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85. Isolated Groups of Anecdotes - Imputation of a League With Beelzebub, and Demand of a sign.

IN conformity with the aim of our criticism, we shall here confine our attention to those narratives, in which the influence of the legend may be demonstrated. The strongest evidence of this influence is found where one narrative is blended with another, or where the one is a mere variation of the other: hence, chronology having refused us its aid, we shall arrange the stories about to be considered according to their mutual affinity.

To begin with the more simple form of legendary influence:

Schuiz has already complained, that Matthew mentions two instances, in which a league with Beelzebub was imputed to Jesus, and a sign demanded from Ilim; circumstances which in Mark and Luke happen only once. The first time the imputation occurs (Matt. ix.32ff.), Jesus has cured a dumb dcinonianic; at this the people marvel, but the Pharisees observe, he casts out demons through the prince of the demons. Matthew does not here say that Jesus returned any answer to this accusation. On the second occasion (xii. 22. ff.), it is a blind and dumb demonianic whom Jesus cures; again the people are amazed, and again the Pharisees declare that the cure is effected by the help of Beelzebub, the prince of the demons, whereupon Jesus immediately exposes the absurdity of the accusation. That it should have been alleged against Jesus more than once when he cast out demons, is in itself probable. It is however suspicious that the demoniac who gives occasion to the assertion of the Pharisees, is in both instances dumb (in the second only, blindness is added). Demoniacs were of many kinds, every variety of malady being ascribed to the influence of evil spirits; why, then, should the above imputation be not once attached to the cure of another kind of demoniac, but twice to that of a dumb one'? The difficulty is heightened, if we compare the narrative of Luke (xi.14 f.), which, in its introductory description of the circumstances, corresponds not to the second narrative in Matthew, but to the first; for as there, so in Luke, the demoniac is only dumb, and his cure and the astonishment of the people are told with precisely the same form of expression: in all which points, the second narrative of Matthew is more remote from that of Luke. But with this cure of the dumb demoniac, which Matthew represents as passing off in silence on the part of Jesus, Luke connects the very discourse which Matthew appends to the cure of the one both blind and dumb; so that Jesus must on both these successive occasions, have said the same thing. This is a very unlikely repetition, and united with the improbability, that the same accusation should be twice made in connection with a dumb demoniac, it suggests the question, whether legend may not here have doubled one, and the same incident? How this can have taken place, Matthew himself shows us, by represent- {P.427} ing the demoniac as, in the one case, simply dumb, in the other, blind also. Must it not have been a striking cure which excited, on the one hand, the astonishment of the people, on the other, this desperate attack of the enemies of Jesus? Dumbness alone might soon appear an insufficient malady for the subject of the cure, and the legend, ever, prone to enhance, might deprive him of sight also.

If then, together with this new form of the legend, the old one too was handed down, what wonder that a compiler, more conscientious than critical, such as the author of the first gospel, adopted both as distinct histories, merely omitting on one occasion the discourse of Jesus, for the sake of avoiding repetition.

Matthew, having omitted (ix. 34) the discourse of Jesus, was obliged also to defer the demand of a sign, which required a previous rejoinder on the part of Jesus, until his second narration of the charge concerning Beelzebub; and in this point again the narrative of Luke, who also attaches the demand of a sign to the accusation, is parallel with the latter passage of Matthew, But Matthew not only has, with Luke, a demand of a sign in connection with this charge. Luke makes the demand of a sign follow immediately on the accusation, and then gives in succession the answers of Jesus to both. This representation modern criticism holds to be far more probable than that of Matthew, who gives first the accusation and its answer, then the demand of a sign and its refusal; and this judgment is grounded on the difficulty of supposing, that after Jesus had given a sufficiently long answer to the accusation, the very same people who had urged it would still demand a sign. But on the other hand, it is equally improbable that Jesus, after having some time ago delivered a forcible discourse on the more important point, the accusation concerning Beelzebub, and even after an interruption which had led him to a totally irrelevant declaration (Luke xi.27 ft), should revert to the less important point, namely, the demand of a sign, The discourse OH the departure and return of the unclean spirit, is in Matthew (v. 4:3-4-5) annexed to the reply of Jesus to this demand; but in Luke (xi. 24; ff.) it follows the answer to the imputation of a league with Beelzebub, and this may at first seem to be a more suitable arrangementi But on a closer examination, it will appear very improbable that Jesus should conclude a defence, exacted from him by his enemies, with so calm and purely theoretical a discourse, which supposes an audience, if not favourably prepossessed, at least open to instruction; and it will be found that here again there is no further connection than that both discourses treat of the expulsion of demons. By this single feature of resemblance, the writer of the third gospel was led to sover the connection between the answer to the oft-named accusation, and that to the demand of a sign, which accusation and demand, as the strongest proofs of the malevolent unbelief of the enemies of Jesus, seem to have been associated by tradition. The first evangelist refrained from this violence, and reserved the discourse on the return of the unclean spirit, which was suggested by the suspicion cast on the expulsion of demons by Jesus, until he had communicated the {P.428} above charge; he has also another, after the second feeding of the multitude (xvi.1ff.), and this second demand Mark also has (viii. 11 f.), while he omits the first. Here the Pharisees come to Jesus (according to Matthew, in the unlikely companionship of Sadducees), and tempt him by asking for a sign, from heaven. To this Jesus gives an answer, of which the concluding proposition, a zoicked and adulterous generation seeks after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it, but the sign of the prophet Jonas, in Matthew, agrees word for word with the opening of the earlier refusal. It is already improbable enough, that Jesus should have twice responded to the above requisition with the same cnismatical reference to Jonah; but the words (v. 2, 3) which, in the second passage of Matthew, precede the sentence last quoted, are totally unintelligible. For why Jesus, in reply to the demand of his enemies that he would show them a sign from heaven, should tell them that they were indeed well versed in the natural signs of the heavens, but were so much the more glaringly ignorant of the spiritual signs of the Messianic times, is so far from evident, that the otherwise unfounded omission of v. 2 and 3, seems to have arisen from despair of rinding any connection for them. Luke, who also has, (xii. 44 f.), in words only partly varied, this reproach of Jesus that his contemporaries understood better the signs of the weather than of the times, gives it another position, which might be regarded as the preferable one; since after speaking of the fire which he was to kindle, and the divisions which he was to cause, Jesus might very aptly say to the people: You take no notice of the unmistakeable prognostics of this great revolution which is being prepared by my means, so ill do you understand the signs of the times. But on a closer examination, Luke's arrangement appears just as abrupt here, as in the case of the two parables (xiii. 18). If from hence we turn again to Matthew, we easily see how he was led to his mode of representation, He may have been induced to double the demand of a sign, by the verbal variation which he met with, the required sign being at one time called simply a "sign", at another a "sign from heaven." And if he knew that Jesus had exhorted the Jews to study the signs of the times, as they had hitherto studied the appearance of the heavens, the conjecture was not very remote, that the Jews had given occasion for this admonition by demanding a sign from heaven, Thus Matthew here presents us, as Luke often does elsewhere, with a fictitious introduction to a discourse of Jesus; a proof of the proposition, advaaiced indeed, but too little regarded by Sieffert: that it is in the nature of traditional records, such as the three first Gospels, that one particular should be best preserved in this {P.429} narrative, another in that; so that first one, and then the other, is at a disadvantage, in comparison with the rest.