificing an offering to an idol. It is derived from the verse that this too is a transgression of the prohibition and renders one liable for the death penalty.

רב המנונא אירכסו ליה תורי פגע ביה רבה רמא ליה מתני' אהדדי תנן העובד עבודת כוכבים עובד אין אומר לא והאנן תנן האומר אעבוד אלך ואעבוד נלך ונעבוד § The Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna lost his oxen and went to search for them. Rabba met him and raised a contradiction between two mishnayot. We learned in the mishna that one who worships idols is liable. By inference, one who worships idols, yes, he is liable, but one who merely says that he will worship idols is not liable. But didn’t we learn in another mishna (67a): One who says: I will worship an idol, or: I will go and worship an idol, or: Let us go and worship an idol, is liable, just as one who actually worships an idol is liable. Evidently, one is liable for merely stating his intention to engage in idol worship.

א"ל באומר איני מקבלו עלי אלא בעבודה Rav Hamnuna said to him: The mishna here is referring to one who states: I intend to accept this idol upon myself as a god only through worship. Consequently, he is liable only when he actually worships it. One who intends to accept the idol as a god immediately is liable even before he actually worships it.

רב יוסף אמר תנאי שקלת מעלמא תנאי היא דתניא האומר בואו ועבדוני רבי מאיר מחייב ור' יהודה פוטר Rav Yosef said: This answer is unnecessary; have you removed the tanna’im from the world? It is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says: I am a god; come and worship me, Rabbi Meir deems him liable for incitement to idol worship, and Rabbi Yehuda deems him exempt.

היכא דפלחו כולי עלמא לא פליגי דכתיב (שמות כ, ג) לא תעשה לך פסל כי פליגי בדיבורא בעלמא רבי מאיר סבר דיבורא מילתא היא ורבי יהודה סבר דיבורא לאו מילתא היא The Gemara explains: In a case where those to whom the inciter spoke subsequently worshiped him, everyone agrees that the inciter is liable, as it is written: “You shall not make yourself a graven image” (Exodus 20:4), which is interpreted to include a case where one establishes himself as a god. When they disagree is in a case where the incident ended in mere speech. Rabbi Meir holds that speech is a significant matter, and therefore the inciter is liable for incitement, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that speech is nothing. Therefore, the contradiction between the mishnayot can be resolved by attributing each mishna to a different tanna.

הדר אמר רב יוסף לאו מילתא היא דאמרי דאפילו לר' יהודה בדיבורא נמי חיובי מחייב (דתנן) רבי יהודה אומר לעולם אינו חייב עד שיאמר אעבוד אלך ואעבוד נלך ונעבוד Rav Yosef then said after reconsidering the matter: What I said is not correct, as even according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is deemed liable for speech as well. As we learned in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Actually, one is not liable unless he says: I will worship, or: I will go and worship, or: Let us go and worship. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable even for speech alone, not only for actual worship.

במאי קמיפלגי במסית לעצמו ואמרי ליה אין קמפלגי מר סבר מסית לעצמו שמעי ליה ואין דקאמרי ליה קושטא הוא ומ"ס מסית לעצמו לא שמעי ליה מימר אמרי Accordingly, with regard to what principle do Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? They disagree with regard to the case of one who incites others to worship him, and the others say to him: Yes, we will worship you. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that when one incites others to worship him, they are apt to listen to him, and the response: Yes, that they say to him, is sincere. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds when one incites others to worship him, they are not apt to listen to him, as they say to themselves:

Daf 60b

מתני׳ העובד עבודת כוכבים אחד העובד ואחד המזבח ואחד המקטר ואחד המנסך ואחד המשתחוה ואחד המקבלו עליו לאלוה והאומר לו אלי אתה MISHNA: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering, and one who pours a libation in idol worship, and one who bows to an idol, and one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god, and one who says to an idol: You are my god.

אבל המגפף והמנשק והמכבד והמרבץ והמרחץ והסך והמלביש והמנעיל עובר בלא תעשה הנודר בשמו והמקיים בשמו עובר בלא תעשה But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, or one who washes it, or one who rubs it with oil, or one who dresses it, or one who puts its shoes on it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, he transgresses a prohibition.

הפוער עצמו לבעל פעור זו היא עבודתה הזורק אבן למרקוליס זו היא עבודתה: One who defecates before the idol known as Ba’al-Peor is liable to receive capital punishment, even though defecating is a degrading act, as that is its form of worship. Likewise, one who throws a stone at Mercury is liable to receive capital punishment, as that is its form of worship.

גמ׳ מאי אחד העובד GEMARA: What is added in the mishna by stating the phrase: One who worships? Since worship is the general description of all the actions detailed in the mishna, why is this phrase necessary?

אמר רבי ירמיה הכי קאמר אחד העובד כדרכה ואחד המזבח ואחד המקטר ואחד המנסך ואחד המשתחוה ואפילו שלא כדרכה Rabbi Yirmeya says that this is what the mishna is saying: One who worships an idol in its typical manner of worship is liable to be executed; and furthermore, one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense, and one who pours a libation, and the one who bows to an idol are all liable to be executed, and this applies even if this manner of worship is not the idol’s typical manner of worship. Even if the idol in question is not typically worshipped in these ways, these specific acts are still considered idol worship because these are the ways in which God is worshipped in the Temple.

וליחשוב נמי זורק אמר אביי זורק היינו מנסך דכתיב (תהלים טז, ד) בל אסיך נסכיהם מדם The Gemara suggests: And let the mishna also count sprinkling the blood of an offering, which is also one of the sacrificial rites in the Temple. Abaye says: Sprinkling the blood of an offering is the same as pouring a libation, since they are essentially one sacrificial rite, as it is written: “I will not pour their libations of blood” (Psalms 16:4), indicating that sprinkling the blood of an offering is also referred to as offering a libation.

מנהני מילי § The Gemara asks with regard to the halakha that one is liable for worshipping an idol in these manners even if they are not the way the idol is typically worshipped: From where are these matters derived?

דתנו רבנן אילו נאמר (שמות כב, יט) זובח יחרם הייתי אומר בזובח קדשים בחוץ הכתוב מדבר תלמוד לומר לאלהים בזובח לעבודת כוכבים הכתוב מדבר The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “One who sacrifices to the gods shall be utterly destroyed, except to the Lord alone” (Exodus 22:19): If it were stated: One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed, I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard, referring to a severe transgression that is stated elsewhere in the Torah. Therefore, the verse states: “To the gods,” indicating that the verse speaks of one who slaughters an offering to an idol.

אין לי אלא בזובח מקטר ומנסך מניין ת"ל (שמות כב, יט) בלתי לה' לבדו ריקן העבודות כולן לשם המיוחד The baraita asks: From here I know only the halakha of one who slaughters an offering to an idol. From where is it derived that one who burns incense or pours a libation is also liable to receive the death penalty? The baraita answers that the verse states: “Except to the Lord alone”; the verse emptied out, i.e., designated, all the sacrificial rites to the ineffable name of God, indicating that one who performs any of these rites in idol worship is liable.

לפי שיצאה זביחה לידון בעבודות פנים מניין לרבות השתחואה The baraita asks: Since slaughter is singled out from all of the forms of worship to be mentioned in this verse in order to derive from it that with regard to all the sacrificial rites performed inside the Temple, one who performs them in idol worship is liable to receive capital punishment, from where is it derived that this halakha includes bowing down to an idol, which is not a sacrificial rite?

ת"ל (דברים יז, ג) וילך ויעבוד אלהים אחרים וישתחו להם וסמיך ליה (דברים יז, ה) והוצאת את האיש ההוא וגו' The baraita answers that the verse states: “And has gone and served other gods and bowed to them” (Deuteronomy 17:3), and a verse near it states: “Then you shall bring forth that man or that woman who has done this evil thing to your gates, the man or the woman, and you shall stone them with stones and they shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:5). It is derived from the juxtaposition of these two verses that one who bows down to an idol is liable to be executed.

עונש שמענו אזהרה מניין ת"ל (שמות לד, יד) כי לא תשתחוה לאל אחר The baraita asks: We have heard the punishment for bowing down to an idol, but from where is the prohibition against doing so derived? The baraita answers that the verse states: “For you shall bow to no other god” (Exodus 34:14).

יכול שאני מרבה המגפף והמנשק והמנעיל ת"ל זובח One might have thought that I should include among those liable to receive capital punishment one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who puts its shoes on it as well. Therefore, the verse states: “One who sacrifices shall be utterly destroyed,” referring to the act of slaughtering an offering in idol worship.

זביחה בכלל היתה ולמה יצאה להקיש אליה ולומר לך מה זביחה מיוחדת שהיא עבודת פנים וחייבין עליה מיתה אף כל שהיא עבודת פנים וחייבין עליה מיתה The baraita explains: The slaughter of an offering was included in the general category of the prohibited forms of idol worship, and why was it singled out to be mentioned in this verse? It was singled out to compare a matter to it and say to you: Just as slaughter is notable in that it is a sacrificial rite performed inside the Temple, and those who perform this rite for the purpose of idol worship are liable to receive the death penalty for it, so too, any form of worship that is a sacrificial rite performed inside the Temple is prohibited when performed for idol worship, and transgressors are liable to receive the death penalty for it.

יצאה השתחואה לידון בעצמה יצאה זביחה לידון על הכלל כולו Therefore, the act of bowing to an idol is singled out to be mentioned in a separate verse to derive the death penalty for that action itself, despite the fact that it is not a sacrificial rite performed in the Temple, whereas the slaughter of an offering is singled out to be mentioned in order to derive from it the principle with regard to the entire category, namely, that generally one is not liable to receive capital punishment for a form of worship that is not performed in the Temple.

אמר מר הייתי אומר בזובח קדשים בחוץ הכתוב מדבר זובח קדשים בחוץ כרת הוא The Gemara proceeds to clarify the baraita. The Master said in the baraita: I would have said that the verse speaks of one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: The punishment for one who slaughters a sacrificial animal outside the Temple courtyard is karet, not capital punishment, as it is stated: “Each and every man…who offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice it to the Lord, even that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). Therefore, how can the baraita suggest that a verse that mentions capital punishment could be referring to this transgression?

סלקא דעתך אמינא כי אתרו ביה קטלא כי לא אתרו ביה כרת קמ"ל The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that in a case when the witnesses warned the transgressor not to slaughter the offering outside the Temple he is liable to receive the death penalty, but in a case when they did not warn him he is liable to receive karet. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple is not liable to receive the death penalty even if he was warned.

אמר ליה רבא בר רב חנן לאביי אימא יצאה השתחואה ללמד על הכלל כולו The baraita states that the principle concerning the forms of idol worship that are punishable by execution is derived from the verse that mentions slaughtering an animal as an idolatrous offering, whereas bowing to an idol is mentioned in the verse as an exception. Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Say that bowing is singled out to be mentioned to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship, when performed for the sake of idol worship, carries the death penalty, not only sacrificial rites performed the Temple.

וכי תימא זובח למה לי לגופיה דמחשבין מעבודה לעבודה And if you would say that if so, why do I need slaughter to be mentioned in the verse specifically, one can say that mentioning slaughter is necessary for the matter of slaughter itself, i.e., to teach that one can have intention from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. In other words, slaughtering an animal with idolatrous intent is punishable by death even if the intention of the transgressor pertains not to the slaughter itself but to another part of the sacrificial process.

דאיתמר השוחט בהמה לזרוק דמה לעבודת כוכבים ולהקטיר חלבה לעבודת כוכבים רבי יוחנן אמר As it was stated that with regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood in idol worship or to burn its fat in idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says:

Daf 61b

מ"ש איהו מינן דידן ואין דקאמרי אחוכי עליה In what way is he different from us? The suggestion to worship him is nonsense. And the fact that they say to him: Yes, is because they ridicule him.

ומתני' כאן ביחיד הניסת כאן ברבים הניסתים יחיד לא מימלך וטעי בתריה רבים מימלכי ולא טעו בתריה And the contradiction between the mishnayot can be resolved as follows: There, where the mishna states that one is liable for speech alone, the reference is to an individual who was incited; here, where the mishna indicates that one not is liable for speech alone, it is referring to a case of an incited multitude of people. The Gemara explains: An individual who was incited does not typically change his mind, and he goes astray after idol worship. Therefore, once he agrees to the suggestion to worship an idol, he has fully accepted the idol upon himself as a god and is liable. By contrast, a multitude of people are apt to change their minds, and consequently they do not go astray after idol worship.

אמר רב יוסף מנא אמינא לה דכתיב (דברים יג, ט) לא תאבה לו ולא תשמע אליו הא אבה ושמע חייב Rav Yosef said: From where do I say that the halakha that one is liable for merely stating that he will worship an idol is referring to an individual who was incited? As it is written with regard to one who incites people to engage in idol worship: “You shall not approve of him, nor listen to him” (Deuteronomy 13:9), which indicates that if one approved of and listened to the inciter, stating his intention to engage in idol worship, he is liable even if he does not actually worship an idol.

איתיביה אביי מי שאני בין ניסת דרבים לניסת יחיד והתניא (דברים יג, ז) כי יסיתך אחיך בן אמך אחד יחיד הניסת ואחר רבים הניסתים והוציא הכתוב יחיד מכלל רבים ורבים מכלל יחיד Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef’s opinion: Is there a difference in halakha between the cases of an incited multitude of people and an individual who was incited? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “If your brother, the son of your mother, or your son, or your daughter, or the wife of your bosom, or your neighbor who is like your own soul, incites you secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:7), that both an individual who was incited and an incited multitude of people are included in this halakha, but the verse singles out the individual from the category of the multitude, and another verse singles out the multitude from the category of the individual.

יחיד מכלל רבים להחמיר על גופו ולהקל על ממונו The Torah states separately the halakhot of an individual who is incited to engage in idol worship and of an entire city that is subverted to engage in idol worship in order to distinguish between the two cases, as follows: An individual who was incited is singled out from the category of a subverted multitude of people in order to render the punishment to an individual’s body more stringent. The individual is executed by stoning, whereas the residents of an idolatrous city are executed by decapitation. And an individual was singled out to render the treatment of the property of an individual who was incited more lenient, as it is not destroyed like that of the residents of an idolatrous city.

רבים מכלל יחיד להקל על גופם ולהחמיר על ממונם Additionally, the Torah singles out the subverted multitude of people from the category of an individual who was incited in order to render the punishment given to the bodies of the residents of an idolatrous city, decapitation, more lenient than that given to an individual who was incited, and to render the treatment of their property more stringent, as the city and the property of its residents are burned.

בהא מילתא הוא דשאני אבל בכל מילי כי הדדי נינהו Abaye concluded his objection to Rav Yosef’s opinion: It can be inferred from the baraita that only with regard to this matter, i.e., the halakhot mentioned in the baraita, is the halakha of an individual who was incited different than that of an incited multitude of people, but with regard to all other halakhic matters they are the same. Therefore, a distinction cannot be made between them with regard to the halakha in the case of a verbal commitment to idol worship.

אלא אמר אביי כאן בניסת מפי עצמו כאן בניסת מפי אחרים מפי עצמו מימלך מפי אחרים גריר בתרייהו Rather, Abaye said that the contradiction between the mishnayot is to be resolved as follows: Here, where the mishna indicates that one is liable only for actual worship, the reference is to one who is incited by himself, i.e., no one incited him to idol worship and he made the decision on his own. Whereas there, in the mishna that deems one liable for stating that he will worship an idol, the reference is to one who is incited by others. The reason for the difference is that one who makes the decision on his own is apt to change his mind, whereas one who is incited by others is drawn after them and is unlikely to change his mind.

אמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דכתיב לא תאבה לו ולא תשמע אליו הא אבה ושמע חייב Abaye said: From where do I say that this distinction is correct? As it is written: “You shall not approve of him, nor listen to him” (Deuteronomy 13:9), referring to another individual who tried to incite him, and the verse indicates that if one approved of and listened to the inciter, he is liable even for the approval alone.

רבא אמר אידי ואידי בניסת מפי אחרים הא דא"ל כך אוכלת כך שותה כך מטיבה כך מריעה הא דלא א"ל כך אוכלת כך שותה כו' Rava says: Both this mishna and that mishna are referring to one incited by others, and they should be differentiated as follows: That mishna, which deems one liable for merely expressing approval, is referring to a case where the inciter described the qualities of the idol and said to him: It eats like this; it drinks like this; it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this. In this case, expressing approval verbally suffices to render one liable, as he was evidently convinced by the description. This mishna, which indicates that one is not liable for speech alone, is referring to a case where the inciter did not say to him: It eats like this; it, drinks like this, it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this.

אמר רבא מנא אמינא לה דכתיב (דברים יג, ח) מאלהי העמים אשר סביבותיכם הקרובים אליך וגו' מה לי קרובים ומה לי רחוקים הכי קא"ל מטיבותן של קרובים אתה למד מה טיבותן של רחוקים Rava said: From where do I say that this distinction is correct? As it is written: “Let us go and worship other gods…from the gods of the peoples that surround you, the ones near to you or the ones far from you” (Deuteronomy 13:7–8). What difference is there to me whether they are near, and what difference is there to me whether they are far? Why would the distance affect the prohibition? Rather, this is what the Torah is saying to you: Do not be tempted to listen to the inciter, as from the nature of the objects of idol worship that are near you, which you recognize to be false, you can derive what the nature is of the ones that are far from you. Therefore, if you are told that there is an idol in a distant land that is real, realize that it is a lie.

מאי לאו דאמר ליה כך אוכלת כך שותה כך מטיבה כך מריעה ש"מ It is from this interpretation that Rava derives his halakhic distinction: What, is it not referring to a case where the inciter described to another the qualities of the idol and said to him: It eats like this; it drinks like this; it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this? Conclude from it that only in such a case is the incited person liable for stating his approval.

רב אשי אמר סיפא בישראל מומר Rav Ashi says that there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the mishnayot: The latter clause of the mishna (67a), which deems one liable for speech alone, is referring to an apostate Jew; since he is already an apostate, his stated commitment to idol worship is certainly final. Consequently, he is liable. By contrast, a regular Jew is not liable for speech alone.

רבינא אמר לא זו אף זו קתני Ravina says that there is no contradiction; rather, the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that. In other words, the tanna first teaches the elementary halakha that one who worships an idol is liable, and afterward it teaches the more novel halakha that even one who merely says that he will engage in idol worship is immediately liable.

איתמר העובד עבודת כוכבים מאהבה ומיראה אביי אמר חייב רבא אמר פטור § It was stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following matter: In the case of one who worships idols due to his love of another who requested that he bow before the statue, or due to fear of someone coercing him to do so, but not due to faith in that idol, what is the halakha? Abaye says: He is liable. Rava says: He is exempt.

אביי אמר חייב דהא פלחה רבא אמר פטור אי קבליה עליה באלוה אין אי לא לא: The Gemara explains: Abaye says he is liable because he worshipped it. Rava says he is exempt, as the criterion for becoming liable for idol worship is as follows: If one sincerely accepted the idol upon himself as a god, yes, he is liable; but if he did not accept it sincerely, he is not liable.

סימן עב"ד ישתחו"ה למשי"ח: Abaye attempts to cite several proofs, whose mnemonic is: A slave will bow to the anointed.

ואמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דתנן העובד עבודת כוכבים אחד העובד כו' מאי לאו אחד העובד מאהבה ומיראה And Abaye said: From where do I say that one who worships idols due to love or fear is liable? As we learned in the mishna: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering. What is added by the mishna by stating twice: One who worships? Is it not to include the case of one who worships idols due to love or due to fear, in addition to the case of one who worships idols out of faith? Evidently, in this case as well, the worshipper is liable.

ורבא אמר לך לא כדמתרץ רבי ירמיה And Rava could have said to you in response that the term: One who worships, should not be understood as Abaye suggests but rather as Rabbi Yirmeya explains it, namely, that one who worships an idol in its standard manner of worship is liable, and one who sacrifices an idolatrous offering is liable even if that is not the standard manner of worship of that particular idol.

אמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דתניא (שמות כ, ד) לא תשתחוה להם להם אי אתה משתחוה אבל אתה משתחוה לאדם כמותך יכול אפילו נעבד כהמן ת"ל (שמות כ, ד) ולא תעבדם והא המן מיראה הוה נעבד Abaye attempts to cite another proof for his opinion. He said: From where do I say that one who worships idols due to love or fear is liable? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “You shall not bow to them nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5): “To them,” to idols, you may not bow, but you may bow to a person like yourself; bowing to a person is merely the acceptance of authority. One might have thought that it is permitted to bow even to a person who is worshipped like a god, like Haman; therefore, the verse states: “Nor worship them,” i.e., any form of pagan worship is prohibited. Abaye concludes: And wasn’t Haman worshipped due to fear, and not because the people considered him a god? Evidently, one who engages in idol worship due to fear is liable.

ורבא כהמן ולא כהמן כהמן דאיהו גופיה עבודת כוכבים ולא כהמן דאילו המן מיראה והכא לאו מיראה And Rava explains this baraita as follows: One might have thought that it is permitted to bow even to a person like Haman in one regard, but not like Haman in all aspects. It is referring to one like Haman in that Haman himself was an object of idol worship, as he claimed he was a god, and one who worships a person out of belief in his divinity is liable. But the reference is to one who is not like Haman in all aspects, as while Haman was worshipped due to fear, and one who engages in idol worship due to fear is not liable, here the reference is to one who worships a person not due to fear, but because he believes in that person’s divinity.

ואמר אביי מנא אמינא לה דתניא כהן משיח בעבודת כוכבים רבי אומר בשגגת מעשה וחכמים אומרים בהעלם דבר And Abaye furthermore said: From where do I say my opinion? As it is taught in a baraita: If an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, unwittingly engaged in idol worship, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He brings an offering for the unwitting act. And the Rabbis say: A High Priest does not bring an offering for an unwitting act of idol worship unless it was due to a lapse of awareness concerning the fundamental halakhot of idol worship, i.e., he thought that this action was halakhically permitted.

ושוין שבשעירה כיחיד ושוין שאין מביא אשם תלוי And they agree that a High Priest brings a female goat as his offering to atone for his act of idol worship, as does an ordinary individual, and not a bull, as a High Priest brings as a sin-offering for other sins. And they agree that a High Priest does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, which is ordinarily brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires him to bring a sin-offering. In such a case, he is exempt.

האי שגגת מעשה דעבודת כוכבים ה"ד אי קסבר בית הכנסת הוא והשתחוה לו הרי לבו לשמים אלא דחזא אנדרטא והשתחוה לו Abaye infers: What are the circumstances of the High Priest’s unwitting act of idol worship that is not due to a lack of awareness of the fundamental halakhot of idol worship? If the High Priest thought that a certain building was a synagogue and bowed to it, and he then realized that it is a house of idol worship, why should he be obligated to bring an offering, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Since his heart was directed toward Heaven, it is not even an unwitting transgression. Rather, it is a case where the High Priest saw the statue of a person and bowed to it.

אי קבליה עליה באלוה מזיד הוא This case must also be clarified: If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor, and he is liable to receive the death penalty and not to bring an offering.

Daf 62a

ואי לא קבליה עליה באלוה לא כלום הוא אלא לאו מאהבה ומיראה And if he did not accept that person upon himself as a god, but rather bowed to the statue in order to honor the person, e.g., the king, what he did is nothing. Rather, is the baraita not referring to a case where the High Priest unwittingly worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of someone? This proves that this is also considered idol worship.

ורבא אמר לך לא באומר מותר And Rava could have said to you in response: No, the baraita is not referring to this case, but to a case where the High Priest says to himself that idol worship is permitted.

אומר מותר היינו העלם דבר The Gemara challenges: If the baraita is referring to a case where the High Priest says to himself that idol worship is permitted, this is a case of a lapse of awareness concerning the fundamental halakhot of idol worship, in which case the Rabbis concede that the High Priest is obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, what is the difference between the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and that of the Sages?

באומר מותר לגמרי העלם דבר קיום מקצת וביטול מקצת The Gemara answers: It is a case where he says to himself that idol worship is entirely permitted, whereas the case of a lapse of awareness in which the Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is a case of upholding part of the prohibition and negating another part of it, i.e., a case where the High Priest recognizes that idol worship is prohibited but mistakenly assumes that certain idolatrous activities are permitted.

תני רבי זכאי קמיה דרבי יוחנן זיבח וקיטר וניסך והשתחוה בהעלם אחד אינו חייב אלא אחת § Rabbi Zakkai taught the following baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one sacrificed an animal as an idolatrous offering, and burned incense as an idolatrous offering, and poured a libation to an idol, and bowed to an idol, all in the course of one lapse of awareness, forgetting that these actions were prohibited, he is obligated to bring only one sin-offering; he is not obligated to bring an offering for each and every act of idol worship.

אמר ליה פוק תני לברא Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Go out and teach it outside; i.e., such a baraita must not be taught in the study hall, as the halakha is that one is obligated to bring an offering for each and every act of idol worship.

אמר רבי אבא הא דאמר ר' זכאי מחלוקת ר' יוסי ורבי נתן דתניא הבערה ללאו יצאה דברי רבי יוסי Rabbi Abba says: That which Rabbi Zakkai says is subject to a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita: The prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat was singled out from the general category of labor prohibited on Shabbat, and it is written explicitly in the Torah in the verse: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). This was done to teach that that the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat is unlike other prohibited labors, as it is an ordinary prohibition, for which one is not liable to be killed by stoning. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

ורבי נתן אומר לחלק יצאה And Rabbi Natan says: Kindling a fire is like any other labor prohibited on Shabbat, and it was singled out to divide the prohibited labors of Shabbat. In other words, by stating one prohibited labor separately, the Torah teaches that each labor performed on Shabbat constitutes its own separate prohibition. Consequently, one who unwittingly violates several categories of labor is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act of prohibited labor.

למאן דאמר הבערה ללאו יצאה השתחואה נמי ללאו יצאה Rabbi Abba concludes: According to the one who says that of all the labors that are prohibited on Shabbat, kindling a fire on Shabbat was singled out to be mentioned in the Torah to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition, then bowing, in the category of idol worship, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse: “You shall not bow to them nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5), was also singled out to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition, which is not punishable by stoning.

למ"ד הבערה לחלק יצאה השתחואה נמי לחלק יצאה Whereas, according to the one who says that kindling a fire was singled out to divide the prohibited labors of Shabbat, bowing was also singled out to divide the rites of idol worship, i.e., to teach that one who unwittingly performs several forms of idol worship is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act of idol worship. Therefore, the baraita taught by Rabbi Zakkai, which states that such a person is obligated to bring only one sin-offering, is in accordance with the former opinion, i.e., the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

מתקיף לה רב יוסף דילמא עד כאן לא קאמר רבי יוסי התם הבערה ללאו יצאה דנפקא ליה חילוק מלאכות (ויקרא ד, ב) מאחת מהנה Rav Yosef objects to this: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei says there, with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, that kindling a fire was singled out to teach that it is an ordinary prohibition only because he derives the division of labors on Shabbat, i.e., that one is obligated to bring an offering for each category of labor that he violated, from a different verse, namely: “From one of them” (Leviticus 4:2).

דתניא ר' יוסי אומר ועשה מאחת מהנה פעמים שחייב אחת על כולן פעמים שחייב על כל אחת ואחת As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says with regard to the verse: “If any one shall sin through error, in any of the things which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and performs from one of them” (Leviticus 4:2), that there are times when one is liable to bring one sin-offering for all of his transgressions together, and there are times when one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression.

וא"ר יונתן מאי טעמא דרבי יוסי דכתיב ועשה מאחת מהנה אחת מאחת הנה מהנה אחת שהיא הנה והנה שהיא אחת And Rabbi Yonatan says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And performs from one of them,” and Rabbi Yosei interprets the verse as follows: The word “one” is qualified, as the verse states: “From one.” Likewise, the word “them” is qualified, as the verse states: “Of them.” Rabbi Yosei derives that there are cases of one transgression that, with regard to punishment, is them, i.e., many. And there are cases of them, i.e., several transgressions, that, with regard to punishment, are one.

אחת שמעון מאחת שם משמעון Rabbi Yonatan delineates the implementation of this principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: “One” complete violation is, e.g., a case where one wrote a whole word as he intended, such as the name Shimon. The term “from one” is referring to a case where one performed only part of a complete act of labor, e.g., he wrote only some of the letters of a word, such as shin mem, from the name Shimon. These two letters spell the word shem. In such a case, one is obligated to bring an offering for his transgression of writing two letters, shin and mem, even though he did not complete his intended act of writing the entire name of Shimon.

הנה אבות מהנה תולדות אחת שהיא הנה זדון שבת ושגגות מלאכות הנה שהיא אחת שגגת שבת וזדון מלאכות Rabbi Yonatan continues: “Them” is referring to the primary categories of labor. The term “of them” includes the subcategories of labor. The cases of one transgression that with regard to punishment is them, i.e., it is counted as many transgressions, are those involving intention, i.e., awareness, on the part of the transgressor that it was Shabbat and unawareness on the part of the transgressor that the acts of labor that he was performing are prohibited on Shabbat. One who transgresses in this way is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every category of labor that he engages in. The cases of them, several transgressions, that with regard to punishment are one are those involving unawareness on the part of the transgressor that it was Shabbat and intention, i.e., awareness, that the acts of labor that he was performing are prohibited on Shabbat. One who transgresses in this way is obligated to bring only one sin-offering.

אבל הכא דלא נפקא ליה חילוק מלאכות מדוכתא אחריתי דכולי עלמא השתחואה לחלק יצאה Rav Yosef concludes his objection to Rabbi Abba’s comparison between the status of the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat and the status of the prohibition against bowing to an idol: The fact that Rabbi Yosei derives that kindling a fire on Shabbat is not punishable by death can be attributed to the fact that he derives from a different verse that one who violates several categories of labor is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every category of labor that he engages in. But here, with regard to idol worship, where he does not derive the division of labors, i.e., the division of categories of idol worship, from another place, perhaps everyone agrees that bowing was singled out to divide the prohibition of idol worship into different categories and bowing to an idol is punishable by death just like other forms of worship.

חילוק מלאכות דעבודת כוכבים נמי תיפוק ליה מאחת מהנה אחת זביחה מאחת סימן אחד The Gemara asks according to both opinions, that of Rav Abba and that of Rav Yosef: Why not derive the division of labors with regard to idol worship, too, from the same verse from which Rabbi Yosei derives the division of labors with regard to Shabbat, namely: “From one of them”? Since this verse is not referring to the halakhot of Shabbat in particular, it can be interpreted with regard to idol worship in the same manner that it is interpreted with regard to Shabbat: The word “one” is referring to one complete, prohibited act of worship, such as sacrificing an animal as an idolatrous offering. The term “from one” is referring to one who performs part of an act of worship, e.g., one who did not finish slaughtering the offering, as he severed only one of the organs, i.e., the windpipe and gullet, that must be severed in ritual slaughter.

הנה אבות זיבוח קיטור ניסוך והשתחואה מהנה תולדות שבר מקל לפניה The word “them” is referring to the primary categories of idol worship that are derived from the manner in which God is worshipped in the Temple, namely, sacrificing an animal as an offering, burning incense, pouring a libation, and bowing. The term “of them” is referring to the subcategories of idol worship, e.g., one who broke a stick before an idol that is worshipped in such a manner. Breaking a stick is a subcategory of sacrificing, as an animal’s neck is broken when it is slaughtered.

אחת שהיא הנה זדון עבודת כוכבים ושגגת עבודות הנה שהיא אחת שגגת עבודת כוכבים וזדון עבודות The principle of one transgression that with regard to punishment is them, i.e., many, can be applied to a case of intention, i.e., awareness, on the part of the transgressor that idol worship is prohibited, and unawareness that the particular rites of worship that he was performing are prohibited. The principle of them, several transgressions, that with regard to punishment are one can be applied to a case of unawareness with regard to the prohibition of idol worship, i.e., the transgressor was unaware that idol worship is prohibited or that he was worshipping an idol, and intention, i.e., awareness, that the rites that he was performing are prohibited.

האי שגגת עבודת כוכבים היכי דמי אי קסבר בית הכנסת הוא והשתחוה לו הרי לבו לשמים The Gemara responds to the suggestion that the division of categories of idol worship can be derived from this verse: What are the circumstances of unawareness with regard to idol worship? If the transgressor thought that a certain building was a synagogue and bowed to it, and he then realized that it is a house of idol worship, he is certainly exempt, as his heart was directed toward Heaven.

אלא דחזא אנדרטא וסגיד ליה אי קבליה עליה מזיד הוא אי לא קבליה עליה לא כלום הוא Rather, it must be a case where the transgressor saw a statue [andarta] of a person and bowed to it. This case must also be clarified: If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor and is liable to receive the death penalty, not to bring an offering. If he did not accept him upon himself as a god, but rather bowed to the statue in order to honor the person, what he did is nothing.

אלא מאהבה ומיראה הניחא לאביי דאמר חייב אלא לרבא דאמר פטור מאי איכא למימר Rather, it is clearly a case where one worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of someone, and he was unaware that this is prohibited. This works out well according to Abaye, who says that one who engages in idol worship due to love or fear is liable; accordingly, one who does so unwittingly must bring an offering. But according to Rava, who says that one who does so is exempt, what can be said?

אלא באומר מותר תפשוט דבעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן העלם זה וזה בידו מהו Rather, according to Rava, unawareness with regard to idol worship can be explained as referring to a case where the transgressor says to himself that idol worship is permitted in general. If so, one can resolve the dilemma that Rava raised before Rav Naḥman: What is the halakha if one who violated Shabbat has a lapse of awareness of both this, i.e., that it was Shabbat, and that, i.e., that the particular labor that he performed is prohibited on Shabbat?

תיפשוט דאינו חייב אלא אחת הא לא קשיא ותפשוט Rava’s dilemma had been left unresolved. If the phrase “and performs from one of them” is interpreted as referring to a case where one engages in idol worship thinking that it is permitted to do so, one can resolve that the transgressor is obligated to bring only one sin-offering for all of his acts of idol worship, according to this interpretation of the verse. The fact that Rava’s dilemma had been left unresolved therefore serves as a challenge to this interpretation. The Gemara refutes this challenge: This is not difficult; indeed, resolve the dilemma from here.

ומי מצית מוקמת להני קראי בעבודת כוכבים דאילו הכא כתיב במשיח פר ובנשיא שעיר וביחיד כשבה ושעירה The Gemara asks: But can you interpret these verses, namely, “and performs from one of them,” with regard to idol worship at all? As here, in Leviticus, chapter 4, where this verse is written, it is written with regard to an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, stating that if he sinned unwittingly he brings a bull as a sin-offering, and with regard to a king who sinned unwittingly it is stated that he brings a goat as a sin-offering, and with regard to an ordinary individual it is stated that he brings a female lamb or a female goat.

ואילו בעבודת כוכבים תנן ושוין שבשעירה כיחיד Whereas with regard to idol worship we learned in a baraita (61b): And they agree that a High Priest who unwittingly engages in idol worship brings a female goat as a sin-offering, as does an ordinary individual. Clearly, then, the halakhot of unwitting idol worship are derived from a different source, i.e., Numbers, chapter 15.

ותו לא מידי The Gemara concludes: And there is nothing more to be discussed. The suggestion to derive a division of categories with regard to idol worship from the phrase in the verse “and performs from one of them” is groundless, and Rav Yosef’s objection to Rabbi Abba’s opinion is justified.

כי אתא רב שמואל בר יהודה אמר § When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said:

Daf 62b

הכי תנא קמיה חומר בשבת משאר מצות חומר בשאר מצות מבשבת חומר בשבת שהשבת עשה שתים בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת מה שאין כן בשאר מצות חומר בשאר מצות שבשאר מצות שגג בלא מתכוין חייב מה שאין כן בשבת This is the baraita that Rabbi Zakkai taught before Rabbi Yoḥanan: There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat vis-à-vis other mitzvot, and conversely, there is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot vis-à-vis Shabbat. There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat, as with regard to Shabbat, if one performed two distinct acts of labor in one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act, which is not so with regard to other mitzvot. Conversely, there is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot, as with regard to other mitzvot, if one sinned unwittingly, without intent to perform the act of the transgression at all, he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering, which is not so with regard to Shabbat.

אמר מר חומר בשבת שהשבת עשה שתים כו' היכי דמי אילימא דעבד קצירה וטחינה דכוותה גבי שאר מצות דאכל חלב ודם הכא תרתי מיחייב והכא תרתי מיחייב The Gemara examines this baraita in detail. The Master said: There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat, as with regard to Shabbat, if one performed two distinct acts of labor in one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each act. What are the circumstances? If we say that he unwittingly performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, the corresponding situation with regard to other mitzvot is a case where one unwittingly consumed forbidden fat and blood. If so, there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot; here, one is obligated to bring two sin-offerings, and there, one is obligated to bring two sin-offerings.

אלא גבי שאר מצות דאינו חייב אלא אחת היכי דמי דאכל חלב וחלב דכוותה גבי שבת דעבד קצירה וקצירה הכא חדא מיחייב והכא חדא מיחייב Rather, what are the circumstances with regard to other mitzvot where one is obligated to bring only one sin-offering? One is obligated in a case where he consumed forbidden fat and again consumed forbidden fat within one lapse of awareness. The corresponding situation with regard to Shabbat is a case where one performed an act of reaping and performed another act of reaping within one lapse of awareness. In that case too there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot; here, one is obligated to bring one sin-offering, and there, one is obligated to bring one sin-offering.

והיינו דאמר ליה פוק תני לברא The Gemara comments: And that is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Zakkai: Go out and teach this baraita outside; it is not worthy of being taught in the study hall.

מאי קושיא דילמא לעולם אימא לך דעבד קצירה וטחינה מה שאין כן בשאר מצות אתאן לעבודת כוכבים כדרבי אמי דאמר ר' אמי זיבח וקיטר וניסך בהעלם אחד אינו חייב אלא אחת The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty that caused Rabbi Yoḥanan to disregard the baraita? Actually, perhaps I will say to you that the baraita is referring to a case where one performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, and when the baraita states: Which is not so with regard to other mitzvot, it is not referring to all mitzvot in general; rather, we arrive at the halakha of idol worship, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami. As Rabbi Ami says: If one sacrificed an animal as an idolatrous offering and burned incense and poured a libation, all in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring only one sin-offering.

לא מיתוקמא ליה בעבודת כוכבים דקתני סיפא חומר בשאר מצות שבשאר מצות שגג בלא מתכוין חייב The Gemara answers: The baraita cannot be interpreted as referring to idol worship, as it teaches in the last clause: There is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot, as with regard to other mitzvot, if one sinned unwittingly, without the intent to perform the act at all, he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering.

שוגג בלא מתכוין בעבודת כוכבים היכי דמי אי דקסבר בית הכנסת הוא והשתחוה לו הרי לבו לשמים אלא דחזא אנדרטא וסגיד ליה אי קבליה עליה באלוה מזיד הוא ואי לא קבליה עליה לא כלום היא The Gemara explains why this cannot be referring to idol worship. What are the circumstances of one who unwittingly transgresses the prohibition of idol worship without the intent to perform the act? If he thought that a house of idol worship was a synagogue and bowed to it, he is certainly exempt, as his heart was directed toward Heaven. Rather, it must be a case where the transgressor saw the statue of a person and bowed to it. If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor and is liable to receive the death penalty, not to bring an offering. And if he did not accept him upon himself as a god, what he did is nothing.

אלא מאהבה ומיראה הניחא לאביי דאמר חייב אלא לרבא דאמר פטור מאי איכא למימר Rather, the baraita must be referring to a case where one worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of a person, and he was unaware that this is prohibited. This works out well according to Abaye, who says that one who engages in idol worship due to love or fear is liable; accordingly, one who does so unwittingly must bring an offering. But according to Rava, who says that one who does so is exempt, what can be said?

אלא באומר מותר מה שאין כן בשבת דפטור לגמרי Rather, the baraita must be referring to a case where the transgressor says to himself that idol worship is permitted in general. Accordingly, the statement in the baraita: Which is not so in the halakhot of Shabbat, is referring to one who was under the impression that performing labor on Shabbat is permitted. One who performs prohibited labor under those circumstances is completely exempt, while one who transgresses under those circumstances with regard to idol worship one is obligated to bring a sin-offering.

עד כאן לא בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן העלם זה וזה אלא אי לחיובי חדא אי לחיובי תרתי פטור לגמרי ליכא למאן דאמר This interpretation of the baraita is difficult, as Rava asked Rav Naḥman about the halakha in a case where one violated Shabbat during a lapse of awareness of both this, that it was Shabbat, and that the particular labor that he performed is prohibited on Shabbat. And Rava’s question was only with regard to whether to deem the person obligated to bring one sin-offering or whether to deem him obligated to bring two sin-offerings. There is no one who says that such a person is entirely exempt, in accordance with this interpretation of the baraita. Therefore, the baraita cannot be referring to idol worship.

מאי קושיא דלמא לעולם אימא לך רישא בעבודת כוכבים וסיפא בשאר מצות The Gemara challenges this conclusion: What is the difficulty in interpreting the baraita as referring to idol worship? Actually, perhaps I will say to you that the first clause of the baraita is referring to the contrast between Shabbat and idol worship, and the last clause is referring to the contrast between Shabbat and other mitzvot.

ושגג בלא מתכוין דקסבר רוק הוא ובולעו מה שאין כן בשבת דפטור שנתכוין להגביה את התלוש וחתך את המחובר פטור And the halakha of one who transgressed other mitzvot unwittingly, without intent to perform the act, is referring to, e.g., a case where one has forbidden fat in his mouth and thinks it is spittle, and he swallows it. In that case he must bring an offering for his transgression, which is not so with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, where in a parallel case one would be exempt. As, for example, one who intended to lift a plant that was detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. One is not liable for an unintentional act of labor on Shabbat.

וכדרב נחמן אמר שמואל דאמר המתעסק בחלבים ובעריות חייב שכן נהנה המתעסק בשבת פטור מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה And this distinction is in accordance with the statement that Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says, as he says: One who acts unawares with forbidden fats or with those with whom sexual relations are forbidden, i.e., one who accidentally consumed forbidden fat or engaged in forbidden sexual intercourse, without intending to perform the act at all (see Yevamot 54a), is obligated to bring a sin-offering, since he derived pleasure from the transgression. But one who acts unawares on Shabbat, performing forbidden labor, is exempt, as the Torah prohibits only planned labor.

ר' יוחנן לטעמיה דלא מוקים מתניתא רישא בחד טעמא וסיפא בחד טעמא Since the baraita can be explained in this manner, the Gemara explains why Rabbi Yoḥanan rejected it anyway: Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning, in that he does not interpret the first clause of a baraita with one explanation and the last clause of the same baraita with one other explanation. Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the premise that a baraita can be referring to a different matter in each clause unless it states so explicitly.

דא"ר יוחנן מאן דמתרגם לי חבית אליבא דחד תנא מובילנא מאניה בתריה לבי מסותא As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whoever explains to me the mishna concerning a barrel (Bava Metzia 40b) in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, I will carry his clothes after him to the bathhouse, i.e., I will attend him as a servant, as although that mishna can be explained by dividing it into two different opinions, I do not accept that type of explanation. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the suggestion that the first clause of the baraita here is referring to idol worship and the last clause is referring to other mitzvot.

גופא § The Gemara discusses the matter itself, namely, whether one who engages in several forms of idol worship in the same lapse of awareness brings more than one sin-offering.

Daf 63a

אמר ר' אמי זיבח וקיטר וניסך בהעלם אחד אינו חייב אלא אחת אמר אביי מ"ט דר' אמי אמר קרא (שמות כ, ה) לא תעבדם הכתוב עשאן כולן עבודה אחת Rabbi Ami says: If one sacrificed an animal as an idolatrous offering and burned incense and poured a libation, all in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring only one sin-offering. Abaye says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Ami? The verse states: “Nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5). The verse renders all the various rites of worship as one rite.

ומי אמר אביי הכי והאמר אביי שלש השתחואות בעבודת כוכבים למה The Gemara asks: And does Abaye actually say this? But doesn’t Abaye say: Why are there three mentions in the Torah of the prohibition against bowing to an object of idol worship? The prohibition against bowing to an idol appears three times: “You shall not bow to them nor worship them” (Exodus 20:5), “You shall not bow to their gods nor worship them” (Exodus 23:24), and “For you shall bow to no other god” (Exodus 34:14).

אחת לכדרכה ואחת שלא כדרכה ואחת לחלק The reason is that one mention is for an idol for which bowing is its standard manner of worship, and one mention is a prohibition against bowing to an idol even if bowing is not its standard manner of worship, and one mention is to divide idol worship into categories, as one is obligated to bring an offering for every type of worship that he performed. Evidently, Abaye’s opinion is not in accordance with Rabbi Ami’s statement that one is obligated to bring one sin-offering for all of his acts of idol worship.

לדבריו דרבי אמי קאמר וליה לא סבירא ליה The Gemara answers: Abaye stated his reason in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ami, but he himself does not hold accordingly.

גופא אמר אביי שלש השתחואות בעבודת כוכבים למה אחת לכדרכה ואחת שלא כדרכה ואחת לחלק The Gemara discusses the matter itself that Abaye says: Why are there three mentions of the prohibition against bowing to an object of idol worship? One is for an idol for which bowing is its standard manner of worship, and one is a prohibition against bowing to an idol even if bowing is not its standard manner of worship, and one mention is to divide idol worship into categories.

לכדרכה (דברים יב, ל) מאיכה יעבדו הגוים האלה נפקא The Gemara asks: Why is a verse necessary for the prohibition against bowing to an idol for which bowing is its standard manner of worship? That prohibition is already derived from the verse: “Take heed to yourself that you not be ensnared to follow them…saying, how do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), which indicates that one is liable for worshipping an idol in the manner that the gentiles worship it.

אלא אחת כדרכה ושלא כדרכה ואחת לשלא כדרכה ואחת לחלק: Rather, Abaye’s statement should be understood as follows: One mention of the prohibition is for an idol for which its typical manner of worship is similar to bowing in that the idol is worshipped in an honorable manner, but bowing is not its typical manner of worship, as it is not typically worshipped by bowing. And one mention is a prohibition against bowing to an idol even if it is not similar to its standard manner of worship at all. And one mention is to divide idol worship into categories.

המקבלו עליו באלוה האומר לו אלי אתה: אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר רב כיון שאמר לו אלי אתה חייב § The mishna includes among those liable for idol worship one who declares that he accepts an idol upon himself as a god and one who says to an idol: You are my god. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: Once a person said to an idol: You are my god, he is liable even if he did not worship it.

למאי אי לקטלא מתניתין היא אלא לקרבן The Gemara asks: The transgressor is liable to receive what punishment? If he is liable to receive the death penalty, Rav’s statement is superfluous, as this is stated in the mishna. Rather, Rav means that one who does so unwittingly is obligated to bring an offering.

ואפילו לרבנן והתניא אינו חייב אלא על דבר שיש בו מעשה כגון זיבוח וקיטור וניסוך והשתחואה ואמר ריש לקיש מאן תנא השתחואה ר' עקיבא היא דאמר לא בעינן מעשה מכלל דרבנן סברי בעינן מעשה The Gemara asks: And is this statement true even according to the opinion of the Rabbis? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One is obligated to bring a sin-offering for unwitting idol worship only for a matter, a transgression, that involves an action, e.g., sacrificing an offering, or burning incense, or pouring a libation, or bowing? And Reish Lakish says: Who is the tanna who taught bowing among these examples? It is Rabbi Akiva, who says that we do not require a significant action in order to render one liable to bring a sin-offering; a minimal action is sufficient. By inference, the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva, maintain that we require a significant action. If bowing is not considered a significant action, then all the more so speech alone is not considered a significant action.

כי קאמר רב נמי לר' עקיבא קאמר The Gemara answers: Rav, too, when he states that one who says to an idol: You are my god, is obligated to bring a sin-offering, he states this according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

לר' עקיבא פשיטא היינו מגדף The Gemara asks: If Rav states this according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, isn’t it obvious that the transgressor is obligated to bring a sin-offering? This is identical to the halakha of a blasphemer, whom Rabbi Akiva obligates to bring an offering despite the lack of an action.

מהו דתימא עד כאן לא מחייב ר"ע קרבן אלא במגדף דכתיב ביה כרת אבל הכא דלא כתיב ביה כרת אימא לא The Gemara answers: Rav states this lest you say that Rabbi Akiva obligates one to bring an offering for a transgression that does not involve an action only in the case of a blasphemer, as it is written explicitly with regard to a blasphemer that he receives karet in the verse: “He blasphemes the Lord, and that soul shall be excised [nikhreta] from among his people” (Numbers 15:30). But here, with regard to one who accepts an idol as his god, where karet is not written explicitly, one might say that he is not obligated to bring an offering.

קמ"ל דאתקושי אתקוש דכתיב (שמות לב, ח) וישתחוו לו ויזבחו לו ויאמרו וגו' Therefore, Rav teaches us that he is obligated to bring an offering, as the Torah compares the acceptance of an idol as a god to a case of active idol worship; as it is written: “They have made themselves a molten calf, and have bowed to it, and have sacrificed to it, and said: These are your gods, Israel, which brought you up out of the land of Egypt” (Exodus 32:8).

א"ר יוחנן אלמלא וי"ו שבהעלוך נתחייבו רשעיהם של ישראל כלייה With regard to the aforementioned verse, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Were it not for the vav in the term: “Which brought you up [he’elukha],” giving it a plural form, the haters of the Jewish people, a euphemism used to refer to the Jewish people themselves, would have been sentenced to destruction for their idol worship. Since they recognized that God had taken them out of Egypt, and thought that He had merely made the golden calf His partner, the Jewish people were spared.

כתנאי אחרים אומרים אלמלא וי"ו שבהעלוך נתחייבו רשעיהם של ישראל כלייה The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion is like one side of the following dispute between tanna’im: Others say: Were it not for the vav in the term: “Which brought you up [he’elukha],” the haters of the Jewish people would have been sentenced to destruction.

אמר לו ר"ש בן יוחאי והלא כל המשתף שם שמים ודבר אחר נעקר מן העולם שנאמר (שמות כב, יט) בלתי לה' לבדו אלא מה תלמוד לומר (שמות לב, ד) אשר העלוך שאיוו אלוהות הרבה: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai to him: But isn’t anyone who links the name of Heaven and something else, a euphemism for an idol, uprooted from the world? As it is stated: “He who sacrifices to the gods, save to the Lord only, shall be utterly destroyed” (Exodus 22:19). The fact that the Jewish people included God in their idolatrous statement could not have saved them from destruction. Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Which brought you up” in the plural? The verse teaches that the Jewish people desired many gods; they were not satisfied with the golden calf alone.

אבל המגפף והמנשק המכבד והמרבץ כו': כי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי אלעזר על כולם לוקה חוץ מהנודר בשמו והמקיים בשמו § The mishna teaches: But with regard to one who hugs an idol, or one who kisses it, or one who cleans it, or one who sprays water before it, he transgresses a prohibition but is not liable to receive capital punishment. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says: For all of these actions one is flogged, with the exception of the cases stated later in the mishna of one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name.

מאי שנא הנודר בשמו והמקיים בשמו דלא לקי משום דהוה ליה לאו שאין בו מעשה הני נמי לאו שבכללות הוא ואין לוקין על לאו שבכללות The Gemara asks: What is different about these cases, one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, that the transgressors are not flogged? It is because they are each an example of a prohibition that does not involve an action. These actions too, namely, hugging or kissing an idol and the like, are not punishable by lashes; one who performs them violates a general prohibition, and one is not flogged for violating a general prohibition, i.e., one that contains several prohibitions.

דתניא מנין לאוכל מן הבהמה קודם שתצא נפשה שהוא בלא תעשה תלמוד לומר (ויקרא יט, כו) לא תאכלו על הדם As this principle is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one who eats from an animal before its soul departs is in transgression of a prohibition? The verse states: “You shall not eat with the blood” (Leviticus 19:26), meaning, you shall not eat from the animal while its soul, which is referred to in the Torah as blood, is still within it.

דבר אחר לא תאכלו על הדם לא תאכלו בשר ועדיין דם במזרק The baraita adds: Another matter is derived from the verse “You shall not eat with the blood”: You shall not eat the meat of an offering while its blood is still in the bowl, as it has not yet been sprinkled on the altar. The meat of an offering may be eaten by the priests only after its blood is sprinkled.

רבי דוסא אומר מניין שאין מברין על הרוגי ב"ד ת"ל לא תאכלו על הדם The baraita continues: Rabbi Dosa says: From where is it derived that although in general, after a deceased person is buried, the mourners are provided by others with a meal, others do not provide the mourners with a meal after the burial of those executed by the court? The verse states: “You shall not eat with the blood,” which is interpreted to mean: You shall not eat a mourners’ meal after the burial of one who was executed.

ר' עקיבא אומר מנין לסנהדרין שהרגו את הנפש שאין טועמין כלום כל אותו היום ת"ל לא תאכלו על הדם Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived with regard to a Sanhedrin that killed a soul, i.e., that sentenced a person to death, that the judges may not taste anything that entire day that they sentenced him? The verse states: “You shall not eat with the blood.”

(אמר רבי יוחנן) אזהרה לבן סורר ומורה מנין ת"ל לא תאכלו על הדם Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From where is the prohibition against the behavior of a stubborn and rebellious son derived? While the Torah states the punishment given to a stubborn and rebellious son, the prohibition against his actions, namely, stealing money from his parents in order to eat a gluttonous meal of meat and wine in the company of lowly men, is not explicit. The verse states: “You shall not eat with the blood,” which is interpreted to mean that one may not eat in a manner that is punishable by death. This concludes the baraita.

וא"ר אבין בר חייא ואיתימא ר' אבין בר כהנא על כולם אינו לוקה משום דהוה ליה לאו שבכללות And Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya says, and some say it is Rabbi Avin bar Kahana who says this: For all of the prohibitions that the Sages derive from this verse, one is not flogged for transgressing them, as it is a general prohibition that is referring to several different actions. Therefore, since the prohibition against hugging or kissing an idol is also derived from a general prohibition, it should not be punishable by lashes, contrary to the opinion of Rav Dimi.

אלא כי אתא רבין א"ר אלעזר על כולן אינו לוקה חוץ מן הנודר בשמו והמקיים בשמו Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he related a different version of what Rabbi Elazar says: For all of the transgressions listed in the mishna one is not flogged, with the exception of one who vows in an idol’s name and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name.

מאי שנא אהנך דלא לקי דהוה ליה לאו שבכללות הני נמי לאו שאין בו מעשה נינהו The Gemara asks: What is different about transgressing those prohibitions for which one is not flogged? It is that they are each an example of a general prohibition, as explained previously. These cases too, namely, one who vows or takes an oath in the name of an idol, are included in a prohibition that does not involve an action, and therefore the transgressors are not punishable by lashes.

ההוא כר' יהודה דאמר לאו שאין בו מעשה לוקין עליו The Gemara answers: That halakha of Rabbi Eliezer’s is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says with regard to a prohibition that does not involve an action that one is flogged for violating it.

דתניא (שמות יב, י) לא תותירו ממנו עד בקר בא הכתוב ליתן עשה אחר לא תעשה As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the Paschal offering: The verse states: “And you shall not leave any of it until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to provide a positive mitzva to burn the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving it over was violated,

Daf 63b

לומר שאין לוקין עליו דברי רבי יהודה to say that one is not flogged for transgressing the prohibition, as any prohibition that can be rectified by the performance of a positive mitzva does not carry a punishment of lashes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

רבי יעקב אומר לא מן השם הוא זה אלא משום דהוה ליה לאו שאין בו מעשה וכל לאו שאין בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו Rabbi Ya’akov says: This is not for that reason. Rather, it is because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action. The transgression is simply the failure to consume all the meat during the allotted time rather than the performance of an action. And one is not flogged for the violation of any prohibition that does not involve an action.

מכלל דרבי יהודה סבר לוקין עליו: The Gemara concludes: By inference, Rabbi Yehuda holds that in general, one is flogged for the violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action. It can therefore be inferred that one who vows or takes an oath in the name of an idol is liable to be flogged according to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, even though no action is involved.

הנודר בשמו והמקיים בשמו הרי זה בל"ת: הנודר בשמו והמקיים בשמו מנלן § The mishna teaches with regard to one who vows in the name of an idol and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name, that this person is in transgression of a prohibition. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one who vows in the name of an idol and one who affirms his statement by an oath in its name transgresses a prohibition?

דתניא (שמות כג, יג) ושם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו שלא יאמר אדם לחבירו שמור לי בצד עבודת כוכבים פלונית (שמות כג, יג) לא ישמע על פיך שלא ידור בשמו ולא יקיים בשמו ולא יגרום לאחרים שידרו בשמו ויקיימו בשמו The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita that the meaning of the verse: “And make no mention of the name of the other gods, neither let it be heard out of your mouth” (Exodus 23:13), is that a person may not say to another: Wait for me next to such and such an object of idol worship. The meaning of the statement “neither let it be heard out of your mouth” is that one may not vow in the name of an idol, nor affirm his statement by an oath in its name, nor cause others, i.e., gentiles, to vow in its name or affirm their statements by an oath in its name.

דבר אחר לא ישמע על פיך אזהרה למסית ולמדיח Alternatively, the statement “neither let it be heard out of your mouth” can be interpreted as a prohibition against one who incites another to worship idols and against one who subverts an entire city to do so. The prohibition against inciting others to engage in idol worship can be derived from this verse.

מסית בהדיא כתיב ביה (דברים יג, יב) וכל ישראל ישמעו ויראו וגו' אלא אזהרה למדיח The Gemara asks: Why must the prohibition against an inciter be derived from here? It is written explicitly in that regard, in the verse concerning the inciter’s punishment: “And all Israel shall hear, and fear, and shall do no more of any such wickedness as this is in your midst” (Deuteronomy 13:12). This is clearly a prohibition against inciting others to worship idols. Rather, the verse “neither let it be heard out of your mouth” is a prohibition against one who subverts an entire city to engage in idol worship; this prohibition is not stated elsewhere.

ולא יגרום לאחרים שידרו בשמו ושיקיימו בשמו מסייעא ליה לאבוה דשמואל דאמר אבוה דשמואל אסור לאדם שיעשה שותפות עם העובד כוכבים שמא יתחייב לו שבועה ונשבע בעבודת כוכבים שלו והתורה אמרה לא ישמע על פיך The baraita teaches: And one may not cause others, i.e., gentiles, to vow in the name of an idol or affirm their statements by an oath in its name. The Gemara comments: The baraita supports the opinion of Shmuel’s father, as Shmuel’s father says: It is prohibited for a person to enter into a partnership with a gentile, lest their joint ventures lead them to quarrel, and his gentile partner will be obligated to take an oath to him, and he will take an oath in the name of his object of idol worship; and the Torah states: “Neither let it be heard out of your mouth,” which includes causing a gentile to take an oath in the name of an idol.

כי אתא עולא בת בקלנבו אמר ליה רבא והיכא בת מר אמר ליה בקלנבו אמר ליה והכתיב ושם אלהים אחרים לא תזכירו אמר ליה הכי אמר ר' יוחנן כל עבודת כוכבים הכתובה בתורה מותר להזכיר שמה והא היכא כתיבא דכתיב (ישעיהו מו, א) כרע בל קרס נבו When Ulla came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he lodged in a place called Kalnevo. Rava said to him: And where did the Master lodge? Ulla said to him: In Kalnevo. Rava said to him: But isn’t it written: “And make no mention of the name of the other gods”? Kalnevo is the name of an idol. Ulla said to him: This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to any object of idol worship that is written in the Torah, it is permitted to mention its name. Since one may mention the idol while reading the Torah, it is permitted to mention it altogether. Rava asked: And where is this idol written? Ulla answered: As it is written: “Bel bows down, Nevo stoops” (Isaiah 46:1).

ואי לא כתיבא לא מתיב רב משרשיא ראה אחת מרובה כשלש שהיא כמגדיון לשילה שהן שתי טבילות ושני ספוגין הרי זה זב גמור אמר רבינא גד נמי מכתב כתיב דכתיב (ישעיהו סה, יא) העורכים לגד שלחן The Gemara asks: And does this mean that if an idol is not written in the Torah, it is not permitted to mention its name? Rav Mesharshiyya raises an objection to this premise from a mishna in tractate Zavim (1:5): If a man saw, i.e., experienced, one gonorrhea-like discharge that lasted as long as three regular gonorrhea-like discharges, which is like the amount of time it takes to walk from the location of the idol Gadyon to Shiloh, which is the amount of time it takes to perform two immersions and two dryings with a towel, he is ritually impure with the impurity status of a full-fledged zav, even though a man generally becomes a zav only after three separate discharges. In any event, the mishna mentions the idol Gadyon. Ravina says: The idol Gad is also written in the Bible; as it is written: “That prepare a table for Gad” (Isaiah 65:11).

אמר רב נחמן כל ליצנותא אסירא חוץ מליצנותא דעבודת כוכבים דשריא דכתיב כרע בל קרס נבו קרסו כרעו יחדו לא יכלו מלט משא § Rav Naḥman says: All types of mockery are forbidden, except for mockery of idol worship, which is permitted, as it is written: “Bel crouches down, Nevo stoops…they stoop, they crouch down together, they could not hold back the burden” (Isiah 46:1–2). The verse is interpreted as meaning that they crouch in order to defecate and cannot retain their excrement.

וכתיב (הושע י, ה) דברו לעגלות בית און יגורו שכן שומרון כי אבל עליו עמו וכמריו עליו יגילו על כבודו כי גלה ממנו אל תקרי כבודו אלא כבידו And it is similarly written: “They speak…the inhabitants of Samaria shall be in dread for the calves of Beth Aven; for its people shall mourn over it, and its priests shall tremble for it, for its glory [kevodo], because it has departed from it” (Hosea 10:4–5). Do not read it as “its glory [kevodo]”; rather, read it as its burden [keveido], meaning that the idol is unable to restrain itself from defecating. These are examples of derogatory statements that are permitted only in reference to idols.

אמר רבי יצחק מאי דכתיב (הושע יג, ב) ועתה יוסיפו לחטא ויעשו להם מסכה מכספם כתבונם עצבים וגו' מאי כתבונם עצבים מלמד שכל אחד ואחד עשה דמות יראתו ומניחה בכיסו בשעה שזוכרה מוציאה מתוך חיקו ומחבקה ומנשקה Rav Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And now they continue to sin, and have made for themselves molten images of their silver, according to their own understanding, idols, all of them the work of the craftsmen; of them they say: Those who sacrifice men kiss calves” (Hosea 13:2)? What is the meaning of the expression: “According to their own understanding [kitvunam], idols”? The word kitvunam is interpreted as meaning: According to their image [ketavnitam], and the verse teaches that each and every person would make an image of his god and place it in his pocket. When he would remember it, he would remove it from his bosom and embrace it and kiss it.

מאי (הושע יג, ב) זובחי אדם עגלים ישקון א"ר יצחק דבי רבי אמי שהיו משרתי עבודת כוכבים נותנים עיניהם בבעלי ממון ומרעיבים את העגלים ועושין דמות עצבים ומעמידין בצד אבוסיהן ומוציאין אותן לחוץ כיון שראו אותן רצין אחריהן וממשמשין בהן אומרים לו עבודת כוכבים חפץ בך יבא ויזבח עצמו לו What is the meaning of the statement: “Those who sacrifice men kiss calves”? Rabbi Yitzḥak of the school of Rabbi Ami says: It means that priests of idol worship would set their eyes on the wealthy, and they would starve the calves that were objects of idol worship, and make statues in the image of those wealthy people, and place those statues next to the troughs of the calves, and they would take those calves outside. When the calves would see those wealthy people, whose image they were used to seeing near their troughs, they would run after them and paw them. At this point the priests would say to that wealthy person: The object of idol worship, the calf, desires you; let the Master come and sacrifice himself to it. The priests would inherit his property.

אמר רבא האי זובחי אדם עגלים ישקון עגלים ישקון לזבוח אדם מיבעי ליה אלא אמר רבא כל הזובח את בנו לעבודת כוכבים אמר לו דורון גדול הקריב לו יבא וישק לו Rava says: That is not the correct interpretation of the verse, as the wording “those who sacrifice men kiss calves” is unsuitable for that interpretation, since in that case the verse should have stated: They make calves kiss to sacrifice men. Rather, Rava says that the verse is to be understood as follows: Whenever anyone sacrifices his son to an object of idol worship, the priest says to him: The Master has sacrificed a great gift [doron] to the idol; therefore, he has the right to come and kiss it. The verse means that the reward of “those who sacrifice men” is to kiss calves.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב (מלכים ב יז, ל) ואנשי בבל עשו את סכות בנות ומאי ניהו תרנגולת (מלכים ב יז, ל) ואנשי כות עשו את נרגל ומאי ניהו תרנגול (מלכים ב יז, ל) ואנשי חמת עשו את אשימה ומאי ניהו ברחא קרחא (מלכים ב יז, לא) והעוים עשו (את) נבחן ואת תרתק ומאי ניהו כלב וחמור Rav Yehuda says that Rav says with regard to the verse describ-ing the peoples that were settled in Samaria by the Assyrians: “And the men of Babylonia made Succoth-Benoth” (II Kings 17:30); and what is this idol? It is the image of a hen. “And the men of Cuth made Nergal” (II Kings 17:30); and what is it? It is the image of a rooster. “And the men of Hamath made Ashima” (II Kings 17:30); and what is it? It is the image of a bald billy goat. “And the Avvites made Nibhaz and Tartak” (II Kings 17:31); and what are they? The image of a dog and a donkey.

(מלכים ב יז, לא) והספרוים שורפים את בניהם (ואת בנותיהם) באש לאדרמלך וענמלך אלהי ספרוים ומאי ניהו הפרד והסוס אדרמלך דאדר ליה למריה בטעינה וענמלך דעני ליה למריה בקרבא “And the Sepharvites burned their sons and their daughters in the fire to Adrammelech and Anammelech, the gods of Sepharvaim” (II Kings 17:31); and what are they? The mule and the horse. And why are they called that? A mule is called Adrammelech because it honors [addar] its master with its load, i.e., because it carries the master’s load, and a horse is called Anammelech because it responds [anei] to its master, assisting him in battle.

אף חזקיה מלך יהודה ביקש אביו לעשות לו כן אלא שסכתו אמו סלמנדרא The Gemara relates: The father of Hezekiah, king of Judea, also attempted to do so to him, i.e., to burn him as an offering to an idol, but his mother rubbed him with the blood of a salamander [salamandera], a creature created out of fire and immune to the effects of fire, whose blood is fireproof.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב יודעין היו ישראל בעבודת כוכבים שאין בה ממש ולא עבדו עבודת כוכבים אלא להתיר להם עריות בפרהסיא § Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The Jewish people knew that idol worship is of no substance; they did not actually believe in it. And they worshipped idols only in order to permit themselves to engage in forbidden sexual relations in public, since most rituals of idol worship would include public displays of forbidden sexual intercourse.

מתיב רב משרשיא (ירמיהו יז, ב) כזכור בניהם מזבחותם וגו' וא"ר אלעזר כאדם שיש לו געגועין על בנו Rav Mesharshiyya raises an objection to this statement from the following verse: “Like the memory of their sons are their altars, and their Asherim are by the leafy trees, upon the high hills” (Jeremiah 17:2). And Rabbi Elazar says that this means that the Jewish people would recall their idol worship like a person who misses his child. This interpretation indicates that they were truly attached to idol worship.

בתר דאביקו ביה The Gemara answers: This was the case after the Jewish people became attached to idol worship, at which point they began to actually believe in it. At first, they were drawn to idol worship only due to their lust.

ת"ש (ויקרא כו, ד) ונתתי פגריכם על פגרי גלוליכם אמר אליהו הצדיק היה מחזר על תפוחי רעב שבירושלים פעם אחת מצא תינוק שהיה תפוח ומוטל באשפה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that the Jewish people engaged in idol worship for its own sake and not for the sake of engaging in forbidden sexual relations: In interpretation of the verse: “And I shall cast your carcasses upon the carcasses of your idols” (Leviticus 26:30), the Sages say that Elijah the Righteous, the prophet, would search for those who were swollen with hunger in Jerusalem. He once found a child who was swollen with hunger and lying in the garbage.

אמר לו מאיזה משפחה אתה אמר לו ממשפחה פלונית אני אמר לו כלום נשתייר מאותה משפחה אמר לו לאו חוץ ממני אמר לו אם אני מלמדך דבר שאתה חי בו אתה למד אמר לו הן אמר לו אמור בכל יום שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד אמר לו Elijah said to the child: From which family are you? The child said to him: I am from such and such family. Elijah said to him: Isn’t there anyone left from that family? The child said to him: No one is left besides me. Elijah said to him: If I teach you something through which you will live, will you learn it? The child said to him: Yes. Elijah said to him: Say every day “Listen Israel, the Lord is our God; the Lord is One” (Deuteronomy 6:4). The child said to him:

Daf 64a

הס שלא להזכיר בשם ה' שלא לימדו אביו ואמו Hush, so as not to mention the name of the Lord (see Amos 6:10). The child did not want to even hear the mention of the name of the Lord, which his father and his mother did not teach him.

מיד הוציא יראתו מחיקו ומחבקה ומנשקה עד שנבקעה כריסו ונפלה יראתו לארץ ונפל הוא עליה לקיים מה שנאמר (ויקרא כו, ד) ונתתי פגריכם על פגרי גלוליכם בתר דאביקו ביה Immediately, the child removed his god from his bosom and began hugging it and kissing it, until his stomach burst from hunger, and his god fell to the earth and he fell upon it, in fulfillment of that which is stated: “And I shall cast your carcasses upon the carcasses of your idols” (Leviticus 26:30). This incident demonstrates that the Jewish people engaged in idol worship for its own sake. The Gemara answers: This also occurred after the Jewish people became attached to idol worship.

ת"ש (נחמיה ט, ד) ויזעקו בקול גדול אל ה' אלהיהם מאי אמור אמר רב יהודה ואיתימא ר' יונתן בייא בייא היינו דאחרביה לביתא וקליא להיכלא וקטלינהו לצדיקי ואגלינהו לישראל מארעייהו ועדיין הוא מרקד בינן כלום יהבתיה לן אלא לקבולי ביה אגרא לא איהו בעינן ולא אגריה בעינן בתר דאביקו ביה The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof, from the verse: “And they cried in a loud voice to the Lord their God” (Nehemiah 9:4). What did they say in that prayer? Rav Yehuda says, and some say it is Rav Yonatan who says: Woe, woe [baya, baya], this evil inclination for idol worship is what destroyed the Temple, and burned the Sanctuary, and murdered the righteous ones, and caused the Jewish people to be exiled from their land. And it still dances among us, i.e., it still affects us. Didn’t You give it to us solely for the purpose of our receiving reward for overcoming it? We do not want it, nor do we not want its reward. Evidently, the Jewish people were drawn to idol worship itself, and they did not worship idols only in order to engage in forbidden sexual relations. The Gemara answers: This also occurred after the Jewish people became attached to idol worship.

יתבו תלתא יומא בתעניתא בעו רחמי נפל להו פיתקא מרקיעא דהוה כתיב בה אמת The Gemara continues to relate the story of the prayer in the days of Nehemiah: The people fasted for three days and prayed for mercy. In response to their prayer a note fell for them from the heavens in which was written: Truth, indicating that God accepted their request.

אמר רבי חנינא שמע מינה חותמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא אמת The Gemara makes a parenthetical observation. Rabbi Ḥanina says: Conclude from it that the seal of the Holy One, Blessed be He, is truth.

נפק כגוריא דנורא מבית קדשי הקדשים אמר להו נביא לישראל היינו יצרא דע"ז בהדי דקתפסי ליה אישתמיט ביניתא מיניה ואזל קליה בארבע מאה פרסי אמרו היכי ניעבד דילמא משמיא מרחמי עליה The form of a fiery lion cub came forth from the chamber of the Holy of Holies. Zechariah, the prophet, said to the Jewish people: This is the evil inclination for idol worship. When they caught hold of it one of its hairs fell out, and it let out a shriek of pain that was heard for four hundred parasangs [parsei]. They said: What should we do to kill it? Perhaps Heaven will have mercy upon it if we attempt to kill it, as it will certainly scream even more.

א"ל נביא שדיוהו בדודא דאברא וכסיוה באברא דשייף קליה דכתיב (זכריה ה, ח) ויאמר זאת הרשעה וישלך אותה אל תוך האיפה וישלך את האבן העופרת אל פיה The prophet said to them: Throw it into a container made of lead and cover it with lead, as lead absorbs sound. As it is written: “And he said: This is the evil one. And he cast it down into the midst of the measure, and he cast a stone of lead upon its opening” (Zechariah 5:8). They followed this advice and were freed of the evil inclination for idol worship.

אמרי הואיל ועת רצון הוא ניבעי רחמי איצרא דעבירה בעו רחמי אימסר בידייהו When they saw that the evil inclination for idol worship was delivered into their hands as they requested, the Sages said: Since it is an auspicious time, let us pray for mercy concerning the evil inclination for sin concerning sexual matters. They prayed for mercy, and it was also delivered into their hands.

חבשוהו תלתא יומי איבעו ביעתא בת יומא לחולה ולא אשכחו אמרו היכי נעביד ניבעי פלגא פלגא מרקיעא לא יהבי כחלינהו לעיניה אהני ביה דלא איגרי איניש בקרובתיה The Sages imprisoned it for three days. At that time, people searched for a one-day-old fresh egg for the sick but could not find one. Since the inclination to reproduce was quashed, the chickens stopped laying eggs. They said: What should we do? If we pray for half, i.e., that only half its power be annulled, nothing will be achieved, because Heaven does not grant half gifts, only whole gifts. What did they do? They gouged out its eyes, and this was effective in limiting it to the extent that a person is no longer aroused to commit incest with his close relatives.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מעשה בנכרית אחת שהיתה חולה ביותר אמרה תעמוד ההיא אשה מחוליה תלך ותעבוד לכל ע"ז שבעולם עמדה (ועבדה) לכל ע"ז שבעולם כיון שהגיע לפעור שאלה לכומרים במה עובדין לזו אמרו לה אוכלין תרדין ושותין שכר ומתריזין בפניה אמרה מוטב שתחזור ההוא אשה לחוליה ולא תעבוד ע"ז בכך § Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: An incident occurred involving a certain gentile woman who was very ill. She said: If that woman, referring to herself, recovers from her illness, she will go and worship every object of idol worship in the world. She recovered from her illness and subsequently worshipped every object of idol worship in the world. When she arrived at Peor she asked the priests: How does one worship this idol? They said to her: One eats spinach, which causes diarrhea, and drinks beer, which also causes diarrhea, and defecates before it. The woman said: Better for that woman, referring to herself, to return to her illness, and not worship an idol in such a manner.

אתם בית ישראל אינן כן (במדבר כה, ה) הנצמדים לבעל פעור כצמיד פתיל (דברים ד, ד) ואתם הדבקים בה' אלהיכם כשתי תמרות הדבוקות זו בזו Rav Yehuda adds: You, the house of Israel, are not like that woman who could not bear the repulsiveness of Ba’al-Peor. It is stated with regard to the attitude of the Jewish people toward idol worship: “That have attached themselves [hanitzmadim] to Ba’al-Peor” (Numbers 25:5), indicating a tight attachment, like a tightly bound cover [ketzamid patil] tied firmly onto a vessel. Yet with regard to the attitude of the Jewish people toward God it is stated: “But you who did cleave [hadevekim] to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 4:4), i.e., the connection between the Jewish people and God is like two dates that are lightly attached [hadevukot] to one another but are not tightly pressed together.

במתניתא תנא הנצמדים לבעל פעור כצמיד ע"י אשה ואתם הדבקים בה' אלהיכם דבוקים ממש This comparison was taught in a baraita but with the opposite conclusion: “That have attached themselves [hanitzmadim] to Ba’al-Peor” indicates a connection that is like a bracelet [ketzamid] on a woman’s arm, which is worn loosely. “But you who did cleave to the Lord your God” means they actually adhered to one another, i.e., there was a tight connection.

ת"ר מעשה בסבטא בן אלס שהשכיר חמורו לנכרית אחת כיון שהגיעה לפעור אמרה לו המתן עד שאכנס ואצא לאחר שיצאה אמר לה אף את המתיני עד שאכנס ואצא אמרה לו ולא יהודי אתה אמר לה ומאי איכפת ליך נכנס פער בפניו וקינח בחוטמו והיו משרתי ע"ז מקלסין לו ואומרים מעולם לא היה אדם שעבדו לזו בכך The Gemara relates another incident with regard to Ba’al-Peor. The Sages taught: There was an incident involving a Jew named Sabbeta ben Alas, who rented out his donkey and his services to a certain gentile woman. He was driving his donkey behind her, and when she arrived at Peor, she said to him: Wait here until I go in and come out. After she came out, he said to her: You too wait for me until I go in and come out. She said to him: Aren’t you Jewish? Why, then, are you worshipping idols? He said to her: And what do you care? He entered and defecated before the idol, and wiped himself with its nostril, as he wanted to demean the idol as much as possible. But he was unsuccessful, as the priests of Peor were praising him and saying: No person has ever worshipped it before with this excellent form of worship. Although he intended to demean Ba’al-Peor, he actually worshipped it.

הפוער עצמו לבעל פעור הרי זה עבודתו אע"ג דמיכוין לביזוי הזורק אבן למרקוליס זו היא עבודתו אע"ג דמיכוין למירגמיה The halakha is that one who defecates before Ba’al-Peor is obligated to bring a sin-offering to atone for idol worship, as this is its typical form of worship, even if he intends to demean the idol. Like-wise, one who throws a stone at Mercury is obligated to bring an a sin-offering to atone for idol worship, as this is its typical form of worship, even if he intends to stone it.

רב מנשה הוה קאזיל לבי תורתא אמרו לו ע"ז היא דקאי הכא שקל פיסא שדא ביה אמרו לו מרקוליס היא אמר להו הזורק אבן למרקוליס תנן The Gemara relates: Rav Menashe was going to a place called Bei Torta. The people there said to him: There is an object of idol worship situated here in this pile of stones. Rav Menashe picked up a stone and threw it at the idol to demean it. They said to him: It is Mercury, and it is worshipped by throwing stones at it. Rav Menashe said to them: We learned in the mishna that one who throws a stone at Mercury as a manner of worship is liable, whereas I intended to demean it.

אתא שאל בי מדרשא א"ל הזורק אבן במרקוליס תנן אף על גב דמיכוין למירגמיה אמר להו איזיל אישקלה א"ל אחד הנוטלה ואחד הנותנה חייב כל חדא וחדא רווחא לחבירתה שביק: Rav Menashe went and asked the Sages in the study hall whether his interpretation of the mishna was correct. They said to him: We learned in the mishna that one who throws a stone at Mercury is liable, which implies that he is liable even if he intends to stone it in order to demean it. Rav Menashe said to the Sages: If so, I will go and take back the stone I threw. They said to him: Both one who removes it and one who places it is liable, as each and every one of the stones taken away from Mercury leaves space for another stone. Taking a stone away from Mercury provides a place for other stones to be thrown at it.

מתני׳ הנותן מזרעו למולך אינו חייב עד שימסור למולך ויעביר באש מסר למולך ולא העביר באש העביר באש ולא מסר למולך אינו חייב עד שימסור למולך ויעביר באש: MISHNA: One who gives of his offspring to Molekh, for which one is executed by stoning, is not liable unless he hands over his child to the priests of Molekh and passes the child through the fire. If he handed over the child to the priests of Molekh but did not pass him through the fire, or if he passed him through the fire but did not hand him over to the priests of Molekh, he is not liable, unless he hands the child over to the priests of Molekh and passes him through the fire.

גמ׳ קתני ע"ז וקתני מולך אמר רבי אבין תנן כמאן דאמר מולך לאו ע"ז היא דתניא אחד למולך ואחד לשאר ע"ז חייב רבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון אומר למולך חייב שלא למולך פטור GEMARA: The halakhot of one’s liability for idol worship are taught in the mishna above (60b), and the halakhot of one’s liability for the worship of Molekh are taught separately, in this mishna. Therefore, Rabbi Avin says: We learn this mishna according to the opinion of the one who says that the ritual of Molekh is not idol worship but is a form of witchcraft or superstition, as a dispute over this matter is taught in a baraita: Both one who transfers his child to the priests of Molekh and one who transfers his child for the purpose of worshipping other idols are liable. Molekh is cited merely as an example. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: One who transfers his child to the priests of Molekh is liable, but if he transfers him to another object of idol worship, not to Molekh, he is exempt.

אמר אביי רבי אלעזר בר' שמעון ור' חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אמרו דבר אחד רבי אלעזר בר' שמעון הא דאמרן רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס דתניא רבי חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר מפני מה תפסה תורה לשון מולך כל שהמליכוהו עליהם אפי' צרור ואפי' קיסם Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus said the same thing, i.e., they share the same halakhic opinion. The statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, is that which we said. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus shares the same opinion, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: For what reason does the Torah use the term Molekh? It is to indicate that if one passes his child through fire in the worship of any object that people enthroned [shehimlikhuhu] over them as their king, referring to it as Molekh, he is liable, even if it is merely a pebble, or even a toothpick. The baraita indicates that one who passes his child through fire in worship of an item that is not referred to as Molekh is not liable, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.

רבא אמר מולך עראי איכא בינייהו Rava says: They do not share the same opinion, as there is a practical difference between their opinions in a case of a temporary Molekh. According to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, one is liable for passing his child through fire only if it is in worship of a permanent Molekh, whereas according to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus, one is liable for worshipping even a temporary Molekh.

Daf 64b

א"ר ינאי אינו חייב עד שימסרנו למשרתי ע"ז שנאמר (ויקרא יח, כא) ומזרעך לא תתן להעביר למולך § Rabbi Yannai says: One is not liable for passing his child through fire to Molekh unless he hands him over to the priests of Molekh, as it is stated: “And you shall not give any of your offspring to pass them over to Molekh” (Leviticus 18:21), which indicates that the prohibition is to give, i.e., to hand the child over to the priests.

תניא נמי הכי יכול העביר ולא מסר יהא חייב ת"ל לא תתן מסר למולך ולא העביר יכול יהא חייב ת"ל להעביר מסר והעביר שלא למולך יכול יהא חייב ת"ל למולך This is also taught in a baraita: One might have thought that one who passed his child through fire but did not hand him over to the priests of Molekh should be liable. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not give.” If one handed over his son to the priests of Molekh but did not pass him through fire, one might have thought that he should be liable. Therefore, the verse states: “To pass,” indicating that passing is also necessary. If one handed over the child and passed him through fire, not to priests of Molekh but rather to priests of another object of idol worship, one might have thought that he should be liable. Therefore, the verse states: “To Molekh.”

מסר והעביר למולך ולא באש יכול יהא חייב נאמר כאן להעביר ונאמר להלן (דברים יח, י) לא ימצא בך מעביר בנו ובתו באש מה להלן באש אף כאן באש ומה כאן מולך אף להלן מולך If one handed over his child and passed him over to the priests of Molekh, but he did not pass him through the fire, one might have thought that he should be liable. It is stated here, in the verse: “To pass,” and it is stated there, in another verse: “There shall not be found among you one who passes his son or his daughter through the fire” (Deuteronomy 18:10). Just as there, the verse is referring to passing one’s child through the fire, so too here, the reference is to passing one’s child through the fire. And just as here, the verse is referring to one who passes his child over to the priests of Molekh, so too there, the reference is to Molekh alone, excluding any other object of idol worship.

אמר רב אחא בריה דרבא העביר כל זרעו פטור שנאמר מזרעך ולא כל זרעך Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, says: One who passed all his offspring through fire to the priests of Molekh is exempt, as it is stated: “Of your offspring,” indicating: But not all your offspring.

בעי רב אשי העבירו סומא מהו ישן מהו בן בנו ובן בתו מהו Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If one passed through the fire a child of his who is blind, what is the halakha? Furthermore, if one passed his child through the fire while the child was asleep, what is the halakha? Does the child need to be capable of passing through on his own, or is that not necessary? Likewise, if one passed his son’s son or his daughter’s son through the fire, what is the halakha?

תפשוט מיהא חדא דתניא (ויקרא כ, ג) כי מזרעו נתן למולך מה ת"ל לפי שנאמר לא ימצא בך מעביר בנו ובתו באש אין לי אלא בנו ובתו בן בנו ובן בתו מנין ת"ל (ויקרא כ, ד) בתתו מזרעו The Gemara answers: Resolve at least one of these dilemmas, as it is taught in a baraita: Why must the verse state: “Because he has given of his offspring to Molekh” (Leviticus 20:3)? What is added by this statement? Because it is stated: “There shall not be found among you one who passes his son or his daughter through the fire,” I have derived only that it is prohibited for one to pass his son or daughter. From where do I derive that one who passes his son’s son or his daughter’s son is also liable? The verse states: “When he gives of his offspring” (Leviticus 20:4). The term “offspring” indicates that grandchildren are included. This resolves one of Rav Ashi’s dilemmas.

תנא פתח בכי מזרעו וסליק בתתו מזרעו The Gemara asks: The tanna began his exposition with the phrase in the verse “because he has given of his offspring,” and ended with an interpretation of the phrase in the verse “when he gives of his offspring.” Why did he cite two different verses as proof for his halakhic statement?

דרשה אחרינא הוא זרעו אין לי אלא זרע כשר זרע פסול מנין ת"ל בתתו מזרעו The Gemara answers: The second verse is stated in the baraita for a different exposition, which was omitted from the baraita and reads as follows: From the term in the verse “his offspring” I have derived only that one is liable for passing through the fire his offspring of unflawed lineage, i.e., his descendants from a woman whom he was permitted to marry. From where do I derive that one is liable for passing through the fire his offspring of flawed lineage, e.g., a mamzer, as well? The verse states: “When he gives of his offspring,” indicating that one is liable for passing any of his offspring.

אמר רב יהודה אינו חייב עד שיעבירנו דרך העברה היכי דמי אמר אביי שרגא דליבני במיצעי נורא מהאי גיסא ונורא מהאי גיסא § Rav Yehuda says: One is not liable for passing his child through fire to Molekh unless he passes him in the typical manner of passing. The Gemara asks: What is considered the typical manner of passing? Abaye says: The child is taken by foot along a latticework [sirega] of bricks in the middle, between the fire on this side and the fire on that side.

רבא אמר כמשוורתא דפוריא Rava says: The typical manner of passing is like the leaps of children on Purim. It was customary to light a bonfire on Purim inside a pit, and children would amuse themselves by leaping over the bonfires. Passing one’s child over a fire in such a fashion is the typical manner of passing a child over to Molekh.

תניא כוותיה דרבא אינו חייב עד שיעבירנו דרך עברה העבירה ברגל פטור The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: One is not liable unless he passes his child through the fire in the typical manner of passing. If he passed her by foot, he is exempt. Evidently, the passing ritual is performed by leaping and not by walking.

ואינו חייב אלא על יוצאי יריכו הא כיצד בנו ובתו חייב אביו ואמו אחיו ואחותו פטור העביר עצמו פטור ורבי אלעזר בר' שמעון מחייב The baraita continues: And one is liable only for passing his descendants. How so? If one passed his son or his daughter through the fire, he is liable. If he passed his father, or his mother, his brother, or his sister, he is exempt. If one passed himself over to Molekh, he is exempt. And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, deems him liable.

אחד למולך ואחד לשאר ע"ז חייב רבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון אומר למולך חייב שלא למולך פטור Both one who passes his child through fire to Molekh and one who passes his child through fire to other objects of idol worship are liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: If he passes him over to Molekh, he is liable, but if he transfers him to another object of idol worship, not to Molekh, he is exempt.

אמר עולא מאי טעמא דרבי אלעזר בר' שמעון אמר קרא (דברים יח, י) לא ימצא בך בך בעצמך Ulla says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who deems one who passes himself over to Molekh liable? The verse states: “There shall not be found among you one who passes his son or his daughter through the fire” (Deuteronomy 18:10), and the term “among you” is interpreted homiletically to mean: Among yourself.

ורבנן לא דרשי בך והתנן אבידתו ואבידת אביו שלו קודמת ואמרינן מאי טעמא ואמר רב יהודה אמר קרא (דברים טו, ד) אפס כי לא יהיה בך אביון שלו קודמת לשל כל אדם The Gemara asks: And do the Rabbis not interpret the term “among you” as referring to oneself? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Metzia 33a): If one finds his lost item and his father’s lost item, taking care of his own lost item takes precedence. And we said in discussion of that mishna: What is the reason for this? And Rav Yehuda said that it is because the verse states: “Only so that there shall be no needy among you” (Deuteronomy 15:4), meaning that one must avoid becoming needy. Therefore, if one lost an item, tending to his lost item takes precedence over tending to the lost item of any other person. Apparently, this interpretation of the verse is based on the understanding that the term “among you” is referring to oneself, i.e., one must take care of himself so that he will not become needy.

והתם מאפס The Gemara answers: And there, in that discussion, the halakha is derived from the word “only,” a limiting term, which is interpreted to mean that in preventing destitution one should begin with himself.

אמר רבי יוסי בר' חנינא שלש כריתות בע"ז למה § Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Why is the punishment of excision from the World-to-Come [karet] mentioned three times with regard to idol worship? It is stated twice with regard to the ritual of Molekh, in the verse: “I will also set My face against that man, and I will excise him from among his people” (Leviticus 20:3), and in the verse: “Then I will set My face against that man, and against his family, and I will excise him” (Leviticus 20:5). The third mention of karet is with regard to one who blasphemes: “That person blasphemes the Lord, and that soul shall be excised from among his people” (Numbers 15:30).

אחת לכדרכה ואחת לשלא כדרכה ואחת למולך One mention is for worshipping an idol in its typical manner of worship, and one mention is for worshipping an idol not in its typical manner of worship, and one mention is for performing the ritual of Molekh.

ולמאן דאמר מולך ע"ז היא כרת במולך למה לי למעביר בנו שלא כדרכה The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that Molekh is an object of idol worship, why do I need a special mention of karet with regard to Molekh? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for the case of one who passes his child through fire to an idol other than Molekh, where this is not its typical manner of worship. According to this opinion, one who passes his son through fire to any idol is liable.

ולמאן דאמר מגדף ע"ז היא כרת במגדף למה לי The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that the verse concerning one who blasphemes is referring to one who engages in idol worship and not to one who curses God, why do I need karet to be mentioned with regard to one who blasphemes?

לכדתניא (במדבר טו, לא) הכרת תכרת הכרת בעולם הזה תכרת לעולם הבא דברי רבי עקיבא The Gemara answers that it is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: It is stated with regard to one who blasphemes: “Because he has despised the word of the Lord, and has breached His mitzva, that soul shall be excised [hikkaret tikkaret], his iniquity shall be upon him” (Numbers 15:31). The phrase “hikkaret tikkaret” is interpreted as follows: “Hikkaret”; the sinner is excised in this world, meaning that he will die prematurely. “Tikkaret”; the sinner is excised in the World-to-Come, and he will not merit everlasting life. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

אמר לו רבי ישמעאל והלא כבר נאמר ונכרתה וכי שלשה עולמים יש אלא ונכרתה בעולם הזה הכרת לעולם הבא תכרת דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם: Rabbi Yishmael said to him: But isn’t it already stated in the previous verse: “He blasphemes the Lord; that soul shall be excised [venikhreta]” (Numbers 15:30)? Are there three worlds in which the sinner is excised? Rather, from the term in the verse “venikhreta” it is derived that the sinner is excised in this world, from the term “hikkaret” it is derived that the sinner is excised in the World-to-Come, and nothing is derived from the doubled verb “hikkaret tikkaret,” as the Torah spoke in the language of people.

Daf 65a

מתני׳ בעל אוב זה פיתום המדבר משחיו וידעוני זה המדבר בפיו הרי אלו בסקילה והנשאל בהם באזהרה: MISHNA: The list of those liable to be executed by stoning includes those who practice various types of sorcery. The mishna describes them: A necromancer is a pitom from whose armpit the voice of the dead appears to speak. And a sorcerer is one from whose mouth the dead appears to speak. These, the necromancer and the sorcerer, are executed by stoning, and one who inquires about the future through them is in violation of a prohibition.

גמ׳ מאי שנא הכא דקתני בעל אוב וידעוני ומאי שנא גבי כריתות דקתני בעל אוב ושייריה לידעוני GEMARA: What is different here, that the mishna teaches the halakhot of both a necromancer and a sorcerer, and what is different in tractate Karetot (2a), that the mishna teaches the halakha of a necromancer but leaves out the halakha of a sorcerer?

ר' יוחנן אמר הואיל ושניהן בלאו אחד נאמרו Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna in tractate Karetot does not count a sorcerer separately in the list of those liable to receive karet since both a necromancer and a sorcerer are stated in the Torah in one prohibition. Consequently, one who unwittingly serves as both a necromancer and a sorcerer is not obligated to bring two sin-offerings, as would be one who transgressed two prohibitions punishable by karet.

ר"ל אמר ידעוני לפי שאין בו מעשה Reish Lakish says: A sorcerer is not included in the list in tractate Karetot because his transgression does not involve an action; it involves only speech, and one does not bring a sin-offering for transgressing a prohibition that does not involve an action.

ור' יוחנן מאי שנא בעל אוב דנקט משום דפתח ביה קרא The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that a sorcerer is not listed because sorcery is included in the same prohibition as that of necromancy, what is different about a necromancer that the mishna uses specifically that example, and not the example of a sorcerer? The Gemara answers: The mishna chooses to mention the example of a necromancer because the verse introduces the prohibition with it; the case of a sorcerer is mentioned in the verse afterward (see Deuteronomy 18:11).

וריש לקיש מ"ט לא אמר כר' יוחנן אמר רב פפא חלוקין הן במיתה The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Reish Lakish did not say an explanation in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan? Rav Pappa says: Reish Lakish disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan because the cases of a necromancer and a sorcerer are divided in the verse with regard to the issue of the death penalty, i.e., one is liable to receive the death penalty for each transgression. Consequently, one would be obligated to bring a separate sin-offering for sorcery were it not for the fact that this transgression does not involve an action.

ור' יוחנן חלוקה דלאו שמה חלוקה דמיתה לא שמה חלוקה And Rabbi Yoḥanan could respond that one cannot infer the number of sin-offerings one is obligated to bring based on capital punishment. With regard to determining the number of sin-offerings, where there is a division of a prohibition, i.e., when two acts are listed as two separate prohibitions, it is considered a division that leads to a separate sin-offering, but where there is a division of a separate death penalty, i.e., when the death penalties are listed separately, it is not considered a division in this regard.

ורבי יוחנן מ"ט לא אמר כריש לקיש אמר לך מתני' דכריתות ר' עקיבא היא דאמר לא בעינן מעשה The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say an explanation in accordance with the explanation of Reish Lakish, that a sorcerer is not listed in tractate Karetot because his transgression does not involve an action? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that the mishna of tractate Karetot is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that we do not require an action for one to be obligated to bring a sin-offering.

וריש לקיש נהי דלא בעי ר' עקיבא מעשה רבה מעשה זוטא בעי And Reish Lakish could have responded that although Rabbi Akiva does not require that one perform a significant action to be obligated to bring a sin-offering; nevertheless, he does require that one perform at least a minor action. Sorcery, by contrast, involves no action, and therefore even Rabbi Akiva would not deem one obligated to bring a sin-offering for it.

מגדף מאי מעשה איכא עקימת שפתיו הוי מעשה The Gemara asks: In the case of a blasphemer, i.e., one who curses God, what action is there? He merely speaks, and nevertheless Rabbi Akiva deems him obligated to bring a sin-offering. Clearly, Rabbi Akiva maintains that no action is necessary at all. The Gemara answers: The twisting of his lips while he speaks is considered an action.

בעל אוב מאי מעשה איכא הקשת זרועותיו הוי מעשה The Gemara asks: What action is there in the case of a necromancer? The Gemara answers: The striking of his arms against each other in order to create the sound of a voice is considered an action.

ואפילו לרבנן והתניא אינו חייב אלא על דבר שיש בו מעשה כגון זיבוח קיטור וניסוך והשתחואה The Gemara asks: And is this considered an action even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who require a significant action for one to be obligated to bring a sin-offering? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One is liable for idol worship only for a matter that involves an action, e.g., sacrificing an idolatrous offering, burning incense to an idol, and pouring a libation to an idol, and bowing to an idol.

ואמר ר"ל מאן תנא השתחואה ר"ע היא דאמר לא בעינן מעשה ור' יוחנן אמר אפילו תימא רבנן כפיפת קומתו לרבנן הוי מעשה And Reish Lakish says: Who is the tanna who taught bowing among these examples? It is Rabbi Akiva, who says: We do not require a significant action for one to be liable; any action is sufficient. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as the bending of one’s height, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, is considered a significant action.

השתא לריש לקיש כפיפת קומתו לרבנן לא הוי מעשה הקשת זרועותיו דבעל אוב הוי מעשה Now consider, if according to Reish Lakish, the bending of one’s height is not considered a significant action according to the Rabbis, can a less noticeable action such as the striking of the necromancer’s arms be considered a significant action?

כי קאמר ר"ל נמי לר"ע אבל לרבנן לא The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish concedes that according to the Rabbis, the striking of the necromancer’s arms is not considered a significant action. When Reish Lakish says that it is considered an action, that statement is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. But according to the Rabbis, it is not considered a significant action.

אי הכי יצא מגדף ובעל אוב מיבעי ליה The Gemara challenges: If so, that the Rabbis hold that the transgression of a necromancer does not involve an action, then when stating in tractate Karetot (2a) that if one unwittingly transgresses a prohibition for which one is liable to receive karet if he transgresses it intentionally he is obligated to bring a sin-offering, excluding a blasphemer, as he does not perform an action, the Rabbis should have stated: Excluding a blasphemer and a necromancer, as they do not perform an action.

אלא אמר עולא במקטר לשד Rather, Ulla says: The reason the Rabbis do not state: Excluding a blasphemer and a necromancer, is that when the mishna there lists the case of a necromancer it is referring to one who burns incense to a demon in order to raise the dead, which is a significant action.

א"ל רבא מקטר לשד עובד עבודת כוכבים הוא אלא אמר רבא במקטר לחבר Rava said to Ulla: One who burns incense to a demon is an idol worshipper, which is already mentioned in the mishna in Karetot. Rather, Rava says: The mishna there is referring to one who burns incense to the demons not as a form of worship but as a manner of sorcery, in order to gather the demons, i.e., to bring them to one place.

אמר ליה אביי המקטר לחבר חובר חבר הוא Abaye said to Ulla: One who burns incense to the demons in order to gather them is considered a charmer, whom the Torah relates to with a distinct prohibition (see Deuteronomy 18:11), which is not punishable by karet.

אין והתורה אמרה חובר זה בסקילה Rava responded: Yes, such a person is also considered a charmer, but the Torah states that this particular charmer, who gathers demons, is included in the category of a necromancer, and therefore he is executed by stoning, and karet applies as well.

ת"ר (דברים יח, יא) חובר חבר אחד חבר גדול ואחד חבר קטן ואפי' נחשים ועקרבים The Sages taught with regard to a charmer that the prohibition applies both to a gathering of large animals to one place and to a gathering of small animals to one place, and even to a gathering of snakes and scorpions.

אמר אביי הלכך האי מאן דצמיד זיבורא ועקרבא אע"ג דקא מיכוין דלא ליזקו אסור Abaye says: Therefore, with regard to this person, who through sorcery gathers a hornet and a scorpion to harm each other, he is nevertheless prohibited from doing so even if he intends to prevent them from harming him.

ורבי יוחנן מאי שנא דכפיפת קומתו לרבנן הוי מעשה ועקימת שפתיו לא הוי מעשה The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that according to the Rabbis one is liable for bowing to an idol but not for blaspheming, what is different between these cases, leading to the conclusion that the bending of one’s height while bowing is considered an action according to the Rabbis, but a blasphemer’s twisting of his lips to speak is not considered an action?

אמר רבא שאני מגדף הואיל וישנו בלב Rava says: The case of a blasphemer is different, since this transgression is in the heart as well. The sin of blasphemy does not apply to speech alone, as the blasphemer’s intention is central to the transgression; if he spoke without intention he is not considered a blasphemer. Consequently, one is not obligated to bring a sin-offering for such an action, as it is essentially a sin of the heart.

Daf 65b

מתיב ר' זירא יצאו עדים זוממין שאין בהן מעשה ואמאי הא ליתנהו בלב Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to Rava’s answer, as it is stated in a baraita that one who unwittingly commits a transgression punishable by death is obligated to bring a sin-offering, excluding conspiring witnesses, who are not obligated to bring a sin-offering, as their transgressions do not involve an action. Rabbi Zeira asks: And why is a false witness’s testimony not considered a transgression that involves an action? The testimony is delivered through speech, which should be considered an action, as this is not a transgression that is committed in the heart; the witnesses are liable for what they said, and not for their intention.

אמר רבא שאני עדים זוממין הואיל וישנו בקול Rava says: Conspiring witnesses are different, since their transgression is committed through their voice. The essence of their transgression is not speech itself but rather making themselves heard by the court. Therefore, since the projection of one’s voice does not involve action, the transgression of conspiring witnesses is considered not be to involving action.

וקול לרבי יוחנן לאו מעשה הוא והא איתמר חסמה בקול והנהיגה בקול רבי יוחנן אמר חייב ור"ל אמר פטור The Gemara asks: And is projecting one’s voice not considered an action according to Rabbi Yoḥanan? But wasn’t it stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following case: If one muzzled an animal by projecting his voice, by berating it whenever it tried to eat, has he transgressed the prohibition of: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the corn” (Deuteronomy 25:4)? And similarly, if one led different species to work together by projecting his voice, without performing any action, has he transgressed the prohibition of: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10)? Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable, and Reish Lakish says he is exempt.

רבי יוחנן אמר חייב עקימת פיו הוי מעשה ר"ל אמר פטור עקימת פיו לא הוי מעשה The Gemara explains the reasoning behind their opinions: Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable, as he maintains that the twisting of one’s mouth to speak is considered an action, whereas Reish Lakish says he is exempt, because he holds that that the twisting of one’s mouth to speak is not considered an action. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that a transgression one commits by projecting his voice is considered to involve an action.

אלא אמר רבא שאני עדים זוממין הואיל וישנן בראיה Rather, Rava says there is a different answer to Rabbi Zeira’s objection: Conspiring witnesses are different, since they are rendered liable mainly through sight, i.e., the important part of their testimony is what they saw, which is not considered an action.

ת"ר בעל אוב זה המדבר בין הפרקים ומבין אצילי ידיו ידעוני זה המניח עצם ידוע בפיו והוא מדבר מאליו § The Sages taught: A necromancer is one who causes the voice of the dead to be heard speaking from between his joints or from his armpit. A sorcerer [yideoni] is one who places a bone of an animal called a yadua in his mouth, and the bone speaks on its own.

מיתיבי (ישעיהו כט, ד) והיה כאוב מארץ קולך מאי לאו דמשתעי כי אורחיה לא דסליק ויתיב בין הפרקים ומשתעי The Gemara raises an objection from the verse: “And your voice shall be as a ghost out of the ground” (Isaiah 29:4). What, does the dead person not speak from the grave on his own? The Gemara answers: No, this is not so, as the dead person rises by sorcery and sits between the joints of the necromancer and speaks.

תא שמע (שמואל א כח, יג) ותאמר האשה אל שאול אלהים ראיתי עולים מן הארץ מאי לאו דמשתעי כי אורחיה לא דיתיב בין הפרקים ומשתעי The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the statement of the necromancer to King Saul: “And the woman said to Saul, I see a godlike being coming up out of the earth” (I Samuel 28:13). What, does the verse not mean to say that the dead person spoke on his own? The Gemara refutes this proof: No, this is not so, as the dead person sits between the joints of the necromancer and speaks.

ת"ר בעל אוב אחד המעלה בזכורו ואחד הנשאל בגולגולת מה בין זה לזה מעלה בזכורו אינו עולה כדרכו ואינו עולה בשבת נשאל בגולגולת עולה כדרכו ועולה בשבת The Sages taught: The category of a necromancer includes both one who raises the dead with his zekhur, which is a form of sorcery, and one who inquires about the future from a skull [begulgolet]. What is the difference between this type of necromancer and that type of necromancer? When one raises the dead with his zekhur, the dead does not rise in its usual manner, but appears upside-down, and it does not rise on Shabbat. By contrast, when one inquires about the future from a skull, the dead rises in its usual manner, and it rises [oleh] even on Shabbat.

עולה להיכא סליק הא קמיה מנח אלא אימא עונה כדרכו ועונה בשבת The Gemara asks with regard to the wording of the last statement: Rises? To where does it rise? Isn’t the skull lying before him? Rather, say as follows: The dead answers in its usual manner, and it answers [ve’oneh] even on Shabbat.

ואף שאלה זו שאל טורנוסרופוס את ר"ע אמר לו ומה יום מיומים אמר לו ומה גבר מגוברין א"ל דמרי צבי שבת נמי דמרי צבי With regard to the statement that the dead do not rise on Shabbat, the Gemara relates: The wicked Turnus Rufus, the Roman governor of Judea, asked this question of Rabbi Akiva as well. Turnus Rufus said to him: And what makes this day, Shabbat, different from other days? Rabbi Akiva said to him: And what makes this man, referring to his interlocutor, more distinguished than other men? Turnus Rufus said to him: I am more distinguished because my master the emperor wants it that way. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Shabbat too is unique because my Master wants it that way, as he has sanctified that day.

א"ל הכי קאמינא לך מי יימר דהאידנא שבתא אמר לו נהר סבטיון יוכיח בעל אוב יוכיח קברו של אביו יוכיח שאין מעלה עשן בשבת אמר לו ביזיתו ביישתו וקיללתו Turnus Rufus said to him: This is what I mean to say to you: Who is to say that now is Shabbat? Perhaps a different day of the week is Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva said to him: The Sabbatyon River can prove that today is Shabbat, as it is calm only on Shabbat. A necromancer can also prove this, as the dead do not rise on Shabbat. The grave of his father, referring to Turnus Rufus’s father, can also prove this, as it does not emit smoke on Shabbat, although smoke rises from it all week, as during the week he is being punished in Gehenna. Turnus Rufus said to him: You have demeaned my father, you have publicly shamed him, and you have cursed him by saying that he is being punished in Gehenna.

שואל אוב היינו ודורש אל המתים § The Gemara asks: Isn’t one who inquires about the future from a necromancer the same as what is described in the verse: “Or directs inquiries to the dead” (Deuteronomy 18:11)? Why are they mentioned separately in the verse?

דורש למתים כדתניא (דברים יח, יא) ודורש אל המתים זה המרעיב עצמו והולך ולן בבה"ק כדי שתשרה עליו רוח טומאה The Gemara answers: One who directs inquiries to the dead em-ploys a different method to contact the dead, as it is taught in a baraita: “Or directs inquiries to the dead”; this is one who starves himself and goes and sleeps overnight in a graveyard so that a spirit of impurity should settle upon him, and he can listen to what the dead are saying.

וכשהיה ר"ע מגיע למקרא זה היה בוכה ומה המרעיב עצמו כדי שתשרה עליו רוח טומאה שורה עליו רוח טומאה המרעיב עצמו כדי שתשרה עליו רוח טהרה על אחת כמה וכמה אבל מה אעשה שעונותינו גרמו לנו שנאמר (ישעיהו נט, ב) כי [אם] עונותיכם היו מבדילים ביניכם לבין אלהיכם And when Rabbi Akiva would arrive at this verse he would weep and say: If one who starves himself so that a spirit of impurity will settle upon him succeeds in doing so, and a spirit of impurity settles upon him, all the more so one who starves himself so that a spirit of purity will settle upon him should be successful, and a spirit of purity should settle upon him. But what can I do, as our iniquities have caused us not to merit the spirit of sanctity and purity, as it is stated: “But your iniquities have separated between you and your God, and your sins have hid His face from you, that He will not hear” (Isaiah 59:2).

אמר רבא אי בעו צדיקי ברו עלמא שנאמר כי עונותיכם היו מבדילים וגו' Rava says: If the righteous wish to do so, they can create a world, as it is stated: “But your iniquities have separated between you and your God.” In other words, there is no distinction between God and a righteous person who has no sins, and just as God created the world, so can the righteous.

רבא ברא גברא שדריה לקמיה דר' זירא הוה קא משתעי בהדיה ולא הוה קא מהדר ליה אמר ליה מן חבריא את הדר לעפריך Indeed, Rava created a man, a golem, using forces of sanctity. Rava sent his creation before Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira would speak to him but he would not reply. Rabbi Zeira said to him: You were created by one of the members of the group, one of the Sages. Return to your dust.

רב חנינא ורב אושעיא הוו יתבי כל מעלי שבתא ועסקי בספר יצירה ומיברו להו עיגלא תילתא ואכלי ליה The Gemara relates another fact substantiating the statement that the righteous could create a world if they so desired: Rav Ḥanina and Rav Oshaya would sit every Shabbat eve and engage in the study of Sefer Yetzira, and a third-born calf [igla tilta] would be created for them, and they would eat it in honor of Shabbat.

תנו רבנן מעונן ר' שמעון אומר זה המעביר שבעה מיני זכור על העין וחכ"א זה האוחז את העינים ר"ע אומר זה המחשב עתים ושעות ואומר היום יפה לצאת למחר יפה ליקח לימודי ערבי שביעיות חיטין יפות עיקורי קטניות מהיות רעות § The Sages taught: What is the definition of the soothsayer mentioned in the verse: “There shall not be found among you…a soothsayer” (Deuteronomy 18:10)? Rabbi Shimon says: This is one who applies seven types of semen [zekhur] to one’s eye in order to perform sorcery. And the Rabbis say: This is one who deceives the eyes, as though he is performing sorcery. Rabbi Akiva says: This is one who calculates the fortune of times and hours, and says, for example: Today is a propitious day for going away on a journey; tomorrow is propitious for purchasing property successfully. Or he says that on the eve of the Sabbatical Years, the wheat harvest is generally good; uprooting legumes rather than cutting them from above the ground prevents them from going bad.

תנו רבנן מנחש זה האומר פתו נפלה מפיו מקלו נפלה מידו בנו קורא לו מאחריו עורב קורא לו צבי הפסיקו בדרך נחש מימינו ושועל משמאלו The Sages taught: The enchanter mentioned in the verse (Deuteronomy 18:10) is one who relies on superstitious signs, e.g., one who says: If one’s bread fell from his mouth, that is a bad sign for him; or: If one’s staff fell from his hand, it is a bad sign; or: If one’s son calls him from behind, it is a sign that he should return from his journey; or: If a raven calls to him, or if a deer blocks him on the way, or if a snake is to his right, or if a fox is to his left, all of these are bad signs. An enchanter is one who relies on these as bad signs and consequently changes his course of action.

Daf 66a

אל תתחיל בי שחרית הוא ראש חודש הוא מוצאי שבת הוא The term is also referring to one who says to a collector of charity: Do not collect from me first, as that is a bad sign for me; or: Do not collect from me now because it is morning, and it is a bad sign to begin the day with a loss; or: Do not collect from me now because it is the New Moon, and it is a bad sign to begin the month with a loss; or: It is the conclusion of Shabbat and I do not want to begin the week with a loss.

תנו רבנן (ויקרא יט, כו) לא תנחשו ולא תעוננו כגון אלו המנחשים בחולדה בעופות ובדגים: The Sages taught that the verse: “Nor shall you practice divination nor soothsaying” (Leviticus 19:26), is referring, for example, to those who divine and receive guidance according to what happens to a weasel, to birds, or to fish.

מתני׳ המחלל את השבת בדבר שחייבין על זדונו כרת ועל שגגתו חטאת: MISHNA: Also liable to be executed by stoning is one who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting performance one is obligated to bring a sin-offering.

גמ׳ מכלל דאיכא מידי דחילול שבת הוי ואין חייבין לא על שגגתו חטאת ולא על זדונו כרת מאי GEMARA: By inference, there is another matter that is a desecration of Shabbat, and it is prohibited by the Torah, but for its unwitting performance one is not obligated to bring a sin-offering, nor does one receive karet for its intentional performance. Otherwise, the statement in the mishna that one is liable for desecrating Shabbat for performing an act for which one receives karet or is obligated to bring a sin-offering would have been superfluous.

היא תחומין ואליבא דרבי עקיבא הבערה ואליבא דר' יוסי: The Gemara asks: What is the labor activity that desecrates Shabbat but whose punishment is not so severe? The Gemara answers: It is the prohibition against going outside the Shabbat boundaries, which are two thousand cubits beyond a person’s location at the beginning of Shabbat, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that although it is a Torah prohibition one is neither obligated to bring a sin-offering for violating it unwittingly nor liable to be executed for violating it intentionally. Alternatively, it may be referring to the prohibition against kindling a fire on Shabbat in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that contrary to other labors prohibited on Shabbat, this act is not punishable by stoning but by lashes.

מתני׳ המקלל אביו ואמו אינו חייב עד שיקללם בשם קללם בכנוי ר' מאיר מחייב וחכמים פוטרין: MISHNA: One who curses his father or his mother is not liable to be executed by stoning unless he curses them with the name of God. If he cursed them with an appellation of the name of God, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

גמ׳ מאן חכמים ר' מנחם בר' יוסי הוא דתניא ר' מנחם בר' יוסי אומר (ויקרא כד, טז) בנקבו שם יומת מה ת"ל שם לימד על מקלל אביו ואמו שאינו חייב עד שיקללם בשם GEMARA: Who are the Rabbis mentioned here? It is Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: The verse states: “And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death; all the congregation shall stone him; the convert as well as the homeborn, when he blasphemes the name he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:16). Why must the verse state “the name” a second time, which appears to be a superfluous repetition? This term taught concerning one who transgresses other prohibitions of cursing, e.g., one who curses his father or his mother, that he is not liable to be executed by stoning unless he curses them with the name of God. If he merely uses an appellation, he is exempt.

תנו רבנן איש מה ת"ל (ויקרא כ, ב) איש איש לרבות בת טומטום ואנדרוגינוס The Sages taught: The verse (Leviticus 20:9) could have stated merely: For a man [ish] that curses his father and his mother shall be put to death; he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him. Why must the verse state: “For any man [ish ish],” repeating the term ish? It is to include not only a son, but also a daughter, one whose sexual organs are indeterminate [tumtum], and a hermaphrodite [ve’androginos].

אשר יקלל את אביו ואת אמו אין לי אלא אביו ואמו אביו שלא אמו אמו שלא אביו מניין ת"ל אביו ואמו קילל דמיו בו אביו קילל אמו קילל דברי רבי יאשיה When the verse states: “That curses his father and his mother,” I have derived only his liability for cursing both his father and his mother. From where do I derive that if one curses his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, that he is liable? The continuation of the verse states: “His father and his mother he has cursed; his blood is upon him.” In the first part of the verse, the word “curses” is in proximity to “his father,” and in the last part of the verse, it is in proximity to “his mother.” This teaches that the verse is referring both to a case where he cursed only his father and to a case where he cursed only his mother; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

רבי יונתן אומר משמע שניהן כאחד ומשמע אחד בפני עצמו עד שיפרוט לך הכתוב יחדיו Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation, because the phrase “his father and his mother” teaches that one is liable if he curses both of them together, and it also teaches that he is liable if he curses either one of them on their own, unless the verse specifies that one is liable only when he curses both together, which it does not do in this case.

מות יומת בסקילה אתה אומר בסקילה או אינו אלא באחת מכל מיתות האמורות בתורה נאמר כאן דמיו בו ונאמר להלן (ויקרא כ, יא) דמיהם בם מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה From the phrase “shall be put to death” it is derived that his punishment is execution by stoning. The baraita asks: Do you say that that they are executed by stoning, or is it rather by one of all the other types of death penalty stated in the Torah? The baraita answers: It is stated here: “His blood shall be upon him,” and it is stated below, with regard to a necromancer and a sorcerer: “They shall be put to death; they shall stone them with stones; their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:27). Just as there the verse states that a necromancer and a sorcerer are executed by stoning, so too here, with regard to one who curses his father or mother, he is executed by stoning.

עונש שמענו אזהרה מניין ת"ל (שמות כב, כז) אלהים לא תקלל וגו' אם היה אביו דיין הרי הוא בכלל אלהים לא תקלל ואם היה אביו נשיא הרי הוא בכלל (שמות כב, כז) ונשיא בעמך לא תאור The baraita asks: We have learned the punishment of one who curses his parent; from where is the prohibition against doing so derived? The verse states: “You shall not blaspheme judges [elohim], nor curse a king of your people” (Exodus 22:27). If his father was a judge, cursing him is included in the prohibition of: “You shall not blaspheme judges,” as it is prohibited for all people to curse a judge. And if his father was a king, cursing him is included in the prohibition of: “Nor curse a king of your people.”

אינו לא דיין ולא נשיא מניין אמרת הרי אתה דן בנין אב משניהן לא ראי נשיא כראי דיין ולא ראי דיין כראי נשיא If he is neither a judge nor a king, from where is it derived that it is prohibited to curse him? One can say: You derive it through a paradigm arrived at from both of them as follows: The defining characteristic of a king is not like the defining characteristic of a judge, and the defining characteristic of a judge is not like the defining characteristic of a king. The two cases are dissimilar.

לא ראי דיין כראי נשיא שהרי דיין אתה מצווה על הוראתו כראי נשיא שאי אתה מצווה על הוראתו ולא ראי נשיא כראי דיין שהנשיא אתה מצווה על המראתו כראי דיין שאי אתה מצווה על המראתו The baraita elaborates: The defining characteristic of a judge is not like the defining characteristic of a king, as with regard to a judge, you are commanded with regard to obeying his halakhic ruling. This is not like the defining characteristic of a king, with regard to whose halakhic ruling you are not commanded to obey. And the defining characteristic of a king is not like the defining characteristic of a judge, as with regard to the king, you are commanded with regard to rebelling against him, i.e., refusing to obey his order. This is not like the defining characteristic of a judge, as you are not commanded with regard to rebelling against him.

הצד השוה שבהם שהן בעמך ואתה מוזהר על קללתן אף אני אביא אביך שבעמך ואתה מוזהר על קללתו Their common denominator is that they are “of your people,” i.e., they are members of the Jewish people, and you are prohibited from cursing them. I too will include the case of your father, as he is “of your people,” and therefore you are prohibited from cursing him.

מה להצד השוה שבהן שכן גדולתן גרמה להן This derivation is insufficient, as what is notable about their common denominator, i.e., another element that they share in common? It is notable in that their prominence has caused them to be entitled to an exceptional degree of respect; they are not merely “of your people.” Therefore, perhaps the prohibition against cursing applies only to such prominent figures.

ת"ל (ויקרא יט, יד) לא תקלל חרש באומללים שבעמך הכתוב מדבר The baraita continues: Consequently, a third case is necessary to arrive at the required paradigm. The verse states: “You shall not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). The verse speaks of the wretched of your people. From the fact that it is prohibited to curse even those people, it can be derived that it is prohibited to curse anyone.

מה לחרש שכן חרישתו גרמה לו Deriving this halakha from the case of a deaf person is also insufficient, as what is notable about the case of a deaf person? It is notable in that his deafness has caused cursing him to be prohibited. Perhaps the only reason it is prohibited to curse him is that he is deaf, just as it is prohibited to mislead the blind.

נשיא ודיין יוכיחו מה לנשיא ודיין שכן גדולתן גרמה להן חרש יוכיח One can respond: The prohibition against cursing a king and a judge can prove that it is prohibited to curse anyone, as it is prohibited to curse them even though they are not wretched. And if the proof from these cases is rejected, as one can claim that what is notable about a king and a judge is that their prominence has caused them to be entitled to this respect, then the prohibition against cursing the deaf can prove that prominence is not a determining factor.

וחזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה ולא ראי זה כראי זה הצד השוה שבהן שהן בעמך ואתה מוזהר על קללתן אף אני אביא אביך שבעמך ואתה מוזהר על קללתו And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this point the halakha is derived from a combination of the three cases: The defining characteristic of this case, i.e., that of a ruler and a judge, is not like the defining characteristic of that case, i.e., that of a deaf person, and the defining characteristic of that case is not like the defining characteristic of this case; their common denominator is that they are “of your people,” and you are prohibited from cursing them. I too will include the case of your father, who is “of your people,” and therefore you are prohibited from cursing him.

מה לצד השוה שבהן שכן משונין The baraita refutes this derivation: What is notable about their common dominator? It is notable in that they are unusual, i.e., they are not common people, but they are in some way different from others. Perhaps there is no prohibition against cursing an ordinary person.

אלא א"כ נכתוב קרא או אלהים וחרש או נשיא וחרש אלהים למה לי אם אינו ענין לגופו תנהו ענין לאביו Rather, this proof is insufficient, and the baraita states a different explanation: If it is so that it is prohibited to curse only unusual people, let the verse write either that it is prohibited to curse judges and the deaf, or that it is prohibited to curse a king and the deaf, and it would have been derived from these two cases that the prohibition applies to all unusual people. Why do I need the verse to state a special prohibition with regard to judges? It is superfluous, as judges are also extraordinary people. Rather, if the verse is not needed for its own matter, i.e., the prohibition against cursing judges, apply it to the matter of cursing one’s father.

הניחא למאן דאמר אלהים חול אלא למאן דאמר קודש מאי איכא למימר The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that in the verse: “You shall not blaspheme elohim” (Exodus 22:27), the word “elohim” is non-sacred, as it is referring to judges. But according to the one who says that the word is sacred, as it is referring to God, what can be said? If the verse is not superfluous, as it is needed to state a special prohibition with regard to God, how is the prohibition against cursing one’s parents derived from it?

דתניא אלהים חול דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר אלהים קודש ותניא רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר אזהרה למברך את השם מניין תלמוד לומר אלהים לא תקלל As it is taught in a baraita: The word “elohim” in this verse is non-sacred; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The word “Elohim” is sacred. And it is taught in a different baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: From where is the prohibition against one who blesses, i.e., curses, the name of God, derived? The verse states: “You shall not blaspheme God [Elohim].”

למ"ד אלהים חול גמר קודש מחול למ"ד אלהים קודש גמרינן חול מקודש The Gemara answers: According to the one who says that “elohim” is non-sacred, he derives the prohibition according to the sacred meaning of the word from the non-sacred meaning, i.e., he derives the prohibition against cursing God from the prohibition against cursing judges. According to the one who says that “Elohim” is sacred, we derive the prohibition according to the non-sacred meaning of the word from the sacred meaning, i.e., he derives the prohibition against cursing judges from the prohibition against cursing God.

בשלמא למ"ד אלהים חול גמר קודש מחול אלא למ"ד אלהים קודש גמר חול מקודש דילמא אקודש אזהר אחול לא אזהר The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that “elohim” is non-sacred, he can derive the prohibition according to the sacred meaning of the word from the non-sacred meaning through an a fortiori inference. But according to the one who says that “Elohim” is sacred, can he derive the prohibition according to the non-sacred meaning from the sacred meaning? Perhaps the Torah renders it prohibited to curse God, in accordance with the sacred meaning of the word, but it does not render it prohibited to curse elohim, judges, in accordance with the non-sacred meaning.

א"כ לכתוב קרא לא תקל The Gemara answers: If so, if it is prohibited to curse God but not judges, let the verse write: You shall not treat lightly [takel], instead of: “You shall not blaspheme [tekallel]”; it would have been derived from this wording that is prohibited to demean or curse God.

Daf 66b

מאי לא תקלל ש"מ תרתי: What halakha can be derived from the seemingly superfluous second letter lamed, which renders the expression: “You shall not curse [tekallel]”? Conclude from it that this expression includes two prohibitions: A prohibition against cursing God and a prohibition against cursing a judge.

מתני׳ הבא על נערה המאורסה אינו חייב עד שתהא נערה בתולה מאורסה והיא בבית אביה באו עליה שנים הראשון בסקילה והשני בחנק: MISHNA: One who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman is not liable to be executed by stoning unless she is a young woman, i.e., neither a minor nor an adult; a virgin; betrothed but not yet married; and she lives in her father’s home, having yet to move in with her husband. If two men engaged in intercourse with her, the first is liable to be executed by stoning, and the second is liable to be executed by strangulation. The second man is executed in this manner in accordance with the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with a married or non-virgin betrothed woman, as she was no longer a virgin when he engaged in intercourse with her.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן (דברים כב, כג) נערה ולא בוגרת בתולה ולא בעולה מאורסה ולא נשואה בבית אביה פרט לשמסר האב לשלוחי הבעל GEMARA: The Sages taught with regard to the conditions stated in the mishna: The punishment of stoning applies only if the woman is a young woman, a category that applies until she is approximately twelve-and-a-half years of age, but not a grown woman. She must be a virgin but not a non-virgin. She must be betrothed but not married. She must be living in her father’s home, excluding a case where the father transferred his daughter to the husband’s agents to bring her to her husband’s home for the purpose of marriage; in such a case, even though she has not arrived there yet, she is already considered a married woman according to halakha.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב זו דברי ר"מ אבל חכמים אומרים נערה המאורסה אפי' קטנה במשמע Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: This mishna is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the halakha of a betrothed young woman applies to a young woman of the intermediate age between minority and adulthood. But the Rabbis say: Even a minor is included in the term: A betrothed young woman; only a grown woman is excluded.

א"ל רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא ממאי דמתני' ר"מ היא ולמעוטי קטנה נמי דילמא רבנן היא ולמעוטי בוגרת ותו לא Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: From where is it indicated that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the specification that she must be a young woman is not only to the exclusion of a grown woman but also to the exclusion of a minor girl? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the condition that she must be a young woman is to the exclusion of a grown woman and nothing more. Accordingly, one who engages in intercourse with an engaged minor girl is liable to be executed by stoning.

א"ל האי אינו חייב עד שתהא נערה בתולה מאורסה אינו חייב אלא על נערה בתולה מאורסה מיבעי ליה ותו לא מידי Ravina said to him: This expression in the mishna: Is not liable unless she is [ad shetehe] a young woman, a virgin, betrothed, does not suit your suggested explanation. If the mishna is merely excluding a grown woman, it should have stated: Is liable only for engaging in intercourse with a young woman who is a virgin and betrothed. The expression ad shetehe indicates: Until she becomes, i.e., this halakha does not apply until she reaches the age of a young woman. And there is nothing more to be said on the matter, as this is clearly the intention of the mishna.

בעא מיניה ר' יעקב בר אדא מרב בא על הקטנה מאורסה לר"מ מהו לגמרי ממעיט ליה או מסקילה ממעיט ליה א"ל מסתברא מסקילה ממעט ליה Rabbi Ya’akov bar Adda asked Rav: In the case of a man who engaged in intercourse with a betrothed minor girl, what is the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Does Rabbi Meir exclude him from punishment entirely, or does he exclude him merely from stoning but he is executed by strangulation, like one who engages in intercourse with any other married woman? Rav said to him: It stands to reason that Rabbi Meir excludes him from stoning alone, but he is liable to be executed by strangulation.

והכתיב (דברים כב, כב) ומתו גם שניהם עד שיהו שניהן שוין שתיק רב Rabbi Ya’akov bar Adda raised an objection to this answer: But isn’t it written: “If a man is found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall both die, the man who lies with the woman, and the woman” (Deuteronomy 22:22), indicating that this punishment does not apply unless they are both equally subject to punishment? If so, one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed minor girl is exempt, as she is not halakhically competent. Rav remained silent and did not answer him.

אמר שמואל מאי טעמא שתיק רב ונימא ליה (דברים כב, כה) ומת האיש אשר שכב עמה לבדו Shmuel says: What is the reason that Rav remained silent? Why not say to Rabbi Ya’akov that his premise is repudiated by the verse: “But if the man finds the betrothed young woman in the field, and the man takes hold of her, and lies with her, then the man who lay with her alone shall die” (Deuteronomy 22:25)? This verse proves that the punishment of stoning applies to the man even if the woman is exempt. The halakha of a man who engages in intercourse with a betrothed minor should be the same.

כתנאי ומתו גם שניהם עד שיהו שניהן שוין דברי ר' יאשיה רבי יונתן אומר ומת האיש אשר שכב עמה לבדו The Gemara answers that this matter is subject to a dispute between tanna’im, as is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Then they shall both die” (Deuteronomy 22:22), indicating that this halakha does not apply unless they are both equally subject to punishment. If one of them cannot be punished, e.g., because he or she is a minor, the other is not executed either. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says that the phrase from the verse “then the man who lay with her alone shall die” indicates that in some cases only one of them is liable to receive the death penalty.

ואידך ההיא ומתו גם שניהם מאי דריש ביה אמר רבא למעוטי מעשה חידודים ואידך מעשה חידודים לאו כלום היא The Gemara asks: And what does the other tanna, Rabbi Yonatan, who holds that this punishment applies even if only one party is subject to punishment, derive from the verse: “Then they shall both die”? Rava says: That verse is stated to exclude an act of sharpening, i.e., engaging in sexual contact with a woman without penetration. Since the man and woman do not equally receive pleasure from such an act, it is not considered sexual intercourse, and they are exempt. And the other tanna, Rabbi Yoshiya, holds that an act of sharpening is nothing; there is clearly no liability for such an act, and it is unnecessary to derive this halakha from the verse.

ואידך האי לבדו מאי דריש ביה The Gemara asks: And what does the other tanna, Rabbi Yoshiya, who holds that they must be equally subject to punishment, derive from the verse “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die”?

כדתניא באו עליה עשרה בני אדם ועדיין היא בתולה כולם בסקילה ר' אומר הראשון בסקילה וכולן בחנק The Gemara answers: He derives another halakha, as it is taught in a baraita: If ten men engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, and she is still a virgin, as they engaged in anal intercourse with her, they are all liable to be executed by stoning. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The first of them is executed by stoning, and all the rest of them are executed by strangulation. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives from the phrase in the verse “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die” that although the woman is still a virgin, only one man can be executed by stoning for engaging in intercourse with her. The others are executed by strangulation, in accordance with the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with a married woman or a betrothed non-virgin.

תנו רבנן (ויקרא כא, ט) ובת איש כהן כי תחל לזנות רבי אומר תחילה וכן הוא אומר ומת האיש אשר שכב עמה לבדו § The Sages taught: The verse states: “And the daughter of any priest, if she profanes [teḥel] herself by playing the harlot, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 21:9). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The word teḥel means first [teḥila]; and likewise it says: “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die” (Deuteronomy 22:25).

מאי קאמר אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע רבי כר' ישמעאל סבירא ליה דאמר ארוסה יצאה לשריפה ולא נשואה והכי קאמר אם תחילת ביאה בזנות בשריפה אידך בחנק The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saying? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that only the betrothed daughter of a priest is singled out for execution by burning, but not one who is married; a married daughter of a priest who commits adultery is executed in the same manner as other women who commit adultery. And this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: If a woman’s first act of sexual intercourse occurs when she commits adultery, as she is still betrothed, she is executed by burning; in another case, i.e., if she is already married and this is not the first time she engages in sexual intercourse, she is executed by strangulation.

מאי וכן כי התם מה התם בתחילת ביאה קמשתעי קרא הכא נמי בתחילת ביאה קמשתעי קרא The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the end of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement: And likewise it says: “Then the man who lay with her alone shall die”? What is the relevance of that verse to this issue? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi means to say that the halakha here, in the case of a betrothed young woman who is the daughter of a priest, is like there. Just as there, with regard to a betrothed young woman who is not the daughter of a priest, the verse speaks of her first intercourse, here too, the verse speaks of her first intercourse.

אמר ליה רב ביבי בר אביי מר לא הכי אמר ומנו רב יוסף Rav Beivai bar Abaye said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: My Master does not say, i.e., does not explain the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, like that. The Gemara comments: And who is his Master? Rav Yosef.

ר' כר' מאיר ס"ל דאמר נשאת לאחד מן הפסולין מיתתה בחנק Rather, he explains the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as follows: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: In the case of the daughter of a priest who married one of the men unfit for her, e.g., a mamzer, and committed adultery while married to him, her death sentence is administered by strangulation and not by burning.

והכי קאמר אם תחילת אחלתה בזנות בשריפה ואידך בחנק ומאי וכן And this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: If she first profanes herself, i.e., disqualifies herself from the priesthood, by committing adultery, she is executed by burning, but in another case, where she was already disqualified from the priesthood by marrying a man unfit for her, she is executed by strangulation. And what is the meaning of the end of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement: And likewise it says: “Then the man who lied with her alone shall die”?

Daf 67a

סימנא בעלמא: It is merely a mnemonic. The verse is not relevant to this halakha, and it is cited merely as a sign indicating that just as the halakha of a betrothed young woman pertains to her first act of sexual intercourse, so too, the halakha of the daughter of a priest who committed adultery pertains to a case where it is her first disqualification from the priesthood.

מתני׳ המסית זה הדיוט והמסית את ההדיוט אמר יש יראה במקום פלוני כך אוכלת כך שותה כך מטיבה כך מריעה MISHNA: With regard to the case of an inciter, listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, this is an ordinary person, not a prophet. And it is referring to one who incites an ordinary person and not a multitude of people. What does the inciter do? He says: There is an idol in such and such a place, which eats like this, drinks like this, does good for its worshippers like this, and harms those who do not worship it like this.

כל חייבי מיתות שבתורה אין מכמינין עליהם חוץ מזו The mishna states a principle with regard to the halakha of an inciter: With regard to all of those mentioned in the Torah who are liable to receive the death penalty, if there are no witnesses to their transgressions, the court does not hide witnesses in order to ensnare and punish them, except for this case of an inciter.

אמר לשנים הן עדיו ומביאין אותו לב"ד וסוקלין אותו אמר לאחד הוא אומר יש לי חבירים רוצים בכך The mishna elaborates: If the inciter said his words of incitement to two men, they are his witnesses, and he does not need to be warned before the transgression; they bring him to court and stone him. If he said his words of incitement to one man alone, that man’s testimony would not be sufficient to have the inciter executed. Therefore he says to the inciter: I have friends who are interested in this; tell them too. This way there will be more witnesses.

אם היה ערום ואינו יכול לדבר בפניהם מכמינין לו עדים אחורי הגדר והוא אומר לו אמור מה שאמרת ביחוד והלה אומר לו והוא אומר לו היאך נניח את אלהינו שבשמים ונלך ונעבוד עצים ואבנים אם חוזר בו הרי זה מוטב ואם אמר כך היא חובתנו כך יפה לנו העומדין מאחורי הגדר מביאין אותו לבית דין וסוקלין אותו The mishna continues: If the inciter is cunning, and he knows that he cannot speak in front of two men, the court hides witnesses for him behind the fence so that he will not see them, and the man whom the inciter had previously tried to incite says to him: Say what you said to me when we were in seclusion. And the other person, the inciter, says to him again that he should worship the idol. And he says to the inciter: How can we forsake our God in Heaven and go and worship wood and stones? If the inciter retracts his suggestion, that is good. But if he says: This idol worship is our duty; this is what suits us, then those standing behind the fence bring him to court and have him stoned.

האומר אעבוד אלך ואעבוד נלך ונעבוד אזבח אלך ואזבח נלך ונזבח אקטיר אלך ואקטיר נלך ונקטיר אנסך אלך ואנסך נלך וננסך אשתחוה אלך ואשתחוה נלך ונשתחוה: The halakha of an inciter includes one who says: I shall worship idols, or one of the following statements: I shall go and worship idols, or: let us go and worship idols, or: I shall sacrifice an idolatrous offering, or: I shall go and sacrifice an idolatrous offering, or: Let us go and sacrifice an idolatrous offering, or: I shall burn incense as an idolatrous offering, or: I shall go and burn incense, or: Let us go and burn incense, or: I shall pour an idolatrous libation, or: I shall go and pour a libation, or: Let us go and pour a libation, or: I shall bow to an idol, or: I shall go and bow, or: Let us go and bow.

גמ׳ המסית זה הדיוט טעמא דהדיוט הא נביא בחנק והמסית את ההדיוט טעמא דיחיד הא רבים בחנק GEMARA: The mishna teaches: With regard to the case of an inciter, this is an ordinary person. The Gemara infers: The reason he is executed by stoning is that he is an ordinary person, but if he is a prophet he is executed by strangulation, not by stoning. The mishna states further: And it is referring to one who incites an ordinary person. The Gemara infers: The reason he is executed by stoning is that he incited an individual, but if he subverted a multitude of people, he is executed by strangulation.

מתני׳ מני ר"ש היא דתניא נביא שהדיח בסקילה ר' שמעון אומר בחנק מדיחי עיר הנדחת בסקילה ר"ש אומר בחנק Consequently, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: A prophet who subverted others to participate in idol worship is executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: He is executed by strangulation. Likewise, the subverters of an idolatrous city are executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: By strangulation.

אימא סיפא המדיח זה האומר נלך ונעבוד עבודת כוכבים ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב מדיחי עיר הנדחת שנו אתאן לרבנן רישא ר"ש וסיפא רבנן The Gemara challenges: Say the last clause of the mishna, i.e., say the following mishna: With regard to the case of the subverter listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, this is one who says: Let us go and worship idols. And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In this mishna the Sages taught the case of the subverters of an idolatrous city. Here we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that those who incite a multitude of people are also executed by stoning. Is it possible that the first clause of the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and the last clause expresses that of the Rabbis?

רבינא אמר כולה רבנן היא ולא זו אף זו קתני Ravina says: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style of: Not only this but also that. In other words, the mishna should be explained as follows: Not only is one who incites an individual executed by stoning, but even one who subverts an entire city is executed by stoning.

רב פפא אמר כי קתני מסית זה הדיוט להכמנה Rav Pappa says: When the mishna teaches with regard to one who incites that this is referring to an ordinary person, it is not indicating that a prophet is not included in this halakha. Rather, it is referring to the hiding of witnesses behind a fence in order to ensnare the inciter, as his life is treated with contempt and derision, as though he were an ordinary person, i.e., a simpleton.

דתניא ושאר כל חייבי מיתות שבתורה אין מכמינין עליהן חוץ מזו As it is taught in a baraita: And with regard to all the rest of those liable to receive the death penalty by Torah law, the court does not hide witnesses in order to ensnare them and punish them except for this case of an inciter.

כיצד עושין לו מדליקין לו את הנר בבית הפנימי ומושיבין לו עדים בבית החיצון כדי שיהו הן רואין אותו ושומעין את קולו והוא אינו רואה אותן והלה אומר לו אמור מה שאמרת לי ביחוד והוא אומר לו והלה אומר לו היאך נניח את אלהינו שבשמים ונעבוד עבודת כוכבים אם חוזר בו מוטב ואם אמר כך היא חובתנו וכך יפה לנו העדים ששומעין מבחוץ מביאין אותו לבית דין וסוקלין אותו: How does the court do this to him? The agents of the court light a candle for him in an inner room, and they place witnesses for him in an outer room in the dark, so that they can see him and hear his voice but he cannot see them. And the other person, whom the inciter had previously tried to incite, says to him: Say what you said to me when we were in seclusion. And he says to him again that he should worship the idol. And the other person says to him: How can we forsake our God in Heaven and worship idols? If the inciter retracts his suggestion, that is good. But if he says: This idol worship is our duty, and this is what suits us, the witnesses, who are listening from outside, bring him to court, and they have him stoned.

[הוספה מחסרונות הש"ס: וכן עשו לבן סטדא בלוד ותלאוהו בערב הפסח And the court did the same to an inciter named ben Setada, from the city of Lod, and they hanged him on Passover eve.

בן סטדא בן פנדירא הוא אמר רב חסדא בעל — סטדא בועל — פנדירא בעל פפוס בן יהודה הוא אלא אֵימא אמו סטדא אמו מרים מגדלא נשיא הואי כדאמרי בפומדיתא סטת דא מבעלה:] The Gemara asks: Why did they call him ben Setada, when he was the son of Pandeira? Rav Ḥisda says: Perhaps his mother’s husband, who acted as his father, was named Setada, but his mother’s paramour, who fathered this mamzer, was named Pandeira. The Gemara challenges: But his mother’s husband was Pappos ben Yehuda, not Setada. Rather, perhaps his mother was named Setada, and he was named ben Setada after her. The Gemara challenges: But his mother was Miriam, who braided women’s hair. The Gemara explains: That is not a contradiction; Setada was merely a nickname, as they say in Pumbedita: This one strayed [setat da] from her husband.

מתני׳ המדיח זה האומר נלך ונעבוד עבודת כוכבים MISHNA: With regard to the case of the subverter listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, this is one who says to a multitude of people: Let us go and worship idols.

המכשף העושה מעשה חייב ולא האוחז את העינים ר"ע אומר משום ר' יהושע שנים לוקטין קשואין אחד לוקט פטור ואחד לוקט חייב העושה מעשה חייב האוחז את העינים פטור: The warlock is also liable to be executed by stoning. One who performs a real act of sorcery is liable, but not one who deceives the eyes, making it appear as though he is performing sorcery, as that is not considered sorcery. Rabbi Akiva says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: For example, two people can each gather cucumbers by sorcery. One of them gathers cucumbers and he is exempt, and the other one gathers cucumbers and he is liable. How so? The one who performs a real act of sorcery is liable, and the one who deceives the eyes is exempt.

גמ׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מדיחי עיר הנדחת שנו כאן: GEMARA: With regard to the case of subverters mentioned in the mishna, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The Sages taught here the case of the subverters of an idolatrous city. Accordingly, there is no halakhic difference between one who incites individuals to idolatry and one who subverts an entire city; both are liable to be executed by stoning.

המכשף זה העושה מעשה וכו': תנו רבנן מכשפה אחד האיש ואחד האשה א"כ מה ת"ל מכשפה מפני שרוב נשים מצויות בכשפים The mishna teaches that the case of the warlock is referring to one who performs a real act of sorcery. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse: “You shall not allow a witch to live” (Exodus 22:17), does not refer only to a female who practices sorcery; both a man and a woman are included. If so, why does verse state “a witch”? This is because most women are familiar with witchcraft.

מיתתן במה רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר נאמר כאן (שמות כב, יז) מכשפה לא תחיה ונאמר להלן (דברים כ, טז) לא תחיה כל נשמה מה להלן בסייף אף כאן בסייף In what manner is their death sentence administered? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is stated here: “You shall not allow a witch to live,” and it is stated there, with regard to the conquest of the Canaanites: “You shall allow nothing that breathes to live” (Deuteronomy 20:16). Just as there, the Canaanites were to be killed by the sword (see Numbers 21:24), so too here, the execution of a witch is administered by the sword.

ר' עקיבא אומר נאמר כאן מכשפה לא תחיה ונאמר להלן (שמות יט, יג) אם בהמה אם איש לא יחיה מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה Rabbi Akiva says: It is stated here: “You shall not allow a witch to live,” and it is stated there, with regard to Mount Sinai: “No hand shall touch it, for he shall be stoned, or thrown down; whether it be animal or man, it shall not live” (Exodus 19:13). Just as there, the verse speaks of stoning, so too here, a witch is executed by stoning.

אמר לו ר' יוסי אני דנתי לא תחיה מלא תחיה ואתה דנת לא תחיה מלא יחיה Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to him: I derived the meaning of the verse “You shall not allow a witch to live” from the verse “You shall allow nothing that breathes to live” via a verbal analogy between two similar phrases, but you derived the meaning of the verse “You shall not allow a witch to live” from the verse “It shall not live,” which is a less similar phrase.

אמר לו רבי עקיבא אני דנתי ישראל מישראל שריבה בהן הכתוב מיתות הרבה ואתה דנת ישראל מעובדי כוכבים שלא ריבה בהן הכתוב אלא Rabbi Akiva said to him: I derived a halakha concerning Jews from a halakha concerning Jews, with regard to whom the verse included many types of death penalties. Therefore, the fact that the expression “It shall not live” refers to stoning when stated with regard to Jews is especially significant. But you derived a halakha concerning Jews from a halakha concerning gentiles, with regard to whom the verse included only

Daf 67b

מיתה אחת one type of death penalty, namely, decapitation. Since that is the only type of capital punishment that applies to gentiles, it cannot be derived through a verbal analogy that the same type applies to a Jewish sorceror.

בן עזאי אומר נאמר (שמות כב, יז) מכשפה לא תחיה ונאמר (שמות כב, יח) כל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת סמכו ענין לו מה שוכב עם בהמה בסקילה אף מכשף בסקילה The baraita continues: Ben Azzai says that it is stated: “You shall not allow a witch to live” (Exodus 22:17), and it is stated in the following verse: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). The fact that the Torah juxtaposes this matter to that matter is to teach that just as one who lies with an animal is executed by stoning (see Leviticus, chapter 20), so too, a warlock is executed by stoning.

אמר לו רבי יהודה וכי מפני שסמכו ענין לו נוציא לזה בסקילה אלא אוב וידעוני בכלל מכשפים היו ולמה יצאו להקיש עליהן ולומר לך מה אוב וידעוני בסקילה אף מכשף בסקילה With regard to this derivation, Rabbi Yehuda said to him: And because the Torah juxtaposes this matter with that matter, shall we take this person out to be stoned? Should he be sentenced to the most severe type of capital punishment on that basis? Rather, the source is as follows: A necromancer and a sorcerer were included in the general category of warlocks, and why were they singled out from the rest, with their prohibition and punishment stated independently? This was done in order to draw an analogy to them and say to you: Just as a necromancer and a sorcerer are executed by stoning, so too, a warlock is executed by stoning.

לרבי יהודה נמי ליהוו אוב וידעוני שני כתובים הבאים כאחד וכל שני כתובין הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, let the punishment with regard to a necromancer and a sorcerer be considered two verses that come as one, i.e., that teach the same matter, and therefore the halakha of other cases cannot be derived from it, according to the principle that any two verses that come as one do not teach about other cases. In other words, if a halakha is taught with regard to two individual cases in the Torah, the understanding is that this halakha applies only to those cases. Had this halakha applied to all other relevant cases as well, it would not have been necessary for the Torah to teach it twice. The fact that two cases are mentioned indicates that they are the exceptions rather than the rule.

אמר רבי זכריה עדא אמרה קסבר ר' יהודה שני כתובין הבאין כאחד מלמדין Rabbi Zekharya says: This means that Rabbi Yehuda holds that two verses that come as one do teach about other cases.

אמר רבי יוחנן למה נקרא שמן כשפים שמכחישין פמליא של מעלה: § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why is sorcery called keshafim? Because it is an acronym for: Contradicts the heavenly entourage [shemakhḥishin pamalia shel mala]. Sorcery appears to contradict the laws of nature established by God.

(דברים ד, לה) אין עוד מלבדו אמר רבי חנינא אפילו לדבר כשפים The verse states: “To you it was shown, so that you should know that the Lord is God; there is none else besides Him” (Deuteronomy 4:35). Rabbi Ḥanina says: This is true even with regard to a matter of sorcery; sorcery is ineffective against a righteous person.

ההיא איתתא דהות קא מהדרא למשקל עפרא מתותי כרעיה דרבי חנינא אמר לה אי מסתייעת זילי עבידי אין עוד מלבדו כתיב The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was attempting to take dust from under the feet of Rabbi Ḥanina in order to perform sorcery on him and harm him. Rabbi Ḥanina said to her: If you succeed, go and do it. I am not concerned about it, as it is written: “There is none else besides Him.”

איני והאמר רבי יוחנן למה נקרא שמן מכשפים שמכחישין פמליא של מעלה שאני רבי חנינא דנפיש זכותיה The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: Why are sorcerers called mekhashefim? Because it is an acronym for: Contradicts the heavenly entourage. This indicates that one should be wary of sorcery. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina is different, as his merit is great, and sorcery certainly has no effect on such a righteous person.

אמר רבי אייבו בר נגרי אמר רבי חייא בר אבא בלטיהם אלו מעשה שדים בלהטיהם אלו מעשה כשפים וכן הוא אומר (בראשית ג, כד) ואת להט החרב המתהפכת Rabbi Aivu bar Nagri says that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that in the verse: “And the magicians of Egypt did in that manner with their secret arts [belateihem]” (Exodus 7:22), these words are describing acts of employing demons, which are invisible, and their actions are therefore hidden [balat]. With regard to the similar term “belahateihem” (Exodus 7:11), these are acts of sorcery, which sorcerers perform themselves, without using demons. And likewise it says: “And the flaming [lahat] sword that turned every way” (Genesis 3:24), referring to a sword that revolves by itself.

אמר אביי דקפיד אמנא שד דלא קפיד אמנא כשפים Abaye says: A sorcerer who is particular about using a certain utensil for his sorcery is employing a demon; one who is not particular about using a certain utensil is performing an act of sorcery.

אמר אביי הלכות כשפים כהלכות שבת יש מהן בסקילה ויש מהן פטור אבל אסור ויש מהן מותר לכתחלה Abaye says: The halakhot of sorcery are like the halakhot of Shabbat, in that their actions can be divided into three categories: There are some of them for which one is liable to be executed by stoning, and there are some of them for which one is exempt from punishment by Torah law but they are prohibited by rabbinic law, and there are some of them that are permitted ab initio.

העושה מעשה בסקילה האוחז את העינים פטור אבל אסור מותר לכתחלה כדרב חנינא ורב אושעיא כל מעלי שבתא הוו עסקי בהלכות יצירה ומיברי להו עיגלא תילתא ואכלי ליה Abaye elaborates: One who performs a real act of sorcery is liable to be executed by stoning. One who deceives the eyes is exempt from punishment, but it is prohibited for him to do so. What is permitted ab initio is to act like Rav Ḥanina and Rav Oshaya: Every Shabbat eve they would engage in the study of the halakhot of creation, and a third-born calf would be created for them, and they would eat it in honor of Shabbat.

אמר רב אשי חזינא ליה לאבוה דקרנא דנפיץ ושדי כריכי דשיראי מנחיריה Rav Ashi said: I saw Karna’s father perform a magic trick in which he would blow his nose and cast rolls of silk from his nostrils by deceiving the eye.

(שמות ח, טו) ויאמרו החרטומים אל פרעה אצבע אלהים היא אמר ר' אליעזר מיכן שאין השד יכול לבראות בריה פחות מכשעורה With regard to the verse: “And the magicians said to Pharaoh: This is the finger of God” (Exodus 8:15), Rabbi Eliezer says: It is derived from here that a demon cannot create an entity smaller than the size of a barley grain. Consequently, the magicians were not capable of duplicating the plague of lice, and they realized that this was not an act of sorcery but was performed by God.

רב פפא אמר האלהים אפילו כגמלא נמי לא מצי ברי האי מיכניף ליה והאי לא מיכניף ליה Rav Pappa said: By God! They cannot create even an entity as large as a camel. They do not create anything. Rather, they can gather these large animals, leading them from one place to another, but they cannot gather those small animals.

א"ל רב לרבי חייא לדידי חזי לי ההוא טייעא דשקליה לספסירא וגיידיה לגמלא וטרף ליה בטבלא וקם אמר ליה לבתר הכי דם ופרתא מי הואי אלא ההיא אחיזת עינים הוה Rav said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: I myself saw a certain Arab who took a sword and sliced a camel and then beat a drum [betavla], and the camel arose from the dead. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: Was there blood and excretion afterward in that place, which flowed from the camel when it was sliced? Rather, since there was none, that was clearly a deception of the eyes and not sorcery.

זעירי איקלע לאלכסנדריא של מצרים זבן חמרא כי מטא לאשקוייה מיא פשר וקם גמלא דוסקניתא אמרו ליה אי לאו זעירי את לא הוה מהדרינן לך מי איכא דזבין מידי הכא ולא בדיק ליה אמיא: The Gemara relates: Ze’eiri happened to come to Alexandria of Egypt. He bought a donkey. When he was about to give it water to drink the magic thawed when the donkey touched the water and it was revealed that it was not a donkey, and it turned into the plank of a bridge. The ones who sold it to him said to him: If you were not Ze’eiri, a distinguished person, we would not refund you the money for the donkey. Is there anyone who buys an item here and does not examine it first with water? Since sorcery was widespread there, anyone who bought an item examined it in order to find out if it was affected by sorcery, and if one did not examine an acquired item by exposing it to water and it turned out to be under a spell, he suffered the loss.

ינאי איקלע לההוא אושפיזא אמר להו אשקין מיא קריבו שתיתא חזא דקא מרחשן שפוותה שדא פורתא מיניה הוו עקרבי אמר להו אנא שתאי מדידכו אתון נמי שתו מדידי אשקייה הואי חמרא רכבה סליק לשוקא אתא חברתה פשרה לה חזייה דרכיב וקאי אאיתתא בשוקא The Gemara relates: A man named Yannai arrived at a certain inn. He said to the innkeepers: Give me water to drink. They brought him flour mixed with water. He saw that the lips of the innkeeper woman were moving, and he cast a bit of the drink to the ground, and it turned into scorpions, and he understood that the innkeepers performed sorcery on the drink. Yannai said to them: I drank from yours; you too drink from mine, and he also performed sorcery on the drink. He gave it to her to drink and she turned into a donkey. He rode upon her and went to the marketplace. Her friend came and released her from the sorcery, and people saw him riding on a woman in the marketplace.

(שמות ח, ב) ותעל הצפרדע ותכס את ארץ מצרים אמר ר' אלעזר צפרדע אחת היתה השריצה ומלאה כל ארץ מצרים It is stated with regard to the plagues of Egypt: “And the frog came up and covered the land of Egypt” (Exodus 8:2). Noting that the term “the frog” is written in the singular, Rabbi Elazar says: At first it was one frog; it spawned and filled the entire land of Egypt with frogs.

כתנאי רבי עקיבא אומר צפרדע אחת היתה ומלאה כל ארץ מצרים אמר לו רבי אלעזר בן עזריה עקיבא מה לך אצל הגדה כלה מדברותיך ולך אצל נגעים ואהלות צפרדע אחת היתה שרקה להם והם באו: The Gemara comments: This matter is subject to a dispute between tanna’im: Rabbi Akiva says: It was one frog, and it spawned and filled the entire land of Egypt with frogs. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to him: Akiva, what are you doing occupying yourself with the study of aggada? This is not your field of expertise. Take your statements to the tractates of Nega’im and Oholot. In other words, it is preferable that you teach the halakhot of the impurity of leprosy and the impurity imparted in a tent, which are among the most difficult areas of halakha and are within your field of expertise. Rather, the verse is to be understood as follows: It was one frog; it whistled to the other frogs, and they all came after it.

אמר ר' עקיבא כו': § In the mishna, Rabbi Akiva says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua that two people can each gather cucumbers by sorcery, one of whom is exempt, as he merely deceives the eyes, and one of whom is liable, as he performs real sorcery.

Daf 68a

והא ר' עקיבא מר' יהושע גמיר לה והתניא כשחלה ר' אליעזר נכנסו ר' עקיבא וחביריו לבקרו הוא יושב בקינוף שלו והן יושבין בטרקלין שלו The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Akiva learn these halakhot from Rabbi Yehoshua? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: When Rabbi Eliezer took ill, Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues came to visit him. He was sitting on his canopied bed [bekinof ], and they were sitting in his parlor [biteraklin]; they did not know if he would be able to receive them, due to his illness.

ואותו היום ע"ש היה ונכנס הורקנוס בנו לחלוץ תפליו גער בו ויצא בנזיפה אמר להן לחביריו כמדומה אני שדעתו של אבא נטרפה אמר להן דעתו ודעת אמו נטרפה היאך מניחין איסור סקילה ועוסקין באיסור שבות And that day was Shabbat eve, and Rabbi Eliezer’s son Hyrcanus entered to remove his phylacteries, as phylacteries are not worn on Shabbat. His father berated him, and he left reprimanded. Hyrcanus said to his father’s colleagues: It appears to me that father went insane, since he berated me for no reason. Rabbi Eliezer heard this and said to them: He, Hyrcanus, and his mother went insane. How can they neglect Shabbat preparations with regard to prohibitions punishable by stoning, such as lighting the candles and preparing hot food, and engage in preparations concerning prohibitions by rabbinic decree, such as wearing phylacteries on Shabbat?

כיון שראו חכמים שדעתו מיושבת עליו נכנסו וישבו לפניו מרחוק ד' אמות Since the Sages perceived from this retort that his mind was stable, they entered and sat before him at a distance of four cubits, as he was ostracized (see Bava Metzia 59b). It is forbidden to sit within four cubits of an ostracized person.

א"ל למה באתם א"ל ללמוד תורה באנו א"ל ועד עכשיו למה לא באתם א"ל לא היה לנו פנאי אמר להן תמיה אני אם ימותו מיתת עצמן אמר לו ר' עקיבא שלי מהו אמר לו שלך קשה משלהן Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Why have you come? They said to him: We have come to study Torah, as they did not want to say that they came to visit him due to his illness. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: And why have you not come until now? They said to him: We did not have spare time. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: I would be surprised if these Sages die their own death, i.e., a natural death. Rather, they will be tortured to death by the Romans. Rabbi Akiva said to him: How will my death come about? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Your death will be worse than theirs, as you were my primary student and you did not come to study.

נטל שתי זרועותיו והניחן על לבו אמר אוי לכם שתי זרועותיי שהן כשתי ספרי תורה שנגללין הרבה תורה למדתי והרבה תורה לימדתי הרבה תורה למדתי ולא חסרתי מרבותי אפילו ככלב המלקק מן הים הרבה תורה לימדתי ולא חסרוני תלמידי אלא כמכחול בשפופרת Rabbi Eliezer raised his two arms and placed them on his heart, and he said: Woe to you, my two arms, as they are like two Torah scrolls that are now being rolled up, and will never be opened again. I have learned much Torah, and I have taught much Torah. I have learned much Torah, and I have not taken away from my teachers, i.e., I have not received from their wisdom, even like a dog lapping from the sea. I have taught much Torah, and my students have taken away from me, i.e., they have received from my wisdom, only like the tiny amount that a paintbrush removes from a tube of paint.

ולא עוד אלא שאני שונה שלש מאות הלכות בבהרת עזה ולא היה אדם ששואלני בהן דבר מעולם ולא עוד אלא שאני שונה שלש מאות הלכות ואמרי לה שלשת אלפים הלכות בנטיעת קשואין ולא היה אדם שואלני בהן דבר מעולם חוץ מעקיבא בן יוסף Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot with regard to a snow-white leprous mark [bebaheret], but no person has ever asked me anything about them. He could not find a student who could fully understand him in those matters. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot, and some say that Rabbi Eliezer said three thousand halakhot, with regard to the planting of cucumbers by sorcery, but no person has ever asked me anything about them, besides Akiva ben Yosef.

פעם אחת אני והוא מהלכין היינו בדרך אמר לי רבי למדני בנטיעת קשואין אמרתי דבר אחד נתמלאה כל השדה קשואין אמר לי רבי למדתני נטיעתן למדני עקירתן אמרתי דבר אחד נתקבצו כולן למקום אחד Rabbi Eliezer described the incident: Once he and I were walking along the way, and he said to me: My teacher, teach me about the planting of cucumbers. I said one statement of sorcery, and the entire field became filled with cucumbers. He said to me: My teacher, you have taught me about planting them; teach me about uprooting them. I said one statement and they all were gathered to one place.

אמרו לו הכדור והאמוס והקמיע וצרור המרגליות ומשקולת קטנה מהו אמר להן הן טמאין וטהרתן במה שהן After these comments, the Sages asked him questions of halakha: What is the halakha, with regard to ritual impurity, of a ball made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise a last, the frame on which a shoe is fashioned, which is made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise an amulet wrapped in leather, and a pouch for pearls, wrapped in leather, and a small weight, which is wrapped in leather? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: They are susceptible to impurity, and their purification is effected by immersing them in a ritual bath as they are, as there is no need to open them up.

מנעל שעל גבי האמוס מהו אמר להן הוא טהור ויצאה נשמתו בטהרה עמד רבי יהושע על רגליו ואמר הותר הנדר הותר הנדר They asked him further: What is the halakha with regard to a shoe that is on a last? Is it considered a complete vessel, which needs no further preparation, and is therefore susceptible to impurity? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: It is pure, and with this word, his soul left him in purity. Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: The vow is permitted; the vow is permitted; i.e., the ostracism that was placed on Rabbi Eliezer is removed.

למוצאי שבת פגע בו רבי עקיבא מן קיסרי ללוד היה מכה בבשרו עד שדמו שותת לארץ פתח עליו בשורה ואמר (מלכים ב ב, יב) אבי אבי רכב ישראל ופרשיו הרבה מעות יש לי ואין לי שולחני להרצותן Rabbi Akiva was not present at the time of his death. At the conclusion of Shabbat, Rabbi Akiva encountered the funeral procession on his way from Caesarea to Lod. Rabbi Akiva was striking his flesh in terrible anguish and regret until his blood flowed to the earth. He began to eulogize Rabbi Eliezer in the row of those comforting the mourners, and said: “My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and its horsemen” (II Kings 2:12). I have many coins, but I do not have a money changer to whom to give them, i.e., I have many questions, but after your death I have no one who can answer them.

אלמא מרבי אליעזר גמרה גמרה מרבי אליעזר ולא סברה הדר גמרה מרבי יהושע ואסברה ניהליה The Gemara returns to the matter at hand: Apparently, Rabbi Akiva learned the halakhot of gathering cucumbers through sorcery from Rabbi Eliezer, not from Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemara answers: He learned it from Rabbi Eliezer but he did not understand it. Later he learned it from Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Yehoshua explained it to him.

היכי עביד הכי והאנן תנן העושה מעשה חייב להתלמד שאני דאמר מר (דברים יח, ט) לא תלמד לעשות לעשות אי אתה למד אבל אתה למד להבין ולהורות: The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Eliezer have performed that act of sorcery? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that one who performs an act of sorcery is liable? The Gemara answers: Performing sorcery not in order to use it, but in order to teach oneself the halakhot is different, and it is permitted; as the Master says that it is derived from the verse: “You shall not learn to do like the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you…one who uses divination, a soothsayer, an enchanter, or a sorcerer” (Deuteronomy 18:9–10), so that you shall not learn, i.e., it is prohibited for you to learn, in order to do, but you may learn, i.e., it is permitted for you to learn, in order to understand the matter yourself and teach it to others.

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Daf 68b

מתני׳ בן סורר ומורה מאימתי נעשה בן סורר ומורה MISHNA: The Torah describes the punishment given to a son who steals money from his parents to eat a gluttonous meal of meat and wine in the company of lowly men. If his parents bring him to court for this act, he is exhorted to desist and is punished with lashes. If he repeats the same misdeed and is again brought to court by his parents within the same three-month period, he is considered a stubborn and rebellious son [ben sorer umoreh]. He is liable to receive the death penalty, which in this case is execution by stoning. From when does a stubborn and rebellious son become liable to receive the death penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son?

משיביא שתי שערות ועד שיקיף זקן התחתון ולא העליון אלא שדברו חכמים בלשון נקיה שנאמר (דברים כא, יח) כי יהיה לאיש בן בן ולא בת בן ולא איש קטן פטור שלא בא לכלל מצות: From when he grows two pubic hairs, which are a sign of puberty and from which time he is considered an adult, until he has grown a beard around. The reference here is to the lower beard surrounding his genitals, and not the upper beard, i.e., his facial hair, but the Sages spoke in euphemistic terms. As it is stated: “If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son” (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed upon a son, but not upon a daughter; and upon a son, but not upon a fully grown man. A minor under the age of thirteen is exempt from the penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, because he has not yet reached the age of inclusion in mitzvot.

גמ׳ קטן מנלן דפטור מנלן כדקתני טעמא שלא בא לכלל מצות ותו היכא אשכחן דענש הכתוב דהכא ליבעי קרא למיפטריה GEMARA: The Gemara inquires about the source of the halakha taught in the mishna: From where do we derive that a minor is exempt from the punishment imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son? The Gemara comments: This question is puzzling: From where do we derive this halakha? The reason is as is taught in the mishna: Because he has not yet reached the age of inclusion in mitzvot. And furthermore, where do we find that the verse punishes a minor, so that a special verse should be required here in order to exempt him?

אנן הכי קאמרינן אטו בן סורר ומורה על חטאו נהרג על שם סופו נהרג וכיון דעל שם סופו נהרג אפילו קטן נמי ועוד בן ולא איש קטן משמע The Gemara clarifies: This is what we are saying: Is this to say that a stubborn and rebellious son is killed for a sin that he already committed? But, as will be explained (71b), he is killed for what he will become in the end. The Torah understands that since the boy has already embarked on an evil path, he will continue to be drawn after his natural tendencies and commit many offenses that are more severe. It is therefore preferable that he should be killed now so that he may die in relative innocence, rather than be put to death in the future bearing much more guilt. And since he is executed for what he will become in the end, one might have thought that even a minor as well can be sentenced to the death penalty as a stubborn and rebellious son. And furthermore, the exclusion: “A son,” but not a man, indicates that a minor is in fact included in the halakha, as he is not yet a man.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב דאמר קרא וכי יהיה לאיש בן בן הסמוך לגבורתו של איש: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: A minor is exempt from the punishment imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, as the verse states: “If a man has a son” (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the halakha applies to a son who is close to the stage of having the strength of a man, i.e., close to full maturity, but not to a younger boy.

ועד שיקיף זקן התחתון כו': תני רבי חייא עד שיקיף עטרה כי אתא רב דימי אמר הקפת גיד ולא הקפת ביצים § The mishna teaches that a boy can be sentenced as a stubborn and rebellious son only until he has grown a lower beard. Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches a baraita that states: Until the hair surrounds the corona. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said in explanation of Rabbi Ḥiyya’s statement: The reference in the mishna is to hair surrounding the penis and not to hair surrounding the sac holding the testicles, which grows later.

אמר רב חסדא קטן שהוליד אין בנו נעשה בן סורר ומורה שנא' כי יהיה לאיש בן לאיש בן ולא לבן בן האי מיבעי ליה לכדרב יהודה אמר רב א"כ לימא קרא כי יהיה בן לאיש מאי כי יהיה לאיש בן ש"מ לכדרב חסדא § Rav Ḥisda says: In the case of a minor who fathered a child, his son cannot become a stubborn and rebellious son, as it is stated: “If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son,” which indicates that the halakha applies only if a man has a son, but not if a son, i.e., one who is not yet a man, has a son. The Gemara asks: How can Rav Ḥisda derive his halakha from this verse? Doesn’t he require this verse to teach us that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, namely, that a minor is exempt from the punishment imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son? The Gemara answers: This verse teaches two halakhot, as, were the intention to teach only the halakha that a minor is exempt, let the verse say: If there be a son to a man. For what reason does the verse introduce a change into the normal word order and state: “If a man has a son”? Conclude from it that the verse serves to teach the ruling of Rav Ḥisda.

ואימא כוליה להכי הוא דאתא אם כן נימא קרא בן איש מאי לאיש בן שמע מינה תרתי The Gemara asks: If so, say that the entire verse comes to teach us this, i.e., what Rav Ḥisda said, and that it does not teach that a minor is not included in the halakha of a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara answers: If so, the verse should have stated: If there be the son of a man. What is the meaning of: “If a man has a son”? Conclude two conclusions from it, both that a minor cannot become a stubborn and rebellious son and that if a minor fathered a son, the son cannot become a stubborn and rebellious son.

ופליגא דרבה דאמר רבה קטן אינו מוליד שנא' (במדבר ה, ח) אם אין לאיש גואל וכי יש לך אדם בישראל שאין לו גואל The Gemara comments: And Rav Ḥisda’s statement disagrees with the opinion of Rabba, as Rabba says in connection with one who returns stolen property after having taken a false oath that he did not steal it: A minor cannot father a child, as it is stated: “But if the man has no relative to whom restitution may be made, let the trespass that is recompensed to the Lord be the priest’s” (Numbers 5:8). And is there any man in the Jewish people who does not have a relative? All members of the Jewish people are related, as they all descend from the patriarch Jacob, and therefore every person has a relative who is fit to inherit from him.

אלא בגזל הגר הכתוב מדבר Rather, the verse is speaking of the robbery of a convert, who is treated like a newborn child and considered to have no ties to his natural parents or relatives. If he did not father any children after his conversion, he is a man with no relatives at all, and therefore if he dies, property that had been stolen from him must be returned to a priest.

Daf 69a

ואמר רחמנא איש איש אתה צריך לחזור עליו אם יש לו גואלין ואם לאו קטן אי אתה צריך לחזור עליו בידוע שאין לו גואלין And the Merciful One states: “But if the man has no relative,” teaching that it is only in the case of a convert who is a man that you must go around seeking whether or not he has relatives, i.e., children who were born to him after his conversion. But in the case of a convert who is a minor, you do not have to go around searching for relatives; it is known that he has no relative, since a minor cannot father a child.

איתיביה אביי איש אין לי אלא איש בן ט' שנים ויום אחד שראוי לביאה מניין ת"ל ואיש Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a baraita discussing a designated maidservant, about whom the verse states: “And if a man lies carnally with a woman who is a maidservant designated to a man, and not fully redeemed, nor freedom given her, inquiry shall be made; they shall not be put to death, because she was not free” (Leviticus 19:20). From the word “man,” I have derived only that this halakha applies to an adult man. But as for a minor aged nine years and one day, who is fit for engaging in intercourse, from where is it derived that he too is subject to this halakha? The verse states: “And if a man.” The extraneous letter vav, meaning “and,” serves to include a minor who is nine years old, as already at that age he can perform complete intercourse.

א"ל יש לו ואינו מוליד כתבואה שלא הביאה שליש דמי Rabba said to Abaye: There is no proof from here, as even though a nine-year-old boy has sperm, he cannot father a child. His sperm is like the seed of grain that was cut even though it had not yet reached one-third of its growth. Such seed, even if planted, will not grow.

דבי חזקיה תנא (שמות כא, יד) וכי יזיד איש איש מזיד ומזריע ואין קטן מזיד ומזריע א"ל רב מרדכי לרב אשי מאי משמע דהאי מזיד לישנא דבשולי הוא דכתיב (בראשית כה, כט) ויזד יעקב נזיד A Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse states: “But if a man comes intentionally [yazid] against his neighbor, to slay him with guile, you shall take him from My altar, that he may die” (Exodus 21:14). The use of the term yazid in this context and its juxtaposition to the word “man” teaches that a man can heat [mezid] himself up and produce viable sperm, but a minor cannot heat himself up and produce viable sperm. Therefore, even though a minor can engage in full intercourse with a woman, he cannot father a child. Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: From where may it be inferred that this word mezid is a term meaning heating up? As it is written in a different verse: “And Jacob cooked [vayyazed] pottage” (Genesis 25:29).

והא תנא דבי ר' ישמעאל בן ולא אב The Gemara asks: But didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach the following baraita concerning a stubborn and rebellious son: The verse that states: “If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son,” teaches that a son can become a stubborn and rebellious son, but not a father, so that one who has a child cannot be sentenced as a stubborn and rebellious son.

היכי דמי אילימא דאיעבר בתר דאייתי שתי שערות ואוליד מקמי דלקיף זקן מי איכא שהות כולי האי והא א"ר כרוספדאי כל ימיו של בן סורר ומורה אינו אלא ג' חדשים בלבד אלא לאו דאיעבר מקמי דלייתי שתי שערות ואוליד מקמיה דלקיף זקן וש"מ קטן מוליד The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that his wife conceived after he grew two pubic hairs and the baby was born before he grew a beard around his genitals, is there such a long interval between these two times to allow for carrying the child to term? But doesn’t Rabbi Kruspedai say: The entire time during which it is possible to judge and sentence a stubborn and rebellious son is only three months, the time between the appearance of two pubic hairs and the growth of a beard around the genitals? Consequently, it is impossible for a child to be born to the stubborn and rebellious son during this period. Rather, is it not that his wife conceived before he grew two pubic hairs, and the baby was born before he grew a beard around his genitals? And you can learn from it that a minor can, in fact, father a child.

לא לעולם דאיעבר בתר דאייתי שתי שערות ואוליד בתר דאקיף זקן ודקא קשיא דרבי כרוספדאי כי אתא רב דימי אמר אמרי במערבא בן ולא הראוי לקרותו אב The Gemara rejects this reasoning: No, actually, you can explain that his wife conceived only after he grew two pubic hairs, and the baby was born after he grew a beard around his genitals. And as for that which is difficult for you based on the statement of Rabbi Kruspedai that the halakha governing a stubborn and rebellious son applies for only three months, it can be explained as follows: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, that the term “son” teaches that only a son can become a stubborn and rebellious son, but not one who is fit to be called a father. That is to say, the verse does not exclude someone whose child was born during this period, but rather one whose wife conceived during this time, so that he is fit to be called a father.

גופא אמר ר' כרוספדאי א"ר שבתי כל ימיו של בן סורר ומורה אינן אלא ג' חדשים בלבד והאנן תנן משיביא שתי שערות ועד שיקיף זקן הקיף זקן אע"ג דלא מלו ג' חדשים מלו ג' חדשים אע"ג דלא הקיף § Returning to the matter itself: Rabbi Kruspedai says that Rabbi Shabbtai says: The entire time during which it is possible to judge and sentence a stubborn and rebellious son is only three months. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that a boy can be judged as a stubborn and rebellious son from when he grows two pubic hairs until he grows a beard around his genitals? This seems to indicate that his liability depends on his physical maturity, and not on any specific time period. The Gemara answers: If he grew a beard around his genitals, then even if three months have not passed, he can no longer become liable as a stubborn and rebellious son. And if three months passed, then even if he has not grown a beard around his genitals, he is similarly exempt.

יתיב רבי יעקב מנהר פקוד קמיה דרבינא ויתיב וקאמר משמיה דרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע ש"מ מדרבי כרוספדאי א"ר שבתי יולדת לשבעה אין עוברה ניכר לשליש ימיה Rabbi Ya’akov from Nehar Pekod sat before Ravina and sat and said in the name of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: Learn from the statement that Rabbi Kruspedai says that Rabbi Shabbtai says that when a woman gives birth at seven months, her fetus cannot yet be discerned after one-third of her days of pregnancy. In a nine-month pregnancy, the fetus can be discerned after three months, which is one-third of the pregnancy. In the case of a pregnancy that lasts seven months, the fetus cannot be discerned at the end of one-third of the pregnancy, i.e., after two and one-third months, but after three months, as in a standard nine-month pregnancy.

דאי ס"ד עוברה ניכר לשליש ימיה למה לי ג' בתרי ותילתא סגיא Rabbi Ya’akov explains the inference: As if it enters your mind that when a woman gives birth at seven months, her fetus can already be discerned after one-third of her days of pregnancy, i.e., after two and one-third months, why do I need three months from the time the boy reaches adulthood until the end of the time that he can become liable as a stubborn and rebellious son? A period of two and one-third months should suffice. If he engaged in intercourse with a woman immediately upon reaching adulthood and the intercourse resulted in a seven-month pregnancy, the fetus would be able to be discerned after two and one-third months, and he would be fit to be called a father already from then. From the statement of Rabbi Kruspedai, citing Rabbi Shabbtai, it is clear that the earliest time the fetus can be discerned is after three months of the pregnancy have passed.

א"ל לעולם אימא לך עוברה ניכר לשליש ימיה זיל בתר רובא Ravina said to Rabbi Ya’akov: Actually, I could say to you that even when a woman gives birth at seven months, her fetus can already be discerned after one-third of her days of pregnancy. But the halakha with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son was not adjusted accordingly because of the principle that one follows the majority. Most women give birth at nine months, and their fetuses are discernible only after three months. Therefore, the fact that one would be fit to be called a father in the case of a seven-month pregnancy is disregarded.

אמרוה קמיה דרב הונא בריה דרב יהושע אמר ליה ובדיני נפשות מי אזלינן בתר רובא התורה אמרה (במדבר לה, כד) ושפטו העדה והצילו העדה ואת אמרת זיל בתר רובא The Sages stated this answer before Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, whereupon he said to them: But do we blindly follow the majority in cases of capital law and not judge each case on its own merits? Doesn’t the Torah state: “And the congregation shall judge…and the congregation shall deliver” (Numbers 35:24–25), from which it is derived that the court must make every effort to find exculpatory arguments in support of the accused; and yet you say that one follows the majority? If it is possible that already after two and one-third months the stubborn and rebellious son will be fit to be called a father, from that time on he should be exempt from punishment.

אהדרוה קמיה דרבינא א"ל ובדיני נפשות לא אזלינן בתר רובא והתנן אחד אומר בשנים בחדש ואחד אומר בג' עדותן קיימת שזה יודע בעיבורו של חדש וזה אינו יודע The Sages then brought Rav Huna’s analysis back to Ravina and presented it before him. Ravina said to them: And do we not follow the majority in cases of capital law? But didn’t we learn in the mishna (Sanhedrin 40a): If one witness says that the event occurred on the second of the month, and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, this is not regarded as a contradiction and their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that this witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event occurred on the second of the month, and that witness does not know of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event occurred on the third of the month.

ואי ס"ד לא אמרינן זיל בתר רובא נימא הני דוקא קא מסהדי ואכחושי הוא דקא מכחשי אהדדי אלא לאו משום דאמרינן זיל בתר רובא ורובא דאינשי עבדי דטעו בעיבורא דירחא And if it enters your mind that we do not say that one follows the majority in cases of capital law, let us then say that these witnesses are testifying with precision, and that they contradict each other, and therefore the accused should be acquitted. Rather, is it not because we say that one follows the majority, and the majority of people are apt to err with regard to the addition of an extra day to the month?

אמר רבי ירמיה מדפתי אף אנן נמי תנינא בת שלש שנים ויום אחד מתקדשת בביאה ואם בא עליה יבם קנאה וחייבין עליה משום אשת איש Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti says: We learn in another mishna (Nidda 44b) as well that one follows the majority even in cases of capital law: A girl who is three years and one day old whose father arranged her betrothal can be betrothed with intercourse, as, despite her age, the legal status of intercourse with her is that of full-fledged intercourse. And in a case where the childless husband of a girl three years and one day old dies, if his brother, the yavam, engages in intercourse with her, he acquires her as his wife. And if a girl of that age is married, a man other than her husband is liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to violation of the prohibition against adultery, as despite her age she is legally considered to be a married woman.

ומטמא את בועלה לטמא משכב התחתון כעליון נישאת לכהן אוכלת בתרומה בא עליה אחד מן הפסולין פסלה מן הכהונה ואם בא עליה אחד מכל העריות האמורות בתורה מומתין עליה והיא פטורה The mishna continues: And if she is impure due to menstruation, she transmits impurity to one who engages in intercourse with her, who then renders all the items designated for lying beneath him impure like the items designated for lying above him. If she marries a priest, she may partake of teruma like any other wife of a priest. If she is unmarried and one of the men who is unfit for the priesthood, e.g., a mamzer or ḥalal, engaged in intercourse with her, he has disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood, and if she is the daughter of a priest, she is disqualified from partaking of teruma. And if one of any of those with whom relations are forbidden, which are enumerated in the Torah, engaged in intercourse with her, e.g., her father or father-in-law, the man is executed by the court for engaging in intercourse with her, and she is exempt because she is a minor.

Daf 69b

ואמאי אימא איילונית היא ואדעתא דהכי לא קדיש אלא לאו דאמרינן זיל בתר רובא ורוב נשים לאו איילונית נינהו Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti explains how this mishna demonstrates that one follows the majority even in cases of capital law: Why is a man who engaged in intercourse with a three-year-old girl who was married to another man liable to receive the death penalty? Say that perhaps it will turn out that she is a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit] who is incapable of bearing children, and her husband did not betroth her with this understanding; and consequently the marriage is null, as it was entered into in error. Therefore, a man who engaged in intercourse with her should not be liable to receive the death penalty for adultery. Rather, is it not that we say that one follows the majority, and the majority of women are not sexually underdeveloped women, and therefore the assumption is that the betrothal was valid? This is proof that even in cases of capital law one follows the majority.

לא מאי חייב עליה דקתני קרבן The Gemara refutes this claim: No; rather, what is the meaning of that which is taught in the mishna: And if she is married, a man other than her husband is liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to violation of the prohibition against intercourse with a married woman? This means that if a man unwittingly engaged in intercourse with a three-year-old girl who was married to another man, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, but there is no liability to receive the death penalty based on a majority.

והא מומתין על ידה קתני בבא עליה אביה The Gemara asks: But wasn’t it taught in the mishna: And if one of any of those with whom relations are forbidden, which are enumerated in the Torah, engaged in intercourse with her, the man is executed by the court for engaging in intercourse with her? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where her father or some other close relative engaged in intercourse with her, so that the prohibition is incest, rather than adultery.

והא אם בא עליה אחד מכל העריות קתני אלא הכא במאי עסקינן דקבלה עילויה The Gemara asks: But wasn’t it taught: If one of any of those with whom relations are forbidden engaged in intercourse with her, the man is executed by the court for engaging in intercourse with her? This seems to indicate that the death penalty is imposed for all types of forbidden intercourse with a three-year-old girl, even if the intercourse is forbidden as a result of her being married. The Gemara refutes this claim: Rather, what are we dealing with here? With a case where the husband explicitly accepted her upon himself as his wife even if she turns out to be a sexually undeveloped woman. Therefore, another man who engages in intercourse with her is liable to receive the death penalty even if he is not one of her close relatives.

ת"ר המסוללת בבנה קטן והערה בה בית שמאי אומרים פסלה מן הכהונה ובית הלל מכשירין § The Sages taught in a baraita: If a woman was acting lewdly with her minor son and he performed the initial stage of intercourse with her, Beit Shammai say that he has thereby disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. And Beit Hillel deem her fit to marry into the priesthood, because they maintain that the intercourse of a minor is not regarded as intercourse.

אמר רבי חייא בריה דרבה בר נחמני אמר רב חסדא ואמרי לה אמר רב חסדא אמר זעירי הכל מודים בבן תשע שנים ויום אחד שביאתו ביאה פחות מבן שמנה שאין ביאתו ביאה לא נחלקו אלא בבן שמנה דב"ש סברי גמרינן מדורות הראשונים ובית הלל סברי לא גמרינן מדורות הראשונים Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabba bar Naḥmani, says that Rav Ḥisda says, and some say that Rav Ḥisda says that Ze’eiri says: All, i.e., both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, concede with regard to a boy nine years and one day old that his intercourse is regarded as intercourse and disqualifies a woman from marrying into the priesthood as well as results in her liability to receive the death penalty, even though he himself is not liable to receive it. And they also all concede concerning a boy less than eight years old that his intercourse is not regarded as intercourse vis-à-vis these halakhot. They disagree only about a boy who is eight years old, as Beit Shammai maintain that we learn from earlier generations, when people were able to father children at that age, and we apply that reality to the present; and Beit Hillel maintain that we do not learn from earlier generations.

ודורות הראשונים מנלן דאוליד אילימא מדכתיב (שמואל ב יא, ג) הלא זאת בת שבע בת אליעם אשת אוריה החתי וכתיב ((שמואל ב כג, לד) (ו)אליעם בן אחיתופל הגילוני וכתיב (שמואל ב יב, כה) וישלח ביד נתן הנביא ויקרא את שמו ידידיה The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that in earlier generations men fathered children at this age? If we say that we know this from the following calculation: It is written: “Is this not Bathsheba, daughter of Eliam, wife of Uriah the Hittite?” (II Samuel 11:3). And it is also written: “And Eliam, son of Ahithophel the Gilonite” (II Samuel 23:34), which teaches that Bathsheba was the granddaughter of Ahithophel. And it is written with reference to the birth of Solomon: “And he sent by the hand of Nathan the prophet, and he called his name Jedidiah, for the Lord’s sake” (II Samuel 12:25).

בעבור (כי) ה' (אהבו) וכתיב (שמואל ב יג, כג) ויהי לשנתים ימים ויהיו גוזזים לאבשלום וכתיב (שמואל ב יג, לח) ואבשלום ברח וילך גשורה And later it is written: “And it came to pass after two years, that Absalom had sheepshearers” (II Samuel 13:23), and at that time Amnon was killed (see II Samuel 13:23–29), this being at least two years after Solomon was born. And afterward it is written: “So Absalom fled, and went to Geshur, and was there three years” (II Samuel 13:38), so that this was five years after Solomon was born.

ויהי שם שלש שנים וכתיב (שמואל ב יד, כח) וישב אבשלום בירושלים שנתים ימים ופני המלך לא ראה וכתיב (שמואל ב טו, ז) ויהי מקץ ארבעים שנה ויאמר אבשלום אל המלך אלכה נא (ואשלמה) את נדרי אשר נדרתי לה' בחברון וכתיב (שמואל ב יז, כג) ואחיתופל ראה כי לא נעשתה עצתו ויחבש את החמור ויקם וילך אל ביתו (ו)אל עירו ויצו אל ביתו ויחנק And it is written: “So Absalom dwelt two years in Jerusalem, and did not see the king’s face” (II Samuel 14:28), bringing the tally to seven years after Solomon was born. And it is written: “And it came to pass after forty years, that Absalom said to the king, I pray you, let me go and pay my vow, which I have vowed to the Lord, in Hebron” (II Samuel 15:7). This was the beginning of Absalom’s rebellion against David. Accordingly, at that time Solomon was at least seven years old. And at some point during the rebellion it is written: “And when Ahithophel saw that his counsel was not followed, he saddled his donkey, and arose, and went to his house, to his city, and put his household in order, and strangled himself and died” (II Samuel 17:23).

וכתיב (תהלים נה, כד) אנשי דמים ומרמה לא יחצו ימיהם ותניא כל שנותיו של דואג אינן אלא שלשים וארבע ושל אחיתופל אינן אלא שלשים ושלש כמה הויא להו תלתין ותלת דל שבע דהוה שלמה פש להו עשרים ושית דל תרתי שני לתלתא עבורי אשתכח דכל חד וחד בתמני אוליד And it is written: “Bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days” (Psalms 55:24). And in keeping with this verse, it is taught in a baraita: All of Doeg’s years were only thirty-four and Ahithophel’s were only thirty-three. Neither reached the age of thirty-five, half of the normal life span of seventy years. Based on this, one can calculate: How many years did Ahithophel live? Thirty-three. Subtract seven years, Solomon’s age at the time of Ahithophel’s death, which leaves Ahithophel twenty-six years old at the time of Solomon’s birth. Subtract two more years for three pregnancies, one preceding the birth of Eliam the son of Ahithophel, one preceding the birth of Bathsheba, daughter of Eliam, and one preceding the birth of Solomon, son of Bathsheba. It turns out that three generations were born in twenty-four years, and that each and every parent begot a child at the age of eight.

ממאי דלמא תרוייהו בתשע אוליד ובת שבע אולידא בשית משום דאתתא בריא תדע דהא הוי לה ולד מעיקרא The Gemara refutes this proof: From where do you prove this? Perhaps both Ahithophel and his son Eliam fathered children when they were each nine years old, and Bathsheba gave birth to Solomon when she was six, because a woman is stronger and can conceive at an earlier age. Know that this is true that women conceive at an earlier age, as Bathsheba had already given birth to a child from David before giving birth to Solomon (see II Samuel 11:27). Therefore, no proof can be derived from here.

אלא מהכא (בראשית יא, כז) אלה תולדות תרח תרח הוליד את אברם את נחור ואת הרן ואברהם גדול מנחור שנה ונחור גדול מהרן שנה נמצא אברהם גדול שתי שנים מהרן וכתיב (בראשית יא, כט) ויקח אברם ונחור להם נשים וגו' Rather, it is from here that one can deduce that in earlier generations men fathered children at the age of eight, as it is written: “And these are the generations of Terah; Terah begot Abram, Nahor, and Haran” (Genesis 11:27). And Abraham was at least one year older than Nahor, and Nahor was one year older than Haran, so it turns out that Abraham was two years older than Haran. And it is written: “And Abram and Nahor took wives for themselves; the name of Abram’s wife was Sarai and the name of Nahor’s wife was Milka, daughter of Haran, father of Milka and father of Iscah” (Genesis 11:29).

ואמר רבי יצחק יסכה זו שרה ולמה נקרא שמה יסכה שסוכה ברוח הקדש והיינו דכתיב (בראשית כא, יב) כל אשר תאמר אליך שרה שמע בקולה דבר אחר יסכה שהכל סכים ביופיה וכתיב (בראשית יז, יז) ויפל על פניו ויצחק ויאמר בלבו וגו' כמה קשיש אברהם משרה עשר שנין וקשיש מאבוה תרתין שנין אשתכח כי אולדה הרן לשרה בתמני אולידה And Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Iscah is in fact Sarah. And why was she called Iscah? Because she envisioned [shesokha] hidden matters by means of divine inspiration. And this explains what is written: “In all that Sarah has said to you, hearken to her voice” (Genesis 21:12). Alternatively, Sarah was also called Iscah, because all gazed [sokhim] upon her beauty. And it is written: “And Abraham fell upon his face, and laughed, and said in his heart: Shall a child be born to him that is a hundred years old? And shall Sarah, who is ninety years old, give birth?” (Genesis 17:17). How much older was Abraham than Sarah? He was ten years older than her and, as stated above, he was two years older than her father, Haran. It turns out then that when Haran begot Sarah, he begot her at the age of eight.

ממאי דלמא אברהם זוטא דאחוה הוה ודרך חכמתן קא חשיב להו The Gemara refutes this proof: From where do you prove this? Perhaps Abraham was the youngest of the brothers, and not the oldest among them. The fact that Abraham is listed first is no proof that he was the oldest, as perhaps the verse listed them in the order of their wisdom and therefore Abraham, being the wisest, was mentioned first.

תדע דקא חשיב להו קרא דרך חכמתן דכתיב (בראשית ה, לב) ויהי נח בן חמש מאות שנה ויולד נח את שם את חם ואת יפת שם גדול מחם שנה וחם גדול מיפת שנה נמצא שם גדול מיפת שתי שנים וכתיב (בראשית ז, ו) ונח בן שש מאות שנה והמבול היה מים על הארץ וכתיב (בראשית יא, י) (ו)אלה תולדות שם שם בן מאת שנה ויולד את ארפכשד שנתים אחר המבול בן מאה שנה בר מאה ותרתין שנין הוה Know that it is true that the verse sometimes lists brothers not according to their birth order, but in the order of their degrees of wisdom, as it is written: “And Noah was five hundred years old; and Noah begot Shem, Ham, and Japheth” (Genesis 5:32). According to this, Shem was at least one year older than Ham, and Ham one year older than Japheth, so it turns out that Shem was two years older than Japheth. And it is written: “And Noah was six hundred years old when the flood of waters was upon the earth” (Genesis 7:6). And it is written: “These are the descendants of Shem; Shem was one hundred years old, and begot Arpachshad two years after the flood” (Genesis 11:10). If Shem was the oldest brother, how could he be only 100 years old? He must have been at least 102 years old, as Noah was 500 years old when his third son was born, and he was 600 years old at the time of the flood.

אלא דרך חכמתן קא חשיב להו הכא נמי דרך חכמתן קא חשיב להו Rather, the verse listed them in the order of their degrees of wisdom, Shem being the wisest. With regard to his age, Shem was the youngest of the brothers, having been born when Noah was 502 years old. Shem begot his son 100 years later, which was two years after the flood. Here too, then, with regard to the sons of Terah, it can be argued that the verse lists them in the order of their degrees of wisdom.

אמר רב כהנא אמריתה לשמעתא קמיה דרב זביד מנהרדעא אמר לי אתון מהכא מתניתו ואנן מהכא מתנינן לה (בראשית י, כא) ולשם יולד גם הוא אבי כל בני עבר אחי יפת הגדול יפת הגדול שבאחיו הוה Rav Kahana says: I stated this discussion before Rav Zevid of Neharde’a. When he heard it, he said to me: You learn that Shem was not Noah’s oldest son from there, and we learn it from here: “And to Shem, the father of all the children of Eber, the brother of Japheth the elder, to him also were children born” (Genesis 10:21). This verse indicates that Japheth, rather than Shem, was the oldest of the brothers.

אלא מנלן מהכא (שמות לח, כב) ובצלאל בן אורי בן חור למטה יהודה וכתיב (דברי הימים א ב, יט) ותמת עזובה (אשת כלב) ויקח לו כלב את אפרת ותלד לו את חור וכי עבד בצלאל משכן בר כמה הוי בר תליסר דכתיב (שמות לו, ד) איש איש ממלאכתו אשר המה עושים ותניא שנה ראשונה עשה משה משכן שניה הקים משכן ושלח מרגלים The Gemara asks: Rather, from where do we derive that in earlier generations men fathered children at the age of eight? From here, as it is written: “And Bezalel, son of Uri, son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah, made all that the Lord commanded Moses” (Exodus 38:22). And it is written: “And Azubah died, and Caleb took for himself Ephrat, who bore him Hur. And Hur begot Uri, and Uri begot Bezalel” (I Chronicles 2:19–20). And when Bezalel made the Tabernacle how old was he? He must have been at least thirteen years old, as it is written: “And all the wise men that carried out all the work of the sanctuary, came every man from his work that they did” (Exodus 36:4), and one who is less than thirteen is not called a man. And it is taught in a baraita: In the first year following the exodus from Egypt Moses made the Tabernacle; in the second year he erected the Tabernacle and sent out the spies.

וכתיב (יהושע יד, ז) בן ארבעים שנה אנכי בשלח משה עבד ה' וגו' ועתה הנה אנכי היום בן חמש ושמנים שנה כמה הויא להו ארבעין דל ארביסר דהוה בצלאל פשא להו עשרים ושית דל תרתי שני דתלתא עיבורי אשתכח דכל חד וחד בתמני אוליד: And it is written that Caleb, Bezalel’s great-grandfather, said to Joshua: “I was forty years old when Moses the servant of the Lord sent me from Kadesh Barnea to spy out the land” (Joshua 14:7). And he added: “And now, behold, I am this day eighty-five years old” (Joshua 14:10). How many years old was Caleb when he was sent off with the spies? He was forty. Subtract fourteen years, as Bezalel was at least fourteen years old when Caleb was sent to spy out the land. This is known because that mission took place a year after the Tabernacle was erected. This leaves twenty-six years. Subtract two more years for three pregnancies, one preceding the birth of Hur, son of Caleb, one preceding the birth of Uri, son of Hur, and one preceding the birth of Bezalel, son of Uri. It turns out that three generations were born in twenty-four years, and that each and every parent begot a child at the age of eight.

בן ולא בת: תניא אמר רבי שמעון בדין הוא שתהא בת ראויה להיות כבן סורר ומורה § The mishna teaches that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed upon a son, but not upon a daughter. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: It would be reasonable that a daughter should be fit to be treated like a stubborn and rebellious son, and to be punished like him if she sins in the same way as he does.

Daf 70a

שהכל מצויין אצלה בעבירה אלא גזירת הכתוב היא בן ולא בת: The reason is that all are found frequently with her in sin, and in the end she will be a sinner and cause others to sin. But it is a Torah edict that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed only upon a son, and not upon a daughter.

מתני׳ מאימתי חייב משיאכל תרטימר בשר וישתה חצי לוג יין האיטלקי ר' יוסי אומר מנה בשר ולוג יין MISHNA: From when is a stubborn and rebel-lious son liable? From when he eats a tarteimar of meat and drinks a half-log of Italian wine. Rabbi Yosei says: From when he eats a maneh of meat and drinks a log of wine.

אכל בחבורת מצוה אכל בעיבור החדש אכל מעשר שני בירושלים אכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים (אכל טבל ומעשר ראשון שלא נטלה תרומתו ומעשר שני והקדש שלא נפדו) The mishna now lists a series of conditions concerning his eating and drinking. If he ate these items with a group assembled for the performance of a mitzva, or he ate them at a meal celebrating the intercalation of a month, or he ate the items when they had second tithe status, in Jerusalem, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son because each of these circumstances involves some aspect of a mitzva. If he ate the meat of unslaughtered animal carcasses or animals that had wounds that would have caused them to die within twelve months [tereifot] or repugnant creatures or creeping animals, or he ate untithed produce from which tithes and terumot were not separated, or first tithe from which its teruma was not separated, or second tithe outside Jerusalem or consecrated food that was not redeemed, each of which involves a transgression, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

אכל דבר שהוא מצוה ודבר שהוא עבירה אכל כל מאכל ולא אכל בשר שתה כל משקה ולא שתה יין אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה עד שיאכל בשר וישתה יין שנאמר (דברים כא, כ) זולל וסובא ואע"פ שאין ראיה לדבר זכר לדבר שנאמר (משלי כג, כ) אל תהי בסובאי יין בזוללי בשר למו: The mishna summarizes: If he ate an item that involves performing a mitzva or an item that involves committing a transgression, or if he ate any food in the world but did not eat meat, or if he drank any beverage but did not drink wine, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he actually eats meat and actually drinks wine, as it is stated: “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he does not listen to our voice; he…is a glutton [zolel] and a drunkard [vesovei]” (Deuteronomy 21:20). One is not called a glutton and a drunkard unless he eats meat and drinks wine. And although there is no explicit proof to the matter that the reference in the Torah is to meat and wine, there is an allusion to the matter in another verse, as it is stated: “Be not among wine drinkers [besovei], among gluttonous eaters [bezolelei] of meat” (Proverbs 23:20).

גמ׳ אמר רבי זירא תרטימר זה איני יודע מהו אלא מתוך שכפל ר' יוסי ביין נמצא כופל אף בבשר ונמצא תרטימר חצי מנה GEMARA: Rabbi Zeira says: Concerning this tarteimar that is mentioned in the mishna, I do not know what its measure is. But since Rabbi Yosei is found to have doubled the measure of the wine, as the unattributed opinion in the mishna speaks of a half-log whereas Rabbi Yosei requires a log, he presumably is found to have doubled the measure of the meat as well. Therefore, it turns out that a tarteimar is equivalent to one-half of a maneh.

אמר רב חנן בר מולדה אמר רב הונא אינו חייב עד שיקח בשר בזול ויאכל יין בזול וישתה דכתיב זולל וסובא Rav Ḥanan bar Molada says that Rav Huna says: A stubborn and rebellious son is not liable unless he purchases inexpen-sive [bezol] meat and eats it, and he buys inexpensive wine and drinks it, as it is written: “He is a glutton [zolel] and a drunkard.”

ואמר רב חנן בר מולדה אמר רב הונא אינו חייב עד שיאכל בשר חי וישתה יין חי איני והא רבה ורב יוסף דאמרי תרווייהו אכל בשר חי ושתה יין חי אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה אמר רבינא יין חי מזיג ולא מזיג בשר חי בשיל ולא בשיל כבשר כיבא דאכלי גנבי And Rav Ḥanan bar Molada says that Rav Huna says: A stubborn and rebellious son is not liable unless he eats raw meat and drinks undiluted wine. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is that so? But don’t Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: If he ate raw meat or drank undiluted wine he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son? Ravina said: The two conflicting statements can be reconciled. If he ate totally raw meat or drank totally undiluted wine, he is in fact exempt. The undiluted wine for which he is liable is wine that is diluted but not diluted properly. And the raw meat for which he is liable is meat that is cooked but not cooked properly, like the scorched meat that thieves are wont to eat, due to the hasty manner in which they must prepare their food.

רבה ורב יוסף דאמרי תרווייהו אכל בשר מליח ושתה יין מגיתו אין נעשה בן סורר ומורה תנן התם ערב תשעה באב לא יאכל אדם שני תבשילין ולא יאכל בשר ולא ישתה יין ותנא אבל אוכל הוא בשר מליח ושותה יין מגתו Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: If he ate heavily salted meat or drank wine from his winepress, i.e., wine that has not finished fermenting, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. And on a related topic we learned in a mishna elsewhere (Ta’anit 26b): On the eve of the Ninth of Av, a person may not eat two cooked dishes in one meal. And furthermore, he may neither eat meat nor drink wine. And a tanna taught in a baraita: But one may eat heavily salted meat, as it is not considered meat, and one many drink wine from his winepress before it has properly fermented.

בשר מליח עד כמה אמר רבי חנינא בר כהנא כל זמן שהוא כשלמים The Gemara asks: With regard to salted meat on the eve of the Ninth of Av, how long must this meat remain in salt before it is permitted? Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana says: As long as it is like a peace-offering, which could be eaten for two days and one night after it was sacrificed. After this time has passed, it is no longer the type of meat that one may not eat during that meal. Therefore, if it was salted for longer than this, it may be eaten on the eve of the Ninth of Av.

ויין מגיתו עד כמה כל זמן שהוא תוסס והתניא יין תוסס אין בו משום גילוי וכמה תסיסתו שלשה ימים The Gemara inquires further: And with regard to wine from his press before it has properly fermented, until when is wine considered in this category? As long as it is still fermenting. And it is taught in a baraita: Fermenting wine is not subject to the prohibition of exposed liquids, as there is no concern that a snake will leave its venom in that wine. And how long is its initial fermenting period? Three days from the time the grapes were pressed.

הכא מאי התם משום שמחה הוא כל זמן שהוא כשלמים נמי אית ביה שמחה הכא משום אימשוכי הוא ובכל שהוא לא מימשיך ויין עד מ' יום The Gemara clarifies: These definitions of salty meat and wine from his winepress were stated with regard to the prohibitions applying on the eve of the Ninth of Av. Here, concerning a stubborn and rebellious son, what is considered salty meat and wine from his press? The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the eve of the Ninth of Av, the prohibition is due to joy; as long as the meat is like a peace-offering, there is still joy. But here, with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son, it is due to the son becoming drawn to it, and if the taste of the meat is flawed only slightly he will not be drawn to it. And with regard to wine, there is no concern that he will be drawn to it until it is forty days old.

א"ר חנן לא נברא יין בעולם אלא לנחם אבלים ולשלם שכר לרשעים שנא' (משלי לא, ו) תנו שכר לאובד ויין למרי נפש § The Gemara’s discussion turns to wine in general. Rav Ḥanan says: Wine was created in the world only to comfort mourners in their distress, and to reward the wicked in this world so that they will have no reward left in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish, and wine to the bitter of soul” (Proverbs 31:6). “Him that is ready to perish” is referring to the wicked, who will perish from this world, while “the bitter of soul” denotes mourners.

א"ר יצחק מאי דכתיב (משלי כג, לא) אל תרא יין כי יתאדם אל תרא יין שמאדים פניהם של רשעים בעוה"ז ומלבין פניהם לעוה"ב רבא אמר אל תרא יין כי יתאדם אל תרא יין שאחריתו דם Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Look not upon wine when it is red” (Proverbs 23:31)? Look not upon wine that reddens the faces of the wicked in this world when they drink it, and whitens their faces, i.e., embarrasses them, in the World-to-Come. Rava says that this is how the verse should be understood: “Look not upon wine that reddens [yitaddam]” means: Look not upon wine, as it leads to bloodshed [dam], indicating that one who drinks wine will end up committing an act of killing or will be killed because of it.

רב כהנא רמי כתיב תירש וקרינן תירוש זכה נעשה ראש לא זכה נעשה רש Rav Kahana raises a contradiction: The verse states: “Therefore, they shall come and sing in the height of Zion, and shall flow to the bounty of the Lord, for wheat, and for wine, and for oil, and for the young of the flock and of the herd” (Jeremiah 31:11). The word for wine is written tirash, without the letter vav, but we read it as tirosh, with the letter vav. The matter can explained as follows: If one merits and drinks a moderate amount he becomes a leader [rosh], whereas if he does not merit and drinks excessively he becomes poor [rash].

רבא רמי כתיב (תהלים קד, לא) ישמח וקרינן ישמח זכה משמחו לא זכה משממהו והיינו דאמר רבא חמרא וריחני פקחין Rava raises a similar contradiction: It is written: “And wine that gladdens the heart of man” (Psalms 104:15). The word for gladdens could be read as yeshamaḥ, meaning that wine makes one crazy, but we read it as yesamaḥ, gladdens the heart. The matter can be explained as follows: If one merits and drinks a moderate amount the wine gladdens him [mesameḥo], whereas if he does not merit and drinks excessively it makes him crazy [meshamemehu]. And that is what Rava meant when he said: Wine and fragrant spices have made me wise; that is to say, the controlled drinking of wine is beneficial to the drinker.

אמר רב עמרם בריה דר"ש בר אבא אמר ר' חנינא מאי דכתיב (משלי כג, כט) למי אוי למי אבוי למי מדנים למי שיח למי פצעים חנם למי חכלילות עינים (וגו') למאחרים על היין לבאים לחקור ממסך כי אתא רב דימי אמר אמרי במערבא האי קרא מאן דדריש ליה מרישיה לסיפיה מדריש ומסיפיה לרישיה מדריש Rav Amram, son of Rabbi Shimon bar Abba, says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Who cries, Woe? Who cries, Alas? Who has quarrels? Who has complaints? Who has causeless injuries? Who has redness of eyes? They who tarry long at the wine, they who go to seek mixed wine” (Proverbs 23:29–30)? When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, that one who interprets this verse from the beginning to the end interprets it in a way that has meaning and significance. And also one who interprets it from the end to the beginning interprets it in a meaningful manner. It is possible to interpret these verses from the beginning to the end and say: Woe and alas to one who drinks wine; and it is also possible to interpret them from the end to the beginning: Who drinks wine? He who has quarrels, complaints, and injuries.

דריש עובר גלילאה י"ג ווי"ן נאמרו ביין (בראשית ט, כ) ויחל נח איש האדמה ויטע כרם וישת מן היין וישכר ויתגל בתוך אהלו וירא חם אבי כנען את ערות אביו ויגד לשני אחיו בחוץ ויקח שם ויפת את השמלה וישימו על שכם שניהם וילכו אחורנית ויכסו את ערות אביהם ופניהם וגו' וייקץ נח מיינו וידע את אשר עשה לו בנו הקטן A visitor from the Galilee expounded: The conversive vav is stated thirteen times in the passage concerning wine, as it is stated: “And Noah began [vayyaḥel] to be a farmer, and he planted [vayyita] a vineyard, and he drank [vayyesht] of the wine, and was drunk [vayyishkar]; and he was uncovered [vayyitgal] within his tent. And Ham, the father of Canaan, saw [vayyar] the nakedness of his father, and told [vayyagged] his two brothers outside. And Shem and Japheth took [vayyikaḥ] the garment, and laid it [vayyasimu] upon both their shoulders, and went [vayyelekhu] backward, and covered [vaykhassu] the nakedness of their father; and their faces were backward, and they did not see their father’s nakedness. And Noah awoke [vayyiketz] from his wine, and knew [vayyeda] what his younger son had done to him” (Genesis 9:20–24). All thirteen instances of the conversive vav here are followed by the letter yod. Together they form the word vay, meaning woe, and allude to the suffering and misfortune caused by uncontrolled drinking.

רב ושמואל חד אמר סרסו וח"א רבעו Having cited the passage discussing Noah, the Gemara enters into a discussion about what was actually done to him by his younger son, Ham. Rav and Shmuel disagreed: One says that Ham castrated Noah and one says that Ham sodomized him.

מאן דאמר סרסו מתוך שקלקלו ברביעי קללו ברביעי ומאן דאמר רבעו גמר וירא וירא כתיב הכא וירא חם אבי כנען את ערות אביו וכתיב התם (בראשית לד, ב) וירא אותה שכם בן חמור וגו' The Gemara explains: The one who says that Ham castrated Noah adduces the following proof: Since he injured Noah with respect to the possibility of conceiving a fourth son, which Noah wanted but could no longer have, therefore Noah cursed him by means of Ham’s fourth son. Ham’s sons were Cush, Mizraim, Put, and Canaan (see Genesis 10:6), and of all of these, it was Canaan whom Noah cursed (see Genesis 9:25–28). And the one who says that Ham sodomized Noah learned this from a verbal analogy between the words “and he saw” and “and he saw.” Here it is written: “And Ham, the father of Canaan, saw the nakedness of his father”; and there it is written: “And Shechem, son of Hamor the Hivite, prince of the country, saw her, and he took her, and lay with her, and afflicted her” (Genesis 34:2). This indicates that the term “saw” alludes to sexual intercourse.

בשלמא למ"ד סרסו משום הכי קללו ברביעי אלא למ"ד רבעו מאי שנא רביעי נלטייה בהדיא הא והא הואי The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that Ham castrated Noah, it is due to that reason that Noah cursed Ham by means of Ham’s fourth son. But according to the one who says that Ham sodomized him, what is different about his fourth son? He should have cursed Ham directly. The Gemara answers: This Sage holds that both this offense and that offense were committed. All agree that Ham castrated Noah, and some say that Ham also sodomized him.

ויחל נח איש האדמה ויטע כרם אמר רב חסדא אמר רב עוקבא ואמרי לה מר עוקבא א"ר זכאי א"ל הקב"ה לנח נח לא היה לך ללמד מאדם הראשון שלא גרם לו אלא יין כמאן דאמר אותו אילן שאכל ממנו אדם הראשון גפן היה The Gemara continues to analyze the passage relating to Noah. The verse states: “And Noah began to be a farmer, and he planted a vineyard.” In explanation of this matter, Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Ukva says, and some say that Mar Ukva says that Rabbi Zakkai says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Noah: Noah, shouldn’t you have learned from Adam the first man, whose banishment from the Garden of Eden was caused only by wine? The Gemara notes: This is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the tree from which Adam the first man ate was a grapevine.

דתניא ר"מ אומר אותו אילן שאכל אדם הראשון ממנו גפן היה As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir says: The tree from which Adam the first man ate was a grapevine,

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שאין לך דבר שמביא יללה לאדם אלא יין ר' יהודה אומר חטה היה שאין התינוק יודע לקרוא אבא ואימא עד שיטעום טעם דגן רבי נחמיה אומר תאנה היה שבדבר שקלקלו בו נתקנו שנאמר (בראשית ג, ז) ויתפרו עלה תאנה as, even today, nothing except wine brings wailing and trouble upon a person; most sins are caused by drunkenness. Rabbi Yehuda says: The Tree of Knowledge was the wheat plant. This is proven by the fact that, even today, an infant does not know how to call out to his father or mother until he tastes the taste of grain, and for this reason wheat is called “the Tree of Knowledge.” Rabbi Neḥemya says: The Tree of Knowledge was a fig tree, because it was with the matter with which they sinned that they were rehabilitated, as it is stated: “And they sewed together fig leaves, and made for themselves loincloths” (Genesis 3:7).

(משלי לא, א) דברי למואל מלך משא אשר יסרתו אמו אמר ר' יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יוחי מלמד שכפאתו אמו על העמוד ואמרה לו מה ברי ומה בר בטני ומה בר נדרי מה ברי הכל יודעים שאביך ירא שמים הוה עכשיו יאמרו אמו גרמה לו § The Gemara continues its discussion of wine. Referring to the verse that states: “The words of King Lemuel, the burden with which his mother corrected him” (Proverbs 31:1), Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: This teaches that when Solomon’s mother Bathsheba saw Solomon engaged in excessive drinking, she bound him to a pillar to have him flogged. And she said to him: “What, my son? And what, son of my womb? And what, son of my vows?” (Proverbs 31:2). She meant: “What, my son?” Everyone knows that your father, David, was a God-fearing man, and now, when they see you sin, they will all say that his mother caused him to drink, i.e., that you engage in these behaviors because you are my son.

ומה בר בטני כל הנשים של בית אביך כיון שמתעברות שוב אינן רואות פני המלך ואני דחקתי ונכנסתי כדי שיהא לי בן מזורז ומלובן “And what, son of my womb?” That is to say: With regard to all of the women of your father’s house, once they conceive they no longer see the face of the king, but I pushed myself in and entered the king’s chamber while I was pregnant, so that I might have a son who is strong and fair-skinned. There are times during a woman’s pregnancy when intercourse is beneficial for the development of the fetus. Bathsheba was telling Solomon: I did my utmost to ensure that you have extra strength and beauty, and now you use that strength and appeal to pursue drink.

ומה בר נדרי כל נשים של בית אביך היו נודרות יהא לי בן הגון למלכות ואני נדרתי ואמרתי יהא לי בן זריז וממולא בתורה והגון לנביאות “And what, son of my vows?” That is to say: With regard to all of the women of your father’s house, they would take vows while they were pregnant, saying: Let me have a son who is fit to be king. But I, by contrast, took a vow and said: Let me have a son who is diligent and filled with knowledge of the Torah and fit for prophecy.

אל למלכים למואל אל למלכים שתו יין אל למלכים אמרה לו מה לך אצל מלכים ששותים יין ומשתכרים ואומרים למה לנו אל ולרוזנים אי שכר מי שכל רזי עולם גלויים לו ישתה יין וישתכר איכא דאמרי מי שכל רוזני עולם משכימין לפתחו ישתה יין וישתכר It is further stated there: “It is not for kings, O Lemoel, it is not for kings to drink wine; nor for princes to say: Where is strong drink?” (Proverbs 31:4). The Gemara provides an explanation of the meaning of each part of this verse. “It is not for kings”: Bathsheba said to her son Solomon: What have you to do with kings who drink wine and become intoxicated and say: Why [lamma] do we need God [El]? The Gemara continues to explain the verse. “Nor for princes [rozenim] to say: Where is strong drink?” This means that one like Solomon, to whom all the secrets [razei] of the world are revealed, should he drink wine and become intoxicated? Alternatively, there are those who say that this part of the verse should be understood as follows: One like Solomon, to whom all the princes of the world rise early to come to his door, should he drink wine and become intoxicated?

אמר ר' יצחק מניין שחזר שלמה והודה לאמו דכתיב (משלי ל, ב) כי בער אנכי מאיש ולא בינת אדם לי כי בער אנכי מאיש מנח דכתיב (בראשית ט, כ) ויחל נח איש האדמה ולא בינת אדם לי זה אדם הראשון: Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where can it be learned that Solomon repented and admitted to his mother that she was justified in her rebukes? As it is written: “For I am more foolish than a man, and have not the understanding of a man” (Proverbs 30:2). This should be understood as follows: “For I am more foolish than a man [ish]”; that is, I am more foolish than Noah, who sinned with wine and is called “a man,” as it is written: “And Noah began to be a farmer [ish ha’adama]” (Genesis 9:20). “And have not the understanding of a man [adam]”; this is a reference to Adam the first man, who also sinned with wine, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the Tree of Knowledge was a grapevine.

אכל בחבורת מצוה: אמר רבי אבהו אינו חייב עד שיאכל בחבורה שכולה סריקין § The mishna teaches that if the son ate and drank the requisite amounts of meat and wine with a group assembled for the performance of a mitzva, he does not become liable as a stubborn and rebellious son. Rabbi Abbahu says: He is not liable unless he eats with a group that is entirely made up of idlers. This seems to indicate that if he eats and drinks in the company of decent people, even if he consumes the required amounts that would otherwise make him liable, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

והאנן תנן אכל בחבורת מצוה אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה טעמא דמצוה הא לאו מצוה אע"ג דלאו כולה סריקין הא קמ"ל דאע"ג דכולה סריקין כיון דבמצוה קא עסיק לא מימשיך: The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: If the son ate and drank the requisite amounts of meat and wine with a group assembled for the performance of a mitzva he does not become liable as a stubborn and rebellious son? A precise reading of the mishna indicates that the reason that he does not become liable is that he ate and drank with a group assembled for the performance of a mitzva. But if they were not assembled for the performance of a mitzva he would be liable even if the group is not entirely made up of idlers. The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction between the mishna and the statement of Rabbi Abbahu. In fact, the son is liable only if he eats with a group of whom all are idlers. And the mishna teaches us this: That even if the group is entirely composed of idlers, since they are occupied with a mitzva, there is no concern that he will be drawn to sin.

אכל בעיבור החודש: למימרא דבשר ויין מסקו והתניא אין עולין לה אלא בפת דגן וקטנית בלבד הא קמ"ל אע"ג דאין עולין לה אלא בפת וקטנית ואיהו אסיק בשר ויין ואכל כיון דבמצוה קא עסיק לא ממשיך The mishna teaches that if the son ate and drank the requisite amounts of meat and wine at a meal celebrating the intercalation of the month he does not become liable as a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that meat and wine are brought up to the upper chamber where the month is intercalated? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: They ascend to intercalate the month only with a meal consisting of bread made of grain and legumes? The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches us this: Even though they ordinarily ascend to the upper chamber only with bread and legumes, and he brought up meat and wine and ate them, since they are occupied with a mitzva, there is no concern that he will be drawn to sin.

תנו רבנן אין עולין בעיבור החודש פחות מעשרה בני אדם ואין עולין לה אלא בפת דגן וקטנית ואין עולין לה אלא לאור עיבורו ואין עולין לה ביום אלא בלילה והתניא אין עולין לה בלילה אלא ביום כדאמר רבי חייא בר אבא לבניה אחריפו ועולו אחריפו ופוקו כי היכי דלישמעו בכו אינשי: The Sages taught in a baraita: No fewer than ten men ascend to the upper chamber for the intercalation of the month; and they ascend to intercalate the month only with bread made of grain and legumes; and they ascend only on the night of the month’s intercalation; and they ascend not by day, but only at night. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita: They ascend not at night, but only by day? The Gemara explains: As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to his sons: When you come to intercalate the month, ascend early and leave early so that people should hear your comings and goings, and thereby know that you have been addressing this matter. The proper time for this is at daybreak, between night and day.

אכל מעשר שני בירושלים: כיון דכי אורחיה הוא קא אכיל ליה לא ממשיך: § The mishna teaches that if he ate second tithe in Jerusalem he is not liable as a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara explains: Since he eats the second tithe in the normal way, i.e., as he is commanded, in Jerusalem, he will not be drawn to sin.

אכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים: אמר רבא אכל בשר עוף אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה The mishna teaches that if he ate the meat of unslaughtered animal carcasses or tereifot or repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he is not liable as a stubborn and rebellious son. Rava says: If the boy ate the meat of fowl, even if he ate the required amount, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

והא אנן תנן אכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה הא טהורין נעשה בן סורר ומורה כי תנן נמי מתני' להשלים: The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that if the boy ate the meat of unslaughtered animal carcasses or tereifot or repugnant creatures or creeping animals, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son? A precise reading of the mishna indicates that it is only if he ate the meat of such animals that he is not liable; but if he ate the meat of kosher animals, which includes the meat of fowl, he would become a stubborn and rebellious son, counter to the ruling of Rava. The Gemara resolves this difficulty: When we learned this in the mishna as well, it was in reference to completing the measure of meat. Rava was speaking of the primary consumption of meat.

אכל דבר שהוא מצוה ודבר עבירה: דבר מצוה תנחומי אבלים דבר עבירה תענית ציבור The mishna teaches that if he ate an item that involves performing a mitzva or an item that involves committing a transgression, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara explains: This ruling concerning an item that involves performing a mitzva includes mitzvot by rabbinic law, such as comforting mourners. And the ruling concerning an item that involves committing a transgression includes transgressing prohibitions by rabbinic law, such as eating on a communal fast.

וטעמא מאי אמר קרא (דברים כא, כ) איננו שומע בקולנו בקולנו ולא בקולו של מקום: The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that eating an item involving a mitzva or a transgression does not render him a stubborn and rebellious son? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voices” (Deuteronomy 21:20), which indicates that the halakha applies to a boy who does not obey “our voices,” i.e., the voice of his parents, but not to one who also does not obey the voice of God.

אכל כל מאכל ולא אכל בשר שתה כל משקה ולא שתה יין וכו': אכל כל מאכל ולא אכל בשר לאיתויי דבילה קעילית שתה כל משקה ולא שתה יין לאיתויי דבש וחלב The mishna teaches that if the rebellious boy ate any other food but did not eat meat, or if he drank any beverage but did not drink wine, he is not liable as a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara clarifies. That which the mishna teaches: The statement: If he ate any other food but did not eat meat, comes to include pressed figs from the town of Ke’ila, the eating of which is as satisfying as eating meat, but for which one is not liable. And that which the mishna teaches: The statement: If he drank any beverage but did not drink wine, comes to include honey and milk, which, though they can have a slightly intoxicating effect, do not render him liable as a stubborn and rebellious son.

דתניא אכל דבילה קעילית ושתה דבש וחלב ונכנס למקדש From where is it learned that honey and milk are intoxicating? As it is taught in a baraita: If a priest ate pressed figs from Ke’ila, or drank honey or milk, thereby becoming intoxicated, and he then entered the Temple to perform the Temple service,

Daf 71a

חייב: he is liable for entering the Temple while intoxicated.

אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה עד שיאכל בשר וישתה יין: תנו רבנן אכל כל מאכל ולא אכל בשר שתה כל משקה ולא שתה יין אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה עד שיאכל בשר וישתה יין שנאמר זולל וסובא § The mishna teaches that the boy does not become a stubborn and rebellious son unless he actually eats meat and drinks wine. The Sages taught in a baraita: If he ate any other food but did not eat meat, or if he drank any other beverage but did not drink wine, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son unless he actually eats meat and drinks wine, as it is stated: “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voices; he is a glutton and a drunkard.”

ואע"פ שאין ראייה לדבר זכר לדבר שנאמר (משלי כג, כ) אל תהי בסובאי יין בזוללי בשר למו ואומר (משלי כג, כא) כי סובא וזולל יורש וקרעים תלביש נומה אמר ר' זירא כל הישן בבית המדרש תורתו נעשית לו קרעים קרעים שנאמר וקרעים תלביש נומה: And although there is no explicit proof to the matter, there is an allusion to the matter in another verse, as it is stated: “Be not among wine drinkers, among gluttonous eaters of meat” (Proverbs 23:20). And the verse states: “For the drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty, and drowsiness shall clothe a man with rags” (Proverbs 23:21). That is to say, a person who is a glutton and a drunkard, and sleeps a lot due to his excessive eating and drinking, will end up poor and dressed in rags. Rabbi Zeira expounds the same verse and says: With regard to anyone who sleeps in the study hall, his Torah shall become tattered, as it is stated: “And drowsiness shall clothe a man with rags.”

מתני׳ גנב משל אביו ואכל ברשות אביו משל אחרים ואכל ברשות אחרים משל אחרים ואכל ברשות אביו אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה עד שיגנוב משל אביו ויאכל ברשות אחרים רבי יוסי בר' יהודה אומר עד שיגנוב משל אביו ומשל אמו: MISHNA: If he stole that which belonged to his father and ate on his father’s property, or he stole that which belonged to others and ate on the property of others, or he stole that which belonged to others and ate on his father’s property, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he steals that which belonged to his father and eats on the property of others. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He does not become a stubborn and rebellious son unless he steals that which belonged to his father and that which belonged to his mother.

גמ׳ גנב משל אביו ואכל ברשות אביו אע"ג דשכיח ליה בעית GEMARA: The Gemara explains the reasons for the various halakhot taught in the mishna: If he stole that which belonged to his father and ate on his father’s property, even though this is accessible to him and it is easy for him to steal, he is afraid that his father will see him eating what he had stolen, and therefore he will not be drawn after his action to further evil.

משל אחרים ואכל ברשות אחרים אע"ג דלא בעית לא שכיח ליה וכל שכן משל אחרים ואכל ברשות אביו דלא שכיח ליה ובעית If he stole that which belonged to others and ate on the property of others, even though he is not afraid of them, as they neither know him nor watch over him, this theft is not easily accessible to him, as it is performed on someone else’s property, and therefore he will not be drawn to additional sin. And all the more so if he stole that which belonged to others and ate on his father’s property, in which case it is not accessible to him, and he is also afraid of his father.

עד שיגנוב משל אביו ויאכל ברשות אחרים דשכיח ליה ולא בעית: Therefore, he is not liable unless he steals that which belonged to his father and eats on the property of others, in which case it is easily accessible to him, and he is not afraid, and there is concern that he will be drawn after his action to additional sin.

רבי יוסי בר' יהודה אומר עד שיגנוב משל אביו ומשל אמו: אמו מנא לה מה שקנתה אשה קנה בעלה אמר רבי יוסי בר' חנינא מסעודה המוכנת לאביו ולאמו The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that he is not liable as a stubborn and rebellious son unless he steals that which belonged to his father and that which belonged to his mother. The Gemara asks: With regard to his mother, from where does she have independently owned property that her son can steal? The basis for this question is the halakha that anything that a woman acquires is acquired by her husband. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says in answer to this question: The mishna is referring to a case where the boy stole food from a meal that had been prepared for his father and for his mother. In such a case the husband grants his wife ownership of the food that she will eat over the course of her meal.

והאמר רבי חנן בר מולדה אמר רב הונא אינו חייב עד שיקנה בשר בזול ויאכל יין בזול וישתה אלא אימא מדמי סעודה המוכנת לאביו ולאמו The Gemara raises a difficulty. But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥanan bar Molada say that Rav Huna says: A stubborn and rebellious son is not liable unless he purchases inexpensive meat and eats it, and he purchases inexpensive wine and drinks it, which indicates that he becomes liable only if he steals money, not if he steals the actual meat and wine? Rather, say that the boy stole from money set aside for a meal that was to be prepared for his father and for his mother.

איבעית אימא דאקני לה אחר ואמר לה על מנת שאין לבעליך רשות בהן: The Gemara presents another answer to the question posed concerning the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: If you wish, say instead that another person gave property to the mother and said to her: This shall be yours on the condition that your husband shall have no right to it. In such a case, the woman acquires the property for herself and her husband does not acquire it. Therefore, it is possible for the son to steal from his mother’s property.

מתני׳ היה אביו רוצה ואמו אינה רוצה אביו אינו רוצה ואמו רוצה אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה עד שיהו שניהם רוצין רבי יהודה אומר אם לא היתה אמו ראויה לאביו אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה: MISHNA: If his father wishes to have him punished but his mother does not wish that, or if his father does not wish to have him punished but his mother wishes that, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless they both wish that he be punished. Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not suited for his father, the two being an inappropriate match, as the Gemara will explain, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.

גמ׳ מאי אינה ראויה אילימא חייבי כריתות וחייבי מיתות ב"ד סוף סוף אבוה אבוה נינהו ואמיה אמיה נינהו GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he speaks of the mother as being not suited for the father? If we say that due to their union they are among those who are liable to receive karet, in which case the marriage does not take effect, and certainly if the union puts them in the category of those who are liable to receive one of the types of court-imposed death penalty, in which case the marriage also does not take effect, there is a difficulty: Why should it matter if they are not married? Ultimately, his father is still his father and his mother is still his mother, and the verses concerning the stubborn and rebellious son can be fulfilled.

אלא בשוה לאביו קאמר תניא נמי הכי רבי יהודה אומר אם לא היתה אמו שוה לאביו בקול ובמראה ובקומה אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה מאי טעמא דאמר קרא איננו שומע בקלנו מדקול בעינן שוין מראה וקומה נמי בעינן שוין Rather, Rabbi Yehuda is saying that the boy’s mother must be identical to his father in several aspects. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not identical to his father in voice, appearance, and height, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? As the verse states: “He will not obey our voices [kolenu]” (Deuteronomy 21:20), which indicates that they both have the same voice. And since we require that they be identical in voice, we also require that they be identical in appearance and height.

כמאן אזלא הא דתניא בן סורר ומורה לא היה ולא עתיד להיות ולמה נכתב דרוש וקבל שכר כמאן כרבי יהודה The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future, as it is impossible to fulfill all the requirements that must be met in order to apply this halakha. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning, this being an aspect of the Torah that has only theoretical value. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who requires that the parents have certain identical characteristics, making it virtually impossible to apply the halakha.

איבעית אימא ר' שמעון היא דתניא אמר רבי שמעון וכי מפני שאכל זה תרטימר בשר ושתה חצי לוג יין האיטלקי אביו ואמו מוציאין אותו לסקלו אלא לא היה ולא עתיד להיות ולמה נכתב דרוש וקבל שכר אמר ר' יונתן אני ראיתיו וישבתי על קברו If you wish, say instead that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: And is it simply due to the fact that the boy ate a tarteimar of meat and drank a half-log of Italian wine that his father and his mother shall take him out to stone him? Rather, there has never been a stubborn and rebellious son and there will never be one in the future. And why, then, was the passage relating to a stubborn and rebellious son written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. Rabbi Yonatan says: This is not so, as I saw one. I was once in a place where a stubborn and rebellious son was condemned to death, and I even sat on his grave after he was executed.

כמאן אזלא הא דתניא עיר הנדחת לא היתה ולא עתידה להיות ולמה נכתבה דרוש וקבל שכר כמאן כר' אליעזר דתניא רבי אליעזר אומר כל עיר שיש בה אפילו מזוזה אחת אינה נעשית עיר הנדחת The Gemara raises a similar question: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been an idolatrous city and there will never be one in the future, as it is virtually impossible to fulfill all the requirements that must be met in order to apply this halakha. And why, then, was the passage relating to an idolatrous city written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: Any city that has even one mezuza or any other sacred scroll cannot become an idolatrous city. It is difficult to imagine an entire city without even one mezuza.

מאי טעמא אמר קרא (דברים יג, יז) ואת כל שללה תקבוץ אל תוך רחבה ושרפת באש וכיון דאי איכא מזוזה לא אפשר דכתיב (דברים יב, ד) לא תעשון כן לה' אלהיכם אמר רבי יונתן אני ראיתיה וישבתי על תילה The Gemara asks: What is the reason that a city that has even one mezuza cannot become an idolatrous city? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And you shall gather all the spoil of it into the midst of the open space of the city, and shall burn with fire both the city and the entire plunder taken in it” (Deuteronomy 13:17). And since if there is a mezuza there it is impossible to burn all the contents of the city, as it is written: “And you shall overthrow their altars, and break their pillars, and burn their asherim with fire…This you shall not do so to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:3–4). It is derived from this verse that it is prohibited to destroy a sacred item such as a mezuza. Therefore, in a city that has even one mezuza, it is impossible to fulfill the halakhot of an idolatrous city, as not all of its contents may be burned. Rabbi Yonatan says: This is not so, as I once saw an idolatrous city that was condemned to destruction, and I even sat on its ruins.

כמאן אזלא הא דתניא בית המנוגע לא היה ולא עתיד להיות ולמה נכתב דרוש וקבל שכר כמאן כר' אלעזר בר' שמעון דתנן ר' אלעזר ברבי שמעון אומר לעולם אין הבית טמא עד שיראה כשתי גריסין על שתי אבנים בשתי כתלים בקרן זוית ארכו כשני גריסין ורחבו כגריס The Gemara asks another similar question: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita: There has never been a house afflicted with leprosy of the house and there will never be one in the future. And why, then, was the passage relating to leprosy of the house written in the Torah? So that you may expound upon new understandings of the Torah and receive reward for your learning. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 12:3) that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: A house never becomes impure with leprosy until a mark about the size of two split beans is seen on two stones in two walls that form a corner between them, the mark being about two split beans in length and about one split bean in width. It is difficult to imagine that such a precise situation will ever occur.

מאי טעמא דר' אלעזר ברבי שמעון כתיב קיר וכתיב קירות איזהו קיר שהוא כקירות הוי אומר זה קרן זוית The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, that a house does not become impure unless it has a mark precisely in the corner? The verse states: “And he shall look at the leprous mark, and, behold, if the leprous mark be in the walls of the house, in greenish or reddish depressions, which in sight are lower than the wall” (Leviticus 14:37). In one part of the verse it is written “wall,” and in another part of the verse it is written “walls.” Which wall is like two walls? You must say this is a corner.

תניא אמר רבי אליעזר בר' צדוק מקום היה בתחום עזה והיו קורין אותו חורבתא סגירתא אמר רבי שמעון איש כפר עכו פעם אחת הלכתי לגליל וראיתי מקום שמציינין אותו ואמרו אבנים מנוגעות פינו לשם: It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: There was a place in the area of Gaza, and it was called the leprous ruin; that is to say, it was the ruin of a house that had been afflicted with leprosy. Apparently, then, leprosy of the house has existed. Rabbi Shimon of the village of Akko said: I once went to the Galilee and I saw a place that was being marked off as an impure place, and they said that stones afflicted with leprosy were cast there. This too indicates that a house afflicted with leprosy has existed.

מתני׳ היה אחד מהם גידם או חיגר או אלם או סומא או חרש אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה שנאמר (דברים כא, יט) ותפשו בו אביו ואמו ולא גדמין והוציאו אותו ולא חגרין ואמרו ולא אלמין בננו זה ולא סומין איננו שומע בקולנו ולא חרשין MISHNA: If one of the parents was without hands, or lame, or mute, or blind, or deaf, their son does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, as it is stated: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him, and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of his place. And they shall say to the elders of his city: This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voices; he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deuteronomy 21:19–20). The Sages derive: “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him,” but not people without hands, who cannot do this. “And bring him out,” but not lame people, who cannot walk. “And they shall say,” but not mutes. “This son of ours,” but not blind people, who cannot point to their son and say “this.” “He will not obey our voices,” but not deaf people, who cannot hear whether or not he declined to obey them.

מתרין בו בפני שלשה ומלקין אותו חזר וקלקל נדון בעשרים ושלשה ואינו נסקל עד שיהו שם שלשה הראשונים שנאמר בננו זה זהו שלקה בפניכם: After he is brought before the elders of the city, he is admonished before three people and then they flog him for having stolen. If he sins again, he is judged by a court of twenty-three judges, but he is not stoned unless the first three judges before whom he had been flogged are present there, as it is stated: “This son of ours,” this is the son who was already flogged before you.

גמ׳ שמעת מינה בעינן קרא כדכתיב שאני הכא GEMARA: The Gemara draws a conclusion from the mishna: You can learn from the mishna that we require that a verse be fulfilled precisely as it is written, in strict conformity with its literal sense, and not in looser or more expansive fashion. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There is no proof from here. Here it is different,

Daf 71b

דכוליה קרא יתירא הוא: since the entire verse is superfluous. The verse’s description of how the father and mother bring their son out appears to be unnecessary, and therefore each element in the verse limits the halakha in a precise manner. When a verse is not superfluous, it is not strictly interpreted.

ומתרין בפני שלשה: למה לי בתרי סגיא אמר אביי הכי קאמר מתרין בו בפני שנים ומלקין אותו בפני שלשה § The mishna teaches that after the rebellious son is brought before the elders of the city, he is admonished before three people. The Gemara asks: Why do I need him to be admonished before three people? Two witnesses should suffice, as in all other matters of halakha. Abaye says: This is what the mishna is saying: He is admonished before two people, who serve as witnesses, and he is flogged before three people, who constitute a court.

מלקות בבן סורר ומורה היכא כתיבא כדר' אבהו דאמר ר' אבהו למדנו (דברים כב, יח) ויסרו (דברים כא, יח) מויסרו ויסרו (דברים כא, יח) מבן ובן (דברים כה, ב) מבן והיה אם בן הכות הרשע: The Gemara asks: Where is it written that lashes are administered to a stubborn and rebellious son? There is no explicit mention of lashes in the verse. The Gemara answers: It is as Rabbi Abbahu said in another context, as Rabbi Abbahu says: We learned the meaning of the word “chastise” as stated with regard to a defamer: “And the elders of that city shall take that man and chastise him” (Deuteronomy 22:18), by means of a verbal analogy from the word “chastise” stated with regard to a rebellious son (Deuteronomy 21:18). And the meaning of the word “chastise” in the latter verse is derived from the word “son” that appears in the same verse. And the meaning of the word “son [ben]” with regard to a rebellious son is derived from the similar word “bin” stated with regard to lashes: “Then it shall be if the wicked man deserves [bin] to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). Consequently, the chastisement mentioned with regard to both a defamer and a rebellious son involves flogging.

חזר וקלקל נידון בכ"ג [וכו']: האי מבעי ליה זה ולא סומין אם כן לכתוב בננו הוא מאי בננו זה שמע מינה תרתי: The mishna teaches: If he sins again, he is judged by a court of twenty-three judges, which must include the three judges before whom he was brought initially, as it is stated: “This son of ours,” this is the son who was already flogged before you. The Gemara asks: But isn’t that verse needed for the derivation mentioned earlier: “This son of ours,” but not blind people, who cannot point to their son and say “this”? The Gemara answers: If so, that these words serve only to teach that the original judges must also be present, the verse should have written: He is our son, which would indicate: He who was already flogged before you. What is the meaning of: “This son of ours”? Conclude two conclusions from it: That the three original judges must also be present at the second trial, and that the son of blind parents cannot become a stubborn and rebellious son.

מתני׳ ברח עד שלא נגמר דינו ואחר כך הקיף זקן התחתון פטור ואם משנגמר דינו ברח ואחר כך הקיף זקן התחתון חייב: MISHNA: If the rebellious son ran away before he was sentenced, and afterward, before he was caught, his lower beard grew around, he is exempt from the death penalty. Once his lower beard grows around his genitals, he can no longer be judged as a stubborn and rebellious son. But if he ran away only after he was sentenced, and afterward, by the time he was caught, his lower beard had already grown around, he is liable to receive the death penalty. Once he is sentenced to death his sentence remains in force.

גמ׳ אמר ר' חנינא בן נח שבירך את השם ואחר כך נתגייר פטור הואיל ונשתנה דינו (נשתנה) מיתתו GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥanina says: If a descendant of Noah blessed, i.e., cursed, the name of God, and afterward he converted to Judaism, he is exempt from punishment, since his trial procedure changed, and the death penalty to which he is subject also changed. A descendant of Noah is tried by a single judge, and he can be sentenced to death on the basis of the testimony of a single witness even with-out having been forewarned; whereas a Jew is tried by a court of twenty-three and can be executed only on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses, and this only after having been forewarned. A descendant of Noah is killed by the sword for this transgression, whereas a Jew is killed by stoning.

נימא מסייעא ליה ברח עד שלא נגמר דינו ואח"כ הקיף זקן התחתון פטור מאי טעמא לאו משום דאמרינן הואיל ואישתני אישתני The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the mishna supports him: If the rebellious son ran away before he was sentenced, and afterward, before he was caught, his lower beard grew around, he is exempt from the death penalty? What is the reason for this exemption? Isn’t it because we say: Since his legal status has changed, his liability has also changed?

לא שאני הכא דאי עבד השתא לאו בר קטלא הוא The Gemara rejects this claim: No, it is different here, with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son, as were he now, after he grew his lower beard, to perform the same actions that render one liable as a rebellious son, he would not be fit for execution, and therefore he is exempt. This is different from a gentile who cursed God’s name and then converted, as even if he cursed God after having converted, he would still be liable to receive the death penalty.

ת"ש אם משנגמר דינו ברח ואחר כך הקיף זקן התחתון חייב נגמר דינו קאמרת נגמר דינו גברא קטילא הוא The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the latter half of the mishna: But if he ran away only after he was sentenced, and afterward, by the time he was caught, his lower beard had already grown around, he is liable to receive the death penalty. This indicates that even though his legal status has changed, he is nevertheless executed. The Gemara rejects this argument: There is no proof from here; you speak of a case where he was already sentenced to death. Once he was already sentenced, he is considered a dead man and his verdict can no longer be changed.

תא שמע בן נח שהכה את חבירו ובא על אשת חבירו ונתגייר פטור עשה כן בישראל ונתגייר חייב ואמאי נימא הואיל ואישתני אישתני The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from what was stated in a baraita: If a descendant of Noah struck and killed another gentile or engaged in intercourse with the wife of another gentile, and he then converted to Judaism, he is exempt. But if he did this to an Israelite, killing a Jew or engaging in intercourse with the wife of a Jew, and then converted, he is liable. But why should this be so? Let us say that since his legal status changed, his liability changed as well, and therefore he should no longer be subject to the death penalty. The baraita indicates that this rationale is not accepted.

דינו ומיתתו בעינן והאי דינו אישתני מיתתו לא אישתני The Gemara refutes this proof: There is no comparison between the cases, because in order to nullify one’s death penalty we require a change both in his trial procedure and in the specific death penalty to which he is subject. But this descendant of Noah, though his trial procedure changed, the death penalty to which he is subject did not change.

בשלמא רוצח מעיקרא סייף והשתא סייף אלא אשת איש מעיקרא סייף והשתא חנק The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, with regard to the case of a murderer, this answer is understandable, as initially, while he was still a gentile, he was subject to death by the sword, and now that he is a Jew he is still subject to death by the sword. Consequently, there is no change in the punishment to which he is subject. But with regard to the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a married woman, initially when he was still a gentile he was subject to death by the sword, but now that he is a Jew he is subject to death by strangulation. Accordingly, there is a change both in his trial procedure and in the type of capital punishment to which he is subject.

בנערה המאורסה דאידי ואידי בסקילה The Gemara answers: The case of a married woman mentioned here involves a man who engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, so that in both this case, where he engaged in intercourse with her when he was still a descendant of Noah, and in that case, where he did so when he was already a Jew, he is subject to death by stoning. Since there was no change in the type of capital punishment to which he is subject, he remains liable and is executed.

והא עשה כן בישראל דומיא דאשת חבירו קתני The Gemara raises an objection: But the baraita teaches the case where he did this to an Israelite, i.e., engaged in intercourse with the wife of a Jew, similar to the case where he engaged in intercourse with the wife of another gentile. Both cases seem to be addressing identical circumstances, and the unique halakha governing a betrothed young woman exists only for Jews, not for descendants of Noah. Accordingly, the baraita must be discussing the case of a fully married woman.

אלא קלה בחמורה מישך שייכא Rather, the lenient punishment is included in the severe one. If initially, when he was a gentile, he was liable to receive a more severe punishment, and now that he is a Jew he is liable to receive a more lenient punishment, the lenient punishment is included in the severe one, and he remains liable to receive the lenient punishment. By contrast, if the punishment that he is now liable to receive is more severe, he is exempt from all punishment.

הניחא לרבנן דאמרי סייף חמור אלא לרבי שמעון דאמר חנק חמור מאי איכא למימר The Gemara raises a difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that death by the sword is more severe than death by strangulation. Therefore, if a descendant of Noah engaged in intercourse with a married woman, so that he was subject to death by the sword, and then he converted to Judaism, so that his sentence was lightened to death by strangulation, he is still executed. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that death by strangulation is more severe than death by the sword, what can be said? The convert should now be exempt from all punishment.

רבי שמעון סבר לה כתנא דבי מנשה דאמר כל מיתה האמורה לבני נח אינה אלא חנק The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Menashe, who says: Any death mentioned in connection with the descendants of Noah is nothing other than death by strangulation, and not death by the sword. Accordingly, if a descendant of Noah engaged in intercourse with a married woman, and he then converted, his punishment did not become more severe with his conversion; rather, it stayed the same, death by strangulation, and he is still executed.

בשלמא אשת איש מעיקרא חנק והשתא חנק אלא רוצח מעיקרא חנק והשתא סייף קלה בחמורה מישך שייכא The Gemara challenges: Granted, with regard to the case of a married woman, this answer is understandable. Initially, when he was still a descendant of Noah, he was subject to death by strangulation, and now, after his conversion, he is subject to death by strangulation. But as for a murderer, initially, when he was still a descendant of Noah, according to the tanna of the school of Menashe he was subject to death by strangulation, but now, after his conversion, he is subject to death by the sword. The Gemara explains: The lenient punishment is included in the severe one, and according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, death by strangulation is more severe than death by the sword. Consequently, he is executed.

לימא מסייעא ליה סרחה ואחר כך בגרה תידון בחנק בסקילה מ"ט לא לאו משום דהואיל ואישתני אישתני וכ"ש הכא דאישתני לגמרי האמר ליה רבי יוחנן לתנא תני תידון בסקילה: The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the following baraita supports Rabbi Ḥanina: If a betrothed young woman sinned by committing adultery, and afterward she reached her majority, at which time she was brought to trial, she is sentenced to death by strangulation like any other betrothed grown woman who commits adultery. What is the reason that she is not sentenced to death by stoning, the punishment imposed upon a betrothed young woman who commits adultery? Is it not that since her legal status changed, her liability changed as well? And all the more so here, in the case of the descendant of Noah who converted, where he changed completely from a gentile to a Jew, his sentence should change. The Gemara rejects this argument: No proof can be derived from here, as doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say to the tanna who taught this baraita before him: Emend your version of the baraita and teach: She is sentenced to death by stoning.

מתני׳ בן סורר ומורה נידון על שם סופו ימות זכאי ואל ימות חייב שמיתתן של רשעים הנאה להן והנאה לעולם לצדיקים רע להן ורע לעולם MISHNA: A stubborn and rebellious son is sentenced to death not because of the severity of the transgression that he already committed but on account of his ultimate end, because a boy of his nature will grow up to lead an immoral life, and it is better that he should die while he is still innocent, before causing excessive harm, and not die after he becomes guilty. This is because the death of the wicked is beneficial to them, because they can no longer sin, and it is also beneficial to the world, which is now rid of those who do it harm. Conversely, the death of the righteous is detrimental to them, as they can no longer engage in the performance of mitzvot, and it is also detrimental to the world, as the righteous are now absent from it.

יין ושינה לרשעים הנאה להן והנאה לעולם ולצדיקים רע להן ורע לעולם By way of association, the mishna continues: The wine and sleep of the wicked are beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, as when they are sleeping or under the influence of wine, they do not cause harm to others. And, conversely, the wine and sleep of the righteous are detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, as wine and sleep prevent them from engaging in their good deeds.

פיזור לרשעים הנאה להן והנאה לעולם ולצדיקים רע להן ורע לעולם כנוס לרשעים רע להן ורע לעולם ולצדיקים הנאה להן והנאה לעולם שקט לרשעים רע להן ורע לעולם לצדיקים הנאה להן והנאה לעולם: The dispersal of the wicked, so that they are not found in close proximity to each other, is beneficial to them, as they are less likely to provoke each other to sin, and it is beneficial to the world. The dispersal of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The assembly of the wicked in one place is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the assembly of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world. The tranquility of the wicked is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the tranquility of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.

Daf 72a

גמ׳ תניא רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר וכי מפני שאכל זה תרטימר בשר ושתה חצי לוג יין האיטלקי אמרה תורה יצא לבית דין ליסקל אלא הגיעה תורה לסוף דעתו של בן סורר ומורה שסוף מגמר נכסי אביו ומבקש למודו ואינו מוצא ויוצא לפרשת דרכים ומלסטם את הבריות GEMARA: It is taught in a baraita that further elaborates upon the words of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Is it simply due to the fact that the boy ate a tarteimar of meat and drank a half-log of Italian wine that the Torah states that he shall be taken out to court to be stoned? Rather, the Torah penetrated the ultimate mind-set of the stubborn and rebellious son and the inevitable results of his actions, and it is understood that he will continue on this path, and in the end he will squander his father’s property, and then, seeking the pleasures to which he had become accustomed but not finding them, he will go out to the crossroads and rob people.

אמרה תורה ימות זכאי ואל ימות חייב שמיתתן של רשעים הנאה להם והנאה לעולם ולצדיקים רע להם ורע לעולם שינה ויין לרשעים הנאה להם והנאה לעולם לצדיקים רע להם ורע לעולם שקט לרשעים רע להם ורע לעולם ולצדיקים הנאה להם והנאה לעולם פיזור לרשעים הנאה להם והנאה לעולם ולצדיקים רע להם ורע לעולם: The Torah said that it is better that he should die now when he is still innocent, and he should not die later when he is guilty. This is because the death of the wicked is beneficial to them and also beneficial to the world, while the death of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The sleep and wine of the wicked is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, while that of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world. The tranquility of the wicked is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world, while the tranquility of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world. The dispersal of the wicked is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world, while the dispersal of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world.

מתני׳ הבא במחתרת נידון על שם סופו היה בא במחתרת ושבר את החבית אם יש לו דמים חייב אם אין לו דמים פטור: MISHNA: A burglar who is found breaking into a house may be killed by the owner of the house with impunity (see Exodus 22:1). He too is sentenced on account of his ultimate end, as it is presumed that if the owner of the house would resist the burglar, the burglar would kill the owner of the house. If the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be liable for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay for the value of the barrel. An example of this is if a father broke into his son’s house, in which case it is presumed that even if the son resists his father, his father would never kill him, and therefore the son may not kill his father, and if he does so he is liable. If there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be exempt from punishment for killing him, the burglar is exempt from paying for the barrel.

גמ׳ אמר רבא מאי טעמא דמחתרת חזקה אין אדם מעמיד עצמו על ממונו והאי מימר אמר אי אזילנא קאי לאפאי ולא שביק לי ואי קאי לאפאי קטילנא ליה והתורה אמרה אם בא להורגך השכם להורגו GEMARA: Rava says: What is the reason for this halakha concerning a burglar who breaks into a house? He explains: There is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore this burglar must have said to himself: If I go in and the owner sees me, he will rise against me and not allow me to steal from him, and if he rises against me, I will kill him. And the Torah stated a principle: If someone comes to kill you, rise and kill him first.

אמר רב הבא במחתרת ונטל כלים ויצא פטור מאי טעמא בדמים קננהו אמר רבא מסתברא מילתיה דרב בששיבר דליתנהו אבל נטל לא Rav says: If a burglar broke into a house and took certain vessels, and he then left and was caught only afterward, he is exempt from the obligation to pay restitution for the vessels. What is the reason? He acquired the vessels with his blood. When he broke into the house, he risked his life, as the owner could have killed him. This grave risk that he took exempts him from any other more lenient punishments that could otherwise have been imposed upon him, including the obligation to pay restitution. Rava says: Rav’s statement is reasonable in a case where he broke the vessels in the course of robbing, so that they no longer exist, and the issue is only whether he has to pay for them. But if he took the vessels and they are still extant, Rav’s ruling does not apply.

והאלהים אמר רב אפילו נטל דהא יש לו דמים ונאנסו חייב אלמא ברשותיה קיימי הכא נמי ברשותיה קיימי The Gemara comments: But by God! Rav states his ruling even with regard to a case where the burglar took the vessels and they are still extant. That is to say, Rav himself does not distinguish between the two cases, as in a case where there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, e.g., in a case where a father came to steal from his son, if an accident occurred to the vessels, the burglar is liable to pay for them. Apparently, the vessels are established in the burglar’s possession, and he must pay for any damage that occurs to them. Here also, then, where there is no blood-guiltiness, the vessels are established as being in the burglar’s possession and they are his.

ולא היא כי אוקמינא רחמנא ברשותיה לענין אונסין אבל לענין מקנא ברשותיה דמרייהו קיימי מידי דהוה אשואל Rava explains: But this is not so, i.e., there is no proof from that case that can be applied to this one. One can claim that when the Merciful One established the vessels in the burglar’s possession, that was only concerning accidents, so he should be liable to pay for any damage that occurs to them. But as for ownership, they remain in the possession of their owner, just as it is in the case of a borrower. Even though a borrower is liable to pay for all the accidental damage caused to the item he borrowed, nevertheless the borrowed item does not become his property.

תנן בא במחתרת ושיבר את החבית יש לו דמים חייב אין לו דמים פטור טעמא דשיבר דכי אין לו דמים פטור הא נטל לא The Gemara raises an objection against Rav: We learned in the mishna that if the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay the value of the barrel. If there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, he is exempt from paying for the barrel. A precise reading of the mishna indicates that the reason he is exempt is that he broke the barrel, so where there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, he is exempt from paying for it. But if he took the barrel, he would not be exempt; rather, he would be liable, counter to the ruling of Rav.

הוא הדין דאפילו נטל נמי והא דקא תני שבר את החבית קמ"ל דכי יש לו דמים אע"ג דשיבר נמי חייב The Gemara explains: The same is true, i.e., that the burglar would be exempt, even if he took the barrel. And that which was taught in the mishna: He broke the barrel, serves to teach us that when there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, then even though he broke the barrel and it is no longer extant, he is also liable to pay for it.

פשיטא מזיק הוא הא קמ"ל דאפילו שלא בכוונה מאי קמ"ל אדם מועד לעולם תנינא אדם מועד לעולם בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין באונס בין ברצון קשיא The Gemara raises an objection: Isn’t it obvious that he is liable? This burglar is like any other person who causes damage and is liable to pay for it. The Gemara answers: This mishna teaches us that he is liable even if he broke the barrel unintentionally. The Gemara objects once again: What is the mishna teaching us with this ruling? Does it teach that the legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned, and therefore he is liable even for unintentional damage? But we already learn this in a baraita: The legal status of a person is always that of one forewarned, whether the damage was done unintentionally or intentionally, whether by unavoidable accident or whether it was done willingly. The Gemara comments: Indeed, this presents a difficulty for Rav.

מתיב רב ביבי בר אביי הגונב כיס בשבת חייב שהרי נתחייב בגניבה קודם שיבא לידי איסור שבת Rav Beivai bar Abaye raises an objection to the ruling of Rava from a baraita: One who steals a purse on Shabbat and takes it out into a public domain is liable to pay for what he stole even though he also desecrated Shabbat, which is a transgression for which one is executed by stoning. Ordinarily, one who is liable to receive two punishments for the same offense is administered only the more severe punishment and exempt from the other one. Here, however, he is liable to pay for the purse and is executed, because he was already liable to pay for the theft as soon as he lifted the purse, and this took place before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying the purse into the public domain.

היה מגרר ויוצא פטור שהרי איסור גנבה ואיסור סקילה באין כאחד The baraita continues: If he did not lift the purse, but rather was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, he is exempt from paying for what he stole, as in this case, since he did not lift the purse, he would become liable to pay for the stolen item only when he drags it out of its owner’s property into the public domain. Accordingly, the prohibition of theft and the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat, which is punishable with death by stoning, are violated simultaneously, and one who is liable to receive the death penalty is exempt from monetary liability that he incurred with the selfsame act. This poses a difficulty to Rava, who ruled that if the stolen item is extant the burglar must return it, whereas this baraita indicates that if one commits a transgression for which he is liable to receive the death penalty, he is exempt from all payments.

והלכתא דשדנהו בנהרא The Gemara answers: And the halakha is that the baraita must be understood as referring to a case where the burglar threw the purse into a river. Since the purse is no longer extant, he is exempt from having to pay for it even though he caused the damage intentionally. But if the purse is extant, he is in fact required to return it.

רבא איגנבו ליה דיכרי במחתרתא אהדרינהו ניהליה ולא קבלינהו אמר הואיל ונפק מפומיה דרב It is related that rams were once stolen from Rava by burglars who broke into his house. The burglars came to return the animals to him, but Rava did not accept them. Rava said: Since a ruling issued from Rav’s mouth that a burglar who may be killed acquires the items he stole, I no longer agree to take them.

ת"ר (שמות כב, א) אין לו דמים אם זרחה השמש עליו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שאין לו שלום עמך הרגהו ואם לאו אל תהרגהו § Apropos a burglar who breaks into a house, the Sages taught in a baraita: The verses state: “If a burglar is found breaking in, and is smitten and dies, there shall not be blood shed on his account. If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1–2). A question may be raised: But did the sun rise only upon him? Rather, these words must be understood in a metaphoric sense: If the matter is as clear to you as the sun that the burglar is not coming to you in peace, but rather his intention is to kill you, arise and kill him first. But if you are not sure about his intentions, do not kill him.

תניא אידך אם זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו ואם לאו הרגהו קשיא סתמא אסתמא It is taught in another baraita: The verse states: “If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account.” A question may be raised: But did the sun rise only upon him? Rather, these words must be understood as follows: If the matter is as clear to you as the sun that the burglar is coming to you in peace, do not kill him. But if you are not sure about his intentions, arise and kill him. The Gemara notes a difficulty: The halakha in the undetermined case as stated in the first baraita contradicts the halakha in the undetermined case as stated in the second baraita. The first baraita indicates that if the homeowner is unsure about the burglar’s intentions, he is prohibited from killing the burglar, whereas the second baraita indicates that in such a case, he is permitted to kill the burglar.

לא קשיא The Gemara answers: This is not difficult.

Daf 72b

כאן באב על הבן כאן בבן על האב Here, where the baraita teaches that if one is unsure about the burglar’s intentions it is prohibited for him to kill him, it is referring to a father who comes to rob his son. A father has great compassion for his son, and therefore it may be presumed that he will not kill his son if he resists. Accordingly, the son is prohibited from killing his father unless he knows for certain that his father has the intention of killing him. There, where the baraita teaches that if one is unsure about the burglar’s intentions it is permitted for him to kill him, it is referring to a son who comes to rob his father. Since a son has less compassion for his father, it may be presumed that he would be ready to kill his father if he resists. Therefore, the father is permitted to kill his son unless he knows for certain that his son would never kill him.

אמר רב כל דאתי עלאי במחתרתא קטילנא ליה לבר מרב חנינא בר שילא מאי טעמא אילימא משום דצדיק הוא הא קאתי במחתרתא אלא משום דקים לי בגוויה דמרחם עלי כרחם אב על הבן Rav says: With regard to anyone who breaks into my house, I would kill him, as I would presume that he is ready to kill me, except for Rav Ḥanina bar Sheila, whom I would not kill. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rav excludes Rabbi Ḥanina bar Sheila? If we say that Rav trusts him because he is a righteous person, this is difficult, as the case is one where he broke into his house, which indicates that he is not a righteous person. Rather, it is because he would say: I am certain that he would have mercy upon me just like a father would have mercy on a son.

תנו רבנן (שמות כב, ב) דמים לו בין בחול בין בשבת אין לו דמים בין בחול בין בשבת § The Sages taught in a baraita: “If the sun is risen upon him, there shall be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:2), both during the week and on Shabbat. “If a burglar is found breaking in…there shall not be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1), both during the week and on Shabbat.

בשלמא אין לו דמים בין בחול בין בשבת איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא מידי דהוה אהרוגי בית דין דבשבת לא קטלינן קמ"ל דקטלינן אלא דמים לו בין בחול בין בשבת השתא בחול לא קטלינן ליה בשבת מבעיא The Gemara clarifies this baraita: Granted that with regard to “there shall not be blood shed on his account,” it was necessary to say that this applies both during the week and on Shabbat, as it might enter your mind to say that this is just as it is in the case of those who are executed by the court, who are not executed on Shabbat. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the burglar may be slain in self-defense even on Shabbat. But with regard to “there shall be blood shed on his account,” the statement that this applies both during the week and on Shabbat is puzzling. Now, if on a weekday he may not be slain, is it necessary to say that he may not be slain on Shabbat?

אמר רב ששת לא נצרכא אלא לפקח עליו את הגל Rav Sheshet says: This ruling is necessary only to teach that if a building collapsed on the burglar on Shabbat, one is obligated to clear the pile of stones from on top of him and perform any action necessary to rescue him, even if it involves the desecration of Shabbat; one does not say that while he is not permitted to actively kill him, he is also not obligated to save him.

תנו רבנן (שמות כב, א) והוכה בכל אדם ומת בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו בשלמא והוכה בכל אדם איצטריך סד"א בעל הבית הוא דקים (להו) דאין אדם מעמיד עצמו על ממונו אבל אחר לא § Concerning the verse that states: “If a burglar is found breaking in, and is smitten and dies, there shall not be blood shed on his account” (Exodus 22:1), the Sages taught a baraita: “And is smitten,” by any person who strikes him; “and dies,” by any means of death by which you can put him to death. The Gemara clarifies this baraita: Granted, with regard to the words “and is smitten,” it was necessary to say that he may be struck by any person, as it might enter your mind to say that it is only the owner of the house whom the burglar is certain will resist him, because there is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore it is only the homeowner’s life that is in danger from the burglar. But as for another person, the burglar is not sure that he will try to stop him, and therefore that other person may not kill him, since the burglar did not come with the intention of killing him.

קמ"ל דרודף הוא ואפילו אחר נמי אלא ומת בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו למה לי Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this burglar is considered a pursuer, and he is subject to the same halakha as anyone who pursues another in order to kill him, namely, that anyone may kill the pursuer in order to rescue the one being pursued. Therefore, even another person is permitted to kill the burglar in order to save the homeowner. But that which the baraita teaches, that the words “and dies” teach that he may be slain by any means of death by which you can put him to death, why do I need this?

מרוצח נפקא דתניא (במדבר לה, כא) מות יומת המכה רוצח הוא אין לי אלא במיתה האמורה בו ומנין שאם אי אתה יכול להמיתו במיתה הכתובה בו שאתה רשאי להמיתו בכל מיתה שאתה יכול להמיתו ת"ל מות יומת מ"מ The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: This can be derived from the halakha governing a murderer, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse with regard to a murderer states: “He that smote him shall be put to death, for he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). I have derived only that the murderer is put to death with the mode of execution stated concerning him, namely, killing by decapitation. From where do I derive that if you cannot put him to death with the mode of execution written concerning him, e.g., if he is escaping, that you can put him to death with any mode of execution with which you can put him to death? The verse states: “He that smote him shall be put to death [mot yumat],” the doubled verb teaching that he is put to death in any case, by any mode of execution. Why not derive the halakha of a burglar from the halakha of a murderer?

שאני התם דאמר קרא מות יומת The Gemara rejects this reasoning: There it is different, as the verse explicitly states: “Mot yumat,” which serves to include all modes of execution.

וניגמר מיניה משום דהוה רוצח וגואל הדם שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובין הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין The Gemara asks: But why not learn from it a principle that can be applied to all people who may be put to death? The Gemara rejects this reasoning: This case does not serve as a source for a principle, because the halakhot of a murderer and of a blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of one who was killed who is allowed to kill his relative’s killer (see Makkot 11b), are two verses that come as one, and two verses that come as one do not teach a principle. In other words, if a halakha is stated with regard to two specific cases in the Torah, the halakha is understood to apply only to those cases. Had the halakha applied to all other relevant cases as well, it would not have been necessary for the Torah to teach it twice. Therefore, the baraita had to teach us that this halakha also applies to a burglar who breaks into a person’s house.

תנו רבנן (שמות כב, א) מחתרת אין לי אלא מחתרת גגו חצירו וקרפיפו מנין ת"ל (שמות כב, א) ימצא הגנב מ"מ אם כן מה ת"ל מחתרת מפני שרוב גנבים מצויין במחתרת § The Sages taught in a baraita: From the words: “If a burglar is found breaking in” (Exodus 22:1), I have derived only that this halakha applies to a burglar who came breaking in through a wall. But from where do I derive that the same halakha applies if he was found on his roof, in his yard, or in the enclosed area behind his house? Therefore, the verse states: “If a burglar is found,” which teaches that the halakha applies in any case. If that is so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Breaking in”? Because the Torah speaks of a common case, and most thieves are found breaking in.

תניא אידך מחתרת אין לי אלא מחתרת גגו חצירו וקרפיפו מנין תלמוד לומר ימצא הגנב מ"מ א"כ מה תלמוד לומר מחתרת מחתרתו זו היא התראתו It is taught in another baraita: From the words: “If a burglar is found breaking in,” I have derived only that this halakha applies to a burglar who came breaking in through a wall. But from where do I derive that the same halakha applies if he was found on his roof, in his yard, or in the enclosed area behind his house? Therefore, the verse states: “If a burglar is found,” which teaches that the halakha applies in any case. If that is so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Breaking in”? This teaches that his breaking in is his forewarning. If a burglar is found breaking into a house, the owner need not formally forewarn him before killing him. If he is found elsewhere, such a forewarning is necessary.

אמר רב הונא קטן הרודף ניתן להצילו בנפשו קסבר רודף אינו צריך התראה לא שנא גדול ולא שנא קטן § Rav Huna says: If a minor was pursuing another person in order to kill him, the pursued party may be saved with the pursuer’s life. That is to say, one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, and one does not say that since the minor lacks halakhic competence, he is not subject to punishment. The Gemara explains: Rav Huna maintains that a pursuer, in general, does not require forewarning, and there is no difference with regard to this matter between an adult and a minor. The essence of the matter is rescuing the pursued party from death, and therefore the pursuer’s liability to receive the death penalty is irrelevant.

איתיביה רב חסדא לרב הונא יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש ואמאי רודף הוא שאני התם דמשמיא קא רדפי לה Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita: If a woman was giving birth and her life was being endangered by the fetus, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in order to save the mother. But once his head has emerged during the birthing process, he may not be harmed in order to save the mother, because one life may not be pushed aside to save another life. If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the minor who is pursuing him, why is this so? The fetus is a pursuer who is endangering his mother’s life. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to the woman giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. Since the fetus is not acting of his own volition and endangering his mother of his own will, his life may not be taken in order to save his mother.

נימא מסייעא ליה רודף שהיה רודף אחר חבירו להורגו אומר לו ראה שישראל הוא ובן ברית הוא והתורה אמרה (בראשית ט, ו) שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך אמרה תורה הצל דמו של זה בדמו של זה The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a baraita supports the ruling of Rav Huna, who said that a pursuer does not require a forewarning: If a pursuer was pursuing another person in order to kill him, a third party says to the pursuer: See that he whom you are pursuing to kill is a Jew, and a loyal member of the covenant, and the Torah stated: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (Genesis 9:6). The Torah stated: Save the blood of this person who is being pursued with the blood of that person who is pursuing him. The fact that there is no indication here that the pursuer must say that he heard the forewarning suggests that forewarning is not required, as stated by Rav Huna.

ההיא רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה היא דתניא רבי יוסי בר' יהודה אומר חבר אין צריך התראה לפי שלא ניתנה התראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Perhaps this baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A ḥaver, who is thoroughly knowledgeable in halakha, does not need to be issued a forewarning by witnesses in order to become liable to be punished, because forewarning is given only to distinguish between unintentional sin and intentional sin, and a ḥaver is certainly aware of the halakha. The same may be said about a pursuer: Since his malice is clear, he does not require a forewarning; his sin is obviously intentional. Those who disagree with Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and say that even a ḥaver needs to be issued a forewarning would say that a pursuer must be forewarned as well.

ת"ש רודף שהיה רודף אחר חבירו להורגו אמר לו ראה שישראל הוא ובן ברית הוא והתורה אמרה שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך אם אמר יודע אני שהוא כן פטור ע"מ כן אני עושה חייב The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that a pursuer must be forewarned, and therefore one may not save a pursued party by killing a minor who is pursuing him, from a baraita: If a pursuer was pursuing another person in order to kill him, and a third party said to him: See that he whom you are pursuing to kill is a Jew, and a loyal member of the covenant, and the Torah stated: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (Genesis 9:6), in this case, if the pursuer said: I know this to be so, he is exempt from being killed, but if he said: I am doing it on this condition, i.e., knowing that I am liable to be killed for this, he is liable to be slain. This indicates that even a pursuer must be issued a forewarning.

לא צריכא דקאי בתרי עיברי דנהרא דלא מצי אצוליה מאי איכא דבעי איתויי לבי דינא בי דינא בעי התראה The Gemara rejects this proof: This forewarning is not necessary except in a case where the pursuer and the person issuing the warning are standing on two opposite sides of a river, so that the latter cannot save the party being pursued by killing the pursuer. What is there for him to do? Unable to save the pursued party, he wants at least to bring the pursuer to court, so that he will be convicted and have the death penalty administered to him. But in order to administer punishment, the court requires that the offender receive proper forewarning. It is for this reason that the baraita speaks of forewarning, but a pursuer may be killed by a bystander even without having been forewarned.

איבעית אימא אמר לך רב הונא אנא דאמרי כתנא דמחתרת דאמר מחתרתו זו היא התראתו: If you wish, say instead that Rav Huna could have said to you: I stated my opinion that it is permitted to kill a minor pursuer in accordance with the tanna who spoke of the issue of a burglar who breaks into a house. As this tanna says that his breaking in is his forewarning, that is, a burglar who breaks into a house needs no further forewarning. Here, too, anyone who is pursuing another in order to kill him does not require forewarning since his pursuit is his forewarning.

Daf 73a

מתני׳ ואלו הן שמצילין אותן בנפשן הרודף אחר חבירו להרגו ואחר הזכר ואחר הנערה המאורסה אבל הרודף אחר בהמה והמחלל את השבת ועובד עבודת כוכבים אין מצילין אותן בנפשן: MISHNA: And these are the ones who are saved from transgressing even at the cost of their lives; that is to say, these people may be killed so that they do not perform a transgression: One who pursues another to kill him, or pursues a male to sodomize him, or pursues a betrothed young woman to rape her. But with regard to one who pursues an animal to sodomize it, or one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat, or one who is going to engage in idol worship, they are not saved at the cost of their lives. Rather, they are forewarned not to transgress, and if they proceed to transgress after having been forewarned, they are brought to trial, and if they are found guilty, they are executed.

גמ׳ ת"ר מניין לרודף אחר חבירו להרגו שניתן להצילו בנפשו ת"ל (ויקרא יט, טז) לא תעמוד על דם רעך והא להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא מניין לרואה את חבירו שהוא טובע בנהר או חיה גוררתו או לסטין באין עליו שהוא חייב להצילו ת"ל לא תעמוד על דם רעך אין ה"נ GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that with regard to one who pursues another in order to kill him, the pursued party may be saved at the cost of the pursuer’s life? The verse states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another” (Leviticus 19:16); rather, you must save him from death. The Gemara asks: But does this verse really come to teach us this? This verse is required for that which is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one who sees another drowning in a river, or being dragged away by a wild animal, or being attacked by bandits [listin], is obligated to save him? The Torah states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another.” The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that this verse relates to the obligation to save one whose life is in danger.

ואלא ניתן להצילו בנפשו מנלן אתיא בקל וחומר מנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה שלא בא אלא לפוגמה אמרה תורה ניתן להצילה בנפשו רודף אחר חבירו להרגו על אחת כמה וכמה The Gemara asks again: But from where do we derive that one may be saved at the cost of the pursuer’s life? The Gemara answers: It is derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakha governing a betrothed young woman who was assaulted by a rapist: If in the case of a betrothed young woman, whom the rapist comes only to degrade, i.e., the result of the rape will be that her status is lowered, the Torah said that she may be saved even at the cost of the rapist’s life, then in the case of one who pursues another person to kill him, all the more so should one say that he may be saved even at the cost of the pursuer’s life.

וכי עונשין מן הדין דבי רבי תנא הקישא הוא (דברים כב, כו) כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש וכי מה למדנו מרוצח The Gemara asks: But does the court administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: A Sage of the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught: This halakha is also derived from an analogy based on a juxtaposition. How so? With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer?

מעתה הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילה בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life.

ונערה מאורסה גופה מנלן כדתנא דבי ר' ישמעאל דתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל (דברים כב, כז) ואין מושיע לה הא יש מושיע לה בכל דבר שיכול להושיע The Gemara asks: And with regard to the betrothed young woman herself, from where do we derive that she may be saved at the cost of the rapist’s life? The Gemara explains: As it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: The verse states: “For he found her in the field, and the betrothed young woman cried out, and there was none to save her” (Deuteronomy 22:27). But if there was someone to save her, he must do so by any means that can save her, even by killing the potential rapist.

גופא מניין לרואה את חברו שהוא טובע בנהר או חיה גוררתו או לסטין באין עליו שהוא חייב להצילו ת"ל לא תעמוד על דם רעך והא מהכא נפקא מהתם נפקא אבדת גופו מניין ת"ל והשבותו לו Concerning the matter itself, it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one who sees another drowning in a river, or being dragged away by a wild animal, or being attacked by bandits, is obligated to save him? The verse states: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another” (Leviticus 19:16). The Gemara asks about this derivation: But is this really derived from here? It is derived from there, i.e., from a different verse, as it is taught: The Torah teaches that one must return lost property to its rightful owner. But from where is it derived that one must help his neighbor who may suffer the loss of his body or his health? The verse states: “And you shall restore it [vahashevato] to him [lo]” (Deuteronomy 22:2), which can also be read as: And you shall restore him [vehashevato] to him, i.e., saving his body. Consequently, there should be no need for the additional verse: “You shall not stand idly by the blood of another.”

אי מהתם הוה אמינא ה"מ בנפשיה אבל מיטרח ומיגר אגורי אימא לא קמ"ל The Gemara answers: If this halakha were derived only from there, I would say that this matter applies only to saving the person in danger by himself, i.e., that he himself must come to his neighbor’s rescue if he can, as is the halakha with regard to returning a lost item. But to trouble himself and hire workers for this purpose, one might say that he is not obligated, just as he is not obligated to hire workers to recover another’s lost item. Therefore, the verse “Do not stand by the blood of another” teaches us that he must even hire workers, and he transgresses a prohibition if he does not do so.

תנו רבנן אחד הרודף אחר חבירו להרגו ואחר הזכר ואחר נערה המאורסה ואחר חייבי מיתות ב"ד ואחר חייבי כריתות מצילין אותן בנפשו אלמנה לכהן גדול גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט אין מצילין אותן בנפשו § The Sages taught yet another baraita on the topic of a pursuer: One who pursues another to kill him; or pursues a male to sodomize him; or pursues a betrothed young woman to rape her; or pursues a woman who is forbidden to him by a prohibition, the violation of which renders him liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty; or pursues a woman who is forbidden to him by a prohibition, the violation of which renders him liable to receive karet, all these people are to be saved at the cost of the life of the transgressor. But with regard to a widow who is being pursued by a High Priest, or a divorcée, or a woman who has performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] who is being pursued by an ordinary priest, they are not saved at the cost of the rapist’s life, because these unions are subject only to a mere prohibition.

נעבדה בה עבירה אין מצילין אותה בנפשו יש לה מושיע אין מצילין אותה בנפשו רבי יהודה אומר אף האומרת הניחו לו שלא יהרגנה Furthermore, if a sin had already been committed with the betrothed young woman, she is not saved at the cost of the rapist’s life. In addition, if there is one to save her, i.e., if there is another way to save the betrothed young woman that does not involve killing the rapist, she is not saved at the cost of his life. Rabbi Yehuda says: Also, if the betrothed young woman says to those who come to rescue her: Let the rapist be, she is saying this so that he should not kill her, and therefore the rapist is not killed.

מנה"מ אמר קרא (דברים כב, כו) ולנערה לא תעשה דבר אין לנערה חטא מות נער זה זכור נערה זו נערה המאורסה חטא אלו חייבי כריתות מות אלו חייבי מיתות ב"ד The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman [na’ara]; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death” (Deuteronomy 22:26). The word is read as young woman, “na’ara,” but it is written as young man, na’ar. Na’ar, as it is written, this is an allusion to sodomy. “Na’ara,” as it is read, this is a betrothed young woman. “Sin”; these are women who are forbidden to him by a prohibition the violation of which renders him liable to receive karet. “Death”; these are women who are forbidden to him by a prohibition the violation of which renders him liable to receive a court-imposed death penalty.

כל הני למה לי צריכי דאי כתב רחמנא נער משום דלאו אורחיה אבל נערה דאורחה אימא לא The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these different cases? Why does it not suffice to offer one example from which all the others can be derived? The Gemara answers: These cases are all necessary, as had the Merciful One written only na’ar to teach the halakha with regard to sodomy, one might say that this victim alone is saved at the cost of his attacker’s life, because it is not his way to engage in intercourse with a man, and so he would suffer excessive embarrassment and pain were he not saved. But a young woman, whose natural way is to engage in intercourse with a man, one might say that her attacker may not be killed.

ואי כתב רחמנא נערה משום דקא פגים לה אבל נער דלא קא פגים ליה אימא לא And had the Merciful One wrote only “na’ara” to teach the halakha concerning a betrothed young woman, one might say that she alone is saved at the cost of her attacker’s life, because he degrades her by taking her virginity, and she will be cheapened in the eyes of her betrothed. But a young man, who is not similarly degraded, one might say that his attacker may not be killed.

ואי כתב רחמנא הני And had the Merciful One wrote both of these,

Daf 73b

משום דהאי לאו אורחיה הוא והא קא פגים לה אבל שאר עריות דאורחייהו ולא נפיש פיגמייהו אימא לא כתב רחמנא חטא one might say that these two alone are saved at the cost of their respective attackers’ lives, because for this one it is not his natural way, and that one he degrades. But one who rapes one of the other women with whom relations are forbidden, whose natural way is to engage in intercourse with a man, and their degradation is not great, one might say that their attackers may not be killed. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote “sin” to include in this halakha the other women with whom relations are forbidden.

ואי כתב רחמנא חטא הוה אמינא אפילו חייבי לאוין כתב רחמנא מות And had the Merciful One wrote only “sin,” I would say that this applies even to women who are forbidden only by a mere prohibition, that they too are to be saved even at the cost of their attackers’ lives. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote “death,” to teach us that this halakha applies only to transgressions that are punishable by the death penalty.

ואי כתב רחמנא מות הוה אמינא חייבי מיתות בית דין אין חייבי כריתות לא כתב רחמנא חטא And had the Merciful One wrote only “death,” I would say that those women who are forbidden to him by a prohibition the violation of which renders him liable to a court-imposed death penalty are indeed to be saved even at the cost of their attackers’ lives, as these are very serious sins, for which they are punished by the court. But those women who are forbidden to him by the type of prohibition the violation of which renders him liable to receive karet, a punishment from God, are not to be saved at the cost of their attackers’ lives. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote “sin,” to teach that this halakha applies even to prohibitions that are punishable by karet.

ולכתוב רחמנא חטא מות ולא בעי נער ונערה אין ה"נ ואלא נער נערה חד למעוטי עובד עבודת כוכבים וחד למעוטי בהמה ושבת The Gemara challenges: But let the Merciful One write only “sin worthy of death” and it would no longer be necessary to specify na’ar and “na’ara.” The Gemara explains: Yes, this is indeed so; the words “sin worthy of death” suffice to include all those who are included in this halakha. But na’ar and “na’ara” are mentioned here not to include a case, but rather to exclude a case. One serves to exclude someone who seeks to worship idols, and one serves to exclude someone who seeks to sodomize an animal or desecrate Shabbat, teaching that these transgressors are not killed in order to prevent them from transgressing.

ולר"ש בן יוחי דאמר עובד עבודת כוכבים ניתן להצילו בנפשו למה לי חד למעוטי בהמה וחד למעוטי שבת The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says that an idol worshipper must be saved from transgressing even at the cost of his life, why do I need the two terms na’ar and “na’ara”? The Gemara answers: One serves to exclude someone who seeks to sodomize an animal, and one serves to exclude someone who seeks to desecrate Shabbat.

סד"א תיתי שבת מחילול חילול מעבודת כוכבים The Gemara explains why both are needed: It might enter your mind to say that the halakha with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat can be derived from the halakha with regard to idol worship by way of a verbal analogy between the word “desecration” mentioned in connection with Shabbat and the word “desecration” mentioned in connection with idol worship. Consequently, you might think that one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat must also be saved from transgressing even at the cost of his life. Therefore, a special derivation was necessary to teach that a potential Shabbat desecrator is not to be saved at the cost of his life.

ולרבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון דאמר מחלל את השבת ניתן להצילו בנפשו דאתיא שבת מחילול חילול מעבודת כוכבים מאי איכא למימר חד מיעוט למעוטי בהמה ואידך איידי דכתב רחמנא נער כתב נמי נערה: The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that one who comes to desecrate Shabbat must be saved from transgressing even at the cost of his life, because the halakha with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat can be derived from the halakha with regard to idol worship by way of a verbal analogy between the word “desecration” mentioned in connection with Shabbat and the word “desecration” mentioned in connection with idol worship, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: One exclusion serves to exclude someone who seeks to sodomize an animal; and as for the other, since the Merciful One wrote na’ar, He also wrote “na’ara.” That is to say, the form in which the word is written in this verse and the form in which it is read do not teach two separate halakhot.

רבי יהודה אומר אף האומרת הניחו לו שלא יהרגנה: במאי קמיפלגי § The baraita cited previously teaches: Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis and says: Also, if the betrothed young woman says to those who come to rescue her: Let the rapist be, she is saying this so that he should not kill her, and therefore the rapist is not killed. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree?

אמר רבא במקפדת על פיגמה ומניחתו שלא יהרגנה רבנן סברי אפיגמה קפיד רחמנא והרי מקפדת על פיגמה ורבי יהודה האי דקאמר רחמנא קטליה משום דמסרה נפשה לקטלא הא לא מסרה נפשה לקטלא Rava says: They disagree about the case where the young woman is particular about the degradation that she is to suffer as a result of the rape, but nevertheless she allows him to rape her so that he should not kill her. The Rabbis maintain that the Torah is particular about her degradation, which is why the rapist may be killed, and she too is particular about her degradation. And Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the Merciful One says that a rapist must be killed because his victim is prepared to sacrifice her life rather than yield to rape. The woman in this case, however, who asks that the rapist not be harmed, is not prepared to sacrifice her life, and therefore her rapist may not be killed.

אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי אלמנה לכהן גדול נמי קא פגים לה אמר ליה אפיגמה רבה קפיד רחמנא אפיגמה זוטא לא קפיד רחמנא: Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If the reason that the rapist may be killed is the woman’s degradation, as claimed by the Rabbis, a High Priest also degrades a widow when he engages in intercourse with her, as he makes her a ḥalala, a woman who is disqualified from marrying a priest. Why then is she not saved even at the cost of her attacker’s life? Abaye said to Rav Pappa: For a great level of degradation, involving karet and potentially a child that is a mamzer, the Merciful One is particular; but for a small level of degradation, as in the case of a ḥalala, the Merciful One is not particular.

חטא אלו חייבי כריתות: ורמינהו ואלו נערות שיש להן קנס הבא על אחותו § The baraita taught that the word “sin” is referring to women who are forbidden to a man by a prohibition the violation of which renders him liable to receive karet. From here it is derived that a man who attempts to rape a woman who is forbidden to him under penalty of karet may be killed. The Gemara raises a contradiction between this and what is taught in a mishna (Ketubot 29a): These are the cases of young women for whom there is a fine paid to their fathers by one who rapes them, and the list includes: One who engages in intercourse with his sister. One who engages in intercourse with his sister is punished with karet, and accordingly, a woman being raped by her brother may be saved even at the cost of her brother’s life. Whenever one is liable to be killed at the hands of people, even if the transgressor is not killed, the transgressor is exempt from paying any fine or payment. Therefore, since one attempting to rape his sister may be killed, he should be exempt from the fine ordinarily imposed upon a rapist.

אמרוה רבנן קמיה דרב חסדא משעת העראה דפגמה איפטר לה מקטלא ממונא לא משלם עד גמר ביאה The Sages stated this solution before Rav Ḥisda: From the time of the initial stage of intercourse, when he has already degraded her, as she is considered to have engaged in intercourse from that time, he is already exempt from being killed, as it was taught in a baraita that once the sin has been committed, and the woman has been degraded, the rapist may no longer be killed. But he does not become obligated to pay any money until the conclusion of the act of intercourse, when the signs of her virginity are completely taken away. Since the two types of liability are not incurred simultaneously, there is no exemption from paying the fine.

הניחא למאן דאמר העראה זו נשיקה אלא למ"ד העראה זו הכנסת עטרה מאי איכא למימר Rav Ḥisda said to those Sages: This works out well according to the one who says that the definition of the initial stage of intercourse is a kiss, i.e., external contact of the sexual organs, as it is inevitable that there will be some slight penetration. But according to the one who said that the definition of the initial stage of intercourse is the insertion of the corona, what is there to say? This stage takes away the woman’s virginity. From the time of the initial stage of intercourse she is no longer a virgin, and he becomes liable to pay the fine at the very moment that he may be killed in order to save him from his transgression.

אלא אמר רב חסדא כגון שבא עליה שלא כדרכה וחזר ובא עליה כדרכה Rather, Rav Ḥisda says: The mishna should be understood as referring to a case where the brother first engaged in intercourse with his sister in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse. With this intercourse he degraded her, but she is still considered a virgin. Afterward, he again engaged in intercourse with her in a typical manner. Only at that point did he become liable to pay the fine paid by one who engaged in intercourse with a virgin and took away her virginity. But he could not then be killed, as she had already been degraded, so there is no exemption from the fine.

רבא אמר במניחתו שלא יהרגנה ור' יהודה היא Rava says: The mishna is referring to a case where the sister allows her brother to rape her and asks that he not be harmed so that he should not kill her, and it is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that in such a case she is not to be saved at the cost of her brother’s life.

Daf 74a

רב פפא אמר במפותה ודברי הכל Rav Pappa says: The ruling of the mishna, which lists his sister among those for whom he must pay a fine, is stated with regard to a young woman who was seduced, and in the case of seduction all agree that the woman is not saved at the cost of the seducer’s life, as the intercourse was consensual.

אביי אמר ביכול להציל באחד מאבריו ורבי יונתן בן שאול היא דתניא רבי יונתן בן שאול אומר רודף שהיה רודף אחר חבירו להורגו ויכול להצילו באחד מאבריו ולא הציל נהרג עליו Abaye says: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a young woman who was raped in a case where one was able to save her by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, so that it was not necessary to kill him in order to achieve her rescue, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and one was able to save the pursued party without killing the pursuer, but instead by injuring him in one of his limbs, but he did not save him in this manner and rather chose to kill him, he is executed on his account as a murderer.

מאי טעמא דרבי יונתן בן שאול דכתיב (שמות כא, כב) וכי ינצו אנשים (יחדו) וגו' וא"ר אלעזר במצות שבמיתה הכתוב מדבר דכתיב (שמות כא, כג) ואם אסון יהיה ונתתה נפש תחת נפש ואפ"ה אמר רחמנא ולא יהיה אסון ענוש יענש The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul? As it is written: “If men strive and strike a woman with child, so that her fruit departs, and yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished, according to the demands that the woman’s husband makes on him; and he shall pay it as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). And concerning this Rabbi Elazar says: The verse is speaking of striving to kill, where each man was trying to kill the other. The proof is that it is written: “But if any harm ensues, then you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:23), and if there was no intention to kill, why should he be executed? And even so, the Merciful One states: “And yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished,” teaching that he must pay the monetary value of the fetus to the woman’s husband.

אי אמרת בשלמא יכול להציל באחד מאבריו לא ניתן להצילו בנפשו היינו דמשכחת לה דיענש כגון שיכול להציל באחד מאבריו Granted, if you say that in a case where one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he may not save the pursued party at the cost of the pursuer’s life, and if he killed the pursuer rather than injure him he is liable to receive the death penalty, that is how you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished. This would be in a case where it was possible to save the man under attack, i.e., one of the men who were fighting, by injuring the pursuer, i.e., the other man, who ultimately struck the woman, in one of his limbs. In this case, the one who ultimately struck the woman was not subject to being killed. Therefore, he is subject to pay a fine.

אלא אי אמרת יכול להציל באחד מאבריו נמי ניתן להצילו בנפשו היכי משכחת לה דיענש But if you say that even if one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he can also save him at the cost of the pursuer’s life, how can you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished? When he was going to strike the other man, he was at risk of being killed, as anybody could have killed him at that time, and the halakha is that anybody who commits an act warranting death exempts himself from any monetary obligation ensuing from that act.

דילמא שאני הכא דמיתה לזה ותשלומין לזה The Gemara tries to refute this reasoning: Perhaps it is different here because his two liabilities are not on account of the same person; rather, his liability to be put to death is on account of this person, the man with whom he fought, while his liability to give payment is on account of that person, the woman he ultimately struck. Consequently, he is liable to receive both punishments.

לא שנא דאמר רבא רודף שהיה רודף אחר חבירו ושיבר את הכלים בין של נרדף ובין של כל אדם פטור מאי טעמא מתחייב בנפשו הוא The Gemara rejects this distinction: There is no difference. As Rava says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and during the course of the chase the pursuer broke vessels belonging either to the person being pursued or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for the broken vessels. What is the reason for this? The reason is that he is liable to be killed, since everyone is entitled to kill him in order to save the victim’s life, and one who commits an act rendering himself liable to be killed is exempt from any monetary obligation arising from that act, even if the payment were to be made to a person not connected to the act for which he is liable to be killed.

ונרדף ששיבר את הכלים של רודף פטור של כל אדם חייב של רודף פטור שלא יהא ממונו חביב עליו מגופו של כל אדם חייב שמציל עצמו בממון חבירו Rava continues: And if the pursued party broke vessels while fleeing from the pursuer, if those vessels belonged to the pursuer, the pursued party is exempt. But if they belonged to anyone else, he is liable to pay for them. The Gemara explains: If the vessels belonged to the pursuer, he is exempt. The reason for this is so that the pursuer’s property should not be more precious to the pursuer than his own body. Were the one being pursued to cause the pursuer bodily harm, he would be exempt; all the more so when the pursued one breaks the pursuer’s vessels. And if the vessels belonged to anyone else, he is liable, as he saved himself at the expense of another’s property, and that other person should not have to suffer a loss on his account.

ורודף שהיה רודף אחר רודף להצילו ושיבר את הכלים בין של רודף בין של נרדף בין של כל אדם פטור ולא מן הדין שאם אי אתה אומר כן נמצא אין לך כל אדם שמציל את חבירו מיד הרודף: Rava continues: But if one pursuer was pursuing another pursuer in order to save him, i.e., if he was trying to save the person being pursued by killing the pursuer, and while doing so he broke vessels belonging either to the pursuer or to the one being pursued, or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for them. The Gemara comments: This is not by strict law, as if one who saves himself at another’s expense is liable to pay for the damage, certainly one who saves another at the expense of a third party should bear similar liability. Rather, it is an ordinance instituted by the Sages. This is because if you do not say that he is exempt, it will be found that no person will save another from a pursuer, as everyone will be afraid of becoming liable to pay for damage caused in the course of saving the pursued party.

אבל הרודף אחר בהמה: תניא רשב"י אומר העובד עבודת כוכבים ניתן להצילו בנפשו מק"ו ומה פגם הדיוט ניתן להצילו בנפשו פגם גבוה לא כל שכן וכי עונשין מן הדין קא סבר עונשין מן הדין § The mishna teaches: But with regard to one who pursues an animal to sodomize it, or one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat, or one who is going to engage in idol worship, they are not saved at the cost of their lives. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: One who seeks to worship idols may be saved from transgressing at the cost of his life. This is derived through an a fortiori inference: If to avoid the degradation of an ordinary person, such as in the case of a rapist who degrades his victim, he can be saved even at the cost of his life, all the more so is it not clear that one may kill the transgressor to avoid the degrading of the honor of God through the worship of idols? The Gemara asks: But does the court administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai maintains that the court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference.

תניא רבי אלעזר ברבי שמעון אומר המחלל את השבת ניתן להצילו בנפשו סבר לה כאבוה דאמר עונשין מן הדין ואתיא שבת בחילול חילול מעבודת כוכבים It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: One who seeks to desecrate Shabbat may be saved from transgressing even at the cost of his life. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of his father, Rabbi Shimon, who says: The court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference, and the halakha with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat is derived from the halakha with regard to idol worship by way of a verbal analogy between the word “desecration” mentioned in the context of Shabbat and the word “desecration” mentioned in the context of idol worship.

א"ר יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יהוצדק נימנו וגמרו בעליית בית נתזה בלוד כל עבירות שבתורה אם אומרין לאדם עבור ואל תהרג יעבור ואל יהרג חוץ מעבודת כוכבים וגילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים § The Gemara now considers which prohibitions are permitted in times of mortal danger. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them.

ועבודת כוכבים לא והא תניא א"ר ישמעאל מנין שאם אמרו לו לאדם עבוד עבודת כוכבים ואל תהרג מנין שיעבוד ואל יהרג ת"ל (ויקרא יח, ה) וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם The Gemara asks: And should one not transgress the prohibition of idol worship to save his life? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael said: From where is it derived that if a person is told: Worship idols and you will not be killed, from where is it derived that he should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes and My judgments, which a person shall do, and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), thereby teaching that the mitzvot were given to provide life, but they were not given so that one will die due to their observance.

יכול אפילו בפרהסיא תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כב, לב) ולא תחללו את שם קדשי ונקדשתי The baraita continues: One might have thought that it is permitted to worship the idol in this circumstance even in public, i.e., in the presence of many people. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall you profane My holy name; but I will be hallowed among the children of Israel: I am the Lord Who sanctifies you” (Leviticus 22:32). Evidently, one is not required to allow himself to be killed so as not to transgress the prohibition of idol worship when in private; but in public he must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress.

אינהו דאמור כר"א דתניא ר"א אומר (דברים ו, ה) ואהבת את ה' אלהיך בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך ובכל מאדך אם נאמר בכל נפשך למה נאמר בכל מאדך ואם נאמר בכל מאדך למה נאמר בכל נפשך The Gemara answers: Those in the upper story of the house of Nitza stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5). If it is stated: “With all your soul,” why is it also stated: “With all your might,” which indicates with all your material possessions? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it also stated: “With all your soul”? One of these clauses seems to be superfluous.

אם יש לך אדם שגופו חביב עליו מממונו לכך נאמר בכל נפשך ואם יש לך אדם שממונו חביב עליו מגופו לכך נאמר בכל מאדך Rather, this serves to teach that if you have a person whose body is more precious to him than his property, it is therefore stated: “With all your soul.” That person must be willing to sacrifice even his life to sanctify God’s name. And if you have a person whose property is more precious to him than his body, it is therefore stated: “With all your might.” That person must even be prepared to sacrifice all his property for the love of God. According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one must allow himself to be killed rather than worship an idol.

גילוי עריות ושפיכות דמים כדרבי דתניא רבי אומר (דברים כב, כו) כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה וכי מה למדנו מרוצח From where is it derived that one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations and the prohibition of bloodshed? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer?

מעתה הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד מקיש רוצח לנערה המאורסה מה נערה המאורסה ניתן להצילו בנפשו אף רוצח ניתן להצילו בנפשו Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life.

ומקיש נערה המאורסה לרוצח מה רוצח יהרג ואל יעבור אף נערה המאורסה תהרג ואל תעבור And conversely, the Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations.

רוצח גופיה מנא לן סברא הוא דההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבה ואמר ליה אמר לי מרי דוראי זיל קטליה לפלניא ואי לא קטלינא לך אמר ליה לקטלוך ולא תיקטול מי יימר דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דהוא גברא סומק טפי The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another.

כי אתא רב דימי א"ר יוחנן לא שנו אלא שלא בשעת גזרת המלכות) אבל בשעת גזרת המלכות אפי' מצוה קלה יהרג ואל יעבור § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught that one is permitted to transgress prohibitions in the face of mortal danger only when it is not a time of religious persecution. But in a time of religious persecution, when the gentile authorities are trying to force Jews to violate their religion, even if they issued a decree about a minor mitzva, one must be killed and not transgress.

כי אתא רבין א"ר יוחנן אפי' שלא בשעת גזרת מלכות לא אמרו אלא בצינעא אבל בפרהסיא אפי' מצוה קלה יהרג ואל יעבור When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even when it is not a time of religious persecution, the Sages said that one is permitted to transgress a prohibition in the face of mortal danger only when he was ordered to do so in private. But if he was ordered to commit a transgression in public, even if they threaten him with death if he does not transgress a minor mitzva, he must be killed and not transgress.

מאי מצוה קלה אמר רבא בר רב יצחק אמר רב The Gemara asks: What is a minor mitzva for this purpose? Rava bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says:

Daf 74b

אפילו לשנויי ערקתא דמסאנא Even to change the strap of a sandal. There was a Jewish custom with regard to sandal straps. If the gentile authorities were to decree that Jews must change their practice and wear sandal straps like those worn by the gentiles, one would be obligated to give up his life rather than veer from the accepted custom.

וכמה פרהסיא אמר ר' יעקב אמר רבי יוחנן אין פרהסיא פחותה מעשרה בני אדם פשיטא ישראלים בעינן דכתיב (ויקרא כב, לב) ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל בעי רבי ירמיה תשעה ישראל ונכרי אחד מהו The Gemara asks: And the presence of how many people is required so that it should be deemed a public act? Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: An action is not considered a public act if it is performed in the presence of fewer than ten people. The Gemara clarifies this point: It is obvious that we require that these ten people be Jews, as it is written in the verse from which we derive the requirement of ten for the sanctification of God’s name: “And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:32). Rabbi Yirmeya asks: What is the halakha if there were nine Jews and one gentile present?

תא שמע דתני רב ינאי אחוה דרבי חייא בר אבא אתיא תוך תוך כתיב הכא ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל וכתיב התם (במדבר טז, כא) הבדלו מתוך העדה הזאת מה להלן עשרה וכולהו ישראל אף כאן עשרה וכולהו ישראל The Gemara answers: Come and hear an answer from what Rav Yannai, the brother of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, teaches in a baraita: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word “among” written with regard to the sanctification of God’s name, and the word “among” written with regard to Korah and his assembly. Here, with regard to the sanctification of God’s name, it is written: “And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel,” and there, with regard to Korah, it is written: “Separate yourselves from among this congregation” (Numbers 16:21). The meaning of the word “congregation” written with regard to Korah is derived by means of a verbal analogy to the word “congregation” written with regard to the spies sent out by Moses to scout the land: “How long shall I bear with this evil congregation” (Numbers 14:27). Just as there, the congregation of spies numbered ten, and all were Jews, so too here, concerning the sanctification of God, there must be ten, all of them being Jews.

והא אסתר פרהסיא הואי אמר אביי אסתר קרקע עולם היתה The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t the incident involving Esther, i.e., her cohabitation with Ahasuerus, a public sin? Why then did Esther not surrender her life rather than engage in intercourse? The Gemara answers: Abaye says: Esther was merely like natural ground, i.e., she was a passive participant. The obligation to surrender one’s life rather than engage in forbidden sexual intercourse applies only to a man who transgresses the prohibition in an active manner. A woman who is passive and merely submits is not required to give up her life so that she not sin.

רבא אמר הנאת עצמן שאני Rava says that there is another justification for Esther’s behavior: When gentiles order the transgression of a prohibition not in order to persecute the Jews or to make them abandon their religion, but for their own personal pleasure, it is different. In such a situation there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life, even when the sin is committed in public.

דאי לא תימא הכי הני קוואקי ודימוניקי היכי יהבינן לה אלא הנאת עצמן שאני הכא נמי הנאת עצמן שאני Rava explains: As if you do not say so, then how do we give them coal shovels [kevakei vedimonikei]? The Persian priests would take coal shovels from every house, fill them with coals, and use them to heat their temples on their festival days. Although this involved assisting idol worship in public, Jews would not sacrifice their lives in order not to do so. Rather, the reason they cooperated is certainly that a measure enacted for the gentiles’ personal pleasure is different. Here too, concerning Esther, Ahasuerus engaged in intercourse with her for his personal pleasure, and a measure enacted for a gentile’s personal pleasure is different, and there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life to avoid it.

ואזדא רבא לטעמיה דאמר רבא עכו"ם דאמר ליה להאי ישראל קטול אספסתא בשבתא ושדי לחיותא ואי לא קטילנא לך ליקטיל ולא לקטליה שדי לנהרא ליקטליה ולא ליקטול מ"ט לעבורי מילתא קא בעי The Gemara comments: And Rava follows his own line of reasoning, as Rava says: If a gentile said to a certain Jew: Cut grass [aspasta] on Shabbat and throw it before the cattle, and if you do not do this I will kill you, he should cut the grass and not be killed. But if the gentile said to him: Cut the grass and throw it into the river, he should be killed and not cut the grass. What is the reason for the latter ruling? Because it is clear that the gentile is not seeking his own personal pleasure, but rather he wants to force the Jew to violate his religion.

בעו מיניה מר' אמי בן נח מצווה על קדושת השם או אין מצווה על קדושת השם § The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: Is a descendant of Noah, who is commanded to refrain from idol worship, also commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, or is he not commanded about the sanctification of God’s name?

אמר אביי ת"ש שבע מצות נצטוו בני נח ואם איתא תמני הויין א"ל רבא אינהו וכל אבזרייהו Abaye says: Come and hear an answer to this question from a baraita in which it was taught: Descendants of Noah were commanded to observe seven mitzvot: To establish courts of law, to refrain from cursing God, idol worship, adultery, bloodshed, robbery, and from eating the limb of a living animal. And if it is so that they are commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, then there would be eight mitzvot in which they are commanded. Rava said to him: There is no proof from here, as when the baraita speaks of seven mitzvot it means the seven mitzvot themselves with all their associated [avzaraihu] obligations. The mitzva to sanctify God’s name can be understood as a detail of the prohibition of idolatry.

מאי הוי עלה אמר רב אדא בר אהבה אמרי בי רב כתיב (מלכים ב ה, יח) לדבר הזה יסלח ה' לעבדך בבא אדני בית רמון להשתחות שמה והוא נשען על ידי והשתחויתי וכתיב (מלכים ב ה, יט) ויאמר לו לך לשלום The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rav Adda bar Ahava says that they say in the school of Rav: It is written that Naaman, commander of the army of the king of Aram, said to the prophet Elisha: “For this matter may the Lord pardon your servant, that when my master goes into the house of Rimmon to bow down there and he leans on my hand, and I bow myself down in the house of Rimmon” (II Kings 5:18). That is, he was forced to bow down before an idol out of fear of his master, the king of Aram. And it is written in the following verse: “And he said to him: Go in peace,” indicating that Elisha did not criticize him for acting in this manner.

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Daf 75a

ואם איתא לא לימא ליה הא בצנעה הא בפרהסיא And if it is so that a descendant of Noah is commanded about the sanctification of God’s name, he should not have said to him: “Go in peace.” The Gemara answers: This situation, where Elisha permitted Naaman’s conduct, happened in private. When Naaman bowed down in the house of Rimmon, he did not do so in the presence of ten Jews. Whereas that question that was raised is whether or not a descendant of Noah must sanctify God’s name in public, in the presence of ten Jews. Consequently, the question remains without a solution.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מעשה באדם אחד שנתן עיניו באשה אחת והעלה לבו טינא ובאו ושאלו לרופאים ואמרו אין לו תקנה עד שתבעל אמרו חכמים ימות ואל תבעל לו תעמוד לפניו ערומה ימות ואל תעמוד לפניו ערומה תספר עמו מאחורי הגדר ימות ולא תספר עמו מאחורי הגדר § Apropos the discussion of the obligation to allow oneself to be killed rather than engage in forbidden sexual intercourse, the Gemara notes that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: There was an incident involving a certain man who set his eyes upon a certain woman and passion rose in his heart, to the point that he became deathly ill. And they came and asked doctors what was to be done with him. And the doctors said: He will have no cure until she engages in sexual intercourse with him. The Sages said: Let him die, and she may not engage in sexual intercourse with him. The doctors said: She should at least stand naked before him. The Sages said: Let him die, and she may not stand naked before him. The doctors suggested: The woman should at least converse with him behind a fence in a secluded area, so that he should derive a small amount of pleasure from the encounter. The Sages insisted: Let him die, and she may not converse with him behind a fence.

פליגי בה ר' יעקב בר אידי ור' שמואל בר נחמני חד אמר אשת איש היתה וחד אמר פנויה היתה בשלמא למאן דאמר אשת איש היתה שפיר אלא למ"ד פנויה היתה מאי כולי האי The Gemara comments: Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi and Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani disagree about this issue. One of them says: The woman in question was a married woman, and the other one says: She was unmarried. The Gemara tries to clarify the issue: Granted, according to the one who says that she was a married woman, the matter is properly understood. Since the case involved a severely prohibited forbidden relationship, the Sages did not allow any activity hinting at intimacy. But according to the one who says that she was unmarried, what is the reason for all this opposition? Why did the Sages say that the man must be allowed to die, rather than have the woman do as was requested?

רב פפא אמר משום פגם משפחה רב אחא בריה דרב איקא אמר כדי שלא יהו בנות ישראל פרוצות בעריות Rav Pappa says: This is due to the potential family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name, as it is not permitted to bring disgrace to the entire family in order to save the lovesick man. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says: This is so that the daughters of Israel should not be promiscuous with regard to forbidden sexual relations. Were they to listen to the doctors’ recommendations, Jewish women might lose moral restraint.

ולינסבה מינסב לא מייתבה דעתיה כדר' יצחק דא"ר יצחק מיום שחרב בית המקדש ניטלה טעם ביאה וניתנה לעוברי עבירה שנאמר (משלי ט, יז) מים גנובים ימתקו ולחם סתרים ינעם: The Gemara asks: But if the woman was unmarried, let the man marry her. The Gemara answers: His mind would not have been eased by marriage, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Since the day the Temple was destroyed, sexual pleasure was taken away from those who engage in permitted intercourse and given to transgressors, as it is stated: “Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant” (Proverbs 9:17). Therefore, the man could have been cured only by engaging in illicit sexual interaction.

הדרן עלך בן סורר ומורה

מתני׳ ואלו הן הנשרפין הבא על אשה ובתה ובת כהן שזנתה MISHNA: And these are the transgressors who are burned in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: One who engaged in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, and one who is the daughter of a priest and who committed adultery.

יש בכלל אשה ובתה בתו ובת בתו ובת בנו ובת אשתו ובת בתה ובת בנה חמותו ואם חמותו ואם חמיו: Included in the category of the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter and the resulting execution by burning, there are: His daughter, and the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son. Likewise, the following are also included in this category: Intercourse with the daughter of his wife, even though she is not his daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, as well as intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The prohibition and punishment apply both in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her daughter, and in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her mother.

גמ׳ הבא על אשה שנשא בתה לא קתני אלא הבא על אשה ובתה מכלל דתרוייהו לאיסורא ומאן נינהו חמותו ואם חמותו GEMARA: The tanna does not teach the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman whose daughter he previously married. Rather, the tanna teaches the case of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman and her daughter. By inference, one may conclude that both the woman and her daughter are mentioned in the mishna for the purpose of establishing that there is a prohibition of intercourse with either of them, and when he engages in intercourse with the first of them he is liable to be executed. And who are these women? The reference is to his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law.

וקתני יש בכלל אשה ובתה מכלל דתרוייהו כתיבי בהדיא והנך מדרשא אתיא And the tanna teaches: Additional women are included in the category of the prohibition of and the punishment for engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter. By inference, one may conclude that with regard to both his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law, the prohibition and punishment are written explicitly in the Torah, and with regard to those additional women enumerated in the mishna, the prohibition and punishment are derived by means of interpretation.

הניחא לאביי דאמר משמעות דורשין איכא בינייהו מתניתין מני רבי עקיבא היא The Gemara comments: This works out well according to Abaye, who says that with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva cited later in the Gemara (76b), the difference between their opinions is only concerning the interpretation of the meaning of the verse, but there is no practical difference between their opinions. According to Abaye, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Abaye explains that Rabbi Akiva maintains that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with the mother of one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah.

אלא לרבא דאמר חמותו לאחר מיתה איכא בינייהו מתניתין מני אמר לך רבא תני הבא על אשה שנשא בתה: But according to Rava, who says that the difference between their opinions is with regard to the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law after the death of his wife, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The opinion of the tanna of the mishna corresponds neither to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva nor to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as they both maintain that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with the mother of one’s mother-in-law is not stated explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: Rava could say to you: Emend the mishna and teach: One who engaged in intercourse with a woman whose daughter he previously married.

יש בכלל אשה ובתה חמותו ואם חמותו ואם חמיו: לאביי איידי דקא בעי למיתנא אם חמיו תני נמי חמותו ואם חמותו The mishna teaches: Included in the category of the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter and the resulting execution by burning, there are: His mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. The Gemara comments: Abaye holds that everyone agrees that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah, and the tanna enumerates his mother-in-law together with relatives concerning whom the prohibition is derived by means of interpretation. Therefore, according to Abaye, since the tanna seeks to teach that the mother of his father-in-law is included in the prohibition, he teaches the halakha of his mother-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law as well, despite the fact the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law is stated explicitly in the Torah.

לרבא איידי דקא בעי למיתנא אם חמיו ואם חמותו תני נמי חמותו By contrast, Rava holds that the woman and her daughter mentioned in the first clause of the mishna are his wife and his mother-in-law. Therefore, according to Rava, since the tanna seeks to teach that the mother of his father-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law are included in the prohibition, he teaches the halakha of his mother-in-law in the latter clause as well, despite the fact that it is stated explicitly in the Torah.

מנהני מילי דת"ר (ויקרא כ, יד) איש אשר יקח את אשה ואת אמה אין לי אלא אשה ואמה בת אשה ובת בתה ובת בנה מנין § The mishna enumerates several women with whom intercourse is forbidden who are included in the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, which is punished by execution by burning. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived as the Sages taught: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14). I have derived only that this punishment applies to one who engages in intercourse with a woman and with her mother. From where is it derived that one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of the woman married to him, or with the daughter of her daughter, or with the daughter of her son, is also liable to be executed by burning?

נאמר כאן זמה ונאמר להלן זמה מה להלן בתה ובת בתה ובת בנה אף כאן בתה ובת בתה ובת בנה The baraita continues: Lewdness is stated here, with regard to the punishment: “There shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14), and lewdness is stated there, with regard to the prohibition: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they are near kinswomen, it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). It is derived by means of a verbal analogy that just as there the prohibition applies to the woman’s daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, so too here, the punishment of burning applies to one who engages in intercourse with the woman’s daughter, and to the daughter of her daughter, and to the daughter of her son.

מנין לעשות זכרים כנקבות נאמר כאן זמה ונאמר להלן זמה מה להלן זכרים כנקבות אף כאן זכרים כנקבות The baraita continues: From where is it derived to render the status of males like that of females with regard to this punishment? Lewdness is stated here and lewdness is stated there. Just as there, the Torah renders the status of males like that of female relatives, so too here, the Torah renders the status of males like that of females.

מנין לעשות למטה כלמעלה נאמר כאן זמה ונאמר להלן זמה מה להלן למטה כלמעלה אף כאן למטה כלמעלה ומה כאן למעלה כלמטה אף להלן למעלה כלמטה From where is it derived to render the status of relatives below like the status of relatives above? Lewdness is stated here and lewdness is stated there. Just as there, the Torah renders the status of relatives below like that of relatives above, so too here, the Torah renders the status of relatives below like that of relatives above. And just as here, the Torah renders the status of relatives above like that of relatives below, so too there, the Torah renders the status of relatives above like that of relatives below.

אמר מר מנין לעשות זכרים כנקבות מאי זכרים כנקבות אילימא בת בנה כבת בתה בהדי הדדי קאתיאן The Gemara proceeds to elaborate on the derivations cited in the baraita. The Master says: From where is it derived to render the status of males like that of females? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The status of males like that of females? If we say that it means that one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of the son of his wife is executed by burning like one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of her daughter, the status of the daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter are derived together in the first clause of the baraita, as both are written explicitly in the prohibition.

אלא אם חמיו כאם חמותו השתא אם חמותו לא קמה לן אם חמיו מיהדר עלה Rather, this clause in the baraita means that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law is executed by burning like one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law. The Gemara asks: Now, we have not yet established the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law, and the baraita is seeking to derive the halakha of one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law from the halakha of the mother of his mother-in-law?

Daf 75a

הדרן עלך בן סורר ומורה

Daf 75b

אמר אביי הכי קאמר מנין לעשות שאר הבא ממנו כשאר הבא ממנה נאמר כאן זמה ונאמר להלן זמה וכו' והא בשאר דידיה לא כתיבא ביה זמה Abaye says: This is what the baraita is saying. From where is it derived to render a relative who comes from his family, e.g., the daughter of his daughter and the daughter of his son, like a relative who comes from her family, e.g., the daughter of his wife and the daughter of his wife’s daughter? Lewdness is stated here and lewdness is stated there. Just as there, the Torah renders the status of male relatives like that of female relatives, so too here, the Torah renders the status of males like that of females. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it so that with regard to a relative from his family the term lewdness is not written, as the verse states: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, their nakedness you shall not expose; for theirs is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10)?

אמר רבא אמר לי רב יצחק בר אבודימי אתיא הנה הנה אתיא זמה זמה Rava says: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi said to me: The equation of his relative to her relative is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word “henna” written with regard to his relative: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, their nakedness you shall not expose; for theirs [henna] is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), and the word “henna” written with regard to her relative: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they [henna] are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). Additionally, it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word “lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17) and the word “lewdness” in the verse: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14).

אמר מר מנין לעשות למטה כלמעלה מאי למטה כלמעלה אילימא בת בנה ובת בתה כבתה בהדי הדדי קאתיין The Master says: From where is it derived to render the status of a relative below like the status of a relative above? The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The status of a relative below like the status of a relative above? If we say this means that the status of second-generation relative, i.e., the daughter of the son of his wife and the daughter of her daughter is like the status of first-generation relative, i.e., her daughter, this is difficult, as they are derived together, as all of them are mentioned in the same verse (see Leviticus 18:17).

אלא אם חמיו ואם חמותו כחמותו האי למטה כלמעלה למעלה כלמטה הואי תני למעלה כלמטה Rather, it means that the status of the mother of his father-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law is like that of his mother-in-law. The Gemara challenges: If so, is this an example of: A relative below is like the status of a relative above? On the contrary, it is an example of: A relative above is like the status of a relative below. The Gemara responds: Emend the baraita and teach: The status of a relative from the generation above is like the status of a relative from the generation below them.

אי הכי נאמר כאן זמה ונאמר להלן זמה ומה השתא אינהי לא כתיבה זמה דידהו כתיבא The Gemara asks: If so, as for the continuation of the baraita: Lewdness is stated here, with regard to the prohibition, and lewdness is stated there, with regard to the punishment, now, if the mother of his father-in-law and the mother of his mother-in-law are not written in the Torah and are derived through interpretation, is the term lewdness written concerning them?

אמר אביי הכי קאמר מנין לעשות שלשה דורות למעלה כשלשה דורות למטה נאמר למטה זמה ונאמר למעלה זמה מה למטה שלשה דורות אף למעלה שלשה דורות Abaye says: This is what the baraita is saying: From where is it derived to render the status of a relative for three generations above, his wife, his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, like the status of a relative for three generations below, his wife, his daughter, and the daughter of his daughter? Lewdness is stated with regard to relatives below, the offspring of his wife (Leviticus 18:17), and lewdness is stated with regard to relatives above, the ancestors of his wife (Leviticus 20:14). Just as with regard to relatives below, one is liable for engaging in intercourse with three generations of women, so too with regard to relatives above, one is liable for engaging in intercourse with three generations of women.

ומה בעונש עשה למטה כלמעלה אף באזהרה נמי עשה למעלה כלמטה And just as with regard to punishment, the verse rendered the status of relatives below like that of relatives above, so too, with regard to the prohibition, the verse rendered the status of relatives above like that of relatives below.

רב אשי אמר לעולם כדקתני ומאי למטה למטה באיסור Rav Ashi says: Actually, it is not necessary to emend the baraita, and the baraita may be interpreted as it is taught. And what is the meaning of the term below? The reference is to below in terms of the prohibition, i.e., below refers to more distant relatives, e.g., the mother of his mother-in-law, with regard to whom the prohibition is less severe, and above refers to closer relatives, e.g., his mother-in-law, with regard to whom the prohibition is more severe.

אי מה היא אם אמה אסורה אף הוא אם אמו אסורה Based on that interpretation of the baraita, the Gemara asks: If so, why not say: Just as the mother of the mother of his wife is forbidden to him, so too the mother of his mother is forbidden to him, and say that he would be liable to be executed by burning?

אמר אביי אמר קרא אמך היא משום אמו אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום אם אמו Abaye says that it is not possible that one is liable to be burned for engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother, as the verse states: “The nakedness of your father and the nakedness of your mother you shall not expose; she is your mother, you shall not expose her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:7). Infer from this: Due to his intercourse with his mother you deem him liable to be executed, but you do not deem him liable to be executed due to his intercourse with the mother of his mother.

רבא אמר בין למאן דאמר דון מינה ומינה ובין למאן דאמר דון מינה ואוקי באתרה לא אתיא Rava says: Both according to the one who says with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy: Infer the halakha from it, i.e., from the source of the verbal analogy, and derive the details from it, i.e., from that source, and according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, i.e., the derived halakha is subject to the principles that govern that which is derived by means of the verbal analogy, it is not derived that one is liable to be burned for engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother.

למ"ד דון מינה ומינה מה היא אם אמה אסורה אף הוא נמי אם אמו אסורה ומינה מה היא בשריפה אף הוא נמי בשריפה The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it and derive the details from it, one might infer: Just as with regard to relatives of his wife, the mother of her mother is forbidden to him, so too with regard to his relatives, the mother of his mother is forbidden to him. And derive again from it: Just as with regard to relatives of his wife, he is liable to be executed by burning due to his intercourse with the mother of her mother, so too with regard to his relatives, he is also liable to be executed by burning due to his intercourse with the mother of his mother.

למ"ד שריפה חמורה איכא למיפרך מה להיא שכן אמה בשריפה תאמר בהוא שאמו בסקילה The Gemara proceeds to explain why one cannot derive that one is liable to be burned for engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother. According to the one who says: Execution by burning is more severe than execution by stoning, the inference from the halakha of relatives of his wife can be refuted as follows: What is notable about her relatives, where he is liable to be burned for engaging in intercourse with the mother of her mother? They are notable in that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his wife is liable to be executed by the more severe punishment of burning, not the less severe, more common, punishment of stoning. Will you then say that the same halakha should apply with regard to his relatives, where one who engages in intercourse with his mother is liable to be executed by the less severe punishment of stoning?

ועוד אמו בסקילה אם אמו בשריפה And furthermore, as one who engages in intercourse with his mother is executed by the less severe punishment of stoning, is it possible that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother, a more distant relative, is executed by the more severe punishment of burning?

ועוד מה היא לא חלקת בה בין אמה לאם אמה אף הוא נמי לא תחלוק בו בין אמו לאם אמו And furthermore, just as with regard to her relatives, you did not distinguish between her mother and the mother of her mother, and one who engages in intercourse with either is executed by burning, so too with regard to his relatives, you should not distinguish between his mother and the mother of his mother. Since one who engages in intercourse with his mother is punished by stoning, not burning, it follows that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother is punished by stoning, not burning.

ולמ"ד סקילה חמורה מהאי קושיא לא נידונה And according to the one who says that stoning is more severe than burning, although the first two refutations of the derivation, based on the fact that execution by burning is more severe, are not relevant, due to this third difficulty, this halakha is not derived. Just as with regard to her relatives, you did not distinguish between her mother and the mother of her mother, so too with regard to his relatives, you should not distinguish between his mother and the mother of his mother.

ולמ"ד דון מינה ואוקי באתרה מה היא אם אמה אסורה אף הוא נמי אם אמו אסורה ואוקי באתרה התם הוא דבשריפה אבל הכא בסקילה כדאשכחן באמו And according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, one might infer: Just as with regard to relatives of his wife, the mother of her mother is forbidden to him, so too with regard to his relatives, the mother of his mother is forbidden to him. And interpret the halakha according to its own place: It is there, with regard to the relatives of his wife, that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of her mother is executed by burning; but here, with regard to his relatives, one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother is executed by stoning, as we found that this is the punishment with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his mother.

למ"ד שריפה חמורה איכא למיפרך The Gemara explains why the derivation with regard to the prohibition is not valid. According to the one who says that execution by burning is more severe than execution by stoning, the derivation can be refuted:

Daf 76a

מה להיא שכן אמה בשרפה תאמר בהוא שאמו בסקילה What is notable about her relatives? They are notable in that one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his wife is liable to be executed by the more severe punishment of burning. Will you then say that there is a prohibition with regard to his relatives, where one who engages in intercourse with his mother is liable to be executed by the less severe punishment of stoning?

ועוד הוא כהיא מה היא לא חלקתה בה בין בתה לאם אמה אף הוא לא תחלוק בו בין בתו לאם אמו And furthermore, one must say that the status of his relatives is like the status of her relatives; and just as with regard to her relatives, you did not distinguish between her daughter and the mother of her mother, and one who engages in intercourse with either is executed by burning, so too with regard to his relatives, you should not distinguish between his daughter and the mother of his mother and he should receive the same punishment for engaging in intercourse with either. Since one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his mother is executed by stoning and one who engages in intercourse with his daughter is executed by burning, the parallel between his relatives and her relatives is incomplete, and the prohibition cannot be derived.

ולמאן דאמר סקילה חמורה מהאי קושיא לא נידונה The Gemara continues: And according to the one who says that stoning is more severe than burning, due to this third difficulty, the fact that intercourse with the mother of his mother is forbidden, this halakha is not derived, as the parallel between his relatives and her relatives is incomplete.

אי מה הוא כלתו אסורה אף היא כלתה אסורה The Gemara asks: If a parallel is drawn between his relatives and the relatives of his wife with regard to the prohibition, just as with regard to his relatives, his daughter-in-law is forbidden to him, so too with regard to her relatives, her daughter-in-law is prohibited to him?

אמר אביי אמר קרא אשת בנך היא משום אשת בנך אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו משום אשת בנה Abaye says: That is not so, as the verse states: “You shall not expose the nakedness of your daughter-in-law; she is your son’s wife, you shall not expose her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:15). Due to his intercourse with the wife of his son you deem him liable to be executed, but you do not deem him liable to be executed due to his intercourse with the wife of the son of his wife.

רבא אמר בין למ"ד דון מינה ומינה בין למאן דאמר דון מינה ואוקי באתרה לא אתיא Rava says: That derivation is unnecessary, as with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy, both according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it and derive the details from it, and according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, it is not derived that intercourse with one’s wife’s daughter-in-law renders him liable to be executed.

למאן דאמר דון מינה ומינה מה הוא כלתו אסורה אף היא נמי כלתה אסורה ומינה מה הוא בסקילה אף היא נמי בסקילה The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it and derive the details from it, one might infer: Just as with regard to his relatives, his daughter-in-law is forbidden to him, so too with regard to her relatives, her daughter-in-law is forbidden to him. And derive again from it: Just as with regard to his relatives, he is liable to be executed by stoning due to his intercourse with his daughter-in-law, so too with regard to her relatives, he is also liable to be executed by stoning due to his intercourse with her daughter-in-law.

למ"ד סקילה חמורה איכא למיפרך מה להוא שכן אמו בסקילה תאמר בהיא שאמה בשרפה The Gemara proceeds to explain why this is not a valid derivation. According to the one who says: Execution by stoning is more severe than execution by burning, the inference can be refuted: What is notable about his relatives? They are notable in that one who engages in intercourse with his mother is liable to be executed by the more severe punishment of stoning. Will you then say that the same is true with regard to her relatives, where one who engages in intercourse with her mother is liable to be executed by the less severe punishment of burning?

ועוד בתה בשרפה וכלתה בסקילה הוא בעצמו יוכיח דבתו בשרפה וכלתו בסקילה And furthermore, as one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his wife, is executed by the less severe punishment of burning, is it possible that one who engages in intercourse with the daughter-in-law of his wife, a more distant relative, is executed by the more severe punishment of stoning? The Gemara rejects that refutation: He himself, with regard to his own relatives, will prove that it is in fact possible, as one who engages in intercourse with his daughter is executed by burning, and one who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law is executed by stoning.

אלא מה הוא לא חלקת בו בין אמו לכלתו אף היא לא תחלוק בה בין אמה לכלתה ולמ"ד שרפה חמורה מהאי קושיא לא נידונין Rather, just as with regard to his relatives, you did not distin-guish between his mother and his daughter-in-law, and one who engages in intercourse with either is executed by stoning, so too with regard to her relatives, you should not distinguish between her mother and her daughter-in-law. Since one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his wife is executed by stoning, apparently, one who engages in intercourse with her daughter-in-law is punished by burning, not stoning. Therefore the parallel between his relatives and her relatives is incomplete, and the prohibition cannot be derived. And according to the one who says that burning is more severe than stoning, although the refutations based on the fact that execution by stoning is more severe are not relevant, due to this difficulty, this halakha is not derived.

ולמ"ד דון מינה ואוקי באתרה מה הוא כלתו אסורה אף היא כלתה אסורה ואוקי באתרה התם הוא דבסקילה אבל הכא בשרפה כדאשכחן באמה And according to the one who says: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, one might infer: Just as with regard to his relatives, his daughter-in-law is forbidden to him, so too with regard to her relatives, her daughter-in-law is forbidden to him. And interpret the halakha according to its own place: It is there, with regard to his relatives, that one who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law is executed by stoning; but here, with regard to her relatives, one who engages in intercourse with her daughter-in-law is executed by burning, as we found that this is the punishment with regard to one who engages in intercourse with her mother.

ועוד מה הוא חלקת בו בין בתו לכלתו אף היא תחלוק בה בין בתה לכלתה ולמ"ד נמי שרפה חמורה מהאי קושיא לא נידונין And furthermore, just as with regard to his relatives, you distinguished between his daughter and his daughter-in-law, and one who engages in intercourse with his daughter is executed by burning while one who engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law is executed by stoning, so too with regard to her relatives, distinguish between her daughter and her daughter-in-law. This is contrary to the parallel drawn between his relatives and her relatives, and the halakha cannot be derived. And according to the one who says that burning is more severe than stoning, although the refutations based on the fact that execution by stoning is more severe are not relevant, due to this latter difficulty, this halakha is not derived.

בתו מאנוסתו מנין האמר אביי ק"ו על בת בתו ענוש על בתו לא כל שכן § Throughout, it is clear from the Gemara that one who engages in intercourse with his daughter is executed by burning. The Gemara asks: With regard to one’s daughter born from a woman whom he raped, from where is it derived that she is forbidden to him? The Gemara answers: Doesn’t Abaye say that this is inferred a fortiori: If one is punished for engaging in intercourse with the daughter of his daughter, for engaging in intercourse with his daughter is it not all the more so that he is punished?

וכי עונשין מן הדין גלויי מילתא בעלמא הוא The Gemara asks: But does the court administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference without an explicit source? The Gemara replies: This is a mere disclosure of the matter, not a derivation by means of an inference. Presumably, the punishment administered to one who engages in intercourse with the daughter of his daughter stems from the kinship with his daughter. When the verse states with regard to the daughter of his daughter: “For theirs is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), his daughter is included.

רבא אמר אמר לי ר' יצחק בר אבדימי אתיא הנה הנה אתיא זמה זמה Rava says: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to me that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter who is not the daughter of his wife is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word “henna,” written with regard to his descendants: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, even their nakedness you shall not uncover; for theirs [henna] is your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10), and the word “henna” written with regard to the descendants of his wife: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they [henna] are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). Then, it is derived from a verbal analogy between the word “lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17) and the word “lewdness” in the verse: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14).

תני אבוה דרבי אבין לפי שלא למדנו לבתו מאנוסתו הוצרך הכתוב לומר (ויקרא כא, ט) ובת איש כהן The father of Rabbi Avin teaches: Due to the fact that we did not learn a punishment for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter born from a woman whom he raped from an explicit verse in the Torah, it was necessary for the verse to state: “And if the daughter of any priest profanes herself by acting licentiously, it is her father [et aviha] whom she is profaning; she shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 21:9). The verse can be interpreted: And if the daughter of any priest profanes herself by acting licentiously with her father [et aviha]…she shall be burned with fire.

אי מה בת כהן היא בשרפה ואין בועלה בשרפה אף בתו מאנוסתו היא בשרפה ואין בועלה בשרפה The Gemara asks: If so, why not say that just as in the case of the daughter of a priest who commits adultery, she is executed by burning but her paramour is executed by strangulation, not by burning, so too in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his daughter born from a woman whom he raped, she is executed by burning but her paramour, i.e., her father, is executed by other means and not by burning?

אמר אביי אמר קרא (ויקרא כא, ט) את אביה היא מחללת מי שמחללת את אביה יצתה זו שאביה מחללה Abaye says that the verse states: “It is her father whom she is profaning,” from which it is inferred that one who profanes her father by acting licentiously is executed with a court-imposed death penalty different from the death penalty imposed upon her paramour; excluded from that halakha is this case of a daughter whose father engaged in intercourse with her, where it is her father who profanes her.

רבא אמר בשלמא התם אפיקתיה מדינא דבת כהן ואוקימתה אדינא דבת ישראל הכא אדינא דמאן מוקמת ליה אדינא דפנוייה מוקמת ליה Rava says: Granted, there, in the case of the daughter of a priest who commits adultery, based on the inference, you excluded the paramour from the punishment of the daughter of a priest, execution by burning, and you established his punishment to correspond with the punishment of an adulterous Israelite woman, who is executed by strangulation. But here, in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his daughter, to correspond with whose punishment do you establish the father’s punishment? The Torah does not state any other form of execution in that case. Will you establish his punishment to correspond with the punishment of an unmarried woman who engages in intercourse, who is not liable to be executed at all? Therefore, there is no alternative to the conclusion that the father, too, is executed by burning.

אזהרה לבתו מאנוסתו מניין בשלמא לאביי ורבא מהיכא דנפקא להו עונש מהתם נפקא להו אזהרה § The Gemara asks: From where is the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with his daughter born from a woman whom he raped derived? Granted, according to Abaye and Rava, who, respectively, derive the punishment a fortiori or by means of a verbal analogy, from the same source from which they derive the punishment, from there they derive the prohibition as well, as the source includes a prohibition.

אלא לדתני אבוה דרבי אבין מאי אמר רבי אילעא אמר קרא (ויקרא יט, כט) אל תחלל את בתך להזנותה But according to that which Rabbi Avin’s father teaches, that the punishment is derived from the verse written with regard to the daughter of a priest, what is the source for the prohibition? Rabbi Ile’a says that the prohibition is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously [lehaznotah], lest the land falls into licentiousness, and the land becomes full of lewdness” (Leviticus 19:29), from which it is derived that one may not engage in intercourse with his daughter.

מתקיף לה רבי יעקב אחוה דרב אחא בר יעקב האי אל תחלל את בתך להזנותה להכי הוא דאתא האי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא אל תחלל את בתך להזנותה יכול בכהן המשיא את בתו ללוי וישראל הכתוב מדבר ת"ל להזנותה בחילול שבזנות הכתוב מדבר במוסר את בתו שלא לשם אישות Rabbi Ya’akov, brother of Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, objects to this: Does this verse: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously,” come to teach that halakha? This verse is necessary to derive that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously,” one might have thought that it is with regard to a priest who marries his daughter to a Levite or Israelite that the verse is speaking, since marrying an Israelite disqualifies her from partaking of teruma. To counter this, the verse states “by causing her to act licentiously,” indicating that it is with regard to profaning that involves licentiousness that the verse is speaking. The reference is to one who gives his daughter to a man for the purpose of intercourse that is not for the sake of marriage.

אם כן לימא קרא אל תחל מאי אל תחלל שמע מינה תרתי ואביי ורבא האי אל תחלל את בתך להזנותה מאי עבדי ליה אמר רבי מני זה המשיא את בתו לזקן The Gemara answers: If so, and that is the sole derivation from the verse, let the verse say: Do not profane [taḥel]. What is the reason that the verse uses the more complex form: Do not profane [teḥalel]? Conclude two derivations from it. The Gemara asks: And according to Abaye and Rava, who derive the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter from a different source, what do they do with this verse: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously”? Rabbi Mani says: This verse is referring to one who marries his daughter to an old man. Since she will not be satisfied with him, it will ultimately lead her to engage in adultery, and her father is responsible for causing that situation.

כדתניא אל תחלל את בתך להזנותה רבי אליעזר אומר זה המשיא את בתו לזקן ר"ע אומר זה המשהא בתו בוגרת This derivation is as it is taught in a baraita: “Do not profane your daughter by causing her to act licentiously.” Rabbi Eliezer says: This is referring to one who marries his daughter to an old man. Rabbi Akiva says: This is referring to one who delays the marriage of his daughter who is a grown woman. Since she finds no permissible outlet for her sexual desire, she is apt to engage in licentiousness.

אמר רב כהנא משום רבי עקיבא אין לך עני בישראל אלא רשע ערום והמשהא בתו בוגרת אטו המשהא בתו בוגרת לאו רשע ערום הוא Rav Kahana says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: You do not have a pauper among the Jewish people other than one who is a conniving wicked person, who seeks to conceal his true nature, and one who delays the marriage of his daughter who is a grown woman. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that one who delays the marriage of his daughter who is a grown woman is not a conniving, wicked person? He connives to delay her marriage to ensure that she will stay at home and do the housework, sparing him the cost of domestic help, and thereby causes her to sin.

אמר אביי Abaye says:

Daf 76b

הכי קאמר איזהו עני רשע ערום זה המשהא בתו בוגרת ואמר רב כהנא משום ר"ע הוי זהיר מן היועצך לפי דרכו This is what Rav Kahana is saying: Who is a pauper who, due to his poverty, becomes a conniving, wicked person? This is one who delays the marriage of his daughter who is a grown woman. And Rav Kahana says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: Beware of one who advises you according to his own interests, as he is likely motivated by personal gain.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב המשיא את בתו לזקן והמשיא אשה לבנו קטן והמחזיר אבידה לכותי עליו הכתוב אומר (דברים כט, יח) למען ספות הרוה את הצמאה לא יאבה ה' סלוח לו Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: One who marries his daughter to an old man, and one who takes a wife for his minor son, and one who returns a lost item to a gentile are all individuals who are the cause of sin. Marriage to an old man or a minor leaves the woman unsatisfied and is apt to lead to licentiousness. One who returns lost property to gentiles adds to the property that they stole from Jews. With regard to each of them the verse states: “Lest there should be among you a man or a woman…whose heart turns away this day from the Lord…saying: I will have peace, even though I walk in the stubbornness of my heart, that the quenched shall be added to the thirsty. The Lord will not be willing to pardon him” (Deuteronomy 29:17-19).

מיתיבי האוהב את אשתו כגופו והמכבדה יותר מגופו והמדריך בניו ובנותיו בדרך ישרה והמשיאן סמוך לפירקן עליו הכתוב אומר (איוב ה, כד) וידעת כי שלום אהלך ופקדת נוך ולא תחטא סמוך לפירקן שאני The Gemara raises an objection to one element of the ruling of Rav from a baraita: One who loves his wife as he loves himself, and who esteems her by giving her clothing and jewelry more than he esteems himself, and one who instructs his sons and daughters to follow an upright path, and who marries them to appropriate spouses adjacent to their reaching puberty, ensures that his home will be devoid of quarrel and sin. Concerning him the verse states: “And you shall know that your tent is in peace; and you shall visit your habitation and shall miss nothing” (Job 5:24). The baraita indicates that it is a mitzva to marry one’s children to appropriate spouses while they are young, contrary to the statement of Rav that one who takes a wife for his minor son causes sin. The Gemara replies: Adjacent to their reaching puberty is different from marrying her to a minor, as there is no concern that his daughter will sin during the brief period until her husband reaches puberty.

תנו רבנן האוהב את שכיניו והמקרב את קרוביו והנושא את בת אחותו והמלוה סלע לעני בשעת דוחקו עליו הכתוב אומר (ישעיהו נח, ט) אז תקרא וה' יענה The Sages taught: One who loves his neighbors, and one who brings his relatives close, and one who marries the daughter of his sister, an example of a woman that he knows and likes before taking her as his wife, and one who lends a sela to a poor man at his time of need, when he has no alternative source of funds, with regard to each of them the verse states: “Break your bread for the hungry, and the poor that are cast out bring to your house; when you see the naked, you shall clothe him, and hide not yourself from your own flesh…then shall you call, and the Lord will answer; you shall cry, and He will say: Here I am” (Isaiah 58:7–9).

תנו רבנן (ויקרא כ, יד) אותו ואתהן אותו ואת אחת מהן דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר אותו ואת שתיהן § The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And if a man takes a woman and her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burned with fire both him and them, and there shall be no lewdness among you” (Leviticus 20:14). What is the meaning of “both him and them”? It means him and one of them, as one woman is his wife. He is liable for engaging in intercourse with the other woman; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It means him and the two of them.

מאי בינייהו אמר אביי משמעות דורשים איכא בינייהו The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them? Clearly Rabbi Akiva does not hold that his wife is punished when he engages in intercourse with her relative. Abaye says: The difference between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael is with regard to the interpretation of the meaning of the verse.

רבי ישמעאל סבר אותו ואתהן אותו ואת אחת מהן שכן בלשון יוני קורין לאחת הינא ואם חמותו מדרשה אתיא רבי עקיבא סבר אותו ואתהן אותו ואת שתיהן ואם חמותו הכא כתיבא Rabbi Yishmael holds that the term “both him and them [et’hen]” means him and one of them, as in the Greek language one calls the number one heina. The prohibition in the verse is with regard to one who engages in intercourse with the mother of his wife. And the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law is derived through an interpretation of the verses and is not written explicitly in the Torah. Rabbi Akiva holds that the term “both him and them” means him and both of them; the prohibition in the verse is with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law, and the prohibition for engaging in intercourse with the mother of his mother-in-law is also written here explicitly.

רבא אמר חמותו לאחר מיתה איכא בינייהו ר' ישמעאל סבר חמותו לאחר מיתה בשרפה ורבי עקיבא סבר איסורא בעלמא: Rava says: Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva agree that the prohibition with regard to the mother of his mother-in-law is derived through interpretation, and the difference between them is with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law after the death of his wife. Rabbi Yishmael holds that one who engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law after the death of his wife is executed by burning. The verse indicates: Both him and one of them, meaning that he is liable to be executed by burning even if only one of the pair of his wife and mother-in-law is alive, i.e., when his wife is deceased and he engages in intercourse with his mother-in-law. And Rabbi Akiva maintains that in that case, one violates a mere prohibition and is not liable to be executed.

מתני' ואלו הנהרגין הרוצח ואנשי עיר הנדחת MISHNA: And these are the transgressors who are killed by decapitation in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: The murderer; and the residents of an idolatrous city, all of whom engaged in idol worship.

רוצח שהכה את רעהו באבן או בברזל וכבש עליו לתוך המים או לתוך האור ואינו יכול לעלות משם ומת חייב The mishna elaborates: In the case of a murderer who struck another with a stone or with iron, or held him in the water or in the fire, and the victim could not extricate himself from there and he died,the murderer is liable to be executed.

דחפו לתוך המים או לתוך האור ויכול לעלות משם ומת פטור שיסה בו את הכלב שיסה בו את הנחש פטור השיך בו את הנחש רבי יהודה מחייב וחכמים פוטרין: If one pushed another into the water or into the fire and that person could have extricated himself from there but failed to do so, and he died, the one who pushed him is exempt from punishment by a court, as he caused the death but did not actually kill the victim. For the same reason, if one set a dog against another and the dog killed him, or if one set a snake against another and the snake killed him, the one who set the dog or the snake is exempt from punishment. If he imbedded the snake’s fangs into another and caused the snake to bite him and kill him, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to be executed, as he is a murderer, and the Rabbis exempt him, as they maintain that he indirectly caused the individual’s death.

גמ׳ אמר שמואל מפני מה לא נאמרה יד בברזל שהברזל ממית בכל שהוא GEMARA: The verses state with regard to a murderer: “And if he struck him with a stone in hand, by which a man may die…or if he struck him with an instrument of wood in hand, by which a man may die, and he died, he is a murderer; the murderer shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:17-18). The term “in hand” indicates that one is liable for murder only if he utilized a stone or a wooden instrument that was of at least a certain measure. Shmuel says: For what reason was the term “in hand” not stated with regard to the iron instrument, as it is written: “But if he struck him with an instrument of iron, so that he died” (Numbers 35:16)? The reason is that an iron instrument of any size kills.

תניא נמי הכי רבי אומר גלוי וידוע לפני מי שאמר והיה העולם שהברזל ממית בכל שהוא לפיכך לא נתנה תורה בו שיעור והני מילי דברזיה מיברז: This is also taught in a baraita. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is revealed and known before He Who spoke and the world came into being that an iron instrument of any size kills. Therefore, the Torah did not provide a measure for it. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only when the murderer stabbed him with the iron instrument. But in a case where the murderer struck another with an iron instrument, he is liable only if the instrument was at least a certain measure capable of causing death.

וכבש עליו לתוך המים: רישא רבותא קמ"ל וסיפא רבותא קמ"ל רישא רבותא קמ"ל אף על גב דלאו איהו דחפו כיון דאין יכול לעלות משם ומת חייב סיפא רבותא קמ"ל אע"ג דדחפו כיון דיכול לעלות משם ומת פטור § The mishna teaches: Or held him in the water and that other person died, the murderer is liable. The Gemara comments: The first clause of the mishna teaches us a novel element, and the latter clause of the mishna teaches us a novel element. The first clause teaches us a novel element: Even though it was not he who pushed the individual into the water, since he held the victim and the victim could not extricate himself from there and he died, the one who held him in the water is liable to be executed. The latter clause teaches us a novel element: Even though he pushed the individual into the water, since the victim could have extricated himself from there but failed to do so and he died, the one who pushed him is exempt from punishment.

כבש מנלן אמר שמואל דאמר קרא (במדבר לה, כא) או באיבה לרבות את המצמצם The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that one who held another in the water is liable to be executed? Shmuel says: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “Or in enmity he struck him with his hand and he died, the assailant shall be put to death; he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). The phrase “or in enmity” serves to include one who confines another in a place where he cannot survive.

ההוא גברא דמצמצמא לחיותה דחבריה בשימשא ומתה רבינא מחייב רב אחא בר רב פטר There was a certain man who confined the animal of another in a place in the sun and it died from exposure to the sun. Ravina deemed the man liable to recompense the owner as though his action caused the death of the animal. Rav Aḥa bar Rav deemed him exempt from recompensing the owner, as it was not his action that caused the death of the animal.

רבינא מחייב קל וחומר ומה רוצח שלא עשה בו שוגג כמזיד ואונס כרצון חייב בו את המצמצם The Gemara elaborates: Ravina deemed him liable to recompense the owner, and he derived it by means of an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to a murderer, where the Torah did not render the legal status of one who kills unwittingly, who is exiled, like that of one who kills intentionally, who is executed, and did not render the status of one who kills due to circumstances beyond his control, who is exempt from punishment, like that of one who kills with intent, who is liable, nevertheless the Torah rendered one who confines another in a place where he cannot survive liable to be executed, even though he did not perform an action;

Daf 77a

נזקין שעשה בהן שוגג כמזיד ואונס כרצון אינו דין שחייב בהן את המצמצם with regard to damage, where the Torah rendered the legal status of one who causes damage unwittingly like that of one who causes damage intentionally, and the status of one who causes damage due to circumstances beyond his control like that of one who causes damage with intent, as one is always responsible for damage that he caused (see Bava Kamma 26a), is it not logical that the Torah rendered one who confines an animal in a place where it cannot survive liable to pay restitution even though he did not perform an action?

רב אחא בר רב פוטר אמר רב משרשיא מ"ט דאבוה דאבא דפוטר אמר קרא (במדבר לה, כא) מות יומת המכה רוצח הוא ברוצח הוא דחייב לן מצמצם בנזקין לא חייב לן מצמצם The Gemara explains the conflicting opinion. Rav Aḥa bar Rav, exempts the one who confined the animal in the sun from recompensing the owner. Rav Mesharshiyya said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav Aḥa, the father of my father, who exempts him from payment? The reason is that the verse states: “Or in enmity he struck him with his hand and he died, the assailant shall be put to death; he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). The phrase “he is a murderer” restricts the liability of one who confines another. It is in the case of a murderer that the Torah renders for us one who confines another liable to be executed. But in the case of damage the Torah does not render for us one who confines the animal of another liable to recompense the owner, as it was not his action that caused the damage.

אמר רבא כפתו ומת ברעב פטור ואמר רבא כפתו בחמה ומת בצינה ומת חייב סוף חמה לבא סוף צינה לבא פטור § Rava says: If one bound another and he died of starvation, he is exempt from the liability to receive a court-imposed death penalty, as it was not his action that caused the death of the victim. Even if the victim was hungry when he was bound, the starvation that caused his death ensued at a later stage. The one who bound him is liable to be punished by the heavenly court. And Rava says: If one bound another in the sun and he died of the heat, or in a cold place and he died of exposure, he is liable to be executed, as from the moment that he bound him, the victim began dying. But if one bound another in a place that at the time was not exposed to the sun or the cold, even though ultimately the sun would arrive at that place, or ultimately the cold would reach that place, he is exempt from execution, as when he bound the victim, the future cause of death was not present.

ואמר רבא כפתו לפני ארי פטור לפני יתושין חייב רב אשי אמר אפילו לפני יתושין נמי פטור הני אזלי והני אתו And Rava says: If one bound another before a lion, he is exempt from execution. Since perhaps the lion will choose not to prey on the victim it was not his action that caused the damage. If he bound another before mosquitoes he is liable to be executed, as inevitably, the mosquitoes will bite him until he dies. Rav Ashi says: Even if he bound an individual before mosquitoes he is exempt from execution, as the mosquitoes who were there when he bound the individual are not the ones who killed him. Rather, those mosquitoes went and these other mosquitoes came. Therefore, this case is comparable to the case where one bound another in a place where the sun or the cold would ultimately arrive.

איתמר כפה עליו גיגית ופרע עליו מעזיבה רבא ורבי זירא חד אמר חייב וחד אמר פטור It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who overturned a vat upon another and he died of suffocation, or breached plaster covering the roof and the lack of a ceiling caused another to die of exposure. Rava and Rabbi Zeira disagree. One says that he is liable to be executed, and one says that he is exempt from execution.

תסתיים דרבא הוא דאמר פטור דאמר רבא כפתו ומת ברעב פטור The Gemara suggests: Conclude that Rava is the one who says that the perpetrator is exempt from execution, as Rava says: If one bound another and he died of starvation, he is exempt from execution, as it was not his action that caused the death of the victim.

אדרבה תסתיים דרבי זירא הוא דאמר פטור דא"ר זירא האי מאן דעייליה לחבריה בביתא דשישא ואדליק ליה שרגא ומת חייב טעמא דאדליק ליה שרגא הא לא אדליק ליה שרגא לא The Gemara rejects that suggestion: On the contrary, conclude that it is Rabbi Zeira who says that the perpetrator is exempt, as Rabbi Zeira says: With regard to this individual who took another into a hermetically sealed house of marble and he kindled a lamp [sheraga] for him, and he died of the fumes, the perpetrator is liable to be executed. One may infer that the reason he is liable is because he kindled a lamp for him, but if he did not kindle a lamp for him, no, he is not liable, although the victim would have ultimately died even without the lamp. Apparently, Rabbi Zeira also maintains that the perpetrator is liable only if the perpetrator’s action caused the death, or at least caused the process of dying to begin. This case is identical to the case of the overturned vat.

אמרי התם בלא שרגא לא מתחיל הבלא The Sages say: In the case there, where one confines another in a house of marble, without a kindled lamp, the atmosphere does not begin to cause suffocation

Daf 77b

בשעתיה הכא בלא שרגא נמי מתחיל הבלא בשעתיה: at the time of the perpetrator’s action, as the room is sufficiently large to enable the individual to breathe. Here, in the case where one overturns a vat upon another, even without a kindled lamp the atmosphere begins to cause suffocation at the time of the perpetrator’s actions. Therefore, the two cases are not comparable, and it is Rava who exempts the one who overturned a vat upon another.

(סימן סול"ם תרי"ס סמני"ן בכות"ל) § The Gemara cited a mnemonic for the halakhot that follow with regard to causing the death of another: Ladder, shield, herbs, in a wall.

אמר רבא דחפו לבור וסולם בבור ובא אחר וסילקו ואפילו הוא קדם וסילקו פטור דבעידנא דשדייה יכול לעלות הוא Rava says: In a case where one pushed another into the pit and there was a ladder in the pit that would enable him to emerge from it, and another individual came and removed the ladder, or even if the perpetrator himself removed the ladder before the one whom he pushed could emerge, causing him to die of starvation, the perpetrator is exempt from execution. The reason is that at the time that he cast him into the pit, the victim was able to ascend and emerge from the pit. Pushing him into the pit did not cause his death, and the removal of the ladder merely prevented the victim from emerging, but was not an action that directly caused his death.

ואמר רבא זרק חץ ותריס בידו ובא אחר ונטלו ואפילו הוא קדם ונטלו פטור דבעידנא דשדייה ביה מיפסק פיסקיה גיריה And Rava says: In the case of one who shot an arrow at another, and there was a shield [teris] in the victim’s hand, if another individual came and took the shield from him, or even if the one who shot the arrow took the shield before the arrow reached the victim, the attacker is exempt from execution. The reason is that at the time that he shot the arrow at the victim, his arrows were blocked from the one being attacked by the shield, and they could not harm him. The victim’s death was caused indirectly, by removal of the shield.

ואמר רבא זרק בו חץ וסמנין בידו ובא אחר ופיזרן ואפי' הוא קדם ופיזרן פטור דבעידנא דשדא ביה יכול להתרפאות הוה And Rava says: In the case of one who shot an arrow at another and the victim had herbs in his possession capable of healing the wound from the arrow before it became fatal, if another individual came and scattered the herbs, or even if the one who shot the arrow scattered them before the victim could heal his wound with the herbs, the attacker is exempt from execution. The reason is that at the time that he shot the arrow at him, the victim was able to be cured. The arrow caused injury, but the victim died due to the unavailability of a cure.

א"ר אשי הלכך אפילו סמנין בשוק א"ל רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי נזדמנו לו סמנין מהו אמר ליה הרי יצא מבית דין זכאי Rav Ashi says: It is established that one who shoots an arrow at another is exempt when herbs that could facilitate his recovery are available; therefore, even if there are herbs available in the marketplace, the attacker is exempt from execution, as in that case, too, the herbs are available. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If the herbs were not available in the marketplace, and herbs capable of healing the wound happened to enter into the victim’s possession, yet he neglected to use them and died, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa: He emerged from the court innocent. As long as there was a possibility that the victim could heal his wound with the herbs, the one who shot the arrow is not a murderer; rather, he is merely one who caused death indirectly.

ואמר רבא זרק צרור בכותל וחזרה לאחוריה והרגה חייב ותנא תונא כגון אלו המשחקין בכדור שהרגו במזיד נהרגין בשוגג גולין § And Rava says: In the case of one who threw a stone with the intent to kill another, and the stone caromed off the wall and rebounded back and killed a different individual, the attacker is liable. And the tanna taught a similar halakha in a baraita: In a case where those who were playing with a ball killed another by hitting him with the rebounding ball, if they did so intentionally, they are executed by beheading; if they did so unwittingly, they are exiled.

בשוגג גולין פשיטא במזיד נהרגין איצטריך ליה מהו דתימא התראת ספק היא מי יימר דהדרה קמ"ל The Gemara asks: If they did so unwittingly, they are exiled; isn’t this obvious? All unwitting murderers are exiled. The Gemara answers: The novel element in this baraita is not that the unwit-ting murderer is exiled; rather, it was necessary for the tanna to teach that if they did so intentionally, they are executed. This halakha needed to be taught lest you say that they cannot be executed because the death penalty requires certain forewarning, i.e., forewarning of an action that will certainly lead to the death penalty, and in this case the forewarning is uncertain, as who is to say that the ball will rebound and cause death? Therefore, the tanna teaches us that those who play ball are trained in throwing it and the ball will certainly rebound; therefore, there is no uncertainty.

תני רב תחליפא בר מערבא קמיה דרבי אבהו כגון אלו המשחקין בכדור שהרגו תוך ארבע אמות פטור חוץ לארבע אמות חייב Rav Taḥlifa, from the West, Eretz Yisrael, taught this baraita before Rabbi Abbahu: In a case where those who were playing with a ball killed an individual by hitting him with the ball, if the ball struck the individual within four cubits of the one who threw the ball, he is exempt from being exiled, as it was certainly not his intent to throw the ball so short a distance; beyond four cubits, he is liable to be exiled.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי היכי דמי אי דקא ניחא ליה אפילו פורתא נמי אי דלא ניחא ליה אפילו טובא נמי לא אמר ליה סתם משחקין בכדור כמה (דעיילי טפי) מינח ניחא ליה Ravina said to Rav Ashi, questioning this halakha: What are the circumstances? If he was amenable to having the ball travel a short distance, then he should be liable even for a throw less than four cubits. And if he was not amenable to having the ball travel the distance that it traveled, but he wanted it to travel farther, then he should not be liable even for a throw greater than four cubits. In what case is the measure of four cubits significant? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: With regard to ordinary people who play with a ball, the farther they enter and approach the wall, the more amenable they are to the result, as the ball caroms off the wall and rebounds farther. Therefore, presumably their intent was that the ball would travel a distance greater than four cubits.

למימרא דכה"ג כחו הוא ורמינהי המקדש ונפל קידוש על ידו או על הצד ואחר כך נפל לשוקת פסול The Gemara questions the principle underlying this halakha. Is that to say that in a case like this, when an item caroms off the wall, the action is considered the result of his force? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Para 6:1): In the case of one who sanctifies the waters of purification by placing the ashes of the red heifer into the water, in order to sprinkle on one impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and the sacred ashes fell on his hand or on the side of the vessel and only thereafter it fell into the water in the trough, the purification waters are unfit, since there is a requirement that the ashes must be placed in the water by the force of his action. Likewise, when an item caroms off a wall, the action is not generated by the force of his action; therefore, he should not be liable.

הכא במאי עסקינן בשותת The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the ashes trickle from his hand or from the sides of the vessel into the water, a slow movement that is not generated by the force of his action. This is in contrast to the case where he throws a ball off the wall.

תא שמע מחט שהיה נתונה על החרס והזה עליה ספק על המחט הזה ספק על החרס הזה ומיצה עליה הזאתו פסול The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof that only an action that one generates directly is considered the force of his action, as it is taught in a mishna (Para 12:2): Concerning a needle that was impure with impurity imparted by a corpse and was placed on an earthenware shard, and one sprinkled water of purification; if there is uncertainty whether he actually sprinkled the purification water on the needle or whether he sprinkled it on the earthenware shard and the water inadvertently sprayed upon the needle, his sprinkling is unfit. Apparently, an action performed indirectly is not considered to have been generated by his force.

אמר רב חיננא בר יהודה משמיה דרב מצא איתמר Rav Ḥinnana bar Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Emend the mishna: Sprayed [mitza] was not stated in the mishna; found [matza] was stated. That is, it was found that the needle was wet, and it is not clear whether it was wet from purification water sprinkled directly upon it or from water that dripped from the earthenware onto the needle. This case is not comparable to the case of one who throws a ball off a wall.

אמר רב פפא האי מאן דכפתיה לחבריה ואשקיל עליה בידקא דמיא גירי דידיה הוא ומיחייב הני מילי בכח ראשון אבל בכח שני גרמא בעלמא הוא Rav Pappa says: With regard to this one who bound another and diverted a flow of water upon him and he died, the water is tantamount to his arrows that were effective in committing the murder, and he is liable. And this matter applies only in a case where he killed the other individual by primary force, as the individual was near to him and was directly drowned by the water. But if the individual was further away and was killed by secondary force after the water flowed on its own, it is not his action; rather, it is merely an indirect action, and he is exempt.

ואמר רב פפא זרק צרור למעלה והלכה לצדדין והרגה חייב אמר ליה מר בר רב אשי לרב פפא מ"ט משום דכחו הוא אי כחו תיזיל לעיל And Rav Pappa says: In a case where one threw a stone upward and it went to the side, and killed an individual, he is liable. Mar, son of Rav Ashi, said to Rav Pappa: What is the reason that you say he is liable? Is it due to the fact that the result is generated by the force of his action? That cannot be, as if it is generated by the force of his action, the stone should go directly upward where he threw it, and not to the side.

Daf 78a

ואי לאו כחו הוא תיזיל לתחת אלא כח כחוש הוא Rav Pappa answered: And were it not for the force of his action, the stone would go down and not to the side. Rather, although it is a weak force, the force of his action is a partial cause of the damage caused by the stone going to the side; therefore, he is liable.

ת"ר הכוהו עשרה בני אדם בעשרה מקלות ומת בין בבת אחת בין בזה אחר זה פטורין רבי יהודה בן בתירא אומר בזה אחר זה האחרון חייב מפני שקירב את מיתתו The Sages taught: If ten people struck an individual with ten sticks and as a result of the beating he died, whether they beat him simultaneously, or whether they beat him one after the other, they are exempt from liability for killing him, as two people are not liable for an action that they performed together. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: If they struck him one after the other, the one who struck him last is liable, because he hastened his death.

אמר ר' יוחנן ושניהם מקרא אחד דרשו (ויקרא כד, יז) ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם רבנן סברי כל נפש עד דאיכא כל נפש ור' יהודה בן בתירא סבר כל נפש כל דהוא נפש Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And both Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, interpreted the same verse in drawing their halakhic conclusion. The verse states: “And a man who strikes any soul mortally, he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17). The Rabbis hold that “any soul” means that one is liable for murder only when there is an entire soul, i.e., when the murderer alone is responsible for taking the entire life of the victim. And Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira holds that “any soul” means that one is liable for murder for taking any soul, even if the victim had already been beaten and was close to death.

אמר רבא הכל מודים בהורג את הטריפה שהוא פטור בגוסס בידי שמים שהוא חייב לא נחלקו אלא בגוסס בידי אדם מר מדמי ליה לטריפה ומר מדמי ליה לגוסס בידי שמים § Rava says: All concede that in the case of one who kills one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa] he is exempt from liability, as in a certain sense the legal status of the victim is that of a dead person. All concede in a case where one kills an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven that he is liable, as no other individual took action contributing to his death, and the murderer alone took his remaining soul. They disagree only in a case where one kills an individual dying from injury caused at the hand of a person. One Sage, the Rabbis, likens this case to the case of a tereifa, and therefore rules that the one who kills him is exempt. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, likens this case to the case of an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven, and therefore rules that the one who kills him is liable.

מאן דמדמי ליה לטריפה מאי טעמא לא מדמי ליה לגוסס בידי שמים גוסס בידי שמים לא איתעביד ביה מעשה האי איתעביד ביה מעשה The Gemara asks: As for the one who likens this case to the case of a tereifa, what is the reason that he does not liken it to the case of an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven? The Gemara answers: In the case of an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven, no action was performed by a person to kill him, whereas in this case of an individual dying from injury caused at the hand of a person, an action was performed by an individual to kill him. Therefore, it is a case of two people who performed an action together, and they are not liable.

ומאן דמדמי ליה לגוסס בידי שמים מ"ט לא מדמי ליה לטריפה טריפה מחתכי סימנים הא לא מחתכי סימנים The Gemara asks: And as for the one who likens this case to the case of an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven, what is the reason that he does not liken it to a tereifa? The Gemara answers: In the case of a tereifa, his status is like that of one whose organs, the trachea and the esophagus, are cut, who is considered to be slaughtered. The status of this individual dying from injury caused at the hand of a person is not like that of one whose organs, the trachea and the esophagus, are cut, as there is no particular defect; rather, he is like one suffering from general frailty, like any frail or elderly individual.

תני תנא קמיה דרב ששת ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם להביא המכה את חבירו ואין בו כדי להמית ובא אחר והמיתו שהוא חייב A tanna taught a baraita before Rav Sheshet: The verse that states: “And a man who strikes any soul mortally, he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17), serves to include the case of one who strikes another and it is a blow in which there is not sufficient force to kill, and then another individual comes and kills him; the verse teaches that the second individual is liable.

אין בו כדי להמית פשיטא אלא יש בו כדי להמית ובא אחר והמיתו שהוא חייב וסתמא כרבי יהודה בן בתירא The Gemara challenges: If the first individual struck him with a blow in which there is not sufficient force to kill, this halakha is obvious, as the first did not perform an act of killing at all, and it is only the second who killed him. Rather, emend the baraita to teach: The verse serves to include the case of one who strikes another and it is a blow in which there is sufficient force to kill, and then another individual comes and kills him; the verse teaches that the second individual is liable. And this unattributed baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who holds that one who completes the killing of an individual is liable to be executed as a murderer.

אמר רבא ההורג את הטריפה פטור וטריפה שהרג בפני ב"ד חייב שלא בפני ב"ד פטור Rava says: One who kills a tereifa is exempt as it is as though he killed a dead person. And as for a tereifa who kills another individual, if he killed him before the judges in court, he is liable to be executed. If the killing was not before the judges in court, he is exempt.

בפני ב"ד (מאי טעמא) חייב דכתי' (דברים יג, ו) ובערת הרע מקרבך שלא בפני ב"ד פטור דהויא לה עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה וכל עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה לא שמה עדות The Gemara explains: In the case of a tereifa who killed before the court, what is the reason that he is liable? He is liable, as it is written: “And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst” (Deuteronomy 13:6), from which it is derived that there is a mitzva for the court to eradicate evil that it witnesses firsthand. In the case where the killing was not before the judges in court, he is exempt, as any testimony against the tereifa is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony. Even if the witnesses testifying that the tereifa committed murder are found to be conspiring witnesses, they cannot be executed, as they conspired to kill a tereifa. And any testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony is not characterized as testimony, and is not accepted in court.

ואמר רבא הרובע את הטריפה חייב טריפה שרבע בפני ב"ד חייב שלא בפני ב"ד פטור בפני ב"ד חייב דכתיב ובערת הרע מקרבך שלא בפני ב"ד פטור דהויא לה עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה And Rava says: One who sodomizes a male who is a tereifa is liable to be executed for committing an act of sodomy. And as for a tereifa who sodomizes a male, if he does so before the judges in court, he is liable to be executed. If the act of sodomy was not before a court, he is exempt. The Gemara explains: If he committed an act of sodomy before the court, he is liable, as it is written: “And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.” If the act of sodomy was not before a court, he is exempt, as any testimony against a tereifa is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony.

הא תו למה לי היינו הך הרובע את הטריפה איצטריכא ליה מהו דתימא ליהוי כמאן דמשמש מת וליפטר קמ"ל דמשום הנאה הוא והא אית ליה הנאה The Gemara asks: Why do I also need this ruling? This case of sodomy is identical to that case of murder; why then does Rava cite two cases with regard to capital transgressions involving a tereifa? The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to mention the case of one who sodomizes a tereifa, as there is a novel element introduced in that halakha. Lest you say: Let the status of one who sodomizes a male who is a tereifa be like one who engages in necrophilia, and let him be exempt from execution. To counter this, Rava teaches us that his liability is due to the pleasure that he experiences, and this man who sodomizes a tereifa has pleasure, as, although the legal status of a tereifa is that of a dead person in certain senses, he is, in fact, alive.

ואמר רבא עדים שהעידו בטריפה והוזמו אין נהרגין עדי טריפה שהוזמו נהרגין רב אשי אמר אפילו עדי טריפה שהוזמו אין נהרגין לפי שאינן בזוממי זוממין And Rava says: Witnesses who testified with regard to a tereifa that he committed a capital transgression, and then they were rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, as they conspired to kill one whose status is that of a dead person. Witnesses who are themselves tereifa who were rendered conspiring witnesses are executed. Rav Ashi says: Even witnesses who are themselves tereifa who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, due to the fact that they are not susceptible to a situation where witnesses who rendered them conspiring witnesses can themselves be rendered conspiring witnesses. Witnesses who render the witnesses who are themselves tereifa conspiring witnesses who then are rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, because they sought to kill a tereifa, whose status is that of a dead person. Therefore, their testimony is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony and is disregarded.

ואמר רבא שור טריפה שהרג חייב ושור של אדם טריפה שהרג פטור מאי טעמא אמר קרא (שמות כא, כט) השור יסקל וגם בעליו יומת כל היכא דקרינא ביה וגם בעליו יומת קרינן ביה השור יסקל וכל היכא דלא קרינן ביה וגם בעליו יומת לא קרינן ביה השור יסקל And Rava says: An ox that is a tereifa that killed an individual is liable to be executed, like any animal that kills a person. And an ox belonging to a person who is a tereifa that killed an individual is exempt. What is the reason for this halakha? It is as the verse states: “The ox shall be stoned and its owner shall also be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). Based on the juxtaposition between the owner and his ox it is derived: Anywhere that we can read concerning the situation: “And its owner shall also be put to death,” we read, i.e., apply, concerning it: “The ox shall be stoned.” And anywhere that we cannot read concerning it: “And its owner shall also be put to death,” we do not read concerning it: “The ox shall be stoned.” Since the owner of the ox cannot be executed, as he is a tereifa, his ox is also not liable to be stoned.

רב אשי אמר אפילו שור טריפה נמי שהרג פטור מאי טעמא כיון דאילו בעלים הוו פטירי שור נמי פטור: Rav Ashi says: Even an ox that is a tereifa that killed an individual is exempt. What is the reason for this halakha? Based on the juxtaposition between the ox and the owner, since if the owner were a tereifa he would be exempt, an ox that is a tereifa that killed an individual is also exempt.

שיסה בו את הכלב וכו': אמר רב אחא בר יעקב כשתמצא לומר לדברי ר' יהודה ארס נחש בין שיניו הוא עומד לפיכך מכיש בסייף ונחש פטור § The mishna teaches: If one set a dog against an individual and the dog killed him, or if one set a snake against an individual and the snake killed him, the one who set the dog or the snake is exempt from punishment. If he imbedded the snake’s fangs into another person and caused the snake to bite him and kill him, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to be executed, and the Rabbis exempt him. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: When you analyze the matter you will find that according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, venom of a snake stands within its fangs, and in this case the entire action is performed by the individual who imbeds the fang in the other person’s skin. The snake is passive. Therefore, the one who causes the snake to bite is liable to be executed by beheading with a sword as a murderer, and the snake is exempt.

לדברי חכמים ארס נחש מעצמו הוא מקיא לפיכך נחש בסקילה והמכיש פטור: According to the statement of the Rabbis, venom of a snake is discharged by the snake itself. The snake directly causes the death, while the individual who imbeds the fang is merely an indirect cause. Consequently, the snake is executed by stoning, and the one who caused the snake to bite is exempt from execution.

מתני׳ המכה את חבירו בין באבן בין באגרוף ואמדוהו למיתה והיקל ממה שהיה ולאחר מכאן הכביד ומת חייב ר' נחמיה אומר פטור שרגלים לדבר: MISHNA: In the case of one who strikes another, whether he does so with a stone or with his fist, and the doctors assessed his condition, estimating that it would lead to death, and then his condition eased from what it was, and the doctors revised their prognosis and predicted that he would live, and thereafter his condition worsened and he died, the assailant is liable to be executed as a murderer. Rabbi Neḥemya says: He is exempt, as there is a basis for the matter of assuming that he is not liable. Since the victim’s condition eased in the interim, a cause other than the blow struck by the assailant ultimately caused his death.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן את זו דרש רבי נחמיה (שמות כא, יט) אם יקום והתהלך בחוץ GEMARA: The Sages taught: Rabbi Neḥemya interpreted this verse in arriving at his ruling. It is written: “If he rises and walks outside

Daf 78b

על משענתו ונקה המכה וכי תעלה על דעתך שזה מהלך בשוק וזה נהרג אלא זה שאמדוהו למיתה והקל ממה שהיה ולאחר כך הכביד ומת שהוא פטור upon his staff, then he that struck him is absolved; only for his loss of livelihood shall he give and he shall heal him” (Exodus 21:19). The phrase: “Then he that struck him is absolved,” is superfluous; would it enter your mind to say that this individual whom he struck is walking in the marketplace, and that individual who struck him will be executed as a murderer? Rather, this is referring to a case where the doctors assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and his condition eased somewhat from what it was and he walked in the marketplace, and thereafter his condition worsened and he died, and the verse is teaching that he is exempt.

ורבנן האי ונקה המכה מאי דרשי ביה מלמד שחובשין אותו The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Neḥemya and hold that he is liable in that case, what do they interpret from that phrase: “Then he that struck him is absolved”? The Gemara explains that according to the Rabbis, the verse teaches that they incarcerate him until the fate of the victim can be determined, and the phrase: “Then he that struck him is absolved,” means that he is freed from incarceration.

ורבי נחמיה חבישה מנא ליה יליף ממקושש The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Neḥemya, from where does he derive the halakha of incarceration? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the incident of the wood gatherer in the wilderness with regard to whom it is written: “And they placed him under guard” (Numbers 15:34).

ורבנן נמי לילפי ממקושש מקושש בר קטלא הוא ומשה לא הוה ידע קטליה במאי לאפוקי האי דלא ידעינן אי בר קטלא הוא אי לאו בר קטלא הוא The Gemara challenges: And the Rabbis too, let them derive the halakha of incarceration from the incident of the wood gatherer. The Gemara explains: With regard to the wood gatherer, he was incarcerated because it was known from the outset that he was liable to be killed, and Moses did not know with what form of capital punishment his death would be implemented. This is to the exclusion of this individual who struck another, with regard to whom we do not know if he is liable to be killed or if he is not liable to be killed. Therefore, one cannot derive the halakha in this case from the case of the wood gatherer.

ורבי נחמיה יליף ממגדף דלא הוה ידע אי בר קטלא הוא וחבשוהו The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Neḥemya, from where does he derive the halakha? He too should not be able to derive the halakha from the case of the wood gatherer. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Neḥemya derives the halakha with regard to one who strikes another from the incident of the blasphemer (see Leviticus 24:12), where Moses did not know if he was liable to be killed, and he nevertheless imprisoned the blasphemer.

ורבנן מגדף הוראת שעה היתה The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, why don’t they derive the halakha from the incident of the blasphemer? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis hold that the case of the blasphemer was a provisional edict.

כדתניא יודע היה משה רבינו שהמקושש במיתה שנאמר (שמות לא, יד) מחלליה מות יומת אלא לא היה יודע באיזו מיתה נהרג שנאמר (במדבר טו, לד) כי לא פורש וגו' אבל מגדף לא נאמר בו אלא לפרש להם על פי ה' שלא היה משה יודע אם הוא בן מיתה כל עיקר אם לאו The difference between the uncertainty in the case of the wood gatherer and the uncertainty in the case of the blasphemer is as it is taught in a baraita: Moses our teacher knew that the wood gatherer was liable to be sentenced to death, as it is stated: “And you shall observe the Shabbat as it is sacred to you; one who desecrates it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14). But he did not know with which death penalty he was to be killed, as it is stated: “And they placed him under guard, as it had not been declared what should be done to him” (Numbers 15:34). But concerning the blasphemer it is stated only: “And they placed him under guard that it might be declared to them according to the Lord” (Leviticus 24:12), as Moses did not know if the blasphemer was liable to be killed at all, or not.

בשלמא לרבי נחמיה היינו דכתיבי תרי אומדני חד אמדוהו למיתה וחיה וחד אמדוהו למיתה והקל ממה שהיה אלא לרבנן תרי אומדני למה לי The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, that is the reason that two assessments are written. It is written in one verse: “And if men quarrel and one strikes the other with a stone or with his fist, and he did not die but is bedridden” (Exodus 21:18), indicating that after the initial blow the victim is assessed to determine whether or not he is expected to die. In the following verse it is written: “If he rises and walks outside upon his staff, then he that struck him is absolved” (Exodus 21:19), indicating that there is an additional assessment to determine whether or not he fully recovers. One verse is where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and he recovered fully; and one verse is where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and his condition eased from what it was and he died thereafter. But according to the Rabbis, why do I need two assessments?

חד אמדוהו למיתה וחיה וחד אמדוהו לחיים ומת The Gemara answers: According to the Rabbis, one assessment is where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death and he recovered fully, in which case the assailant is certainly not executed but pays compensation. And one assessment is where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to life and he died, in which case the assailant is also not executed but pays compensation.

ורבי נחמיה אמדוהו לחיים ומת לא צריך קרא שהרי יצא מבית דין זכאי The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Neḥemya, from where does he derive these two halakhot? The Gemara answers: He holds that in the case where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to life, and he died, one does not need an explicit verse to exempt the assailant from execution, as he emerged from the court after the first hearing innocent when they predicted that the victim would live, and the court does not rescind its initial ruling and convict him.

תנו רבנן המכה את חבירו ואמדוהו למיתה וחיה פוטרין אותו אמדוהו למיתה והקל ממה שהיה אומדין אותו אומד שני לממון ואם לאחר כן הכביד ומת הלך אחר אומד האמצעי דברי רבי נחמיה וחכמים אומרים אין אומד אחר אומד The Sages taught: In the case of one who strikes another and they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and he recovered fully, the court exempts the assailant. If they assessed his condition saying that it would lead to death and his condition eased from what it was, they assess the victim with a second assessment to determine the monetary restitution for damages. And if thereafter his medical condition worsened and he died, the halakha is: Follow the assessment that was assessed at the intermediate stage, which determined that the victim would live, and the assailant is not executed; this is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya. And the Rabbis say: There is no assessment after assessment. The death of the victim proves that the assessment at the intermediate stage was erroneous, and the assailant is executed.

תניא אידך אמדוהו למיתה אומדין אותו לחיים לחיים אין אומדין אותו למיתה אמדוהו למיתה והקל ממה שהיה אומדין אותו אומד שני לממון ואם לאחר כן הכביד ומת משלם נזק וצער ליורשים It is taught in another baraita: If they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and his condition improved, they assess his condition to determine whether it would lead to life. If they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to life, and his condition deteriorated, they do not then assess his condition to determine whether it would lead to death, but the assailant is exempted based on the initial determination. If they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and his condition eased from what it was, they assess the victim with a second assessment to determine the monetary restitution for damages, as the assailant is certainly liable to pay restitution for the injury that he caused. And if thereafter his medical condition worsened and he died, the assailant pays restitution to the heirs for injury and suffering that he caused.

מאימתי משלם משעה שהכהו וסתמא כרבי נחמיה: The Gemara asks: From when is the initial assessment of the value of the victim performed to determine the sum of the damages that the assailant pays? It is the assessment of his value from the moment that the assailant struck him. The Gemara notes: And this unattributed baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, as according to the opinion of the Rabbis, he is liable to be executed even if there was a temporary improvement in his condition before he died.

מתני׳ נתכוין להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם לעובד כוכבים והרג את ישראל לנפלים והרג את בן קיימא פטור MISHNA: If one intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person standing adjacent to it, or if he intended to kill a gentile, for whose murder he is not liable to be executed in court, and he killed a Jew, or if he intended to kill non-viable newborns, for whose murder one is not liable, and he killed a viable person, the assailant is exempt from execution, since his intent was to kill one for whose murder he is not liable.

נתכוין להכותו על מתניו ולא היה בה כדי להמיתו על מתניו והלכה לה על לבו והיה בה כדי להמיתו על לבו ומת פטור נתכוין להכותו על לבו If one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was not powerful enough to kill him if it were to land on his loins, but instead the blow landed on his chest over the victim’s heart, and it was powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his chest over his heart, and the victim died as a result of the blow, the assailant is exempt from execution, as he did not intend to strike the victim a blow that would cause his death. If he intended to strike him on his chest over his heart

Daf 79a

והיה בה כדי להמית על לבו והלכה לה על מתניו ולא היה בה כדי להמית על מתניו ומת פטור and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his chest over his heart, and instead the blow landed on his loins, and it was not powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his loins, and nevertheless the victim died, the assailant is exempt. Although the assailant intended to kill the victim, the blow was not powerful enough to kill. Ostensibly, his death was not a result of the blow.

נתכוון להכות את הגדול ולא היה בה כדי להמית הגדול והלכה לה על הקטן והיה בה כדי להמית את הקטן ומת פטור נתכוון להכות את הקטן והיה בה כדי להמית את הקטן והלכה לה על הגדול ולא היה בה כדי להמית את הגדול ומת פטור If one intended to kill an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and instead the blow landed on a minor, and the blow was powerful enough to kill the minor and the minor died, the assailant is exempt. If one intended to kill a minor and the blow was powerful enough to kill a minor, and the blow landed on an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and nevertheless, the adult died, the assailant is exempt.

אבל נתכוון להכות על מתניו והיה בה כדי להמית על מתניו והלכה לה על לבו ומת חייב נתכוון להכות את הגדול והיה בה כדי להמית את הגדול והלכה לה על הקטן ומת חייב ר' שמעון אומר אפילו נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור: But if one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his loins, and instead the blow landed on his chest over his heart, and he died, the assailant is liable, since in any event, his intent was to kill the victim and the blow was powerful enough to kill him wherever it struck him. If one intended to strike an adult and the blow was powerful enough to kill the adult, and the blow landed on a minor and he died, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, although he would be liable for killing either, he is exempt, because one is executed only if his action completely corresponded with his intent.

גמ׳ ר"ש אהייא אילימא אסיפא ר"ש פוטר מיבעי ליה GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to which clause of the mishna does Rabbi Shimon disagree? If we say that he disagrees with the latter clause of the mishna, concerning one who intended to kill an adult and killed a minor, the mishna should have employed the formulation: Rabbi Shimon exempts him, not the extended statement of: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, he is exempt.

אלא ארישא נתכוון להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם לעובד כוכבים והרג את ישראל לנפלים והרג את בן קיימא פטור הא נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה חייב ר"ש אומר אפילו נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור Rather, he disagrees with the first clause of the mishna, which states: If one intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person, or he intended to kill a gentile and he killed a Jew, or he intended to kill non-viable newborns and he killed a viable person, the assailant is exempt from execution; and from which it may be inferred: But if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, he is exempt.

פשיטא קאי ראובן ושמעון ואמר אנא לראובן קא מיכוונא לשמעון לא קא מיכוונא היינו פלוגתייהו אמר לחד מינייהו מאי א"נ כסבור ראובן ונמצא שמעון מאי תא שמע דתניא ר"ש אומר עד שיאמר לפלוני אני מתכוון The Gemara comments: If Reuven and Shimon were standing, and before throwing the stone or shooting the arrow, the assailant said: I intend to kill Reuven, and I do not intend to kill Shimon, it is obvious that this is the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon. If the assailant said: I intend to kill one of them, and he did not specify whether it is Reuven or Shimon, what is the halakha? Alternatively, in a case where he intended to kill one whom he thought was Reuven and he killed him and he was found to be Shimon, what is the ruling? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this matter, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable until he says: I intend to kill so-and-so, and he then kills him.

מאי טעמא דר"ש אמר קרא (דברים יט, יא) וארב לו וקם עליו עד שיתכוון לו ורבנן אמרי דבי רבי ינאי פרט לזורק אבן לגו The Gemara seeks to clarify the rationale underlying the opinions of the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon, and asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states: “But if there will be a man who hates his neighbor, and he lies in wait for him and rises up against him, and strikes him mortally and he dies” (Deuteronomy 19:11). Based on the repeated use of pronouns in the phrase: “And lies in wait for him and rises up against him,” Rabbi Shimon derives: One is not liable to be executed until he intends to kill specifically him, the actual victim. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they derive from the repetitive pronouns in that phrase? The Gemara answers: The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say that one derives: This is to the exclusion of one who casts a stone into the midst of a group of people and one of them is killed. Since he did not intend to kill any specific individual, he is not executed.

היכי דמי אילימא דאיכא תשעה כותים ואחד ישראל ביניהן תיפוק ליה דרובא כותים נינהו אי נמי פלגא ופלגא ספק נפשות להקל The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that it is a case where there are nine gentiles and one Jew among them, there is no need for a derivation; derive that he is exempt from the fact that they are a majority of gentiles, and based on that majority, the probability is that the stone will strike a gentile. Alternatively, if the group of people comprises half gentiles and half Jews, the principle is that the ruling in a case of uncertainty with regard to cases of capital law is to be lenient, and therefore the one who threw the stone will be exempt from punishment.

לא צריכא דאיכא תשעה ישראל וכותי אחד ביניהן דהוה ליה כותי קבוע וכל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to have this derivation only in a case where there are nine Jews and one gentile among them, as this is a case where the gentile is a fixed presence in the group, and the principle is: The legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority. This is what the Rabbis derive from the phrase: “And he lies in wait for him” (Deuteronomy 19:11).

בשלמא לרבנן דאמרי נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה חייב דכתיב (שמות כא, כב) וכי ינצו אנשים ונגפו אשה הרה ואמר רבי אלעזר במצות שבמיתה הכתוב מדבר דכתיב (שמות כא, כג) אם אסון יהיה ונתתה נפש תחת נפש The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that if one intended to kill this individual and he killed that individual he is liable, there is support for their opinion from that which is written: “If men struggle and they hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and there is no tragedy, he shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). It can be inferred form the verse that if there is a tragedy, i.e., if the woman dies, there is no payment of restitution. And Rabbi Elazar says: It is with regard to a quarrel that involves the intent of each to cause the death of the other that the verse is speaking, as it is written: “But if there shall be a tragedy then you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). This is proof that in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed a pregnant woman instead, he is liable to be executed, which is why he does not pay restitution.

אלא לר"ש האי ונתתה נפש תחת נפש מאי עביד ליה ממון וכדרבי דתניא רבי אומר ונתתה נפש תחת נפש ממון אתה אומר ממון או אינו אלא נפש ממש נאמרה נתינה למטה ונאמרה But according to Rabbi Shimon, this verse: “Then you shall give a life for a life,” what does he do with it? According to his opinion, the party to the quarrel is exempt from the punishment of execution in this case. The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Shimon, “a life for a life” is not referring to execution; rather, the reference is to monetary restitution. And this understanding is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the phrase “then you shall give a life for a life” does not mean execution, but rather monetary restitution for the life that he took. Do you say that it means monetary restitution, or does it mean only the taking of an actual life? Based on the language employed in the verse, it can be determined that the reference is to monetary payment. In these verses, a term of giving is stated below: “And you shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). And additionally, a term is stated of

Daf 79b

נתינה למעלה מה להלן ממון אף כאן ממון giving above: “He shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). Just as there, in the phrase: “Give as the judges determine,” the reference is to monetary restitution, so too here, in the phrase: “Give a life for a life,” the reference is to monetary restitution.

אמר רבא האי דתנא דבי חזקיה מפקא מדרבי ומפקא מדרבנן דתנא דבי חזקיה (ויקרא כד, כא) מכה אדם ומכה בהמה Rava says: That which the school of Ḥizkiyya taught diverges from the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and diverges from the statement of the Rabbis. The school of Ḥizkiyya holds that in the case where one intended to kill one individual and killed another individual, he is exempt from both liability to be executed, counter to the opinion of the Rabbis, and from the obligation to pay monetary restitution. As the school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse states: “And he who kills an animal shall pay for it, and he who kills a man shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), indicating that one who kills a man and one who kills an animal are comparable.

מה מכה בהמה לא חלקת בה בין שוגג למזיד בין מתכוין לשאינו מתכוין בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לפוטרו ממון אלא לחייבו ממון אף מכה אדם לא תחלוק בו בין שוגג למזיד בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לחייבו ממון אלא לפוטרו ממון This teaches that just as with regard to one who kills an animal, the Torah did not differentiate between whether he does so unwittingly or intentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in all these cases but rather to render him liable to pay monetary restitution, as one who kills an animal is liable in any event; similarly, with regard to one who kills a person, do not differentiate concerning him whether he does so unwittingly or unintentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in any event.

מאי שאין מתכוין אילימא שאין מתכוין כלל היינו שוגג אלא פשיטא שאין מתכוין לזה אלא לזה וקתני לחייבו ממון אלא לפוטרו ממון ואי בר קטלא הוא מאי איצטריך למיפטריה ממון Accordingly, it is derived from here that one who commits a transgression carrying the death penalty is exempt from paying damages for his action, even if he is not given the death penalty in practice. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of with no intent? If we say that it means that he had no intent to kill at all and he happened to kill a person, that is unwitting murder that is mentioned explicitly in the baraita. Rather, it is obvious that the reference in the baraita is to one who does not intend to kill this individual, but does intend to kill that individual. And it is taught: This is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution. And if according to the school of Ḥizkiyya he is liable to be executed, for what reason was it necessary to exempt him from monetary restitution? Clearly the halakha is that one who is executed is exempt from payment.

אלא לאו שמע מינה לאו בר קטלא הוא ולאו בר ממונא הוא: Rather, must one not conclude from it that he is neither liable to be executed, nor is he liable to pay monetary restitution. With regard to liability to be executed in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed another, the school of Ḥizkiyya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that he is exempt from the death penalty, and holds that he is exempt from paying monetary restitution as well.

מתני׳ רוצח שנתערב באחרים כולן פטורין ר' יהודה אומר כונסין אותן לכיפה MISHNA: With regard to a murderer who was intermingled with others and it is not possible to identify the murderer, all of them are exempt from liability to be executed. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber [lakippa] where they will eventually die.

כל חייבי מיתות שנתערבו זה בזה נידונין בקלה הנסקלין בנשרפין ר' שמעון אומר נידונין בסקילה שהשריפה חמורה וחכמים אומרים נידונין בשריפה שהסקילה חמורה With regard to all those liable to be executed with different court-imposed death penalties who became intermingled with each other and it cannot be determined which individual was sentenced to which death, they are all sentenced to the most lenient form of execution to which any of them was sentenced. In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be executed by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by burning, as stoning is a more severe form of execution than burning.

אמר להן ר"ש אילו לא היתה שריפה חמורה לא נתנה לבת כהן שזנתה אמרו לו אילו לא היתה סקילה חמורה לא נתנה למגדף ולעובד עבודת כוכבים Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If burning were not more severe than stoning, it would not have been administered to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. A betrothed daughter of an Israelite who committed adultery is executed by stoning. If burning were not a more severe form of execution than stoning, it would not have been administered to the daughter of a priest who committed adultery, who would presumably receive a more severe punishment. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: If stoning were not more severe than burning it would not have been the death penalty administered to a blasphemer and to an idol worshipper, as their actions violate the very core of the Jewish faith.

הנהרגין בנחנקין ר"ש אומר בסייף וחכ"א בחנק: There is a parallel dispute: In a case where those who are liable to be killed by beheading were intermingled with those who are liable to be strangled, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be beheaded with a sword, as strangulation is a more severe form of execution than beheading. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by strangulation, as beheading is a more severe form of execution than strangulation.

גמ׳ מאן אחרים אילימא אחרים כשרים פשיטא ותו בהא לימא רבי יהודה כונסין אותן לכיפה GEMARA: The mishna teaches the halakha of a murderer who was intermingled with others. The Gemara asks: Who are the others with whom he was intermingled? If we say that the others are upstanding individuals, it is obvious that they are exempt; why would they all be punished for the transgression of one who happened to be among them? And furthermore, shall Rabbi Yehuda say in that case: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber where they will eventually die? Can innocent people be left to die in this manner?

(סימן בשר"ק) The Gemara cites a mnemonic, beit, shin, reish, kuf, for the Sages who address the above question: Rabbi Abbahu citing Shmuel, Rava, and Reish Lakish.

א"ר אבהו אמר שמואל הכא ברוצח שלא נגמר דינו שנתערב ברוצחים אחרים שנגמר דינן עסקינן רבנן סברי אין גומרין דינו של אדם אלא בפניו הלכך כולן פטורין ור' יהודה מיפטרינהו לגמרי נמי לא כיון דרוצחין נינהו הלכך כונסין אותן לכיפה Rabbi Abbahu says that Shmuel says: Here we are dealing with a murderer about whom witnesses testified and the judges deliberated, but his verdict was not yet finalized; and he was incarcerated until the end of his trial, and he was intermingled with other murderers whose verdicts were already finalized. It cannot be determined which of them is the murderer whose verdict was not yet finalized so that he may be brought to court for the verdict. The reason for the dispute is: The Rabbis hold that a court finalizes a person’s verdict only in his presence. Since the identity of the one whose verdict was not finalized is unknown, he cannot be sentenced to death. Since one of them cannot be executed, none of them can be executed; therefore, they are all exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Completely exempting them is also not possible, since they are murderers. Therefore, the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber.

ריש לקיש אמר באדם דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דפטירי אבל הכא בשור שלא נגמר דינו שנתערב בשורים אחרים שנגמר דינן קמיפלגי רבנן סברי כמיתת בעלים כך מיתת השור ואין גומרין דינו של שור אלא בפניו הלכך כולן פטורין ור' יהודה סבר כונסין אותן לכיפה Reish Lakish says: In the case where a person who was accused of killing another was intermingled with others, everyone agrees that they are all exempt, because one is not punished for a murder committed by others. But here, it is with regard to an ox whose verdict for goring a person to death was not yet finalized, that was intermingled with other oxen whose verdict was already finalized, that they disagree. The Rabbis hold that based on the juxtaposition between them (see Exodus 21:29), the halakha is that like the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox, and just as a court finalizes an individual’s verdict only in his presence, a court finalizes the verdict of an ox only in its presence. Therefore, all the oxen are exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber. Since it is an ox that gored, and the other oxen were sentenced to be stoned, they are incarcerated until they die.

אמר רבא Rava says:

Daf 80a

אי הכי היינו דקתני עלה אמר ר' יוסי אפילו אבא חלפתא ביניהן If so, according to Shmuel or Reish Lakish, is that compatible with that which is taught in a baraita with regard to the mishna, that Rabbi Yosei says: This is the halakha even if Abba Ḥalafta, i.e., Rabbi Yosei’s father, who himself was a righteous Sage, was among them? This is difficult according to Shmuel, as Rabbi Yosei would certainly not include his father in a group of murderers, and according to Reish Lakish, what is the connection between Rabbi Yosei’s father and a group of oxen?

אלא אמר רבא הכי קאמר שנים שהיו עומדין ויצא חץ מביניהם והרג שניהם פטורין וא"ר יוסי אפילו אבא חלפתא ביניהן Rather, Rava says: This is what the mishna is saying: In a case where two people were standing together and an arrow emerged from their midst and killed a person, since it is not known which of them shot the arrow, both of them are exempt. And Rabbi Yosei says: This is the halakha even if Abba Ḥalafta was among them. Even if one of the two people from among whom the arrow emerged was a righteous individual like Abba Ḥalafta, who presumably is not a murderer, since there is no conclusive testimony identifying the shooter, uncertainty remains and both are exempt.

ושור שנגמר דינו שנתערב בשוורין אחרים מעלייא סוקלין אותן ר' יהודה אומר כונסין אותן לכיפה The tanna then proceeds to discuss a different matter. And an ox whose verdict was finalized, that was sentenced to execution by stoning, and that was intermingled with other ordinary oxen, i.e., oxen that did not gore, the court stones all of them. Rabbi Yehuda says: They are placed in a vaulted chamber.

והתניא פרה שהמיתה ואחר כך ילדה אם עד שלא נגמר דינה ילדה וולדה מותר אם משנגמר דינה ילדה וולדה אסור נתערב באחרים ואחרים באחרים כונסין אותן לכיפה ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון אומר מביאין אותן לב"ד וסוקלין אותן The Gemara notes: And it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a cow that killed a person, and thereafter calved, if it was before its verdict was finalized that the cow calved, its offspring is permitted. If it was after its verdict was finalized that the cow calved, its offspring is prohibited, as it was prohibited together with the cow. If the cow was intermingled with other cows and the identity of the cow that killed cannot be determined, and those other cows were intermingled with yet others, the court gathers them into a vaulted chamber. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: One brings them to court and the court stones them. The unattributed baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna.

אמר מר אם עד שלא נגמר דינה ילדה וולדה מותרת ואף על גב דכי נגחה הות מיעברה והאמר רבא ולד הנוגחת אסור היא וולדה נגחו ולד הנרבעת אסור היא וולדה נרבעו The Master says in the baraita: If the cow calved before its verdict was finalized, its offspring is permitted. The Gemara asks: And is that the ruling even though when it gored it was already pregnant? But doesn’t Rava say with regard to the offspring of a cow that gores while pregnant: It is prohibited to bring it as an offering, like any animal that killed a person, as the cow and its unborn offspring gored together. And similarly, with regard to the offspring of a cow that was the object of bestiality while the offspring was in utero: It is prohibited to bring it as an offering, as the cow and its unborn offspring were the object of bestiality together. The baraita poses a difficulty according to Rava.

אימא אם עד שלא נגמר דינה עיברה וילדה וולדה מותר אם משנגמר דינה עיברה וילדה וולדה אסור The Gemara answers: Emend the baraita and say that the reference is not to a case where a cow that was pregnant gored; rather, the reference is to a case where a cow was impregnated after it gored, and this is the distinction: If before its verdict was finalized the cow was impregnated and calved, its offspring is permitted; if after its verdict was finalized the cow was impregnated and calved, its offspring is forbidden together with it.

הניחא למאן דאמר זה וזה גורם אסור The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the one who says that in a case where this permitted factor and that forbidden factor cause an outcome to be produced, that outcome is forbidden. The offspring that was produced from a bull from which deriving benefit is permitted and a cow from which deriving benefit is forbidden is therefore forbidden as well.

Daf 80b

אלא למ"ד זה וזה גורם מותר מאי איכא למימר But according to the one who says that in a case where this permitted factor and that forbidden factor cause an outcome to be produced, that outcome is permitted, what can be said? Since deriving benefit from the bull that sired the offspring is permitted, deriving benefit from the offspring should be permitted as well.

אלא אמר רבינא אימא אם עד שלא נגמר דינה עיברה וילדה ולדה מותר ואם עד שלא נגמר דינה עיברה ומשנגמר דינה ילדה ולדה אסור עובר ירך אמו הוא: Rather, Ravina says: Emend the baraita and say that the distinction in the baraita is: If before its verdict was finalized, the cow was impregnated and calved, its offspring is permitted. If before its verdict was finalized, the cow was impregnated and after its verdict was finalized it calved, its offspring is forbidden because the legal status of the fetus is not that of an independent entity; rather, its status is like that of its mother’s thigh, i.e., a part of its body. Therefore, when the mother is sentenced to death, the offspring is also forbidden once it is born.

כל חייבי מיתות: ש"מ מותרה לדבר חמור הוי מותרה לדבר קל § The mishna teaches: All those liable to be executed with different court-imposed death penalties who became intermingled are sentenced to the most lenient form of execution. The Gemara noted: Conclude from the mishna that an individual who is forewarned for a severe matter is forewarned for a lesser matter. If one is forewarned that if he violates a certain prohibition then he is liable to be stoned, while in fact, he is liable to be executed with a less severe form of execution, the forewarning is effective and he is executed with the less severe form of execution. That is the reason for the halakha in the mishna that even those liable to be executed with a more severe form of execution are executed with the less severe form of execution.

א"ר ירמיה הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהתרו בו סתם והאי תנא הוא דתניא ושאר חייבי מיתות שבתורה אין ממיתין אותן אלא בעדה ועדים והתראה ועד שיודיעוהו שהוא חייב מיתת ב"ד רבי יהודה אומר עד שיודיעוהו באיזה מיתה הוא נהרג Rabbi Yirmeya rejects that proof and says: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the witnesses forewarned the individual that if he violates the prohibition he is liable to be executed, without specification of the mode of execution. And this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to all the others, those who are liable for the various death penalties stated in the Torah other than the inciter to idol worship, the court executes them only when the following elements are present: The congregation, represented by the court, and witnesses, and forewarning just before the defendant commits the transgression. And the court does not execute him unless the witnesses informed the defendant that he is liable to receive the death penalty from the court. Rabbi Yehuda says: The defendant is not executed unless the witnesses informed the defendant by which form of death penalty he is to be executed.

ת"ק יליף ממקושש ורבי יהודה אומר מקושש הוראת שעה היתה: Based on the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, it may be inferred that according to the first tanna, although they must inform him that he is liable to be executed, they are not required to inform him of the specific mode of execution. The Gemara explains the basis for the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda: The first tanna derived forewarning from the incident of the wood gatherer (see Numbers 15:32–36), who was executed even though even Moses did not know with which death penalty he was to be executed. Clearly, the mode of execution could not have been included in his forewarning. Rabbi Yehuda says: The execution of the wood gatherer was a provisional edict based on the word of God. The halakha throughout the generations cannot be derived from it.

הנסקלין בנשרפין: מתני ליה רב יחזקאל לרמי בריה הנשרפין בנסקלין ר"ש אומר ידונו בסקילה שהשריפה חמורה § The mishna teaches: In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be executed by stoning, and the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by burning. Rav Yeḥezkel taught a different version to Rami, his son: In a case where those who are liable to be burned were intermingled with those who are liable to be stoned, Rabbi Shimon says: They shall all be sentenced to execution by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution.

אמר ליה רב יהודה אבא לא תיתנייה הכי מאי איריא דשריפה חמורה תיפוק ליה דרובה נסקלין נינהו אלא היכי אתנייה Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Yeḥezkel, said to him: Father, do not teach it in that manner, as it is difficult to understand: Why does Rabbi Shimon teach that the reason is specifically that burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning? Derive this halakha, that they are stoned, for a different reason: The principle with regard to a mixture is to follow the majority, and in this case the majority of the intermingled group is liable to be stoned. Rav Yeḥezkel asked Rav Yehuda: Rather, how then shall I teach it?

הנסקלין בנשרפין ר"ש אומר ידונו בסקילה שהשריפה חמורה אי הכי אימא סיפא וחכ"א ידונו בשריפה שהסקילה חמורה תיפוק ליה דרובה נשרפין נינהו Rav Yehuda said: You should teach: In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, where the majority is liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They shall all be sentenced to execution by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution. Rav Yeḥezkel, his father, asked: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: And the Rabbis say: They shall all be sentenced to execution by burning, as stoning is a more severe form of execution. If so, derive this halakha, that they are burned because in this case the majority of the intermingled group is liable to be burned, not because stoning is a more severe form of execution.

התם רבנן הוא דקאמרו ליה לר"ש לדידך דאמרת שריפה חמורה לא סקילה חמורה Rav Yehuda answered: There, in the latter clause, it is the Rabbis who say to Rabbi Shimon: According to you, who say that burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning, the fact that the majority is liable to be burned does not warrant the execution of the entire group by burning, since the minority was sentenced to stoning, which is more lenient in your opinion. That is not so, as stoning is a more severe form of execution. And that reason is extraneous, as in this case, they are burned because the majority of the group is liable to be burned.

אמר ליה שמואל לרב יהודה שיננא When this narrative was heard, Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Long-toothed one:

Daf 81a

לא תימא ליה לאבוך הכי דתניא הרי שהיה אביו עובר על דברי תורה לא יאמר לו אבא עברת על דברי תורה אלא אומר לו אבא כך כתיב בתורה סוף סוף היינו הך אלא אומר לו אבא מקרא כתוב בתורה כך (הוא): Do not speak to your father in that manner, where you tell him directly that he is mistaken. Rather, raise the matter in a circumspect manner, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case where one’s father was violating Torah matters he should not say to him: Father, you violated Torah matters. Rather, he should say to him: Father, it is written so in the Torah. The Gemara asks: Ultimately, isn’t this formulation identical to that previous formulation? In both cases he embarrasses his father. Rather, say to him: Father, there is a verse written in the Torah and this is what it says. Tell him the halakha or the verse in a way in which it is not obvious that it relates to the action that his father performed.

מתני׳ מי שנתחייב בשתי מיתות בית דין נידון בחמורה עבר עבירה שנתחייב שתי מיתות נידון בחמורה ר' יוסי אומר נידון בזיקה הראשונה שבאה עליו: MISHNA: One who is liable to be executed with two different court-imposed death penalties, as he violated two different capital transgressions, is sentenced to the more severe form of execution. If one violated one transgression for which he is liable to receive two death penalties, e.g., if one engaged in intercourse with his mother-in-law, who is also a married woman, he is sentenced to the more severe form of execution. Rabbi Yosei says: He is sentenced to the form of execution that he is liable to receive due to the first relationship that came upon him, i.e., if she was his mother-in-law before she was married, he is executed by burning; if she was married before she was his mother-in-law, he is punished by strangulation.

גמ׳ פשיטא אלא איתגורי איתגור GEMARA: With regard to the ruling in the mishna that one who is liable to be executed with two different court-imposed death penalties is sentenced to the more severe form of execution the Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Rather, would you say that he would profit from the fact that he violated a second capital transgression and would receive a more lenient punishment?

אמר רבא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שעבר עבירה קלה ונגמר דינו על עבירה קלה וחזר ועבר עבירה חמורה סלקא דעתא אמינא כיון דנגמר דינו לעבירה קלה האי גברא קטילא הוא קמ"ל Rava says: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he violated a relatively minor transgression punishable by a less severe form of execution, and his verdict was issued for the minor transgression, and he then violated a major transgression punishable by a more severe form of execution. It could enter your mind to say: Once his verdict was finalized for the minor transgression, the legal status of this individual is that of a dead man, and anything that he does thereafter is insignificant. To counter this, the tanna teaches us that he is liable to be punished for the subsequent transgression, and if it is punishable by a more severe form of execution, he is executed with that form of execution.

בעא מניה (אבוה) דרב יוסף בר חמא מרבה בר נתן מנא הא מילתא דאמור רבנן מי שנתחייב שתי מיתות ב"ד נידון בחמורה דכתיב (יחזקאל יח, י) והוליד בן פריץ שופך דם [וגו'] אל ההרים אכל ואת אשת רעהו טמא ואל הגלולים נשא עיניו The father of Rav Yosef bar Ḥama asked of Rabba bar Natan: From where is this matter that the Sages stated derived: One who is liable to be executed with two different court-imposed death penalties is sentenced to the more severe form of execution? Rabba bar Natan answered: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And he begets a violent son, a shedder of blood, who does to a brother any of these. And he had not done any of these, for he has eaten upon the mountains and defiled his neighbor’s wife, has wronged the poor and needy, has taken by robbery, does not return collateral, and has lifted his eyes toward the idols, has committed abomination” (Ezekiel 18:10–12).

והוליד בן פריץ שופך דם בסייף את אשת רעהו טימא זו אשת איש בחנק ואל הגלולים נשא עיניו זו עבודת כוכבים בסקילה וכתיב (יחזקאל יח, יג) מות יומת דמיו בו יהיה בסקילה This is interpreted: “And he begets a violent son, a shedder of blood,” this is one who is liable to be executed by beheading with a sword; “defiled his neighbor’s wife,” this is engaging in intercourse with a married woman, for which one is liable to be executed by strangulation; “lifted his eyes toward the idols,” this is idol worship, for which one is liable to be executed by stoning. And it is written thereafter: “He shall be put to death, his blood shall be upon himself” (Ezekiel 18:13), which means that he is executed by stoning. It appears that one who violates several capital transgressions is executed with the most severe form of execution for which he is liable.

מתקיף לה רב נחמן בר יצחק אימא כולהו בסקילה והוליד בן פריץ שופך דם זה בן סורר ומורה דבסקילה אשת רעהו טמא זו נערה המאורסה דבסקילה ואל הגלולים נשא עיניו זו עבודת כוכבים דבסקילה Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak objects to this: Say that all of the transgressions listed in the verse are punishable by stoning. How? “And he begets a violent son, a shedder of blood,” this is a wayward and rebellious son, who is executed by stoning; “defiled his neighbor’s wife,” this is engaging in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, for which one is executed by stoning; “lifted his eyes toward the idols,” this is idol worship, for which one is executed by stoning.

א"כ מאי קמ"ל יחזקאל דילמא תורה קא מהדר א"כ איבעי ליה לאהדורה כי היכי דאהדרה משה רבינו The Gemara answers: If so, according to that understanding of the verse, what is Ezekiel teaching us? According to the first understanding, a new halakha is derived from here; but according to the interpretation of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak there is nothing novel. The Gemara rejects this contention: Perhaps it is the halakhot of the Torah that Ezekiel is reiterating, admonishing the people to fulfill the directives of the Torah. The Gemara answers: If it is so that this was Ezekiel’s intention, it would have been necessary for him to reiterate the halakhot in the manner that Moses our teacher reviewed it, employing the same language. The fact that Ezekiel diverged from Moses’ formulation indicates that he sought to teach a new halakha.

דרש רב אחא בר' חנינא מאי דכתיב (יחזקאל יח, ו) אל ההרים לא אכל שלא אכל בזכות אבותיו ועיניו לא נשא אל גלולי בית ישראל שלא הלך בקומה זקופה The Gemara cites a homiletic interpretation that Rav Aḥa, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “He did not eat upon the mountains, nor did he lift his eyes toward the idols of the house of Israel, nor did he defile his neighbor’s wife, nor did he approach a menstruating woman” (Ezekiel 18:6)? This cannot be understood literally, as refraining from performing these transgressions is not sufficient to characterize an individual as righteous. “He did not eat upon the mountains” is an allusion to the fact that he did not eat due to the merit of his fathers; rather, he relies on his own merit and righteousness. “Nor did he lift his eyes toward the idols of the house of Israel” is a reference to one who distances himself from anything similar to idol worship, to the extent that he did not walk with upright stature, typical of a haughty person, as haughtiness is typical of idolaters.

ואת אשת רעהו לא טימא שלא ירד לאומנות חבירו ואל אשה נדה לא קירב שלא נהנה מקופה של צדקה וכתיב (יחזקאל יח, ט) צדיק הוא חיה יחיה כשהיה רבן גמליאל מגיע למקרא הזה היה בוכה ואמר מאן דעביד לכולהו הוא דחיי בחדא מינייהו לא “Nor did he defile his neighbor’s wife” is an allusion to the fact that he did not infringe upon another’s trade, thereby compromising his livelihood. “Nor did he approach a menstruating woman” is an allusion to the fact that he did not benefit from the charity fund even if he was needy. And it is written with regard to one who refrains from these actions: “He is a righteous man, he shall live” (Ezekiel 18:9). The Gemara relates: When Rabban Gamliel would reach this verse: “And has kept all My statutes, and has performed them, he shall live” (Ezekiel 18:19), he would cry and say: It is one who performs all of them, who lives; one who performs one of them, no, he shall not live.

א"ל ר"ע אלא מעתה (ויקרא יח, כד) אל תטמאו בכל אלה הכי נמי בכולהו אין בחדא מינייהו לא אלא באחת מכל אלה הכי נמי באחת מכל אלה: Rabbi Akiva said to Rabban Gamliel in an attempt to console him: If that is so, that the term “all” is understood in that manner, with regard to that which is written concerning the forbidden relatives enumerated in the Torah: “Do not become defiled with all of these” (Leviticus 18:24), would you also say that there too, one who is in violation of all of the prohibitions, yes, he is punished, but one who is in violation of one of them, no, he is not punished? Rather, clearly, “all of these” means in violation of one of all these; therefore, here too, the verse in Ezekiel: “And has kept all My statutes,” means that in fulfillment of one of all these one merits eternal life.

עבר עבירה: תניא כיצד אמר רבי יוסי נידון בזיקה ראשונה הבאה עליו חמותו ונעשית אשת איש נידון בחמותו אשת איש ונעשית חמותו נידון באשת איש § The mishna teaches: If one violated one transgression for which he is liable to receive two death penalties, he is sentenced to the more severe form of execution. Rabbi Yosei says: He is sentenced to the form of execution that he is liable to receive due to the first relationship that came upon him. It is taught in a baraita: How, i.e., in what circumstances, does Rabbi Yosei say that he is sentenced to the first relationship that came upon him? If this woman was a widow or a divorcée when she became his mother-in-law, and then she became a married woman and he engaged in intercourse with her, he is sentenced to execution by burning for engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law. If before he married her daughter she was a married woman, and then she became his mother-in-law, and he engaged in intercourse with her, he is sentenced to execution by strangulation for engaging in intercourse with a married woman.

אמר ליה רב אדא בר אהבה לרבא חמותו ונעשית אשת איש נידון בחמותו Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: If this woman was a widow or a divorcée when she became his mother-in-law, and then she became a married woman and he engaged in intercourse with her, is he sentenced to execution by burning for engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law?

לידון נמי אאיסור אשת איש דהא אמר ר' אבהו מודה ר' יוסי באיסור מוסיף Why is this the halakha? Let him be sentenced for violating the prohibition of a married woman as well, as Rabbi Abbahu says: Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of an expanded prohibition. Rabbi Yosei holds that generally, a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists. Nevertheless, when the second transgression is an expanded prohibition, i.e., one that that incorporates additional people into the list of those for whom the items or individuals are forbidden, Rabbi Yosei concedes that since the second prohibition applies to others, it takes effect concerning the person included in the first prohibition as well. Here too, the prohibition of intercourse with a married woman is expanded, as it applies to everyone and is therefore more comprehensive than the prohibition of intercourse with his mother-in-law, which applies only to her sons-in-law. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yosei, he should be punished also for violating the prohibition of intercourse with a married woman.

Daf 81b

אמר ליה אדא ברי בתרי קטלי קטלת ליה: Rava said to him: Adda my son, will you kill him with two death penalties? Rabbi Yosei concedes that the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with a married woman takes effect in addition to the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with his mother-in-law. If he had violated the transgression unwittingly, he would have been liable to bring two sin-offerings. But if he violated the transgression intentionally, it is impossible to execute him by strangulation after executing him by burning.

מתני׳ מי שלקה ושנה ב"ד מכניסין אותו לכיפה ומאכילין אותו שעורין עד שכריסו מתבקעת: MISHNA: One who was flogged for violating a prohibition and then repeated the violation and was flogged again assumes the status of a forewarned transgressor. The court places him into the vaulted chamber [lakippa] and feeds him barley bread until his belly ruptures due to the low-quality food, and he dies.

גמ׳ משום דלקה ושנה ב"ד כונסין אותו לכיפה אמר ר' ירמיה אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש הכא במלקיות של כריתות עסקינן דגברא בר קטלא הוא וקרובי הוא דלא מיקרב קטליה וכיון דקא מוותר לה נפשיה מקרבינן ליה לקטליה עילויה GEMARA: Due to the fact that he was flogged and repeated the violation does the court place him into the vaulted chamber for the duration of his life and advance his death? Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Here, we are dealing with lashes administered for violations of prohibitions punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet]. As when one violates such a prohibition, the man is essentially liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven, but his death is not advanced by the court, as it is administered by the heavenly court. And in this case, since he surrenders his life through his repeated transgressions, we advance his execution upon him by placing him in the vaulted chamber.

א"ל רבי יעקב לר' ירמיה בר תחליפא תא אסברא לך במלקיות של כרת אחת אבל של שתים ושל שלש כריתות איסורי הוא דקא טעים ולא מוותר כולי האי: Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: Come and I will explain to you the circumstances of this halakha. It is in a case where he was flogged with lashes for repeatedly violating one prohibition punishable with karet that he is considered to have surrendered his life. But if he received lashes for violating two or for violating three different prohibitions punishable with karet, he is not placed in the vaulted chamber, as he merely is tasting the taste of prohibition and wants to enjoy the different experiences, and he is not thereby surrendering his life to that extent.

מי שלקה ושנה: שנה אע"ג דלא שילש לימא מתני' דלא כרשב"ג דאי רשב"ג הא אמר עד תלת זימני לא הויא חזקה § The mishna teaches: One who was flogged for violating a prohibition and then repeated the violation, the court places him into the vaulted chamber. The Gemara infers: He is placed in the vaulted chamber if he repeated the violation, doing it a second time, even if he did not again repeat the violation, doing it a third time. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, doesn’t he say: Presumptive status is not established until the action is performed three times? In his opinion, only after violating the prohibition three times would one assume the status of a forewarned transgressor.

אמר רבינא אפילו תימא רשב"ג קסבר עבירות מחזיקות Ravina rejects that proof and says: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the tanna holds that transgressions, not lashes, establish the presumptive status of a transgressor. Therefore, the mishna that teaches: One who was flogged for violating a prohibition and then repeated the violation and was flogged, is placed in the vaulted chamber only after he violated the prohibition a third time, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

מיתיבי עבר עבירה שיש בה מלקות פעם ראשונה ושניה מלקין אותו ושלישית כונסין אותו לכיפה אבא שאול אומר אף בשלישית מלקין אותו ברביעית כונסין אותו לכיפה מאי לאו דכולי עלמא מלקיות מחזיקות ובפלוגתא דרבי ורשב"ג קמיפלגי The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If one performed a transgression that has lashes as its punishment, the first and the second time, the court flogs him; and the third time, the court places him in the vaulted chamber. Abba Shaul says: Even the third time the court flogs him; and the fourth time, the court places him in the vaulted chamber. What, is it not that everyone agrees that lashes establish the presumptive status of a transgressor, and it is concerning the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, whether presumptive status is established after two or three times, that the Rabbis and Abba Shaul disagree?

לא דכולי עלמא אית להו דרשב"ג והכא בהא קא מיפלגי דמר סבר עבירות מחזיקות ומר סבר מלקיות מחזיקות The Gemara rejects that parallel. No, it can be explained that everyone, the Rabbis and Abba Shaul, agrees with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that presumptive status is established after three times, and here it is with regard to this matter that they disagree: That one Sage, the Rabbis, holds: Transgressions establish the presumptive status of a transgressor, and after he is flogged twice and performs the transgression a third time, the court places him in the vaulted chamber; and one Sage, Abba Shaul, holds: Lashes establish the presumptive status of a transgressor, and it is only after he performs the third transgression and is flogged for that transgression that he assumes the status of a forewarned transgressor, and when he performs the transgression a fourth time, he is placed in the vaulted chamber.

והדתניא התרו בו ושתק התרו בו והרכין ראשו פעם ראשונה ושניה מתרין בו שלישית כונסין אותו לכיפה אבא שאול אומר אף בשלישית מתרין בו ברביעית כונסין אותו לכיפה The Gemara questions that interpretation of the dispute. And that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where witnesses forewarned him that he was about to violate a prohibition punishable by lashes and he was silent and did not acknowledge that he accepted the forewarning, and likewise a case where the witnesses forewarned him and he bowed his head but did not explicitly acknowledge that he accepted the forewarning, the first and second time they forewarn him the court does not flog him, because he did not accept the forewarning. If this scenario occurs a third time, the court places him in the vaulted chamber. Abba Shaul says: Even the third time the witnesses forewarn him the court does not flog him; and the fourth time, the court places him in the vaulted chamber.

והתם מלקות ליכא במאי קמיפלגי אמר רבינא בכיפה צריכה התראה קמיפלגי And there, in the case in the baraita, there are no lashes, as he did not explicitly acknowledge acceptance of the forewarning. The reference is to a case where one violated the transgression several times, and if their dispute is not with regard to the number of times required to establish presumptive status, with regard to what matter do they disagree? Ravina says: It is with regard to whether placing an individual into a vaulted chamber requires forewarning that they disagree. The Rabbis hold that once he disregarded the forewarning three times, the court places him in a vaulted chamber. Abba Shaul holds that after he is forewarned three times that he will be flogged if he performs the transgression, he requires additional forewarning, before the fourth time, that he will be placed in a vaulted chamber if he performs the transgression again.

ומאי כיפה אמר רב יהודה מלא קומתו והיכא רמיזא אמר ריש לקיש (תהלים לד, כב) תמותת רשע רעה The Gemara clarifies: And what is the nature of this vaulted chamber? Rav Yehuda says: It is a small chamber that is the full height of the transgressor, and it does not allow him to move in it. The Gemara asks: And where is this punishment intimated? Reish Lakish said that it is intimated in the verse: “Evil shall kill the wicked” (Psalms 34:22). Ultimately, an evildoer finds his demise through his evil, and the result is this harsh form of death.

ואמר ריש לקיש מאי דכתיב (קהלת ט, יב) כי [גם] לא ידע האדם את עתו כדגים שנאחזים במצודה רעה מאי מצודה רעה אמר ר"ל חכה: The Gemara cites a related statement. And Reish Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For man also knows not his time, like fish snared in an evil net” (Ecclesiastes 9:12)? What is the nature of this evil net? Reish Lakish says: It is a hook; although it is small and the fish is much larger, the fish cannot escape it.

מתני׳ ההורג נפש שלא בעדים מכניסין אותו לכיפה ומאכילין אותו (ישעיהו ל, כ) לחם צר ומים לחץ: MISHNA: With regard to one who kills a person not in the presence of witnesses and it is impossible to judge him in court, the court places him into a vaulted chamber and feeds him sparing bread and scant water (see Isaiah 30:20).

גמ׳ מנא ידעינן אמר רב בעדות מיוחדת ושמואל אמר שלא בהתראה GEMARA: The Gemara asks: If there are no witnesses, from where do we know that he killed a person and is liable to be punished? Rav says: The tanna of the mishna is speaking about a case of disjointed testimony, where the witnesses were not together and they witnessed the murder from different vantage points. The court cannot convict a person for committing a murder based on that type of testimony even though it is clear that the witnesses are telling the truth. And Shmuel says: The tanna of the mishna is speaking about a case where the witnesses testified that they witnessed the murder but there was no forewarning, and therefore the court cannot convict him.

ורב חסדא אמר אבימי כגון דאיתכחוש בבדיקות ולא איתכחוש בחקירות כדתנן מעשה ובדק בן זכאי בעוקצי תאנים: And Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says: The tanna of the mishna is speaking of a case where the witnesses contradicted each other in the examinations that involve matters peripheral to the murder but did not contradict each other in the interrogations, which are integral to the murder, i.e., time and place. Therefore, it is clear to the court that the accused is guilty and consequently they place him in the vaulted chamber. As we learned in a mishna (40a): There was an incident and ben Zakkai examined the witnesses with regard to the stems of figs on the fig tree beneath which the murder took place. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai questioned the witnesses about the thickness of the stems in order to determine whether they would contradict each other in this peripheral detail in order to save the accused (see 41a).

ומאכילין אותו לחם צר ומים לחץ: מאי שנא הכא דקתני נותנין לו לחם צר ומים לחץ ומאי שנא התם דקתני מאכילין אותו שעורין עד שכריסו מתבקעת אמר רב ששת אידי ואידי נותנין לו לחם צר ומים לחץ עד שיוקטן מעיינו והדר מאכילין אותו שעורין עד שכריסו מתבקעת: The mishna teaches: And feeds him sparing bread and scant water. The Gemara asks: What is different in the mishna here that the tanna teaches that the court gives him sparing bread and scant water in the vaulted chamber, and what is different in the previous mishna there that the tanna teaches that the court feeds him barley bread until his belly ruptures; are these two different punishments? Rav Sheshet says: Both this and that are one punishment; first, the court gives him sparing bread and scant water until his intestines contract due to his starvation diet, and then the court feeds him barley bread that expands in his innards until his belly ruptures.

מתני׳ הגונב את הקסוה והמקלל בקוסם והבועל ארמית קנאין פוגעין בו כהן ששמש בטומאה אין אחיו הכהנים מביאין אותו לב"ד אלא פרחי כהונה מוציאין אותו חוץ לעזרה ומפציעין את מוחו בגזירין זר ששמש במקדש רבי עקיבא אומר בחנק וחכ"א בידי שמים: MISHNA: With regard to one who steals a kasva, and one who curses with a sorcerer, and one who engages in intercourse with an Aramean woman, zealots strike him and kill him. Although the Torah does not say that one who performs one of these actions is liable to be executed, it is permitted for anyone who zealously takes the vengeance of the Lord to do so. In the case of a priest who performed the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity, his priestly brethren do not bring him to court for judgment; rather, the young men of the priesthood remove him from the Temple courtyard and pierce his skull with pieces of wood. In the case of a non-priest who performed the service in the Temple, Rabbi Akiva says: His execution is by strangulation, and the Rabbis say: He is not executed with a court-imposed death penalty; rather, he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven.

גמ׳ מאי קסוה אמר רב יהודה כלי שרת וכן הוא אומר (במדבר ד, ז) ואת קשות הנסך והיכא רמיזא (במדבר ד, כ) ולא יבאו לראות כבלע את הקדש ומתו: GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the kasva mentioned in the mishna? Rav Yehuda says: It is a term used to describe any service vessel utilized in the Temple. And likewise, it is stated: “And the jars [kesot] with which to pour libations” (Numbers 4:7). The Gemara asks: And where is it intimated that one who steals a service vessel is liable to be killed by zealots? The Gemara answers that it is intimated in the verse: “But they shall not come to see the sacred items as they are being covered [kevala], lest they die” (Numbers 4:20). The Gemara interprets the term kevala as one who ingests, i.e., who takes (see Job 20:15), and the verse thereby teaches that one who steals a service vessel is liable to be killed.

והמקלל בקוסם: תני רב יוסף יכה קוסם את קוסמו רבנן ואיתימא רבה בר מרי אמרי יכהו קוסם לו ולקונו ולמקנו: The mishna teaches: And one who curses with a sorcerer is among those liable to be killed by zealots. Rav Yosef teaches that the reference is to one who says: Let the sorcerer strike his sorcerer, meaning one who curses God in the name of idol worship. He does not explicitly say God’s name, but he believes that a sorcerer can curse the sorcerer who provided him with his powers, i.e., the Divine Presence. The Rabbis, and some say that it was Rabba, son of Mari, say that the reference is to one who says: Let the sorcerer strike him, i.e., the individual with whom he is quarreling, and his Creator and his Provider. Since he curses God, it is permitted for zealots to kill him.

והבועל ארמית: בעא מיניה רב כהנא מרב The mishna teaches that one who engages in intercourse with an Aramean woman is among those liable to be killed by zealots. Rav Kahana asked of Rav:

Daf 82a

לא פגעו בו קנאין מהו אינשייה רב לגמריה אקריוהו לרב כהנא בחלמיה (מלאכי ב, יא) בגדה יהודה ותועבה נעשתה בישראל ובירושלים כי חלל יהודה קדש ה' אשר אהב ובעל בת אל נכר אתא א"ל הכי אקריון If zealots did not strike him, what is the halakha? Rav forgot that which he learned through tradition concerning this matter. They read this verse to Rav Kahana in his dream: “Judah has dealt treacherously and an abomination is committed in Israel and in Jerusalem, as Judah has profaned the sacred of the Lord, which he loves, and has engaged in intercourse with the daughter of a strange god” (Malachi 2:11). Rav Kahana came and said to Rav: This is what they read to me in my dream.

אדכריה רב לגמריה בגדה יהודה זו עבודת כוכבים וכן הוא אומר (ירמיהו ג, כ) [כן] בגדתם בי בית ישראל נאום ה' ותועבה נעשתה בישראל ובירושלים זה משכב זכור וכן הוא אומר (ויקרא יח, כב) ואת זכר לא תשכב משכבי אשה תועבה היא כי חלל יהודה קדש ה' זו זונה וכן הוא אומר (דברים כג, יח) לא (יהיה קדש) ובעל בת אל נכר זה הבא על הכותית Rav then remembered that which he learned through tradition and said: “Judah has dealt treacherously,” this is a reference to the sin of idol worship. And likewise it says: But as a wife who treacherously departs her husband, you have dealt treacherously with Me, house of Israel, says the Lord (Jeremiah 3:20). “And an abomination is committed in Israel and in Jerusalem,” this is a reference to male homosexual intercourse, and likewise it says: “You shall not lie with a man as one lies with a woman; it is an abomination” (Leviticus 18:22). “As Judah has profaned the sacred [kodesh] of the Lord,” this is a reference to a prostitute, and likewise it says: “There shall be no harlot [kedesha] of the daughters of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18). “And has engaged in intercourse with the daughter of a strange god,” this is a reference to one who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman.

וכתיב בתריה (מלאכי ב, יב) יכרת ה' לאיש אשר יעשנה ער ועונה (מאלהי) יעקב ומגיש מנחה לה' צבאות אם ת"ח הוא לא יהיה לו ער בחכמים ועונה בתלמידים אם כהן הוא לא יהיה לו בן מגיש מנחה לה' צבאות And it is written thereafter with regard to those enumerated in the verse: “May the Lord excise the man who does this, who calls and who answers from the tents of Jacob, and he who sacrifices a meal-offering to the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 2:12). The Gemara interprets the verse: If he is a Torah scholar, he will have neither one among his descendants who calls and initiates discourse among the Sages, nor one who answers among the students, i.e., one who is capable of answering questions posed by the Sages. If he is a priest, he will not have among his descendants a son who sacrifices a meal-offering to the Lord of hosts.

א"ר חייא בר אבויה כל הבא על הכותית כאילו מתחתן בעבודת כוכבים דכתיב ובעל בת אל נכר וכי בת יש לו לאל נכר אלא זה הבא על הכותית Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avuya says: With regard to anyone who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman it is as though he married the object of idol worship itself, as it is written: “And has engaged in intercourse with the daughter of a strange god.” Does a strange god have a daughter? Rather, this is a reference to one who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman who is an adherent of a strange god.

וא"ר חייא בר אבויה כתוב על גלגלתו של יהויקים זאת ועוד אחרת זקינו דרבי פרידא אשכח ההוא גולגלתא דהות שדיא בשערי ירושלים והוה כתוב עילויה זאת ועוד אחרת קברה והדר נבוג קברה והדר נבוג אמר האי גולגלתא של יהויקים דכתיב ביה (ירמיהו כב, יט) קבורת חמור יקבר סחוב והשלך מהלאה לשערי ירושלים § The Gemara cites another of Rav Ḥiyya bar Avuya’s statements. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avuya says: It was written on the skull of Jehoiakim king of Judea: This and yet another, indicating that he will suffer a punishment in addition to the punishment that he already received. The Gemara relates: The grandfather of Rabbi Perida, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avuya, found a skull that was cast at the gates of Jerusalem, and upon it was written: This and yet another. He buried it, and it then emerged [navug] from beneath the soil. He buried it and it then emerged from beneath the soil again. He said: This is the skull of Jehoiakim, as it is written in his regard: “With the burial of a donkey he shall be buried, drawn and cast beyond the gates of Jerusalem” (Jeremiah 22:19). He will find no rest in a grave.

אמר מלכא הוא ולאו אורח ארעא לבזויי שקלה כרכה בשיראי ואותביה בסיפטא אתאי דביתהו חזיתה נפקת אמרה להו לשיבבתהא אמרי לה האי דאיתתא קמייתא היא דלא קא מנשי לה שגרתא לתנורא וקלתה כי אתא אמר היינו דכתיב עילויה זאת ועוד אחרת Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avuya said: He is a king and it is not proper conduct to treat him contemptuously. He took the skull, wrapped it in silk [beshira’ei] and placed it in a chest [besifta]. His wife came and saw the skull, went out and told her neighbors and asked them what it was. The neighbors said to her: This is the skull of the first wife to whom he was married, as he has not forgotten her and he keeps her skull in her memory. That angered his wife, and she kindled the oven and burned the skull. When Rabbi Ḥiyya son of Avuya came and learned what she had done, he said: That is the fulfillment of that which is written about him: This and yet another. Having his remains cast beyond the gates of Jerusalem did not complete the punishment of Jehoiakim. He suffered the additional indignity of having his remains burned.

כי אתא רב דימי אמר בית דינו של חשמונאי גזרו הבא על הכותית חייב עליה משום נשג"א § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: The court of the Hasmoneans issued a decree that one who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman is liable due to his violation of prohibitions represented by the letters: Nun, shin, gimmel, alef. He is liable for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman [nidda] who did not immerse in a ritual bath and remains impure. Although by Torah law there is no impurity of menstruation with regard to gentiles, it has been decreed that one must distance himself from them as he does from a menstruating woman. He is liable for engaging in intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant [shifḥa], as relative to a Jewish woman, the status of a gentile woman is that of a maidservant. He is liable for engaging in intercourse with a gentile woman [goya] and with a married woman [eshet ish].

כי אתא רבין אמר משום נשג"ז נדה שפחה גויה זונה אבל משום אישות לית להו ואידך נשייהו ודאי לא מיפקרי When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: He is liable due to his violation of prohibitions represented by the letters: Nun, shin, gimmel, zayin. Ravin agreed with Rav Dimi that the Hasmoneans decreed that one who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman is liable for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman, a maidservant, and a gentile woman. He adds that the individual is liable for engaging in intercourse with a zona. But he disagrees with Rav Dimi and holds that one is not liable due to the violation of the prohibition involving matrimony, i.e., of engaging in intercourse with a married woman, because the halakhic framework of matrimony does not exist among gentiles. Their relationships are fundamentally temporary. And the other amora, Rav Dimi, holds that gentiles certainly do not forsake their wives; therefore, the status of the wife of a gentile is that of a married woman.

א"ר חסדא הבא לימלך אין מורין לו איתמר נמי אמר רבה בר בר חנה א"ר יוחנן הבא לימלך אין מורין לו Rav Ḥisda says: Concerning one who comes to consult with the court when he sees a Jewish man engaging in intercourse with a gentile woman, the court does not instruct him that it is permitted to kill the transgressor. It was also stated that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Concerning one who comes to consult with the court, the court does not instruct him that it is permitted to kill the Jewish man engaging in intercourse with a gentile woman.

ולא עוד אלא שאם פירש זמרי והרגו פנחס נהרג עליו נהפך זמרי והרגו לפנחס אין נהרג עליו שהרי רודף הוא Moreover, if Zimri son of Salu (see Numbers 25:1–9) had separated himself from the woman and only then Pinehas killed him, Pinehas would have been executed for killing him, because it is permitted for zealots to kill only while the transgressor is engaged in the act of intercourse. Furthermore, if Zimri would have turned and killed Pinehas in self-defense, he would not have been executed for killing him, as Pinehas was a pursuer. One is allowed to kill a pursuer in self-defense, provided that the pursued is not liable to be executed by the court.

(במדבר כה, ה) ויאמר משה אל שופטי ישראל וגו' הלך שבטו של שמעון אצל זמרי בן סלוא אמרו לו הן דנין דיני נפשות ואתה יושב ושותק מה עשה עמד וקיבץ כ"ד אלף מישראל והלך אצל כזבי אמר לה השמיעי לי אמרה לו בת מלך אני וכן צוה לי אבי לא תשמעי אלא לגדול שבהם אמר לה אף הוא נשיא שבט הוא ולא עוד אלא שהוא גדול ממנו שהוא שני לבטן והוא שלישי לבטן It is stated: “And Moses said to the judges of Israel: Each of you shall slay his men who have adhered unto Ba’al-Peor” (Numbers 25:5). The tribe of Simeon went to Zimri, son of Salu, their leader, and said to him: They are judging cases of capital law and executing us and you are sitting and are silent? What did Zimri do? He arose and gathered twenty-four thousand people from the children of Israel, and went to Cozbi, daughter of Zur, princess of Midian, and said to her: Submit to me and engage in intercourse with me. She said to him: I am the daughter of a king, and this is what my father commanded me: Submit only to the greatest of them. Zimri said to her: He, too, referring to himself, is the head of a tribe; moreover, he is greater than Moses, as he is the second of the womb, as he descends from Simeon, the second son of Jacob, and Moses is the third of the womb, as he descends from Levi, the third son of Jacob.

תפשה בבלוריתה והביאה אצל משה אמר לו בן עמרם זו אסורה או מותרת ואם תאמר אסורה בת יתרו מי התירה לך נתעלמה ממנו הלכה געו כולם בבכיה והיינו דכתיב (במדבר כה, ו) והמה בוכים פתח אהל מועד וכתיב (במדבר כה, ז) וירא פנחס בן אלעזר He seized her by her forelock and brought her before Moses. Zimri said to Moses: Son of Amram, is this woman forbidden or permitted? And if you say that she is forbidden, as for the daughter of Yitro to whom you are married, who permitted her to you? The halakha with regard to the proper course of action when encountering a Jewish man engaging in intercourse with a gentile woman eluded Moses. All of the members of the Sanhedrin bawled in their weeping, and that is the meaning of that which is written: “And they are crying at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Numbers 25:6). And it is written thereafter: “And Pinehas, son of Elazar, son of Aaron the priest, saw and arose from the midst of the congregation and took a spear in his hand” (Numbers 25:7).

מה ראה אמר רב ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה אמר לו אחי אבי אבא לא כך לימדתני ברדתך מהר סיני הבועל את כותית קנאין פוגעין בו אמר לו קריינא דאיגרתא איהו ליהוי פרוונקא The Gemara asks: What did Pinehas see that led him to arise and take action? Rav says: He saw the incident taking place before him and he remembered the halakha. He said to Moses: Brother of the father of my father, as Moses was the brother of his grandfather Aaron, did you not teach me this during your descent from Mount Sinai: One who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman, zealots strike him? Moses said to him: Let the one who reads the letter be the agent [parvanka] to fulfill its contents.

ושמואל אמר ראה שאין (משלי כא, ל) חכמה ואין תבונה ואין עצה נגד ה' כל מקום שיש חילול השם אין חולקין כבוד לרב ר' יצחק אמר ר"א ראה שבא מלאך והשחית בעם And Shmuel says: Pinehas saw and considered the meaning of the verse: “There is neither wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord” (Proverbs 21:30), which the Sages interpreted to mean: Anywhere that there is desecration of the Lord’s name, one does not show respect to the teacher. In those situations, one need not consult his teacher, but must immediately proceed to right the wrong that is transpiring. Therefore, he took the spear and took immediate action. Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Eliezer says: He saw that an angel came and destroyed among the people in punishment for the sin of Zimri, and he realized that he must take immediate action to ameliorate the situation.

ויקם מתוך העדה ויקח רומח בידו מיכן שאין נכנסין בכלי זיין לבית המדרש שלף שננה והניחה באונקלו והיה It is written with regard to Pinehas: “He arose from amidst the assembly and he took a spear in his hand” (Numbers 25:7). From here, where it is written that he took the spear only after he arose from the assembly, it is derived that one does not enter the study hall with a weapon. The assembly in this context is referring to the seat of the Sanhedrin. Pinehas removed the blade of the spear and placed it in his garment [be’unkalo] and held the shaft of the spear like a walking stick, and he was

Daf 82b

נשען והולך על מקלו וכיון שהגיע אצל שבטו של שמעון אמר היכן מצינו ששבטו של לוי גדול משל שמעון אמרו הניחו לו אף הוא לעשות צרכיו נכנס התירו פרושין את הדבר walking, leaning on his walking stick, the shaft of the spear. And once he reached the tribe of Simeon he said: Where did we find that the tribe of Levi is greater than that of Simeon? If all the members of your tribe submit to the temptation of the women of Moab, I may do so as well. After hearing that statement, the members of the tribe of Simeon said: Allow him to enter; like us, he too is entering to attend to his needs and engage in intercourse with the Moabite women. They rejoiced and said: Apparently, the pious and God-fearing have permitted this matter, as Pinehas is one of them.

א"ר יוחנן ששה נסים נעשו לו לפנחס אחד שהיה לו לזמרי לפרוש ולא פירש ואחד שהיה לו לדבר ולא דבר ואחד שכוון בזכרותו של איש ובנקבותה של אשה ואחד שלא נשמטו מן הרומח ואחד שבא מלאך והגביה את המשקוף ואחד שבא מלאך והשחית בעם Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Six miracles were performed for Pinehas when he killed Zimri. One is that Zimri should have separated himself from Cozbi, and he did not separate himself. Had he done so, it would have been prohibited for Pinehas to kill him. And one is that Zimri should have spoken and alerted the members of his tribe to come to his assistance, and he did not speak. And one is that Pinehas directed the spear precisely to the male genitals of Zimri and to the female genitals of Cozbi so that the reason that he killed them would be evident. And one is that Zimri and Cozbi did not fall from the spear. And one is that an angel came and raised the lintel of that chamber so that Pinehas could emerge holding them aloft on the spear. And one is that an angel came and caused destruction among the people, distracting them from interfering with the actions of Pinehas.

בא וחבטן לפני המקום אמר לפניו רבש"ע על אלו יפלו כ"ד אלף מישראל שנאמר (במדבר כה, ט) ויהיו המתים במגפה ארבעה ועשרים אלף והיינו דכתיב (תהלים קו, ל) ויעמד פנחס ויפלל Pinehas came and slammed them on the ground before the Omnipresent and said before Him: Master of the Universe, will twenty-four thousand of the children of Israel fall due to these sinners? As it is stated: “And those that died in the plague were twenty-four thousand” (Numbers 25:9). And that is the meaning of that which is written: “And Pinehas stood and wrought judgment and the plague was stayed” (Psalms 106:30).

אמר רבי אלעזר ויתפלל לא נאמר אלא ויפלל מלמד כביכול שעשה פלילות עם קונו בקשו מלאכי השרת לדחפו אמר להן הניחו לו קנאי בן קנאי הוא משיב חימה בן משיב חימה הוא Rabbi Elazar says: It is not stated in the verse: And prayed [vayitpallel]; rather, it is stated vayefalel. This teaches that Pinehas, as it were, wrought judgment [pelilut] with his Creator. The ministering angels sought to push him away because he spoke harshly to God. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Leave him be; he is a zealot, son of a zealot, from the tribe of Levi, who was zealous in avenging the violation of his sister Dinah; he is an alleviator of wrath, son of an alleviator of wrath, a descendant of Aaron, who alleviated the wrath of God during the plague that followed the assembly of Korah.

התחילו שבטים מבזין אותו ראיתם בן פוטי זה שפיטם אבי אמו עגלים לעבודת כוכבים והרג נשיא שבט מישראל בא הכתוב ויחסו פנחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן The tribes began to demean Pinehas: Did you see this son of Puti, so-called because his mother was one of the daughters of Putiel (see Exodus 6:25), and they interpreted homiletically: As Yitro, the father of his mother, according to one rabbinic tradition, fattened [shepittem] calves for idol worship, and he impudently killed the prince of a tribe of Israel without a trial. In response, the verse comes and provides his lineage as “Pinehas, son of Elazar, son of Aaron the priest” (Numbers 25:11). It is due to that lineage that he zealously executed Zimri.

א"ל הקב"ה למשה הקדם לו שלום שנאמר (במדבר כה, יב) לכן אמור הנני נותן לו את בריתי שלום וראויה כפרה זו שתהא מכפרת והולכת לעולם The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Be the first to greet Pinehas with a blessing of peace, to honor him before the people, as it is stated: “Therefore say: I hereby give to him My covenant of peace” (Numbers 25:12), and it is stated: “And it shall be unto him and to his descendants after him a covenant of eternal priesthood, because he was zealous for his God and he atoned for the children of Israel” (Numbers 25:13), and this atonement that he facilitated is worthy of continuing to atone forever.

אמר רב נחמן אמר רב מאי דכתיב (משלי ל, לא) זרזיר מתנים או תיש ומלך אלקום עמו ד' מאות ועשרים וארבע בעילות בעל אותו רשע אותו היום והמתין לו פנחס עד שתשש כחו והוא אינו יודע שמלך אלקום עמו § With regard to the same matter, Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The thigh-belted greyhound [zarzir], or the he-goat, and the king against whom none can rise” (Proverbs 30:31)? That wicked Zimri engaged in four hundred and twenty-four, the numerical value of the word zarzir, acts of intercourse with Cozbi that day. And Pinehas waited until his strength waned from all that activity. And Pinehas did not know that it was not necessary to wait that long because the king against whom none can rise, a reference to the Holy One, Blessed be He, was with him.

במתניתא תנא ששים עד שנעשה כביצה המוזרת והיא היתה כערוגה מליאה מים אמר רב כהנא ומושבה בית סאה תני רב יוסף קבר שלה אמה It was taught in a baraita: Zimri engaged in intercourse sixty times until he became like an addled egg whose contents are a muddled and non-differentiated fluid, and Cozbi was like a garden bed full of water. Rav Kahana said to underscore her disgrace resulting from her extensive sexual activity: And her seat was as wide as the area required for sowing one se’a of seed [beit se’a]. Rav Yosef taught: The opening of her womb was a cubit.

אמר רב ששת לא כזבי שמה אלא שוילנאי בת צור שמה ולמה נקרא שמה כזבי שכזבה באביה ד"א כזבי שאמרה לאביה כוס בי עם זה Rav Sheshet says: Cozbi was not her given name; rather, Shevilnai, daughter of Zur, was her real name. And why was she called Cozbi? Because through her actions, she distorted [shekizzeva] the instructions of her father. He told her to submit only to the greatest of the children of Israel, and she submitted to the leader of a tribe. Alternatively: She was called Cozbi because she said to her father: Slaughter [kos] this people through me [bi], as I will seduce them to engage in licentiousness.

והיינו דאמרי אינשי בין קני לאורבני שוילנאי מאי בעיא בהדי קלפי דקני שוילנאי מאי בעיא גפתה לאמה Her name was Shevilnai; and this is as people say in reference to a famous prostitute: Between reeds and willows, what does Shevilnai seek? Clearly, she seeks licentiousness. There is another adage: Among the peels of the reeds, what does Shevilnai seek? Clearly, she seeks licentiousness. She prostituted her mother. Apparently, Shevilnai became a name popularly used to connote a prostitute. Since everyone refers to her as prostitute, daughter of prostitute, she has implicated her mother with her licentiousness.

א"ר יוחנן חמשה שמות יש לו זמרי ובן סלוא ושאול ובן הכנענית ושלומיאל בן צורי שדי זמרי על שנעשה כביצה המוזרת בן סלוא על שהסליא עונות של משפחתו שאול על שהשאיל עצמו לדבר עבירה בן הכנענית על שעשה מעשה כנען ומה שמו שלומיאל בן צורי שדי שמו: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Zimri has five names: Zimri; and son of Salu; and Saul; and son of the Canaanite woman; and Shelumiel, son of Zuri Shaddai. He was called Zimri because of the fact that he became like an addled [hamuzeret] egg as a result of engaging in multiple acts of intercourse. He was called son of Salu because of the fact that he evoked [shehisli] the sins of his family. He was called Saul [Shaul] because of the fact that he lent [shehishil] himself to sinful matters. He was called son of the Canaanite woman because of the fact that he performed an act of Canaan, as the Canaanites are renowned for their licentiousness. And what is his given name? Shelumiel, son of Zuri Shaddai, is his name, the leader of the tribe of Simeon (Numbers 1:6).

כהן ששימש בטומאה: בעא מיניה רב אחא בר הונא מרב ששת כהן ששימש בטומאה חייב מיתה בידי שמים או אין חייב מיתה בידי שמים § The mishna teaches: In the case of a priest who performed the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity, the young of the priesthood kill him. Rav Aḥa bar Huna raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: In the case of a priest who performed the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity, is he liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven or is he not liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven?

א"ל תניתוה כהן ששימש בטומאה אין אחיו הכהנים מביאין אותו לב"ד אלא פירחי כהונה מוציאין אותו חוץ לעזרה ופוצעין את מוחו בגיזרין ואי ס"ד מחייב בידי שמים לישבקיה דליקטול בידי שמים אלא מאי אינו חייב Rav Sheshet said to him: You learned the resolution of that dilemma from the mishna itself, as we learned: In the case of a priest who performed the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity, his priestly brethren do not bring him to court for judgment; rather, the young of the priesthood remove him from the Temple courtyard and pierce his skull with pieces of wood. And if it enters your mind to say that he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, let the young of the priesthood leave him, so that he will be killed at the hand of Heaven. Rather, what must one say? He is not liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven.

מי איכא מידי דרחמנא פטריה ואנן ניקום וניקטול ליה ולא והתנן מי שלקה ושנה ב"ד מכניסין אותו לכיפה רחמנא פטריה ואנן קטלינן ליה האמר ר' ירמיה אמר ר"ל במלקות של כריתות עסקינן דגברא בר קטלא הוא Rav Aḥa bar Huna rejects that proof: Is there any act for which the Torah absolves him of the death penalty and we shall arise and execute him? Rav Sheshet said to him: And are there not cases where one is executed even though the Torah absolves him? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: One who was flogged for violating a prohibition and then repeated the violation, the court places him into the vaulted chamber? There too, the Merciful One absolves him of the death penalty and we execute him. Rav Aḥa bar Huna rejects that proof: Doesn’t Rabbi Yirmeya say that Reish Lakish says: We are dealing with lashes administered for violations of prohibitions punishable by karet? As in that case, the man is essentially liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

והא גונב הקסוה האמר רב יהודה בכלי שרת עסקינן ורמיזא (במדבר ד, כ) לא יבואו לראות כבלע את הקדש ומתו Rav Sheshet said to him: But isn’t there the case of one who steals a kasva, who is exempt from punishment by Torah law, and the mishna says that zealots strike him? Rav Aḥa bar Huna rejects that proof: But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say: We are dealing with a service vessel utilized in the Temple, and the fact that one who steals a service vessel is liable to be killed by zealots is intimated in the verse: “But they shall not come to see the sacred items as they are being covered, lest they die” (Numbers 4:20).

והא המקלל את הקוסם הא תני רב יוסף יכה קוסם את קוסמו דמיחזי כמברך את השם Rav Sheshet said to him: But isn’t there the case of one who curses the sorcerer, who is exempt from punishment by Torah law, and the mishna says that zealots strike him? Rav Aḥa bar Huna rejects that proof: But didn’t Rav Yosef teach that the reference is to a case where one says: Let the sorcerer strike his sorcerer, which appears to be like one who is blessing, a euphemism for cursing, the name of God, and he is liable to be executed for desecration of the name of God.

והא בועל את הכותית הא אקריוה לרב כהנא בחלמיה ואדכריה רב לגמריה Rav Sheshet said to him: But isn’t there the case of one who engages in intercourse with an Aramean woman, who is exempt from punishment by Torah law, and the mishna says that zealots strike him? Rav Aḥa bar Huna rejects that proof: Didn’t they read a verse to Rav Kahana in his dream and when he related his dream to Rav, Rav remembered that which he learned through tradition that God will excise the soul of one who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman?

איתיביה היוצק והבולל והפותת המולח המניף המגיש והמסדר את השולחן המטיב את הנרות והקומץ והמקבל דמים בחוץ פטור Rav Aḥa bar Huna raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Sheshet that a priest who performs the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity is not liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven. A baraita teaches: With regard to a priest who pours oil onto a meal-offering, and one who mixes the oil into the meal-offering, and one who breaks a baked meal-offering into pieces, and one who salts the meal-offering, and one who waves it toward the altar, and one who brings the meal-offering to the altar, and one who arranges the Table of the shewbread, and one who removes the ashes from the lamps of the Candelabrum, and one who removes the handful from the meal-offering, and one who collects the blood after the slaughter of one of the offerings; if the priest performs any of these sacrificial rites outside the Temple, although there are severe prohibitions with regard to performing the Temple service outside the Temple, he is exempt from karet.

ואין חייבין עליהן And one is not liable for their performance,

Daf 83a

לא משום זרות ולא משום טומאה ולא משום מחוסר בגדים ולא משום רחוץ ידים ורגלים neither due to non-priesthood, if a non-priest performs one of those rites in the Temple, he is not liable to receive the death penalty; nor due to the performance of any of these rites in a state of ritual impurity; nor due to the performance of any of these rites as a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments; nor due to the performance of any of these services without the washing of his hands and feet. The reason for the lack of liability is that in all these cases, additional rites must be performed in order to complete the service. One is liable for performing the service outside the Temple, or performing the service as a non-priest, in a state of ritual impurity, etc., only when performing a ritual that completes the service.

הא מקטר חייב מאי לאו מיתה לא באזהרה From the baraita, one may infer: But one who burns the offering on the altar in one of these circumstances, including in a state of ritual impurity, is liable. What, is it not teaching that he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, and there is proof from the baraita to resolve Rav Aḥa bar Huna’s dilemma? The Gemara rejects that proof: No, he is liable for violating a prohibition, without the punishment of death.

אלא זר נמי לאזהרה והכתיב (במדבר יח, ז) והזר הקרב יומת הא כדאיתא והא כדאיתא The Gemara asks: But according to that understanding, as for the non-priest who is mentioned in the baraita together with the priest who performs the Temple service in a state of impurity, is he too liable for violating a prohibition, and not death, if he burns the offering on the altar? But isn’t it written: “And the non-priest who approaches shall be put to death” (Numbers 18:7)? The Gemara answers: Do not extrapolate the liability of a non-priest from the liability of a ritually impure priest, as this case of ritual impurity is as it is, and that case of a non-priest is as it is; each situation is discussed independently.

מכלל דיוצק ובולל לאו נמי לא והתניא אזהרה ליוצק ובולל מניין ת"ל (ויקרא כא, ו) קדושים יהיו ולא יחללו מדרבנן וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא The Gemara asks: Is that to say, by inference, that a priest who pours oil onto a meal-offering and one who mixes the oil into the meal-offering, in a state of ritual impurity, does not violate even a prohibition? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: From where is a prohibition against pouring oil and against mixing oil in a state of ritual impurity derived? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “They shall be sacred to their God and they shall not profane the name of their God; for the fire offerings of the Lord, the bread of their God, they offer” (Leviticus 21:6). The Gemara answers: No proof may be cited from that verse, as the prohibition against performing Temple rites that do not complete the service in a state of impurity is by rabbinic law, and the verse is a mere support, not a Torah prohibition.

מיתיבי ואלו הן שבמיתה טמא ששימש תיובתא: The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita (Tosefta, Zevaḥim 12:17): And these are they who are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven: Among those enumerated is an impure individual who performed the Temple service. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Sheshet, and proof that an impure individual who performs the Temple service is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, and young priests and zealots may kill only one who is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven.

גופא ואלו שבמיתה האוכל את הטבל וכהן טמא שאכל תרומה טהורה וזר שאכל את התרומה וזר ששימש וטמא ששימש וטבול יום ששימש ומחוסר בגדים ומחוסר כפרה ושלא רחץ ידים ורגלים ושתויי יין ופרועי ראש § In order to discuss the matter itself, the Gemara cites the Tosefta: And these are they who are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven: One who partakes of untithed produce, and a ritually impure priest who partook of ritually pure teruma, and a non-priest who partook of teruma, and a non-priest who performed the Temple service, and a ritually impure priest who performed the Temple service, and a priest who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, who performed the Temple service, and a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments, and a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete his purification process as a leper or zav, and a priest who did not wash his hands and feet before beginning the Temple service; and priests who performed the Temple service while intoxicated with wine, and priests who performed the Temple service with overgrown hair on their heads.

אבל ערל ואונן ויושב אינן במיתה אלא באזהרה בעל מום רבי אומר במיתה וחכ"א באזהרה The baraita continues: But a priest who performs the Temple service while uncircumcised or as an acute mourner on the day that one of his close relatives dies, or a priest who performs the Temple service while seated, are not punished with death at the hand of Heaven; rather, they are liable for violating a prohibition. With regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the Rabbis say: He is liable only for violating a prohibition.

הזיד במעילה רבי אומר במיתה וחכ"א באזהרה As the Torah states the halakha only in the case of one who misuses consecrated property unwittingly, there is a dispute with regard to one who intentionally performed an action of misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the Rabbis say: He is liable only for violating a prohibition.

האוכל את הטבל מנלן דאמר שמואל משום ר"א מניין לאוכל את הטבל שהוא במיתה דכתיב (ויקרא כב, טו) ולא יחללו את קדשי בני ישראל [את] אשר ירימו לה' בעתידים לתרום הכתוב מדבר The Gemara elaborates: It was taught in the baraita that one who partakes of untithed produce is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: As Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: From where is it derived that one who partakes of untithed produce is punished with death at the hand of Heaven? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “They shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they will set apart unto the Lord” (Leviticus 22:15). From the fact that it is formulated in the future tense: “Which they will set apart,” it is clear that the verse is speaking about items that are destined to be separated in the future, i.e. untithed produce from which teruma and tithes will be separated.

ויליף חילול חילול מתרומה מה להלן במיתה אף כאן במיתה And the tanna derives the punishment by means of a verbal analogy: The term of desecration written with regard to untithed produce is derived from the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma (see Leviticus 22:9). Just as there, with regard to teruma, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, with regard to untithed produce, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

ונילוף חילול חילול מנותר מה להלן בכרת אף כאן בכרת The Gemara challenges: And let us derive the punishment by means of a different verbal analogy: Derive the term of desecration written with regard to untithed produce from the term of desecration written with regard to meat leftover from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption [notar] (see Leviticus 19:6, 8). Just as there, with regard to notar, he is punished with karet, so too here, with regard to untithed produce, he is punished with karet.

מסתברא מתרומה הוה ליה למילף שכן תרומה חוצה לארץ הותרה ברבים פירות פיגול ונותר The Gemara answers: It is reasonable to say that he should have derived the punishment for partaking of untithed produce from teruma, as there are many elements common to teruma and untithed produce. Unlike notar, they are germane to the halakhot of teruma; they are not in effect outside of Eretz Yisrael; both of them can become permitted, as an impure priest can immerse and partake of teruma, and untithed produce can become permitted by taking teruma and tithes; in both cases, the term of desecration is formulated in the plural, while with regard to notar it is formulated in the singular; both apply to produce; and neither the halakha of an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul], nor the halakha of notar, apply in either case.

אדרבה מנותר הוה ליה למילף שכן פסול אוכל אין לו היתר במקוה הנך נפישן רבינא אמר חילול דרבים מחילול דרבים עדיף The Gemara rejects that conclusion: On the contrary, he should have derived the punishment for the partaking of untithed produce from notar, as there are elements common to notar and untithed produce. Both cases relate to the unfitness of the food, while in the case of an impure individual partaking of teruma, it is the person who is unfit; and in both cases there is no permission granted by means of immersion in the ritual bath, while in the case of an impure individual partaking of teruma, immersion is effective. The Gemara answers: Those elements common to teruma and untithed produce are more numerous, therefore that is the preferred derivation. Ravina says: There is no need for a tally of common elements, as deriving desecration in the plural by means of a verbal analogy from desecration in the plural is preferable.

וכהן טמא שאכל תרומה טהורה מנלן דאמר שמואל מניין לכהן טמא שאכל תרומה טהורה שהוא במיתה בידי שמים דכתיב (ויקרא כב, ט) ושמרו את משמרתי ולא ישאו עליו חטא וגו' The Gemara continues to analyze the baraita. From where do we derive that an impure priest who partook of pure teruma is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven? It is derived as Shmuel says: From where is it derived with regard to an impure priest who partakes of pure teruma that he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to a priest who partakes of teruma: “And they shall keep my charge lest they bear a sin for it and die therein if they desecrate it: I am the Lord” (Leviticus 22:9).

טהורה אין טמאה לא דאמר שמואל א"ר אליעזר מניין לכהן טמא שאכל תרומה טמאה שאינו במיתה שנאמר ומתו בו כי יחללוהו The Gemara asks: From where is it derived that for partaking of ritually pure teruma, yes, the impure priest is liable, but for partaking of impure teruma, no, the priest is not liable? It is derived as Shmuel says that Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that an impure priest who partakes of impure teruma is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated in that verse: “And die therein if they desecrate it,”

Daf 83b

פרט לזו שמחוללת ועומדת: to the exclusion of teruma that is impure and already desecrated.

וזר שאכל את התרומה: אמר רב זר שאכל את התרומה לוקה אמרי ליה רב כהנא ורב אסי לרב לימא מר במיתה דכתיב (ויקרא כב, י) וכל זר לא יאכל קדש § The Gemara continues in its analysis of the baraita: A non-priest who partook of teruma is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven. Rav says: A non-priest who partook of teruma is flogged. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: Let the Master say that he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, as it is written: “And they shall keep my charge lest they bear a sin for it and die therein if they desecrate it: I am the Lord Who sanctifies them. No non-priest shall eat of the sacred, a tenant of a priest, or a hired servant, shall not eat of the sacred” (Leviticus 22:9–10). Based on the juxtaposition between them, one should say that just as an impure priest who partakes of teruma is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too a non-priest who partakes of teruma is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

אני ה' מקדשם הפסיק הענין מיתיבי ואלו הן שבמיתה זר האוכל את התרומה מתניתא אדרב קא רמית רב תנא הוא ופליג: Rav responded: The phrase “I am the Lord Who sanctifies them” ends the matter of death, so the matter of a non-priest who partakes of teruma is not juxtaposed to it. The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav from the baraita: And these are they who are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven: A non-priest who partakes of teruma. The Gemara explains: Are you raising a contradiction from a baraita to the opinion of Rav? Rav is a tanna, and as such has the authority to dispute the determination of the baraita.

וזר ששימש דכתיב (במדבר ג, י) והזר הקרב יומת: The baraita continues: The punishment for a non-priest who performed the Temple service is death at the hand of Heaven, as it is written: “You and your sons with you shall safeguard your priesthood with regard to every matter of the altar…and any non-priest who approaches shall die” (Numbers 18:7).

וטמא ששימש כדבעא מיניה רב חייא בר אבין מרב יוסף מניין לטמא ששימש שהוא במיתה דכתיב (ויקרא כב, ב) דבר אל אהרן ואל בניו וינזרו מקדשי בני ישראל ולא יחללו את שם קדשי The baraita continues: The punishment for an impure priest who performed the Temple service is death at the hand of Heaven. The source for this is explained: As Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin asked of Rav Yosef: From where is it derived that an impure priest who performed the Temple service is punished with death at the hand of Heaven? Rav Yosef answered: It is derived from a verse, as it is written in the context of admonishing priests to avoid impurity: “Speak to Aaron and his sons that they shall separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel that they sanctify to Me, and they shall not desecrate My sacred name: I am the Lord” (Leviticus 22:2).

ויליף חילול חילול מתרומה מה להלן במיתה אף כאן במיתה Rav Yosef continues: And the tanna derives the punishment by means of a verbal analogy. He derives the meaning of the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who performs the Temple service from the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma (see Leviticus 22:9). Just as there, with regard to teruma, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, with regard to an impure priest who performs the Temple service, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

ונילף חילול חילול מנותר מה להלן כרת אף כאן כרת The Gemara asks: And let us derive the punishment by means of a different verbal analogy: Derive the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who performs the Temple service from the term of desecration written with regard to notar. This would teach that just as there, with regard to notar, he is punished with karet, so too here, with regard to an impure priest who performs the Temple service, he is punished with karet.

מסתברא מתרומה הוה ליה למילף שכן גוף טמא מקוה ברבים The Gemara answers: It is reasonable to say that it is from teruma that he should have derived the punishment for an impure priest who performs the Temple service, as there are many elements common to an impure priest who partakes of teruma and an impure priest who performs the Temple service. In both of these cases, unlike notar, the problem relates to the body of the priest; both relate to impurity; in both, the issue can be resolved through immersion in a ritual bath; and in both, the term of desecration is formulated in the plural, while with regard to notar it is formulated in the singular.

אדרבה מנותר ה"ל למילף שכן קדש פנים פיגול ונותר חילול דרבים מחילול דרבים עדיף: The Gemara rejects that conclusion: On the contrary, it is from notar that he should have derived the punishment for an impure priest who performs the Temple service, as there are elements common to notar and an impure priest who performs the Temple service. Unlike teruma, both are cases involving sacrificial matters; both involve acts performed inside the Temple; and in both cases, the disqualification of piggul and the disqualification of notar are applicable. The Gemara explains: Although the number of elements common to an impure priest who partakes of teruma equals the number of elements common to notar, deriving desecration in the plural by means of a verbal analogy from desecration in the plural is preferable.

טבול יום ששימש: מנלן דתניא ר' סימאי אומר רמז לטבול יום שאם עבד חילל מניין ת"ל (ויקרא כא, ו) קדושים יהיו לאלהיהם ולא יחללו The baraita continues: The punishment for a priest who was ritually impure, who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, and who performed the Temple service, is death at the hand of Heaven. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is derived as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Simai says: From where in the Torah is the allusion with regard to a priest who immersed that day, that if he performed the Temple service he desecrated that service? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “They shall be sacred to their God and they shall not desecrate the name of their God” (Leviticus 21:6).

אם אינו ענין לטמא ששימש דנפקא לן מוינזרו תניהו ענין לטבול יום ששימש If this verse is not written with regard to the matter of an impure priest who performed the Temple service, as that halakha is derived for us from the verse: “That they shall separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:2), then apply it to the matter of a priest who immersed that day who performed the Temple service. Although he is no longer impure in every sense, the priest remains impure in terms of the prohibitions of partaking of teruma and sacrificial food, and of entering the Temple.

ויליף חילול חילול מתרומה מה להלן במיתה אף כאן במיתה: And the tanna derives the punishment by means of a verbal analogy. He derives the meaning of the term of desecration written with regard to a priest who immersed that day who performed the Temple service from the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma (see Leviticus 22:9). Just as there, with regard to teruma, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, with regard to an impure priest who performs the Temple service, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

ומחוסר בגדים מנלן אמר רבי אבהו אמר רבי יוחנן ומטו בה משמיה דרבי אלעזר בר' שמעון (שמות כט, ט) וחגרת אותם אבנט The baraita continues: And the punishment for a priest who is lacking the requisite priestly vestments and who performed the Temple service is death at the hand of Heaven. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that this is his punishment? Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and there are those who determined that this halakha is a tradition that was cited in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: It is stated: “You shall gird them with a belt, Aaron and his sons, and you shall wrap the headdresses upon them; and they shall have the priesthood as an eternal statute, and you shall inaugurate Aaron and his sons” (Exodus 29:9).

בזמן שבגדיהם עליהם כהונתם עליהם אין בגדיהם עליהם אין כהונתם עליהם והוו להו זרים ואמר מר זר ששימש במיתה: From that verse it is derived: At a time when their vestments are upon them, their priesthood is upon them; but when their vestments are not upon them, their priesthood is not upon them. Therefore, priests who are lacking the requisite priestly vestments assume the status of non-priests in this respect, and the Master says earlier in the baraita: A non-priest who per-forms the Temple service is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

ומחוסר כפרה מנלן אמר רב הונא דאמר קרא (ויקרא יב, ח) וכפר עליה הכהן וטהרה טהרה מכלל שהיא טמאה ואמר מר טמא ששימש במיתה: The baraita continues: And the punishment for a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process and who performs the Temple service is death at the hand of Heaven. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that this is his punishment? Rav Huna says: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states with regard to a woman after childbirth who is obligated to bring an atonement offering: “And the priest shall atone for her and she shall become purified” (Leviticus 12:8). He infers: As the verse states “shall become purified,” by inference, one concludes that until the priest sacrifices her atonement offering she is impure to a certain extent. And the Master says earlier in the baraita: An impure priest who performs the Temple service is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

ושלא רחוץ ידים ורגלים מנלן דכתיב (שמות ל, כ) בבאם אל אהל מועד ירחצו מים ולא ימותו: The baraita continues: And the punishment for a priest whose hands and feet are not washed and who performed the Temple service is death at the hand of Heaven. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “Whenever they come to the Tent of Meeting, they shall wash with water that they shall not die” (Exodus 30:20).

ושתויי יין דכתיב (ויקרא י, ט) יין ושכר אל תשת וגו': The baraita continues: And the punishment for priests who performed the Temple service while intoxicated with wine is death at the hand of Heaven, as it is written: “Drink no wine nor strong drink, you and your sons with you, when you come into the Tent of Meeting, that you shall not die” (Leviticus 10:9).

ופרועי ראש דכתיב (יחזקאל מד, כ) ראשם לא יגלחו ופרע לא ישלחו וכתיב בתריה ויין לא ישתו איתקש פרוע ראש לשתויי יין מה שתויי יין במיתה אף פרועי ראש במיתה: The baraita continues: And the punishment for priests who performed the Temple service with overgrown hair on their heads is death at the hand of Heaven, as it is written: “Neither shall they shave their heads nor allow their hair to grow long” (Ezekiel 44:20), and it is written thereafter: “Neither shall any priest drink wine when they enter the inner courtyard” (Ezekiel 44:21). One with overgrown hair on his head is juxtaposed to priests who are intoxicated with wine. Just as priests who are intoxicated with wine are punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too priests with overgrown hair on their heads are punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

אבל ערל אונן יושב באזהרה ערל מנלן אמר רב חסדא דבר זה מתורת משה רבינו לא למדנו עד שבא יחזקאל בן בוזי ולמדנו (יחזקאל מד, ט) כל בן נכר ערל לב The baraita continues: But a priest who performs the Temple service while uncircumcised, or as an acute mourner on the day that one of his close relatives dies, or a priest who performs the Temple service while seated, is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven; rather, he is liable for violating a prohibition and his punishment is lashes. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that it is prohibited for an uncircumcised priest to perform the Temple service? Rav Ḥisda says: This matter we did not learn from the Torah of Moses our teacher. It was not learned until Ezekiel, son of Buzi, the prophet, came and taught it to us, as it is stated: “No foreigner uncircumcised in heart

Daf 84a

וערל בשר לא יבא אל מקדשי (לשרתני) or uncircumcised in flesh may enter My Temple” (Ezekiel 44:9).

אונן מנלן דכתיב (ויקרא כא, יב) ומן המקדש לא יצא ולא יחלל את מקדש אלהיו הא אחר שלא יצא חילל The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that it is prohibited for an acute mourner priest to perform the Temple service? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to a High Priest whose mother or father died: “And from the Temple he shall not emerge and he shall not desecrate the Temple of his God” (Leviticus 21:12), from which it may be inferred that another, who is not a High Priest but an ordinary priest, who did not emerge from the Temple and who continued to perform the service, has desecrated the service.

א"ל רב אדא לרבא ונילף חילול חילול מתרומה מה להלן במיתה אף כאן במיתה Rav Adda said to Rava: And let us derive it by means of a verbal analogy: Derive the meaning of the term of desecration written with regard to an acute mourner who performs the Temple service from the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma. Just as there, with regard to teruma, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, with regard to an acute mourner who performs the Temple service, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

מי כתיב ביה בגופיה מכללא קאתי הוי דבר הבא מן הכלל וכל דבר הבא מן הכלל אין דנין אותו בגזרה שוה Rava answers: Is desecration written with regard to the matter of a priest who performs the Temple service as an acute mourner itself? It is derived from that which is written with regard to the High Priest, by inference. Therefore, it is a matter that emerges from an inference, and the principle is: Any matter that emerges from an inference cannot be derived by means of a verbal analogy. A verbal analogy can be derived only when the matter is written explicitly.

יושב מנלן אמר רבא אמר רב נחמן אמר קרא (דברים יח, ה) כי בו בחר ה' אלהיך מכל שבטיך לעמוד לשרת לעמידה בחרתיו ולא לישיבה The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that it is prohibited for a priest who is seated to perform the Temple service? Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The verse states: “For him has the Lord chosen from among all your tribes, to stand and minister in the name of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 18:5). God states in the verse that I chose him for service while he is standing, but not for service while seated.

בעל מום ר' אומר במיתה וחכמים אומרים באזהרה מ"ט דרבי דכתיב (ויקרא כא, כג) אך אל הפרוכת לא יבא וגו' ויליף חילול חילול מתרומה מה להלן במיתה אף כאן במיתה § The baraita continues: With regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the Rabbis say: He is liable only for violating a prohibition. The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is as it is written: “But he shall not come into the curtain and he shall not approach the altar as he has a blemish, that he desecrate not My sacred places” (Leviticus 21:23). And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the punishment by means of a verbal analogy: The meaning of the term of desecration written with regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service is derived from the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma. Just as there, with regard to teruma, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, with regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

ונילף חילול חילול מנותר מה להלן בכרת אף כאן בכרת The Gemara challenges: And let us derive the punishment by means of a different verbal analogy: Derive the meaning of the term of desecration written with regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service from the term of desecration written with regard to notar. Just as there, with regard to notar, he is punished with karet, so too here, with regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service, he is punished with karet.

מסתברא מתרומה הוה ליה למילף שכן פסול הגוף מפסול הגוף אדרבה מנותר הוה ליה למילף שכן קודש פנים פיגול ונותר The Gemara explains: It is reasonable to say that he should have derived the punishment for a blemished priest who performs the Temple service from teruma, as the tanna derives the bodily disqualification of a blemished priest from the bodily disqualification of the impure priest. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, he should have derived the punishment for a blemished priest who performs the Temple service from notar, as there are elements common to notar and a blemished priest who performs the Temple service. Unlike teruma, both are cases involving sacrificial matters; both involve matters performed inside the Temple; and in both cases, the disqualification of piggul and the disqualification of notar are applicable.

אלא מטמא ששימש גמר פסול הגוף מפסול הגוף קודש פנים פיגול ונותר מקודש פנים פיגול ונותר Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the halakha of a blemished priest who performed the Temple service from the halakha of an impure priest who performed the Temple service, due to the elements common to both. He derives the bodily disqualification of a blemished priest from the bodily disqualification of an impure priest who performs the Temple service, and he derives the case of a blemished priest, whose case involves sacrificial matters, matters performed inside the Temple, and the relevance of both piggul and notar, from the case of an impure priest, whose case involves sacrificial matters, matters performed inside the Temple, and the relevance of both piggul and notar.

ורבנן אמר קרא בו ולא בבעל מום The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what is the reason that they hold that he is liable only for violating a prohibition? It is as the verse states: “And die because of it if they desecrate it; I am the Lord Who sanctifies them” (Leviticus 22:9), from which it is derived: “Because of it” they receive death at the hand of Heaven, but not in the case of a blemished priest.

הזיד במעילה רבי אומר במיתה וחכמים אומרים באזהרה מאי טעמא דרבי אמר ר' אבהו גמר חטא חטא מתרומה מה להלן במיתה אף כאן במיתה The baraita continues: With regard to one who intentionally performed an action of misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the Rabbis say: He is liable only for violating a prohibition. The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Rabbi Abbahu says: He derives a verbal analogy: The meaning of the term of sin written with regard to one who intentionally misuses consecrated property (see Leviticus 5:15) is derived from the term of sin written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma (see Leviticus 22:9). Just as there, with regard to teruma, the priest is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, one who intentionally misuses consecrated property is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

ורבנן אמרי אמר קרא בו בו ולא במעילה: The Gemara explains: And the Rabbis say that the verse states with regard to teruma: “Because of it” they receive death at the hand of Heaven, but not in the case of the intentional misuse of consecrated property.

זר ששימש במקדש: תניא רבי ישמעאל אומר נאמר כאן (במדבר יח, ז) והזר הקרב יומת ונאמר להלן (במדבר יז, כח) כל הקרב הקרב אל משכן ה' ימות מה להלן בידי שמים אף כאן בידי שמים The Gemara cites a dispute between the Sages with regard to the punishment of a non-priest who performed the Temple service. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yishmael says: It is stated here: “You and your sons with you shall keep your priesthood in everything that pertains to the altar…and any non-priest who approaches shall be put to death [yumat]” (Numbers 18:7), and it is stated there: “Anyone who approaches the Tabernacle of the Lord shall die [yamut]” (Numbers 17:28). Just as there, the reference is to death at the hand of Heaven; so too here, in the case of a non-priest who performs the Temple service, the reference is to death at the hand of Heaven.

ר"ע אומר נאמר כאן והזר הקרב יומת ונאמר להלן (דברים יג, ו) והנביא ההוא או חולם החלום ההוא יומת מה להלן בסקילה אף כאן בסקילה רבי יוחנן בן נורי אומר מה להלן בחנק אף כאן בחנק Rabbi Akiva says that it is stated here: “And any non-priest who approaches shall be put to death [yumat]” and it is stated there: “And that prophet or that dreamer of a dream shall be put to death [yumat]” (Deuteronomy 13:6). Just as there, with regard to the prophet, he is executed by stoning, so too here, a non-priest who performs the Temple service is executed by stoning. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: Just as there, with regard to the prophet, he is executed by strangulation, so too here, a non-priest who performs the Temple service is executed by strangulation.

במאי קמיפלגי רבי ישמעאל ורבי עקיבא רבי עקיבא סבר דנין יומת מיומת ואין דנין יומת מימות ורבי ישמעאל סבר דנין הדיוט מהדיוט ואין דנין הדיוט מנביא ורבי עקיבא כיון שהדיח אין לך הדיוט גדול מזה The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds: In the verbal analogy, one derives yumat from yumat and one does not derive yumat from yamut. And Rabbi Yishmael holds: Although the terms are not identical, one derives by means of a verbal analogy the halakha of an ordinary person from the halakha of an ordinary person and one does not derive the halakha of an ordinary person from the halakha of a prophet. The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Akiva hold? Once the prophet incited others to idol worship, you have no greater example of an ordinary person than that, i.e., he no longer has the status of a prophet.

במאי קמיפלגי רבי עקיבא ורבי יוחנן בן נורי בפלוגתא דרבי שמעון ורבנן דתניא נביא שהדיח בסקילה ר"ש אומר בחנק הא אנן תנן רבי עקיבא אומר בחנק The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita: A prophet who incited others to idol worship is executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: He is executed by strangulation. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to a prophet who incites others to idol worship that Rabbi Akiva says: He is executed by strangulation, contrary to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion cited in the baraita?

תרי תנאי ואליבא דרבי עקיבא מתניתין ר' שמעון ואליבא דר' עקיבא ברייתא רבנן ואליבא דרבי עקיבא: The Gemara answers: These are two tanna’im and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The mishna, which cites the opinion that Rabbi Akiva holds that a prophet who incited others to idol worship is executed by strangulation, is citing the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon was his preeminent disciple. The baraita, which cites the opinion that Rabbi Akiva holds that a prophet who incited others to idol worship is executed by stoning, is citing the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon, and they too hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

הדרן עלך אלו הן הנשרפין

Talmud

Talmud - The William Davidson Edition