| 85. Of Penance as a virtue (six articles) | ||||
We must now consider penance as a virtue, under which head there are six points of inquiry: | ||||
Art. 1. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a virtue. For penance is a sacrament numbered among the other sacraments, as was shown above (Question 84, Article 1; Question 65, Article 1). Now no other sacrament is a virtue. Therefore neither is penance a virtue. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9), "shame is not a virtue," both because it is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, and because it is not the disposition of a perfect thing, since it is about an evil act, so that it has no place in a virtuous man. Now, in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "penance consists in deploring past sins": moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. sins, which have no place in a virtuous man. Therefore penance is not a virtue. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "no virtuous man is foolish." But it seems foolish to deplore what has been done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue. | ||||
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue, because "a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous" (Ethic. ii, 1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according to Mt. 4:17: "Do penance," etc. Therefore penance is a virtue. | ||||
I answer that, As stated above (Objection 2; Question 84, Article 10, ad 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated above (Question 84, Article 9) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6 that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of a virtue. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question 84, Article 1, ad 1; Articles 2,3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered as a passion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done. But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment: and this is not foolish. | ||||
Art. 2. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9): wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoices not at iniquity, but rejoices with the truth." Therefore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting from charity. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter, because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and consequently is not a special virtue. | ||||
On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated above (Question 84, Articles 5,7). | ||||
I answer that, As stated in the Part 2/1, Question 54, Article 1, ad 1, Article 2, habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: An act springs from charity in two ways: first as being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate to charity. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: In point of fact, penance has indeed a general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in co-operating with God for his justification. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: Every special virtue removes formally the habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue. | ||||
Art. 3. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was shown in the Part 2/2, Question 62, Article 3. But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: "Make you mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation." Therefore penance is not a species of justice. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative." But penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice. | ||||
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 6:21, "Blessed are ye that weep now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things." But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice. | ||||
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done." But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tullius says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice. | ||||
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, ad 2) penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice. | ||||
It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Ps. 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters . . . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to Lk. 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before you"; and as a wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "You have prostituted yourself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, says the Lord." | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God, but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic. v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge. Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice. | ||||
Reply to Objection 4: Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude. | ||||
Art. 4. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in the irascible part. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, the past is the proper object of the memory, according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the past, as stated above (Article 1, ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory. | ||||
Objection 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every power of the soul, and not only in the will. | ||||
On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps. 50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: "I will freely sacrifice to You." Therefore penance is in the will. | ||||
I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above (Article 3), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in the Part 2/1, Question 56, Article 6, is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against God. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers penance as a passion. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: To desire vengeance on another, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in the memory, but presupposes it. | ||||
Reply to Objection 4: The will, as stated above (Part 1, Question 82, Article 4; Part 2/1, Question 9, Article 1), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each power of the soul. | ||||
Art. 5. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that penance does not originate from fear. For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, men are induced to do penance, through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Mt. 3:2 and Mt. 4:17: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Now the kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope rather than from fear. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the operation of God, according to Jer. 31:19: "After You did convert me I did penance." Therefore penance does not result from fear. | ||||
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:17): "As a woman with child, when she draws near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and cries out in her pangs, so ere we become," by penance, to wit; and according to another [*The Septuagint] version the text continues: "Through fear of You, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, and have brought forth the spirit of salvation," i.e. of salutary penance, as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear. | ||||
I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first principle [*Cf. Part 2/1, Question 113] of which acts is the operation of God in turning the heart, according to Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to You, and we shall be converted"; the second, an act of faith; the third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to make amends to God through fear of Him. | ||||
Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: Sin begins to displease a man, especially a sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand, we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Mt. 3:7): "Ye brood of vipers, who has showed you to flee from the wrath to come?" | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: Even the movement of fear proceeds from God's act in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Dt. 5:29): "Who shall give them to have such a mind, to fear Me?" And so the fact that penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of God in turning the heart. | ||||
Art. 6. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is the first of the virtues. Because, on Mt. 3:2, "Do penance," etc., a gloss says: "The first virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance." | ||||
Objection 2: Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems that penance precedes all the other virtues. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes penance, which is itself the first of all and opens the door to the others by expelling sin. | ||||
On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as already stated (Articles 2,5). Therefore penance is not the first of the virtues. | ||||
I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are connected with one another, as stated in the Part 2/1, Question 65, Article 1, they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile fear; while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. For, as was stated in the Part 2/1, Question 113, Articles 7,8, in the justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason and cause of the second. | ||||
Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man's good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above (Question 55, Article 2), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the other sacraments aforesaid. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts of the other virtues. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: In successive movements withdrawal from one extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. ii. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: Penance opens the door to the other virtues, because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace all the virtues, as stated in the Part 2/1, Question 65, Articles 3,5Question 86. .... | ||||
We must now consider the effect of Penance; and (1) as regards the pardon of mortal sins; (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins; (3) as regards the return of sins which have been pardoned; (4) as regards the recovery of the virtues. | ||||
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: | ||||
Art. 1. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that not all sins are taken away by Penance. For the Apostle says (Heb. 12:17) that Esau "found no place of repentance, although with tears he had sought it," which a gloss explains as meaning that "he found no place of pardon and blessing through Penance": and it is related (2 Macc. 9:13) of Antiochus, that "this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain mercy." Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by Penance. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i) that "so great is the stain of that sin (namely, when a man, after coming to the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin." Therefore not every sin can be taken away by Penance. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Mt. 12:32): "He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come." Therefore not every sin can be pardoned through Penance. | ||||
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:22): "I will not remember" any more "all his iniquities that he has done." | ||||
I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin. In the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis. 5:3: "Repenting, and groaning for anguish of spirit." Consequently such Penance brings no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil. Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will, secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace, whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it." | ||||
It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which it is written (Joel 2:13) that God is "gracious and merciful, patient, and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil"; for, in a manner, God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out, which God were unwilling to blot out. Secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of Christ's Passion, through which Penance produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1 Jn. 2:2): "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world." | ||||
Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be blotted out by true Penance. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from his saying (Gn. 27:41): "The days will come of the mourning of my father, and I will kill my brother Jacob." Likewise neither did Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he suffered in his body. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: These words of Augustine should be understood thus: "So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble himself in prayer," i.e. it is not easy for him to do so; in which sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal him. Yet this is possible by the power of God's grace, which sometimes turns men even "into the depths of the sea" (Ps. 67:23). | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xi), which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended, there is no pardon of sins. or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Ghost is unpardonable, i.e. not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the Part 2/2, Question 14, Article 3. | ||||
Art. 2. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that sin can be pardoned without Penance. For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard to children. But He pardons the sins of children without Penance. Therefore He also pardons adults without penance. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God's power sin can be pardoned without Penance. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, God's mercy is greater than man's. Now man sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting: wherefore our Lord commanded us (Mt. 5:44): "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Much more, therefore, does God pardon men for offending him, without their repenting. | ||||
On the contrary, The Lord said (Jer. 18:8): "If that nation . . . shall repent of their evil" which they have done, "I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them," so that, on the other hand, if man "do not penance," it seems that God will not pardon him his sin. | ||||
I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an offense against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an offense committed against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in the Part 2/1, Question 110, Article 1, the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is denoted by the word "grace," is the cause of all created good. Hence it is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended with someone, without any change in the latter's will; but it is impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man's will being turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good. Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is necessary for man's will to be so changed as to turn to God and to renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner, together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue. | ||||
But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above (Question 88, Article 3), is perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as related in Jn. 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in Evang.), "He drew inwardly by grace," i.e. by penance, "her whom He received outwardly by His mercy." | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: In children there is none but original sin, which consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual disorder of nature, as explained in the Part 2/1, Question 82, Article 1, and so in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the will, which is the effect of Penance. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes Penance as a sacrament. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: God's mercy is more powerful than man's, in that it moves man's will to repent, which man's mercy cannot do. | ||||
Art. 3. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another. For it is written (Amos 4:7): "I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered." These words are expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech.): "When a man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in others." Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, without another. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose in commenting on Ps. 118, "Blessed are the undefiled in the way," after expounding verse 136 (My eyes have sent forth springs of water), says that "the first consolation is that God is mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, for although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfaction and raises us up." Therefore a man can be raised up from one sin, while the sin of unbelief remains. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, when several things are not necessarily together, one can be removed without the other. Now it was stated in the Part 2/1, Question 73, Article 1 that sins are not connected together, so that one sin can be without another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by Penance without another being taken away. | ||||
Objection 4: Further, sins are the debts, for which we pray for pardon when we say in the Lord's Prayer: "Forgive us our trespasses," etc. Now man sometimes forgives one debt without forgiving another. Therefore God also, by Penance, forgives one sin without another. | ||||
Objection 5: Further, man's sins are forgiven him through the love of God, according to Jer. 31:3: "I have loved you with an everlasting love, therefore have I drawn you, taking pity on you." Now there is nothing to hinder God from loving a man in one respect, while being offended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as regards his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore it seems possible for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin without another. | ||||
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "There are many who repent having sinned, but not completely; for they except certain things which give them pleasure, forgetting that our Lord delivered from the devil the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows us that we are never healed unless it be from all sins." | ||||
I answer that, It is impossible for Penance to take one sin away without another. First because sin is taken away by grace removing the offense against God. Wherefore it was stated in the Part 2/1, Question 109, Article 7; Part 2/1, Question 113, Article 2 that without grace no sin can be forgiven. Now every mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it. Therefore it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another. Secondly, because, as shown above (Article 2) mortal sin cannot be forgiven without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins: and where the same reason applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a man cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not of another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to him, because it is against the love of God above all things (which motive is necessary for true repentance), it follows that he would repent of all. Whence it follows that it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through Penance, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary to the perfection of God's mercy, since His works are perfect, as stated in Dt. 32:4; wherefore whomsoever He pardons, He pardons altogether. Hence Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], that "it is irreverent and heretical to expect half a pardon from Him Who is just and justice itself." | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Gregory do not refer to the forgiveness of the guilt, but to the cessation from act, because sometimes a man who has been wont to commit several kinds of sin, renounces one and not the other; which is indeed due to God's assistance, but does not reach to the pardon of the sin. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: In this saying of Ambrose "faith" cannot denote the faith whereby we believe in Christ, because, as Augustine says on Jn. 15:22, "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin" (viz. unbelief): "for this is the sin which contains all others": but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes a man receives pardon for a sin of which he is not conscious, through the punishment which he bears patiently. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: Although sins are not connected in so far as they turn towards a mutable good, yet they are connected in so far as they turn away from the immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in common. and it is thus that they have the character of an offense which needs to be removed by Penance. | ||||
Reply to Objection 4: Debt as regards external things, e.g. money, is not opposed to friendship through which the debt is pardoned. hence one debt can be condoned without another. On the other hand, the debt of sin is opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offense is not pardoned without another; for it would seem absurd for anyone to ask even a man to forgive him one offense and not another. | ||||
Reply to Objection 5: The love whereby God loves man's nature, does not ordain man to the good of glory from which man is excluded by any mortal sin. but the love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven, ordains man to eternal life, according to Rm. 6:23: "The grace of God (is) life everlasting." Hence there is no comparison. | ||||
Art. 4. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that no debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through Penance. For when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of punishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he has been guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been forgiven, no debt of punishment can remain. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Rm. 5) the gift of Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. Now, by sinning, man incurs at the same time guilt and the debt of punishment. Much more therefore, by the gift of grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same time the debt of punishment remitted. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, the forgiveness of sins is effected in Penance through the power of Christ's Passion, according to Rm. 3:25: "Whom God has proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His Blood . . . for the remission of former sins." Now Christ's Passion made satisfaction sufficient for all sins, as stated above (Questions 48,49,79, Article 5). Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt of punishment remains. | ||||
On the contrary, It is related (2 Kgs. 12:13) that when David penitent had said to Nathan: "I have sinned against the Lord," Nathan said to him: "The Lord also has taken away your sin, you will not die. Nevertheless . . . the child that is born to you shall surely die," which was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated in the same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven. | ||||
I answer that, As stated in the Part 2/1, Question 87, Article 4, in mortal sin there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an inordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal sin turns inordinately to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment, because the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice, except by punishment: since it is just that he who has been too indulgent to his will, should suffer something against his will, for thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written (Apoc. 18:7): "As much as she has glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." | ||||
Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, sin does not, in this respect, induce a debt of eternal punishment. Wherefore, if man turns inordinately to a mutable good, without turning from God, as happens in venial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of temporal punishment. Consequently when guilt is pardoned through grace, the soul ceases to be turned away from God, through being united to God by grace: so that at the same time, the debt of punishment is taken away, albeit a debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: Mortal sin both turns away from God and turns to a created good. But, as stated in the Part 2/1, Question 71, Article 6, the turning away from God is as its form while the turning to created good is as its matter. Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you take away the human species. Consequently mortal sin is said to be pardoned from the very fact that, by means of grace, the aversion of the mind from God is taken away together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet the material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a created good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is due. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the Part 2/1, Question 109, Articles 7,8; Part 2/1, Question 111, Article 2, it belongs to grace to operate in man by justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with man that his work may be rightly done. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt of eternal punishment belongs to operating grace, while the remission of the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating grace, in so far as man, by bearing punishment patiently with the help of Divine grace, is released also from the debt of temporal punishment. Consequently just as the effect of operating grace precedes the effect of co-operating grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal punishment precedes the complete release from temporal punishment, since both are from grace, but the former, from grace alone, the latter, from grace and free-will. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion is of itself sufficient to remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; and man is released from the debt of punishment according to the measure of his share in the power of Christ's Passion. Now in Baptism man shares the Power of Christ's Passion fully, since by water and the Spirit of Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again in Him to a new life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the remission of all debt of punishment. In Penance, on the other hand, man shares in the power of Christ's Passion according to the measure of his own acts, which are the matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above (Question 84, Articles 1,3). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment is not remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by which act the guilt is remitted, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed. | ||||
Art. 5. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that all the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Our Lord never healed anyone without delivering him wholly; for He wholly healed the man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from all disease, and his soul from all taint." Now the remnants of sin belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not seem possible for any remnants of sin to remain when the guilt has been pardoned. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "good is more efficacious than evil, since evil does not act save in virtue of some good." Now, by sinning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once. Much more, therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all remnants of sin. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, God's work is more efficacious than man's. Now by the exercise of good human works the remnants of contrary sins are removed. Much more, therefore, are they taken away by the remission of guilt, which is a work of God. | ||||
On the contrary, We read (Mk. 8) that the blind man whom our Lord enlightened, was restored first of all to imperfect sight, wherefore he said (Mk. 8:24): "I see men, as it were trees, walking"; and afterwards he was restored perfectly, "so that he saw all things clearly." Now the enlightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the sinner. Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby the sinner is restored to spiritual sight, there still remain in him some remnants of his past sin. | ||||
I answer that, Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inordinately to a mutable good, produces in the soul a certain disposition, or even a habit, if the acts be repeated frequently. Now it has been said above (Article 4) that the guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace removing the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when that which is on the part of the aversion has been taken away by grace, that which is on the part of the inordinate turning to a mutable good can remain, since this may happen to be without the other, as stated above (Article 4). Consequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has been forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should not remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they remain weakened and diminished, so as not to domineer over man, and they are after the manner of dispositions rather than of habits, like the "fomes" which remains after Baptism. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: God heals the whole man perfectly; but sometimes suddenly, as Peter's mother-in-law was restored at once to perfect health, so that "rising she ministered to them" (Lk. 4:39), and sometimes by degrees, as we said above (Question 44, Article 3, ad 2) about the blind man who was restored to sight (Mt. 8). And so too, He sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it receives at once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt being pardoned, but all remnants of sin being removed as was the case with Magdalen (Lk. 7); whereas at other times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by operating grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the remnants of sin by degrees. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: Sin too, sometimes induces at once a weak disposition, such as is the result of one act, and sometimes a stronger disposition, the result of many acts. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: One human act does not remove all the remnants of sin, because, as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. viii) "a vicious man by doing good works will make but little progress so as to be any better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in being good as to acquired virtue." But God's grace does this much more effectively, whether by one or by several acts. | ||||
Art. 6. .... | ||||
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue. For penance is said to be a virtue, in so far as it is a principle of a human action. But human action does nothing towards the remission of guilt, since this is an effect of operating grace. Therefore the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue. | ||||
Objection 2: Further, certain other virtues are more excellent than penance. But the forgiveness of sin is not said to be the effect of any other virtue. Neither, therefore, is it the effect of penance as a virtue. | ||||
Objection 3: Further, there is no forgiveness of sin except through the power of Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 9:22: "Without shedding of blood there is no remission." Now Penance, as a sacrament, produces its effect through the power of Christ's Passion, even as the other sacraments do, as was shown above (Question 62, Articles 4,5). Therefore the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, not as a virtue, but as a sacrament. | ||||
On the contrary, Properly speaking, the cause of a thing is that without which it cannot be, since every defect depends on its cause. Now forgiveness of sin can come from God without the sacrament of Penance, but not without the virtue of penance, as stated above (Question 84, Article 5, ad 3; Question 85, Article 2); so that, even before the sacraments of the New Law were instituted, God pardoned the sins of the penitent. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is chiefly the effect of penance as a virtue. | ||||
I answer that, Penance is a virtue in so far as it is a principle of certain human acts. Now the human acts, which are performed by the sinner, are the material element in the sacrament of Penance. Moreover every sacrament produces its effect, in virtue not only of its form, but also of its matter. because both these together make the one sacrament, as stated above (Question 60, Article 6, ad 2, Article 7). Hence in Baptism forgiveness of sin is effected, in virtue not only of the form (but also of the matter, viz. water, albeit chiefly in virtue of the form) [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition] from which the water receives its powerand, similarly, the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, chiefly by the power of the keys, which is vested in the ministers, who furnish the formal part of the sacrament, as stated above (Question 84, Article 3), and secondarily by the instrumentality of those acts of the penitent which pertain to the virtue of penance, but only in so far as such acts are, in some way, subordinate to the keys of the Church. Accordingly it is evident that the forgiveness of sin is the effect of penance as a virtue, but still more of Penance as a sacrament. | ||||
Reply to Objection 1: The effect of operating grace is the justification of the ungodly (as stated in the Part 2/1, Question 113), wherein there is, as was there stated (Articles 1,2,3), not only infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, but also a movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and a movement of the free-will against sin, which is the act of penance. Yet these human acts are there as the effects of operating grace, and are produced at the same time as the forgiveness of sin. Consequently the forgiveness of sin does not take place without an act of the virtue of penance, although it is the effect of operating grace. | ||||
Reply to Objection 2: In the justification of the ungodly there is not only an act of penance, but also an act of faith, as stated above (ad 1: Part 2/1, Question 113, Article 4). Wherefore the forgiveness of sin is accounted the effect not only of the virtue of penance, but also, and that chiefly, of faith and charity. | ||||
Reply to Objection 3: The act of the virtue of penance is subordinate to Christ's Passion both by faith, and by its relation to the keys of the Church; and so, in both ways, it causes the forgiveness of sin, by the power of Christ's Passion. | ||||
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that the act of the virtue of penance is necessary for the forgiveness of sin, through being an inseparable effect of grace, whereby chiefly is sin pardoned, and which produces its effect in all the sacraments. Consequently it only follows that grace is a higher cause of the forgiveness of sin than the sacrament of Penance. Moreover, it must be observed that, under the Old Law and the law of nature, there was a sacrament of Penance after a fashion, as stated above (Question 84, Article 7, ad 2). | ||||